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Operation Peace
Coalition and Iraqi commanders had long-recognized the threat posed by the continued Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia and Iranian-backed Special Groups safe havens in Baghdad. In late 2007, they began to prepare for an operation to clear Sadr City. The plans called for an extensive period of preparatory operations, where Coalition and Iraqi forces would “isolate and target [Special Groups] criminals over time, eventually planning at some point to enter into the area.”1 Indeed, in the early months of 2008, the isolation and targeting phase was well underway, as US and Iraqi forces were tightening the cordon around Sadr City.2 The operations in Shaab and Ur against the Hasnawi network permitted the US and Iraqi forces to tighten the cordon around Sadr City. 3 By February, U.S. forces had encircled Sadr City andconstructed several Joint Security Stations (JSS) along the borders of the district. These stations allowed Coalition and Iraqi forces to maintain a permanent presence along the borders of Sadr City, so as to interdict criminal movement into and out of the district.
Presumably, the isolation and targeting of criminal elements in Sadr City would have continued well into the spring of 2008, until conditions for the full-scale clearing operations were set. However, in late March, Prime Minister Maliki’s security offensive in Basra (Operation Knight's Charge) sparked a forceful reaction by Shi’a militias in Baghdad, which prompted Coalition and Iraqi commanders to accelerate their plans to enter and clear Sadr City.
The crackdown in Basra prompted a strong, and in some cases violent, backlash by Sadr’s supporters in Baghdad. Civil disobedience movements and protests were conducted in a number of neighborhoods, including Sadr City, Aamel, Bayaa,
and Shula. Over the course of the week, Coalition and Iraqi patrols were engaged by gunmen in the Sadrist strongholds of east Baghdad and Kadhimiyah. It is highly likely that mainstream JAM militiamen were involved, although level of enemy coordination during a number of the attacks suggests Special Groups’ leadership. However, the Special Groups caused the greatest threat to security and stability in the capital by launching indirect fire attacks. During the last week of March, Special Groups fired barrages of Iranian rockets and mortars at the Green Zone each day, aimed at the Government of Iraq and Coalition headquarters.4 While a number of the enemy rockets and mortars hit their intended target, others fell on nearby residential neighborhoods, causing dozens of casualties.5 Most of the rocket launch sites were traced to Sadr City,6 and over the course of the week, Coalition Forces aggressively pursued those responsible.7
In early April, U.S. and Iraqi forces began moving into the western and northern fringes of Sadr City.8 The purpose of the operation was to drive JAM and Special Groups criminals out of firing range of the Green Zone. Their efforts, therefore, focused on the Tharwa and Jameela neighborhoods in the southern third of the Sadr City. As Coalition and Iraqi Forces entered the district, they faced fierce resistance from the Shi’a militias, who had fortified their defenses with IEDs, including especially-lethal EFPs. Groups of militiamen frequently engaged Coalition and Iraqi Forces with small arms fire.
Over the next few weeks, U.S. and Iraqi forces fought to establish permanent positions in the first third of Sadr City.9 As they pushed into the district, they also conducted preparatory operations “to shape the battlefield in Sadr City by cordoning off the main entry and exit points, building new check posts, instituting a vehicle ban, conducting a series patrols and humanitarian missions, carrying out targeted raids against Mahdi Army and Special Groups leaders, and providing a blanket of aerial coverage from unmanned aerial vehicles and helicopters from US Army air weapons teams.”10 Coalition air assets engaged a number of criminals as they attacked Iraqi patrols or attempted to launch mortar or rocket rounds.11
During the initial push into Sadr City, Iraqi units were several hundred yards ahead of their U.S. counterparts.12 This move was intended to put an ‘Iraqi face’ on the operation, given the hostile operating environment for U.S. Soldiers. In the face of heavy resistance, some of the more inexperienced Iraqi units pulled back from their forward positions; however, the government forces did not cede the ground, as more seasoned Iraqi units rushed to replace them.13 While the fierce nemy resistance and complex urban terrain challenged their initial drive, the Iraqi Security Forces demonstrated improved performance and capability.14 They were able to occupy permanent positions in the neighborhoods, albeit with Coalition logistics, intelligence, and aviation support.15
Throughout April, U.S. and Iraqi forces continued their push into Sadr City.16 As they did so, they faced fierce resistance from the Shi’a militias, who had fortified their defenses with IEDs and EFPs. Groups of militiamen frequently engaged Coalition and Iraqi Forces with small arms fire. Coalition Air Weapons Teams frequently targeted JAM and Special Group elements attempting to launch indirect fire attacks or emplacing IEDs.17
In mid-April, Coalition Forces began construction on a wall along al-Quds Street, on the northern edge of the Jameela and Tharwa neighborhoods.18 Coalition Forces had walled off the southern edges of the district the year before, and the new construction sought to prevent the infiltration of militia elements from the northern section of Sadr City. Coalition Forces intended to create a “safe neighborhood” in the southern third of Sadr City, as they had done with much success elsewhere in Baghdad. The partition would prevent JAM and Special Groups members from carrying out attacks in the southern section, while enabling Iraqi and Coalition Forces to accelerate reconstruction and humanitarian assistance efforts. Indeed, on April 12, Prime Minister Maliki ordered additional food rations for Sadr City residents in order to prevent shortages stemming from the vehicle ban.19 Several days later, Iraqi Army troops launched an operation to provide medical assistance to residents of the southern section of Sadr City.20
As the construction of the wall progressed throughout late April, Coalition and Iraqi units building the partition became magnets for JAM and Special Groups attacks.21 Militia fighters desperately sought to halt its construction, and launched persistent and complex attacks with rocket-propelled grenades, machine guns, IEDs, and small arms fire. Some managed to blow several holes in the wall; others planted EFPs along stretches of the barrier.22 Sandstorms also slowed the construction efforts, as U.S. helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were unable to provide necessary air support. 23 This inclement weather did not only slow construction; on April 28, a sandstorm provided cover for militia groups to launch a complex attack on Coalition Forces patrolling near the wall.24 In the ensuing fight, U.S. forces killed 28 JAM fighters; six U.S. Soldiers were also wounded in the engagement.25
In addition to the construction efforts, Coalition UAVs and air weapons teams provided constant surveillance of the northern section of Sadr City. 26 Throughout April, they frequently targeted JAM and Special Group elements attempting to launch indirect fire attacks or emplacing IEDs.27 These air assets were also deployed to the areas surrounding Sadr City in order to contain the violence. Six Apache helicopters were stationed over northern and eastern Baghdad at all times.28 As a result, militia groups bore heavy casualties throughout the April fighting. More than 160 enemy fighters were killed; sixty-one rocket and mortar teams were also destroyed.29 The areas surrounding al-Quds Street also suffered heavy collateral damage, asmany buildings were destroyed in the crossfire.
By early May, the operations in Sadr City were beginning to bear fruit. Construction on the wall was nearly complete and the number of indirect fire attacks on the Green Zone fell sharply.30 Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces maintained control of the southern third of Sadr City, while Special Groups and JAM criminals continued to suffer heavy losses. On May 3, Coalition Forces launched a precision strike on a Special Groups command center in northern Sadr City. The command center was located in a trailer near the al-Sadr hospital, in a placement often used by Special Groups to discourage Coalition strikes.31
The attack destroyed the trailer, killing a top Special Groups commander and injuring several other criminals. No patients in the hospital were wounded, although nearly two dozen civilians were injured nearby.32 Several reports suggested that Arkan Hasnawi was killed in the attack. Hasnawi was a senior Special Groups leader in northeastern Baghdad, who was responsible for the uptick in violence in the Shaab and Ur neighborhoods in early 2008. However, amidst conflicting reports, the identity of the leader has not been publically confirmed. Still, the destruction of the Special Groups commandcenter and the loss in its senior leadership dealt a significant blow to the militias.
The Sadrist Trend vs. the Jaysh al-Mahdi
The Coalition and Iraqi operations in Sadr City prompted a political crisis. In late April, the main parliamentary blocs granted Prime Minister Maliki a mandate for the operations and he vowed to continue the crackdown.33 As they became more politically isolated, Sadrist politicians came under increasing pressure to negotiate a ceasefire, particularly from the residents of Sadr City who were suffering under the cordon.334 Civilians were the primary victims of the violence, as the exchanges of fire killed or wounded many and caused extensive property damage, particularly in the areas near al-Quds Street. It is likely that the threat of the further collateral damage, which would have resulted from a push into the northern sector of Sadr City, played an important role in the Sadrist’s willingness to negotiate a ceasefire. Additionally, the Sadrist politicians were also pressured by the Iranians, who also pushed for an end to fighting “by throwing their weight behind the government after a delegation of Shiite members of Parliament visited Iran earlier [that] month.”35
Like the Sadrist political faction, Jaysh al-Mahdi and Special Groups also came under growing pressure to end the hostilities. Aside from suffering heavy losses, they were increasingly blamed by residents for civilian casualties.36 Food, oil, and medicine shortages were intensified as JAM gunmen targeted vehicles carrying thosesupplies.37 This further alienated the population. Hence, the Shi’a militias faced the threat of continued fighting and casualties, in addition to a loss of popular support.
On May 10, after several days of negotiations, Salah al Obeidi, a top Sadrist aide, announced that a deal had been reached to end the fighting.38 The Sadrist Trend negotiated the deal with the majority bloc in parliament, the United Iraqi Alliance. The fourteen-point agreement stipulated that JAM would cease all armed activities and the government would gain control over the entire district. In exchange, the deal restricted government raids, allowing arrests only for those actively involved in the violence. JAM would not be disbanded, but instead would be prohibited from publically displaying weapons.39 The agreement also called for the reopening of roads into the district and an increase in humanitarian assistance in order to relieve the burden on Sadr City residents.
The truce was formally announced in the Green Zone on May 11; however, in Sadr City, there was not an immediate end to the fighting.40 Indeed, clashes between Coalition Soldiers and the militias persisted for several days. Gunmen continued their attempts to destroy the wall, while targeting Coalition and Iraqi forces protecting it.41 The lingering violence suggested that the Sadrist politicians were having difficulty imposing the agreement on the armed wing of their movement.42
Operation Peace
By the end of the week, Sadr City quieted. Despite reports of sporadic fighting, the ceasefire finally appeared to take hold.43 The Iraqi government expanded its humanitarian efforts in the district, providing essential services and aid.44 At the same time, the Iraqi Security Forces prepared for an offensive to assert its control over the northern sector of district. The offensive, termed Operation Peace, began early on the morning of May 20. The first phase of the operation called for the Iraqi forces to take control of the main roads in the district.45 To do so, six Iraqi Army battalions moved north along the six major thoroughfares in Sadr City in “long columns of Iraqi armored personnel carriers, tanks and trucks … some flying the Iraqi flag.”46 The force of roughly 10,000 continued to clear IEDs, while also occupying permanent positions throughout the northern sector of the district.47 Coalition Forces did not participate in the ground operations, unlike during the Basra offensive, where Coalition military advisers were embedded with Iraqi Units.48 They did, however, provide intelligence and air support.49
As the Iraqi forces moved further into Sadr City, they faced no resistance. By midday on May 20, they had moved deep into the northern sector and were take up key positions at the major hospitals and police stations without incident.50 The atmosphere in Sadr City remained quiet as Iraqi units fanned out throughout the district and set up a number of checkpoints.51
The second phase of the offensive called for wide-scale clearing operations to rid the district of illegal weapons. Shortly after they took up positions in the northern section of Sadr City, the Iraqi Security Forces began these operations. In the weeks that followed, government troops uncovered a staggering amount of weapons. By June 5, they had seized more than one hundred weapons caches.52 By June 16, the total number of weapons discovered rose to nearly 8,000, a vast number of which were traced to Iran.53
The Enemy Response: The Flight From Sadr City
The calm in Sadr City stemmed not only from the ceasefire, but from the fact that most JAM and Special Groups commanders fled the district in the wake of the agreement. Indeed, by early June, ninety percent of militia fighters had left the area.54 When the Iraqi Security Forces launched Operation Peace in Sadr City, there was a noticeable uptick in Special Groups violence elsewhere in the capital, particularly in the nearby 9 Nissan district and in the Shaab and Ur neighborhoods of the Adhamiyah district. Since many of the Coalition forces that pushed into Sadr City in April came from the neighborhoods bordering the district, the smaller troop presence prompted militants to move into the area.55 On May 19, the day before Iraqi Forces moved into the northern sector of the district, Coalition and Iraqi troops conducted an operation in Shaab to address the uptick in militia activity. As U.S. forces maintained the cordon, Iraqi soldiers and police raided mosque, where they found a large weapons cache; simultaneous house-to-house clearing efforts also resulted in the arrest of twenty-two suspected militiamen.56
Other criminals fled to western Baghdad, particularly to the Sadrist stronghold of Shula in the Kadhimiyah district. While Special Groups violence flared in this area in the immediate wake of the Basra offensive, further clashes erupted when the ceasefire went into effect as militia elements from eastern Baghdad reinforced the area.57 It appears that Special Groups and JAM commanders fled northeast Baghdad, through the Special Groups hubs of Rashidiyah and Husayniyah just north of the capital, and over into northwest Baghdad. In the days surrounding the launch of Operation Peace, Coalition and Iraqi forces captured a number of Special Groups leaders transiting through Rashidiyah and Husayniyah.58 In Shula, which was at the time considered a “high-threat area and a stronghold for Special Groups,”59 militiamen clashed with Iraqi and Coalition troops, as U.S. helicopters provided air support.60 In order to contain the violence, U.S. and Iraqi troops conducted a number of operations in late May and early June to dismantle the Special Groups network in the area, seizing numerous Iranian weapons caches and capturing several key leaders.61
In the wake of the negotiations, many JAM and Special Groups leaders also fled Baghdad altogether. While top Special Groups leaders, including those that survived the May 3 missile strike in Sadr City, fled to Iran, other mid-level JAM and Special Groups commanders fled to Sadrist strongholds in southern Iraq.62 The cities of Kut and Amarah—both important hubs of militia activity given their large populations of Sadrist supporters and their proximity to the Iranian border—were the primary destinations of fleeing fighters.63 Those who escaped from Sadr City joined JAM and Special Groups fighters who had fled Basra in the wake of offensive operations that were launched in the southern city in late March. As it became evident that Maysan province was the last major refuge for these Shi’a militia groups, Iraqi forces prepared for another major
offensive, Operation Promises of Peace.
Excerpted from Marisa Cochrane, "Special Groups Regenerate," Iraq Report 11, Institute for the Study of War.
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1. Maj. Gen. Jeffery Hammond, Department of Defense New Briefing with Multi-National Division-Baghdad, June 2, 2008.
2. Maj. Gen. Jeffery Hammond, Department of Defense New Briefing with Multi-National Division-Baghdad, June 2, 2008.
3. Maj. Gen. Jeffery Hammond, Department of Defense New Briefing with Multi-National Division-Baghdad, June 2, 2008.
4. Multi-National Corps – Iraq Press Release No. 20080326-03, “4 attacks from Sadr City strike Baghdad,” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, March 26, 2008; Multi-National Corps – Iraq Press Release No. 20080326-10, “MND-B Soldiers detain three linked to indirect fire attacks,” Multi-National Corps – Iraq PAO, March 26, 2008; Multi-National Corps – Iraq Press Release No. 20080327-02, “MNDB attack aviation crews destroy enemy positions,” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, March 27, 2008; Multi-National Corps – Iraq Press Release No. 20080327-12, "Terrorists launch eleven indirect
fire attacks, other unrest (Baghdad)," Multi-National Division Baghdad PAO, March 27, 2008; "U.S. base in Baghdad attacked,” Voices of Iraq, March 28, 2008.
5. “Mortar shelling leaves 21 casualties in Baghdad,” Voices of Iraq, March 28, 2008.
6. Multi-National Corps – Iraq Press Release No. 20080326-03, “4 attacks from Sadr City strike Baghdad,” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, March 26, 2008.
7. Multi-National Corps – Iraq Press Release No. 20080327-02, “MND-B attack aviation crews destroy enemy positions,” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, March 27, 2008.
8. AE/SR, “20 killed, 53 wounded in Sadr City clashes,” Voices of Iraq, April 4, 2008; James Glanz, “A Dozen Iraqis Die in Continuing Fighting in Sadr City, and Bombs Kill Three Americans,” The New York Times, April 10, 2008.
9. Liz Sly, “U.S. reaches out in Iraq to fighters loyal to Sadr; A strategy that built Sunni support hits a hurdle with Shiites as cleric, government resist compromise,” The Chicago Tribune, April 17, 2008, ZONE C, Pg. 8.
10. Bill Roggio, “US, Iraqi troops prepare the battlefield in Sadr City,” The Long War Journal, April 12, 2008.
11. Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080406-09, “MND-B aerial weapons team kills 9 criminals,” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, April 6, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release no. 20080407-16, “Aircraft drops bombs
on criminal mortar site (Baghdad),” Multi-National Corps-Iraq PAO, April 7, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No 20080410-09, “MNDB Air Weapons teams engage criminals (Baghdad),” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, April 10,
2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080413-04, “MND-B Air Weapons Team engages IED emplacers, wounds three locals (Baghdad),” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, April 13, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080414-04, “MND-B Soldiers defend themselves, kill 6 criminals,” Multi-National Division – Baghdad
PAO, April 14, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080425-05, “NPs search for cache in psychiatric hospital in New Baghdad,” 4th BCT PAO, 10th Mtn. Div. Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, April 25, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080501-05, “MND-B soldiers kill 8 criminals,” Multi-National Corps – Iraq PAO, May 1,2008.
12. Michael R. Gordon, “Fight for Sadr City a Proving Ground for Iraq Military,” The New York Times, April 11, 2008.
13. Michael R. Gordon, “Iraqi Unit Flees Post, Despite American’s Plea,” The New York Times, April 16, 2008.
14. Michael R. Gordon, “Fight for Sadr City a Proving Ground for Iraq Military,” The New York Times, April 11, 2008.
15. Michael R. Gordon, “Fight for Sadr City a Proving Ground for Iraq Military,” The New York Times, April 11, 2008.
16. Liz Sly, “U.S. reaches out in Iraq to fighters loyal to Sadr; A strategy that built Sunni support hits a hurdle with Shiites as cleric, government resist compromise,” The Chicago Tribune, April 17, 2008, ZONE C; Pg. 8.
17. Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080410-09, “MND-B Air Weapons Teams engage criminals (Baghdad),” Multi-National Division
– Baghdad PAO, April 10, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080420-04, “MNDB engage criminals, Soldiers seize weapons in separate operations,” Multi-National Corps – Iraq PAO, April 20, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080428-10, “AWT, MND-B tank crew kill seven criminals (Baghdad),” Multi-National Division
– Baghdad PAO, April 28, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080426-08, “MND-B UAV kills 2 special group criminals; Iraqi Army, National Police seize munitions caches,” Multi-National Corps – Iraq PAO, April 26, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080412-02, “Coalition forces return fire after complex attack in Sadr City (Baghdad),” 3rd BCT PAO, 4th Inf. Div., Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, April 12, 2008.
18. Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Begins Erecting Wall in Sadr City,” The New York Times, April 18, 2008.
19. “Maliki orders extra foodstuffs quota for Sadr City residents,” Voices of Iraq, April 14, 2008.
20. Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080419-07, “Iraqi Army provides first aid supplies to Sadr City residents,” Multi-National Corps – Iraq PAO, April 19, 2008.
21. Sholnn Freeman, “Iraqi, U.S. Forces Put Pressure on Mahdi Army,” The Washington Post, April 19, 2008, A10.
22. Michael R. Gordon, “War over the Wall Persists,” The New York Times, May 15, 2008.
23. Sholnn Freeman, “Iraqi, U.S. Forces Put Pressure on Mahdi Army,” The Washington Post, April 19, 2008, A10; “Sadr City barrier works suspended – NYT,” Voices of Iraq, April 19, 2008.
24. Bill Roggio, “Sadr City barrier ‘a magnet’ for Mahdi Army attacks,” The Long War Journal, May 2, 2008.
25. Bill Roggio, “Sadr City barrier ‘a magnet’ for Mahdi Army attacks,” The Long War Journal, May 2, 2008.
26. Note - Air weapons teams consist of two Apache helicopters.
27. Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080410-09, “MND-B Air Weapons Teams engage criminals (Baghdad),” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, April 10, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080420-04, “MNDB
engage criminals, Soldiers seize weapons in separate operations,” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, April 20, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080428-10, “AWT, MND-B tank crew kill seven criminals (Baghdad),” Multi-
National Division – Baghdad PAO, April 28, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080426-08, “MND-B UAV kills 2 special group criminals; Iraqi Army, National Police seize munitions caches,” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO,
April 26, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080412-02, “Coalition forces return fire after complex attack in Sadr City (Baghdad),” 3rd BCT PAO, 4th Inf. Div., Multi-National Division– Baghdad PAO, April 12, 2008.
28. Bill Murray, “Battle Over Sadr City Defines Apache Helicopter Regiment’s Tour in Iraq,” The Long War Journal, July 8, 2008.
29. Amit R. Paley, “Attacks on Green Zone Drop Sharply, U.S. Says; Joint Offensive With Iraqis Is Credited With Curbing Militancy in Cleric’s Stronghold,” The Washington Post, April 24, 2008, A10; Department of Defense New Briefing with Maj. Gen. Jeffery Hammond, Multi-National Division-Baghdad, June 2, 2008.
30. Amit R. Paley, “Attacks on Green Zone Drop Sharply, U.S. Says; Joint Offensive With Iraqis Is Credited With Curbing Militancy in Cleric’s Stronghold,” The Washington Post, April 24, 2008, A10
31. Bradley Brook, “US strike takes out suspected militant hideout in Sadr City,” Associated Press, May 3, 2008.
32. Bradley Brook, “US strike takes out suspected militanthideout in Sadr City,” Associated Press, May 3, 2008.
33. “PM vows to continue crackdown on militiamen,” Voices of Iraq, May 1, 2008.
34. “Iraqi PM calls on Sadr city residents to cooperate with gov’t forces-statement,” Voices of Iraq, May 1, 2008; “Tribal chieftain held rally to stop military operations in Sadr city,” Voices of Iraq, May 5, 2008.
35. Alissa J. Rubin, “Sadrists and Iraqi Government Reach Truce Deal,” The New York Times, May 11, 2008.
36. Alissa J. Rubin, “Sadrists and Iraqi Government Reach Truce Deal,” The New York Times, May 11, 2008.
37. “At least 925 killed in Sadr city clashes- spokesman,” Voices of Iraq, May 1, 2008.
38. Sholnn Freeman and Ernesto Londoño, "Deal Reached to End Fighting in Sadr City; Agreement Reported by Aide to Cleric,” The Washington Post, May 11, 2008, A21.
39. Howard Lafranchi, “Hasty truce with Moqtada al-Sadr tests his sway in Baghdad stronghold,” The Christian Science Monitor, May 12, 2008.
40. “Iraq: Elusive Cease-Fire in Al-Sadr City Begs New Questions,” Radio Free Europe, May 14, 2008.
41. Michael R. Gordon, “War Over Wall Persists in Sadr City Despite Truce,” The New York Times, May 15, 2008.
42. Michael R. Gordon and Stephen Farrell, “In Sadr City, a Cease-Fire Is Put to the Test, and Fails,” The NewYork Times, May 12, 2008.
43. Aseel Kami and Tim Cocks, “Seven die in clashes in Baghdad’s Sadr City,” Reuters, May 15, 2008; “Calm prevails in Sadr City, says spokesman,” Voices of Iraq, May 16, 2008; Alissa J. Rubin, “Truce Holds in Sadr City Amid Patrols by Iraqi Army,” The New York Times, May 18, 2008.
44. Spc. April Campbell, Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080515-06, “IA, GoI, local government take lead in providing aid to Sadr City residents,” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, May 15, 2008; “Services to Sadr city starting
from Sunday – spokesperson,” Voices of Iraq, May 18, 2008; “Sadr City residents start receiving urgent services – spokesman,” Voices of Iraq, May 18, 2008; “Exceptional campaign to provide services to Sadr city – Baghdad operations,” Voices of Iraq, May 20, 2008.
45. Ernesto Londoño, "Iraqi Troops Enter Baghdad’s Shiite Stronghold," The Washington Post, May 20, 2008.
46. Michael R. Gordon and Stephen Farrell, “Iraqi Troops Take Charge of Sadr City in Swift Push,” The New York Times, May 21, 2008.
47.Wisam Mohammed and Aseel Kami, “Iraqi troops test truce in cleric stronghold,” Reuters, May 21, 2008.
48. Michael R. Gordon and Stephen Farrell, “Iraqi Troops Take Charge of Sadr City in Swift Push,” The New York Times, May 21, 2008.
49. Michael R. Gordon and Stephen Farrell, “Iraqi Troops Take Charge of Sadr City in Swift Push,” The New York Times, May 21, 2008.
50. Michael R. Gordon and Stephen Farrell, “Iraqi Troops Take Charge of Sadr City in Swift Push,” The New York Times, May 21, 2008.
51. Ernesto Londoño, "Iraqi Troops Enter Baghdad’s Shiite Stronghold," The Washington Post, May 20,2008.
52. Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080606-12, “IA Soldiers find 100th cache, continue securing Sadr City,” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, June 6, 2008.
53. Kim Gamel, “More weapons caches turning up in Iraq,” The Associated Press, June 19, 2008.
54. Department of Defense New Briefing with Maj. Gen. Jeffery Hammond, Multi-National Division-Baghdad, June 2, 2008.
55. Michael R. Gordon, “Iraqi Forces Find Weapons Cache in Baghdad Mosque,” The New York Times, May 20, 2008.
56. Michael R. Gordon, “Iraqi Forces Find Weapons Cache in Baghdad Mosque,” The New York Times, May 20, 2008.
57. Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080421-04, “Special Group criminals continue attacks against Iraqi people and U.S. Soldiers,” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, April 21, 2008; “11 gunmen killed in Baghdad in 24 hours,” Voices of Iraq, May 7, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080508-06, “ISF, MND-B soldiers engage IED emplacers and armed criminals; find weapons caches in Baghdad,” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, May 8, 2008; Multi-National Corps- Iraq Press Release No. 20080512-01, “MND-B Soldiers seize munitions, detain criminals (Baghdad),”Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, May 12, 2008; “8 gunmen killed, 23 wanted men arrested under Baghdad security plan,” Voices of Iraq, May13, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080513-07, “MND-B Soldier attacked by IED (Baghdad),” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, May 13, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080515-02, “MND-B Soldiers kill 5 criminals (Kadamiyah),” Multi-National Division– Baghdad PAO, May 15, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080518-05, “MNDB soldiers kill two criminals, seize munitions caches,” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, May 18, 2008; Waleed Ibrahim and Tim Cocks, “Baghdad fighting kills 6: Iraqi police,” Reuters, May 14, 2008.
58. Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080516-01, “Iraqi Army captures Special Groups cell leader in Husayniyah,” Multi-National Corps – Iraq PAO, May 16, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080518-06, “Iraqi Army captures Special Groups IED cell leader in Husayniyah,” Multi-National Corps – Iraq PAO, May 18, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 17-008-054, “Coalition forces capture four suspected Special Groups criminals,” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, May 23, 2008.
59. Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No.20080625-05, “Iraqi Special Operations Forces capture suspected Special Groups criminal,” Multi-National Corps – Iraq PAO, June 25, 2008.
60. Waleed Ibrahim and Tim Cocks, “Baghdad fighting kills 6: Iraqi police,” Reuters, May 14, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080515-02, “MND-B Soldiers kill 5 criminals (Kadamiyah),” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, May 15, 2008.
61. Bill Roggio “Operation to clear the Mahdi Army in Baghdad’s Shula neighborhood on hold,” The Long War Journal, May 31, 2008; Multi-National Force-Iraq Press Release A080601a-058, “Four Special Groups members captured in Kadhamiyah,” Multi- National Force – Iraq Press Desk, June 1, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080603-03, “ISF, MND-B Soldiers engage criminals, take weapons off streets,” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, June 3, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080603-08, “ISF, MND-B Soldiers detain one suspected insurgent, seize weapons caches in Baghdad,” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, June 3, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080604-05, “IA, MND-B Soldiers find multiple weapons caches,” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, June 4, 2008;Multi-National Corps- Iraq Press Release No. 20080607-11, “IA soldiers continue seizing caches in Sadr City,” Multi-National Division – North PAO, June 7, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080608-04, “ISF, MND-B Soldiers detain three, seize weapons,” Multi-National Division – Baghdad, June 8, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080609-04, “IA, MND-B Soldiers seize more weapons,” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, June 9,
2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080610-11, “ISF, MND-B Soldiers seize weapons throughout Baghdad,” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, June 10, 2008; Multi-National Corps-Iraq Press Release No. 20080611-02, “NPs, MND-B Soldiers seize weapons in Baghdad,” Multi-National Division – Baghdad PAO, June 11, 2008.
62. Department of Defense New Briefing with Maj. Gen. Jeffery Hammond, Multi-National Division-Baghdad,June 2, 2008.
63. Multi-National Force-Iraq Press Release A008-067, “Coalition forces capture three Special Groups criminals in Kut,” Multi-National Force – Iraq Press Desk, June 18, 2008; Bill Roggio, “Iraqi offensive underway against the Mahdi Army in Maysan,” The Long War Journal, June 14, 2008.