Toplines

Iran is pushing the United States to unfreeze a significant amount of Iranian financial assets and acknowledge Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz as part of the United States-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU). Doing so would leave Iran in a significantly stronger strategic position and could support its military reconstitution efforts. Iranian officials told Reuters that the Iranian delegation’s talks with Qatari officials in Doha on July 1 would focus on unfreezing $6 billion worth of Iranian financial assets and obtaining US recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.[1] The Iranian-Qatari meetings followed Qatari officials’ meetings with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner in Doha on June 30 to establish the US negotiating position.[2] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi confirmed on July 1 that the talks in Doha aimed to accelerate the implementation of the ceasefire in Lebanon, lift the US blockade on Iran, and release Iranian frozen assets.[3] Gharibabadi noted that the United States and Iran have formed specialized working groups to monitor the MoU implementation but that these working groups have not yet started talks.[4] Gharibabadi later claimed that Iranian and Qatari officials reached an agreement to unfreeze 6 billion US dollars’ worth of Iranian financial assets to purchase and provide goods needed by Iran.[5] US and Qatari officials have yet to confirm Gharibabadi’s specific claim, but a US official denied that the United States had agreed to unfreeze Iranian funds to Israeli media on July 1.[6] US Vice President JD Vance stated on June 22 that Iran would use unfrozen assets to purchase US agricultural products, following quadrilateral Iran-US-Qatar-Pakistan talks in Switzerland on June 21.[7] Iranian media subsequently denied that Iran agreed to purchase US agricultural products, however.[8] A US official told Axios on July 1 that Witkoff and Kushner attempted to convince the Iranian side that their demand for tolls in the strait could disrupt the whole MoU and that a diplomatic agreement would financially benefit Iran more than collecting tolls.[9] The US official did not comment on recognizing Iran’s claims of sovereignty over the strait. Iranian Parliament Speaker and Iran’s negotiating delegation head Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf highlighted how Iran intended to voice its concerns over the United States’ implementation of the MoU, including the demands for the US to fulfill Iran’s stipulations, at the Doha talks in an interview on June 30.[10] Ghalibaf also said that Iran did not plan to conduct actual negotiations in Doha.[11]

Ghalibaf’s June 30 interview appears to be part of an effort to build intra-regime support for the MoU amid domestic backlash from the anti-negotiation camp. Ghalibaf argued that Iran will continue to collect fees from vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, implicitly arguing that the MoU supports Iranian claims of sovereignty over the strait.[12] Ghalibaf claimed that the MoU stipulates that Iran will retrieve half of its 24 billion US dollars’ worth of frozen financial assets and that the Iranian Central Bank will use these funds “to purchase any goods it needs, at any price, and in any currency in the world.”[13] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, who likely wields dominant influence over Iranian decision-making at the moment, has considered using the funds for military spending, according to mediators speaking to the New York Times on June 13.[14] Ghalibaf underlined in the interview the economic benefits of the MoU so far, including the lifting of the US naval blockade, which has allowed Iran to export over 40 million barrels of oil at a price 20 percent higher than before the war.[15]

The Pezeshkian administration has likewise tried to present Iranian leadership as unified in support of the MoU. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian emphasized that his administration has followed Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s guidance and is aligned with the Iranian armed forces, implicitly referring to the IRGC and Vahidi, in a meeting with the Islamic Propaganda Coordination Council on July 1.[16] Vice President for Executive Affairs Mohammad Jafar Ghaem Panah, an adviser to Pezeshkian, separately published the names of 11 of the 12 Supreme National Security Council members who voted for the MoU on June 30, which included ultra-hardline political leader Saeed Jalili.[17] Ghaem Panah likely published this list to appeal to the ultra-hardline camp, which has been the most critical of negotiations so far.[18] Hardline regime elements still appear concerned that the negotiating delegation may cross Supreme Leader Mojtaba’s red lines, however. Sixty of 88 Assembly of Experts members, responsible for appointing and supervising the Supreme Leader, went so far as to issue a warning to negotiators not to violate Mojtaba’s “red lines,” in a 10-point statement on June 28.[19]

Iranian officials are openly discussing expanding their missile ranges beyond the long-held 2,000-kilometer limit. A senior political adviser to former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Brigadier General Rasoul Sanaei Rad, said on July 1 that Ali Khamenei had previously issued “phased” guidance to increase missile range and then improve missile accuracy.[20] An Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee member similarly said in October 2025 that Ali Khamenei had lifted all restrictions on Iran’s missile ranges and that Iran would expand its missile program “wherever it sees fit.”[21] Iran’s known longest-range missiles are the Emad, Sejjil, and Shahab-3, which all have a reported range of 2,000 kilometers.[22] Iran may seek to develop missiles that can reach more distant US positions after its failed attempt to strike a US military base in Diego Garcia. Iran fired two ballistic missiles targeting the base in March 2026, which is located approximately 3,700 kilometers from Iran’s southern border.[23] The attack marked the furthest-ever attempted Iranian missile strike, but one of the missiles failed in flight, and US forces intercepted the other.[24] Eighty-five Iranian parliamentarians also implicitly called for the development of intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities in a letter to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei on May 31.[25] The parliamentarians stated that Parliament will support Iran’s military forces and defense industry until Iranian missiles can reach the United States.[26]