Toplines

The Iranian armed forces are undergoing an extensive reorganization that reflects lessons that the regime learned from the June 2025 and Spring 2026 wars. Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei instructed Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi on August 10 to “complete the process” of merging the AFGS and the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters (KOACH).[1] The AFGS is responsible for developing strategic guidance and military policy while the KOACH is responsible for joint and wartime operations.[2] The two organizations previously operated as a single institution, but former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei separated them in 2016.[3] ISW-CTP has reported indicators over the past year that suggested that the regime was considering merging the AFGS and KOACH. ISW-CTP reported in December 2025 that Khamenei was considering merging the AFGS and KOACH, citing unverified social media reports.[4] ISW-CTP also assessed on June 23 that Abdollahi may have been serving as the AFGS deputy chief and KOACH commander simultaneously, given that AFGS-affiliated media had begun referring to Abdollahi as the AFGS deputy chief.[5]

The regime likely calculates that merging the AFGS and KOACH will help streamline coordination between the Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), reduce institutional redundancies, and enable military leaders to make wartime decisions more quickly and effectively. The United States and Israel successfully conducted decapitation campaigns that targeted senior Iranian leaders during the June 2025 and Spring 2026 wars, which likely degraded Iranian forces’ ability to coordinate and respond effectively.[6] A New York Times report from late March noted that US-Israeli combined force strikes against Iranian commanders had fractured the regime and complicated its ability to coordinate retaliatory strikes, for example.[7] The regime made initial efforts to improve coordination after the June 2025 War by forming the Defense Council in August 2025 to streamline wartime decision-making.[8]

Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei appointed several Iranian officials to senior military positions on August 10.[9] These appointments largely formalize the structure of the armed forces that has existed for several months and consolidate both Mojtaba and his inner circle’s authority. 

•   Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi has de facto led the IRGC since US-Israeli combined force strikes killed his predecessor, Major General Mohammad Pakpour, on February 28.[10] ISW-CTP has assessed since March 2026 that Vahidi and his inner circle are playing an outsized role in regime decision-making.[11] Vahidi has played a significant behind-the-scenes role in US-Iran negotiations and supported using force against the United States and Israel on multiple occasions to achieve Iranian objectives. Vahidi reportedly advocated for striking Israel in June, two months after the United States and Iran had agreed to a ceasefire, in order to condition a US-Iran deal on the cessation of Israeli operations against Hezbollah, for example.[12] Vahidi has held multiple senior roles in the regime, such as IRGC Quds Force commander, defense and armed forces logistics minister, interior minister, AFGS deputy chief, and IRGC deputy commander.^[13] The United States sanctioned Vahidi in October 2022 for his role in directing the Law Enforcement Command (LEC), which nominally operates under the Interior Ministry, during the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini protests.[14] Vahidi is also implicated in the 1994 AMIA bombing in Argentina, which killed 85 people.[15] He remains the subject of an Interpol Red Notice.[16]
• IRGC Deputy Commander Major General Mostafa Izadi served in senior IRGC command positions during the Iran-Iraq War.[17] Izadi subsequently served as the IRGC Ground Forces commander from 1989 to 1992 and has held multiple senior roles in the AFGS.[18] Izadi has most recently served as the head of the KOACH Cyber and Emerging Threats Headquarters since 2017, where he focused on “addressing modern warfare challenges.”[19] Izadi is notably one of only nine Iranian commanders who hold the rank of major general.[20]
• Basij Commander Hossein Taeb helped Mojtaba engineer the 2005 presidential election in favor of hardline candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.[21] Taeb later led the Basij’s suppression of the 2009 Green Movement, which broke out in response to Ahmadinejad’s rigged reelection as president.[22] The United States sanctioned Taeb in 2010 for his involvement in suppressing the 2009 protests.[23] Taeb subsequently served as the head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization from 2009 to 2022 and then served as an adviser to the IRGC commander.[24] Former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei dismissed Taeb in 2022 for incompetence.[25] Taeb’s appointment as Basij commander therefore reflects Taeb’s deep personal ties to Mojtaba. Taeb has known Mojtaba since the Iran-Iraq War, when he and Mojtaba served together in the Habib Ibn Mazahir Battalion under the IRGC 27th Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Division.[26]
•  AFGS Chief Major General Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi has commanded the AFGS since March 2026.[27] Aliabadi replaced Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi, who was killed during the Spring 2026 War.[28] Aliabadi fought in the Iran-Iraq War and later served as the IRGC Air Force deputy commander from 1997 to 2001 under then-IRGC Air Force Commander Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.[29] The IRGC Air Force was later renamed the IRGC Aerospace Force in 2009.[30] Aliabadi also served as the LEC deputy commander under Ghalibaf in the early 2000s, governor of Gilan and Semnan provinces from 2005 to 2009, and deputy interior minister for security and law enforcement from 2009 to 2014.[31] Aliabadi’s LEC and Interior Ministry positions highlight his experience in Iran’s internal security apparatus. Aliabadi served as the AFGS coordination deputy–the third most senior position in the AFGS–for nine years prior to becoming the KOACH commander in July 2025.[32] It is therefore not surprising that Mojtaba appointed Aliabadi to head this institution. Anti-regime media reported in April that President Masoud Pezeshkian had criticized both Vahidi and Aliabadi for “unilaterally” escalating strikes against Gulf states and steering Iran into “a huge catastrophe,” highlighting the central role Aliabadi has played in recent months.[33]
• AFGS Deputy Chief Brigadier General Kiomars Heydari served under Aliabadi as the KOACH deputy commander.[34] Heydari began his military career as a Basij volunteer during the Iran-Iraq War.[35] Heydari has extensive experience in the Artesh Ground Forces, initially serving in the 81st Armored Division in Kermanshah and later serving as the Southwestern Regional Headquarters commander.[36] Heydari was appointed as the Artesh Ground Forces commander in 2016 and warned in November 2022 at the height of the Mahsa Amini Protest Movement that protesters would “no longer have a place” in Iran if then-Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered a more brutal crackdown on them.[37] Heydari’s comment confirmed the Artesh Ground Forces’ role in protest suppression, a role that has historically been assumed primarily by the LEC, Basij, and IRGC Ground Forces.
• IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Ozmaei previously served as deputy commander of the IRGC’s First and Fifth Naval Regions.[38] Ozmaei replaced Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri on July 4.[39]

These appointments follow Mojtaba’s appointment of his former senior military adviser, Major General Mohsen Rezaei, as the new Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) secretary on August 9. Rezaei replaced Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, whom Mojtaba appointed as a political adviser.[40] Mojtaba may have conducted the recent flurry of appointments to strengthen his hold over the SNSC and other major organizations.[41] ISW-CTP cannot independently confirm that Mojtaba actually made the recent appointments, however. Rezaei and Zolghadr are ideologically aligned and served together in the IRGC, which suggests that the reshuffling was not done to change the policy posture of the SNSC.[42] Mojtaba’s appointments reinforce the regime’s current maximalist and hardline positions, including absolute Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz, the removal of US troops from the region, and the development of Iran’s nuclear program, among others. ISW-CTP assessed on March 8, when Mojtaba became supreme leader, that he would likely pursue hardline domestic and foreign policies similar to those of his father.[43]

The recent appointments underscore that the Iranian regime is reconsolidating the upper echelons of its leadership structure after the US-Israeli decapitation campaigns. This new cadre of Iranian leadership will come with its own prerogatives and desires to shape Iranian decision-making. It is unclear at this time how and to what degree these figures will be able to do so. 

Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) forces and the Houthis exchanged fire across multiple Yemeni governorates between August 7 and 10.[44] ROYG Armed Forces Spokesperson Colonel Majed Nuzaili announced on August 8 that unspecified ROYG units targeted Houthi positions on several fronts in retaliation for Houthi attacks on ROYG military camps and civilian areas in Marib and Hadramawt governorates on August 6 and 7.[45] The ROYG-affiliated, Saudi-backed National Resistance Forces said it shelled Houthi command and control centers and positions in southern Hudaydah Governorate on August 8 in response to Houthi attacks in Marib and Hadramawt Governorates.[46] The Houthis responded to these attacks by conducting a drone and missile attack targeting Saudi “mobilization” and weapons depots at the ROYG-controlled Mocha Port in Taiz Governorate on August 9, which killed four ROYG soldiers and three civilians.[47] ROYG forces also conducted several drone attacks on Houthi positions and vehicles in Marib Governorate on August 10 following the Houthi attack on Mocha Port.[48] The extent to which this exchange of fire marks a significant escalation is unclear. Houthi and ROYG forces have fought at low levels since 2023, but the recent fighting follows reports that Saudi Arabia is preparing for a naval and possible land offensive to end the Houthi “chokehold” on Saudi Red Sea oil exports.[49] The Houthis have imposed a blockade on Saudi Arabia since July 20, which has reduced Saudi Arabia’s ability to export oil and other goods.[50]

The Iraqi federal government appears to be taking limited steps to prevent further Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks against Saudi Arabia and other regional states in order to avoid further strikes on Iraq. Iraqi officials who met with a Saudi intelligence delegation on August 8 pledged to prevent the use of Iraqi territory for attacks against Saudi Arabia and asked for information to help prevent future attacks, according to local sources speaking to Iraqi media on August 8.[51] The Saudi delegation said that Saudi Arabia does not want escalation but will not hesitate to act against militia threats if the Iraqi government fails to do so.[52] US and Saudi forces struck several Iraqi militia positions on July 28 in response to Iraqi militia attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure and US interests in Iraq and the region.[53] Iraqi sources separately told Qatari media on August 10 that the Iraqi federal government formed the Badia Operations Command to enhance coordination between Iraqi forces deployed to the Muthanna desert near the Iraqi borders with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.[54] The sources stated that the Iraqi federal government formed the command to prevent militias from launching attacks from this area, which they did in March and April.[55] The Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Jazeera and Badia Operations Command, which operates in the area, is affiliated with Kataib Hezbollah.[56] The PMF is a state security service that includes multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, such as Kataib Hezbollah, that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[57] Iraqi federal government Spokesperson Haider al Aboudi also announced on August 8 that Iraqi authorities dismantled an armed network, arrested its members, and seized drones and other equipment.[58] Unspecified sources told Saudi media on August 9 that the network planned to conduct attacks outside Iraq and maintained contact with Iranian officials responsible for managing drone attacks (read more on Iranian activities in Iraq below).[59] Saudi media added that the network included three militia members in Babil Province.[60]

The Iraqi Interior Ministry announced on August 10 that it closed 71 “fake” PMF offices across Iraq as part of the government’s disarmament efforts.[61] The Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC), which oversees PMF training, administration, and planning, denied that the offices were affiliated with the PMF and said that the PMC’s General Directorate of Security and Discipline closed the offices as part of the state’s efforts to register weapons.[62] Likely Kataib Hezbollah member Abu Zainab al Lami heads the PMC’s General Directorate of Security and Discipline, which oversees the PMF’s internal affairs.[63] The Interior Ministry’s efforts to register civilian weapons began in 2023 and differ from the federal government’s disarmament campaign, which has mainly focused on disarming Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[64] The PMC’s claim that it closed the offices as part of the state’s efforts to register weapons, instead of the state’s efforts to disarm the militias, could be an attempt to distance the PMF and the militias within it from accusations of conducting kinetic activity outside of the state, as is implied in the Interior Ministry’s statement.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ transfer of weapons to the Iranian-backed PMF would harm US interests in Iraq by strengthening Iranian influence in the Iraqi security establishment. A Shia Coordination Framework source told Iraqi media on August 9 that Iraqi militias will hand over their weapons to the PMF before the Iraqi federal government’s September 30 disarmament deadline, which corresponds with the planned withdrawal of US-led coalition forces from Iraq.[65] The framework source added that the PMF will supervise the inventory and storage of the militia weapons it receives.[66] Some Iraqi government officials have suggested that the militias will avoid disarmament by handing over weapons to the PMF.[67] The PMF contains many Iraqi militias that answer to Iran and is led by Iranian-backed Iraqi actors.[68] Over half of the PMF’s brigades either conducted or supported militia attacks against US and foreign targets in Iraq and the region in March and April.[69] Transferring militia weapons to the PMF would thus harm US interests by transferring weapons to an organization that Iran has heavily infiltrated. Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri met with several unspecified PMF brigade commanders on August 9, according to Iraqi media.[70] Ameri reportedly discussed distributing militia fighters among PMF brigades to build more integrated formations that are less connected to previous religious and political leadership.[71] The integration of fighters into different PMF units would not reduce Iranian influence in the PMF if the units continued to answer to Iran. Ameri also reportedly discussed including military officers within the PMF’s structure and a new structure for ranks and leadership positions.[72] The 2016 PMF Law is currently the only Iraqi legislation that covers the PMF.[73] Multiple Iraqi administrations, including under former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi, have attempted to regulate the PMF via executive orders but the PMF has only implemented some of the provisions.[74] Iranian-backed actors have attempted since 2025 to pass new legislation to formalize key PMF structures.[75]

It is unclear if Iraqi militias would be willing to hand over their weapons to the PMF. Multiple Iraqi militias, particularly Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, continue to refuse to disarm.[76] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada leader Abu Alaa al Walai sarcastically offered on August 8 to buy weapons from any militia that sells them.[77] The militias are using a variety of excuses to remain armed and will likely continue to do so.[78] A Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated parliamentarian suggested on August 8 that Iraq would normalize relations with Israel if the PMF disarmed.[79] The militias have consistently circumvented the disarmament process, including by handing over inoperable weapons.[80]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may have conducted a drone strike that destroyed shells for US-provided Iraqi tanks and armored vehicles at Camp Taji, north of Baghdad, on August 2, according to security and intelligence sources speaking to Saudi media on August 10.[81] ISW-CTP has not observed further information to corroborate the Saudi report at the time of this writing. Iraqi authorities previously attributed an explosion at Camp Taji to a fire caused by high temperatures at an Iraqi Army 9th Armored Division ammunition depot.[82] Two Iraqi officers told Saudi media on August 10 that thermal footage showed an object approaching from south of the base before the ammunition depot and tank shells exploded.[83] One of the officers said the explosion destroyed all of the 9th Armored Division’s unloaded shells and the majority of its tank equipment.[84] A security source said that the attack occurred while 9th Armored Division forces were deployed to secure the Arbaeen Pilgrimage.[85] An intelligence official said that the drone was launched from an unspecified site south of Baghdad.[86] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control multiple areas south of Baghdad and have previously launched drone attacks from those areas.[87] The official added that the attack indicates that some militias opposed to disarmament are attempting to strip the Iraqi military of military assets that it could use against the militias as part of pre-emptive plans for “friction” with Iraqi authorities.[88] An unspecified political official quoted a militia leader who said the militias are prepared to confront the Iraqi government or the United States if they use force to try to disarm them.[89]

US-funded Arabic-language media reported on August 8 additional details of the IRGC’s role in directing Iraqi militia attacks on Iraqi Kurdistan and neighboring countries.[90] The IRGC reportedly operates small cells of between five and ten Iraqi fighters from the main Iraqi militias who maintain a “lower profile” and “bypass” Iraqi militia leadership, according to unspecified sources.[91] The sources added that the cell members wear civilian clothing with no insignia and launch drones from different areas in Iraq to make their operations harder to track by the Iraqi federal government.[92] The cells have reportedly conducted drone attacks against unspecified targets in Iraqi Kurdistan and neighboring countries.[93] Unspecified actors have launched multiple drones against US targets in Iraqi Kurdistan in recent weeks.[94] Iraqi militias have also launched recent attacks on Gulf countries, such as the July 27 attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure.[95] The sources added that the cells report directly to Haji Hamed, the head of the IRGC’s advisory mission in Iraq, and that the IRGC established the cells over the past several months as Iraqi militias began to hand over weapons to the Iraqi federal government.[96] Iraqi militias Asaib Ahl al Haq and Kataib al Imam Ali both announced their willingness to disarm on July 2.[97] The August 8 report follows a similar June 19 Reuters report that the IRGC formed militia cells to report directly to the IRGC and attack Gulf countries between late April and mid-May.[98] The IRGC may have decided to reactivate or create new cells similar to the ones it used in April and May in reaction to Asaib Ahl al Haq and Kataib al Imam Ali’s announcement. Iran may have also maintained the militia cells the entire time. Iraqi government Spokesperson Haider al Aboudi appeared to confirm on August 9 that the PMF is working with foreign advisers, almost certainly from Iran.[99] Recent US-Saudi airstrikes on militia positions killed at least 4 IRGC Quds Force officers.[100]