Toplines
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to greatly exaggerate the extent of Russian advances across the frontline to construct a false narrative of Russian battlefield progress for domestic and international audiences. The unusual MoD statement comes in the midst of Russian State Duma elections and shortly before the convening of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. The Russian MoD claimed on September 19 that Russian forces have seized over 5,300 square kilometers and more than 220 settlements in Ukraine since the start of 2026, including over 670 square kilometers and 27 settlements so far in September 2026.[1] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized only 147.7 square kilometers and 40 settlements, but have lost a net of 20 settlements in 2026. Including areas into which Russian forces have infiltrated but do not control brings the total Russian gains to 718.8 square kilometers this year, still far below the Russian MoD’s September 19 claims. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces, on the other hand, have liberated at least 972.56 square kilometers and 60 settlements in 2026. The Russian MoD’s September 19 claims are part of a longstanding Kremlin effort to use aggrandized claims of battlefield advances to convince Ukraine and its partners that Ukrainian defenses will collapse and that Ukraine should surrender in the face of an allegedly inevitable Russian victory.[2] Exaggerated Russian claims likely also result from the culture of pervasive lying within the Russian military. Ukrainian forces have, in fact, successfully contested both the strategic and the operational initiative since late 2025, having held Russian forces to near-zero gains since March 2026 and having conducted successful counterattacks that have liberated significant amounts of territory in the Kupyansk, Oleksandrivka, and Lyman directions.[3]
The Russian MoD also tried to deny Ukrainian successes in the Lyman direction by presenting an inaccurate picture of the battlefield that denies the ample evidence provided by Russian milbloggers, Ukrainian sources, and geolocated footage. The Russian MoD’s claims were a response to a growing number of Ukrainian officials’ and Russian milbloggers’ reports about Ukrainian successes north of Lyman over the past months during Operation Vivaldi.[4] The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) is successfully conducting combat operations in the Lyman direction and that Ukraine is spreading lies about this part of the battlefield. The Russian MoD claimed that small Ukrainian assault groups are unsuccessfully trying to penetrate Russian lines in the area. The Russian MoD implied that Russian forces have advanced much further northwest of Lyman, claiming that Russian forces are attacking to seize Oskil, Krymky, and Studenok. Ukrainian forces have largely leveled the frontline along the Zherebets River north of Lyman, however, leaving Oskil, Krymky, and Studenok 22 to 37 kilometers from the current assessed Russian forward line of own troops (FLOT). The Russian MoD also claimed that Russian forces are clearing Lyman and Svyatohirsk, implying that Russian forces have already seized these towns. Ukrainian military officials have recently definitively disproven Russian President Vladimir Putin’s September 1 claim that Russian forces had seized Svyatohirsk, and the town is currently 25 kilometers from the assessed Russian FLOT.[5] Similarly, Russian forces have conducted limited infiltrations into Lyman but have failed to consolidate any of those positions.
The Russian MoD’s claims likely aim to shape Russian voters’ perceptions of the war during the ongoing State Duma elections as well as the perceptions of foreign governments that support Ukraine. The Russian MoD’s September 19 post was anomalous, as the MoD does not typically offer claimed statistics about Russian advances at apparently random moments or highlight the alleged successes of each GoF apropos of nothing. The post is part of the Kremlin’s wider effort to promote a narrative that Russian forces are maintaining the initiative across the battlefield and advancing at high rates in order to convince Russians to accept the ever-increasing costs associated with Putin’s war. The MoD statement is a defensive response to the growing chorus of Russian milbloggers, who have large numbers of followers in Russia, about Ukrainian successes in the Lyman direction. This Kremlin information campaign is particularly important in the context of the ongoing September 18-20 Russian State Duma elections, as the Kremlin is trying to position the United Russia party as the party of victory in Ukraine and is presenting the election as a referendum on the war.[6] This Russian information operation likely also aims to convince Western audiences that support for Ukraine is futile just ahead of the annual UN General Assembly sessions that will be held from September 21 through September 28.
Ukrainian forces extensively targeted Russian drone operators as part of their battlefield shaping effort that enabled Ukrainian drone overmatch prior to Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction. Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander Petro Horbatenko stated on September 19 that Ukrainian forces established dedicated coordination channels, conducted a series of strikes against Russian drone launch sites, established air defense and electronic warfare (EW) systems, and severed Russian supply lines in the sector to shape the battlefield ahead of their counteroffensive against the Russian salient north of Lyman.[7] An air defense commander of the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps stated on September 19 that Ukrainian forces prioritized identification and destruction of Russian drone launch sites to counter increasing numbers of Russian reconnaissance and strike drones.[8] The commander stated that Ukrainian strikes on Russian drone operators pushed Russian drone units further away from the frontline and forced Russia’s elite Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems units to relocate the entire force it had deployed in this area to a different sector. Ukraine’s systematic intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Luhansk Oblast disrupted Russian logistics up to 120 kilometers from the frontline and degraded fuel supplies to the frontline, straining Russia’s ability to use drones and EW to protect against Ukrainian drones.[9]
ISW assessed in 2024 that the restoration of operational-level maneuver would require neutralizing the Russian tactical reconnaissance strike complex (TRSC) to facilitate a penetration that Ukrainian forces can exploit, sustainment of these exploitations, and expansion of the campaign design to encompass planning and preparation for successive operations.[10] The TRSC is the expression ISW uses to describe the current system of persistent reconnaissance and strike drones coupled with legacy crewed weapons, artillery, and prepared defenses in depth. Ukrainian forces have successfully incorporated operational planning and battlefield shaping along with achieving surprise by concealing the intent of forces concentrated ostensibly for defensive operations into their offensive template. The Ukrainian mid-range strike campaign isolated Russian frontline forces from reinforcements and supplies. Ukrainian forces established an anti-drone bubble primarily using electronic warfare systems over Ukrainian forces that temporarily disrupted the Russian TRSC and moved with advancing Ukrainian forces. This campaign design is consistent with ISW’s 2024 assessment of how maneuver could be restored in contemporary war.
The US Department of State approved on September 18 the sale of air defense equipment worth $2.68 billion to Ukraine.[11] The sale will provide Ukraine with S-300 Clone missiles, GAM-67 missiles, Range-Extended Air Defense Laser Guided Rocket missile systems, several launch systems, RPS 202 counter-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) radars, and logistical and maintenance support. European contributions and US Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which provides grants and loans to foreign governments to fund the purchase of American defense equipment, will finance the sale if the states conclude the proposed purchases. S-300 Clone missiles are not the standard Soviet 5V55 missiles but are new designs with a modern guidance system and are compatible with Ukraine’s older S-300 air defense systems.[12]
US President Donald Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act on September 18.[13] The act will authorize the United States to impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on the five largest importers of Russian oil and natural gas.
Key Takeaways
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to greatly exaggerate the extent of Russian advances across the frontline to construct a false narrative of Russian battlefield progress for domestic and international audiences. The unusual MoD statement comes in the midst of Russian State Duma elections and shortly before the convening of the United Nations General Assembly in New York.
- The Russian MoD also tried to deny Ukrainian successes in the Lyman direction by presenting an inaccurate picture of the battlefield that denies the ample evidence provided by Russian milbloggers, Ukrainian sources, and geolocated footage.
- The Russian MoD’s claims likely aim to shape Russian voters’ perceptions of the war during the ongoing State Duma elections as well as the perceptions of foreign governments that support Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces extensively targeted Russian drone operators as part of their battlefield-shaping effort that enabled Ukrainian drone overmatch prior to Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction.
- The US Department of State approved on September 18 the sale of air defense equipment worth $2.68 billion to Ukraine.
- US President Donald Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act on September 18.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the eastern Fortress Belt and Oleksandrivka directions, while Russian forces recently advanced in the southern Fortress Belt direction.
- Russia launched two Zirkon anti-ship missiles and 174 drones and loitering munitions at Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian military officials confirmed that recent Ukrainian strikes damaged aircraft and radars in Russia. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on September 19 that Ukrainian forces struck three An-12 and An-25 transport aircraft and three helicopters at the Rostov Airfield, likely on the night of September 16 to 17.[14] Ukrainian open-source Telegram channels assessed that Ukrainian forces destroyed two Mi-8 helicopters, an An-12 aircraft, and an An-26 aircraft at the Rostov Airfield, citing satellite imagery collected on unspecified recent dates.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on September 19 damage to a Russian 80P6 radar station near Mityuli, Smolensk Oblast (roughly 220 kilometers from the international border) from a Ukrainian strike conducted on September 17.[16]
Ukrainian forces have been engaging in a suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign throughout 2026 that has facilitated subsequent intermediate- and long-range strikes against occupied Ukraine and Russia. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on September 19 that Ukrainian forces have destroyed or struck 300 Russian air defense systems since the start of 2026, including 162 air defense systems, 124 radar systems, and 14 electronic warfare (EW) systems.[17]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 18 and 19 but did not advance.[18] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces have been “stuck” at the Korova River near Ryasne (southeast of Sumy city) for a few months and have been suffering from shortages of provisions.[19] The source denied Russian claims that Russian forces have crossed the river from Dronovka, Belgorod Oblast (just southwest of Ryasne across the international border).
Russian forces continue to use glide bombs to strike frontline cities. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted a guided glide bomb strike against a high-rise building in Sumy City on the evening of September 18, killing two people and damaging six residential buildings.[20]
Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Velykyi Burluk direction. Geolocated footage published on September 19 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions west of Vilkhuvatka (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the area contrary to Russian claims.[21]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 18 and 19 but did not advance.[22] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces are beginning infiltration missions toward Nova Kozacha and Tokarivka (both northwest of Kharkiv City).[23] The source claimed that Russian attempts to cross the international border north of Ternova (northeast of Kharkiv City) were “extremely unsuccessful” as Ukrainian drones reconnoitered and struck the Russian infantry from afar.
Russian officials and milbloggers continue to make unsubstantiated claims about an encirclement of Ukrainian forces in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed on September 19 that Russian forces continue to destroy encircled Ukrainian forces in the area and have reduced Ukrainian-controlled territory in the area by 152 square kilometers since September 5.[24] The Russian MoD further claimed on September 19 that Russian forces seized Komisarove and Loshakove (both northeast of Velykyi Burluk in the eastern part of the alleged encirclement).[25] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces are closing the encirclement, with one milblogger assessing that Russian forces aim to seize Khyzhnyakove (between Lukashove and Komisarove) in order to form a “mini-encirclement” to the east and destroy the wider encirclement “piecemeal.”[26] ISW continues to assess that Russian sources are misrepresenting the situation on the ground as there is no evidence of an encirclement in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast.[27]
Russian forces continue efforts to degrade Ukrainian air defense and logistics infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed on September 19 that Russian forces conducted Geran-type drone strikes against Ukrainian 35D6 and P-18 radar stations in unspecified areas of Kharkiv Oblast and a Geran-4 Seeker drone strike against a logistics center in Kurortne (just north of Kharkiv City).[28]
Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 18 and 19 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Kupyansk.[29]
Russian forces may try to cross the shallow areas of the Oskil River near Kupyansk in order to expand their presence on the western side of the river. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on September 19 that the water level of the Oskil River has recently lowered notably near Kupyansk, allowing Russian forces to ford it in certain areas.[30] Ukrainian Joint Forces Group Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov recently stated that there are no active Russian crossings over the river but that Russian forces in some areas hold positions on both sides of the river.[31]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Borova direction on September 18 or 19.
Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest
Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements
See topline text for more information about the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Lyman tactical area.
Russian forces continued offensive operations east, north, and southeast of Lyman on September 18 and 19 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[32]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east
Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements
Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Slovyansk. Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander Petro Horbatenko stated on September 19 that Ukrainian forces cleared Rai-Oleksandrivka, which Russian forces had previously infiltrated.[33]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south
Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements
Russian forces recently advanced in Kostyantynivka. Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Kostyantynivka based on geolocated footage published on September 18.[34]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest
Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk and Dobropillya directions on September 18 and 19 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[35] The Russian MoD claimed on September 19 that Russian forces seized Hulive (southwest of Dobropillya) and Marivka (northeast of Dobropillya), but ISW has not observed any visual evidence of Russian positions in either settlement.[36]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline and intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on September 18 or on the night of September 18 to 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point in Pokrovsk, a logistics depot in Rybynske (roughly 77 kilometers from the frontline), and an ammunition depot in Amvrosiivka (roughly 95 kilometers from the frontline).[37]
Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 18 and 19.[38] Russian milbloggers claimed on September 19 that Russian forces advanced to southeastern Novopavlivka.[39]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Oleksandrivka. Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Solodke (southeast of Oleksandrivka), based on geolocated footage published on September 18.[40]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr Grouping of Forces
Russian forces are attempting to bypass Ukraine’s heavily fortified positions around Orikhiv through the Hulyaipole direction. A spokesperson for the Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces stated on September 19 that the Ukrainian military command assigned the Hulyaipole direction to the 7th Rapid Reaction Corps’ area of responsibility (AoR).[41] The spokesperson stated that the Hulyaipole direction is one of the most important and intense sectors along the southern frontline, noting that the area is less urban and features more open terrain, making it harder to mass forces. The spokesperson stated that the Russian 5th and 35th Combined Arms Armies (both Eastern Military District [EMD] and part of the Eastern Grouping of Forces) are conducting offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction with the objective of bypassing Ukrainian defensive positions around Orikhiv.[42] Polevyi stated that Russian forces are attempting to bypass Mala Tokmachka (southwest of Hulyaipole and southeast of Orikhiv) from the northeast to eventually reach the outskirts of Zaporizhzhia City. The spokesperson added that Russian forces have likely amassed a sufficient number of armored vehicles to reinforce Russian infantry and conduct tactical-level mechanized assaults where Russian forces “have at least some small tactical successes.”
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 18 and 19 but did not make confirmed advances.[43] Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) People’s Militia representative Lieutenant Colonel Andrey Marochko claimed that Russian forces seized the southern outskirts of Orikhiv, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are operating in the central part of the town.[44]
Ukrainian forces conducted multiple frontline strikes in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to degrade Russian forces’ drone capabilities. Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone ground control stations near Volodymyrivka (likely the settlement roughly 20 kilometers from the frontline), Verbove (roughly nine kilometers from the frontline), Novoprokopivka (roughly eight kilometers from the frontline), Dobropillya (along the frontline northwest of Hulyaipole), and Rivnopillya (roughly five kilometers from the frontline) on September 18 or the night of September 18 to 19, according to the Ukrainian General Staff.[45] Ukrainian forces also struck the Vostochny Training Ground in Novopetrivka, Zaporizhia Oblast (roughly 70 kilometers from the frontline).
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck an unidentified facility in occupied Melitopol (roughly 64 kilometers from the frontline), possibly a fuel facility or electrical substation, according to geolocated footage published on September 18.[46]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 19.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[47]
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 18 to 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Zirkon anti-ship missiles from Kursk Oblast and 174 Shahed-type strike drones (about half of which were jet-powered), Gerbera-type strike drones, Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[48] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces mainly targeted Odesa and Kyiv oblasts; that Ukrainian forces downed 141 air targets, including three Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions and 138 drones; that an unspecified number of air targets hit 15 locations; and that debris fell at nine locations. The Ukrainian Air Force clarified that an unspecified number of missiles did not reach their targets. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck medical, industrial, business, and administrative infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, and Odesa oblasts and conducted a “double tap” strike against rescue workers in Odesa City.[49] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck logistics centers in Kyiv and Odesa oblasts; dry cargo ships and tanker-type vessels in the Chornomorsk and Odesa City ports; and a launch command post at Voznesensk Air Base in Mykolaiv Oblast.[50] Ukraine’s largest energy company, DTEK, reported on September 19 that over 178,000 families were without power in Odesa Oblast after large-scale Russian strikes on the region.[51]
Russian forces conducted a Banderol strike against civilian infrastructure in Balakliya, Kharkiv Oblast on the morning of September 19.[52] Russian forces also conducted a strike against a shopping center in Dnipro City on the afternoon of September 19, and various Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces used a ballistic missile, a Dan-T loitering munition, or Geran-type drones for the strike.[53]
Russian forces likely continue to target bridges in Odesa Oblast that Ukraine has been using as alternative export routes in the face of Russia’s strike campaign against Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck a pontoon crossing over the Dnister River connecting the Izmail Port in Odesa Oblast to Romania overnight on September 18 to 19.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck a bridge across the Dnister near Mayaki, Odesa Oblast (east of Izmail) with about 15 Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions and five glide bombs.[55] It is unclear if the milblogger is referring to the same reported strike as the Russian MoD.
The Ukrainian defense industrial base continues to make progress toward developing and deploying interceptors capable of downing faster jet-powered Russian drones. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky posted footage on September 19 showing a Ukrainian interceptor drone downing a Russian jet-powered Geran-5 drone.[56] Ukrainian drone manufacturer Wild Hornets reported that one of its Ukrainian Sting S interceptor drones also successfully intercepted a Russian jet drone.[57] Zelensky reported that this was the second successful deployment of a new Ukrainian interceptor drone against Russian jet-powered drones.[58]
Russian forces have been increasingly leveraging repurposed S-400 missiles to compensate for shortfalls in ballistic missile stockpiles, as ISW previously assessed.[59] Russian forces significantly increased their use of RM48U missiles – repurposed training missiles for S-400 air defense systems that fly on ballistic trajectories at high speeds – during the summer, according to official Ukrainian data that Reuters observed.[60] Russian forces launched two to 15 RM48U missiles between January and June 2026 before launching 87 in July — 55 percent of the total 158 ballistic and hypersonic missiles Russian forces launched in July. The number of Russian-launched Iskander missiles fell to 38 in July and August, down from more than 100 in June 2026, according to Ukraine’s General Prosecutor’s Office. The RM48U reportedly deviates about 300 meters on average from its intended target, which has likely caused higher civilian casualties in the last few months.
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/67456
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2026/
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/
[4] https://t.me/mod_russia/67456
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-7-2026/; https://t.me/ab3army/7443
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2026/;
[7] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1407348-se-e-zvilneni-sela-sili-oboroni-prodovzuut-operaciu-vivaldi-na-pivnoci-doneccini-nacstabu-tretogo-korpusu/
[8] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/ppo-3-ak-zmusyla-rubikon-zminyty-dilyanku/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Ukraine20and20the20Problem20of20Restoring20Maneuver20in20Contemporary20War_final.pdf
[11] https://www.state.gov/releases/bureau-of-political-military-affairs/2026/09/ukraine-air-defense-development-upgrade/
[12] https://en dot defence-ua.com/news/what_is_known_about_s_300_clone_gam_67_missiles_in_268_billion_us_aid_package_for_ukraine-19832.html; https://www.war.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/3896714/opening-remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-at-the-24th-ukraine/; https://euromaidanpress dot com/2026/09/19/what-are-s-300-clone-and-gam-67-in-americas-new-2-68-billion-package-for-ukraine-experts-think-they-have-answer/; https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/retired-army-colonel-explains-why-patriot-missiles-are-so-valuable-and-in-short-supply
[13] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2026/09/congressional-bill-h-r-5334-signed-into-law/; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/house-passes-russia-sanctions-bill-named-lindsey-graham-sending-trump-rcna598124;
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2026/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/09/19/rosiya-vtrachaye-milyardy-dolariv-vnaslidok-ukrayinskyh-dip-i-midlstrajkiv-pidsumky-chergovyh-udariv-vid-minoborony/; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1568990747631441; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/suputnykovi-znimky-znyshhennya-my-an-rostov/#google_vignette
[15] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13512; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8171
[16] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42298
[17] https://x.com/414magyarbirds/status/2101296050187256271
[18] https://t.me/dva_majors/99196; https://t.me/severnnyi/9365; https://t.me/wargonzo/37042 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9369
[19] https://t.me/severnnyi/9369
[20] https://t.me/serhii_kryvosheienko/2314; https://t.me/serhii_kryvosheienko/2315; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20945; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/44876; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1407184-armia-rf-vlucila-po-sumah-2/; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1407214-u-sumah-zaginuli-pracivniki-miskradi-roman-trepalin-ta-alla-kornienko/, https://t.me/serhii_kryvosheienko/2317
[21] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/22049; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13003
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42291; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42293
[23] https://t.me/severnnyi/9365
[24] https://t.me/mod_russia/67456
[25] https://t.me/mod_russia/67460;
[26] https://t.me/sashakots/64535; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47773; https://t.me/arx_spn/31145; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56045;
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/
[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/67468; https://t.me/mod_russia/67477
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42291; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42293; https://t.me/rybar/83263; https://t.me/severnnyi/9365
[30] https://t.me/grvZapad/19816
[31] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2026/
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42291 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42293 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/99196 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37042 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19816
[33] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1407348-se-e-zvilneni-sela-sili-oboroni-prodovzuut-operaciu-vivaldi-na-pivnoci-doneccini-nacstabu-tretogo-korpusu/
[34] https://t.me/soniah_hub/18269 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/38376
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42291; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42293; https://t.me/wargonzo/37042; https://t.me/epoddubny/29130
[36] https://t.me/mod_russia/67462 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/67463
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42298
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42291; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42293
[39] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56041; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47771
[40] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2101047205670854707; https://t.me/mod_russia/67446
[41] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/19/somyj-korpus-dshv-pryjnyav-novu-smugu-oborony-desantnyky-teper-voyuyut-na-gulyajpilskomu-napryamku/; https://youtu.be/E0-JZ3ixHKU
[42] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/19/v-obhid-maloyi-tokmachky-rosiyany-kynuly-na-zaporizhzhya-odrazu-2-armiyi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E0-JZ3ixHKU
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42291; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42293; https://t.me/rybar/83263; https://t.me/wargonzo/37042; https://t.me/dva_majors/99196; https://t.me/dva_majors/99207
[44] https://t.me/tass_agency/396125; https://t.me/dva_majors/99207
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42298
[46] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2101042356749230288; https://t.me/luftwaffe422/1170
[47] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[48] https://t.me/kpszsu/78956
[49] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32116; https://t.me/astrapress/125594; https://t.me/khmelnytskaODA/11480; https://www.facebook.com/suziria.ukraine/posts/pfbid0349zxZQhmfTeidCaBitsTYJYLHAkyZqT6QLgpthQEms4Q65MrEjKm5jhf886VqM2yl; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2921; https://t.me/kyivoda/57795; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2923; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/75117; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20360; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20372; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20425; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/63563; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3297; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3298; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3299; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3301
[50] https://t.me/mod_russia/67453; https://t.me/mod_russia/67468; https://t.me/mod_russia/67477; https://t.me/mod_russia/67475
[51] https://t.me/dtek_ua/4540
[52] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/30665
[53] https://t.me/borys_filatovv/3604; https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/2101329381893312783?s=20; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/78701; https://t.me/dva_majors/99246; https://t.me/notes_veterans/29893; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/123601 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/179798 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/75283; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/75290
[54] https://t.me/mod_russia/67453
[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47764
[56] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20960; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/reaktyvnyj-dron-perehoplyuvach-geran-5/
[57] https://x.com/wilendhornets/status/2101304449289363650?s=20
[58] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2101353001461993958
[59] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2026/
[60] https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-russia-war/revamped-missile-leading-russias-ballistic-onslaught-ukraine-2026-09-18/
