The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran. Most updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas Monday updates also include events from the preceding weekend, collected after ISW-CTP’s 2:00 PM ET Friday data cutoff. ISW-CTP may publish special updates on Saturdays and Sundays if events warrant, however.
Key Takeaways
- US President Donald Trump reportedly decided to refrain from striking Houthi targets in Yemen “for the time being” on September 20.
- The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is reportedly supporting Houthi efforts to develop infrastructure in the Houthis’ newly captured territory along Yemen’s southwestern coast that the group could use to consolidate its recent territorial gains around the Bab al Mandeb and establish long-term leverage over international shipping. Two Houthi military sources told AFP on September 19 that IRGC personnel visited recently captured Houthi territory along Yemen’s Red Sea coastline and supervised Houthi efforts to construct tunnels along the mountainous terrain surrounding the port city of Mokha in Taiz Governorate.
- Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Major General Mohsen Rezaei used his September 20 interview with Qatari outlet Al Jazeera to further Iran’s ongoing effort to sow divisions between the United States and its Gulf allies. Rezaei also sought to portray Iran as a cooperative regional security partner to Gulf states, likely as part of an Iranian effort to secure recognized control of the Strait of Hormuz among other Persian Gulf littoral states.
- Rezaei also claimed that Iran tested a new anti-ship missile armed with a cluster munition warhead in a recent Iranian attack targeting the USS George Washington aircraft carrier on September 5. The missile did not impact the warship but struck “near” the vessel, according to Rezaei.
- Russia planned to deepen Russian economic support for Iran and deepen sanctions evasion collaboration between 2024 and 2026, according to the 44-page plan Fox News obtained and published on September 20.
Toplines
US President Donald Trump reportedly decided to refrain from striking Houthi targets in Yemen “for the time being” on September 20.[1] Unspecified US officials told the New York Times that Trump told US military officials on September 17 to prepare for US airstrikes against the Houthis after Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) appealed for US involvement in the Saudi-led air campaign.[2] MBS has reportedly made several such entreaties since the Houthis seized territory along Yemen’s southwestern coast on September 9 and 10.[3] The US State Department issued a security alert for the Middle East on September 19, citing the “potential for unforeseen escalation.”[4] Trump later decided to postpone the strikes, according to the US officials.[5] The president of Yemen’s internationally recognized government, Rashad al Alimi, also requested US military aid to fight the Houthis during a phone call with Trump on September 20, according to Reuters.[6] Trump did not pledge support to the Yemeni government during the phone call, according to two sources.[7] The United States recently increased intelligence and targeting support to Saudi Arabia amid ongoing Houthi attacks on the kingdom.[8]
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is reportedly supporting Houthi efforts to develop infrastructure in the Houthis’ newly captured territory along Yemen’s southwestern coast that the group could use to consolidate its recent territorial gains around the Bab al Mandeb and establish long-term leverage over international shipping. Two Houthi military sources told AFP on September 19 that IRGC personnel visited recently captured Houthi territory along Yemen’s Red Sea coastline and supervised Houthi efforts to construct tunnels along the mountainous terrain surrounding the port city of Mokha in Taiz Governorate.[9] These tunnel systems would likely support Houthi efforts to consolidate their positions on Yemen’s western coastal plain and defend against future Yemeni government counteroffensives that aim to recapture Mokha. These tunnels would also likely protect Houthi forces against ongoing Saudi airstrikes and thereby further complicate Saudi and Yemeni government efforts to dislodge the Houthis from positions along the coast.[10] Iranian support for the Houthis in this regard is part of an effort to advance Iranian objectives by increasing global oil prices and therefore increasing pressure on the United States to surrender to Iranian demands.
The two Houthi military sources also said that the Houthis and IRGC personnel discussed the installation of radar infrastructure near Mokha and on Zuqar Island, which is located north of the Bab al Mandeb Strait.[11] It is unclear which radar systems the Houthis and IRGC discussed installing, but discussions about installing radar systems near Mokha and on Zuqar Island suggest that such radars might contribute to the Houthis’ maritime sensing capabilities and support ongoing Houthi efforts to establish long-term leverage over international shipping. A Houthi official told Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated media on September 19 that the Houthi “coast guard” is mobilizing vessels to conduct “extensive maritime surveillance” within Houthi-“controlled” sections of the strait in response to potential attacks on vessels by pirates or “hostile parties.”[12] Radar systems could also, in theory, support Houthi air defenses that the group may seek to position in the area. The United States previously destroyed multiple Houthi air defense radar systems during strikes across Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory in 2024 and during Operation Rough Rider in 2025.[13]
Houthi-IRGC efforts to improve Houthi positioning and capabilities in southwestern Yemen come amid recent Houthi rhetoric that indicates that the group intends to exert control over shipping in the strait. Houthi Defense Minister Mohammad Nasser al Atifi stated on September 20 that the Houthi Navy has “imposed a secure framework” to ensure the “protection and security” of navigation in the Red Sea.[14] Atifi noted that this excludes Saudi vessels, given that the Houthis are currently enforcing a blockade against Saudi ports and vessels.[15] Houthi Political Bureau member Mohamed al Bukhaiti told Western media on September 20 that the Houthis confirmed to the United States that the group will not target any nation in the strait except for Saudi Arabia.[16] Current Houthi promises to refrain from restricting international, non-Saudi maritime traffic through the Bab al Mandeb offer no guarantee that the group will perpetually refrain from attacking vessels belonging to the United States and its allies. Allowing the Houthis to determine which vessels may transit through the strait violates international maritime law and is unacceptable for US national security interests.[17]
Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Major General Mohsen Rezaei used his September 20 interview with Qatari outlet Al Jazeera to further Iran’s ongoing effort to sow divisions between the United States and its Gulf allies.[18] Rezaei urged Gulf states to reconsider their partnerships with the United States during the interview and repeated the Iranian regime’s longstanding narrative that the US military presence in the region is the primary source of regional insecurity.[19] This line of messaging supports Iran’s broader objective of reducing US military and political influence in the region.[20] Such narratives from Iranian officials ignore Iran’s own destabilizing activities against Gulf states, such as Iran’s support for Houthi attacks on Saudi military and energy infrastructure and continued threats to commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandeb Strait.[21]
Rezaei also sought to portray Iran as a cooperative regional security partner to Gulf states, likely as part of an Iranian effort to secure recognized control of the Strait of Hormuz among other Persian Gulf littoral states.[22] Rezaei stated that Iran is willing to work with littoral states on an agreement to manage the strait.[23] Iranian leadership recognizes that consolidating Iranian control over the strait in the long term requires other littoral states to recognize Iran’s authority and management in the strait. Such cooperation is also required by the June 2026 US-Iran memorandum of understanding.[24] Iran has yet to reach an agreement that meets its own requirements for Iranian management over the strait and also satisfies the other Gulf states. Rezaei noted that Iraq and five other states refused to meet with Iran and Oman in Oman last week. These states met instead with US Central Command, Israel, and other Arab countries in Germany.[25] Several states, including Saudi Arabia and Oman, have protested against certain aspects of the most recent Iranian proposal, which reportedly included mandatory tolls.[26]
Iranian information operations aimed at sowing discord between the United States and its Gulf allies take place as Iran faces apparent challenges in enforcing its control over the Strait of Hormuz.[27] Iran still presents a serious threat to commercial vessels in the strait, as demonstrated by an Iranian attack on a vessel on September 21.[28] Gulf states have increasingly relied upon US-supported maritime arrangements and alternative transit routes that reduce Iran’s ability to disrupt or control shipping in recent weeks, however.[29] Rezaei’s attempts to influence Gulf states away from their partnership with the United States likely carry particular importance for the regime under such conditions.[30]
Rezaei also claimed that Iran tested a new anti-ship missile armed with a cluster munition warhead in a recent Iranian attack targeting the USS George Washington aircraft carrier on September 5.[31] The missile did not impact the warship but struck “near” the vessel, according to Rezaei.[32] Iranian media claimed that Iran fired Qassem Basir ballistic missiles in the attack.[33] The Qassem Basir, which Iran unveiled in May 2025, is a solid-fueled medium-range ballistic missile with a 1,200-kilometer range and a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV) that allows missiles to maneuver mid-flight to evade air defenses.[34] The Qassem Basir is reportedly equipped with electro-optical seeker technology capable of tracking moving targets, according to the Telegraph.[35] Rezaei’s claim that Iran used a cluster munition comes after Iran’s recent firing of cluster munition warheads in an attack on US forces at Muwaffaq Salti Airbase in Jordan on September 8.[36] Cluster munitions disperse over a wide area and are intended to maximize damage. Iran regularly fired cluster munitions targeting Israeli civilian areas in March and April 2026, likely intended to maximize damage inflicted by Iranian ballistic missiles given their relatively low accuracy when fitted with standard warheads.[37] Iran’s deployments of cluster warheads targeting US forces and bases indicate that Iran seeks to inflict greater damage or casualties to impose further human and political costs on the United States.[38]
Russia planned to deepen Russian economic support for Iran and deepen sanctions evasion collaboration between 2024 and 2026, according to the 44-page plan Fox News obtained and published on September 20.[39] Russia approved the plan in September 2024, according to the document. The plan outlined a broad effort to deepen Russo-Iranian ties through nuclear and energy cooperation, Iranian production of Russian aircraft components, and the construction of new transport corridors.[40] The plan also called for both countries to expand the share of bilateral trade conducted in national currencies, expand correspondent banking, develop cross-border payments using central bank digital currencies, and connect banks through independent financial messaging systems.[41] Iran and Russia first operationalized the Shetab–Mir interbank payment system to circumvent the SWIFT payment system and the US dollar in 2024.[42]
The plans for Iranian and Russian cooperation between 2024 and 2026 are broadly consistent with the principles of Iran and Russia’s formal strategic partnership.[43] Such a partnership is of particular value to Iran as it engages in an active war with the United States. Russia has reportedly provided Iran with satellite imagery and military equipment, including man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) and drone components before and during the US-Israel-Iran war.[44] Iran’s relationship with Russia is also central to Iran’s broader campaign to circumvent sanctions through its regional partnerships and mitigate the effects of growing US economic pressure on Iran. Iran has recently met with other traditional trading partners and facilitators of Iran’s illicit networks as well as multilateral organizations as part of its campaign.[45]
The documents also emphasize Russo-Iranian collaboration in the media and communications sphere.[46] Both Russia and Iran use media and information campaigns to shape public perceptions and challenge Western influence, and Russia has significantly expanded its global soft power and media reach in recent years.[47] Iran may view Russia’s experience as a useful model as Iran continues what it describes as a “hybrid war” with the United States, which includes efforts to compete in the informational and cognitive space.[48]
US and Partner Military Operations
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Strike Campaign
Assessed Iranian War Aims:
- Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
- Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
- Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
- Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states
See topline section.
US-Iran Negotiations
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Domestic Affairs
Iranian regime security forces conducted several operations targeting anti-regime separatist groups in northwestern Iran. The Iranian Intelligence Ministry claimed that its forces killed one alleged separatist fighter in Piranshahr, West Azerbaijan Province, on September 20.[49] The ministry claimed that the fighter had planned to assassinate a local regime security commander.[50] The ministry also claimed that its forces arrested an operative who allegedly gathered and transmitted the coordinates of IRGC and Basij military bases to Israeli intelligence agents.[51] The regime has longstanding concerns about Kurdish separatism and militancy in Iran’s western and northwestern provinces.[52] Iranian leaders have historically accused anti-regime Kurdish militias based in Iraq of operating and inciting social unrest in Iran’s border provinces.
The regime is also facing internal security challenges in southeastern Iran. The Intelligence Ministry claimed that its forces arrested anti-regime operatives planning to bomb critical infrastructure in Bam, Kerman Province, on September 20.[53] IRGC-affiliated media separately reported on September 21 that anti-regime fighters killed an Iranian Law Enforcement Command officer in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[54] Sistan and Baluchistan Province is a hotspot for anti-regime activity, including by anti-regime Baloch separatist groups that frequently attack Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran.[55] ISW-CTP has observed a slight uptick in regime security operations in southeastern Iran over the past month.
Lebanon
Nothing significant to report.
Iraq
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi is reportedly attempting to restrict Iranian military advisors’ movement and activities in Iraq.[56] A senior Iranian-backed Iraqi militia official told US-funded, Arabic-language media on September 19 that Zaydi is aiming to introduce new rules that would require any foreign official or advisor, including from Iran, to use official channels to request a visit to Iraq and obtain an entry visa.[57] The rules would reportedly go into effect on September 30, which is the deadline for the Iraqi federal government to disarm the Iraqi militias and when US-led coalition forces will withdraw from Iraq.[58] Iranian advisors operate alongside the militias in Iraq, including those within the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[59] Zaydi’s reported efforts to reduce Iranian military advisors’ freedom of movement follow an Iraqi federal government memorandum in early September that appeared designed to restrict the movement and activities of senior Iranian security and military officials in Iraq.[60] That memorandum also explicitly restricted Iranian officials with security or military backgrounds from visiting Iraq, according to Lebanese media.[61] The new procedures that Zaydi is reportedly introducing may be an attempt to address the lack of specificity within the previous memorandum. This effort may also be in response to possible problems with Iraqi federal government enforcement or Iranian compliance. Iraqi sources speaking to Lebanese media on September 6 said that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani’s visit to Iraq in early July to attend former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s funeral procession violated an earlier version of the memorandum.[62]
Zaydi’s efforts to restrict the movement of Iranian officials in Iraq come amid his own attempts to consolidate his power as prime minister and the Iraqi government’s continued work to restrict weapons to the state. Zaydi has reestablished the Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, which places several security institutions under his authority, and considered major reform of the PMF, for example.[63] Zaydi reasserting Iraqi sovereignty in the form of restricting the activities of Iranian officials in Iraq would also support his position as prime minister. Iranian officials visiting Iraq in recent months have instructed the Iraqi militias to refrain from surrendering their weapons to the Iraqi government, which directly undermines Zaydi’s effort to disarm the militias.[64] Zaydi’s efforts to curb unchecked Iranian activities in Iraq, while seemingly related to his own efforts to consolidate his power, also support the US objective of lessening Iranian influence in Iraq.
The Shia Coordination Framework committee tasked with negotiating with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias reportedly proposed a “Sovereignty Law” to unspecified framework parties that would address several relevant issues.[65] A framework source told Iraqi media on September 20 that the proposed law would “regulate” the Iraqi federal government’s process for receiving weapons from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias after the militias agree to surrender their weapons.[66] This proposed law would also instruct the PMF to create a “special drone unit” and arrange for local authorities above the “36th parallel,” which likely refers to the Kurdistan Regional Government, to monitor the withdrawal of Turkish forces from the area.[67] The 36th parallel marks the boundary of the no-fly zone the United States established in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1991 after the Gulf War.[68] The source also confirmed that unspecified framework parties discussed this proposed law during recent framework meetings, but it is unclear which framework parties support its passage.[69] The full text of the proposed law is not available at this time, but its clause regarding the withdrawal of Turkish forces is consistent with some aspects of a reported agreement that the framework reportedly negotiated in recent weeks with some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that would enable the militias to keep their weapons.[70] That agreement reportedly stipulated that unspecified actors would schedule the complete withdrawal of Turkish forces from Iraq by July 2027 and proposed the creation of a committee to monitor the Turkish withdrawal.[71]
Arabian Peninsula
Yemeni government-aligned forces have reportedly repelled Houthi attempts to advance eastward into Taiz Governorate near Yemeni government-aligned supply lines that connect Taiz City and Aden City. The Houthis attempted to advance eastward into western Taiz Governorate along three axes near Jabal Naman, Jabal Rasin, and Jabal Jirdad on September 20 and September 21, according to a US-based Yemen analyst and Saudi media.[72] Yemeni government-aligned forces, including the Yemeni National Army, reportedly repelled Houthi forces’ attempts to advance.[73] These attempted Houthi advances follow a September 14 Houthi advance eastward from al Waziyah into al Shamayatan District, Taiz Governorate, west of the current Houthi advance attempts.[74] Further Houthi advances northeastward, particularly those near Jabal Jirdad, could threaten Yemeni government-aligned supply lines in al Turbah, Taiz Governorate, which connect Taiz and Aden cities. A US-based Yemen analyst assessed on September 20 that Houthi attempts to advance along these axes represent a Houthi effort to capture al Turbah.[75]
[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/20/us/politics/trump-yemen-houthis-red-sea-iran.html
[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/20/us/politics/trump-yemen-houthis-red-sea-iran.html
[3] https://www.cnn.com/2026/09/19/politics/frustration-houthis-saudi-arabia-iran
[4] https://iq.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-mission-iraq-september-19-2026/ ; https://il.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-jerusalem-september-19-2026/ ; https://jo.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-amman-september-19-2026/
[5] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/20/us/politics/trump-yemen-houthis-red-sea-iran.html
[6] https://x.com/timourazhari/status/2102027444194844911 ; https://x.com/timourazhari/status/2102028494779855344
[7] https://x.com/timourazhari/status/2102027444194844911 ; https://x.com/timourazhari/status/2102028494779855344
[8] https://www.cnn.com/2026/09/19/politics/frustration-houthis-saudi-arabia-iran ; https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/09/centcom-chief-meets-saudi-arabias-mbs-amid-houthi-gains-yemen
[9] https://aawsat dot com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5320216-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A8-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA
[10] https://t.me/army21ye/3754 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-14-2026/
[11] https://aawsat dot com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5320216-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A8-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA
[12] https://t.me/alakhbar_news/95705
[13] https://www.afcent.af.mil/News/Article/3643851/afcent-commander-statement-on-strikes-against-houthi-positions-in-yemen/ ; https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/20/us/politics/trump-yemen-houthis-red-sea-iran.html
[14] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/2101750995885679002
[15] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/2101750995885679002
[16] https://apnews.com/article/mideast-news-roundup-september-20-2026-4ca7f5b7d7b4a6658909b7c92764973a
[17] https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47744 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-17-2026/
[18] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2026/9/19/عاجل-أمين-مجلس-الأمن-القومي-الإيراني-3; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-14-2026/
[19] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2026/9/19/عاجل-أمين-مجلس-الأمن-القومي-الإيراني-3
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-10-2026/
[21] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2026/9/19/عاجل-أمين-مجلس-الأمن-القومي-الإيراني-3; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-10-2026/; https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2102044500453445984?s=20
[22] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2026/9/19/عاجل-أمين-مجلس-الأمن-القومي-الإيراني-3;
[23] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2026/9/19/عاجل-أمين-مجلس-الأمن-القومي-الإيراني-3;
[24] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4gy700j0eko
[25] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2026/9/19/عاجل-أمين-مجلس-الأمن-القومي-الإيراني-3; https://www.axios.com/2026/09/15/military-commanders-us-israel-arab-countries-iran-meeting-germany
[26] https://nypost.com/2026/09/03/world-news/oman-quietly-rejects-irans-pitch-for-strait-of-hormuz-fees-despite-irgc-claim-of-deal/; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-14-2026/
[27] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/31/us/politics/us-strikes-iran-new-naval-mine.html; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-14-2026/; https://www.isna dot ir/news/1405062315855/; https://t.me/defapress_ir/67557; https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2099591186583371830; https://www.axios.com/2026/07/07/us-strikes-iran-hormuz-ship-attacks; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-4-2026; https://x.com/TreyYingst/status/2094854875154731098?s=20; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-31-2026/;
https://x.com/MartinKelly/status/2094129711483891783?s=20; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-9-2026/; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/seafarer-oil-products-tanker-killed-incident-off-dubai-peninsula-says-2026-09-09/ ;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-attacks-us-base-jordan-ships-near-hormuz-after-tankers-sunk-2026-09-09/
[28] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2102044500453445984?s=20
[29] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-18-2026/;
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/aramco-boost-exports-strait-hormuz-60-million-bbl-september-october-traders-say-2026-09-18/; https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2101292730030669968
[30] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2026/9/19/عاجل-أمين-مجلس-الأمن-القومي-الإيراني-3; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-20-2026/; https://t.me/defapress_ir/63898
[31] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2026/9/19/عاجل-أمين-مجلس-الأمن-القومي-الإيراني-3
[32] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2026/9/19/عاجل-أمين-مجلس-الأمن-القومي-الإيراني-3
[33] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/us/news/2026/09/09/us-forces-destroy-five-iranian-oil-carriers/; https://www.javanonline dot ir/fa/news/1378032/
[34] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/us/news/2026/09/09/us-forces-destroy-five-iranian-oil-carriers/; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-may-5-2025/; ] https://x.com/IranObserver0/status/1919090642405249230 ;
https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/15/3305763
[35] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/us/news/2026/09/09/us-forces-destroy-five-iranian-oil-carriers/
[36] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-9-2026 ; https://www.foxnews.com/video/6404785881112
[37] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-22-2026/
[38] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-9-2026
[39] https://www.foxnews.com/world/exclusive-russian-document-reveals-sweeping-iran-plan-spanning-nuclear-finance-aviation
[40] https://www.foxnews.com/world/exclusive-russian-document-reveals-sweeping-iran-plan-spanning-nuclear-finance-aviation
[41] https://www.foxnews.com/world/exclusive-russian-document-reveals-sweeping-iran-plan-spanning-nuclear-finance-aviation
[42] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-12-2024/ ; https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2024/11/11/737064/Iran-Russia-trade-ties-dollar-SWIFT-remova
[43] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/The20Russia-Iran20Coalition20Deepens20013025.pdf
[44] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-23-2026/; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-strikes-cia-facilities-prompt-questions-about-possible-russian-role-2026-07-22/; https://www.ft.com/content/d034cc1a-f5fb-494e-a3c1-466e8e80ed82?syn-25a6b1a6=1
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