Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 8, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 8, 2025

Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, and George Barros

February 8, 2025, 5:00pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:40am ET on February 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia may be providing drone and missile technology to North Korea in exchange for North Korean troops fighting in Kursk Oblast. Japanese outlet NHK, citing multiple sources familiar with Russia–North Korea relations, reported on February 8 that Russia has agreed to assist North Korea in developing and mass-producing various types of drones in exchange for North Korean forces supporting Russia’s war effort against Ukraine.[1] NHK noted that Russia remains reluctant to help North Korea develop nuclear weapons, fearing that North Korean nuclear tests could further strain relations with the United States and complicate relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), however. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on February 8 that Russia is specifically spreading modern technology to North Korea, including drone technology, and told Reuters on February 7 that thousands of North Korean troops have returned to active combat in Kursk Oblast after a brief pause.[2] A Ukrainian brigade operating in Kursk Oblast published a video on February 8 reportedly showing North Korean forces conducting assaults alongside Russian forces in Kursk Oblast.[3] South Korean sources recently reported that Russia withdrew North Korean troops from the battlefield in Kursk Oblast in mid-January 2025, possibly for rest and reconstitution or to rethink how Russia is using these troops.[4] ISW assesses that North Korea is using the war in Ukraine as a testing ground for its own military capabilities.[5] Reuters reported on February 6 that North Korean ballistic missiles fired by Russian forces since December 2024 have demonstrated significantly improved accuracy, likely an example of North Korean capability enhancement gained through the North Korea-Russia alliance.[6]

Russia continues to expand its military capabilities, indicating that the Kremlin has no immediate interest in negotiations or a lasting peace with Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, citing Ukrainian intelligence, reported on February 8 that Russian forces are forming new military divisions, building additional defense-industrial base (DIB) facilities, planning to increase military personnel by over 100,000 soldiers, and deepening military cooperations with North Korea.[7] Then–Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in January 2023 that Russia would create 14 new military divisions, but ISW is unable to assess whether Zelensky is referring to these previously announced plans or the creation of additional new divisions.[8] ISW also cannot verify the status of the formation of the 14 divisions Shoigu previously announced. Zelensky highlighted that Russia's force-generation, restructuring, and defense-production efforts make it clear that Putin is not interested in negotiations with Ukraine and seeks to continue Russia’s war.[9] Such Russian plans suggest that Russia, not Ukraine, is the party refusing good-faith negotiations and actively pushing for protracted war rather than peace, while also setting conditions to prepare for a potential broader conflict with NATO.[10] Russian officials and information space have frequently framed the war in Ukraine as a part of a larger confrontation with the West.[11]

The Russian command may be redeploying forces from the Kurakhove direction towards Toretsk in order to facilitate Russian offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in Spring or Summer 2025. A Russian source claimed that the Russian military command is redeploying elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments, 163rd Tank Regiment, and 381st Artillery Regiment (all of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division) and elements of the 96th regiment (possibly also part of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, although ISW has not previously observed reports of this unit operating in Ukraine) from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction.[12] ISW has not observed confirmation or other reporting on this alleged redeployment. Another Russian source claimed that elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments are operating near Dachne as of February 8, however.[13] A redeployment of elements of the 8th CAA to the Toretsk direction- in conjunction with intensified Russian efforts in the Chasiv Yar direction in recent weeks- would indicate that the Russian command may intend to prioritize advances towards Kostyantynivka and pressuring Ukraine's fortress belt in 2025, as ISW previously assessed.[14]

The Baltic States cut ties with the Soviet-era power grid that connected them to Belarus and Russia on February 8 as part of efforts to achieve full energy independence from Russia and further integrate their energy infrastructure with the European Union (EU). Western sources reported on February 7 and 8 that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania disconnected from the centralized Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (BRELL) energy network on February 8 as part of a long-planned effort to integrate more closely with the EU and strengthen regional security.[15] The three countries are temporarily operating independently from the grid and, pending final tests, will synchronize with the EU’s grid on February 9. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas wrote on X (formerly Twitter) on February 7 that this move ensures Russia can no longer use energy as a “tool of blackmail”- something Russia has repeatedly leveraged against countries reliant on Russian energy, including Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine.[16] Russia’s Ministry of Energy reported on February 8 that Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast, located on the Baltic Sea between Poland and Lithuania, has also transitioned to autonomous power generation as a result of the Baltic states' decision.[17] Kaliningrad Oblast possesses three gas-fueled and one coal-fired power plant and can reportedly generate a total capacity of 1.88 gigawatts, which the Russian Ministry of Energy claimed is more than twice Kaliningrad's peak energy consumption.[18] It is unclear if Kaliningrad’s transition to autonomous power generation will impact daily life or Russian military activity in the region.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia may be providing drone and missile technology to North Korea in exchange for North Korean troops fighting in Kursk Oblast.
• Russia continues to expand its military capabilities, indicating that the Kremlin has no immediate interest in negotiations or a lasting peace with Ukraine.
• The Russian command may be redeploying forces from the Kurakhove direction towards Toretsk in order to facilitate Russian offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in Spring or Summer 2025.
• The Baltic States cut ties with the Soviet-era power grid that connected them to Belarus and Russia on February 8 as part of efforts to achieve full energy independence from Russia and further integrate their energy infrastructure with the European Union (EU).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to incentivize Russian citizens to serve in the military.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces maintain positions in Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha) amid ongoing activity in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on February 8. Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continues southeast of Sudzha near Makhnovka, Cherkasskaya Konopelka, and Fanaseyevka and that Russian forces are clearing nearby forested areas.[19] Two Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces control Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka, but another milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces both maintain positions in Cherkasskaya Konopelka.[20]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 7 indicates that Russian forces maintain positions in southern Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha).[21]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces maintain positions at the Lotos gas station along the 38K-028 Sudzha-Oboyan highway southeast of Sudzha.[22] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from strongholds near Sverdlikovo (west of Sudzha).[23]

ORBAT: Drone operators of the Chechen "Aida" Akhmat Spetsnaz Detachment and elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade, and 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[24] Elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), "Nevsky" Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps), and "Veterany" Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating southeast of Sudzha.[25] Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are operating near Malaya Loknya (northwest of Sudzha).[26] Elements of the Chechen "Akhmat-Russia" Motorized Rifle Regiment, Chechen "Zapad-Akhmat" Battalion, the "Grom" detachment, and Rosgvardia’s 116th Special Purpose “Stalhaya" Brigade are operating in Kursk's border areas.[27]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

The Sumy Oblast Military Administration reported on February 7 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group consisting of 13 personnel and partially pushed them back over the international Ukraine-Russia border near Serednya-Buda, Sumy Oblast.[28]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on February 8 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 7 and 8.[29]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 8. Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on February 7 and 8.[30] A Ukrainian brigade reported that elements of the Russian 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) unsuccessfully conducted an at least company-sized mechanized assault near Pershotraveneve (east of Kupyansk) and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 10 armored vehicles during the assault.[31]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 8 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced west and northeast of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[32]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces have not completely pushed Ukrainian forces out of Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk) and that Russian forces only occupy some areas in the northern part of the settlement.[33]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), with support from elements of the Russian Volunteer Corps, are operating near Dvorichna and advanced 250 to 300 meters southward along the Oskil River towards Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk and southwest of Dvorichna).[34] Elements of the Russian 26th Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st GTA) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[35]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 8 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahyrzove and Lovoza, east of Borova near Kopanky, and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka on February 7 and 8.[36] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces stated that Russian forces attacked Nova Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova) with one tank and three armored personnel carriers and that Ukrainian forces destroyed the vehicles.[37] A Ukrainian regiment reported that Russian forces conducted an at least platoon-sized mechanized assault in the Lozova direction on the morning of February 7 and that Ukrainian forces destroyed two infantry fighting vehicles and one tank during the assault.[38]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA) are operating near Makiivka (southeast of Borova).[39] Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are also reportedly operating near Makiivka.[40]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 8. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and Novolyubivka and towards Nove on February 7 and 8.[41]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman) and seized the fields east of the settlement.[42] Mashovets reported on February 8 that Russian forces recently seized Terny (northeast of Lyman).[43]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are operating near Ivanivka (northeast of Lyman).[44]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 8 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on February 7 and 8.[45]

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on February 8 that Russian forces attacked near Bilohorivka and Verkhnokamyanske with motorized and armored vehicle support and that Ukrainian forces destroyed five armored personnel carriers and 11 motorcycles during the attack.[46] A Ukrainian brigade commander operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russian forces use tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, buggies, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to attack when frozen ground provides more stable terrain and favor smaller infantry assaults in warmer weather when softer soil makes vehicle movement more difficult.[47]

Ukrainian forces recently regain lost positions in the Chasiv Yar direction amid continued Russian offensive operations in the direction on February 8. Russian forces continued attacking within and near Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne and Bila Hora on February 7 and 8.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting continues in Shevchenko and Tsekh No. 2 microraions in southern Chasiv Yar and that Russian forces are concentrating attacks towards the T-0504 highway.[49]

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 7 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced along the T-0504 Bakhmut-Kostyantynivka highway south of Chasiv Yar.[50]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 8 that Russian forces advanced in an area 3.5 kilometers wide and over 1.5 kilometers in depth south of Chasiv Yar and seized the Stupki and Krinichki tracts in the area.[51] The milblogger noted that Russian forces continue to clear Novopivnichnyi Microraion (western Chasiv Yar) and positions south of the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1065th Airborne (VDV) Artillery Regiment, 299th VDV Regiment, and the 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (all of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in and near Chasiv Yar.[52]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the direction on February 8. Russian forces continued attacking near Toretsk and northeast of Toretsk near Krymske on February 7 and 8.[53]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Kuzanva, Molodoi Hvardii, and Zhovtneva streets in northern Toretsk.[54]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 1st, 9th, and 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigades (all part of the 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are conducting clearing operations in Toretsk, Druzhba (east of Toretsk), and Krymske and that Russian forces are only 10 kilometers away from Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk and southwest of Chasiv Yar).[55] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.

A Russian milblogger claimed on February 8 that Ukrainian forces hold isolated defensive positions in Toretsk and that Russian forces may spend several weeks clearing Ukrainian forces from the town.[56] A Ukrainian brigade officer operating in Toretsk reported on February 8 that his units are holding in their positions in Toretsk.[57]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st "Slovyansk" Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) reportedly continue to operate in Toretsk.[58]

Ukrainian military officials reported on February 8 that Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian Su-25 attack aircraft on the outskirts of Toretsk.[59] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the area reported that Ukrainian forces also likely used first-person view (FPV) drones to damage a Russian Mi-8 helicopter that tried to evacuate the Su-25 pilot.[60] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov reported that Ukrainian forces used Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) to down the plane.[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on February 8. Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Novooleksandrivka, Zelene Pole, Tarasivka, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Uspenivka, Kotlyne Pishchane, Nadiivka, Udachne, Novoserhiivka, and Zaporizhzhia on February 7 and 8.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Udachne, Kotlyne and Pishchane.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in southern Kotlyne.[64]

Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 8 indicating that Russian forces advanced northeast of Novokalynove and in central Baranivka (both east of Pokrovsk).[65]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian National Guard brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces continue to attack in small infantry groups and are conducting fewer mechanized assaults due to foggy weather conditions.[66] An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that the number of Russian assaults south of Pokrovsk has decreased but that fighting remains intense.[67] The officer stated that Russian forces are trying to reach the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway that runs west of Pokrovsk.

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) suffered significant losses south and southwest of Pokrovsk and that the Russian military command replaced the brigade with part of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD).[68] Mashovets stated that elements of the 433rd and 506th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA), 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA), 239th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA), 87th Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division), and 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA) are operating south and southwest of Pokrovsk. Mashovets stated that elements of the 6th and 80th tank regiments and 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (all of the 90th Tank Division) are operating along the Nadiivka-Sribne line southwest of Pokrovsk.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on February 8 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko and Andriivka; west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil; south of Kurakhove near Dachne; and southwest of Kurakhove near Zelenivka on February 7 and 8.[69] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in western and northwestern Andriivka.[70]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupy central Andriivka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[71]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 428th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 67th Rifle Regiment (both of the 90th Tank Division) are operating on the eastern outskirts of Andriivka and that elements of the 110th and 114th motorized rifle brigades (51st CAA) are operating along the Shevchenko-Andriivka line.[72] Elements of the 381st Artillery Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Kurakhove.[73] See topline text for additional details about the evolving order of battle in the Kurakhove direction and how the Russian command may be redeploying forces from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction.

Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on January 8 but did not advance.[74]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 8 but Russian forces did not advance.[75] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked with armored vehicle support near Stepove and Kamyanske (both northwest of Robotyne).[76]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported activity in the Kherson direction on February 8.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 80th Arctic Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Kherson direction.[77]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 7 and 8. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 139 Shahed and decoy drones from Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[78] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 67 drones over Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Odesa oblasts and that 71 decoy drones were ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck Sumy, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kyiv oblasts.[79]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin continues efforts to incentivize Russian citizens to serve in the military. Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed on February 8 the Russian Cabinet of Ministers and the Prosecutor General’s Office to take measures to preserve government entitlements granting Russian military personnel fighting in the war to live in government housing.[80]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www3.nhk.or dot jp/nhkworld/en/news/20250208_05/ ; https://t.me/istories_media/8924 https://t.me/bbcrussian/76348

[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/zelenskiy-says-lets-do-deal-offering-trump-mineral-partnership-seeking-security-2025-02-07/; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13270 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/08/putin-gotuyetsya-zovsim-ne-do-peremovyn-prezydent-zustrivsya-z-novym-glavoyu-vijskovogo-komitetu-nato/

[3] https://t.me/brygada47/1228

[4] https://en.yna.co dot kr/view/AEN20250204006600315?section=nk/nk; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2025

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2025

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2025; https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraine-sees-marked-improvement-accuracy-russias-north-korean-missiles-2025-02-06/

[7] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13270 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/08/putin-gotuyetsya-zovsim-ne-do-peremovyn-prezydent-zustrivsya-z-novym-glavoyu-vijskovogo-komitetu-nato/

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2023

[9] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13270

[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15-2024

[12] https://t.me/supernova_plus/35958 ; https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/02/08/poka-vs-rf-gotovyat-novye-nastupleniya-vsu-poshli-v-kontrataku-v-kurskoy-oblasti-i-u-pokrovska-udalos-li-im-ottesnit-rossiyskie-voyska

[13] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31930;

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2025

[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/lithuania-cuts-russian-power-grid-ties-baltics-prepare-link-with-eu-2025-02-08/ ; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/baltics-brace-cut-decades-old-ties-russian-grid-2025-02-07/ ; https://www.freiheit.org/era-russian-energy-manipulations-over ; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/08/baltic-states-leave-russian-power-grid-in-closer-eu-integration

[16] https://x.com/kajakallas/status/1887762594779279740

[17] https://t.me/MID_Russia/51765

[18] https://www.euractiv dot com/section/eet/news/baltic-grid-divorce-will-further-isolate-russian-exclave-in-the-eu/ ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/51765

[19] https://t.me/dva_majors/64174 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31951; https://t.me/sudoplatov_official/4120 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24714 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/20703

[20] https://t.me/notes_veterans/21836 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31924 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20995

[21] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1888001111598186867; https://t.me/dshp78/290

[22] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31924

[23] https://t.me/dva_majors/64150

[24] https://t.me/tass_agency/299716 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85877 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23567 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153885

[25] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85854; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85857 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31951; https://t.me/sudoplatov_official/4120 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/20685

[26] https://t.me/dva_majors/64146

[27] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5473 ; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5474

[28] https://www.facebook.com/sumska.oda/posts/pfbid037FyVvYpGHwzj7sy6XkrXsxrRjPuss4tqPQwvqAdiV2fs2swHdt8SQK1UDjwMy8z8l?ref=embed_post ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/943601-castkovo-znisena-ukrainski-vijskovi-vidbili-rosijsku-drg-na-sumsini-ova/

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VW5JTtQ6ZEhnSkiRNxvWTt2vYf4LWfgEZVg1rmKoZdoiSwPrRvRhpQfsk94TdyV5l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08PPoAPhbFcY1LXYgkM5rCuNRFiZfqtBJf7DygnTdGCHSaBdt1bmcCXwMoh2bc6Pcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028ST6Qqw7pGkgWuD3GY4cZtGuwrXpUqjc4y3PQYud8KsyBFs1xKwa5ogmHvoMjNgfl

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VW5JTtQ6ZEhnSkiRNxvWTt2vYf4LWfgEZVg1rmKoZdoiSwPrRvRhpQfsk94TdyV5l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08PPoAPhbFcY1LXYgkM5rCuNRFiZfqtBJf7DygnTdGCHSaBdt1bmcCXwMoh2bc6Pcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028ST6Qqw7pGkgWuD3GY4cZtGuwrXpUqjc4y3PQYud8KsyBFs1xKwa5ogmHvoMjNgfl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5060

[31] https://t.me/ab3army/5208

[32] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8334; https://www.facebook.com/151OMBr/videos/1129442275638345/; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8337; https://t.me/ceroke24/1954

[33] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2545

[34] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2545

[35] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153912

[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VW5JTtQ6ZEhnSkiRNxvWTt2vYf4LWfgEZVg1rmKoZdoiSwPrRvRhpQfsk94TdyV5l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08PPoAPhbFcY1LXYgkM5rCuNRFiZfqtBJf7DygnTdGCHSaBdt1bmcCXwMoh2bc6Pcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028ST6Qqw7pGkgWuD3GY4cZtGuwrXpUqjc4y3PQYud8KsyBFs1xKwa5ogmHvoMjNgfl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5060

[37] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5060

[38] https://t.me/fedorenkoys/955

[39] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2548

[40] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153938

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VW5JTtQ6ZEhnSkiRNxvWTt2vYf4LWfgEZVg1rmKoZdoiSwPrRvRhpQfsk94TdyV5l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08PPoAPhbFcY1LXYgkM5rCuNRFiZfqtBJf7DygnTdGCHSaBdt1bmcCXwMoh2bc6Pcl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028ST6Qqw7pGkgWuD3GY4cZtGuwrXpUqjc4y3PQYud8KsyBFs1xKwa5ogmHvoMjNgfl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5060

[42] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8323; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=498280896623269

[43] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2548

[44] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2548

[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08PPoAPhbFcY1LXYgkM5rCuNRFiZfqtBJf7DygnTdGCHSaBdt1bmcCXwMoh2bc6Pcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028ST6Qqw7pGkgWuD3GY4cZtGuwrXpUqjc4y3PQYud8KsyBFs1xKwa5ogmHvoMjNgfl

[46] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5060

[47] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/08/boloto-cze-klyuchova-perepona-na-siverskomu-napryamku-meteozalezhni-shturmy/

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VW5JTtQ6ZEhnSkiRNxvWTt2vYf4LWfgEZVg1rmKoZdoiSwPrRvRhpQfsk94TdyV5l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08PPoAPhbFcY1LXYgkM5rCuNRFiZfqtBJf7DygnTdGCHSaBdt1bmcCXwMoh2bc6Pcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028ST6Qqw7pGkgWuD3GY4cZtGuwrXpUqjc4y3PQYud8KsyBFs1xKwa5ogmHvoMjNgfl

[49] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85878

[50] https://x.com/jkmncz/status/1887961714999611653; https://t.me/Sever_Z/9753

[51] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85878

[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23567

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VW5JTtQ6ZEhnSkiRNxvWTt2vYf4LWfgEZVg1rmKoZdoiSwPrRvRhpQfsk94TdyV5l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08PPoAPhbFcY1LXYgkM5rCuNRFiZfqtBJf7DygnTdGCHSaBdt1bmcCXwMoh2bc6Pcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028ST6Qqw7pGkgWuD3GY4cZtGuwrXpUqjc4y3PQYud8KsyBFs1xKwa5ogmHvoMjNgfl

[54] https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/590; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1888262140823294016; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1888250620152287502; https://www.tiktok.com/@polk.dnipro1.npu/video/7467842147694185733 

[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23590

[56] https://t.me/yurasumy/21004

[57] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/07/russia-ukraine-war-toretsk-donetsk/bf7d201a-e55c-11ef-ab83-bb30e4340014_story.html

[58] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85901

[59] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5071; https://t.me/ombr_28/1796

[60] https://t.me/ombr_28/1796

[61] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/17260

[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VW5JTtQ6ZEhnSkiRNxvWTt2vYf4LWfgEZVg1rmKoZdoiSwPrRvRhpQfsk94TdyV5l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08PPoAPhbFcY1LXYgkM5rCuNRFiZfqtBJf7DygnTdGCHSaBdt1bmcCXwMoh2bc6Pcl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028ST6Qqw7pGkgWuD3GY4cZtGuwrXpUqjc4y3PQYud8KsyBFs1xKwa5ogmHvoMjNgfl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5060; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61977; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23587; https://t.me/notes_veterans/21837; https://t.me/yurasumy/21001

[63] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61977

[64] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31955

[65] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=973066108339801&set=pcb.973066381673107

[66] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/08/zdijsnyuyut-sproby-zavershyty-svoye-zhyttya-samostijno-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-tryvayut-zapekli-boyi/

[67] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/08/pihota-yide-na-legkovyh-avtomobilyah-u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-kudy-rvetsya-vorog-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/

[68] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2546

[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VW5JTtQ6ZEhnSkiRNxvWTt2vYf4LWfgEZVg1rmKoZdoiSwPrRvRhpQfsk94TdyV5l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08PPoAPhbFcY1LXYgkM5rCuNRFiZfqtBJf7DygnTdGCHSaBdt1bmcCXwMoh2bc6Pcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028ST6Qqw7pGkgWuD3GY4cZtGuwrXpUqjc4y3PQYud8KsyBFs1xKwa5ogmHvoMjNgfl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5060; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61975; https://t.me/dva_majors/64150; https://t.me/wargonzo/24714; https://t.me/yurasumy/20998

[70] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61975; https://t.me/yurasumy/20998

[71] https://t.me/yurasumy/20998

[72] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2547

[73] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153908

[74] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VW5JTtQ6ZEhnSkiRNxvWTt2vYf4LWfgEZVg1rmKoZdoiSwPrRvRhpQfsk94TdyV5l

[75] https://t.me/wargonzo/24714

[76] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85895

[77] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/43556

[78] https://t.me/kpszsu/28328

[79] https://t.me/police_su_region/25771; https://t.me/kyivoda/25092 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/28328

[80] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/23087787 ; http://kremlin dot ru/acts/assignments/orders/76233