The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.
Key Takeaways
- US President Donald Trump extended his deadline for Iran to reach a deal with the United States to March 27. In extending the deadline, Trump said that Iran agreed to cease uranium enrichment, relinquish its existing stockpiles, and remain “low-key on the missiles.” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on March 23 that Trump told him that the United States sees an opportunity to “leverage the military achievements of the war” to secure all strategic objectives through an eventual agreement.
- Ghalibaf publicly rejected reports of United States-Iran negotiations on X on March 23. That Ghalibaf is leading diplomatic engagement with the United States is consistent with reports that he has consolidated tremendous influence in Iran, especially since the current war began.
- The combined force continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure to degrade Iran’s missile capabilities. The combined force also struck IRGC Ground Force units at several echelons in central and southern Iran.
- Two unspecified sources told Israeli media on March 22 that Iran has decided to limit its attacks on Saudi Arabia due to concerns that continued strikes could trigger a direct Saudi military response. ISW-CTP has observed a relative decrease in Iranian attacks targeting Saudi Arabia since March 22, which corroborates this Israeli media report.
- Hezbollah claimed 55 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as northern Israeli towns, between 3:00 PM ET on March 22 and 3:00 PM ET on March 23. Most of Hezbollah’s claimed attacks targeted IDF positions and Israeli towns in northern Israel. Hezbollah is primarily relying on rockets but also increasingly using drones in its attacks against Israel.
Toplines
US President Donald Trump extended his deadline for Iran to reach a deal with the United States to March 27.[2] Trump had previously threatened to strike Iranian power plants if Iran did not stop attacks around the Strait of Hormuz by March 23.[3] In extending the deadline, Trump said that Iran agreed tocease uranium enrichment, relinquish its existing stockpiles, and remain “low-key on the missiles.”[4] Trump told reporters that his team is “dealing with a man that I believe is the most respected, not the supreme leader, we have not heard from him.”[5] An Israeli official told Axios that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner have spoken to Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.[6] A source with knowledge of the matter told Axios that there “did not appear” to have been direct talks with Ghalibaf, but that Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey have passed messages between the United States and Iran and were pursuing a call between the Trump administration and Ghalibaf.[7]
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on March 23 that Trump told him that the United States sees an opportunity to “leverage the military achievements of the war” to secure all strategic objectives through an eventual agreement.[8] Netanyahu conveyed that Trump believed such an agreement could safeguard shared US-Israeli interests, depending on how the emerging diplomatic channel unfolds.[9] A separate source familiar with the matter told Axios that the US Vice President JD Vance discussed United States-Iran negotiations with Netanyahu in a phone call on March 23.[10]
Ghalibaf publicly rejected reports of United States-Iran negotiations on X on March 23.[11] Ghalibaf added that all Iranian officials stand firmly behind Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and the Iranian people’s demand for “complete and remorseful punishment” of the United States and Israel.[12]
That Ghalibaf is leading diplomatic engagement with the United States is consistent with reports that he has consolidated tremendous influence in Iran, especially since the current war began. Ghalibaf is a former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officer who maintains close ties to the military establishment but has operated primarily as a politician in recent decades.[13] Ghalibaf reportedly assumed an unprecedented senior command role during the 12-Day War, however, demonstrating his influence and authority in the regime.[14] Ghalibaf was also reportedly behind the formation of the Defense Council after the 12-Day War, which was meant to streamline decision-making and prepare the regime for future conflict against the United States and Israel.[15] More recently, Ghalibaf was reportedly among the small cadre of IRGC officers who aggressively intervened in the supreme leader succession process to ensure that Mojtaba Khamenei replaced his father.[16] Remarks from US and Israeli security officials on March 22 suggest that this inner circle of IRGC figures has been especially empowered since the ascension of Mojtaba, who remains badly wounded.[17] The killing of Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani may have removed yet another constraint on Ghalibaf’s influence, given that Larijani played a similarly dominant role in Iranian foreign and defense policy and had opposed Mojtaba’s accession, instead backing his own brother, Sadegh Amoli Larijani, for supreme leadership.[18]
US and Israeli Air Campaign
The combined force has continued to strike Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure to degrade Iran’s missile capabilities. An Israeli military correspondent reported that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has destroyed or rendered inaccessible approximately 330 of Iran’s estimated 470 ballistic missile launchers, which is consistent with the general declining trend of Iranian missile fire.[19] The IDF destroyed over half the launchers in strikes, while the other half are buried in currently inaccessible underground missile facilities.[20] The combined force likely struck the Imam Hossein strategic missile base south of Yazd City on March 22.[21] An open-source intelligence (OSINT) account geolocated a video of smoke and fire rising from the mountain where the facility is located on March 22.[22] The combined force has repeatedly struck this facility since the war began, including strikes on March 1, 6, and 17.[23] The Imam Hossein strategic missile base stored long-range Khorramshahr missiles in underground tunnels and launched around 60 missiles at Israel during the 12-Day War, according to the IDF.[24] Iran reportedly launched cluster munition-equipped ballistic missiles from this base, which Iran has used consistently against Israel since February 28 and previously during the 12-Day War.[25] An Israeli analyst assessed that the Imam Hossein strategic missile base is responsible for several ballistic missile attacks against Israel since the war began, based on calculations from an Israeli-American scientist.[26] ISW-CTP cannot verify these calculations, however.
The combined force likely struck the Bid Ganeh missile facility in Tehran Province on March 22. An Israeli journalist published a video of an explosion in Bid Ganeh, and anti-regime media reported sounds of explosions in the area on March 22.[27] The combined force likely struck the Modarres missile base complex, which is reportedly associated with the development and production of Iran’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles as well as Iran’s space program.[28] The Bid Ganeh site also produces medium-range liquid-propellant systems, according to a missile expert.[29] The IDF previously struck Bid Ganeh during the 12-Day War.[30] The strikes may alternatively have targeted the IRGC al Ghadir Missile Command or the Amir al Momenin missile launch site, which are in the vicinity of Bib Ganeh.
The combined force also likely struck the Chamran missile base near Jam City, Bushehr Province, on March 23. Anti-regime media published a video of smoke and fire at the Chamran missile base following a reported combined force strike on the facility.[31] Iran stores Ghiam-1 ballistic missiles, which have a range of around 800 kilometers, at the Chamran missile base, according to an Israeli think tank.[32] The combined force previously struck the Chamran missile base on March 6 and 20.[33] Repeated strikes on these facilities indicate a continued effort to degrade Iran’s ability to store, launch, and sustain ballistic missile operations.
US Central Command (CENTCOM) published a video on March 23 of strikes on Iranian drone launch sites in unspecified areas of Iran.[34] The footage showed US strikes targeting an Arash-2 drone, a Shahed-136, and a mobile drone launch platform carrying another Shahed-136.[35] Iran claimed to target Ben Gurion Airport with an Arash-2 drone on March 22.[36]
The combined force has continued to degrade Iranian air and air defense capabilities in order to maintain air dominance over parts of Iran. Geolocated footage shows the combined force likely struck the Artesh Ground Forces 4th Aviation Base in Esfahan City several times on March 23.[37] The combined force previously struck the Artesh Ground Forces 4th Aviation Base on March 7, which damaged several buildings at the airbase and the runway’s tarmac.[38] The combined force also struck the airbase on March 13 and 19.[39] The Artesh Ground Forces 4th Aviation Base hosts rotary-wing aircraft.[40]
The combined force also likely struck the Artesh Air Force 6th Tactical Air Base in Bushehr City on March 22.[41] Iranian opposition media and an Israeli journalist reported sounds of explosions and published videos of smoke rising from the airbase on March 22.[42] The combined force previously cratered the runway at the Artesh Air Force 6th Tactical Air Base, which is colocated with Bushehr International Airport, between March 14 and 22.[43] The IDF previously struck the airport during the 12-Day War.[44]
The IDF separately said on March 23 that it struck the IRGC Aerospace Force headquarters in Tehran.[45] The IRGC Aerospace Force is the principal operator of the Iranian missile and drone arsenals.[46] The IDF previously struck the headquarters on March 7.[47] CENTCOM separately published a video on March 23 of strikes on what appear to be Iranian air defense systems in unspecified areas of Iran.[48]
The combined force continued to strike Iranian naval infrastructure possibly as part of its efforts to limit Iran’s ability to threaten international shipping. The combined force likely struck an ammunition depot at the Sijran naval training base in Kerman Province on March 23.[49] Geolocated footage from anti-regime media shows what appears to be munitions cooking off after multiple strikes on the base followed by a large secondary explosion.[50] The combined force previously struck the Sijran naval training base on March 14.[51] Commercially available satellite imagery of the base shows several storage bunkers at the base, which further indicates that Iran used the facility for munitions storage. The combined force previously struck an ammunition depot in Sirjan, Kerman Province, on March 16.[52]
The combined force has continued to strike IRGC Ground Forces units and headquarters across Iran. The regime has historically deployed IRGC Ground Forces units to suppress internal unrest.[53] The IDF announced on March 23 that it struck the IRGC Ground Forces Headquarters in eastern Tehran overnight.[54] The Ground Forces decentralized its command structure in the 2000s and 2010s, establishing 32 provincial units that could operate independently in the event of a decapitation strike against IRGC central leadership.[55]
The combined force has targeted IRGC Ground Forces units at several echelons in central Iran.[56] The combined force struck the Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base in Esfahan City on March 8.[57] Operational bases are regional headquarters that oversee IRGC Ground Forces units and security operations typically across two to three provinces.[58] The Seyyed ol Shohada Operational base specifically oversees IRGC Ground Force units in Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Esfahan, and Yazd provinces.[59] The following units are subordinate to the Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base:
- Saheb ol Zaman Provincial Unit. The IDF struck the IRGC Ground Forces Saheb ol Zaman Provincial Unit in Esfahan on March 8.[60] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on March 9 showed damage to buildings in the northeastern and northwestern corners of the base. The strike likely killed the combined force killed the Saheb ol Zaman Provincial Unit coordination deputy.[61] The Saheb ol Zaman Provincial Unit has played a role in suppressing protests in Esfahan, including during the Dey protests in 2017-2018.[62]
- 8th Najaf-e Ashraf Armored Division (Najafabad, Esfahan Province). Commercially available satellite imagery from March 9 shows damage to the IRGC Ground Forces 8th Najaf-e Ashraf Armored Division in Najafabad, west of Esfahan City.[63]
- 14th Imam Hossein Division (Esfahan City, Esfahan Province). Commercially available satellite imagery indicates that the combined force destroyed buildings in the northern and central parts of the division complex.[64] Geolocated footage showed explosions at the 14th Imam Hossein Division headquarters on March 22, suggesting the combined force has struck the facility again.[65] The Imam Hossein Division deployed to Syria to fight for the Assad regime during the Syrian civil war.[66]
- 18th Al Ghadir Independent Brigade (Yazd City, Yazd Province). Iranian sources reported that combined force struck an unspecified military facility south of Yazd City, Yazd Province, on March 23 that may be affiliated with the nearby 18th Al Ghadir Independent Brigade headquarters.[67] The facility appears to host underground infrastructure. It is also located about nine kilometers from the Imam Hossein missile base.
- 44th Ghamar Bani Hashem Brigade (Shahr-e Kurd, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province). ISW-CTP has not yet observed combined force strikes targeting this brigade.
The combined force has also targeted IRGC Ground Forces units in southern Iran. The Madinah ol Munawarah Operational Base oversees IRGC Ground Forces in Bushehr, Fars, and Hormozgan provinces.[68] Commercially available satellite imagery from March 9 showed damage to hardened structures within and around a base in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, that hosts both the Madinah ol Munawarah Operational Base and the 34th Imam Sajjad Brigade. The 34th Imam Sajjad Brigade is subordinate to the Imam Sajjad Provincial Unit.[69] The following units are subordinate to the Madinah ol Munawarah Operational Base:
- Imam Sajjad Provincial Unit (Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province). ISW-CTP has not yet observed strikes targeting the Imam Sajjad Provincial Unit’s headquarters in Bandar Abbas. The combined force may have struck facilities affiliated with the provincial unit’s 34th Imam Sajjad Brigade, which is co-located with the Madinah ol Munawah Operational Base, as noted above.
- 19th Fajr Operational Division (Shiraz, Fars Province). ISW-CTP has not yet observed combined force strikes targeting this unit.
- 2nd Imam Sajjad Special Forces Brigade (Kazeroun, Fars Province). ISW-CTP has not yet observed combined force strikes targeting this unit.
- 14th Imam Sadegh Infantry Brigade (Bushehr city, Bushehr Province). Iranian opposition media posted footage on March 12 of smoke rising over the Imam Sadegh Infantry Brigade.[70]
- 33rd Al Mehdi Airborne Brigade (Jahrom, Fars Province). Satellite imagery from March 6 showed damage to likely warehouses or hangars at the brigade’s base in Jahrom.[71]
The combined force has continued to strike internal security institutions in northwestern Iran. Satellite imagery showed that the combined force likely struck several buildings within a compound in Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province, between March 3 and 13.[72] The compound hosts both the Artesh Ground Forces 21st Hamzeh Infantry Division headquarters and the Tabriz City LEC headquarters, and ISW-CTP is unable to identify which headquarters were struck at this time.[73] The combined force also struck a Tabriz police station between March 3 and 13.[74] The IDF conducted a wave of strikes targeting internal security institutions in Tabriz on March 10.[75]
The IDF announced that it struck the “IRGC Imam Ali headquarters” in southern Tehran on March 23.[76] The IDF may be referring to the Imam Ali Central Security headquarters, which is the central Basij unit that oversees the Imam Ali Battalions across the country. The Imam Ali Battalions are Basij security units trained and equipped to suppress urban protests and conduct anti-riot operations and intimidate and arrest protesters under IRGC direction.[77] Regional Basij bases maintain operational control over local Imam Ali units.[78]
The combined force has continued to strike industrial sites or companies with ties to the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. The IDF reported on March 23 that it struck manufacturing industries and additional research sites in various fields of electronics, ballistic missiles, and warheads in Tehran.[79] Geolocated footage posted on March 23 showed damage to a building affiliated with Iran Electronic Industries in Tajrish, northeastern Tehran.[80] Iran Electronics Industries manufactures a range of military products, including electronic warfare equipment, missile launchers, and tactical communication systems.[81] The United States sanctioned Iran Electronics Industries in 2008 for its ties to the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry and its role supporting the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programs.[82] The combined force has so far targeted at least two sanctioned subsidiaries of Iran Electronics Industries: Shiraz Electronics Industries and Esfahan Optical Industries.[83]
The combined force killed a university professor who had supported research and development for Iran’s missile program. The strikes killed University of Science and Technology professor Saeed Shamghadri in the Chizar area in northern Tehran City on March 23.[84] Khorasan Razavi Province Governor Gholam Hossein Mozaffari said that Shamghadri had sacrificed his life for “the indigenization of the missile industry,” in a condolence message.[85] Anti-regime media reported that Mozaffari’s security deputy was the brother of Shamghadri.[86]
Iranian Response
Iran continued to target Israel on March 22 and 23. Iran has launched four missile waves at Israel since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 22, according to an Israeli journalist.[87] ISW-CTP observed reports of impacts across Israel between 3:00 PM ET on March 22 and 3:00 PM ET on March 23. Israeli media reported on March 22 that Iranian cluster munitions and missile fragments impacted in several areas of central Israel.[88] Iranian ballistic missiles reportedly impacted in Tel Aviv, central Israel, and in Kiryat Gat and Ashkelon, southern Israel, on March 22.[89] Israeli media reported on March 23 that fragments fell near Safed, northern Israel.[90] The IDF reported that it has intercepted 92 percent of Iranian missile attacks and noted that Iran has launched over 400 ballistic missiles at Israel since the war began on February 28.[91] Israeli sources reported multiple instances of sirens across Israel on March 22 and 23 in response to missile attacks.[92]
Iran has continued to target the Gulf states since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 22. Iranian ballistic missiles reportedly struck two data centers near Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE).[93] Iran has previously targeted data centers in the Gulf states, including an Amazon Web Services data center in the UAE.[94] An Iranian missile also impacted an uninhabited area near Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.[95]
Two unspecified sources told Israeli media on March 22 that Iran has decided to limit its attacks on Saudi Arabia due to concerns that continued strikes could trigger a direct Saudi military response.[96] Saudi officials have previously made clear, including in discussions with Iran, that their red line is any attack on electricity generation and water desalination facilities.[97] The sources noted that Iran is also avoiding targeting Qatar, but that Iranian strikes against Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UAE will “continue as usual.”[98] ISW-CTP has observed a relative decrease in Iranian attacks targeting Saudi Arabia since March 22 (see below), which corroborates this Israeli media report. The Bahrain Defense Force reported on March 23 that it intercepted 36 Iranian drones, which is a significant number of Iranian drones launched at Bahrain given previous trends (see below).[99] The Emirati Defense Ministry reported that Iran launched 16 drones at the UAE on March 23.[100]
Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response
Hezbollah claimed 55 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as northern Israeli towns, between 3:00 PM ET on March 22 and 3:00 PM ET on March 23.[101] Most of Hezbollah’s claimed attacks targeted IDF positions and Israeli towns in northern Israel.[102] Hezbollah claimed that it launched rockets targeting IDF positions in northern Israel, including the Dovev Barracks, Beit Hillel Barracks, Zarit Barracks, Mount Neria base, Yiftah Barracks, and Ramot Naftali base.[103] Hezbollah claimed that it fired a ”swarm” of drones targeting an Israeli air defense system in Maalot Tarshiha, northern Israel.[104] Hezbollah also claimed six rocket attacks targeting the northern Israeli town of Kiryat Shmona, all of which triggered Israeli sirens.[105] An OSINT account and Israeli media reported on March 23 that Hezbollah rockets impacted at least four sites around Kiryat Shmona, injuring at least two individuals.[106] Hezbollah has claimed to have conducted over 700 attacks against Israel since Hezbollah joined the war on March 1.[107] The number of Hezbollah attacks during the current war surpasses the group’s total number of claimed attacks in October 2024, which was the most intense month of fighting during the Fall 2024 Israel-Hezbollah conflict.[108]
The rate of Hezbollah attacks targeting Israel has varied since the group joined the war on March 1, as illustrated below.
Hezbollah is primarily relying on rockets but also increasingly using drones in its attacks against Israel. An Israeli think tank noted that drones are increasing becoming ”a significant component of [Hezbollah’s] campaign.[109] Hezbollah claimed 11 drone attacks between 3:00 PM ET on March 22 and 3:00 PM ET on March 23.[110] Hezbollah prioritized domestic drone production and shifted its munition rehabilitation budget to focus on drones in June 2025.[111] The IDF also claimed in June 2025 that Hezbollah’s Unit 127, which is the group‘s aerial unit responsible for drone production, has produced thousands of drones.[112] Hezbollah has long assembled the cheap Ayoub and Mersad models within Lebanon using civilian parts ordered online.[113] ISW-CTP previously forecasted in a February 28 report that Hezbollah would likely use low-cost weapons, such as drones, to conduct attacks against Israel.[114]
Hezbollah Political Council member Wafiq Safa said on March 23 that Hezbollah is preparing itself for a long war with Israel and noted that Israel should expect “surprises in the near future,” especially regarding one-way attack drones.[115] Safa added that Hezbollah will “force” the Lebanese government to reverse its decision to ban Hezbollah’s military activities after the war “no matter how we do it.”[116] The Lebanese Cabinet declared all Hezbollah military and security activity to be illegal on March 2 and demanded that Hezbollah transfer its weapons to the state.[117] Lebanese officials have reiterated the government’s commitment to the cabinet’s March 2 decision.[118] Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam stated on March 22 that the Lebanese government will not back down from its decision to disarm Hezbollah and noted that Hezbollah’s threats will not scare the government.[119] Salam added that the IRGC is present in Lebanon illegally and is the one leading military operations.[120] Salam stated that IRGC elements fired drones from Lebanon at Cyprus and noted that the government is working to remove the IRGC from Lebanon.[121] An Iranian drone that was reportedly launched by Hezbollah struck the UK RAF Akrotiri base in Cyprus on March 1.[122] Cypriot authorities intercepted two additional drones on March 2.[123]
The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes and ground operations targeting Hezbollah infrastructure across Lebanon. The IDF struck 15 Hezbollah sites in Nabatieh, southern Lebanon, and an IRGC Quds Force unit in Beirut on March 22 and 23, respectively.[124] The IDF struck the Dallafa Bridge in southern Lebanon on March 23 after issuing an evacuation warning.[125] A British journalist reported on March 23 that the IDF has struck seven bridges that cross the Litani River.[126] The IDF stated that Hezbollah fighters have used bridges to send fighters and thousands of weapons from northern to southern Lebanon to fight against Israeli forces.[127] The IDF reported that the IDF 84th (Givanti) Infantry Brigade (91st Division) has located a large quantity of Hezbollah weapons and arrested Radwan Force fighters in southern Lebanon.[128] The Radwan Force is Hezbollah’s elite special operations unit that Hezbollah, with Iranian support, built to conduct major ground attacks into Israel.[129] The IDF stated that the arrested fighters set up anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) launchers and planned to fire ATGMs at Israeli forces and towns.[130] The IDF noted that the fighters moved from the Bekaa Valley in northeastern Lebanon to the south at the beginning of the war.[131] The IDF also reported on March 23 that the Hasmonean Infantry Brigade is operating in southern Lebanon for the first time ever.[132]
IDF forces continued to advance deeper into southern Lebanon on March 22 and 23. A geospatial intelligence analyst reported on March 22 that IDF 810th Mountain Brigade (210th Division) forces advanced two and a half kilometers past the Lebanese border and are positioned on Jabal al Sedana, north of the Israeli-controlled Shebaa Farms.[133] Jabal al Sedana is an operationally significant hilltop that overlooks Kfarchouba, Shebaa, and several roads in southeastern Lebanon.[134] The analyst noted that IDF forces have also advanced towards the center of Khiam, southern Lebanon, and are expected to advance deeper into the town.[135] Khiam is located on high ground from which Hezbollah can fire into northern Israel, and it also grants Hezbollah a vantage point to observe Israeli forces and other targets around the Galilee Panhandle.[136] Israeli media reported on March 23 that the IDF has expanded the Israeli ”security zone” in southern Lebanon with some units positioned between nine and 11 kilometers deep inside Lebanese territory.[137] An unspecified senior IDF Northern Command officer told Israeli media on March 23 that the IDF has doubled its forward defense positions in southern Lebanon, which have removed the threat of a coordinated Hezbollah cross-border infiltration into northern Israel.[138] The officer noted that the IDF’s current objective is to push Hezbollah forces back to limit their ability to fire ATGMs targeting northern Israeli towns.[139]
Other Axis of Resistance Response
Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah agreed on March 22 to extend its temporary and conditional suspension of attacks on the US Embassy in Baghdad for an additional five days.[140] An unspecified Shia Coordination Framework adviser confirmed to a Kurdish journalist on March 19 that most Shia Coordination Framework leaders “pushed for an immediate halt” to Kataib Hezbollah attacks.[141] ISW-CTP previously reported on March 19 that, according to an Iraq analyst, Kataib Hezbollah may have issued the temporary ceasefire due to mounting political and military pressure on the group.[142] Kataib Hezbollah‘s political wing is notably a member of the Shia Coordination Framework.[143] Kataib Hezbollah added that they see no benefit in targeting the Iraqi Intelligence Service but noted that the Iraqi Intelligence Service must intensify efforts to reassess its officers’ loyalty and patriotism.[144] Kataib Hezbollah claimed that all Kurdish intelligence officers are Mossad officers and that Sunni officers work for Jordan and the UAE.[145] A likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia conducted a one-way drone attack targeting the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) headquarters in Baghdad City on March 21, killing an Iraqi intelligence officer.[146] The Shia Coordination Framework and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s political wing condemned the attack.[147] Kataib Hezbollah also called out Iraqi politicians who condemn the Iraqi resistance attacks on US assets and turn around and condemn bombings on the Popular Mobilization Forces positions.[148]
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ front groups continued to conduct drone and rocket attacks targeting US forces and interests in Iraq and the region. Likely front group Kataib Sarkhat al Quds claimed that it conducted a drone attack targeting an “alternative Mossad spy headquarters” in Erbil on March 22.[149] Likely front group Jaysh al Ghadab claimed that it launched drones at Camp Victory in Baghdad on March 22.[150] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have repeatedly claimed attacks targeting the former US Victory base since the war began on February 28.[151] Syrian and Iraqi sources reported on March 23 that Iraqi militias reportedly launched rockets from Rabia, Nineveh Province, targeting the former US Rumaylan Landing Zone Base in Hasakah Province, Syria.[152] A Syrian source reported that US forces withdrew from Rumaylan Landing Zone in late February 2026.[153] The Syrian Army 60th Division backfilled the base on March 14.[154] Two Iraqi security sources told Reuters on March 23 that Iraqi security forces seized a burnt-out truck with a rocket launcher platform in Rabia after the attack.[155] This is the first reported attempted attack targeting US forces in Syria.[156]
The combined force has continued to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militia positions. The combined force conducted strikes targeting the 15th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade headquarters in Salah al Din Province and the 27th PMF Brigade headquarters in Anbar Province on March 23.[157] Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[158] The Iranian-backed Badr Organization controls the 27th PMF Brigade.[159]
The United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia are working to prevent the Houthis from opening another front in the war against Iran. Saudi authorities are reportedly trying to sustain diplomatic channels with the Houthis to ensure that they remain outside the war, according to a US official speaking to the Wall Street Journal.[160] The same official added that the United States and Israel are simultaneously being cautious to avoid actions that could provoke Houthi involvement and further complicate the war.[161]
Iranian Internal Security
Iranian security forces continued to arrest individuals on charges of espionage in Tehran, East Azerbaijan, Kerman, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Khuzestan, Fars, Yazd, and North Khorasan provinces across Iran on March 22 and 23.[162] The LEC arrested two ”mercenaries” in East Azerbaijan Province, on March 23, and seized a large amount of ”satellite equipment,” possibly referring to Starlink devices.[163]The LEC also arrested an individual attempting to procure and distribute various bladed weapons in Shiraz, Fars Province, on March 23.[164] The forces seized 2,076 such weapons, including knives, machetes, swords, and axes.[165]
[1] https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/2035760116616634845?s=20
[2]https://www.foxnews.com/video/6391454274112; https://x.com/RapidResponse47/status/2036036830877925719
[3] https://x.com/TrumpDailyPosts/status/2035527252931395584?s=20
[4] https://www.axios.com/2026/03/23/trump-suspends-iran-strikes-hormuz-negotiations
[5] https://www.axios.com/2026/03/23/trump-suspends-iran-strikes-hormuz-negotiations
[6] https://www.axios.com/2026/03/23/trump-suspends-iran-strikes-hormuz-negotiations
[7] https://www.axios.com/2026/03/23/trump-suspends-iran-strikes-hormuz-negotiations
[8] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/2036150160321839555?s=20
[9] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/2036150160321839555?s=20
[10] https://www.axios.com/2026/03/23/trump-suspends-iran-strikes-hormuz-negotiations
[11] https://x.com/mb_ghalibaf/status/2036108959417827447?s=20
[12] https://x.com/mb_ghalibaf/status/2036108959417827447?s=20
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-23-2025-2/; https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/UANI_Profile_Ghalibaf_Update_JR_KA%20track%20changes%20v.pdf
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-23-2025-2/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-23-2025-2/; https://www.iranintl.com/en/202602289114
[16] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/16/world/middleeast/iran-mojtaba-khamenei-election-supreme-leader.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share
[17] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/03/22/marines-hormuz-strait-decisive-battle-iran-trump/
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-17-2026/
[19] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036100573859131621
[20] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036100573859131621
[21] https://x.com/Mitch_Ulrich/status/2035851535029055751
[22] https://x.com/Mitch_Ulrich/status/2035851535029055751 ; https://x.com/Vahid/status/2035821960685306085
[23] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-17-2026 ; https://t.me/BenTzionM/7037 ; //x.com/acceladealer/status/2033882701330035096 ; https://t.me/mamlekate/101782
[24] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936783687271498211 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936803848175157610 ; https://x.com/MeraMeraska/status/1936808147756192223; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936803848175157610
[25] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/1936784300067750322 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/2-impacts-from-suspected-iranian-cluster-bomb-in-central-israel-no-injuries-reported/ ; https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/12/middleeast/iran-cluster-munition-israel-defenses-intl-cmd
[26] https://t.me/BenTzionM/7214 ; https://x.com/the_yaniv/status/2035828951407354010
[27] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2035883071073874384 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2035894309245919455?s=20
[28] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/satellite-photos-show-iran-expanding-missile-production-sources-say-2024-07-08/
[29] https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1933930436083724602
[30] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-16-2025-evening-edition/
[31] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2036032468550136134?s=20
[32] https://israel-alma dot org/jam-missile-development-project-of-the-iranian-revolutionary-guard-corps/
[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-20-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-8-2026/
[34] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2035810137428930960
[35] https://x.com/OSINTWarfare/status/2035876533479321845
[36] https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2026/iran-claims-arash-2-drone-penetrates-air-defenses-in-strike-on-israels-ben-gurion-airport
[37] https://x.com/Mitch_Ulrich/status/2035773278136996056?s=20 ; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2035659332264616216?s=20
[38] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-8-2026/
[39] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-20-2026/ ; https://x.com/Vahid/status/2032843889917166039
[40] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-8-2026/
[41] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2036010217792573739?s=20 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2035901844904374290?s=20 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2036005705484738933?s=20 ; https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2035894639371157666
[42] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2036010217792573739?s=20 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2035901844904374290?s=20 https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2036005705484738933?s=20 ; https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2035894639371157666
[43] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-22-2026/
[44] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1936067580693029268
[45] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2036101124873183353
[46] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces
[47] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030304975813750880
[48] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2036141805008277906
[49] https://x.com/acceladealer/status/2036016461899018422?s=20
[50] https://x.com/acceladealer/status/2036016461899018422?s=20 ; https://x.com/mamlekate/status/2035978994500153439?s=20 ;
[51] https://x.com/mamlekate/status/2032708040768762101
[52] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-17-2026/
[53] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf
[54] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2036101124873183353
[55] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces
[56] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf
[57] https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/2030881087917056464 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030881626897461438?s=20
[58] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf
[59] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf
[60] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-9-2026; https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/2030881087917056464 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030881626897461438?s=20 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-9-2026#_ednc3c068e7c38c0db2cc25b137050eac257
[61] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2030751192033231192?s=20
[62] https://www.radiofarda.com/a/f4_radio_farda_manager_reacion_revolutionary_guards/29017713.html
[63] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-9-2026/
[64] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-9-2026/
[65] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2035716270763491707?s=20; https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/2035725686166430036
[66] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf
[67] https://x.com/Vahid/status/2035936722723262847; https://x.com/ayatsubzero/status/2035947459331940676; https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2035938679080751183?s=20
[68] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf
[69] https://x.com/Barandaz_khak/status/1639204984645464065?lang=ar
[70] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2032053821766078709?s=20
[71] https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2030027173277352088?s=20
[72] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2035851551672009078?s=20
[73] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2035851551672009078?s=20
[74] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2035851551672009078?s=20
[75] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2031442397897306364 ; https://t.me/Nournews_ir/336638 ; https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2031403139396505971 ; https://x.com/Vahid/status/2031398902864249188?s=20
[76] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2036120627937984939
[77] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/FINAL%20-%20The%20Tharallah%20Headquarters%20Unveiled%20JAN%2026.pdf (pp. 15)
[78] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/FINAL%20-%20The%20Tharallah%20Headquarters%20Unveiled%20JAN%2026.pdf
[79] https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2036101104082055640
[80] https://x.com/Vahid/status/2035970495997202505?s=20; https://x.com/EndlessWint_r/status/2035997174786376014?s=20; https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2036031472218280064?s=20
[81] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/hp1145
[82] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/hp1145
[83] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/hp1145; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1820 ; https://x.com/Vahid/status/2028740049454706932?s=20 ; https://x.com/geo27752/status/2029994375728546141
[84] https://x.com/iribnews_irib/status/2036052224053260612?s=20 ; https://x.com/bbcpersian/status/2036089509952028969?s=20
[85] https://x.com/bbcpersian/status/2036089509952028969?s=20
[86] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2036047936501526717?s=20
[87] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2035990553339302180?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2035838473614070257 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2035828057588531332 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2035823237590851949
[88] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/irans-latest-volley-causes-several-impacts-in-central-israel-no-injuries-reported/ ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2035846885773021378
[89] https://x.com/clashreport/status/2035845123397869805
[90] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/2035950659934060546
[91] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/davids-sling-system-failed-to-down-iranian-ballistic-missiles-that-struck-southern-towns-idf/
[92] https://t.me/IL_RedAlerts/34711 ; https://t.me/IL_RedAlerts/34693 ; https://t.me/IL_RedAlerts/34661 ; https://t.me/IL_RedAlerts/34657
[93] https://x.com/EGYOSINT/status/2035749614909849745 ; https://x.com/dex_eve/status/2035787636200157448
[94] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/amazons-cloud-unit-reports-fire-after-objects-hit-uae-data-center-2026-03-01/
[95] https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2035903502048772517
[96] https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/iran-news/article-890833
[97] https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/iran-news/article-890833
[98] https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/iran-news/article-890833
[99] https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2036003340052480263 ; https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2035638122059305398
[100] https://x.com/modgovae/status/2036036840382517754?s=20
[101] Data available upon request
[102] Data available upon request
[103] https://t.me/mmirleb/12287 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/12320 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/12272 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/12299 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/12349 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/12329
[104] https://t.me/mmirleb/12367
[105] https://t.me/mmirleb/12278 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/12302 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/12305 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/12308 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/12332 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/12233 ; https://t.me/IL_RedAlerts/34621 ; https://t.me/IL_RedAlerts/34721 ; https://t.me/IL_RedAlerts/34727 ; https://t.me/IL_RedAlerts/34731 ; https://t.me/IL_RedAlerts/34733 ; https://t.me/IL_RedAlerts/34737
[106] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/2-hurt-1-seriously-in-hezbollah-rocket-attack-on-kiryat-shmona-medics-say-in-updated-toll/ ; https://x.com/Osint613/status/2036067245374193839 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036064104562008403?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036066028849938804
[107] Data available upon request
[108] https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/2036044020200222855 ; https://israel-alma dot org/hezbollahs-attacks-on-israel-summary-and-analysis-october-2024/#:~:text=During%20the%20past%20month%2C%20Hezbollah%20claimed%20responsibility%20for%20102%20attacks,of%20some%20of%20the%20attacks.
[109] https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/2036044020200222855
[110] Data available upon request
[111] https://aawsat dot com/شؤون-إقليمية/5198751-تقديرات-إسرائيلية-عن-إعادة-بناء-حزب-الله-قدراته-العسكرية ; https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/hyobzilreg
[112] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1930753541846487369
[113] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-hezbollah-what-weapons-does-it-have-2023-10-30/
[114] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/hezbollahs-limited-options-for-supporting-iran/
[115] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/400008
[116] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/400008
[117] https://x.com/nawafsalam/status/2028436712930545867
[118] https://x.com/nawafsalam/status/2032144905594638551 ; https://x.com/YoussefRaggi/status/2034921377686282681?s=20 ; https://x.com/YoussefRaggi/status/2034612577926361233
[119] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2035805167115780485
[120] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2035806968300859736
[121] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2035806968300859736
[122] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/02/uk-airbase-raf-akrotiri-cyprus-suspected-drone-strike
[123] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/02/uk-airbase-raf-akrotiri-cyprus-suspected-drone-strike
[124] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2035811607997980702 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2036083624882172251
[125] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/03/23/world/iran-war-oil-trump/c5570b96-c78a-53c7-b0cf-6e71b63c08cc?smid=url-share ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2036056048423805027
[126] https://x.com/_bvdm/status/2036084589324644695?s=46
[127] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/03/23/world/iran-war-oil-trump/c5570b96-c78a-53c7-b0cf-6e71b63c08cc?smid=url-share ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2035811607997980702
[128] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2036014773557412078
[129] https://israel-alma dot org/the-threat-posed-by-hezbollahs-comando-unit-radwan-unit-to-the-state-of-israel/ ; https://www.ajc.org/news/hamas-october-7-massacre-plan-was-inspired-by-hezbollahs-radwan-heres-what-to-know-about-the ; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/20/world/middleeast/hezbollah-radwan-ibrahim-aqeel.html
[130] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2036146001057075711
[131] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2036146001057075711
[132] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2036000844001231302
[133] https://x.com/thetimapping/status/2035870384919130479?s=46
[134] https://x.com/thetimapping/status/2035870384919130479?s=46
[135] https://x.com/thetimapping/status/2035870384919130479?s=46
[136] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-7-2024/
[137] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/skg69opcwx
[138] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/skg69opcwx
[139] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/skg69opcwx
[140] https://t.me/centerkaf/5603
[141] https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/2034721089440358458
[142] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-19-2026/ ; https://t.me/centerkaf/5595 ; https://x.com/LizHurra/status/2034419663858278888 ; https://x.com/LizHurra/status/2032773359159714237 ; https://x.com/Mustafa_salimb/status/2033192823416148438
[143] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/inside-the-divides-of-iraqs-coordination-framework-and-why-they-matter-ahead-of-landmark-elections/
[144] https://t.me/centerkaf/5603
[145] https://t.me/centerkaf/5603
[146] https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2035307762121408816 ; https://x.com/INIS_IQ/status/2035286863565447283
[147] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/ال-طار-التنسيقي-يدين-استهداف-المخابرات-ويحذر-من-العبث-ب-من-العراق ; https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=252609 ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-asaib-ahl-al-haq-0
[148] https://t.me/centerkaf/5603
[149] https://t.me/aishab_alkahf/531
[150] https://t.me/Jaysh_AlGhadab/139
[151] https://t.me/awlialdm/281 ; https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2011/12/2/us-hands-over-main-base-in-iraq ; https://t.me/Extremedistress/879 ; https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/2032963872693563531?s=20
[152] https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/طلاق-7-صواريخ-من-العراق-على-قاعدة-سابقة-للتحالف-الدولي-في-سوريا ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/2036138637532786748 ; https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/2036148551068074342?s=20 ; https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/2036144975948255337?s=20 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/rockets-launched-iraqs-mosul-towards-us-base-northeastern-syria-say-sources-2026-03-23/
[153] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/2026273662228119688
[154] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/799820/الجيش-السوري-يتسلم-قاعدة-رميلان-بعد-ان/ ; https://www.facebook.com/sana.gov/posts/pfbid0zndJo9My5eFCiTVwFcMz5X6knyLzHJ4wfKwTbt8DWmwFuXiFBkBsyAAD36vJERrtl?rdid=720NUK19PGq11jNX#
[155] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/rockets-launched-iraqs-mosul-towards-us-base-northeastern-syria-say-sources-2026-03-23/
[156] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/rockets-launched-iraqs-mosul-towards-us-base-northeastern-syria-say-sources-2026-03-23/
[157] https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/قصف-جوي-يستهدف-مقرا-للحشد-الشعبي-في-صلاح-الدين-1 ; https://x.com/LizHurra/status/2036064928952467628
[158] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces/
[159] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Iraq20-20ISF20PMF20Orders20of20Battle_0_0.pdf
[160] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/irans-houthi-allies-lie-in-wait-on-another-key-oil-route-the-red-sea-9c0c38f5?mod=author_content_page_1_pos_1
[161] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/irans-houthi-allies-lie-in-wait-on-another-key-oil-route-the-red-sea-9c0c38f5?mod=author_content_page_1_pos_1
[162] https://t.me/mehrnews/363256; https://t.me/Tasnimnews/399989; https://t.me/defapress_ir/53256; https://t.me/Nournews_ir/341082; https://t.me/farsna/423076; https://t.me/defapress_ir/53276; https://t.me/Tasnimnews/400163 https://t.me/mehrnews/363526
[163] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/400163
[164] https://t.me/mehrnews/363526
[165] https://t.me/mehrnews/363526
