The Return of Special Groups

The Return of Special Groups

As predicted in Iraq Report XI,Special Groups Regenerate, Special Groups fighters are returning to Iraq from Iran to destabilize security. In the last few weeks, several Iraqi and Coalition officials have echoed this concern.¹  With provincial elections slated to be held in the coming months, these “assassination squads” will likely work to undermine democratic elections by targeting key Iraqi government officials as well as Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces.²  Special Groups desire to keep the Iraqi government divided and weak so that they can operate unhindered; any attempts at national political consolidation run counter to their aims.

In the spring of 2008, Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces cleared Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia strongholds during operations in Basra, Sadr City, and Amara. Seeking to evade capture, many enemy fighters and leaders fled to Iran. In early August, an estimated 5,000 JAM and Special Groups members were in Iran, where they were being trained in advanced assassination techniques.³   The training was conducted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force and members of Lebanese Hezbollah in four Iranian camps near Qom, Tehran, Ahvaz, and Mashad.⁴  These training programs ran for four months, during which time fighters were instructed in advanced weaponry, sniper, reconnaissance, and operational security tactics. 

Special Groups are entering from Iran via traditional smuggling routes that run through Maysan province in southern Iraq.⁵

  While Coalition and Iraqi Forces have sought to interdict the movement of weapons and fighters from Iran, the long porous border, marshy terrain, and limited number of troops make for a difficult task. To further avoid detection, these fighters are returning in small groups. It is highly likely that those who have entered Iraq in the last few weeks fled to Iran in April or May in the wake of the Basra and Sadr City offensives. Having recently completed their four-month of training, they are seeking to reinfiltrate.

While nothing can yet be proven with certainty, in the last month, there have been several assassinations that suggest Special Groups involvement. They appear to be targeting high-level government officials and Sons of Iraq (SOI) leaders. On September 18^th, a Colonel in the Ministry of Interior (MOI) was killed by gunmen who fired on his moving vehicle.⁶  The next week, another high-ranking MOI official survived a similar assassination attempt as gunmen fired on his vehicle. The nature of the attacks and their similarities suggest the high degree of planning and training that is a hallmark of Special Groups.

They have also adopted “new types of explosives…which are attached under cars.”⁷

These “sticky bombs” have been used in a series of attacks on SOI leaders in the Adhamiyah neighborhood. Coalition intelligence reports have indicated that they are coming from “outside” the area, presumably from Special Groups members who have long operated out of the nearby Shaab, Ur, and Sadr City neighborhoods.⁸  These explosives are not limited to Baghdad. The chief of police in Dhi Qar province, Brigadier General Sabah al-Fatlawi, recently announced that Iraqi police have already seized twenty motorcycle bombs in Nasiriyah.⁹

Coalition and Iraqi Forces have been readying for the return of Special Groups for several months.  In mid-August, U.S. military officials gave Iraq’s National Security Adviser several lists of expected targets for the assassination campaign.¹⁰ These lists were compiled from their intelligence sources and were released to the Iraqi government so they could take preparatory measures.  U.S. troops have also posted pictures of wanted Special Groups criminals throughout Baghdad and distributed flyers offering rewards for information.¹¹  Across Iraq, Coalition and Iraqi Forces have stepped up their operations to target returning militants. In the last two weeks of September, over 107 suspected Special Groups fighters have been detained.¹²

As the majority of Special Groups fighters return from Iran over the next few months, Iraqi and U.S. troops must keep pressure on these enemy networks to prevent their destabilization of Iraqi security and stop them from undermining the upcoming provincial elections.

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[1] “Iran-trained Shiite Iraqis returning home to launch bombings: police,” Agence France Presse, September 20, 2008; “U.S. military: Iraqis trained for assassination coming home,” CNN, September 21, 2008; Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable with Colonel Philip Battaglia, Commander, 4^th Brigade Combat Team, 1^st Cavalry Division, September 3, 2008.

[2] “U.S. military: Iraqis trained for assassination coming home,” CNN, September 21, 2008.

[3] Gina Chon, “Radical Cleric in Retreat,” The Wall Street Journal, August 5, 2008.

[4] Pamela Hess, “Iran Training Iraqi Hit Squads to Assassinate US, Iraqi Troops,” Associated Press, August 15, 2008.

[5] “Iran-trained Shiite Iraqis returning home to launch bombings: police,” Agence France Presse, September 20, 2008.

[6] Sudarsan Raghavan, “Helicopter Crash Kills 7 Troops in Iraq; U.S. Soldier Held in 2 Deaths at Base,” The Washington Post, September 19, 2008.

[7] “Official warns of ‘special groups’ returning to Iraq; Ash Sharqiyah update,” BBC Monitoring Middle East—Political, June 18, 2008.

[8] Erica Goode, “Friction Infiltrates Sunni Patrols on Safer Iraqi Streets,” The New York Times, September 22, 2008.

[9] “Iran-trained Shiite Iraqis returning home to launch bombings: police,” Agence France Presse, September 20, 2008.

[10] Pamela Hess, “Iran Training Iraqi Hit Squads to Assassinate US, Iraqi Troops,” Associated Press, August 15, 2008.

[11] Pamela Hess, “Iran Training Iraqi Hit Squads to Assassinate US, Iraqi Troops,” Associated Press, August 15, 2008; “U.S. military: Iraqis trained for assassination coming home,” CNN, September 21, 2008.

[12] Bill Roggio, “US, Iraq step up operations against Iranian terror groups,” The Long War Journal, September 27, 2008.