Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 12, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 12, 2025

Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 12, 2025, 2:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on January 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Ukrainian General staff reported on January 12 that Ukrainian forces conducted a high-precision airstrike on the command post of Russia's 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA] (Central Military District) in Novohrodivka, Donetsk Oblast.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the operation is part of a broader series of Ukrainian strikes targeting command posts of Russian forces operating in the Donetsk direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 8 and 10 that Ukrainian forces struck the command posts of the Russian 8th CAA (Southern Military District) in occupied Khartsyzk, Donetsk Oblast, and the 3rd Army Corps [AC] (Central Military District) in occupied Svitlodarsk, Donetsk Oblast, respectively.[2] Ukrainian strikes on tactical command posts and positions located near the frontline, such as the strike against Novohrodivka, are likely intended to disrupt Russian tactical activity and directly complicate Russian command and control (C2) on the battlefield. Ukrainian strikes against main command posts further in the Russian rear, such as the January 8 strike on the Russian 8th CAA post, are likely aimed at degrading broader Russian logistics and operational planning efforts, which could have impacts on Russia's ability to conduct its military operations in western Donetsk Oblast. ISW has observed that the 2nd CAA is currently leading Russian operations south of Pokrovsk, that the 3rd AC is operating near Chasiv Yar, and that the 8th CAA is leading Russian efforts near Kurakhove.[3]

South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) confirmed that Ukrainian forces captured two North Korean soldiers during combat operations in Kursk Oblast on January 9.[4] The NIS told Agence-France-Presse (AFP) on January 12 that one of the captured North Korean soldiers initially believed that North Korean authorities had sent him to Russia for training but that he realized upon arrival that he would be engaged in combat - in line with recent statements from Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.[5] One of the captured North Korean soldiers also stated that they suffered food and water shortages for several days before their capture and that North Korean forces have suffered significant losses.[6]

Key Takeaways:

• The Ukrainian General staff reported on January 12 that Ukrainian forces conducted a high-precision airstrike on the command post of Russia's 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA] (Central Military District) in Novohrodivka, Donetsk Oblast.
• South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) confirmed that Ukrainian forces captured two North Korean soldiers during combat operations in Kursk Oblast on January 9.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.   

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces recently crossed into northern Sumy Oblast as part of their ongoing efforts to eliminate the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on January 10 indicates that Russian forces recently crossed the international border and advanced west of Zhuravka (north of Sumy City along the international border).[7] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces crossed into Sumy Oblast as part of their efforts to bypass Nikolayevo-Darino (east of Sudzha) from the south.[8] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced into northern Sumy Oblast near Prokhody (northeast of Sumy City), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[9]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the main Ukrainian salient on January 12 but did not make any confirmed advances. Geolocated footage published on January 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Pogrebki (northwest of Sudzha) despite recent claims that Russian forces seized the settlement.[10] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Sudzha near Nikolskiy, Novaya Sorochina, Kruglenkoye, and Malaya Loknya; north of Sudzha near Kositsa, Russkoye Porechnoye, and Cherkasskoye Porechnoye; and south of Sudzha near Kurilovka.[11] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call up) repelled a Ukrainian attack near Russkoye Porechnoye.[12] Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Pogrebki, and elements of the 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade reportedly continue to operate in Kursk Oblast.[13]

Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin stated on January 12 that Russian authorities are continuing efforts to put out the fire at Russia's state-owned Kombinat Kristal oil storage facility near Engels, Saratov Oblast following a Ukrainian drone strike on the night of January 7 to 8.[14] A Russian insider source claimed that the fire has destroyed three fuel tanks holding 120,000 cubic meters of fuel and damaged six additional fuel tanks.[15]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on January 12 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Kharkiv City towards Kozacha Lopan and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on January 11 and 12.[16] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[17] Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Yevheniy Romanov stated that Russian forces are constantly replenishing supplies and losses in the Kharkiv direction.[18]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Kupyansk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 12. Geolocated footage published on January 11 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in northwestern Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[19] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 12 that Russian forces seized Kalynove (north of Kupyansk), and a Russian milblogger claimed that the settlement had a population of fewer than 10 people before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[20] Russian forces continued attacking north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Dvorichna; northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka on January 11 and 12.[21]

Russian forces recently conducted two reinforced company-sized mechanized assaults northeast of Borova but did not make any confirmed advances. Geolocated footage published on January 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a reinforced company-sized Russian mechanized assault west of Vyshneve (northeast of Borova).[22] The Ukrainian brigade that repelled the attack reported that elements of the Russian 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) attacked Ukrainian positions twice from four directions on January 8 and 9 and that Ukrainian artillery, anti-tank mines, and drones repelled the attack.[23] The brigade reported that it destroyed 20 Russian tanks and armored vehicles, but did not specify the total number of vehicles that Russian forces used in the assault. The brigade's spokesperson stated that Russian forces have not conducted a large mechanized assault in the area for several months and noted that Russian forces used T-72 and T-80 tanks during the assault.[24] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces attempted to protect the tanks and armored vehicles with electronic warfare (EW) systems, but that Ukrainian forces were able to use anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) systems to strike the vehicles and other unspecified "solutions" to bypass Russian EW interference. Russian forces continued assaults north of Borova near Zahryzove; northeast of Borova near Zelenyi Hai; east of Borova near Pershotravneve, Kopanky, and Novoyehorivka; and southeast of Borova near Makiivka on January 11 and 12.[25]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January 12 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest and west of Ivanivka and west of Novosadove (both northeast of Lyman), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[26] Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Terny, Zarichne, and the Serebryanske forest area on January 11 and 12.[27] Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) reportedly continue operating in the Lyman direction.[28]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka (both northeast of Siversk) on January 11 and 12 but did not make any confirmed advances.[29]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on January 12 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations within and near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Stupochky on January 11 and 12.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in Chasiv Yar.[31] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced in Pivnichnyi Microraion (eastern Chasiv Yar) and occupy about 20 percent of the refractory plant in central Chasiv Yar, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[32] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces stated that Russian forces used an unspecified number of armored vehicles to support offensive operations in Chasiv Yar and that Ukrainian forces destroyed one armored vehicle.[33]

Russian forces recently advanced in Toretsk amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 12. Geolocated footage published on January 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Toretsk.[34] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself, northeast of Toretsk near Dyliivka, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on January 11 and 12.[35] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked in Shcherbynivka.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting has shifted to western and northwestern Toretsk, where Russian forces are attacking in small infantry groups.[37] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command recently transferred reserves to Toretsk, doubling the number of Russian maneuver groups involved in assaults. A Ukrainian brigade operating near Toretsk posted pictures showing Russian forces dressed in civilian clothing in the settlement – a war crime if confirmed.[38] Elements of the 3rd Battalion of the Russian 109th Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st "Slovyansk" Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) are reportedly operating within Toretsk.[39]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 12. Geolocated footage published on January 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Novovasylivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Zelene (south of Pokrovsk) and advanced south of Novovasylivka, to within one kilometer of Udachne, and northwest of Solone (all southwest of Pokrovsk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[41] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on January 12 that Russian forces conducted a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault near Yasenove (southwest of Pokrovsk) and that Ukrainian forces destroyed one tank and two armored vehicles.[42] Russian forces continued offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Baranivka and Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Novooleksandrivka, Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novyi Trud and Zelene; southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, Uspenivka, Novovasylivka, Novoandriivka, Novoyelyzavetivka, Sribne, and Yasenove; and west of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne on January 11 and 12.[43] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces are attempting to bypass Pokrovsk by advancing through small settlements south of Pokrovsk and to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs).[44]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 12. Geolocated footage published on January 11 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Yantarne (southwest of Kurakhove).[45] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 12 that Russian forces seized Yantarne, and Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 10th Tank Regiment and 33rd and 225th motorized rifle regiments (all 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) participated in the seizure.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Slovyanka (northwest of Kurakhove), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[47] Russian forces continued attacking northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko; west of Kurakhove near Dachne; and southwest of Kurakhove near Yantarne, Kostyantynopolske, and Kostyantynopil on January 11 and 12.[48] Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating west of Kurakhove; elements of the 68th Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction; and elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating on the eastern outskirts of Andriivka (west of Kurakhove).[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on January 12 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking near Velyka Novosilka itself; southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Neskuchne; and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on January 11 and 12.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Novyi Komar (north of Velyka Novosilka).[51]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 12. Elements of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne).[52]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dnipro direction on January 11 and 12 but did not make any confirmed advances.[53] Ukrainian Volunteer Army's Southern Group of Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk stated that Russian forces, including elements of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Leningrad Military District [LMD]), most often try to attack Kozatskyi, Velikiy Potemkin, and Zabych islands (east, south, and southwest of Kherson City, respectively) in order to establish bridgeheads for future attacks against right (west) bank Kherson Oblast.[54]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 11 to 12. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 94 Shahed drones along with other strike and decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast and Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts.[55] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 60 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Zaporizhia, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, and Donetsk oblasts and that 34 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference.[56] Kharkiv Oblast Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported on January 12 that a Russian Shahed drone struck a residence in Vlasivka, Kharkiv Oblast.[57]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 12 that Russian forces launched almost 700 glide bombs and over 600 strike drones against Ukraine during the week of January 6 to 12.[58]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)  

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0D7pjvTxhrtXDz4wAEws5ukKHvsgcybH6xuPhYVXv7usVUSqexLTbmD49pihdRX3gl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19931 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/12/zsu-zavdaly-udaru-po-komandnomu-punktu-armiyi-rf-u-novogrodivczi/

[2] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19859; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2025

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-30-2024

[4] https://www.france24 dot com/en/live-news/20250112-seoul-confirms-ukraine-captured-two-north-korean-soldiers; https://www.foxnews.com/world/ukraine-captured-north-korean-soldiers-south-koreas-intelligence-service-says; https://t.me/bbcrussian/75213; https://www.businessinsider.com/zelenskyy-says-ukraine-captured-2-wounded-north-korean-soldiers-2025-1; https://www.rfa dot org/korean/in_focus/011225dh1-01112025233740.html; https://en.yna.co dot kr/view/AEN20250112000651315; https://news.kbs.co dot kr/news/pc/view/view.do?ncd=8150143; https://www.koreaherald dot com/article/10388459

[5] https://t.me/SBUkr/13742; https://t.me/ukr_sof/1369; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/12949; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2025

[6] https://www.france24 dot com/en/live-news/20250112-seoul-confirms-ukraine-captured-two-north-korean-soldiers

[7] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1878198585868599302; https://t.me/OMBr67/2122

[8] https://t.me/yurasumy/20484

[9] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30500

[10] https://x.com/Brokenarrow42/status/1878198841041711266; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84295 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2025

[11] https://t.me/dva_majors/62300 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22253 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30494 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30497 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/20039 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61367

[12] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22253

[13] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84327 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84295 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84304

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010825 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/295626 ; https://suspilne dot media/923253-pisla-udaru-sil-oboroni-naftobaza-u-rosijskomu-engelsi-palae-5-den-pospil/ ; https://t.me/idelrealii/39485 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/01/12/v-engelse-pyatyy-den-gorit-neftebaza-posle-ataki-vsu-gubernator-prodolzhaetsya-kontroliruemoe-vygoranie-topliva ; https://t.me/astrapress/72244 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/75212

[15] https://t.me/vchkogpu/53936

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PGuHJS6t3yY2ymZ3DpccJ8HKQNoSyDwr1iS4AzNsCJzSMqW8M69rqhVG187vfQXLl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dg98zSKEDwfDgtqpf51PeNfTd2dk8c2NURsJXKmapUs7KmHpKRBvxp5UdTJ7aYNjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02HTzHuy74CCxfHaE9XU145Q21JdvDGefAu5h9ZMi9K1MwDDrevX4wSYAkZAdTynHjl; https://t.me/otukharkiv/3559

[17] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12259

[18] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JFvyCBahZ_k; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/12/fahivczi-vyazni-strokovyky-na-harkivskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-postijno-popovnyuyut-vtraty/

[19] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/5576

[20] https://t.me/mod_russia/47814 ; https://t.me/sashakots/51232

[21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19932 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19921 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19918 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62300 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20491

[22] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24526; https://t.me/ab3army/5081 

[23] https://t.me/ab3army/5081

[24] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/12/vtratyly-20-tankiv-i-bmp-detali-ridkisnogo-mehanizovanogo-shturmu-rosiyan-na-harkivshhyni/

[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PGuHJS6t3yY2ymZ3DpccJ8HKQNoSyDwr1iS4AzNsCJzSMqW8M69rqhVG187vfQXLl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19932 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19921; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dg98zSKEDwfDgtqpf51PeNfTd2dk8c2NURsJXKmapUs7KmHpKRBvxp5UdTJ7aYNjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02HTzHuy74CCxfHaE9XU145Q21JdvDGefAu5h9ZMi9K1MwDDrevX4wSYAkZAdTynHjl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19918

[26] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30487

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PGuHJS6t3yY2ymZ3DpccJ8HKQNoSyDwr1iS4AzNsCJzSMqW8M69rqhVG187vfQXLl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19932 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19921; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dg98zSKEDwfDgtqpf51PeNfTd2dk8c2NURsJXKmapUs7KmHpKRBvxp5UdTJ7aYNjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02HTzHuy74CCxfHaE9XU145Q21JdvDGefAu5h9ZMi9K1MwDDrevX4wSYAkZAdTynHjl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19918

[28] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18539

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dg98zSKEDwfDgtqpf51PeNfTd2dk8c2NURsJXKmapUs7KmHpKRBvxp5UdTJ7aYNjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02HTzHuy74CCxfHaE9XU145Q21JdvDGefAu5h9ZMi9K1MwDDrevX4wSYAkZAdTynHjl

[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19932; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19921; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19918; https://t.me/wargonzo/24213

[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/24213

[32] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151008; https://t.me/wargonzo/24213

[33] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4049

[34] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24542; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8090; https://www.instagram.com/stories/asp.kr/3542528342855047759/

[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19932; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19921 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19918

[36] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84315

[37] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84315

[38] https://www.facebook.com/28mechanizedbrigade/posts/pfbid0237NTQq1JJWajuPdcERGzcE3kMjKVxcgXiSXxWXpVhTiLSb3buCTbdw4AscEft8Jol?rdid=vNxR5KOx6stXz2EW

[39] https://t.me/rybar/67099 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22258

[40] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8091; https://www.facebook.com/61563003013214/videos/1645249229404642/

[41] https://t.me/yurasumy/20479 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151110 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24213 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61368 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61359 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61365

[42] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4049

[43] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61368 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61363 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24213 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20479 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20480 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19932 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19921 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19918

[44] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/12/u-zsu-poyasnyly-chomu-rosiyany-hochut-obijty-pokrovsk-ta-myrnograd/

[45] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8087; https://t.me/SolovievLive/308298; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30490

[46] https://t.me/mod_russia/47814 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62304 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62298

[47] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151110

[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19932 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19921 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19918 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61360  ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84297 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20477

[49] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84305 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13252 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20477

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19932 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19921 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19918 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62300 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61362 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24213 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/12737  

[51] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61362

[52] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84336

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dg98zSKEDwfDgtqpf51PeNfTd2dk8c2NURsJXKmapUs7KmHpKRBvxp5UdTJ7aYNjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02HTzHuy74CCxfHaE9XU145Q21JdvDGefAu5h9ZMi9K1MwDDrevX4wSYAkZAdTynHjl

[54] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wyKewVkUlEs; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/12/tam-navit-raby-pidijmayut-golos-rosiyany-vidmovlyayutsya-jty-na-shturmy-a-najmudrishi-zdayutsya-v-polon/

[55] https://t.me/kpszsu/26687

[56] https://t.me/kpszsu/26687

[57] https://t.me/synegubov/12683

[58] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/12959 ; https://suspilne dot media/923203-sotni-aviabomb-i-droniv-zelenskij-ozvuciv-kilkist-ozbroen-akimi-rf-protagom-tizna-bila-po-ukraini/