Publications

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, October 26, 2023

October 27, 2023 - ISW Press

A recent poll revealed broad backing among Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) supporters for a joint KMT-TPP presidential ticket. 81 percent of KMT supporters and 67 percent of TPP supporters approve of a joint presidential ticket, according to data from the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF). The polling data is consistent with ISW’s assessments that the two candidates will form a joint ticket, but such a ticket is unlikely to capture the entirety of each candidate’s support base.

Iran Update, October 26, 2023

October 26, 2023 - ISW Press

Palestinian militias continued attacks at their usual rate from the Gaza Strip into Israel on October 26. The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas’ militant wing—claimed responsibility for 10 indirect fire attacks. Saraya al Quds—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—claimed responsibility for five mortar and rocket attacks. The al Aqsa Matyrs’ Brigade, which claims it is affiliated with Fatah, claimed responsibility for one rocket attack. Fatah denies that it has any connection to the al Aqsa Matyrs’ Brigade, however. The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades—the militant wing of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—claimed responsibility for two rocket attacks. Axis of Resistance-affiliated media reported five other unclaimed mortar and rocket attacks.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 26, 2023

October 26, 2023 - ISW Press

Heavy Russian equipment losses around Avdiivka will likely undermine Russian offensive capabilities over the long term.
Ukrainian forces marginally advanced on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Ukrainian officials denied reports that Ukraine suspended a corridor for civilian vessels in the Black Sea on October 26.
An amendment to the Russian citizenship law allowing for the revocation of naturalized Russian citizenship came into force on October 26, providing the Russian government with a new mechanism to coerce migrants into Russian military service.
A senior Hamas delegation traveled to Moscow and met with Russian and Iranian officials on October 26.

Iran Update, October 25, 2023

October 25, 2023 - ISW Press

Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” are pursuing a coordinated strategy to (1) deter Israel from trying to destroy Hamas in the Gaza Strip, (2) prevent Israel from destroying Hamas if deterrence fails, and (3) deter the United States from providing military support to Israel’s ground operation in the Gaza Strip. Iran and its proxy and partner militias throughout the Middle East seek to ensure Hamas’ long-term survival, as Israel has indicated that it will soon launch a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip to destroy Hamas. The Iran-led effort to prevent this outcome is occurring along four main geographic axes: the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, southern Lebanon, and the broader Middle East. The following text examines the campaign objectives that CTP-ISW assesses that the Axis of Resistance is pursuing on each axis in support of its strategic objectives of deterring Israel and the United States.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 25, 2023

October 25, 2023 - ISW Press

Ukrainian forces marginally advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast and continued offensive operations near Bakhmut on October 25. Geolocated footage published on October 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces made further marginal advances west of Robotyne. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also achieved unspecified partial success west of Verbove (9km west of Robotyne). Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated on October 24 that Ukrainian forces are conducting offensive operations near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).

Salafi-Jihadi Movement Weekly Update, October 25, 2023

October 25, 2023 - ISW Press

The Malian junta and its Wagner Group auxiliaries cannot backfill withdrawing UN forces in northern Mali while maintaining pressure across the country, which will likely create gaps for al Qaeda­–affiliated militants to exploit in central Mali. Al Qaeda–affiliated militants and the Tuareg rebels are at least tacitly supporting each other operationally in northern Mali and may explicitly be coordinating some attacks, which will prolong the conflict and further strain the junta’s capacity issues.

Iran Update, October 24, 2023

October 24, 2023 - ISW Press

Hamas and its allies are preparing the information environment to blame Israel for the possible deaths of hostages in the Gaza Strip, especially if Hamas begins killing hostages. Hamas military spokesperson Abu Ubaida said on October 9 that Hamas would kill hostages in response to Israeli airstrikes, indicating Hamas’ willingness to do so for perceived military and/or political gains. Tasnim News Agency—an Iranian outlet affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—reported on October 22 that Israel’s “clandestine goal” is to “cause the killing of captive Israelis,” according to “informed sources. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) spokesperson Abu Hamza said on October 24 that Israel does not “pay attention” to the lives of hostages.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 24, 2023

October 24, 2023 - ISW Press

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern and southern Ukraine on October 24 and advanced south of Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on October 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced east of Andriivka (10 km southwest of Bakhmut), and geolocated footage published on October 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced west of Robotyne. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on October 24 that Ukrainian forces continued offensive actions south of Bakhmut and achieved partial success near Robotyne.

Iran Update, October 23, 2023

October 23, 2023 - ISW Press

Iranian officials and media are continuing their attempts to deter an Israeli ground operation into the Gaza Strip while also attempting to reassure their domestic and Axis of Resistance audiences that such an operation will fail. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency outlined the “significant challenges” that Israel will face in conducting a ground operation into the Gaza Strip, highlighting Hamas’ anti-tank capabilities. Iranian state media similarly argued that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s senior advisers fear Hamas and further outlined several “challenges” facing Israeli ground operations into the strip, including declining public support, weakened relations with the Arab world, a high military death toll, and the potential for a geographic expansion of the conflict. IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi similarly warned that Israel would suffer a “disgraceful” defeat at the hands of the Palestinian resistance were it to enter the Gaza Strip during an interview IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 23, 2023

October 23, 2023 - ISW Press

Russia's domestic production of artillery shells, supplemented by increased ammunition imports from North Korea, will likely allow Russian forces to sustain sufficient rates of artillery fire in Ukraine in 2024, albeit at a relatively lower level than during 2022.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Avdiivka and made confirmed advances northeast of Avdiivka.
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces back from some newly captured positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast but noted that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence on the east bank.
Russian forces conducted another series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 22 to 23.
Ukrainian forces advanced south of Bakhmut on October 23 amid continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

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