Toplines
North Korea is escalating its support for Russia’s war in Ukraine and will likely aid Russian efforts to intensify ballistic missile attacks against Ukraine. Increased Russian demand for North Korean missiles and manpower could open new opportunities for North Korea to benefit from its strategic partnership with Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 8 that North Korea is preparing to deploy between 30,000 and 50,000 personnel to Russia at an unspecified time.[1] Reuters reported on August 5 that a Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson stated that North Korea has begun deploying a missile unit equipped with 120 ballistic missiles and six launchers to Russia’s 112th Missile Brigade in Voronezh Oblast.[2] This deployment is the first such North Korean deployment to Russia. ISW has assessed that Russia is increasing the intensity of its ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine to capitalize on Ukraine’s shortage of ballistic missile interceptors.[3] Ukraine’s Strategic Communications Center reported on August 8 that Russia is preparing to conduct a major strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in the coming weeks.[4] The North Korean missile unit and its ballistic missiles will likely support Russia’s missile campaign against Ukraine by allowing Russia to increase the number of ballistic missiles in each strike or sustain smaller strikes for a longer period.[5]
North Korean manpower may also enable Russia’s ground campaign against Ukraine. North Korea sent around 15,000 infantry, sappers, and construction workers to Kursk Oblast in late October 2024, which aided Russia’s counteroffensive in the area, of which around 10,000 remain in Russia.[6] An estimated additional deployment of between 30,000 and 50,000 personnel would mark a significant escalation in North Korean support for Russia and may allow North Korean forces to take over rear-area and border defense roles to free up Russian personnel for advances in Eastern Ukraine, although the purpose of the prospective deployment has not been specified at the time of writing.
North Korea will likely benefit significantly from frontline combat experience and increased Russian demand for missiles and manpower. ISW-CDOT has previously assessed that North Korea may be able to integrate Russian technical improvements and tactical innovations displayed in Russia’s long-range strike campaign to improve the efficacy of its own missile forces.[7] North Korean ground forces will likely also develop an improved understanding of modern combat, including unmanned systems warfare, by deploying alongside Russian forces. North Korea could also leverage its equipment and personnel commitments to demand further economic and military support from Russia. North Korean efforts to develop a military reconnaissance satellite network and a large surface fleet, in particular, would benefit from Russian equipment and expertise.[8]
South Korea is unlikely to provide Ukraine with direct military support in Ukraine’s war with Russia to prioritize maintaining engagement prospects with North Korea, despite Ukraine’s calls for air defense cooperation. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on August 8 that Ukraine is in contact with South Korea to expand bilateral cooperation in air defense systems and drones.[9] The South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) responded to the statement on August 10 that its provision of defense equipment to foreign countries must comply with South Korean domestic laws, reaffirming its policy of not providing lethal weapons to Ukraine.[10] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha previously expressed Ukraine’s interest in purchasing air defense systems from South Korea during his visit to South Korea in June 2026, but the visit did not result in a meaningful arms deal.[11]
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung appears less willing to provide direct military assistance to Ukraine than former South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol. The South Korean ruling Democratic Party (DP) alleged that the Yoon administration indirectly provided Ukraine with 500,000 rounds of 155mm artillery shells through the United States.[12] Yoon stated in November 2025 that South Korea would not rule out providing weapons to Ukraine following North Korea’s deployment of troops to Russia.[13] The Lee administration, on the other hand, has pledged to improve relations with “four major neighboring countries” — including Russia — as part of its effort to resume dialogue with North Korea.[14] Russia said in February 2026 that Russia-South Korea relations depend on whether South Korea provides weapons to Ukraine.[15] The Lee administration is thus unlikely to expand cooperation with Ukraine, considering that it believes improving relations with Russia would lead to engagement opportunities with North Korea.
Key Takeaways
- North Korean Military Deployments: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 8 that North Korea is preparing to deploy between 30,000 and 50,000 personnel to Russia, although the purpose of the deployment has not been revealed at this time. North Korea will likely aid Russian efforts to intensify ballistic missile attacks against Ukraine and seek new opportunities to financially and militarily benefit from its cooperation with Russia.
- South Korea-Ukraine Relations: South Korea is unlikely to provide Ukraine with direct military support despite Ukraine’s calls for air defense cooperation. South Korea likely assesses that cooperation with Ukraine could harm its prospects for engagement with North Korea due to North Korea’s alliance with Russia.
North Korean Domestic Politics
Nothing significant to report.
North Korean Military Developments
See topline.
North Korean Foreign Relations
Nothing significant to report.
North Korean Cognitive Warfare
North Korea seeks to justify its military development by accusing the US-South Korea-Japan trilateral relationship of regional destabilization. An unnamed North Korean military commentator claimed in North Korean state media on August 4 that combined US-South Korea military exercises constitute a new security threat to the Asia-Pacific region.[16] North Korean state media criticized the recent US-South Korea Buddy Squadron combined air exercise, US-South Korea Combined Joint Sustainment Training, and the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) multinational naval exercise and characterized them as US “war rehearsals.”[17] Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) General Secretary Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jong also issued a statement on August 5 regarding the July 29 Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s test launch of Tomahawk cruise missiles, describing the launch as the “military expansionist ambitions of a war-criminal state.”[18] Kim Yo Jong further criticized the United States for its support of Japan’s recent military build-up.[19] South Korean media outlet Kyunghyang Shinmun reported that North Korea issued six distinct statements criticizing US-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation since July 9.[20] North Korea’s statements likely implicitly referenced North Korea’s commitments to reinforcing its nuclear arsenal amidst its adversaries’ cooperation.[21] North Korea’s short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) launch on August 6 was likely intended to protest recent trilateral cooperation, Japan’s missile launch, and the upcoming annual US-South Korea Ulchi Freedom Shield combined military exercises.[22] North Korea could seek to enhance its own trilateral alignment with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to counter the US-South Korea-Japan coalition.
Inter-Korean Relations
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung urged the South Korean Ministry of Unification (MOU) to temper its conciliatory policies towards North Korea, likely to minimize domestic political discontent and secure support from moderate voters amid Lee’s declining approval ratings. Lee responded to South Korean Minister of Unification Chung Dong-young’s August 5 briefing by saying that Chung should be “cautious” when enacting his North Korean coexistence policy initiative.[23] Lee expressed his concern over the MOU’s initiative to change the official terminology used to refer to North Korea, which could result in domestic political controversy and partisan disputes.[24] Chung responded that changing the terminology serves as the initial step toward advancing “peaceful coexistence.”[25] The MOU began pursuing this terminology shift in earnest after Chung addressed North Korea by its official title and preferred terminology, “Joseon,” in March.[26] ISW-CDOT assessed that the MOU’s attempt to change the terminology was intended as a sign of respect towards Pyongyang and part of the MOU’s efforts to facilitate inter-Korean dialogue.[27] Lee expressed skepticism regarding the MOU’s conciliatory unilateral trust-building measures at an August 5 briefing.[28] Chung also proposed during the briefing that the MOU should facilitate a dialogue for “peace on the Korean Peninsula” with key regional stakeholders during the upcoming United Nations (UN) General Assembly and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.[29] South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Hyun also dismissed Chung’s proposal as unrealistic during an August 5 press conference.[30]
Lee’s statements could reflect his intention to decelerate the pace of the MOU’s preemptive conciliatory policies, as they thus far lack tangible returns and could risk worsening Lee’s approval ratings.”[31] Lee is likely seeking to preemptively block controversies that South Korean opposition parties could exploit amid a sharp increase in his disapproval ratings. South Korean polling agency Realmeter reported on August 10 that Lee recorded his highest disapproval rating since his inauguration in June 2025.[32] Lee earned a 53 percent disapproval rating in the first week of August, compared to a 41 percent disapproval rating the first week of June.[33] Realmeter attributed this decline in Lee’s popularity to real estate policies, criminal law revisions, Lee’s recent statements on the Korean Military Academy, and economic instability.[34] Lee appears concerned about how his North Korea policies are being viewed by moderate voters. The Lee administration also appears to face ongoing internal policy misalignment regarding its specific North Korean policy approaches. MOFA and the MOU disagreed over North Korean policy jurisdiction in December 2025, prompting Lee to intervene directly to settle the dispute by expanding the MOU’s authority.[35] The MOU has engaged in multiple disputes with MOFA and the South Korean National Security Council over issues such as UN resolutions on North Korean human rights.[36]
Lee may seek to reduce or pause the MOU’s conciliatory activities toward North Korea while strengthening defense cooperation with the United States as he attempts to increase his political support. Lee may aim to minimize what he assesses as unnecessary public criticism of his administration. Lee will also likely seek to resolve internal jurisdictional disputes between MOFA and the MOU and enhance coordination with Washington on prospects for United States-North Korea dialogue. Lee will not completely abandon his “peaceful coexistence” policy, however.
The South Korean MOU may participate in Russia’s Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) in Vladivostok in September, likely to urge Russia to help facilitate inter-Korean dialogue. South Korean Minister of Unification Chung Dong-yong said on August 5 that Russian President Vladimir Putin may attend the annual EEF and thus advocated for South Korea’s attendance of the forum to improve Russia-South Korea bilateral relations.[37] South Korean media outlet News1 reported on the possibility of WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un also attending the EEF.[38] Chung added that South Korea needs to maintain independent relations with Russia despite North Korea’s likely opposition to improving South Korea-Russia relations. Former South Korean presidents Park Geun-hye and Moon Jae-in attended the EEF in 2016 and 2017, respectively. South Korea sent high-level officials to the forum each year until the COVID-19 pandemic postponed the 2020 EEF to 2021. South Korea has not attended the EEF since. South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Hyun said on August 5 that MOFA has not yet reviewed Chung’s proposal to attend the EEF and added that attendance of the forum falls under MOFA’s jurisdiction.[39]
The Lee Jae Myung administration is seeking alternative ways to renew engagement with North Korea amid Pyongyang’s continued rejection of dialogue with Seoul. Chung’s proposal is likely a part of such efforts, as the Lee administration has repeatedly urged foreign countries with amicable ties with North Korea — such as the PRC, Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam — to support Lee’s engagement initiative. South Korean efforts to reach North Korea through a third party remain unsuccessful, and Cho expressed skepticism on August 5 towards such an approach. The United States and Ukraine are unlikely to welcome South Korea’s participation in the EEF, however, which would strengthen Russia’s demand that South Korea should reject Ukrainian requests for air defense cooperation. Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Rudenko said in May 2026 that the Lee administration has not shown efforts to normalize bilateral trade and economic relations, despite having “considerable potential,” while warning that Russia would retaliate if South Korea sent direct military support to Ukraine.[40] The MOU’s potential participation in the EEF is unlikely to change North Korea’s stance on dialogue, however.
South Korean Domestic Politics
Nothing significant to report.
Counter-North Korean Coalition Building Efforts
The Donald Trump administration is considering using South Korean shipyards for the construction of four vessels as part of a broader push to loosen regulations on overseas construction of US naval ships, presenting a possible solution to US shipbuilding undercapacity. The White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) proposed to the US Congress that the US Navy must build at least four vessels at overseas shipyards to address shipbuilding backlogs, utilize advanced shipbuilding capabilities overseas, and encourage foreign direct investment in US domestic shipyards.[41] The Trump administration seeks to build two surface combatant vessels and two non-combat auxiliary vessels at foreign shipyards, although US laws prevent the construction of naval vessels overseas.[42] South Korean media outlet Newsis and US media outlet USNI News reported that the Trump administration is considering using South Korean or Japanese shipyards and designs if the US Congress approves.[43]
Cooperation with South Korean shipyards presents a possible solution to addressing the capacity and capability gaps in meeting US Navy shipbuilding goals.[44] South Korea and Japan both operate guided-missile destroyers that implement US-designed Aegis combat systems and US AN/SPY-1 radars as core components of their surface fleets.[45] The US government has previously issued Requests for Information (RFIs) to HD Hyundai Heavy Industries and Hanwha Ocean on their ability to construct guided-missile destroyers and fleet replenishment ships, with Samsung Heavy Industries and two other South Korean shipbuilders receiving a separate RFI for medium-sized fleet oilers.[46] This proposed cooperation follows remarks by US Forces Korea (USFK) Commander General Xavier Brunson, who discussed the possibility of making South Korea a “regional sustainment hub” for US military logistics cooperation, which could feature shipbuilding as part of a broader US-South Korean cooperation.[47] This proposed cooperation with South Korea is preceded by a 2025 agreement by the US Coast Guard and a Canadian shipbuilder on the construction of two Arctic Security Cutter designs for a new class of medium US icebreakers and follow-on ships in shipyards in Finland and the United States, dubbed the “Finland model” by OMB director Russ Vought.[48]
The United States, South Korea, and several US partners and allies are expanding cooperation to deter and counter North Korean cyber operations. An unnamed spokesperson for North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs dismissed a joint advisory issued by 11 nations on North Korean information technology (IT) workers as “a groundless accusation and a hostile act from the United States and its allies” on August 3.[49] The Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT), which includes security agencies from 11 participating nations, issued a warning on July 31 that North Korean IT personnel are infiltrating Western IT sectors through deceptive employment schemes.[50] ISW-CDOT previously assessed that North Korea leverages advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and other technologies, along with illicit identity forging, to secure employment at Western IT and cryptocurrency firms and transfer corporate financial assets to fund North Korean military development.[51] North Korea also reportedly disseminates malicious code across online open-source websites to compromise the personal data of individual users.[52] North Korea denied its involvement in cyber threats on May 3, characterizing the allegations as a “political ploy” by the United States to slander Pyongyang.[53] The US Department of State emphasized on May 8 that North Korea uses illicit cybercrime revenues directly to fund its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs.[54] US-based security firm Kumio revealed on August 6 that North Korean-affiliated hackers regularly gain unauthorized access to internal corporate networks and employ other deceptive recruitment tactics against job seekers in so-called “contagious interviews.”[55] Kumio secured five terabytes of North Korean data from 1,640 companies across 57 targeted countries.[56] Approximately 700 to 800 firms suffered critical security compromises, including breaches in administrator authorities and leaks of private cryptocurrency keys.[57] North Korean hackers have targeted Western local governments, cryptocurrency firms, tech agencies, and civilian infrastructure.[58]
The United States and South Korea are strengthening multilateral cyber defense cooperation as North Korean cyber threats expand across multiple domains. The South Korean Ministry of National Defense announced on July 27 that the South Korean Cyber Operation Command will participate in the US-led “Cyber Flag” exercise alongside 25 other nations.[59] The US-South Korea-Japan diplomatic working group also agreed in June to bolster trilateral cooperation against North Korean cyber threats.[60] US allies are accelerating combined diplomatic, military and technical countermeasures as North Korea diversifies and enhances its cyber tactics. North Korea reportedly stole $2 billion worth of cryptocurrency in 2025, an increase of nearly $800 million from the previous year.[61]
[1] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2086145876662083676
[2] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/north-korean-missile-unit-deploys-russia-ukraine-war-kyiv-says-2026-08-05/
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2026/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2026/; https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/2086061649648115797
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2026/
[6] https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/08/07/how-north-korean-forces-are-bolstering-russias-war-against-ukraine/; https://tvpworld.com/91571541/-nearly-11000-north-korean-troops-in-russias-kursk-region-seoul
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-june-30-2026/
[8] https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-spy-satellite-russia-assistance-6461d7216fa5bd3fa0945efeb06530c6; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-received-russian-aid-satellite-launch-south-korea-lawmakers-2023-11-23/; https://www.38north.org/2026/05/tracing-russian-linkages-in-north-koreas-expanding-nuclear-complex/; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-likely-received-help-russia-submarines-south-korea-minister-says-2025-10-13/
[9] https://x dot com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2086145876662083676
[10] https://www.hani.co dot kr/arti/politics/politics_general/1272277.html
[11] https://www.chosun dot com/politics/diplomacy-defense/2026/07/01/7UDMFDT5CJGGNLDCRESDV5KF3E/
[12] https://www.yna.co dot kr/view/MYH20230419012400641; https://www.news1 dot kr/diplomacy/defense-diplomacy/5848036; https://news.kbs.co dot kr/news/pc/view/view.do?ncd=8297234
[13] https://www.joongang.co dot kr/article/25286944
[14] https://imnews.imbc dot com/replay/2025/nwdesk/article/6722568_36799.html
[15] https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260203004500080
[16] https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1785792817-519966483/%ec%95%84%ec%8b%9c%ec%95%84%ed%83%9c%ed%8f%89%ec%96%91%ec%a7%80%ec%97%ad%ec%9d%98-%ec%83%88%eb%a1%9c%ec%9a%b4-%ec%95%88%eb%b3%b4%ec%9c%84%ea%b8%b0%eb%a1%9c-%ea%b3%a0%ec%b0%a9%eb%90%9c-%eb%af%b8/
[17] https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1785792817-519966483/%ec%95%84%ec%8b%9c%ec%95%84%ed%83%9c%ed%8f%89%ec%96%91%ec%a7%80%ec%97%ad%ec%9d%98-%ec%83%88%eb%a1%9c%ec%9a%b4-%ec%95%88%eb%b3%b4%ec%9c%84%ea%b8%b0%eb%a1%9c-%ea%b3%a0%ec%b0%a9%eb%90%9c-%eb%af%b8/
[18] https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1785889973-225576462/%ea%b9%80%ec%97%ac%ec%a0%95%eb%b6%80%ec%9e%a5-%ec%9d%bc%eb%b3%b8%ec%9d%98-%e3%80%8a%ed%86%a0%eb%a7%88%ed%98%b8%ed%81%ac%e3%80%8b%ec%9e%a5%ea%b1%b0%eb%a6%ac%ec%88%9c%ed%95%ad%eb%af%b8%ec%8b%b8%ec%9d%bc/
[19] https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1785889973-225576462/%ea%b9%80%ec%97%ac%ec%a0%95%eb%b6%80%ec%9e%a5-%ec%9d%bc%eb%b3%b8%ec%9d%98-%e3%80%8a%ed%86%a0%eb%a7%88%ed%98%b8%ed%81%ac%e3%80%8b%ec%9e%a5%ea%b1%b0%eb%a6%ac%ec%88%9c%ed%95%ad%eb%af%b8%ec%8b%b8%ec%9d%bc/
[20] https://www.khan.co dot kr/article/202608041522001
[21] https://www.khan.co dot kr/article/202608041522001; https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1783549076-597352946/%eb%a9%b8%eb%a7%9d%ec%9d%84-%ec%9e%90%ec%b4%88%ed%95%98%eb%8a%94-%ec%9c%84%ed%97%98%ec%b2%9c%eb%a7%8c%ed%95%9c-%ea%b5%b0%ec%82%ac%ec%a0%81%ea%b2%b0%ed%83%81/; https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1785490461-838881687/%ec%a1%b0%ec%84%a0%ec%a4%91%ec%95%99%ed%86%b5%ec%8b%a0%ec%82%ac-%eb%a1%a0%ed%8f%89-%ec%a3%bc%ec%9d%bc%eb%af%b8%ea%b5%b0%ec%82%ac%eb%a0%b9%eb%b6%80%ea%b0%80-%e3%80%8a%ec%a0%84%ec%9f%81%ec%82%ac/; https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1785618657-691067596/%ec%9d%bc%eb%b3%b8%ec%9d%80-%ec%99%9c-%e3%80%8a%eb%b9%84%ed%95%b5%ef%bc%93%ec%9b%90%ec%b9%99%e3%80%8b%ec%9d%84-%ec%88%98%ec%a0%95%ed%95%98%eb%a0%a4-%ed%95%98%eb%8a%94%ea%b0%80/; https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1784930621-84025732/%ec%a1%b0%ec%84%a0%ec%a4%91%ec%95%99%ed%86%b5%ec%8b%a0%ec%82%ac-%eb%a1%a0%ed%8f%89-%ec%9d%bc%eb%b3%b8%ec%9d%98-%ed%95%b5%ec%a0%95%ec%b1%85%ea%b0%9c%ec%a0%95%ec%9d%80-%ea%b3%a7-%ec%a0%84%eb%b2%94/
[22] https://www.yna.co.kr/view/MYH20260807000100038
[23] https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260805127551504?input=1195m
[24] https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260805127551504?input=1195m
[25] https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260805127551504?input=1195m
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-may-5-2026/
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-may-5-2026/
[28] https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260805127551504?input=1195m
[29] https://www.yonhapnewstv.co.kr/news/MYH20260806204420QUG
[30] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oPvb-E82aEU; https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260805127551504?input=1195m
[31] https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260805127551504?input=1195m
[32] http://www.realmeter dot net/%ec%97%90%eb%84%88%ec%a7%80%ea%b2%bd%ec%a0%9c%ec%8b%a0%eb%ac%b8-%eb%a6%ac%ec%96%bc%eb%af%b8%ed%84%b0-8%ec%9b%94-1%ec%a3%bc-%ec%b0%a8-%ec%a3%bc%ea%b0%84-%eb%8f%99%ed%96%a5-%e6%9d%8e-%eb%8c%80-2/?ckattempt=1
[33] http://www.realmeter dot net/%ec%97%90%eb%84%88%ec%a7%80%ea%b2%bd%ec%a0%9c%ec%8b%a0%eb%ac%b8-%eb%a6%ac%ec%96%bc%eb%af%b8%ed%84%b0-8%ec%9b%94-1%ec%a3%bc-%ec%b0%a8-%ec%a3%bc%ea%b0%84-%eb%8f%99%ed%96%a5-%e6%9d%8e-%eb%8c%80-2/?ckattempt=1
[34] http://www.realmeter dot net/%ec%97%90%eb%84%88%ec%a7%80%ea%b2%bd%ec%a0%9c%ec%8b%a0%eb%ac%b8-%eb%a6%ac%ec%96%bc%eb%af%b8%ed%84%b0-8%ec%9b%94-1%ec%a3%bc-%ec%b0%a8-%ec%a3%bc%ea%b0%84-%eb%8f%99%ed%96%a5-%e6%9d%8e-%eb%8c%80-2/
[35] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-december-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-december-19-2025/
[36] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-april-7-2026/
[37] https://www.ytn.co.kr/_ln/0101_202608051433153564
[38] https://nk.news1 dot kr/news/articles/6249575
[39] https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260805138300504?section=nk/news/all
[40] https://www.ytn.co dot kr/_ln/0134_202603290915368826
[41] https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/SAP-HR8800.pdf
[42] https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/SAP-HR8800.pdf
[43] https://www.newsis dot com/view/NISX20260805_0003736795; https://news.usni.org/2026/04/24/u-s-considering-foreign-designs-shipyards-for-new-navy-frigate-destroyer-work-in-1-85b-study
[44] https://www.theatlantic.com/economy/archive/2025/05/american-shipbuilding-decline/682945/; https://www.forbes.com/sites/jimvinoski/2025/11/28/can-america-recover-from-its-shipbuilding-crisis/; https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-Releases/display-pressreleases/Article/4464720/department-of-the-navy-releases-fy27-budget-request/
[45] https://news.usni.org/2026/04/24/u-s-considering-foreign-designs-shipyards-for-new-navy-frigate-destroyer-work-in-1-85b-study
[46] https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/us-navy-invites-south-korean-shipyards-to-build-powerful-guided-missile-destroyers/ar-AA27IW8c
[47] https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2026/05/13/LSFAGUKJWJAWBJSTL234BQONW4/
[48] https://news.usni.org/2026/04/24/u-s-considering-foreign-designs-shipyards-for-new-navy-frigate-destroyer-work-in-1-85b-study
[49] https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1785834158-455134139/%ec%a1%b0%ec%84%a0%eb%af%bc%ec%a3%bc%ec%a3%bc%ec%9d%98%ec%9d%b8%eb%af%bc%ea%b3%b5%ed%99%94%ea%b5%ad-%ec%99%b8%eb%ac%b4%ec%84%b1-%eb%8c%80%eb%b3%80%ec%9d%b8-%eb%af%b8%ea%b5%ad%ec%9d%b4-%ec%a3%bc/; https://www.nknews.org/2026/08/north-korea-slams-11-nation-advisory-on-remote-it-worker-schemes/
[50] https://www.hankookilbo dot com/news/article/A2026080408420000165; https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=377471
[51] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-april-28-2026/; https://www.voakorea.com/a/8181226.html
[52] https://www.voakorea.com/a/amazon-reveals-new-evidence-of-open-source-supply-chain-attacks-by-north-korean-hacking-group-073026/8180845.html
[53] https://www.voakorea.com/a/state-department-rejects-north-korea-s-denial-of-cybercrime-allegations-says-regime-funds-wmd-programs-through-crypto-theft-050826/8148004.html; https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1777791773-466472742/%ec%a1%b0%ec%84%a0%eb%af%bc%ec%a3%bc%ec%a3%bc%ec%9d%98%ec%9d%b8%eb%af%bc%ea%b3%b5%ed%99%94%ea%b5%ad-%ec%99%b8%eb%ac%b4%ec%84%b1-%eb%8c%80%eb%b3%80%ec%9d%b8%eb%8c%80%eb%8b%b5
[54] https://www.voakorea.com/a/state-department-rejects-north-korea-s-denial-of-cybercrime-allegations-says-regime-funds-wmd-programs-through-crypto-theft-050826/8148004.html
[55] https://www.wired.com/story/a-security-pro-hacked-north-korean-hackers-he-found-theyd-breached-hundreds-of-networks-worldwide/; https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260807071200091?section=nk/news/all
[56] https://www.wired.com/story/a-security-pro-hacked-north-korean-hackers-he-found-theyd-breached-hundreds-of-networks-worldwide/
[57] https://www.wired.com/story/a-security-pro-hacked-north-korean-hackers-he-found-theyd-breached-hundreds-of-networks-worldwide/
[58] https://www.wired.com/story/a-security-pro-hacked-north-korean-hackers-he-found-theyd-breached-hundreds-of-networks-worldwide/
[59] https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260727002300315
[60] https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=377358
[61] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-january-22-2026/
