Toplines
The Kremlin continues to deny that Russia will conduct mobilization after its September 18-20 State Duma elections, likely in an effort to dissuade Russian citizens from fleeing abroad. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on September 18 that Russian authorities have no plans to conduct a covert mobilization after the elections.[1] Bloomberg reported on September 18 that Russian government and military recruitment officials have been attempting to open accounts at foreign banks and move assets abroad, while also encouraging their relatives to leave Russia, amid concerns over an upcoming mobilization.[2] Russian officials have repeatedly denied that Russia will conduct involuntary reserve call-ups, likely in an effort to appease Russian society and avoid public upheaval or mass emigration such as occurred as a result of the 2022 involuntary reserve call-up.[3]
The Kremlin will have to change its recruitment practices and likely conduct some form of involuntary reserve call-up in order to sustain its war effort in Ukraine over the mid- to long-term if it continues operations that generate casualties at the current rate. Russia’s current casualty rate exceeds its recruitment rate by thousands per month, and the Russian war effort is even so failing to achieve its operational and strategic objectives.[4] Russian denials of mobilization do not indicate that Russia will not conduct mobilization, as Putin has shown no inclination to accept a ceasefire or lower the objectives he has given the Russian military to accomplish. These denials instead signal Putin’s concerns about the likely reaction of Russian society to involuntary mobilizations. It remains unclear when or what form of mobilization Putin may choose to order.
Poland has changed its air defense posture in response to increasing Russian strikes against border infrastructure and drone and other incursions into the territories of states neighboring Ukraine. Military aviation “preventively” operated in Polish airspace on September 17 in order to protect eastern Poland amid Russian strikes against central Ukraine, according to the Polish Armed Forces Operational Command.[5] Polish Minister of National Defense Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz similarly stated on September 3 that Polish air forces would expand their protection of Polish airspace, including with F-16 fighter jets and helicopters, due to Russian drone incursions in recent weeks.[6] Aviation in Poland is likely sortieing while Russian air targets are still operating in central Ukraine because the expansion of Russia’s use of its faster jet-powered Geran-type drones has significantly reduced the time available for neighboring states to react to Russian drones nearing or entering their airspace from Ukraine.[7] Sortieing aircraft more often, however, will increase the financial costs and maintenance requirements for NATO air forces and thus reflects a real way in which Russian drone incursions into NATO airspace impose costs on alliance members.
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk reported on September 17 that intelligence indicates that Russia plans to conduct drone and missile strikes against states on NATO’s eastern flank supporting Ukraine, such as Poland.[8] Tusk added that the Kremlin intends these strikes to appear to be “random” and will make official claims that the strikes were accidents. Tusk assessed that the strikes aim to weaken NATO states’ motivations to invoke NATO’s Article 5 and to show that the article is only “theoretical.” ISW continues to assess that both intentional and unintentional Russian drone incursions enable the Russian military to test NATO air defenses and erode the meaning of NATO’s Article 5 collective defense provision.[9]
Russian President Vladimir Putin seized several prominent foreign enterprises under the pretext of defending Russian national security as he continues to expand and exercise his power to nationalize foreign and Russian assets. Putin signed a decree on September 17 that places 16 Russian companies, including Russian subsidiaries of French companies Auchan and Lemana PRO (formerly Leroy Merlin) and of the Swiss company Nestlé, under the “temporary management” of L.E.V. Management, effective immediately with no expiration date.[10] Putin enacted this decree on the basis of an existing April 2023 decree that authorized the Russian government to take “temporary management” of any property, securities, or shares belonging to persons associated with countries that Russia designates as “unfriendly” and that threaten Russian national security or property rights.[11] Both Putin’s September 17, 2026, and April 2023 decrees authorize indefinite “temporary management” over an enterprise’s property rights, effectively constituting nationalization of private assets.[12] Both decrees also designate the Russian Federal Agency for State Property Management (Rosimushchestvo) — an entity responsible for channeling revenues from nationalized property into the Russian federal budget — as the manager for any property seized under the decree, while also allowing Putin to appoint another organization as the manager at his discretion. Putin’s September 17 decree authorizes L.E.V. Management to manage all 16 companies’ assets instead of Rossimushchestvo for an unspecified reason. Independent outlet Novaya Gazeta Europe identified the director of L.E.V. Management as retired Russian Major General Andrei Krayushkin, who served as the first deputy head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Migration Department from 2016 until at least 2020.[13] ISW has repeatedly assessed that Putin is likely setting conditions for a broader nationalization of Russian private assets to support state revenues as he more desperately seeks fiscal relief and additional revenues amid rising war costs.[14]
The details of Ukraine’s restructuring of the military command arrangements in and around Donetsk Oblast are becoming clear as the new organizations come formally into operation. The Ukrainian military command disbanded the Eastern Group of Forces (GoF) and replaced it with newly formed Azov GoF and Center GoF, according to Ukrainian news outlet Hromadske.[15] The Center GoF AoR runs from the Lyman direction to the Kramatorsk-Kostyantynivka area in the Fortress Belt, and the Azov GoF AoR covers the Dobropillya tactical area to the south.[16] Ukraine’s Operational Command East announced on September 17 that General Major Viktor Nikolyuk left his post as the commander of Ukraine’s Eastern GoF, which defended Donetsk Oblast, and is returning to the command of Ukraine’s Operational Command East.[17] Ukrainian Joint Forces Group Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on September 18 that the Ukrainian military command is transferring the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps and the responsibility for the Lyman direction from the Joint Forces Group to the Center GoF.[18] Trehubov stated that the Joint Forces Group will retain responsibility over the Kupyansk and South-Slobozhansk directions.
Ukraine is attempting to increase the resilience of its energy system in preparation for Russia’s anticipated intense winter strike campaign targeting Ukraine’s energy grid. Ukrainian Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal reported on September 17 that Ukraine is planning to restore and build over 10 GW of power capacity and is modernizing and integrating its energy system with the European one in anticipation of a Russian winter strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy network.[19] Shmyhal added that Ukraine is also building a decentralized and flexible system. Shmyhal did not specify the progress or timeline of Ukraine’s energy modernization, integration, and resilience-building efforts. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated on September 17 that Russia plans to destroy road and rail border crossings in Ukraine and potentially on the Polish or Moldovan sides of the border to prevent Ukraine’s partners from carrying out relief efforts to support Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in the wintertime.[20] Russia attempted in Winter 2025/2026 to split Ukraine’s energy grid in half along the west-east axis and create energy islands that were cut off from Ukraine’s electricity generation, international deliveries, and transmission systems.[21] Deeper integration of Ukraine’s energy network with the European one and decentralization would create additional redundancies necessary to increase the resilience of the entire energy grid against a Russian strike campaign, particularly as Russian forces are able to regularly strike Ukraine’s western regions and international borders.
Key Takeaways
- The Kremlin continues to deny that Russia will conduct mobilization after its September 18-20 State Duma elections, likely in an effort to dissuade Russian citizens from fleeing abroad.
- The Kremlin will have to change its recruitment practices and likely conduct some form of involuntary reserve call-up in order to sustain its war effort in Ukraine over the mid- to long-term if it continues operations that generate casualties at the current rate.
- Poland has changed its air defense posture in response to increasing Russian strikes against border infrastructure and drone and other incursions into the territories of states neighboring Ukraine.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin seized several prominent foreign enterprises under the pretext of defending Russian national security as he continues to expand and exercise his power to nationalize foreign and Russian assets.
- The details of Ukraine’s restructuring of the military command arrangements in and around Donetsk Oblast are becoming clear as the new organizations come formally into operation.
- Ukraine is attempting to increase the resilience of its energy system in preparation for Russia’s anticipated intense winter strike campaign targeting Ukraine’s energy grid.
- Russia launched 93 drones against Ukraine overnight.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure on the night of September 17 and 18.
- Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces advanced.
ISW has reorganized its axes in Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts to better reflect the Russian campaign to seize Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast Fortress Belt. ISW will analyze the Russian campaign in Donetsk Oblast in more detail in a forthcoming special edition.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure on the night of September 17 and 18. Open-source Telegram accounts reported explosions in Rostov-on-Don and claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Rostov Airfield.[22] Rostov Oblast Governor Yuri Slyusar claimed on September 18 that Russian forces intercepted more than 50 Ukrainian drones over the region.[23] Ukrainian forces also struck the Rostov Airfield on September 17 and have been increasingly striking Russian military assets in Rostov Oblast since at least June 2026, including air bases and air defense systems, in an effort to degrade Russian strike and air defense capabilities.[24]
Ukrainian and open sources provided updated battlefield damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes. Open-source Telegram accounts published imagery purporting to show damage to production and warehouse buildings at the Atlant Aero plant in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast (roughly 190 kilometers from the front line), which produces Molniya drones, following a September 15 Ukrainian strike.[25] Additional satellite imagery shows damage to an ELOU-AVT-7 processing unit at the TANECO refinery in Nizhnekamsk, Republic of Tatarstan (roughly 1,105 kilometers from the border) following a September 13 Ukrainian strike, according to an open-source Telegram channel.[26] Reuters reported on September 17, citing industry sources, that the Slavneft-Yaroslavnefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Yaroslavl City (roughly 700 kilometers from the frontline) ceased production following a September 17 Ukrainian strike.[27] The strike reportedly damaged the refinery’s AVT-3 unit, which has a processing capacity of 17,140 metric tons of crude a day and accounts for 40 percent of the refinery’s total production capacity.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 17 to 18 but did not advance.[28] A Russian milblogger assessed that footage of Russian strikes against Ukrainian personnel in Zapsillya (northeast of Sumy City) suggests that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in the area.[29] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian positions on elevated terrain near Psyarivka and Ivolzhanske (both north of Sumy City) are complicating Russian assaults that have to cross about 15 kilometers of open terrain.[30]
Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 17 and 18 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Kharkiv City.[31] Ukrainian Joint Forces Group Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on September 18 that Russian forces control most of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) but that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the southeastern part of the town.[32] Trehubov added that Russian attempts to develop offensive operations in the area remain limited.
Russian forces continue efforts to degrade Ukrainian drone infrastructure in the Kharkiv direction in Kharkiv Oblast. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces conducted a Kh-39 air-to-surface tactical missile strike against a Ukrainian ground drone control station in Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[33]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 17 and 18 but did not make confirmed advances.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk).[35]
Russian milbloggers continue to make spurious claims about an encirclement in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continue to tighten the encirclement near Vovchansk.[36] ISW continues to assess that there is no evidence of an encirclement in northeast Kharkiv Oblast.[37]
Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kupyansk direction. Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in central Tyshenkivka (northwest of Kupyansk), according to geolocated footage published on September 17 showing Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in the area.[38]
Russian forces reportedly maintain positions within Kupyansk but are not conducting attacks. Ukrainian Joint Forces Group Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces maintain a bridgehead on the western bank of the Oskil River north of Kupyansk and positions in northern Kupyansk but are not conducting active offensive operations.[39] Trehubov added that there are no Russian crossings over the river but that Russian forces in some areas hold positions on both sides of the river.
Russian forces in the Borova direction are submitting false reports up the chain of command — a general trend in the Russian military across the entire frontline. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Borova direction reported that Russian forces are unsuccessfully attacking in small groups in the Kolisnykivka direction (northeast of Borova) and are reporting to Russian commanders that they have seized settlements they do not in reality control.[40] The spokesperson added that Russian forces have been attempting to use drone footage to falsely claim the seizures of settlements and that such false information misinforms the Russian military command about difficult situations on the ground that require additional resources.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast, including in areas less than 10 kilometers from the Ukrainian-Russian border. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot near Dovzhansk (roughly 145 kilometers from the front) and a material and technical warehouse near Kypuche (roughly 70 kilometers from the front) on September 17 or the night of September 17 to 18, according to the Ukrainian General Staff.[41]
Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest
Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements
Ukrainian forces continue to provide additional details about Ukraine’s ability to achieve operational surprise in their counteroffensive north of Lyman over the past several months — Operation Vivaldi. The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction stated on September 17 that Ukrainian forces entered Serednie (northwest of Lyman) using armored vehicles as part of Operation Vivaldi, achieving an element of surprise and suffering no losses.[42] The commander stated that Ukrainian forces deployed armored vehicles in unexpected areas after equipping the tanks such that they could operate in areas where the ground was wet after heavy rains and where Russian forces thought heavy equipment movement was unlikely. The commander of another Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction stated on September 18 that Russian forces had been using Serednie to accumulate forces in order to further advance toward Korovyi Yar, Rubtsi, and Yatskivka (all northeast of Serednie).[43] The deputy commander of another battalion stated on September 18 that Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to recapture Serednie.[44] The deputy commander noted that Russian sources attempted to discredit information about Ukraine’s liberation of Serednie, claiming that Ukrainians used AI-altered footage to prove their advances.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east
Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission near Chasiv Yar. Russian personnel raised flags in Virolyubivka (west of Chasiv Yar) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission, based on geolocated footage published on September 18.[45] The Russian MoD claimed on September 18 that Russian forces seized Virolyubivka, but ISW does not assess that Russian forces have consolidated any positions in the settlement.[46]
Russian forces are reportedly trying to advance on Kramatorsk from the east via flat terrain. A milblogger claimed on September 18 that Russian forces aim to eliminate the Ukrainian pockets between Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk) and Pershomarivka (southwest of Mykolaivka and just east of Kramatorsk) as this is the “most convenient” entry point into Kramatorsk as the area is a flat plateau that opens up into high-rise buildings in the city.[47] The area is, indeed, a flat plateau leading up to high-rises in the city, and it is unclear why the milblogger thinks that this is propitious terrain for operations in a war of the current type other than in its lack of water features to be crossed. The success of Ukrainian defenders in and around Lyman, coupled with Ukrainian successes in Operation Vivaldi, have deprived Russian forces of the option of outflanking Slovyansk from the northeast, leaving an attack from due east and from the southeast as the only viable routes to approach the settlement. The planned Russian attack via Lyman was always going to face the challenge of having to cross significant water features, but would at least have allowed Russian forces to attack the flank and possibly rear of Ukrainian positions in Slovyansk.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south
Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements
Russian forces continued offensive operations in and west of Kostyantynivka on September 17 to 18 but did not advance.[48]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest
Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on September 17 and 18 but did not make confirmed advances.[49] The Russian MoD claimed on September 18 that Russian forces seized Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya).[50] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) with the seizure of the settlement.[51] Another Russian milblogger assessed that Russian forces can use the alleged seizure of Zolotyi Kolodyaz to maintain fire control over the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway and highlighted how dirt roads to Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka also pass through the area.[52]
Russian forces are intensifying their drone and artillery strikes against Ukrainian logistics in the Dobropillya area to shape the battlefield and enable Russian advances in upcoming offensives against the town in the fall and winter. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Dobropillya tactical area reported on September 18 that Russian forces are intensifying strikes against Ukrainian logistics, rotations, and evacuations.[53] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have been significantly increasing their use of artillery and began moving artillery guns closer to the frontline since September 9. ISW recently observed reports that Russian forces are transferring armor and drone support assets to the Dobropillya direction for mechanized assaults in the fall, and the uptick in Russian artillery activity in the area in recent weeks is likely also part of preparation for these mechanized assaults.[54]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone storage, preparation, and launch site near Donetsk City (roughly 55 kilometers from the frontline) on September 17 or the night of September 17 to 18.[55] Geolocated footage published on September 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking an armored vehicle and trucks near Donetsk City, Pisky (roughly 46 kilometers from the frontline), Yasynuvata (roughly 42 kilometers from the frontline), and Vodyane (roughly 43 kilometers from the frontline).[56]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 933rd Anti-aircraft Missile Regiment (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are operating near occupied Ocheretyne (roughly 24 kilometers from the frontline east of Pokrovsk), according to geolocated footage published on September 17.[57] This is the first evidence ISW has observed of this regiment operating in Ukraine.
Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on September 17 and 18 but did not advance.[58]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr Grouping of Forces
Russian milbloggers continue making exaggerated claims of advances in the Hulyaipole direction. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on September 17 that Russian forces advanced near Rozivka (northwest of Hulyaipole and 11.5 kilometers from the closest confirmed Russian position).[59] The milblogger’s claim is consistent with the Kremlin’s systematic cognitive warfare effort to fabricate claims of Russian tactical successes in areas where Russian forces do not maintain enduring positions as part of wider efforts to falsely portray the frontline as collapsing.[60]
Ukrainian forces cleared Russian infiltrators south of Zaporizhzhia City. Ukrainian forces recently cleared a Russian position in northwestern Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv), while Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in central Stepnohirsk, according to geolocated footage published on September 17.[61]
False reports of Russian advances are resulting in premature Russian assaults on heavily fortified Ukrainian positions in Orikhiv. A Russian milblogger complained on September 18 that Russian commanders are pushing Russian troops to attack near Orikhiv despite heavily fortified Ukrainian positions in the town and the extensive network of strongpoints and logistics in Novoandriivka (west of Orikhiv) and Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[62] The milblogger claimed that the commanders are trying to keep up with Russian media reports that Russian forces are close to seizing Orikhiv. The milblogger stated that Russian forces are fighting on the outskirts of Orikhiv and in some places within the town itself, but that Russian forces are still far from seizing the town and that Ukrainian drone crews are slowing Russian advances in the area.
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian source reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 17 or 18.
Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian missile launch capabilities in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Orion strike and reconnaissance drone ground control station at Saky Airfield (roughly 180 kilometers from the frontline) near Novofedorivka on September 17 or on the night of September 17 to 18.[63] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Orion drones can remain airborne for up to 24 hours and carry guided missiles or bombs with a total weight of up to 250 kilograms to engage ground targets. Russian forces notably use Orion drones to launch jet-powered S8000 Banderol loitering munitions.[64]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[65]
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 17 to 18. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 93 Shahed-type strike drones (including 46 jet-powered Shahed-type drones), Gerbera-type strike drones, Parodiya-type decoy drones, and Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions from the directions of Oryol City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea; and the Sea of Azov.[66] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 69 drones and three Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions; that Russian aerial targets hit 13 locations; that debris fell at three; and that some air targets did not reach their targets. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, industrial, civilian, and business infrastructure in Odesa, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Zaporizhia, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[67] Russian forces also conducted a Geran-4 drone strike against an electric train near Lypkuvativka, Kharkiv Oblast, killing at least one person.[68] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian radar and an electronic warfare (EW) system in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and a radar station, several dry cargo ships, and a Ukrainian postal service Nova Poshta logistics center in Odesa Oblast.[69]
Ukraine will likely be able to deploy interceptors against Russia’s new jet-powered drones before Russia builds out the infrastructure required to launch very large numbers of the drones in a single strike package. Ukrainian military expert Lieutenant Colonel Serhiy Misyura stated that the launch infrastructure that Russian forces use to launch jet-powered Geran-type drones is different from the installations on pickup trucks used for traditional piston engine-driven Geran drones.[70] Misyura noted that Russian forces currently do not have sufficient infrastructure to launch hundreds of jet drones in one strike package and likely will not be able to build out such infrastructure in the near future. Misyura added that Russian forces in part aim to degrade the engines of Ukrainian aviation with the jet drone strikes, as Ukrainian forces are currently largely using fighter jets to down the drones. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 18, however, that jet-powered Geran interceptor drones from two companies have already passed combat trials and destroyed jet drones flying at high speeds.[71]
Russian forces have been successfully using their jet-powered drones to significantly degrade Ukraine’s railway infrastructure, however. Russian forces are increasingly using the jet-powered Geran-type drones to target Ukrainian passenger trains, according to Politico.[72] Russian forces have damaged or destroyed more than 500 locomotives since the start of the war, with more than 60 percent of that damage occurring in the past eight months (since about January 2026). The head of Ukraine’s railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia, Oleksandr Pertsovskyi, stated that this Russian strike campaign aims to isolate frontline areas, sow panic and fear among the Ukrainian population, and paralyze the Ukrainian economy. Pertsovskyi stated that most of the strikes occur within 200 kilometers of the frontline or the Russian border but that Russian forces have been using repeaters in Belarus to expand the geographic reach of their strikes against trains.
Russia may be producing as many as 250 Banderol loitering munitions per month, but exact production numbers remain unclear. Independent open-source investigative group Nordsint reported on September 17 that Russian defense industrial enterprise Kronshtadt, which makes the Banderols, plans to produce about 250 Banderols per month, according to public tender information from early 2025 procuring Banderol components.[73] Nordsint estimated that Russia will have produced a total of 4,450 Banderols between Spring 2025 and the end of September 2026. The Kronstadt procurement information indicates that the Banderol uses older anti-jamming antennas that make it more susceptible to electronic warfare (EW) than the Geran-2 drone but includes an inertial navigation system that allows it to continue flying without a satellite signal. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated in early August 2026 that Russia was capable of producing 80 Banderols per month.[74] It is unclear whether the GUR estimate reflects intelligence about Kronstadt’s inability to maintain the planned production levels that Nordsint used to estimate the total production count.
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://rtvi dot com/news/v-kremle-otvetili-na-informacziyu-o-mobilizaczii-eshhe-300-tys-chelovek-posle-vyborov/
[2] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-09-18/russians-fear-putin-will-send-them-to-war-once-election-is-over
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/ ; https://thehuman-rights.com/russia-emigration-after-mobilization/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_23-10/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2026/
[5] https://x.com/DowOperSZ/status/2100629559880110442?s=2
[6] https://x.com/KosiniakKamysz/status/2095556736786612401
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/
[8] https://www.onet dot pl/informacje/onetwiadomosci/donald-tusk-nagle-pojawil-sie-na-mownicy-przedstawia-najbardziej-prawdopodobny/197vntp,79cfc278
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-campaign-against-europe-defining-the-threat/
[10] http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/document/0001202609170018?index=1
[11] http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202304250033?index=1
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-24-2026/
[13] https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2026/09/17/rossiiskie-aktivy-nestle-ashana-i-byvshego-leroy-merlin-peredali-v-upravlenie-kompanii-pod-rukovodstvom-generala-mvd-news
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-24-2026/ ;
[15] https://hromadske dot ua/viyskovi/271165-heneral-mayor-nikoliuk-yde-z-posady-komanduvacha-uv-skhid
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/
[17] https://www.facebook.com/EastOC/posts/pfbid02oQzYH1xuwVWzy9RZF4q7SiqTqBTMMTn7r9gkyMdjQWHw2FLhxkfFzKgyRBhMGDwFl
[18] https://vchasnoua dot com/news/limanskii-napriamok-perexodit-pid-komanduvannia-novogo-ugrupovannia-viisk-centr; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aN-TSVfhSRI
[19] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/13080
[20] https://www.onet dot pl/informacje/onetwiadomosci/donald-tusk-nagle-pojawil-sie-na-mownicy-przedstawia-najbardziej-prawdopodobny/197vntp,79cfc278
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2025/
[22] https://t.me/supernova_plus/60088; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/09/18/ukrainskie-drony-atakovali-rostovskuyu-oblast-povrezhdeny-zhilye-doma-sobyanin-soobschil-o-350-bespilotnikah-letevshih-na-moskvu; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/aviabaza-u-rostovi-na-donu-jmovirno-znovu-bula-pid-udaramy-ukrayinskyh-droniv/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/125493
[23] https://t.me/Yuri_Slusar/7185
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/
[25] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8170; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/31117; https://t.me/milinfolive/179736; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/udar-znyshhyv-budivli-atlant-aero/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/
[26] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8169; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/udar-ukrayinskyh-droniv-po-taneko-13-veresnya-zagrozhuye-zupynkoyu-52-potuzhnostej-npz/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2026/
[27] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-yaroslavl-refinery-shuts-processing-after-drone-attack-sources-say-2026-09-17/; https://t.me/sotaproject/118728; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42272; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42274; https://t.me/wargonzo/37019; https://t.me/severnnyi/9352
[29] https://t.me/rybar/83238
[30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47725
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42272; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42274; https://t.me/severnnyi/9352; https://t.me/severnnyi/9352
[32] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/09/18/okupanty-tysnut-ale-kartyna-vzhe-insha-shho-vidbuvayetsya-na-harkivshhyni/; https://youtu.be/v_hgVy3tUZM
[33] https://t.me/mod_russia/67443
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42272; https://t.me/rybar/83238; https://t.me/wargonzo/37019
[35] https://t.me/rybar/83238
[36] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/75195; https://t.me/wargonzo/37019; https://t.me/rybar/83238;
[37] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/
[38] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12986; https://www.instagram.com/bambi_no39/reel/DdY_Bw0ttMJ
[39] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/09/18/okupanty-tysnut-ale-kartyna-vzhe-insha-shho-vidbuvayetsya-na-harkivshhyni/; https://youtu.be/v_hgVy3tUZM
[40] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/17/%c2%abperejshly-z-kredytiv-na-mikrozajmy%c2%bb-u-77-j-brygadi-rozpovily-pro-dyvnu-taktyku-rosiyan/; https://youtu.be/v_hgVy3tUZM
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42286
[42] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/17/pidkuvaly-bronyu-i-zajshly-tam-de-ne-chekaly-yak-66-ta-brygada-vzyala-serednye-bez-vtrat/ ; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1094703096351822
[43] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/18/detali-sekretnoyi-operacziyi-vivaldi-yaka-pozbavyla-rosiyan-placzdarmu-dlya-nastupu-na-izyum/ ; https://youtu.be/v_hgVy3tUZM
[44] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/18/operacziya-vivaldi-yak-zvilnyaly-serednye-na-lymanskomu-napryamku/ ; https://youtu.be/Zl6UvfGK0UE?t=875
[45] https://t.me/Osintpen/3569 ; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/36451
[46] https://t.me/mod_russia/67432
[47] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47736
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42272 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42274 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37019
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42272; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42274; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47746; https://t.me/wargonzo/37019; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/123510
[50] https://t.me/mod_russia/67433
[51] https://t.me/epoddubny/29121
[52] https://t.me/sashakots/64513
[53] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1406500-vijskovi-rf-rvutsa-do-dnipropetrovskoi-oblasti-na-pokrovskomu-fronti-poblizu-udacnogo-trivaut-vazki-boi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EHiuKvFUr2w&pp=0gcJCf4LAYcqIYzv
[54] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42286
[56] https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2100713165088510357; https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2100699997436047859; https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2100694250564251722; https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2100690074824327315; https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2100687418508591265; https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2100678394220367925
[57] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15893; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2100823283960541485?s=20
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42272; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42274
[59] https://t.me/rybar/83238
[60] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2026/
[61] https://t.me/risk_dept/722; https://x.com/WagnerGeosint/status/2100649713309479232; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2100630072004575415; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12989
[62] https://t.me/arx_spn/31141
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42286
[64] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2026/
[65] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[66] https://t.me/kpszsu/78771
[67] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32106; https://t.me/dsns_kyiv_region/19620; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2919; https://t.me/kyivoda/57616; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2920; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/34729; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20331; https://www.facebook.com/DSNSODE/posts/pfbid02DJDREsvSp7K6pNszpow2xmc1oAvWjUbnb4eWA7sHmW7akKM7CNh6QuxgXe3Px4xNl; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1406352-rf-atakuvala-odesu-ta-oblast-poskodzeni-pidpriemstvo-j-budinki-e-travmovani/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/75043; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/67697; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/67698; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/67699; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/67703; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/67705; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/48505; https://suspilne dot media/zhytomyr/1406232-udar-po-civilnomu-pidpriemstvu-na-zitomirsini-pid-cas-trivogi-dvoe-zagiblih-e-postrazdali/; https://www.facebook.com/zhytomyr.police/posts/pfbid02KeoM5MS1jo51owbsw64B9M8t23kLwTNj86wHXJy1ZjGBRYTyHkUH8uVxUk2Yv35pl; https://www.facebook.com/VolodumurMockalenko/posts/pfbid0bf5xx1wQUQ9nHGEuL8C7bSx7fhpDaJoXF3Sx2ZwQrfa9DDyE4KqnGr5R71BQh8J8l; https://www.facebook.com/vitaliy.bunechko/posts/pfbid0RCyEPDAE28f8DTRuCK8we7ux2korLKNcgvMX5njWNgLHXHMeCFo2y4r4CP2uEuPBl?locale=uk_UA; https://www.facebook.com/DSNSZhytomyr/posts/pfbid02h2SfrbnhpfLLerP5dh94QJhqeSpdZLoS3WsXQBxaB3tzq1beVug4KoHNP44obyCHl; https://www.facebook.com/vitaliy.bunechko/posts/pfbid02pSJ194nY3XgXSq3CMJ6GvtaZseZwEWX86eGMbmbNHxtiTEMC3xDkPuPToFGjC7G7l?locale=uk_UA; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/75058
[68] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1406542-rosiani-vdarili-po-elektricci-na-harkivsini-stalasa-pozeza-so-vidomo/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/25770 ; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/30647https://t.me/synegubov/25770
[69] https://t.me/mod_russia/67437; https://t.me/mod_russia/67426; https://t.me/mod_russia/67430; https://t.me/mod_russia/67439
[70] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/17/rosiyany-ne-zdatni-zapustyty-100-reaktyvnyh-shahediv-odnochasno-ekspert-rozkryv-taktyku-yih-zastosuvannya/
[71] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2100914347945984213?s=20
[72] https://www.politico dot eu/article/russia-hits-passenger-trains-to-break-the-backbone-of-ukraines-economy-morale/
[73] https://nordsint dot org/2026/09/17/estimating-russias-banderol-missile-production-numbers/
[74] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-capable-of-producing-up-to-80-banderol-missiles-per-month/
