Publications

Iran Update, July 5, 2023

Palestinian militants thanked Iran and the broader Axis of Resistance for their help during the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) raid in Jenin and likely will receive Iranian assistance to rebuild the military capabilities the IDF degraded.
Iranian officials inflated the amount of Iranian funds that a recent US sanctions waiver for Iraq will provide, possibly to inspire confidence in Iran’s economy and currency. News of similar waivers for Iraq has coincided with short-term improvements for the Iranian economy.

Iran became a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on July 4, which may enable it to circumvent sanctions through non-US dollar financial transactions with other SCO countries. Iran could benefit militarily from its membership in the SCO through participation in counterterrorism and naval exercises.

Iran attempted to seize two US oil tankers in the Strait on July 5, likely to assert its control over the Strait of Hormuz given the recent US naval deployments to the Persian Gulf. Iran also likely sought to pressure the US to accede to Iran’s demands in the nuclear negotiations.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 4, 2023

Ukrainian forces appear to be focusing on creating an asymmetrical attrition gradient that conserves Ukrainian manpower at the cost of a slower rate of territorial gains, while gradually wearing down Russian manpower and equipment. Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov reported on July 4 that Ukrainian forces are performing their main task of destroying Russian manpower, equipment, fuel depots, artillery, and air defenses and that a “war of destruction is equal to a war of kilometers.” Danilov’s assessment underlines the prioritization of Ukraine’s ongoing campaign to attrit Russian manpower and assets over attempting to conduct massive sweeping mechanized maneuvers to regain large swaths of territory rapidly. NATO Military Committee Chair Admiral Bob Bauer reported on July 3 that Ukrainian forces are correct to proceed cautiously and avoid high casualties in the counteroffensive and acknowledged that the counteroffensive is difficult due to landmines and other obstacles up to 30km deep into Russian-occupied territory. Bauer stated that Ukrainian forces should not face criticism or pressure for moving slowly.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 2, 2023

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted counteroffensive operations in six sectors of the front on July 2 and made gains in some of these areas. The Russian Ministry of Defense and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Lyman direction, in the Bakhmut area, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front, in western Donetsk Oblast, on the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported on July 2 that Ukrainian forces are continuing to make unspecified advances on the flanks around Bakhmut. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made unspecified gains southwest of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut). Geolocated footage published on July 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced northeast of Volodymyrivka (12km southeast of Vuhledar) in western Donetsk Oblast. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations south and southwest of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced towards Russian trench positions near Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv) and that there is ongoing close combat in these trenches. Some Russian sources continue to describe these Ukrainian counteroffensive operations as smaller tactical operations than earlier Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.

Iran Update, June 30, 2023

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC QF) and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) established a headquarters in eastern Syria, probably to coordinate arms transfers, intelligence collection, and training for Iranian-backed militants in Syria.

The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and Russian forces conducted air strikes on rebel groups in Idlib Province shortly after the failure of the latest normalization and Astana Talks, and Iran may send Iranian-backed militants to in northwestern Syria to support the pro-regime operations.

Iran's worsening water crisis is increasing food insecurity and internal migration, which will likely fuel greater popular unrest in the coming years.