Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 8, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 8, 2025

Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan with William Runkel

March 8, 2025, 8:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on March 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The extent of the US suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine remains unclear. The Washington Post reported on March 7 that a statement by the US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) noted that the NGA "temporarily suspended [Ukraine's] access" to the system that provides Ukraine with commercial satellite imagery that the United States has purchased.[1] Ukraine can reportedly still access imagery that it has purchased with its own accounts. A Ukrainian servicemember told the Washington Post that satellite service near Pokrovsk "simply disappeared" but that Ukrainian forces will "use [their] own plans." CNN reported on March 7 that two US defense officials stated that the United States is still sharing intelligence with Ukraine that can help Ukrainian forces "defend" themselves but has "scaled back" the sharing of intelligence that Ukrainian forces could use for offensive targeting of Russian forces.[2] Politico reported on March 8 that a European official familiar with the intelligence capabilities of allies was "still puzzling" over the extent of the US intelligence sharing suspension and stated that European states may not be able to "bridge the gap."[3] A source familiar with talks among the NATO allies about how to handle the US suspension reportedly stated that NATO members are not prohibited from sharing some US intelligence with Ukraine but that such sharing could be very limited as the NATO allies are trying to avoid "jeopardizing" their relationships with the United States or with each other. Politico reported that one NATO official stated that there is no pressure from the Trump administration to reduce or curtail allies' intelligence sharing or weapons deliveries to Ukraine.

Western and Ukrainian officials indicated that the US suspension of intelligence sharing is generating battlefield effects. Time reported on March 8 that five senior Western and Ukrainian officials and military officers stated that the suspension of US intelligence to Ukraine has helped Russian forces advance on the battlefield.[4] An unspecified officer told Time that the suspension has left Ukrainian forces unable to use "some of their best weapons systems." A source in the Ukrainian government stated that the suspension has impacted Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast the most and that Ukrainian forces have lost the ability to detect Russian aircraft approaching Ukraine — compromising Ukrainian authorities' ability to warn civilians and military personnel about incoming Russian strikes. CNN reported on March 8 that a Ukrainian official stated that Ukrainian forces may run out of artillery shells by May or June 2025 — likely referring only to stockpiles of US-supplied ammunition.[5] A Ukrainian official also told CNN that Ukraine may exhaust its stockpile of Patriot air defense missiles, upon which Ukraine relies to shoot down Russian ballistic missiles, "in a matter of weeks." ISW cannot independently verify statements about the effects on the ground of the US intelligence sharing suspension. ISW continues to assess, however, that the complete suspension of US intelligence sharing would damage Ukraine's ability to use long-range strikes to generate battlefield effects and defend against Russian offensive operations and would allow Russian forces to intensify their drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian rear areas, affecting millions of Ukrainian civilians and the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).[6]

European states continue efforts to supplement intelligence sharing with Ukraine following the US suspension. French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Christophe Lemonde stated on March 8 that European states discussed how to try to compensate for the intelligence that the United States "may stop providing" during that March 6 EU summit.[7] French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu stated on March 6 that France would continue to provide intelligence to Ukraine.[8] French outlet Intelligence Online reported on March 7 that Safran.AI, a subsidiary of French defense corporation Safran, will provide Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) with a data fusion platform to analyze French satellite imagery and that Safran.AI and the GUR signed the agreement at the end of February 2025 — before the US suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine.[9] Two Ukrainian officers told Time that some European intelligence agencies are trying to fill the gap following the US suspension of intelligence sharing to Ukraine but that it will take time for European authorities to deploy these capabilities and that Europe is unlikely to entirely make up for the US intelligence capability "any time soon."[10]

Russian forces intensified their multi-directional campaign to eliminate the remaining Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on March 7 and 8. Geolocated footage published on March 8 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha).[11] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call up) are advancing near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye.[12] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian airborne (VDV) units seized Lebedevka (west of Sudzha), and another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Kubatkin (north of Sudzha) and advanced up to eight kilometers into the Ukrainian salient.[13] A Russian source claimed that fighting is ongoing along the Lebedevka-Kubatkin-Bondarevka line (northwest and east of Sudzha), but that the situation in this area is unclear.[14]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division), seized Viktorovka and Nikolayevka and that elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD) and 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are advancing near Malaya Loknya (all northwest of Sudzha).[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are attacking Nikolskyi (northwest of Sudzha).[16] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian and Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz units seized Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha) and that elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are advancing west of Kurilovka (south of Sudzha).[17] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently took advantage of an unsuccessful Ukrainian rotation in order to advance near Sudzha, and an unnamed Ukrainian commander operating in Kursk Oblast told the New York Post that roughly eight to 10 Russian vehicles recently broke through Ukrainian positions near Sudzha and were able to swiftly advance — likely referring to recent Russian advances south of Sudzha between Kurilovka and Guyevo.[18]

Russian forces also began attacks on Sudzha itself on March 8. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Chechen "Aida" Spetsnaz Group, 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 11th VDV Brigade, "Veterany" Assault Detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps), and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are attacking near Sudzha.[19] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces attempted to covertly attack behind Ukrainian positions in Sudzha via an underground gas pipeline but issued contradictory claims about the outcome of the attack.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attacking central Sudzha and Sudzha's industrial zone.[21] Russian milbloggers reiterated that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Sudzha and claimed that some Ukrainian forces are falling back to Sudzha from positions north of the town.[22]

Russian forces appear to be destroying bridges in Kursk Oblast and along the international border, likely as part of efforts to prevent Ukrainian forces from withdrawing from Kursk Oblast into Ukraine. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces destroyed a bridge north of Sudzha along the H-07 Sumy City-Sudzha highway (known as the R-200 highway in Russia) and that Russian forces are attempting to prevent Ukrainian forces from withdrawing to Sudzha.[23] Another Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment destroyed a bridge over the Psel River between Myropillya, Sumy Oblast, and Gornal, Kursk Oblast in order to complicate Ukrainian logistics.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are continuing to advance slowly in northern Sumy Oblast near Basivka and Novenke (both northeast of Sumy City) and that Russian shelling has interdicted the H-07 highway.[25] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces intend to interdict the H-07 to complicate Ukrainian logistics in Kursk Oblast and support Russian efforts to envelop the Ukrainian salient from the south.[26]

The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander, Major General Apti Alaudinov, announced the intensified Russian effort in Kursk Oblast on March 8.[27] Alaudinov credited elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz, "Veterany" Assault Detachment, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, and 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment with conducting the main assaults. A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian military command ordered Russian Spetsnaz units to identity and destroy Ukrainian communications equipment in Kursk Oblast on the night of March 7 to 8 in order to complicate Ukraine's ability to defend against intensified Russian offensive operations.[28] Russian forces have been working to slowly eliminate the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast over the last seven months but have been struggling to make significant progress in recent months after retaking the western part of the salient in Fall 2024.[29] Russian forces may be attempting to exploit any immediate impacts that the suspension of US intelligence sharing and military aid is having on Ukraine's capabilities in Kursk Oblast. ISW has not observed reports of Ukrainian HIMARS or ATACMS strikes to support Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast on March 7 or 8, and Ukrainian forces may be struggling to leverage these systems amid the pause in US intelligence sharing.[30]

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian rear and near rear areas on the night of March 7 and 8 and during the day on March 8, and Ukrainian forces notably did not shoot down any Russian ballistic missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M/Kn-23 ballistic missiles and one Iskander-K cruise missile from Rostov Oblast and 145 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea on the night of March 7 to 8.[31] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down the Iskander-K cruise missiles and 79 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, Mykolaiv, and Odessa oblasts and that 54 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. The Ukrainian Air Forces notably did not report that Ukrainian forces shot down the two ballistic missiles. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes damaged civilian and energy infrastructure in Donetsk, Poltava, Kharkiv, Sumy, Zaporizhia, and Odesa oblasts.[32] Ukraine's largest private energy company, DTEK, noted on March 8 that Russian forces have struck DTEK energy facilities in Odesa City seven times in the past three weeks.[33] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted a large-scale strike against Dobropillya, Donetsk Oblast (north of Pokrovsk) overnight with Iskander-M ballistic missiles, Tornado-S MLRS, and Shahed drones, killing 11 people and injuring at least 50.[34] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces struck Dobropillya a second time after Ukrainian rescue workers arrived on the scene following the initial strike.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on the evening of March 8 that Russian forces conducted a strike, likely with Iskander-M ballistic missiles, against Bila Krynytsya, Kherson Oblast (northeast of Kherson City) and Novoselivka (possibly referring to Novoselivka, Mykolaiv Oblast roughly 65 kilometers northwest of Bila Krynytsya).[36] ISW continues to assess that Russia will likely take advantage of the suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine to intensify its long-range strike campaign and deplete Ukrainian air defense missiles, particularly Patriot missiles that are vital to Ukraine's defense against ballistic missiles.[37]

The Kremlin continues to promote the false narrative that European Union (EU) member states and Ukraine seek to protract and escalate the war in Ukraine in order to distract from Russia's own long-term preparations for a war with the West. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova responded on March 7 to the March 6 EU summit by characterizing EU initiatives to increase military spending and financial aid to Ukraine as "deliberately fueling" escalation between the West and Russia and described the EU as a "militarized union" that is "obsessed" with inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia.[38] Zakharova claimed that the EU is playing "dangerous geopolitical games" and is "delaying" the possibility of negotiations to end the war. Zakharova's comments ignore an ongoing Kremlin effort to rally domestic support for the war in Ukraine and justify Russia's long-term efforts to militarize Russian society by claiming that Russia is fighting a proxy war with the West in Ukraine and must prepare for a future war with the West.[39]

Russia's efforts to strengthen its force grouping in Belarus, expand its military capabilities, and militarize its society in the long term reflect Russia's preparations for a potential future war with NATO. Russia deployed several S-300 air defense systems to Belarus in late August 2021 and Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) forces to Belarus in September 2021 and has continued to build out its force presence in Belarus over the last three years.[40] Russia and Belarus have continually used the Union State Treaty to deepen their bilateral military agreements.[41] Russia updated its nuclear doctrine in November 2024 to expand its nuclear umbrella to encompass Belarus and explicitly stated that Russia might employ tactical nuclear weapons located in Belarus in the event of aggression against Belarus.[42]

Russia is engaged in significant force restructuring, military industrial, and hybrid war efforts that underline Russia's efforts to prepare for and possibly initiate a future conflict with the West. Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in March 2023 that Russia would create 14 new military divisions, demonstrating Russia's clear intention to expand its military in the coming years.[43] Russia is attempting to build out its long-term warfighting capabilities by expanding and nationalizing its defense industrial base (DIB).[44] Various European law enforcement agencies and authorities have identified Russia's ongoing hybrid warfare efforts across Europe for the better part of a decade, including reports that Russia forced several commercial aircraft to turn back after targeting the aircraft with GPS jamming devices in April 2024.[45] The Kremlin is likely advancing this narrative as part of its efforts to exacerbate tensions between the United States and Europe and undermine the wider Western alliance supporting Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 8 that Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, and Deputy Head of the Ukrainian President's Office Colonel Pavlo Palisa will participate in the US-Ukrainian talks on March 11 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.[46] Zelensky confirmed that he will meet with Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammad bin Salman on March 10 before the US-Ukrainian talks. Zelensky stated that Ukraine is "fully committed" to constructive dialogue and has been seeking peace since the start of the war.

Key Takeaways:

• The extent of the US suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine remains unclear.
• Western and Ukrainian officials indicated that the US suspension of intelligence sharing is generating battlefield effects.
• European states continue efforts to supplement intelligence sharing with Ukraine following the US suspension.
• Russian forces intensified their multi-directional campaign to eliminate the remaining Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on March 7 and 8.
• Russian forces appear to be destroying bridges in Kursk Oblast and along the international border, likely as part of efforts to prevent Ukrainian forces from withdrawing from Kursk Oblast into Ukraine.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander, Major General Apti Alaudinov, announced the intensified Russian effort in Kursk Oblast on March 8.
• Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian rear and near rear areas on the night of March 7 and 8 and during the day on March 8, and Ukrainian forces notably did not shoot down any Russian ballistic missiles.
• The Kremlin continues to promote the false narrative that European Union (EU) member states and Ukraine seek to protract and escalate the war in Ukraine in order to distract from Russia's own long-term preparations for a war with the West.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 8 that Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, and Deputy Head of the Ukrainian President's Office Colonel Pavlo Palisa will participate in the US-Ukrainian talks on March 11 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for updates on Russian offensive operations in Kursk and Sumy oblasts.

Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast on the night of March 7 to 8. Head of Ukraine’s Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian forces struck the Kirishi Petroleum Organic Synthesis (KINEF) oil refinery in Kirishi, Leningrad Oblast overnight — over 800 kilometers from the Russian-Ukrainian border.[47] Kovalenko noted that KINEF is the second largest refinery in Russia, has a processing capacity of about 20.1 million tons of oil per year, and specializes in gasoline, diesel fuel, and fuel oil production. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that sources in Ukrainian intelligence stated that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted a drone strike against KINEF, damaging at least one oil tank.[48] The GUR sources noted that the refinery supplies the Russian military. Leningrad Oblast Governor Aleksander Drozdenko claimed that Russian forces shot down two drones near KINEF and that falling drone debris damaged one tank at the facility.[49] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed one drone over Leningrad Oblast overnight.[50]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 7 and 8.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[52]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 8 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced near Kalynove (north of Kupyansk) and Fyholivka (north of Kalynove).[53]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations toward Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk toward Petro-Ivanivka and Krasne Pershe; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on March 7 and 8.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conduct periodic counterattacks near Kalynove.[55]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Kalynove.[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently deployed forces near Senkove (north of Borova on the west bank of the Oskil River).[57] ISW has not observed confirmation that Russian forces have crossed the Oskil River near Senkove.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on March 7 and 8.[58]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 8 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Lyman toward Nove and Zelena Dolyna and northeast of Lyman near Myrne, Yampolivka, and Torske and toward Novomykhailivka on March 7 and 8.[59]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on March 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka on March 7 and 8.[60]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the "Prosvet" Battalion are operating near Bilohorivka.[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 8 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora on March 7 and 8.[62] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Chasiv Yar.[63]

A Russian source claimed that Russian forces occupy at least 85 percent of Chasiv Yar.[64] ISW has only observed geolocated evidence indicating that Russian forces occupy roughly 57 percent of the settlement.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) and 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[65]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced on Druzhby Street in central Toretsk and on Budivelnykiv Street in southern Toretsk.[66]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Voronezska Street in western Toretsk.[67]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; and northeast of Toretsk near Dachne and Dyliivka on March 7 and 8.[68]

A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) preemptively told the Russian military command that Russian forces seized Toretsk and that Russian forces who recently redeployed to the settlement are "stunned by the real state of affairs."[69] Russian milbloggers claimed that Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk) and the area just north of Leonidivka (just south of Shcherbynivka) are contested "gray zones."[70]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Oleksandro-Kalynove (northwest of Toretsk) direction.[71]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along Horkoho Street in southwestern Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[72] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced along Kalynova Street in northern Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[73]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Udachne, south of Preobrazhenka (both southwest of Pokrovsk), and south of Zaporizhzhia (south of Preobrazhenka).[74]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces regained lost positions in Shevchenko after successful counterattacks.[75]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka; northeast of Pokrovsk near Nova Poltavka, Tarasivka, and Oleksandropil; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka and Promin; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Novooleksandrivka, Pishchane, Ulakly, Bohdanivka, and Nadiivka on March 7 and 8.[76] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Uspenivka.[77]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using armored vehicles in attacks in the Nadiivka-Kotlyarivka direction (southwest of Pokrovsk).[78]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Vizantiya" detachment are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[79]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 8 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 8 that elements of the Russian 29th CAA (Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Kostyantynopil (west of Kurakhove).[80] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced three kilometers from Rozdolne (southwest of Kurakhove) toward Bahatyr (north of Rozdolne and west of Kurkahove) and up to one kilometer deep along a front more than 1.7 kilometers wide in an unspecified area along the Vovcha Riverbed (west of Kurakhove).[81]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Zelenyi Kut, Andriivka, Kostyantynopil, and Oleksiivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Bahatyr and Rozlyv on March 7 and 8.[82] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in southwestern Kostyantynopil and temporarily pushed Russian forces back in the area.[83]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynopil.[84] Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Oleksiivka and Andriivka (both west of Kurakhove).[85]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on March 8 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 1.5 kilometers deep along a front two kilometers wide south of Pryvilne (west of Velyka Novosilka).[86]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne, northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Dniproenerhiya and Burlatske, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole on March 8.[87] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Vilne Pole.[88]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Rozdolne.[89]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 8 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Robotyne near Charivne and northwest of Robotyne near Stepove, Shcherbaky, and Pyatykhatky on March 7 and 8.[90]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction, including near Pyatykhatky.[91]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground attacks in the Kherson direction on March 8.  

Unconfirmed claims: Kherson Oblast occupation governor Vladimir Saldo claimed on March 8 that Russian forces control the spits, islands, river delta, and the left bank of the Dnipro River delta area in the Kherson direction.[92]

Geolocated footage posted on March 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely conducted a raid into the area north of occupied Oleshky (south of Kherson City and in west [right] bank Kherson Oblast).[93] ISW is unable to verify whether Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the area.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Fobos” drone detachment (18thCombined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Oleshky, and elements of the 81st Artillery Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[94]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for updates on Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukraine.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian state arms exporter Rosoboronexport announced on March 7 that it signed a $248 million contract with the Indian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to supply India with tank engines to re-motorize T-72 tanks.[95] The contract provides for the supply of the engines and the organization of production of T-72 engines in India. Rosoboronexport did not specify when it will deliver these engines.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/03/07/maxar-ukraine-sateliite-imagery/

[2] https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-administration-presidency-news-03-07-25#cm7yz0pkq00053b6sw8gklx6q

[3] https://www.politico.com/news/2025/03/08/europe-scrambles-to-aid-ukraine-after-us-intelligence-cutoff-00219678

[4] https://time.com/7265679/satellites-front-failing-hundreds-dead-fallout-trump-ukraine-aid-pause/

[5] https://www.cnn.com/2025/03/08/world/ukraine-military-aid-trump-visualized-dg/index.html

[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030525

[7] https://suspilne dot media/965505-evropa-namagatimetsa-kompensuvati-rozviddani-ssa-dla-ukraini/

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625

[9] https://www.intelligenceonline dot com/surveillance--interception/2025/03/07/ukraine-military-intelligence-turns-to-france-for-geospatial-needs,110384362-art ; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/safran-ai-analizuvatyme-frantsuzki-suputnykovi-znimky-dlya-ukrayiny/

[10] https://time.com/7265679/satellites-front-failing-hundreds-dead-fallout-trump-ukraine-aid-pause/

[11] https://t.me/milinfolive/143497 ; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1898404848137023852 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/304666

[12] https://t.me/rybar/68661 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33191 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33200

[13] https://t.me/rybar/68661 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66163

[14] https://t.me/yurasumy/21630

[15] https://t.me/bella_Ciao44/7596 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/49846 ; https://t.me/vrogov/19462 ; https://t.me/ne_rybar/6195 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87502 ; https://t.me/rybar/68627 ; https://t.me/rybar/68661 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66167 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/21447

[16] https://t.me/dva_majors/66167 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/21447

[17] https://t.me/rybar/68661 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25018 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87502 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62696

[18] https://t.me/rybar/68661 ; https://nypost.com/2025/03/07/world-news/ukraine-forces-likely-to-pull-out-of-russias-kursk-region-within-two-weeks-sources/; https://t.me/tass_agency/304559

[19] https://t.me/dva_majors/66153 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66156 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66161 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66167 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/21447

[20] https://t.me/dva_majors/66171 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/18022 ; https://www.facebook.com/butusov.yuriy/posts/pfbid02t3fRt8WRzHzexPP3TjTJvTcxAA2KStkVfpo4JAQSHXP5Dk3GmayDfSnr6XJrzJwJl ; https://www.facebook.com/myroslavhai/posts/pfbid0tePnX342Uv3pSTh7zwvbg9u9CxjVBGvitqSwjp6WoU8R64mRADTeznxnKG7CKdidl ; https://suspilne dot media/965805-zsu-znisili-grupu-rosijskih-sil-u-sudzanskomu-rajoni-rf-vijskovij/ ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87508 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/143475 ; https://www.pravda.com dot ua/rus/news/2025/03/8/7501875/

[21] https://t.me/yurasumy/21623  

[22] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/156985 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/22363 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20780 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21623  

[23] https://t.me/yurasumy/21616 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/157015

[24] https://t.me/dva_majors/66115 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66173 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/143490

[25] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25018 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20781 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62682 ; https://t.me/rybar/68661 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62691

[26] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2025

[27] https://t.me/AptiAlaudinovAKHMAT/8712 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/304666

[28] https://t.me/dva_majors/66170

[29] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment

[30] https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/u-s-halts-military-aid-to-ukraine-leaving-storm-shadow-and-himars-dead-on-the-battlefield/ ; https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russia-putin-trump-cia-zelenskyy-5eb2c8025f6bb4b616c86e1fe89bba0f

[31] https://t.me/kpszsu/30197

[32] https://t.me/kpszsu/30197; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/36528 ; https://www.facebook.com/vadym.filashkin/posts/pfbid0aUjWME6DthaDmDPBARbNFkXTJMR5nZcrhzxxUo6r9J57vULmevVSx9hey5U4shhwl ; https://www.facebook.com/DSNSDon/posts/pfbid0VthRqXZEPJb7o9jtJbyY34k5WV7DjaFpt42XowFcWsuu66X2xEs3n18wkhBNPYvCl; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/965499-naslidki-udariv-po-dobropillu-na-doneccini-e-zagibli-ta-poraneni/?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13499 ; https://suspilne dot media/965639-zelenskij-vidreaguvav-na-rosijsku-ataku-po-dobropillu-cili-v-rosii-nezminni/; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/965499-naslidki-udariv-po-dobropillu-na-doneccini-e-zagibli-ta-poraneni/?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=ps; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/965877-ce-najbilsij-masovanij-udar-nacalnik-dobropilskoi-mva-pro-vidnovlenna-stan-poranenih-ta-rujnuvanna/; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/7056 ; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/7055 ; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/7041 ; https://t.me/synegubov/13392 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/965569-rosiani-atakuvali-bezpilotnikami-masokombinat-na-harkivsini-troe-ludej-zaginuli-semero-poraneni/; https://t.me/synegubov/13392 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12194; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/39253; https://t.me/odeskaODA/8907 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/17022 ; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/965547-vnaslidok-padinna-ulamkiv-bpla-armii-rf-u-zaporizzi-stalas-pozeza-na-teritorii-pidpriemstva/

[33] https://www.facebook.com/dtekoem/posts/pfbid09VJDCetUQtN11pQp8Diod9bperYSKCKKnPWJ8gdk6aXPEP43K4VXo8AXzy1jek4pl?ref=embed_post

[34] https://t.me/UA_National_Police/36528 ; https://www.facebook.com/vadym.filashkin/posts/pfbid0aUjWME6DthaDmDPBARbNFkXTJMR5nZcrhzxxUo6r9J57vULmevVSx9hey5U4shhwl ; https://www.facebook.com/DSNSDon/posts/pfbid0VthRqXZEPJb7o9jtJbyY34k5WV7DjaFpt42XowFcWsuu66X2xEs3n18wkhBNPYvCl ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/965499-naslidki-udariv-po-dobropillu-na-doneccini-e-zagibli-ta-poraneni/?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13499 ; https://suspilne dot media/965639-zelenskij-vidreaguvav-na-rosijsku-ataku-po-dobropillu-cili-v-rosii-nezminni/; https://gp.gov dot ua/ua/posts/11-lyudei-zaginuli-30-poraneni-sered-nix-5-ditei-rozpocato-rozsliduvannya-za-faktom-kombinovanoyi-ataki-voroga-na-dobropillya ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/965499-naslidki-udariv-po-dobropillu-na-doneccini-e-zagibli-ta-poraneni/?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=ps ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/965877-ce-najbilsij-masovanij-udar-nacalnik-dobropilskoi-mva-pro-vidnovlenna-stan-poranenih-ta-rujnuvanna/; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/7056 ; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/7055 ; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/7041 ; https://t.me/severrealii/29863; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=625802237024958

[35] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=625802237024958

[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0DymFC1vxaBKD8xW9qosqwBxtyE5bR7iDMvPUq81jcnxmk7zZHZRAATMBTgzL4QXcl

[37] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725

[38] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2002117/

[39] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625

[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-august-18-august-31-2021 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-zapad-2021-exercise ; https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2022/10/whats-behind-russias-new-deployment-of-troops-to-belarus?lang=en ; https://jamestown.org/program/russian-troops-deploy-to-belarus-with-fanfare/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russia%27s%20Quiet%20Conquest%20Belarus.pdf

[41] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russia%27s%20Quiet%20Conquest%20Belarus.pdf

[42] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2024

[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2025

[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2024

[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2024

[46] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1898361925807018492

[47] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8945

[48] https://suspilne dot media/965767-droni-gur-atakuvali-naftopererobnij-kompleks-v-leningradskij-oblasti-dzerela/

[49] https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/6605

[50] https://t.me/mod_russia/49799

[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0DymFC1vxaBKD8xW9qosqwBxtyE5bR7iDMvPUq81jcnxmk7zZHZRAATMBTgzL4QXcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u5QKBStR5ZPoVzZ8ZyxTDSmNgWtRBtD7uw9QAWLVHLjiU4UCTvc4tBanoJmzyWepl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fKWhYHWnjKmbvyPRG98FsLtVzr1c9w64WdoFxS2dVSYX2gZGgLKeTxxzMJK3dMq3l

[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25001; https://t.me/synegubov/13392

[53]https://t.me/motopatriot78/33180 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66128 ; https://t.me/synegubov/13392 ; https://t.me/synegubov/13392 ;

[54]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0DymFC1vxaBKD8xW9qosqwBxtyE5bR7iDMvPUq81jcnxmk7zZHZRAATMBTgzL4QXcl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u5QKBStR5ZPoVzZ8ZyxTDSmNgWtRBtD7uw9QAWLVHLjiU4UCTvc4tBanoJmzyWepl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fKWhYHWnjKmbvyPRG98FsLtVzr1c9w64WdoFxS2dVSYX2gZGgLKeTxxzMJK3dMq3l ; https://t.me/synegubov/13392 ; https://t.me/synegubov/13392

[55] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33180

[56] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33180

[57] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12618

[58]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0DymFC1vxaBKD8xW9qosqwBxtyE5bR7iDMvPUq81jcnxmk7zZHZRAATMBTgzL4QXcl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u5QKBStR5ZPoVzZ8ZyxTDSmNgWtRBtD7uw9QAWLVHLjiU4UCTvc4tBanoJmzyWepl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fKWhYHWnjKmbvyPRG98FsLtVzr1c9w64WdoFxS2dVSYX2gZGgLKeTxxzMJK3dMq3l

[59]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0DymFC1vxaBKD8xW9qosqwBxtyE5bR7iDMvPUq81jcnxmk7zZHZRAATMBTgzL4QXcl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u5QKBStR5ZPoVzZ8ZyxTDSmNgWtRBtD7uw9QAWLVHLjiU4UCTvc4tBanoJmzyWepl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fKWhYHWnjKmbvyPRG98FsLtVzr1c9w64WdoFxS2dVSYX2gZGgLKeTxxzMJK3dMq3l

[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u5QKBStR5ZPoVzZ8ZyxTDSmNgWtRBtD7uw9QAWLVHLjiU4UCTvc4tBanoJmzyWepl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fKWhYHWnjKmbvyPRG98FsLtVzr1c9w64WdoFxS2dVSYX2gZGgLKeTxxzMJK3dMq3l ;

[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33158; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62685

[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0DymFC1vxaBKD8xW9qosqwBxtyE5bR7iDMvPUq81jcnxmk7zZHZRAATMBTgzL4QXcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u5QKBStR5ZPoVzZ8ZyxTDSmNgWtRBtD7uw9QAWLVHLjiU4UCTvc4tBanoJmzyWepl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fKWhYHWnjKmbvyPRG98FsLtVzr1c9w64WdoFxS2dVSYX2gZGgLKeTxxzMJK3dMq3l; https://t.me/wargonzo/25146

[63] https://t.me/tass_agency/304627

[64] https://t.me/tass_agency/304594

[65] https://t.me/tass_agency/304627; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24995

[66] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8561; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87499; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1898301388200759532; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1898317261862994109; https://t.me/KykyshkaBpLA/783

[67] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1898321505005507050 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1898321638950568377

[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0DymFC1vxaBKD8xW9qosqwBxtyE5bR7iDMvPUq81jcnxmk7zZHZRAATMBTgzL4QXcl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u5QKBStR5ZPoVzZ8ZyxTDSmNgWtRBtD7uw9QAWLVHLjiU4UCTvc4tBanoJmzyWepl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fKWhYHWnjKmbvyPRG98FsLtVzr1c9w64WdoFxS2dVSYX2gZGgLKeTxxzMJK3dMq3l

[69] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33171

[70] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33172; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25015

[71] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/156944

[72] https://x.com/Ryan72101/status/1898204072341119030 ; https://t.me/digest1744/3043  

[73] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33148 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62683 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25020

[74] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1898134065506554244 ; https://t.me/ombr72/10663 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8558 ; https://t.me/ombr72/10663 ; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1898130088115552366

[75] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25020

[76] https://t.me/dva_majors/66128 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33164 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fKWhYHWnjKmbvyPRG98FsLtVzr1c9w64WdoFxS2dVSYX2gZGgLKeTxxzMJK3dMq3l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u5QKBStR5ZPoVzZ8ZyxTDSmNgWtRBtD7uw9QAWLVHLjiU4UCTvc4tBanoJmzyWepl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0DymFC1vxaBKD8xW9qosqwBxtyE5bR7iDMvPUq81jcnxmk7zZHZRAATMBTgzL4QXcl

[77] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62686

[78] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62686

[79] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25002

[80] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62688 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/157019 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66187 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/143500 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13794 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31052

[81] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/157019 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13794 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25024

[82] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0DymFC1vxaBKD8xW9qosqwBxtyE5bR7iDMvPUq81jcnxmk7zZHZRAATMBTgzL4QXcl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u5QKBStR5ZPoVzZ8ZyxTDSmNgWtRBtD7uw9QAWLVHLjiU4UCTvc4tBanoJmzyWepl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fKWhYHWnjKmbvyPRG98FsLtVzr1c9w64WdoFxS2dVSYX2gZGgLKeTxxzMJK3dMq3l ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25146 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25144 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24957 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62680 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62688 

[83] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62680

[84] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/156952 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24957 

[85] https://t.me/mod_russia/49771 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62680

[86] https://t.me/voin_dv/13794 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/157019

[87] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/157019 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13794 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66128 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62680 ;

[88] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25024

[89] https://t.me/wargonzo/25144  

[90]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0DymFC1vxaBKD8xW9qosqwBxtyE5bR7iDMvPUq81jcnxmk7zZHZRAATMBTgzL4QXcl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0u5QKBStR5ZPoVzZ8ZyxTDSmNgWtRBtD7uw9QAWLVHLjiU4UCTvc4tBanoJmzyWepl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fKWhYHWnjKmbvyPRG98FsLtVzr1c9w64WdoFxS2dVSYX2gZGgLKeTxxzMJK3dMq3l ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12195 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25146 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25026

[91] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25026 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24995

[92] https://t.me/tass_agency/304661  

[93] https://x.com/Ryan72101/status/1898194076572283278 ; https://t.co/Y2EezulJII

[94] https://x.com/Ryan72101/status/1898194076572283278; https://t.me/fobos_bpla/143671 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25007

[95] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1012603; https://t.me/tass_agency/304546 ; https://t.me/roe_russia/1703