Key Takeaways

North Korea’s May 2026 constitutional amendments cemented the regime’s strategic posture. Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) General Secretary Kim Jong Un used the revisions to codify the centrality of nuclear weapons to North Korea’s defense, sever any basis for engagement with South Korea, and free himself from the ideological constraints of Kim Il Sung’s and Kim Jong Il’s legacies.

North Korea is signaling continuous research and development of military capabilities through advancements in science and technology, revitalization of the defense industry, and labor mobilization. North Korea added two new provisions under Chapter 4 of the Constitution on “National Defense.” Article 60 now mandates the state to develop “defense science and technology” ­and raise the “Juche-oriented, modernized, and scientific level” of North Korea’s defense industry. Juche, meaning “self-reliance” in Korean, is North Korea’s state ideology emphasizing political, economic, and military independence from external influence. Article 61 established a new requirement for the state to establish a “military-first atmosphere” and prepare its population “for resistance warfare.”

North Korea has consistently embraced ambitions to invest in science and technology in the defense sector to overcome technological obstacles­­ it likely faces in advancing certain weapons systems. Kim introduced “science technology” as a key focus area for North Korean investment and policy to develop North Korea’s economy, national defense, and culture during the 7th WPK Congress in 2016.[29] South Korean think tank the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS) assessed that North Korea sought investments in defense science technologies throughout 2016 and 2020, leading to advancements in its nuclear and missile programs.[30] Kim further directed the development of artificial intelligence (AI) and space technology to national defense during the 9th WPK Congress in 2026.[31]

North Korea likely seeks to codify the importance of defense modernization and sustaining current lines of efforts to advance its nuclear, missile, space, AI, unmanned systems, and cyber warfare capabilities. This codification may be a way for North Korea to signal its determination to defend against external pressure to stop is military modernization.[32] Article 61 enables North Korea to secure the resources required for expanding its defense industry and weapons production. The amendment demands the North Korean population participate in “jeon-min hang jeon” (全民抗戰, resistance warfare by every citizen), a term North Korea uses to encourage civilian mobilization during wartime.[33] North Korea is likely to utilize its population as a resource for all state efforts to resist external forces as part of its self-reliance policy.

WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un may be seeking to elevate the role of the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission in the constitution as a dictatorial organ of the state and a means of legitimizing his governing base. Chapter 6, Section 1 of the constitution previously detailed the roles and responsibilities of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), and was followed by the authorities of the SAC chairman in Section 2. The amendment reversed this order, possibly intending to signify the elevation of the SAC chairman over the SPA. Kim established the SAC as a new institution within the SPA in 2016, designating its role as a formal policy-making body of the country. Kim has primarily utilized the SAC as a counterpart for foreign governments in diplomatic settings and added “Chairman of the SAC” to his formal title alongside “WPK General Secretary.” The constitution redefined the SAC chairman as “the head of state representing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” replacing the previous designation of “the supreme leader.” The amendment further expanded the powers of the SAC Chairman to include suspending, appointing, or dismissing SPA leadership or the Cabinet premier; vetoing laws adopted by the SPA; and receiving credentials from foreign diplomatic representatives.[36] The amendment also removed the SPA’s authority to summon the SAC chairman.[37]

North Korea mandates nationwide elections every five years to select 687 members of the SPA. North Korea uses a single-member district system, in which it elects one deputy per roughly 30,000 residents, resulting in 687 seats based on population. Elected SPA members elect the SPA leadership, including the Chairman of the SAC. The system remains authoritarian, however. It does not enable meaningful transfers of power or reflect democratic representation, as every electoral district allows one candidate to be registered, and voters cast ballots either in favor of or against the given candidate. North Korea received zero out of 40 for political rights in the 2025 Global Freedom Score, reflecting the absence of an electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government.[38] North Korea forbids political dissent or challenges to the Kim regime’s authority, and operates a set of political prisons for those who violate North Korean law. North Korea previously allowed minor political parties to exist to give the illusion of political pluralism, but they have been systematically eliminated in recent years.[39]

The change in defining Kim as the “supreme leader” to “head of state” in the constitution likely signifies an effort to ground Kim’s governing legitimacy in what the regime portrays as a democratic process, rather than reliance on the cult of personality and hereditary lineage. Kim likely intends to strengthen a political system led by a dynastic totalitarian dictatorship that allows him to maintain his position of authority. The use of the title “head of state” in diplomatic settings likely serves to elevate the standing of Kim as a representative of North Korea beyond that of the ruling party, although the WPK remains Kim’s de facto source of power and control. These changes coincide with recent efforts to move away from propaganda centered on former North Korean leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, while promoting Kim Jong Un’s “people-first” principle. Kim may be seeking to portray his leadership as stemming from popular support by elevating the legitimacy of the SAC, while also depicting North Korea as a legitimate state in the international community.[40]

Kim Jong Un’s reduced emphasis on inherited political legacies may allow Kim to pursue a unification policy not bound by traditional frameworks. North Korea removed most references to former North Korean leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il from the preamble of the constitution.[43] Kim Il Sung’s name, in particular, appeared only once in the amended version, compared to 21 times in the 2023 constitution.[44] The removal aligns with North Korea’s efforts to reduce the emphasis on Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in North Korean state propaganda in recent years. Kim Jong Un excluded Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s names for the first time at the 9th WPK Congress in February 2026.[45] Kim Jong Un also scaled down state celebrations for the previous leaders, including their birthdays.[46] ISW-CDOT previously assessed that Kim Jong Un has consolidated his authority independent of his predecessor’s legacies, accelerating the retirement of second-generation descendants of Kim Il Sung-era ”revolutionary” figures.[47] The shift has coincided with a promotion of the “people-first” principle, the main theme of North Korea’s current propaganda focus.[48] North Korea has used the “people-first” ideology to frame Kim’s domestic policies as being centered around improving living standards for ordinary North Koreans. The shift likely reflects a transition from the ideological framing the Kim regime has historically relied on to a new narrative introduced by Kim Jong Un.[49]

North Korea’s strategic reorientation since the 2019 Hanoi diplomatic breakdown has largely contradicted with constitutional demands anchored by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. North Korea has traditionally espoused a unified Korea under a socialist government as its primary national objective.[50] The 2026 constitutional amendments—including the new territorial definitions, removal of references to unification, and de-prioritization of past political legacies—likely functions to eliminate contradictions stemming from the current “hostile two states” policy.

The movement also aligns with Kim Jong Un’s broader efforts to redefine the basis of his regime’s legitimacy to one based on popular support, through what it portrays as a legitimate political process, by moving away from a propaganda strategy centered on the cult of personality during the Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il eras.

WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un may be seeking to reduce the gap between unrealistic welfare promises and the state’s ability to deliver them by abandoning specific responsibilities in the constitution. The 2023 constitution stated in Article 25, Chapter 2 under “Economy,” that taxes have been “abolished” and North Korea provides “all conditions necessary for workers to eat, clothe, use, and live.” The 2026 amendments omitted any reference to tax abolition and replaced “eat, clothe, use, and live” with “provide affluent and civilized living conditions.” The 2023 constitution had also stated in Article 29 that North Korean workers know “no unemployment,” but removed that language in the amended version. This amendment also deleted the language on “universal free medical care system” in Article 56, Chapter 3 under “Culture,” of the 2023 constitution, instead replacing it with the “socialist public health system.”

These amendments under Chapter 2 and 3 largely reduced the state’s responsibility in terms of welfare, such as providing living goods, food, jobs, and health care. North Korea’s ability to deliver such welfare promises has been compromised due to economic difficulties since the 1990s.[53] A survey by the South Korean Ministry of Unification in 2024 reported that approximately 72 percent of North Korean defectors surveyed who escaped the country between 2016 and 2022 did not receive food rations from the state.[54] North Korea has promoted the construction of multiple large-scale farms, fisheries, hospitals, and community entertainment facilities as some of Kim Jong Un’s key economic achievements that put “people first” during the 9th WPK Congress, however. ISW-CDOT assessed that North Korea built the Sinuiju greenhouse farm—one of the farms described as Kim’s “gift” to the people—for propaganda purposes, as large portions of the facility remain nonoperational three months after the completion ceremony, according to satellite imagery from South Korean satellite imaging firm SI Analytics.[55] The omission of specific welfare promises likely reflects North Korea’s inability to materialize such promises due to economic realities.

It is unlikely that North Korea would abandon a socialist distribution system entirely. North Korea would likely continue to promote state-led welfare efforts in food production, residential conditions, and medical innovation, at least externally, aiding Kim’s propaganda strategy centered on the “people-first” ideology. North Korea likely intends to manage the disparity between its constitutionally guaranteed welfare rights and what the state is actually providing to minimize perceived hypocrisy. This aligns with Kim’s broader efforts to reinvent North Korea’s portrayal as a legitimate socialist system. North Korea remains one of the world’s lowest-performing countries in terms of measures of social welfare, being placed 149th out of 172 countries on the Social Progress Index in 2023.[56] The revision may also enable Kim to implement taxation in the future or signal an increasingly lax regulation on private economic activities—including local markets known as “Jangmadang”—for acquiring living goods instead of the reliance on state distribution.