Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 14, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 14, 2025

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, William Runkel, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 14, 2025, 7:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on January 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin remains committed to achieving the original goals of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in any future peace negotiations — namely the destruction of the Ukrainian state, dissolution of the current Ukrainian government, demilitarization of Ukraine, and a permanent ban on Ukraine's future membership in NATO. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev rejected the suggestion that Russia could be willing to cede any occupied territory to Ukraine in future negotiations during an interview with Russian outlet Komsomolskaya Pravda published on January 14 and stated that this idea is "not even up for discussion."[1] Patrushev falsely claimed that sham referendums in occupied Ukraine in September 2022 legitimized Russia's claim to occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and insinuated that international recognition of Russia's illegal occupation and annexation of the four oblasts and occupied Crimea is a non-negotiable condition for a future peace agreement.

Patrushev stated that Russia's goals in Ukraine remain unchanged and that Russia remains committed to achieving all of the goals that Russian President Vladimir Putin used to justify the full-scale invasion. Putin identified the "demilitarization" and "denazification" of Ukraine as the key goals of the full-scale invasion during a speech on February 23, 2022 — and these goals amount to the destruction of Ukraine's ability to defend itself and replacement of the legitimate Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government.[2] Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin stated during an interview with Russian outlet Gazeta.Ru on January 14 that the Russian government continues to pursue "denazification" in Ukraine, which Rogozin defined as the "liquidation of those who instill a misanthropic Russophobic spirit" in people.[3] Putin has consistently demanded that the Ukrainian people concede their right to determine their own government, the right to defend themselves against ongoing and future aggression, and the right to choose their own security alliances before and throughout the full-scale invasion.[4] ISW continues to assess that Putin's goals in Ukraine are to break up NATO and seize full control over Ukraine and that Putin remains committed to these goals, and ISW has not observed any indication that Putin is willing to concede on such goals in future negotiations.[5]

Russian officials continue to deny the existence of a Ukrainian identity and state that is independent of Russia as part of ongoing Russian efforts to justify the destruction of the Ukrainian state. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov referred in a press conference on January 14 to "the country that is now called Ukraine" — a clear effort to discredit Ukraine's existence as a sovereign and independent state.[6] Patrushev also emphasized the "fraternal" connection between Russia and Ukraine and rejected any suggestion that Russia and Ukraine have distinct cultural and historical identities.[7] Putin published an essay in July 2021 arguing that ethnic Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Russians all belong to the same "Russian nation," and Kremlin officials have reiterated these false narratives throughout the war.[8] The Kremlin's ongoing information operation attempting to portray Russians and Ukrainians as one unified nation and culturally and historically homogeneous is one of its most significant information operations aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine. Calls for the West to acquiesce to all of Russia's demands in Ukraine require the West to tacitly acknowledge and agree that a Ukrainian identity and state independent from Russia either does not currently exist or does not deserve to exist in the future.

Patrushev stated that he believes that only Russia and the United States should engage in negotiations to end Russia's war in Ukraine, and senior Kremlin officials are also questioning the role that European countries could play in such negotiations. Patrushev explicitly stated that Russia and the United States should negotiate on Ukraine "without the participation of other Western countries," specifically excluding the European Union (EU) and United Kingdom (UK) and heavily implying that Ukraine also should not participate in these negotiations.[9] Lavrov similarly stated that he does not know what role Italy could play in resolving the war and accused Germany and France of failing in their roles as guarantors to the Minsk agreements — agreements that Russia regularly violated.[10] These statements revive a Kremlin information operation that previously framed the West writ large — rather than just the United States —as the only meaningful negotiating party regarding the war in Ukraine other than Russia itself and rejected Ukraine's right to participate in discussions about its sovereignty and territorial integrity.[11] The Kremlin has periodically revived this information operation in an attempt to extract concessions from the United States, particularly concessions that would undermine Ukrainian legitimacy and further Putin's goal of destroying Ukraine.[12] Patrushev's comments also seek to place Russia on an equal footing with the United States as the Soviet Union was once regarded.

The Kremlin will likely attempt to seize on potential future Russian advances into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast for informational purposes, but these advances, if they occur, are unlikely to have significant operational impact. ISW assesses as of January 14 that Russian forces are seven kilometers away from the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border at their closest point of advance near Novovasylivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) and up to 7.5 kilometers away from the border near Novodarivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka). Russian advances west of Pokrovsk and in the Velyka Novosilka area toward Dnipropetrovsk Oblast may be a part of Russian efforts to envelop Ukrainian forces in those areas and seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast.[13] Russian forces may also be attempting to seize any territory — including territory in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast — regardless of such territory's tactical significance in order to strengthen Russia's negotiating position before potential talks to end the war. Russian authorities may attempt to leverage limited gains in southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to claim that Russia has a right to control and annex all of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in the future. Russian President Vladimir Putin has previously called for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts that Russia does not occupy as a prerequisite for negotiations, and Russian officials have consistently laid claim to the entirety of these four oblasts and occupied Crimea as part of their demands in Ukraine.[14] Russian forces currently occupy limited areas in northern and northeastern Kharkiv Oblast and the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast, and the Kremlin may attempt to use these positions to make additional territorial demands in the future. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev acknowledged Russia’s extensive territorial objectives that expand deep into central Ukraine in March 2024, and Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev claimed on January 14 that "Ukraine may cease to exist" in 2025, indicating that the Kremlin is interested in illegally occupying territory far beyond the current frontline and will leverage potential future advances in an attempt to enhance its negotiation position.[15]

Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against military and defense industrial targets in Russia on the night of January 13 to 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces targeted Russian military facilities between 200 and 1,110 kilometers deep in the Russian rear in Bryansk, Saratov, and Tula oblasts and the Republic of Tatarstan.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) struck the Russian state-owned Kombinat Kristal oil storage facility near Engels, Saratov Oblast, which provides fuel for the strategic bombers at Russia's Engels-2 Air Base, and that the GUR and Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) also struck the Saratov Oil Refinery.[17] The Ukrainian Unmanned System Forces' 14th Drone Regiment reported that Ukrainian drones struck tanks with aviation fuel for Tu-160 bomber aircraft at the Kristal oil facility at the Engels-2 Air Base.[18] Sources within the SBU told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that Ukrainian forces struck glide bomb and cruise missile warehouses at the Engels-2 Air Base.[19] Geolocated footage published on January 14 shows a fire at the Saratov Oil Refinery.[20] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged unspecified industrial enterprises in Engels and Saratov City.[21] Ukrainian forces notably struck the Kristal oil facility on the night of January 7 to 8, causing a fire that Russian authorities did not put out until January 13 — likely several hours before Ukrainian forces struck the facility again.[22]

The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces reported that Ukrainian forces, including elements of the Unmanned Systems Force, Special Operations Forces (SSO), SBU, missile troops, and GUR, struck the Bryansk Chemical Plant in Seltso, Bryansk Oblast, which produces components for Kh-59 cruise missiles and ammunition for tube artillery, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), and TOS thermobaric artillery systems and repairs Russian MLRS systems.[23] The Unmanned Systems Forces reported that Ukrainian forces used drones to overwhelm Russian air defense systems, allowing missiles to strike their targets and that Ukrainian drones hit substations and other infrastructure after the missile strike.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that there were secondary explosions at the plant and that Ukrainian forces also destroyed a Tor and a Buk air defense system during the strike.[25] Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Andriy Kovalenko noted that the Bryansk Chemical Plant is important for Russian artillery ammunition and missile production and specializes in the production of gunpowder, solid propellant components for rocket fuel, and explosives.[26] Kovalenko also stated that Ukrainian forces struck the "Kremniy  El" microelectronics plant in Bryansk City, which Ukrainian forces previously struck in October 2024 and that produces microelectronics for missile systems, Pantsir air defense systems, and Iskander missiles; radars, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and drones.[27] Geolocated footage shows drone strikes and explosions in Seltso.[28] Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz claimed on January 13 that Ukrainian forces conducted a large combined missile strike against Bryansk Oblast and that Russian air defense systems destroyed all targets.[29] Bogomaz later claimed on January 14 that a falling missile fragment damaged civilian property in Bryansk Oblast, including in Seltso.[30]  The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted Bryansk Oblast with six ATACMS missiles, six Storm Shadow missiles, and 31 drones.[31]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the GUR and SBU struck the Kazanorgsintez Chemical Plant in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan, causing a fire.[32] Kovalenko stated that the strike damaged the plant, which makes materials for military use such as polyamides, synthetic rubber, and chemical compounds for armored vehicles; tires for tanks and armored personnel carriers; plastics for weapons and equipment; and explosives for ammunition.[33] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that geolocated footage indicates that the strike did not hit the Kazanorgsintez plant but rather a Gazprom liquified gas depot two kilometers from the plant and that three fuel tanks are burning.[34] Astra also reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Transneft enterprise in Almetyevsk, Republic of Tatarstan.[35] Republic of Tatarstan authorities claimed that a drone strike caused a gas tank to catch fire in the suburbs of Kazan on the morning of January 14.[36]

Sources in the Ukrainian military and SBU told Ukrainian and Russian outlets that Ukrainian forces and the SBU conducted a drone strike that started a fire at the Aleksinsky Chemical Plant in Tula Oblast.[37] Astra stated that Ukrainian drone debris fell on the Aleksinsky Chemical Plant, which produces polymer and composite materials; the Aleksinskaya thermal power plant; and the Tulachermet metallurgical enterprise, which is one of the world's largest producers and suppliers of commercial pig iron and is crucial for Russia's steel industry.[38] Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed that Russian forces downed 16 drones over the oblast on January 13 and an additional drone on January 14.[39]

Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities continue efforts to find a solution to the gas crisis in Moldova as the pro-Russian breakaway republic Transnistria continues to refuse help from Ukraine or Moldova. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 12 that Ukraine is ready to provide Transnistria with coal but that Transnistrian authorities have not responded to the proposal.[40] Transnistria has also reportedly recently refused offers from Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz and Moldovan state electricity company Energocom to help Transnistria obtain gas from European platforms. In December 2024, tests showed that Moldova could receive gas through the Trans-Balkan pipeline that transits Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, and Ukraine.[41] Moldovan President Maia Sandu stated on January 14 that Moldova has offered medical care to Transnistrian residents but that Transnistrian authorities have refused.[42] Sandu also acknowledged on January 14 that Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky recently traveled to Moscow and stated that Moldovan authorities helped the Transnistrian delegation travel through the Chisinau airport (likely because Krasnoselsky does not have a Moldovan passport or residence permit).[43] Sandu stated that Moldovan authorities' involvement in Krasnoselsky's visit to Russia shows that Chisinau is not preventing any efforts to find a solution to the energy crisis. Zelensky recently stated that Russia is using the gas crisis to affect Moldovan public opinion ahead of the Summer 2024 Moldovan parliamentary elections. Moldovan Foreign Minister Mihail Popsoi stated on January 14 that Russia is using its artificially created energy crisis to try to destabilize the Moldovan economy in order to influence the upcoming elections.[44]

Kremlin officials are attempting to exploit the energy crisis in Moldova to set conditions to justify future Russian aggression against Moldova. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev claimed in an interview published on January 14 that Moldovan authorities are to blame for the current energy crisis even though the crisis began on January 1 when Gazprom cut gas supplies to Transnistria while making false allegations about Moldova's debt to Gazprom.[45] Patrushev claimed that Russia's main priority in Moldova is to protect Russia's "compatriots" from "discrimination."[46] Patrushev compared Moldova to Ukraine and alleged that Ukraine's "neo-Nazism and Russophobia" led the country to collapse "long before" Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. Patrushev stated that he "does not rule out" that Moldova's "anti-Russian policy" will "lead to Moldova either becoming part of another state [likely in reference to Romania] or ceasing to exist altogether." Russia has long claimed its need to protect its "compatriots abroad" in Ukraine as a justification for its aggression against Ukraine, and Patrushev's statements suggest that the Kremlin is setting conditions to exploit the artificially created gas crisis in Moldova to justify potential future Russian aggression against Moldova as a necessary response to Moldova's policies that threaten Russian "compatriots" in Moldova.[47]

Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor reportedly caused a brief but widespread internet outage in Russia while operating restriction systems of its Sovereign Internet on January 14. Russian state media reported widespread internet outages of major Russian internet domains and online services affecting subscribers of all Russian telecommunications companies.[48] Sources in the Russian telecommunications industry attributed this outage to Roskomnadzor's technical means of countering threats (TSPU), which Russian authorities use to restrict Russians from accessing blocked domains and services.[49]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin remains committed to achieving the original goals of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in any future peace negotiations — namely the destruction of the Ukrainian state, dissolution of the current Ukrainian government, demilitarization of Ukraine, and a permanent ban on Ukraine's future membership in NATO.
• Patrushev stated that Russia's goals in Ukraine remain unchanged and that Russia remains committed to achieving all of the goals that Russian President Vladimir Putin used to justify the full-scale invasion.
• Russian officials continue to deny the existence of a Ukrainian identity and state that is independent of Russia as part of ongoing Russian efforts to justify the destruction of the Ukrainian state.
• Patrushev stated that he believes that only Russia and the United States should engage in negotiations to end Russia's war in Ukraine, and senior Kremlin officials are also questioning the role that European countries could play in such negotiations.
• The Kremlin will likely attempt to seize on potential future Russian advances into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast for informational purposes, but these advances, if they occur, are unlikely to have significant operational impact.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against military and defense industrial targets in Russia on the night of January 13 to 14.
• Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities continue efforts to find a solution to the gas crisis in Moldova as the pro-Russian breakaway republic Transnistria continues to refuse help from Ukraine or Moldova.
• Kremlin officials are attempting to exploit the energy crisis in Moldova to set conditions to justify future Russian aggression against Moldova.
• Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor reportedly caused a brief but widespread internet outage in Russia while operating restriction systems of its Sovereign Internet on January 14.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk and Pokrovsk directions.
• Russia continues efforts to bolster military recruitment efforts by offering financial incentives to those who sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.   

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 14 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian naval infantry are clearing Nikolaevka (northwest of Sudzha) and that Russian airborne (VDV) forces are advancing within Makhovka (south of Sudzha) from the north and southeast.[50] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. The commander of a Ukrainian platoon operating in Kursk Oblast stated that North Korean forces conduct infantry assaults in large groups comprised of between 20 and 100 people and attack across open terrain during the day and at night.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attacking throughout Ukraine's salient and that Ukrainian counterattacks are slowing Russian forces' pace of advance in Kursk Oblast.[52] Russian sources claimed on January 14 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Sudzha, northwest of Sudzha near Nikolaevo-Darino and Pogrebki, and south of Sudzha near Makhnovka.[53] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 14 that drone operators of the Russian Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are operating in Kursk Oblast.[54] Elements of the Russian "Smuglyanka" Detachment are reportedly operating in the Kursk direction, and elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Pogrebki.[55]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on January 13 and 14 but did not make any confirmed advances.[56]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 14 but did not advance. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are about a kilometer away from the P-79 Dvorichna-Kupyansk highway south of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk), but ISW assesses that Russian forces' closest point of advance is roughly 3.5 kilometers away from the P-79 highway in the area.[57] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are more active near Holubivka (north of Kupyansk).[58] Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorichna and Zapadne and southeast of Kupyansk near Tabaivka on January 13 and 14.[59] Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz “Shram” Group reportedly are operating in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction.[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 14 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka, Lozova, Zeleny Hai, and Zahryzove; east of Borova near Pershotravneve, Shyikivka, Raihorodka, and Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka, Hrekivka, Makiivka, and Novoyehorivka on January 13 and 14.[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January 14 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Russian MoD claimed on January 14 that Russian forces, including elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), seized Terny (northeast of Lyman), but ISW has not observed confirmation that Russian forces seized the settlement.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Terny had a population of roughly 30 people before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[63] Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Lyman near Terny and east of Lyman near Zarichne on January 13 and 14.[64]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka and Vyimka on January 13 and 14 but did not advance.[65]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on January 14 but did not make any confirmed advances. Several Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced within the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar and in western Chasiv Yar, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from the Refractory Plant, but another Russian milblogger claimed that such reports are premature and inaccurate.[67] Russian forces continued attacking within Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne, Stupochky, Bila Hora, and Oleksandro-Shultyne on January 13 and 14.[68] Elements of the 98th VDV Division are reportedly conducting ground assaults near Chasiv Yar.[69]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced within northern Toretsk amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 14. Geolocated footage published on January 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within northern Toretsk.[70] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced on the northwestern outskirts of Toretsk, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[71] Russian forces continued attacking near Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Dyliivka, northeast of Toretsk near Krymske, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on January 13 and 14.[72]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 14. Geolocated footage published on January 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the southwestern outskirts of Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk).[73] Additional geolocated footage published on January 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Novoyelyzavetivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the southern outskirts of Novoukrainka (south of Pokrovsk), to eastern Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk and on the southern bank of the Solona River), and towards Novoserhiivka (west of Uspenivka) along the northern bank of the Solona River, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[75] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 14 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar, south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, and southwest of Pokrovsk near Novovasylivka.[76] Russian forces continued offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near  Nova Poltavka, and Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Baranivka, Zelene Pole, Novotoretske, Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novyi Trud, Novoukrainka, Shevchenko, Chunyshyne, and Zelene; southwest of Pokrovsk near Novooleksandrivka, Zvirove, Udachne, Uspenivka, Novovasylivka, Novoandriivka, Sribne, Nadiivka, and Yasenove; and west of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne on January 13 and 14.[77] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces are trying to advance in small settlements near Pokrovsk such as Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Lysivka, and Novyi Trud but are not attacking into Pokrovsk itself.[78] The acting spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian infantry assaults are becoming more intense and that Russian forces are attacking in groups of two to three people.[79] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are increasing the distance between soldiers to 15 to 20 meters — likely to protect against Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone strikes - as they move on foot to accumulate in one place before storming Ukrainian positions. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are mainly using armored vehicles for logistics and rotations and not to conduct mechanized assaults in the area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian advances along the Malynivka-Vodyane Druhe-Baranivka line indicate that Russian forces intend to eliminate the Ukrainian salient between Toretsk and Pokrovsk.[80] Drone elements of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[81] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) previously seized Dachenske (south of Pokrovsk), which ISW assessed Russian forces had seized as of December 22.[82]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on January 14 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing northwest of Kurakhove from Zorya towards Slovyanka and attacking the eastern outskirts of Andriivka.[83] Russian forces continued attacking near Kurakhove itself; northwest of Kurakhove near Slovyanka and Petropavlivka; west of Kurakhove near Dachne, Andriivka, Ulakly, and Kostyantynopil; and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv and Yantarne on January 13 and 14.[84]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on January 14 but did not make confirmed advances. The Russian MoD claimed on January 14 that Russian forces seized Neskuchne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka), which ISW assessed Russian forces had seized as of January 13.[85] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 218th Tank Regiment (both of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) with the seizure of Neskuchne and claimed that Russian forces entered the southern outskirts of Vremivka (immediately west of Velyka Novosilka) and advanced in the area south of Velyka Novosilka.[86] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. A Russian milblogger speculated that Russian forces may seek to interdict the Velyka Novosilka-Hulyaipole road after seizing Vremivka in order to complicate the future Ukrainian withdrawal from the area.[87] Russian forces continued attacking near Velyka Novosilka itself, north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar, northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne, southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Neskuchne, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Vremivka on January 13 and 14.[88]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Limited positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 12 and 13 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[89] Drone operators of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to strike targets near Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne).[90]

Ukrainian officials reported on January 14 that locals reported hearing explosions, possibly from Ukrainian strikes, near port facilities and the AZMOL petrochemicals plant in occupied Berdyansk.[91]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Dnipro direction and on the islands of the Dnipro River Delta on January 13 and 14 but did not make any confirmed advances.[92] Elements of the Russian 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 81st Artillery Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue operating in the Kherson direction.[93]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 80 Shahed and other strike and decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Oryol and Kursk oblasts.[94] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 58 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Kherson oblasts; that 21 decoy drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that debris from downed drones damaged residential building and civilian vehicles in Sumy, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Kharkiv, and Cherkasy oblasts. Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian drones struck a residential building in Chuhuiv, Kharkiv Oblast, and several commercial buildings in Cherkasy Oblast.[95]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia continues efforts to bolster military recruitment efforts by offering financial incentives to those who sign military service contracts with the Russian MoD. BBC's Russia service reported on January 14 that at least 12 Russian federal subjects (regions) increased one-time payments to individuals who sign MoD contracts at the end of 2024 and the start of 2025.[96] BBC's Russia Service reported that more than 60 percent of all Russian regions offer volunteers a one-time payment exceeding one million rubles (approximately $9,670) and that one-time payments exceeding two million rubles (approximately $19,350) are offered in 25 percent of all Russian regions. Samara Oblast officials are reportedly offering recruits a one-time signing bonus of four million rubles (approximately $38,690) until February 1. Saratov Oblast's Yabloko Party Deputy Chairperson Kirill Rumyantsev reported on January 14 that local officials are offering to suspend legal proceedings against debtors in exchange for the debtor signing military service contracts.[97] Rumyantsev published photos of such offers purportedly sent to individuals with significant debts.

Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin stated on January 14 that the Russian State Duma will "immediately" consider the draft law that would extend combat veteran status to veterans who fought in Kursk Oblast as soon as the Russian government submits the document.[98] Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on December 19, 2024, during his annual "Direct Line" televised press conference that he would remedy this classification error, but Russian legislators have thus far failed to pass a law addressing this issue.[99] Putin is likely to approve this draft law in the future.

Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin stated on January 14 that he has recruited over 50 percent of the personnel for the BARS-Sarmat Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) and that 30 to 40 new volunteers join the detachment each week.[100] Rogozin claimed that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is suffering from "unacceptable" bureaucratic delays but acknowledged that Russia's DIB has generally restructured itself to support the Russian military's needs.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)  

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the start of joint Russian-Belarusian command-staff exercises within the framework of the Union State on January 14 ahead of the anticipated "Zapad-2025" joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises.[101] The Belarusian MoD stated that the command-staff exercises will focus on determining when to deploy the Union State Regional Grouping of Forces and will conclude on January 16.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.kp dot ru/daily/27651/5036217/ ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/50612

[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/23/world/europe/putin-announces-a-military-operation-in-ukraine-as-the-un-security-council-pleads-with-him-to-pull-back.html ; http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/67843

[3] https://www.gazeta dot ru/social/2025/01/14/20372738.shtml

[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/weakness-lethal-why-putin-invaded-ukraine-and-how-war-must-end ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624

[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/weakness-lethal-why-putin-invaded-ukraine-and-how-war-must-end

[6] https://iz dot ru/1822215/ekaterina-khamova/glavnyi-zapros-moskva-gotova-obsuzhdat-garantii-bezopasnosti-dlia-kieva

[7] https://www.kp dot ru/daily/27651/5036217/

[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/weakness-lethal-why-putin-invaded-ukraine-and-how-war-must-end ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2024

[9] https://www.kp dot ru/daily/27651/5036217/

[10] https://iz dot ru/1822215/ekaterina-khamova/glavnyi-zapros-moskva-gotova-obsuzhdat-garantii-bezopasnosti-dlia-kieva

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2024

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2023

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112424

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024 ; https://www.kp dot ru/daily/27651/5036217/ ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/50612

[15] https://www.kp dot ru/daily/27651/5036217/ ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/50612 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2024

[16] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19975

[17] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19975; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010825

[18] https://t.me/army_14reg/220 ; https://suspilne dot media/924591-sili-oboroni-povtorno-vrazili-naftobazu-u-saratovskij-oblasti-rf/

[19] https://suspilne dot media/924325-zelenskij-pidpisav-novi-sankcii-proti-rf-bajden-u-finalnij-promovi-zgadav-pro-plan-putina-1056-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1736854737&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[20] https://t.me/supernova_plus/35293; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/1879031639558509046

[21] https://t.me/busargin_r/7889; https://t.me/busargin_r/7891

[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010825 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2025; https://t.me/busargin_r/7886

[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19975 ; https://t.me/usf_army/341

[24] https://t.me/usf_army/341

[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19975

[26] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8594 ; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8593 ; https://suspilne dot media/924339-rosia-zaavila-pro-masovanij-raketnij-udar-po-branskij-oblasti/

[27] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8594; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8593; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/13/u-bryansku-prolunaly-vybuhy-na-himzavodi/; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8595 ;  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19-2024

[28] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/5586 ; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/1878917544352076082; hhttps://t.me/exilenova_plus/4833 ; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/1878920278174261600; https://t.me/supernova_plus/35256 ; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/1878925603174552025 ; https://t.me/supernova_plus/35248

[29] https://t.me/avbogomaz/10236 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/295831 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/295832

[30] https://t.me/avbogomaz/10257

[31] https://t.me/mod_russia/47874

[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19975

[33] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8601

[34] https://t.me/astrapress/72359 ; https://t.me/astrapress/72381 ; https://t.me/astrapress/72394  

[35] https://t.me/astrapress/72392

[36] https://t.me/nashtatarstan_official/15090

[37] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/rus/news/2025/01/14/7493464/; https://t.me/bbcrussian/75285

[38] https://t.me/astrapress/72400  ; https://metholding dot ru/company/factory/ao-tulachermet/

[39] https://t.me/tass_agency/295842; https://t.me/tass_agency/295850 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22324 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22321 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/295858

[40] https://www.president.gov dot ua/en/news/ukrayinci-mozhut-dopomogti-amerikancyam-zahistiti-zhittya-15-95385

[41] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010225; https://www.infotag dot md/politics-en/321392/

[42] https://www.ipn dot md/ru/sandu-o-vizite-krasnoselskogo-v-moskvu-kishinev-ne-yavlyaetsya-prepyatstviem-7965_1110827.html

[43] https://www.zdg dot md/stiri/politic/surse-liderul-separatist-de-la-tiraspol-a-fost-la-moscova-prezentand-la-vama-pasaportul-rusesc/

[44] https://www.ipn dot md/en/mihai-popsoi-russia-aims-at-moldovas-economic-destabilization-and-7965_1110807.html ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/en/news/ukrayinci-mozhut-dopomogti-amerikancyam-zahistiti-zhittya-15-95385

[45] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010225; https://www.kp dot ru/daily/27651/5036217/

[46] https://www.kp dot ru/daily/27651/5036217/

[47] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections

[48] https://t.me/tass_agency/296004; https://t.me/tass_agency/296006 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/296008 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/01/14/v-rabote-rossiyskih-servisov-svyazi-proizoshel-sboy ; https://t.me/tass_agency/296016;

[49]  https://t.me/sotaproject/92589; https://t.me/agentstvonews/8798; https://t.me/vedomosti/56111; https://t.me/severrealii/29168

[50] https://t.me/dva_majors/62402; https://t.me/rusich_army/20089

[51] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2sfeyYlJxsY; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/14/myasni-shturmy-2-0-pivnichnokorejczi-gynut-na-kurskomu-fronti-yak-rosiyany/

[52] https://t.me/wargonzo/24257

[53]https://t.me/mod_russia/47878 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62402 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/20089 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22372

[54] https://t.me/mod_russia/47870

[55]  https://t.me/dva_majors/62400 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84400 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84405

[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TeVNWimvqbYF7Kcfx9Sn9Eag7QUrVFhAmirrBjb8wpNourN8igDBs2jLwTF5PcDxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0n7jQSgyFDZiERg5vZ5tDQEEHrz59ApQpkTCuCYwnXYwPf57Ptf6z6GYAqdbGL45pl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4075 ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/3621

[57] https://t.me/alehingennadiy/4637

[58] https://t.me/alehingennadiy/4637

[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TeVNWimvqbYF7Kcfx9Sn9Eag7QUrVFhAmirrBjb8wpNourN8igDBs2jLwTF5PcDxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iqpFkFVAnMbcroyTyfkjmcB1B9hvk92rRUcpCDcgfCgNX3V3oBuCRXtVRX34LtwNl  ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0n7jQSgyFDZiERg5vZ5tDQEEHrz59ApQpkTCuCYwnXYwPf57Ptf6z6GYAqdbGL45pl ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/924855-sinegubov-dvoricna-teritoria-aktivnih-bojovih-dij/ ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4075

[60] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5419   

[61]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TeVNWimvqbYF7Kcfx9Sn9Eag7QUrVFhAmirrBjb8wpNourN8igDBs2jLwTF5PcDxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iqpFkFVAnMbcroyTyfkjmcB1B9hvk92rRUcpCDcgfCgNX3V3oBuCRXtVRX34LtwNl  ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0n7jQSgyFDZiERg5vZ5tDQEEHrz59ApQpkTCuCYwnXYwPf57Ptf6z6GYAqdbGL45pl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4075  ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4075

[62] https://t.me/mod_russia/47874 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/47877 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/47881

[63] https://t.me/sashakots/51271

[64]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TeVNWimvqbYF7Kcfx9Sn9Eag7QUrVFhAmirrBjb8wpNourN8igDBs2jLwTF5PcDxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iqpFkFVAnMbcroyTyfkjmcB1B9hvk92rRUcpCDcgfCgNX3V3oBuCRXtVRX34LtwNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0n7jQSgyFDZiERg5vZ5tDQEEHrz59ApQpkTCuCYwnXYwPf57Ptf6z6GYAqdbGL45pl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4075

[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TeVNWimvqbYF7Kcfx9Sn9Eag7QUrVFhAmirrBjb8wpNourN8igDBs2jLwTF5PcDxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iqpFkFVAnMbcroyTyfkjmcB1B9hvk92rRUcpCDcgfCgNX3V3oBuCRXtVRX34LtwNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0n7jQSgyFDZiERg5vZ5tDQEEHrz59ApQpkTCuCYwnXYwPf57Ptf6z6GYAqdbGL45pl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4075

[66] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151306

[67] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84411 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/295907 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22366 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24257

[68]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TeVNWimvqbYF7Kcfx9Sn9Eag7QUrVFhAmirrBjb8wpNourN8igDBs2jLwTF5PcDxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iqpFkFVAnMbcroyTyfkjmcB1B9hvk92rRUcpCDcgfCgNX3V3oBuCRXtVRX34LtwNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0n7jQSgyFDZiERg5vZ5tDQEEHrz59ApQpkTCuCYwnXYwPf57Ptf6z6GYAqdbGL45pl

[69] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22320 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22338

[70] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1879154501879558159; https://t.me/ombr_28/1682

[71] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151306

[72]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TeVNWimvqbYF7Kcfx9Sn9Eag7QUrVFhAmirrBjb8wpNourN8igDBs2jLwTF5PcDxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iqpFkFVAnMbcroyTyfkjmcB1B9hvk92rRUcpCDcgfCgNX3V3oBuCRXtVRX34LtwNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0n7jQSgyFDZiERg5vZ5tDQEEHrz59ApQpkTCuCYwnXYwPf57Ptf6z6GYAqdbGL45pl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4075

[73] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8115; https://t.me/sokoly_foksa_47/122

[74] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8114; https://www.facebook.com/3012NGU/videos/1694456358094289/;

[75] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61387; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61395;

[76] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61410 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61391

[77]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TeVNWimvqbYF7Kcfx9Sn9Eag7QUrVFhAmirrBjb8wpNourN8igDBs2jLwTF5PcDxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iqpFkFVAnMbcroyTyfkjmcB1B9hvk92rRUcpCDcgfCgNX3V3oBuCRXtVRX34LtwNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0n7jQSgyFDZiERg5vZ5tDQEEHrz59ApQpkTCuCYwnXYwPf57Ptf6z6GYAqdbGL45pl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4075 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61387 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61391; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61395 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20529 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61410

[78] https://youtu.be/WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/924167-armia-rf-hoce-zacepitisa-za-koznij-budinok-i-prosuvatisa-u-nizci-sil-na-pokrovskomu-napramku-osuv-hortica/

[79] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/14/vid-5-do-10-nakativ-za-den-pihota-okupantiv-ye-osnovnoyu-syloyu-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM

[80] https://t.me/yurasumy/20534

[81] https://t.me/sashakots/51269

[82] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-6-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2024 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84394

[83] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22364 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20527

[84]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TeVNWimvqbYF7Kcfx9Sn9Eag7QUrVFhAmirrBjb8wpNourN8igDBs2jLwTF5PcDxl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4075 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0n7jQSgyFDZiERg5vZ5tDQEEHrz59ApQpkTCuCYwnXYwPf57Ptf6z6GYAqdbGL45pl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61395 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4075

[85] https://t.me/mod_russia/47874; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2025

[86] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84443; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61389; https://t.me/wargonzo/24257; https://t.me/voin_dv/12770

[87] https://t.me/sashakots/51271

[88]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TeVNWimvqbYF7Kcfx9Sn9Eag7QUrVFhAmirrBjb8wpNourN8igDBs2jLwTF5PcDxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iqpFkFVAnMbcroyTyfkjmcB1B9hvk92rRUcpCDcgfCgNX3V3oBuCRXtVRX34LtwNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0n7jQSgyFDZiERg5vZ5tDQEEHrz59ApQpkTCuCYwnXYwPf57Ptf6z6GYAqdbGL45pl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4075

[89] https://t.me/wargonzo/24257

[90] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22344%20 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22320

[91] https://t.me/bmvabrzo/570 ; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/924639-u-timcasovo-okupovanomu-berdansku-na-zaporizzi-prolunav-vibuh-mva-2/ ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/32101

[92]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0n7jQSgyFDZiERg5vZ5tDQEEHrz59ApQpkTCuCYwnXYwPf57Ptf6z6GYAqdbGL45pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iqpFkFVAnMbcroyTyfkjmcB1B9hvk92rRUcpCDcgfCgNX3V3oBuCRXtVRX34LtwNl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02dUTRuDqYZxFXK4d5CXXAqYHyzBLcMAgPwo96Bw3aJjpPxf1P2a44G7SgnHzydm74l

[93] https://t.me/dva_majors/62395 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/62405

[94] https://t.me/kpszsu/26788

[95] https://suspilne dot media/cherkasy/923743-poskodzeni-vikna-rozpovili-podrobici-dronovoi-ataki-na-cerkasinu-14-sicna/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/12686 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/13/postrazhdala-dytyna-u-harkivskij-ova-rozpovily-pro-naslidky-ataky-shahediv/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/14/vorozhi-bpla-atakuvaly-zhyteliv-harkivshhyny-ye-postrazhdali-sered-nyh-dytyna/; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/33651

[96] https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c8r5ljk75dro

[97] https://t.me/KirillRumyantsev/418

[98] https://t.me/tass_agency/295924

[99] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2024

[100] https://www.gazeta dot ru/social/2025/01/14/20372738.shtml

[101] https://t.me/modmilby/44399