The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.
Key Takeaways
- Iran is reportedly requiring some vessels to pay a fee to transit the Strait of Hormuz. Maritime intelligence company Lloyd’s List reported on March 23 that over 20 vessels have taken a “Tehran-approved route” to transit the Strait of Hormuz through Iranian territorial waters since the war began. Lloyd’s List reported that at least two vessels, including a Chinese state-owned feeder tanker, have paid Iran a fee in exchange for safe passage through the strait.
- The combined force continued to strike Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure to degrade Iran’s missile capabilities. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that it has conducted more than 600 strikes targeting Iranian ballistic missile sites since the start of the war.
- The combined force continued to strike industrial sites and companies with ties to the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. The IDF reported that it conducted an “extensive” wave of strikes targeting Iranian “production sites” in Esfahan Province and other areas of Iran on March 24.
- Iran has launched nine waves of missiles targeting Israel since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff. Iran continued to fire cluster munitions targeting Israel on March 24, likely to maximize destruction and terrorize Israeli civilians.
- Hezbollah claimed 54 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as northern Israeli towns, between 3:00 PM ET on March 23 and 3:00 PM ET on March 24. The IDF is preparing to expand its ground operations and air campaign in Lebanon.
Toplines
Iran has reportedly mined the Strait of Hormuz with about a dozen Maham 3 and Maham 7 limpet mines.[1] US officials told CBS News that Iran has laid at least a dozen Maham 3 and Maham 7 mines, but a separate US official told CBS that Iran has laid fewer than a dozen mines in the strait.[2] The Maham 3 is a high-explosive “moored, buoyant, anti-shipping” naval mine with a maximum depth of 100 meters, according to the Collective Awareness to Unexploded Ordnance (CAT-UXO) organization.[3] The Maham 3 is equipped with magnetic and acoustic sensors, which it uses to target vessels.[4] The Maham 3 can determine a ship’s presence from around three meters in all directions, according to CAT-UXO.[5] The Maham 7 is a high-explosive “bottom influence” mine that sits on the seafloor and is equipped with magnetic and acoustic sensors that it uses to target medium-sized ships, landing crafts, and small submarines.[6] The Maham 7 is lightweight and can be deployed by surface vessels as well as via parachute from aircraft or helicopters.[7] The number of mines that Iran has reportedly laid is relatively consistent with a March 10 Wall Street Journal report that Iran had laid fewer than ten mines.[8] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine said on March 19 that US Central Command (CENTCOM) has destroyed 44 Iranian minelaying vessels.[9]
Iran is reportedly requiring some vessels to pay a fee to transit the Strait of Hormuz. Maritime intelligence company Lloyd’s List reported on March 23 that over 20 vessels have taken a “Tehran-approved route” to transit the Strait of Hormuz through Iranian territorial waters since the war began.[10] A senior reporter at Lloyd’s List reported that vessels that transit through the approved route pass by Larak Island, where the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) verifies vessel details and, in some cases, requires vessels to pay a fee.[11] Lloyd’s List reported that at least two vessels, including a Chinese state-owned feeder tanker, have paid Iran a fee in exchange for safe passage through the strait, with one fee reported to have been around $2 million USD.[12]
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian appointed former IRGC Deputy Commander and Expediency Discernment Council Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr as the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) secretary on March 24, replacing Ali Larijani.[13] Pezeshkian reportedly appointed Zolghadr with Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s approval.[14] Zolghadr is a hardline figure with deep connections to Iran’s military and judicial apparatuses. Zolghadr commanded the IRGC Ramadan Headquarters during the Iran-Iraq War.[15] Zolghadr served as the IRGC coordination deputy between 1989 and 1997 and IRGC deputy commander between 1997 and 2005.[16] Zolghadr was heavily critical of former reformist President Mohammad Khatami and was one of the primary architects of former hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005.[17] Zolghadr served as the security deputy in the Interior Ministry during Ahmadinejad’s term and later served as the Armed Forces General Staff deputy for Basij affairs, playing a large role in suppressing the 2009 Green Movement.[18] The UN sanctioned Zolghadr in 2007 for his involvement in developing Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.[19] Ali Larijani’s brother, Sadegh Amoli Larijani, appointed Zolghadr as Expediency Discernment Council secretary in 2021.[20]
US and Israeli Air Campaign
The combined force continued to strike Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure to degrade Iran’s missile capabilities. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that it has conducted more than 600 strikes targeting Iranian ballistic missile sites since the start of the war.[21] The Israeli Air Force struck more than 50 targets in northern and central Iran, including sites used to launch and store ballistic missiles, on March 23 and 24.[22] IDF Military Intelligence has identified “low morale, absenteeism, and burnout” among IRGC ballistic missile units within the past week.[23] The IDF said that ballistic missile unit soldiers have refused to go to launch sites due to fear of IDF strikes.[24] The combined force reportedly struck the IRGC Amand Missile Base, north of Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province, on March 24.[25] An open-source intelligence (OSINT) account published a video of smoke rising from the mountain where the base is located on March 24.[26] The combined force struck this base at the beginning of the war on February 28.[27] The base reportedly stores Ghadr medium-range ballistic missiles, which Iran has used to attack Israel during this war and during previous rounds of conflict.[28]
The combined force also continued to target Artesh Air Force bases. Anti-regime media published footage of a combined force strike on the Artesh Air Force 7th Tactical Airbase in Shiraz, Fars Province, on March 24.[29] The combined force previously struck the 7th Tactical Airbase on March 13.[30]
The combined force continued to strike industrial sites and companies with ties to the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. The IDF reported that it conducted an “extensive” wave of strikes targeting Iranian “production sites” in Esfahan Province and other areas of Iran on March 24.[31] The IDF separately reported that it struck Iran’s “main” explosives production facility southwest of Esfahan City, Esfahan Province.[32] The IDF said that the factory was used to manufacture explosives for various Iranian weapons.[33] Commercially available satellite imagery from March 9 shows damage to this facility, which indicates that the combined force previously struck this site around March 9. The IDF said that it previously targeted the facility during the June 2025 war.[34] Anti-regime media reported in late June 2025 that the IDF had targeted Lenjan Defense Industries in Esfahan during the June 2025 war.[35] It is unclear if the facility that the IDF targeted on March 24 is associated with Lenjan Defense Industries, although the facility is located near the town of Lenjan.
Geolocated footage posted on March 24 shows extensive damage to a building affiliated with Esfahan Optics Industries in Esfahan Province.[36] The geolocated footage shows that multiple floors of the building collapsed, and the majority of the building’s facade is destroyed.[37] Esfahan Optics Industries is a subsidiary of Iran Electronics Industries, which is owned by the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics.[38] Esfahan Optics Industries produces complex lenses and prisms that Iran uses in a variety of military weapons systems, including small arms, tanks, and drones.[39] The United States sanctioned Esfahan Optics Industries in October 2023 for supporting Iran’s drone and missile programs.[40] The IDF previously struck a facility associated with Iran Electronic Industries in Tajrish, northeastern Tehran, on March 23.[41] Iran Electronics Industries manufactures various military products, including electronic warfare equipment, missile launchers, and tactical communication systems.[42]
Geolocated footage shows that the combined force also struck the Malek Ashtar University of Technology in Shahin Shahr, Esfahan Province.[43] The university is linked to the Defense Industries Organization, which is a subsidiary of the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics.[44] The combined force previously struck the Malek Ashtar University Aerospace Complex in Pasdaran, Tehran City, on March 2.[45]
An OSINT account geolocated footage on March 24 of a combined force strike on a Shahid Tamjidi Offshore Industries building in Bandar Anzali, Gilan Province.[46] Shahid Tamjidi Offshore Industries is affiliated with the Marine Industries Organization, which is a subsidiary of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization.[47] The combined force previously struck this site, along with the 4th Artesh Naval District Headquarters at Bandar Anzali Port, on March 18.[48]
Satellite imagery from March 22 shows that the combined force has inflicted substantial damage to Iranian naval and air infrastructure in the Nazeat Islands near the Strait of Hormuz as part of its effort to degrade Iran’s ability to threaten international shipping.[49] The Nazeat Islands, which include the Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, Abu Musa, and Siri islands, are strategically located along key maritime approaches to the Strait of Hormuz. US strikes damaged or destroyed communications infrastructure, fuel depots, maintenance facilities, an aircraft hangar, and port facilities on Greater Tunb Island, according to commercially available satellite imagery, an OSINT account, and an Israeli think tank.[50] Imagery from March 22 shows extensive damage to the island’s port, including strikes on berths, nearby buildings, and many docked fast attack craft.[51] US strikes also targeted facilities that support a “vast network of underground bunkers,” according to the Israeli think tank.[52] The think tank reported that these bunkers store anti-ship cruise missiles and other weapons that Iran can use to threaten shipping.[53] US strikes also targeted an aircraft hangar and a nearby vehicle repair building at Greater Tunb Island’s airbase but did not target the runway itself, unlike other combined force strikes on Iranian airbases.[54] The lack of strikes on the runway may suggest that the US strikes were focused on degrading specific operational capabilities, such as drone operations or aircraft maintenance, rather than rendering the airfield unusable. The cumulative damage to communications, port, and airfield infrastructure has likely degraded Iran’s ability to coordinate and sustain maritime operations from Greater Tunb Island.
Commercially available satellite imagery from March 22 shows that the combined force similarly struck Abu Musa Island. Combined force strikes on Abu Musa Island appear to have targeted both the island’s port facilities as well as aircraft hangars adjacent to the island’s airstrip. Strikes on the island’s eastern port appear to have targeted the port’s berths and an adjacent warehouse, while strikes on the western port targeted an unspecified structure on the port’s wharf that was constructed after August 2022.[55] Strikes also targeted three aircraft hangars on the eastern end of the island’s airstrip but did not strike the main airport building on the western end.[56] The combined force’s strikes on Abu Musa Island have likely similarly degraded Iran’s ability to coordinate and sustain maritime operations from the island.
The combined force likely struck the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy 2nd Nouh-e Nabi Region Headquarters in Bushehr City on March 23.[57] Anti-regime media published a video that shows a large plume of smoke following a strike on a naval base in Bushehr.[58] The IRGC Navy 2nd Nouh-e Nabi Region Headquarters oversees parts of the northern Persian Gulf.[59] The combined force likely previously struck this base on March 7, March 14, and March 21.[60]
Iranian Response
Iran has launched nine waves of missiles targeting Israel since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff.[61] This rate is generally consistent with the daily rate of Iranian missile barrages against Israel in recent days. A ballistic missile impacted in Tel Aviv on March 24, injuring four individuals.[62] Israeli police assessed that Iran fired a missile with a 220-pound (nearly 100-kilogram) warhead in the attack, which is around half the weight of the warheads in missiles that Iran has previously fired at Israel during this conflict.[63] Iran has typically fired missiles with 520-pound (236-kilogram) warheads, according to an Israeli security official.[64]
An Iranian missile fragment landed in Hares in the northern West Bank on March 24.[65] A missile expert identified the fragment as belonging to an Iranian Fattah-series medium-range ballistic missile.[66] An Iranian ballistic missile also fell in Safed, northern Israel, injuring two people.[67]
Iran continued to fire cluster munitions targeting Israel on March 24, likely to maximize destruction and terrorize Israeli civilians. An Israeli military correspondent posted footage of an Iranian cluster munition over Haifa, which caused damage to a home in a Haifa suburb.[68] Iranian cluster munitions also dispersed over central Israel and impacted in Bnei Brak and Petah Tikvah.[69] Seven people were injured in Bnei Brak.[70] Around 70 percent of the missiles that Iran has launched at Israel have reportedly contained cluster munitions.[71]
An unspecified actor intercepted an Iranian ballistic missile over Lebanon on March 24.[72] Two Lebanese security sources told a Reuters journalist that a “foreign naval vessel” intercepted the missile.[73] Iranian ballistic missile fragments landed in several villages along the Lebanese coast about nine miles north of Beirut.[74] An unspecified senior US official told Israeli media that the missile may have been targeting Cyprus.[75] Lebanese media speculated that the missile was targeting US assets in Lebanon.[76] Two Iranian missiles fell in southern Lebanon on March 23.[77]
Iran is attempting to conduct cyberattacks targeting Israel, the United States, and the Gulf states as part of its asymmetric strategy to try to degrade the combined force’s willingness to continue their war effort.[78] Israel National Cyber Directorate Chief Yossi Karadi said on March 24 that dozens of Iranian hacker groups have attempted to conduct both kinetic and cyber-attacks targeting Israeli utilities and businesses, as well as Gulf states’ infrastructure.[79] Karadi said that a hacker group broadcast false messages on Israel Railways’ monitors in a few locations on March 11.[80] Karadi also noted that Iran has increasingly coordinated cyberattacks with Hezbollah.[81] An Iranian-linked hacker group previously conducted a cyber-attack targeting a US healthcare company on March 11, likely to try to impose political pressure on the US administration.[82] The US Justice Department seized domains linked to the Iranian Intelligence and Security Ministry involved in recent cyberattacks or hacking attempts on March 19.[83]
Iran appears to have refrained from attacking Qatar since March 18, likely due to President Trump’s March 18 warning that the United States would attack Iran’s South Pars Gas Field if Iran continued to attack Qatar. Trump warned on Truth Social on March 18 that the United States would “massively blow up the entirety” of the South Pars Gas Field if Iran attacked Qatar again.[84] Trump‘s warning came after Iran struck Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City and damaged Qatari liquefied natural gas facilities on March 18 in retaliation for Israel’s attack on South Pars.[85] ISW-CTP has not observed any Iranian missile or drone attacks targeting Qatari territory since Trump’s statement. Iranian state media issued a statement denying the validity of an alleged IRGC graphic that threatened Qatar on March 21.[86] The South Pars Gas Field is central to Iran’s domestic natural gas supply and broader energy system.[87]
Iran may be increasing its rate of drone attacks targeting Bahrain to compensate for its apparent pause in attacks targeting Qatar. Iranian drone attacks against Bahrain have increased in recent days. Iran fired 36 and 19 drones targeting Bahrain on March 23 and 24, respectively, compared to two drones on both March 21 and 22 (see graphs below).[88] The timing of this increase suggests that Iran may be redirecting drone fire away from Qatar and toward Bahrain.
Iran continued to target Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on March 24. Unspecified sources told Israeli media on March 22 that Iranian strikes against Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE will “continue as usual” even though Iran is reportedly avoiding attacking Qatar and Saudi Arabia.[89] Two unspecified sources told Israeli media on March 22 that Iran has decided to limit its attacks on Saudi Arabia due to concerns that continued strikes could trigger a direct Saudi military response.[90] The volume of Iranian drones targeting Saudi Arabia has fluctuated in recent days. Iran launched 47 drones at Saudi Arabia on March 23 but only launched one drone at Saudi Arabia on March 24 (see graph below). Iran also conducted the following attacks against Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE on March 24:
- Bahrain: Iran launched 19 drones and six missiles targeting Bahrain on March 24.[91] The Emirati Defense Ministry reported that an Emirati army contractor was killed in an Iranian ballistic missile attack on Bahrain.[92] The attack also injured five other Emirati soldiers.[93]
- Kuwait: Iran launched a slightly higher volume of missiles and drones targeting Kuwait on March 24 than it has in the past three days (see graph below). Iran fired 13 drones and 17 missiles targeting Kuwait.[94]
- UAE: Iran launched 17 drones and five ballistic missiles targeting the UAE on March 24.[95] These volumes of drones and missiles are consistent with Iranian fire volumes over the past week targeting the UAE (see graph below).[96]
Iran launched multiple ballistic missiles targeting a Peshmerga base near Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, on March 24, killing six soldiers and wounding thirty others.[97] The Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) Peshmerga Affairs Ministry released a statement condemning the attack and affirming the KRG’s right to respond to threats against Iraqi Kurdistan.
ISRAELI CAMPAIGN AGAINST HEZBOLLAH AND HEZBOLLAH RESPONSE
Hezbollah claimed 54 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, as well as northern Israeli towns, between 3:00 PM ET on March 23 and 3:00 PM ET on March 24.[98] Hezbollah claimed that it launched rockets and drones targeting IDF sites in northern Israel, including the Liman Barracks and Ramot Naftali Base.[99] Hezbollah claimed that it launched rockets targeting the Rafael Advanced Defense Systems complex in Acre, northern Israel, which Hezbollah has previously targeted in the Fall 2024 conflict and during this war.[100] Rafael Advanced Defense Systems is an Israeli state-owned organization that develops weapons and military technology for the IDF.[101] An Israeli journalist reported on March 24 that Hezbollah launched a barrage of approximately 30 rockets toward the Upper Galilee.[102] One of the rockets impacted near the Mahanayim Junction, northern Israel, killing one individual and injuring two others.[103] Hezbollah launched another barrage of 30 rockets toward the Haifa Bay area in northern Israel on March 24.[104] Israeli sources reported multiple instances of sirens in northern Israel on March 23 and 24 in response to Hezbollah drone and rocket attacks.[105] An Israeli military official told the Wall Street Journal that the IDF estimates that Hezbollah currently has between 11,000 and 13,000 missiles and rockets in its arsenal.[106]
Hezbollah conducted 36 attacks against Israeli forces and towns in northern Israel on March 23, which marks the highest number of attacks against Israel that Hezbollah has claimed in a 24-hour period since the start of the war.[107] The rate of Hezbollah attacks targeting Israel has varied since the group joined the war on March 1 (see below).
Hezbollah is primarily using rockets, but is increasingly also using drones, to attack Israel. Hezbollah has recently maintained a high number of rocket attacks against IDF targets, conducting over 20 rocket attacks per day since March 17 (see below).[108] Hezbollah claimed 14 drone attacks on March 23, which marks the highest number of drone attacks that Hezbollah has claimed since the group joined the war on March 1.[109] Hezbollah also claimed 12 drone attacks between 3:00 PM ET on March 23 and 3:00 PM on March 24.[110] An Israeli think tank previously noted that drones are increasingly becoming ”a significant component of [Hezbollah’s] campaign.”[111] Hezbollah prioritized domestic drone production and shifted its munition rehabilitation budget to focus on drones after the Fall 2024 conflict.[112] Hezbollah has long assembled low-cost Ayoub and Mersad drones in Lebanon using civilian parts ordered online.[113] ISW-CTP previously forecasted in a February 28 report that Hezbollah would likely use low-cost weapons, such as drones, to conduct attacks against Israel.[114]
The IDF continued to conduct airstrikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure across Lebanon on March 23 and 24. The IDF struck several Hezbollah sites and command centers, including a Radwan Force command center and a Hezbollah Intelligence Division command center, in Beirut.[115] The IDF struck a Hezbollah command center in a building belonging to the Hezbollah-owned al Nour radio station in southern Lebanon.[116] The IDF killed IRGC Quds Force member Mohammad Ali Kourani in an airstrike in Beirut on March 24.[117] The IDF conducted a wave of airstrikes targeting Amana Fuel Company-owned gas stations across Lebanon on March 24.[118] The Amana Fuel Company is owned by Hezbollah, operates a network of gas stations in Lebanon, and manages Hezbollah’s fuel supplies.[119] The United States sanctioned the Amana Fuel Company in February 2020 for its role in supporting Hezbollah.[120] The United States stated in February 2020 that Hezbollah profits from the sale of essential goods, such as pharmaceuticals and gasoline.[121]
The IDF continued to conduct ground operations in southern Lebanon on March 24. The IDF reported on March 24 that the IDF 810th Mountain Infantry Brigade (210th Territorial Division) is conducting targeted raids in the Mount Hermon area of southern Lebanon.[122] Forces from the 810th Brigade located a Hezbollah tunnel and a Hezbollah weapons complex in the area.[123] The IDF reported on March 24 that the IDF 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade (36th Armored Division) conducted targeted raids in southern Lebanon, during which forces killed eight Hezbollah fighters, destroyed a Hezbollah underground tunnel, and located dozens of Hezbollah weapons.[124] IDF Spokesperson Brigadier General Effie Defrin stated that Israel intends to deploy additional soldiers to Lebanon ”in the coming days” to reinforce and “intensify” the IDF’s ground operations.[125] The following brigades are currently operating in southern Lebanon:
- 300th Infantry Territorial Brigade (146th Reserve Division). The IDF 300th Infantry Territorial Brigade typically operates under the IDF 91st Territorial Division but is currently operating under the IDF 146th Reserve Division.[126] The IDF reported on March 18 that the brigade had conducted several raids to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon over the past week.[127] A geospatial intelligence analyst reported on March 24 that the 146th Division is advancing deeper into Naqoura, southwestern Lebanon.[128]
- 810th Mountain Infantry Brigade (210th Territorial Division). The IDF reported on March 24 that the IDF 810th Mountain Infantry Brigade is conducting targeted raids in the Mount Hermon area of southern Lebanon.[129] A geospatial intelligence analyst reported on March 22 that the brigade is expanding its operations near Kfarchouba, southwestern Lebanon, and currently controls Jabal Sedana, which is located west of Mount Hermon.[130]
- 188th Armored Brigade (36th Armored Division). A geospatial intelligence analyst reported on March 24 that the 188th Armored Brigade largely controls Taybeh, southeastern Lebanon, and has started to conduct large-scale demolitions in the area.[131]
- 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade (36th Armored Division). The IDF reported on March 24 that the IDF 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade conducted targeted raids in southern Lebanon.[132] A geospatial intelligence analyst reported on March 24 that the IDF 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade is operating in Taybeh, southeastern Lebanon.[133] An OSINT account reported on March 24 that the brigade destroyed buildings near the Taybeh Mosque.[134] IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir previously ordered the IDF 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade to move from the Southern Command to the Northern Command on March 11.[135]
- 84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade (91st Territorial Division). The IDF 84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade typically operates under the IDF 162nd Armored Division but is currently operating under the IDF 91st Territorial Division.[136] The IDF reported on March 22 that the 84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade killed several Hezbollah members during an engagement in southern Lebanon.[137] A geospatial intelligence analyst reported on March 24 that the brigade is conducting clearing operations in Khiam, southeastern Lebanon, and noted that Israeli forces have seized the majority of the town.[138]
- 401st Armored Brigade (91st Territorial Division). The IDF 401st Armored Brigade typically operates under the IDF 162nd Armored Division but is currently operating under the IDF 91st Territorial Division.[139] The IDF reported that the IDF 401st Armored Brigade destroyed a weapons depot and discovered Hezbollah weapons in southern Lebanon on March 16.[140] A geospatial intelligence analyst reported on March 17 that the brigade advanced deeper into Aita al Shaab, southeastern Lebanon, and conducted demolition operations in the town.[141] The analyst reported on March 24 that the brigade is likely spearheading the IDF’s advance toward Beit Lif, north of Aita al Shaab.[142]
- 613th Hasmonean Infantry Brigade (146th Reserve Division). The IDF reported on March 23 that the 613th Hasmonean Infantry Brigade is operating in southern Lebanon for the first time.[143] It is unclear where specifically the brigade is operating. A geospatial intelligence analyst reported on March 24 that the 146th Division is advancing deeper into Naqoura, southwestern Lebanon, however.[144]
- 7th Armored Brigade (36th Armored Division). The IDF noted on March 9 that the IDF 36th Armored Division, including the 7th Armored Brigade, conducted a targeted raid in Rab el Thalathine, southeastern Lebanon.[145] The IDF reported on March 14 that the 7th Armored Brigade had conducted raids that destroyed Hezbollah infrastructure and killed Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon over the past week.[146] A geospatial intelligence analyst reported on March 18 that the 36th Armored Division is conducting clearing operations in Kfar Kila, north of Rab el Thalathine.[147]
- 7338th Artillery Brigade (91st Territorial Division). Israeli media reported on March 13 that the 7338th Artillery Brigade directed an Israeli airstrike against Hezbollah fighters in Tyre, southwestern Lebanon.[148]
The IDF is preparing to expand its ground operations and air campaign in Lebanon. The IDF stated that IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir approved the IDF’s plans to “advance the targeted ground operations and strikes” against Hezbollah and noted that this would be a “prolonged operation.”[149] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said on March 24 that Israel seeks to control a ”security zone” in southern Lebanon that expands up to the Litani River, which is approximately 29 kilometers north of the Israel-Lebanon border.[150] Katz noted that the IDF also seeks to control the remaining bridges over the Litani River.[151] Senior Hezbollah lawmaker Hassan Fadlallah responded to Katz’s comment and stated that any Israeli control of territory south of the Litani would be met with resistance.[152]
The Lebanese government has continued to act against Hezbollah and Iran. The Lebanese Foreign Ministry withdrew on March 24 accreditation from Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani, declaring him persona non grata and demanding that he leave Lebanon.[153] Hezbollah condemned the Lebanese Foreign Ministry’s decision, stating that “it constitutes a coup against [Hezbollah].”[154] Hezbollah added that the decision ”opens the doors to internal division, deepens the national rift, and plunges the country into a highly dangerous path of dependency, weakness, and vulnerability.”[155] Lebanese authorities also reportedly arrested eight Hezbollah operatives transporting 21 rockets to southern Lebanon on March 24.[156] The Lebanese government’s actions are notable because no previous Lebanese government has taken such direct steps against Hezbollah or the IRGC.
Other Axis of Resistance Response
The US and Israeli combined force struck an Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) base near al Habbaniya District, eastern Anbar Province, Iraq, on March 24.[157] Many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi Prime Minister.[158] The PMF announced that the strikes killed Anbar Operations Commander Saad al Bajili.[159] The strikes reportedly killed at least 13 other PMF members and injured 30 others.[160] Qasim Musleh al Khafaji, who is affiliated with Kataib Hezbollah, is often characterized by the PMF as the Anbar Operations Commander.[161] It is unclear how Bajili and Khafaji’s responsibilities differed. Iraqi security sources speaking to Reuters said that the strikes occurred during a meeting attended by senior PMF commanders.[162]
Combined force strikes targeted the Mosul residence of Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh on March 24.[163] Fayyadh was not at the residence during the strikes and reportedly only uses the residence when he is in Mosul. A security source told Iraqi media on March 24 that combined force strikes separately targeted a site in Mosul linked to Fayan al Kildani, who commands the Asaib Ahl al Haq-affiliated 50th PMF Brigade.[164] The combined force previously struck a checkpoint belonging to the 50th PMF Brigade north of Mosul on March 2.[165] An Iraqi security source also told Iraqi media on March 24 that airstrikes targeted a 31st PMF Brigade base in Baiji District, Salah al Din Province, killing seven PMF members.[166]
Iraqi authorities reportedly arrested four people in al Rabia, Ninewa Province, for their involvement in the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia rocket attack targeting the former US Rumaylan Landing Zone base in Hasakah Province, Syria, on March 23.[167] Syrian and Iraqi sources reported on March 23 that Iraqi militias launched rockets from al Rabia, Ninewa Province, targeting the base.[168] A Syrian source reported that US forces withdrew from Rumaylan Landing Zone in late February 2026.[169] The Syrian Army 60th Division backfilled the base on March 14.[170] Two Iraqi security sources told Reuters on March 23 that Iraqi security forces seized a burnt truck with a rocket launcher platform in al Rabia after the attack.[171]
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to launch and claim attacks on US and foreign targets in Iraq. An OSINT account posted footage on March 23 of an air defense system intercepting drones over Erbil.[172] British media reported that British troops based in Erbil intercepted 12 drones between March 23 and 24.[173] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have consistently targeted US and foreign forces in Iraqi Kurdistan since the war began.[174] Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia front group Jaysh al Ghadb claimed on March 23 that it conducted an “air attack” targeting unspecified US interests in Erbil.[175] Kataib Sarqhat al Quds, which is considered a front group for Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, also claimed on March 24 that it conducted a drone attack against US forces in northern Iraq.[176] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq said it conducted 23 attacks against “enemy” bases in Iraq and the region using dozens of missiles and drones in the past 24 hours.[177] ISW-CTP has not observed Iranian-backed Iraqi militias using drones in the war at the time of this writing.
Other Activity
US President Donald Trump told reporters on March 24 that the United States is negotiating with Iran.[178] Trump said that Iran would “like to make a deal.”[179] Unspecified sources told Axios on March 24 that the United States and regional partners, including Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan, have discussed holding high-level peace talks with Iran on March 26 but are waiting for Iran’s response.[180] Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said on March 24 that Pakistan would be willing to host the US-Iran talks.[181] An unspecified Iranian source told CNN on March 24 that the United States reached out to Iran via various intermediaries.[182] The source claimed that there have not been “full-on negotiations” between the United States and Iran.[183] Three senior sources in Tehran separately told Reuters on March 24 that Iran is hardening its position in any potential talks with the United States.[184] Iran would demand guarantees against future military action, compensation for wartime losses, formal control of the Strait of Hormuz, and no limits on its ballistic missile program, according to the sources.[185] Trump previously extended his deadline for Iran to reach a deal with the United States to March 27.[186]
[1] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/strait-of-hormuz-mines-iran-talks-officials/
[2] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/strait-of-hormuz-mines-iran-talks-officials/
[3] https://cat-uxo.com/explosive-hazards/naval-devices/maham-3-seamine
[4] https://cat-uxo.com/explosive-hazards/naval-devices/maham-3-seamine ; https://www.hisutton.com/Iranian-Naval-Mines.html
[5] https://cat-uxo.com/explosive-hazards/naval-devices/maham-3-seamine
[6] https://cat-uxo.com/explosive-hazards/naval-devices/maham-7-limpet-mine https://www.hisutton.com/Iranian-Naval-Mines.html
[7] https://cat-uxo.com/explosive-hazards/naval-devices/maham-7-limpet-mine https://www.hisutton.com/Iranian-Naval-Mines.html
[8] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-war-us-israel-trump-2026/card/iran-lays-mines-in-the-strait-of-hormuz-57THxxr9LISh6lvqg8tv?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqekvYcOZw2ksgaFCylnW4Bec64gHkAWGRCCK-wPugXbr_HAf2uCGPR6TPjstsk%3D&gaa_ts=69c30c9f&gaa_sig=PyVz9cgW-8iaTmBszV2wC2zObgwU8m05HCmVq_fhvWXcqTwzHTL7AiZmfoGHyDn6AgipwzGu0u8mMzjSkuwQew%3D%3D
[9] https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4438625/secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-air-force-gen-da/
[10] https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156694/Zombie-tankers-take-Tehran-Toll-Booth-route-as-more-vessels-make-detour
[11] https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156694/Zombie-tankers-take-Tehran-Toll-Booth-route-as-more-vessels-make-detour
[12] https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156694/Zombie-tankers-take-Tehran-Toll-Booth-route-as-more-vessels-make-detour
[13] https://t.me/defapress_ir/53405
[14] https://t.me/defapress_ir/53405
[15] https://www.ifmat.org/09/21/irgc-hand-appointed-secretary-iran-expediency-council/
[16] https://www.ifmat.org/09/21/irgc-hand-appointed-secretary-iran-expediency-council/
[17] https://www.radiofarda.com/a/33714335.html
[18] https://www.radiofarda.com/a/f2_Iran_Zolghadr_Revolutionary_Guards_judiciary_Larijani_postelection/1923473.html ; https://www.ifmat.org/09/21/irgc-hand-appointed-secretary-iran-expediency-council/
[19] https://www.annahar dot com/en/region/middle-east/291787/iran-appoints-mohammad-bagher-zolghadr-as-secretary-of-supreme-national-security-council-replacing-ali-larijani#google_vignette
[20] https://www.ifmat.org/09/21/irgc-hand-appointed-secretary-iran-expediency-council/
[21] https://www.idf dot il/335268
[22] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2036343465299067251
[23] https://www.idf dot il/335268
[24] https://www.idf dot il/335268
[25] https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2036362665245687879
[26] https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2036362665245687879
[27] https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/2027794038716567648
[28] https://israel-alma dot org/the-irgc-ballistic-missile-threat-in-tabriz/
[29] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2036408896005480942?s=20 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2036403619235557529?s=20 ; https://x.com/indypersian/status/2036422921233768648?s=20 ; https://x.com/AmirMiresmaeili/status/2036415218096492880?s=20
[30] https://x.com/Vahid/status/2032623293224615953 ; https://x.com/Vahid/status/2032843889917166039 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-14-2026/
[31] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036389532971528400
[32] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2036502610484822141
[33] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2036502610484822141
[34] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2036502610484822141
[35] https://www.iranintl.com/fa/202506216288
[36] https://x.com/Vahid/status/2036457334898057235?s=20 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2036448793974263990?s=20 ; https://t.me/BenTzionM/7220
[37] https://x.com/Vahid/status/2036457334898057235?s=20 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2036448793974263990?s=20 ; https://t.me/BenTzionM/7220
[38] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/isfahan-optics-industries-ioi
[39] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/isfahan-optics-industries-ioi
[40] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1820
[41] https://x.com/Vahid/status/2035970495997202505?s=20; https://x.com/EndlessWint_r/status/2035997174786376014?s=20; https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2036031472218280064?s=20 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-23-2026/
[42] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/hp1145
[43] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2036417621093130761?s=20 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2036447016163979568?s=20 ; https://x.com/acceladealer/status/2036456700606071106
[44] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/malek-ashtar-university
[45] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-2-2026/
[46] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2036474646334206213
[47] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/shahid-tamjidi-offshore-industries
[48] https://x.com/IAFsite/status/2034633053776097504?s=20 ; https://x.com/IAFsite/status/2034633086281949237?s=20 ; https://x.com/Vahid/status/2034635043260211264?s=20
[49] https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/2036196696791957564/photo/2 ; https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/2036167054848618700/photo/2
[50] https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/2036196696791957564/photo/2 ; https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/2036140927656358044/photo/1
[51] https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/2036196701028118538/photo/2
[52] https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/2036196701028118538/photo/1 ; https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/2036140927656358044/photo/1
[53] https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/2036140927656358044/photo/1
[54] https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/2036196701028118538/photo/3 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-22-2026/
[55] https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/2036167054848618700/photo/2
[56] https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/2036167054848618700/photo/2
[57] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2036407363893338205?s=20
[58] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2036407363893338205?s=20
[59] https://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/iran/Iran%20022217SP.pdf
[60] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2032922230678602004?s=20 ; https://x.com/MiddleEastBuka/status/2030287125199897051 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2035285086656987465?s=20
[61] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036162140193570907; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036170199330611626; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036205465902702989 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036294150329430476 ;
https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036340105602859119; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036392955884277821; https://x.com/Osint613/status/2036422414163226736; https://x.com/Osint613/status/2036439576193970489; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/2036493350946095329
[62] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036340105602859119; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036352772874879262
[63] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-war-us-israel-news-updates-2026/card/iranian-strike-on-tel-aviv-makes-rare-use-of-220-pound-warhead-KcpvKljYq7faLD0zvcR4
[64] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-war-us-israel-news-updates-2026/card/iranian-strike-on-tel-aviv-makes-rare-use-of-220-pound-warhead-KcpvKljYq7faLD0zvcR4
[65] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/03/24/world/iran-war-trump-oil/b62c6b33-384b-53fe-b80b-a64cd080d265?smid=url-share ; https://x.com/kann_news/status/2036342043304227071
[66] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/03/24/world/iran-war-trump-oil/b62c6b33-384b-53fe-b80b-a64cd080d265?smid=url-share
[67] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/2036493350946095329; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036491802736251077
[68] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036209037826531773; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/home-in-suburb-of-haifa-damaged-by-iranian-cluster-munition/
[69] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036519348622250396?s=20; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036522298459693405?s=20
[70] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036522298459693405?s=20
[71] https://www.mako.co dot il/news-military/2026_q1/Article-9f63f0e8c380d91027.htm
[72] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036472653859406096
[73] https://x.com/TalaRamadan/status/2036470684818481372; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036472653859406096
[74] https://x.com/balloot/status/2036438279822754187 ; https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/03/24/world/iran-war-trump-oil/fed6524c-57a5-5e2f-ac88-bd92c1d50922?smid=url-share
[75] https://x.com/N12News/status/2036460940179218450?s=20
[76] https://www.annahar dot com/lebanon/291939/طرد-السفير-الإيراني-وصاروخ-كسروان-تلازم-التصعيد-السياسي-والميداني
[77] https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2036099535672377467
[78] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-war-in-iran-operational-progress-but-challenges-remain/
[79] https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/defense-news/article-891024
[80] https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/defense-news/article-891024
[81] https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/defense-news/article-891024
[82] https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/11/politics/pro-iran-hackers-cyberattack-medical-device-maker; https://cybernews.com/cyber-war/iran-linked-hackers-verifone-stryker-cyberattacks-handala ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-12-2026
[83] https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-disrupts-iranian-cyber-enabled-psychological-operations
[84] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116253388303392718
[85] https://x.com/MOD_Qatar/status/2034432881045520612 ; https://x.com/MOD_Qatar/status/2034344764594672041; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iran-attack-damage-wipes-out-17-qatars-lng-capacity-three-five-years-qatarenergy-2026-03-19; https://www.axios.com/2026/03/18/israel-strikes-iran-natural-gas-infrastructure
[86] https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/iranian-state-broadcaster-denies-apparent-233644890.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYmluZy5jb20v&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAA1AojpB8MVAO2VcHPvWJC_Pol6npfP-f-tbSOT-qU77IENCemY9K3-SkvDst6poeLPhOA_GYcnAZlt1x8wUALv94hEStqpnDkjHs6Iyb52eKEzR9R91vk5vTY4S4pCyLwhoxwvWySUEjxciHX9fAuupTbD5SXF7Xf9DE7Zzf8Eb
[87] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202509190909?source=share-link ;
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/irans-main-oil-gas-production-infrastructure-2026-03-18/
[88] https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2036003340052480263;
https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2036411540329603479?s=20
[89] https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/iran-news/article-890833
[90] https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/iran-news/article-890833
[91] https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2036411540329603479?s=20
[92] https://x.com/modgovae/status/2036465093014331647
[93] https://x.com/modgovae/status/2036465093014331647
[94] https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2036455186860749236
[95] https://x.com/modgovae/status/2036392457202815326
[96] https://x.com/modgovae/status/2036392457202815326
[97] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/kurdistan/2403202616 ; https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/03/24/world/iran-war-trump-oil/2db783ee-3cb0-50ec-95d4-f3522e822a7e?smid=url-share
[98] Data available upon request
[99] https://t.me/mmirleb/12417 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/12425 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/12428 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/12431 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/12552
[100] https://t.me/mmirleb/12467 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/10819 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/10253 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-and-hezbollah-ramp-up-cross-border-attacks-as-war-moves-closer-19f6bfff?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1
[101] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-and-hezbollah-ramp-up-cross-border-attacks-as-war-moves-closer-19f6bfff?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1 ; https://www.iafastro.org/membership/all-members/rafael-advanced-defense-systems-ltd.html ; https://caat.org.uk/data/companies/rafael/
[102] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036483004344717507 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036478123961626788
[103] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036485534646767810?s=20
[104] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036361891618963596
[105] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036361891618963596 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036358368336425312?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036438756970889461?s=20 ; https://t.me/IL_RedAlerts/34879 ; https://t.me/IL_RedAlerts/35046
[106] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-war-us-israel-news-updates-2026/card/hezbollah-s-missile-arsenal-sharply-degraded-israeli-military-says-VlInxECmQ46BXLHkuGZh
[107] Data available upon request
[108] Data available upon request
[109] Data available upon request
[110] Data available upon request
[111] https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/2036044020200222855
[112] https://aawsat dot com/شؤون-إقليمية/5198751-تقديرات-إسرائيلية-عن-إعادة-بناء-حزب-الله-قدراته-العسكرية ; https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/hyobzilreg
[113] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-hezbollah-what-weapons-does-it-have-2023-10-30/
[114] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/hezbollahs-limited-options-for-supporting-iran/
[115] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036365837297197120
[116] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036365837297197120
[117] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2036460192783642934
[118] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2036436330486358120
[119] https://x.com/israel_alma_org/status/2034213973902414156?s=46
[120] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm917
[121] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm917
[122] https://www.idf dot il/335205
[123] https://www.idf dot il/335205
[124] https://www.idf dot il/335230
[125] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/03/24/world/iran-war-trump-oil/9f173be3-7676-5b9b-82ff-eb8f36f654a6?smid=url-share
[126] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2034201035523178696
[127] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2034201035523178696
[128] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2036505805827219650
[129] https://www.idf dot il/335205
[130] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2035870384919130479
[131] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2036505794368143655?s=20
[132] https://www.idf dot il/335230
[133] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2036505794368143655?s=20
[134] https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/2036437717484269799
[135] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2031654107245650189
[136] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2036505788986851688
[137] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2035258020611961089
[138] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2036505788986851688
[139] https://www.idf dot il/333464
[140] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2033567115622433005
[141] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2034083422675542112
[142] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2036505800609276195
[143] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2036000844001231302
[144] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2036505805827219650
[145] https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/defense-news/article-889323 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030933349712228629?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2030933458936041944
[146] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032878451925848281
[147] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2034434863688745126
[148] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/r1gwyc119wg#google_vignette
[149] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c30rl05evd8o
[150] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036375736076910738
[151] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2036375736076910738
[152] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-military-occupy-swathe-southern-lebanon-defence-chief-says-2026-03-24/
[153] https://www.arabnews dot com/node/2637458/middle-east
[154] https://t.me/mmirleb/12525
[155] https://t.me/mmirleb/12525
[156] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2036413008545505378
[157] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/two-iraqs-shiite-popular-mobilization-forces-fighters-killed-airstrikes-western-2026-03-23/ ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%88-20-%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%A7-%D8%AD%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1
[158] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces/
[159] https://al-hashed dot gov.iq/2026/03/24/%d8%a8%d9%8a%d8%a7%d9%86-%d9%85%d9%86-%d9%87%d9%8a%d8%a6%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d8%b4%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b4%d8%b9%d8%a8%d9%8a-5/
[160] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/two-iraqs-shiite-popular-mobilization-forces-fighters-killed-airstrikes-western-2026-03-23/
[161] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces/ ; https://al-hashed dot gov.iq/2026/03/18/%d9%82%d9%8a%d8%a7%d8%af%d8%a9-%d8%b9%d9%85%d9%84%d9%8a%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a3%d9%86%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d9%84%d9%84%d8%ad%d8%b4%d8%af-%d8%aa%d8%a4%d9%83%d8%af-%d8%b3%d9%84%d8%a7%d9%85%d8%a9/
[162] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/two-iraqs-shiite-popular-mobilization-forces-fighters-killed-airstrikes-western-2026-03-23/
[163] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/two-iraqs-shiite-popular-mobilization-forces-fighters-killed-airstrikes-western-2026-03-23/ ; https://shafaq dot com/en/Security/Airstrike-targets-headquarters-of-Faleh-al-Fayyadh-and-Rayan-al-Kildani-in-Mosul
[164] https://shafaq dot com/en/Security/Airstrike-targets-headquarters-of-Faleh-al-Fayyadh-and-Rayan-al-Kildani-in-Mosul ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-kataib-babiliyoun-50th-pmf-brigade
[165] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%B7%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA
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