Toplines

The Houthis are seeking to end Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the war in Yemen by demanding Saudi recognition of Houthi sovereignty, which would create conditions for the Houthis to advance their grand strategic objective of controlling all of Yemen. Sources briefed on negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis told the Wall Street Journal on November 4 that, shortly after the Houthis’ assault on the Red Sea coast on September 9 and 10, the Houthis demanded that Saudi Arabia recognize the Houthis’ sovereignty over all of Yemen as part of an agreement to end the current war.[1] The Houthis resumed their war with Saudi Arabia in July 2026 after exploiting the window of opportunity presented by Saudi attempts to prevent the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) from landing in Sanaa.[2] The Houthis have since demanded that Saudi Arabia grant them significant concessions that would alleviate the dire economic conditions in Houthi-controlled territory.[3] The Houthis’ reported demand that Saudi Arabia recognize the Houthis’ sovereignty over Yemen indicates that the Houthis also seek the end of Saudi Arabia’s involvement in Yemen as one of their war aims. Saudi Arabia initially intervened in Yemen in March 2015 to restore the internationally recognized government of Yemen’s control over the country following the Houthi capture of Sanaa and advance on Aden.[4] Saudi Arabia has since supported numerous armed factions aligned with the Yemeni government to combat the Houthis in Yemen.[5] Saudi military involvement in the current conflict, primarily through close air support for partner forces on the ground, has enabled Yemeni government-aligned counteroffensives against the Houthis, including the counteroffensive along the Red Sea coastal plain in early October 2026.[6] Saudi withdrawal from the conflict would seriously cripple the coalition of forces fighting for the internationally recognized Yemeni government and enable future Houthi offensives to destroy such groups and attempt to seize all of Yemen.[7]

The Houthis have structured a campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to abandon its military intervention in Yemen, which would undermine the Yemeni government’s ability to resist future Houthi efforts to seize the rest of the country. The Houthis initiated their campaign by imposing a blockade on Saudi shipping in July 2026.[8] The group switched tactics after the blockade failed to produce desired effects and intensified a strike campaign against Saudi critical infrastructure, including oil facilities and airports.[9] Houthi attacks have, at times, temporarily disrupted the kingdom’s ability to export oil and have targeted major civilian centers.[10] The Houthis have simultaneously launched a ground offensive that seeks to capture Taiz City and terrain along the Red Sea coast that, if successful, sets the conditions for future Houthi campaigns.[11] Houthi presence near the Bab al Mandeb improves the Houthis’ capabilities to target Saudi shipping in the Red Sea.

The Houthis have long sought to consolidate control over all of Yemen as a grand strategic objective, and the economic concessions that they have sought from Saudi Arabia advance this objective.[12] The Houthis institutionally subscribe to an ideology based on the Jaroudi school of Zaydi Shia Islam, which the group believes grants them a divine right to rule over not just Yemen, but also territories controlled by Saudi Arabia and beyond.[13] The Houthis’ current demands from Saudi Arabia in this war, including the lifting of the Saudi “blockade” on shipping and securing control over Yemen’s oil and gas resources, set conditions for total Houthi control over Yemen, because some degree of economic stability is necessary for the Houthis to maintain control over their territory.[14] The Houthi demands to lift Saudi restrictions on shipping and grant Houthi access to Yemen’s oil and gas resources also reflect the Houthis’ insistence that Saudi Arabia recognize their sovereignty over Yemeni territory, which includes its critical infrastructure.[15] The Houthis have also rejected multiple Saudi ceasefire offers in recent months, including offers that reportedly included the removal of Saudi restrictions on Houthi-controlled ports and airports for humanitarian purposes and $1 billion USD in reparations.[16] The Houthis’ rejection of the offers likely reflects the group’s assessment that such concessions do not satisfy their broader objective of securing recognition of their authority over all of Yemen.

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi has reportedly sidelined Shia Coordination Framework leaders from engaging in disarmament negotiations with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, which is part of Zaydi’s continued efforts to balance between the United States and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors.[17] Leaders within the framework have been negotiating with the militias for several months. Unidentified sources suggested to Iraqi media on November 5 that Zaydi has sidelined the framework committee from engaging in negotiations with the militias on an unspecified date after September 30 by rejecting a written agreement that framework leaders reached with the militias that outlined conditions for disarmament and established a timeline for the militias to disarm.[18] The militias’ demands reportedly included a complete Turkish withdrawal from Iraq and the exile of anti-Iranian regime groups based in Iraqi Kurdistan.[19] The militias have consistently conditioned their disarmament on Baghdad’s fulfillment of such conditions, which ISW-CTP has assessed indicates that the militias have no intention of disarming. Zaydi’s concerns with the negotiating committee are related to the orientation of the committee.[20] The four framework members on the committee have long-standing ties with Iran and the Iraqi militias, including State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki and Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri.[21] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Zaydi’s pursuit of his own negotiations with the militias reflects his desire to make decisions independent of the framework but could also support US aims for the development of a sovereign and independent Iraq.[22] Previous reporting did not suggest that Zaydi’s pursuit of separate negotiations amounts to actions that completely sideline the framework, which rejecting the framework’s agreement with the militias would effectively achieve.

Zaydi’s apparent rejection of the framework’s agreement with the militias while he pursues independent negotiations with them suggests that the agreement does not meet US demands for the militias’ disarmament. Zaydi has proven his willingness in recent months to act on, or at least consider, courses of action that are contrary to the interests of Iranian-backed actors in order to counter the militias and meet US objectives.[23] Kataib Hezbollah Security Chief Abu Mujahid Aasaf’s November 3 statement called on Zaydi to release the signed disarmament agreement between the Iraqi militias and the framework.[24] Kataib Hezbollah’s demand for Zaydi to release the agreement, despite the group’s repeated rejection of disarmament, suggests that the agreement does not meaningfully disarm the militias or leaves sufficient room for the militias to circumvent its terms. Kataib Hezbollah may calculate that Zaydi releasing the agreement could undermine Zaydi’s standing with the United States by portraying him as inadequately addressing US demands, which could further complicate Zaydi’s efforts to balance between US pressure for disarmament and the militia actors in Iraq.[25]

The success of Zaydi’s efforts to convince the United States to accept Iraqi militia participation in the Iraqi federal government reportedly bolstered Zaydi’s decision to pursue independent negotiations with the militias and circumvent the framework.[26] The federal government recently granted individuals affiliated with three Iraqi militias control over some ministries, which ISW-CTP assessed was likely meant to incentivize militias that have already offered to disarm to fully comply with the process, as well as convince militias rejecting disarmament to comply with the government’s efforts.[27] Iraqi media also reported on November 5 that Zaydi rejected the framework’s proposed arrangement with Kataib Hezbollah that would offer the militia a myriad of positions in various Iraqi government sectors despite the militia’s continued rejection of disarmament.[28] Iraqi militias have historically pursued courses of action intended to increase their infiltration of the Iraqi state, which is a goal shared with Iran.[29] Aasaf denied reports that the group is involved in the federal government or has requested positions within the government.[30] Kataib Hezbollah’s political wing, Haquq, controls five seats in the Iraqi Parliament and is part of the framework, however.[31]

Kataib Hezbollah appears to be attempting to counter Zaydi’s efforts to balance between the United States and the militias by stoking tensions between Zaydi and the framework. The Iraqi militias have historically attempted to undermine prime ministers that have acted against militia interests.[32] Kataib Hezbollah likely views exacerbating Zaydi-framework tensions as an effective countermeasure to Zaydi’s efforts to disarm the militias, given that the framework has multiple political tools to thwart Zaydi’s endeavors. Aasaf’s November 3 statement accused Zaydi of “tampering” with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) law.[33] Zaydi is attempting to reform the PMF through the draft PMF law to fulfill US objectives regarding militia disarmament and simultaneously consolidate his individual power as prime minister.[34] Zaydi reportedly withdrew the draft law from parliament to rewrite “contentious clauses” and reach an unspecified compromise that preserves the “core” of the proposed PMF restructuring, according to an informed source speaking to Iraqi media on November 3.[35] Zaydi’s aims reportedly face pushback from multiple framework members, which Kataib Hezbollah may seek to capitalize upon in order to discredit Zaydi.[36] Aasaf recently highlighted accusations against Zaydi for engaging in corruption with US Special Envoy to Iraq and Syria Tom Barrack, for example.[37]

Kataib Hezbollah also appears to be trying to discredit Zaydi in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the Iraqi militias and their ability to bear arms following the September 2026 US withdrawal from Iraq. Aasaf claimed in his November 3 statement that unidentified actors, almost certainly referring to the militias, intercepted two aircraft violating Iraqi airspace, one of which Aasaf said the PMF Security Directorate obtained.[38] Kataib Hezbollah urged all Iraqi militias on September 30 to halt all military operations except operations targeting “enemy” aircraft.[39] ISW-CTP has not identified any evidence that supports the veracity of Aasaf’s claim at the time of this writing. Iraqi militias have historically used the protection of Iraqi sovereignty, including its airspace, as their raison d’etre.[40] The US withdrawal removed one commonly cited threat to Iraqi sovereignty, but claims of enemy aircraft in Iraqi airspace, regardless of their veracity, allow the militias to continue to use their nationalist veneer to gain Iraqi public support. The militias can also use such claims to portray the Zaydi government as incapable of defending Iraqi sovereignty, thereby arguing that continued militia existence and armament remain necessary amid government efforts to disarm them.

Current indicators suggest that IRGC-directed militia cells conducted drone reconnaissance of the US Embassy in Baghdad on October 27.[41] The US Embassy in Baghdad intercepted two surveillance drones, almost certainly launched by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, on October 27.[42] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias repeatedly conducted drone attacks on the US Embassy in Baghdad in March and April 2026, including using fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones to fly through and reconnoiter the embassy.[43] Aasaf stated on November 3 that the Iraqi militias have ceased all military operations and claimed the overflight was a friendly-fire incident.[44] Aasaf added that the militias normally claim their operations, implying that the militias did not conduct the attack.[45] Iraqi media, citing “leaked reports,” reported on November 5 that Iran asked Kataib Hezbollah to temporarily suspend its kinetic operations because Iran has formed militia cells that the IRGC directly oversees.[46] One of these cells conducted the overflight of the embassy, according to the “leaked reports.”[47] These IRGC-directed cells do not report to the leaders of the established militias and have conducted numerous attacks on neighboring countries in recent months, including with Houthi support.[48] Iran has also reportedly encouraged some of its more established partners to focus on politics instead of kinetic activity in recent months and has prioritized arming and supporting the new cells, which is consistent with the information in “leaked reports.”[49]

Iran reportedly sought to acquire Russian military equipment in 2023 and 2024 that could support the regime’s counterinsurgency efforts. Iran purchased at least six Mi-28 helicopters and at least 90 helicopter-mounted, APU-9L guided missile launchers from Russia in 2023 and Spring 2024, respectively, according to documents the Financial Times received from a Ukrainian private intelligence organization.[50] Iranian Deputy Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Mehdi Farahi announced in November 2023 that Iran had “finalized” agreements to purchase at least six Russian Mi-28 helicopters, which can mount APU-9L launchers.[51] An Iranian journalist later shared footage of an Mi-28 in a hangar at an unspecified location in Tehran in January 2026, though it remains unclear whether Iran received the launchers and the guided missiles designated for the launchers.[52] APU-9L launchers are designed for Kh-39 LMUR guided missiles, and it is unclear whether they can accommodate other munitions.[53] The APU-9L system is designed for strikes against stationary and moving targets at ranges of up to 14.5 km, meaning it can be deployed to strike force concentrations, armor, radar stations, or electronic warfare assets, among others.[54] Iran likely sought to acquire these systems to support its counterinsurgency and border security operations, given the systems’ limitations. Iran has historically faced anti-regime and insurgent threats along its northwestern and southeastern borders with Kurdish groups and anti-regime Baloch groups, respectively. Iran has previously deployed helicopters for internal security operations, including to target Kurdish insurgent groups near the Iran-Iraq border in July 2026.[55]