Toplines
Both Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of limited violations of the Kremlin’s unilateral short-term, theater-wide ceasefire over the Orthodox Easter holiday on April 11 and 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 12 that Russian forces violated the ceasefire 2,299 times as of 0700 local time on April 12, including launching 28 ground assaults, 479 artillery strikes, 747 Lancet loitering munitions and Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drone strikes, and 767 other FPV drone strikes.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not carry out missile, guided glide bomb, or Shahed long-range strike drone strikes after the start of the ceasefire. Ukrainian officials reported on April 11 and 12 that Russian forces continued artillery and FPV drone strikes after the start of the ceasefire in the Lyman and Pokrovsk directions and in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[2] Sumy Oblast officials reported that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against an ambulance in Hlukhivska Hromada, Sumy Oblast, overnight on April 11 to 12, injuring three medics.[3] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian forces conducted Molniya drone strikes in Kharkiv Oblast that damaged a store and injured two civilians in Zolochiv and damaged buildings in Klynova-Novoselivka and Odnorobivka, and that a Molniya drone fell in a garden in Derhachi on April 12 but did not result in casualties.[4]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 12 that Ukrainian forces violated the ceasefire 1,971 times between the start of the ceasefire at 1600 local time on April 11 and 0800 local time on April 12, including launching eight ground assaults in Sumy, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts; 258 artillery strikes in border areas and against Russian positions; and 1,329 FPV drone strikes.[5] Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein claimed on April 11 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a gas station in Lgov, Kursk Oblast, injuring three civilians, after the start of the ceasefire.[6] Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov claimed on April 11 that a Ukrainian drone strike injured two civilians in Shebekino, Belgorod Oblast.[7] Gladkov did not mention a time in his claim, but Russian milbloggers claimed that the strike violated the ceasefire.[8]
Russian forces committed a war crime in Kharkiv Oblast, reportedly amid the Easter ceasefire on April 11. The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office published footage and reported on April 12 that Russian forces executed four Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on April 11 after entering Ukrainian positions near Veterynarne (north of Kharkiv City).[9] Ukrainian 14th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Vitaliy Sarantsev reported on April 12 that Russian forces launched an assault near Veterynarne after 1400 local time on April 11, ahead of the ceasefire, and that the assault lasted several hours and resulted in the seizure of Ukrainian positions.[10] The spokesperson emphasized that Russian forces shot the unarmed Ukrainian servicemembers after the start of the ceasefire at 1600 local time. The execution of POWs is a war crime that violates the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of POWs.[11] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield, including POW executions.[12]
Key Takeaways
- Both Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of limited violations of the Kremlin’s unilateral short-term, theater-wide ceasefire over the Orthodox Easter holiday on April 11 and 12.
- Russian forces committed a war crime in Kharkiv Oblast, reportedly amid the Easter ceasefire on April 11.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.
- Russian forces did not conduct any long-range drone or missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 11 to 12.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
[Note: The Ukrainian General Staff’s 0800 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0800 on the previous day to 0800 on the current day, and the 2200 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 2200. ISW is unable to assess whether Russian attacks reported in these SITREPs occurred after Russia’s 32-hour unilateral Easter truce that started at 1600 local time on April 11. The Ukrainian General Staff’s 1600 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 1600, and any reports of Russian ground activity in the Ukrainian General Staff’s April 12, 1600 SITREP are by default an accusation of truce violations.]
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Pro-Ukrainian actors reportedly recently sabotaged a Russian train in Rostov Oblast on an unspecified date. Ukrainian Crimea-based partisan group Atesh reported on April 12 that Atesh agents conducted a sabotage operation on an unspecified date that destroyed a Russian locomotive near the Likhovskaya railway station in Rostov Oblast, which supplies Russian forces use to deliver supplies to Zaporizhia Oblast.[13] The Atesh group noted that Russia has a locomotive shortage and has almost exhausted its capacity to replace locomotives. The Atesh group noted that the burned locomotive is disrupting railway traffic through the Likhovskaya railway station.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on April 12 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Yunakivka and Varachyne (both northeast of Sumy City).[14]
Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including northeast of Sumy City toward Myropillya and southwest of Glushkovo near Kucherov, Kursk Oblast, on April 11 and 12.[15] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Nova Sich (north of Sumy City).[16]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade and of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy direction.[17]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 12 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Veterynarne and northeast of Kharkiv City near Synelnykove, Starytsya, Izbytske, Vovchansk, Prylipka, and Vovchanski Khutory on April 11 and 12.[18]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on April 12.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 12 but did not advance.
Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on April 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in central Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk) – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[19]
Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Podoly, and southeast of Kupyansk toward Novoosynove on April 11 and 12.[20]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1486th Motorized Rifle Regiment (comprised of mobilized personnel, reportedly of the 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are operating on the eastern outskirts of Kupyansk.[21] Drone operators of the 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in Kurylivka.[22]
Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Borova near Shyikivka on April 11 and 12 but did not advance.[23]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on April 12 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; north of Lyman near Drobysheve and Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Zarichne; east of Slovyansk near Platonivka, Ozerne, Kalenyky, and Rai-Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Fedorivka Druha on April 11 and 12.[24]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 7 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced west of Stupochky and in eastern Kostyantynivka.[25]
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on April 8, 10, and 11 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in eastern Kostyantynivka, in southern Dovha Balka (west of Kostyantynivka), and southwest of Illinivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses were all Russian infiltration missions that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[26]
Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Markove and Chasiv Yar; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Novopavlivka on April 11 and 12.[27]
Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 13th Rusichi Assault Detachment of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion (both of the 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces near and within Kostyantynivka.[28] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) and of the Zmey Gorynych detachment (Russian Federal Security Service’s [FSB] Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Directorate) are striking Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka.[29] Drone operators of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 136th Motorized Separate Rifle Brigade (58th CAA, SMD) are observing and striking Ukrainian forces near Stupochky (east of Kostyantynivka) and Novodmytrivka (north of Kostyantynivka).[30] Elements of the 77th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[31] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Druzhkivka direction.[32]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks east of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar and southeast of Dobropillya near Dorozhnie on April 11 and 12 but did not advance.[33]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on April 12 but did not advance.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[34]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne, north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske, northeast of Pokrovsk near Zatyshok, east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Molodetske on April 11 and 12.[35]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself and northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka on April 11 and 12 but did not advance.[36]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Novohryhorivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[37]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai, east of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad and Sichneve, and southeast of Oleksandrivka toward Kalynivske, Verbove, Ternove, Pryvillya, and Novohryhorivka on April 11 and 12.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksandrohrad before the 1600 start time of the April 11 to 12 ceasefire.[39] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Hai and Vidradne (both south of Oleksandrivka).[40]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Pokrovske (just north of Oleksandrivka).[41] Drone operators of the 14th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[42]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continue offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on April 12 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself, northwest of Hulyaipole near Olenokostyantynivka, Varvarivka, northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, southwest of Hulyaipole near Hulyaipilske and Myrne and toward Charivne, and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and toward Staroukrainka on April 11 and 12.[43]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) and of the 392nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[44]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported Russian ground operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 12.
Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on April 12 that Ukrainian forces conducted clearing operations in Stepnohirsk (northwest of Orikhiv) within the past week (since about April 5) and that Ukrainian forces still hold positions along both banks of the Yanchekrak River between Kamyanske and Stepove (both northwest of Orikhiv).[45]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Bilohirya (southeast of Orikhiv) and near Richne (northwest of Orikhiv) on April 11 and 12.[46]
Russian forces are reportedly overextended across the frontline in western Zaporizhia Oblast despite receiving reinforcements from Russia’s strategic reserve. Mashovets reported on April 12 that elements of the Russian 58th CAA (SMD) operating west and south of Orikhiv are overextended between two separate operational objectives along a roughly 50-kilometer-long frontline from Prymorske to Bilohirya (southeast of Orikhiv).[47] Mashovets stated that Russian forces are unable to concentrate sufficient forces and means to accomplish either objective. Mashovets reported that the 58th CAA is simultaneously attempting to advance west and northwest of Orikhiv toward Zaporizhzhia City and advance to the southeastern outskirts of Orikhiv to support the 5th CAA’s left flank attempting to advance on Orikhiv from the west and southwest of Hulyaipole.[48] Mashovets noted that Russian forces have made very few tactically-significant gains in these endeavors and that the force concentrations for the operations on both flanks of the Orikhiv direction have left Russian forces vulnerable to potential Ukrainian counterattacks against the Russian salient west of Orikhiv.[49] Mashovets noted that the elements of the 7th and 76th Airborne (VDV) divisions that Russian forces had redeployed to the Zaporizhia direction are components of Russia’s strategic reserve and that Russian forces may be redeploying more components of their strategic reserve to southern Ukraine through occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, and Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.[50]
Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 19th Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA) are fighting near Prymorske and that elements of the 7th VDV Division are fighting toward Orikhiv from Mala Tokmachka and Novopokrovka (both southeast of Orikhiv).[51] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) are striking Ukrainian forces in Orikhiv and Novodanylivka.[52] Drone operators of the 4th Military Base (58th CAA) reportedly continue to operate in the Orikhiv direction.[53]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge and southwest of Kherson City toward Bilohrudyi Island on April 11 and 12 but did not advance.[54]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces did not conduct long-range drone or missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 11 to 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported as of 0800 local time on April 12 that Russian forces did not launch any missiles, Shahed-type drones, or guided glide bombs against Ukraine overnight.[55] This is the first night Ukrainian officials have not reported Russian long-range drone or missile strikes since May 10, 2025.[56]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing Significant To Report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37190
[2] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1287281-rosijski-vijska-ne-dotrimuutsa-tisi-zastupnik-komandira-motopihotnogo-batalonu-pro-limanskij-napramok/; https://t.me/corps7DSHV/1307; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/12/pid-chas-rezhymu-tyshi-rosijska-pihota-namagalas-prosunutysya-u-bik-gryshynogo/; https://www.facebook.com/7CorpsDSHV/posts/pfbid0J5joroouVEjmEL9q16uuKbH7g6vPiGaxk91MgQ5r7uJ3oguuwyB1hznjRJEFrtHzl?locale=uk_UA; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1287249-bezpilotniki-rf-u-povitri-komandir-brigadi-ahilles-dopoviv-pro-situaciu-na-harkivsini-pisla-pocatku-peremira/ ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/28672
[3] https://t.me/hryhorov_oleg/2020; https://t.me/prokuraturasumy/5136; https://t.me/police_su_region/36291; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1287335-armia-rf-vdarila-po-svidkij-u-gluhivskij-gromadi-postrazdali-troe-medikiv/
[4] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/61597; https://suspilne dot media/1287293-z-polonu-povernulas-ponad-sotna-ukrainciv-sili-oboroni-urazili-naftobazu-v-krimu-1509-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1775975479&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/zadorenko_v/17038
[5] https://t.me/mod_russia/62598; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/27080719; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/27080733
[6] https://t.me/Hinshtein/17700
[7] https://t.me/vvgladkov/20697; https://t.me/vvgladkov/20708
[8] https://t.me/dva_majors/91132; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/25027
[9] https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/36421
[10] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/12/rosiyany-planuyut-poshyryty-fejk-pro-insczenuvannya-rozstrilu-chotyroh-vijskovopolonenyh/
[11] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciii-1949/article-3
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-7-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2025/
[13] https://t.me/atesh_ua/9700
[14] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/206742
[15] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37213; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37190; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37184; https://t.me/uvkkursk/312;
[16] https://t.me/mod_russia/62598; https://t.me/tass_agency/370778
[17] https://t.me/tass_agency/370806; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41793
[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37213; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37190; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37184; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20436
[19] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2043074940472299731; https://t.me/msprubezh/52
[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37213; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37190; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37184; https://t.me/wargonzo/33470
[21] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11672; https://t.me/kcaebirds/2656
[22] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2043074940472299731; https://t.me/msprubezh/52
[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37190 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37184
[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37213; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37190; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37184; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20436; https://t.me/wargonzo/33470; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41779; https://t.me/gvZapad/18294
[25] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042955798838473125; https://t.me/brigada0005/4252 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042959450751869023; http://verumreactor [dot] ru/forum/postid/283; https://t.me/verumreactor/35169
[26] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042981177254887645; https://www.instagram.com/2battalion.marines.ua/reel/DW2_tIGiP63/ ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042974763602137207; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/112840 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042985489888678239; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1276588714604059; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11675
[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37213 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37190 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37184 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33470
[28] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2043000719679086666; https://t.me/rusich13sho/1523 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042964080277758277; https://t.me/Legion_W_Bat1/1072 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042964080277758277; https://t.me/Legion_W_Bat1/1072
[29] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042959450751869023; http://verumreactor [dot] ru/forum/postid/283; https://t.me/verumreactor/35169 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042958007345012901; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042958011358974322; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/17252
[30] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042955798838473125; https://t.me/brigada0005/4252 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042979076890100218; https://t.me/RembaKillers/46 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042968402919076272; https://t.me/RembaKillers/44 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042962327578738918; https://t.me/RembaKillers/45
[31] https://t.me/dva_majors/91140
[32] https://t.me/dva_majors/91158
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37213 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37190 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37184
[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41777
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37213; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37190; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37184; https://t.me/wargonzo/33470
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37213 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37190 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37184
[37] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34846 ; https://t.me/zsu82odshbr/2766
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37213 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37190 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37184
[39] https://t.me/wargonzo/33470
[40] https://t.me/mod_russia/62598; https://t.me/tass_agency/370777
[41] https://t.me/voin_dv/19238
[42] https://t.me/voin_dv/19236 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/19244
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37213; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13702; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37190; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37184; https://t.me/wargonzo/33470
[44] https://t.me/voin_dv/19244; https://t.me/milinfolive/170385
[45] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3346 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02rFbM3QCM6L7yx8KoGrnwWAbyevQCYqXWwJzziXR1jgnbQGyn68UdQwY1yYhCxHRsl
[46] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/25041; https://t.me/wargonzo/33470
[47] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3348
[48] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3348
[49] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3349
[50] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3348
[51] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3346 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02rFbM3QCM6L7yx8KoGrnwWAbyevQCYqXWwJzziXR1jgnbQGyn68UdQwY1yYhCxHRsl; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3348
[52] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2043014201376149901; https://t.me/UVO58/1333; https://x.com/ChaMapping/status/2042993162726314278?s=20; https://t.me/UVO58/1341
[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/91153; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3345
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37190; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37184
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37190
[56] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2025/
