Toplines
The Kremlin is downplaying Viktor Orban’s election defeat as Russia loses a key European ally. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban conceded defeat after 16 years in power to Hungarian lawyer Peter Magyar, who won an overwhelming victory for the opposition Tisza party, securing over two-thirds of Hungarian parliamentary seats.[1]Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told a Russian journalist on April 13 that the Kremlin will not congratulate Magyar as Hungary remains an “unfriendly country” that supports sanctions against Russia.[2] Peskov told a journalist on the Russian state TV program Vesti on April 13 that relations between Russia and the European Union (EU) cannot worsen after Hungary’s elections, as they are already at rock bottom.[3] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov emphasized that Russia is ready to build a relationship with the new Hungarian government, depending on how the Hungarian government “understands its own national interests.”[4] Prominent Russian milbloggers expressed mixed reactions ranging from downplaying Orban’s defeat and questioning his alignment with Russia to voicing concerns that the Kremlin has lost its main ally in the EU, who vetoed decisions unfavorable to Russia.[5] Orban consistently opposed and undermined the EU’s efforts to provide military and financial assistance to Ukraine, aligning with the Kremlin’s interests, and Russian President Vladimir Putin personally endorsed Orban in the 2026 Hungarian parliamentary election.[6] The Kremlin is likely downplaying the loss of its key ally in Europe to project confidence that Ukraine will still face pressure to accept Russia’s terms to end the war.
An open-source analysis of Russian contract recruitment reports that Russian recruitment continues to decline as battlefield casualties rise, consistent with other indicators of Russian recruiting and manpower challenges that ISW has observed. German Institute for International and Security Affairs economist Janis Kluge assessed on April 12 based on an analysis of the budgets of Russian federal subjects that Russian forces recruited between 800 and 1,000 soldiers a day in the first quarter of 2026 (between January 1 and March 31, 2026), compared to 1,000 to 1,200 a day in the first quarter of 2025, a 20 percent decrease year-over-year.[7] Kluge noted that regional increases in one-time signing bonuses failed to prevent slowing recruitment despite average signing bonuses reaching a record high of 1.47 million rubles (roughly $19,300) in March 2026. Kluge also assessed, based on Russian Finance Ministry data, that Russian authorities paid compensation to the families of around 25,000 killed Russian soldiers in the first quarter of 2026, compared to around 20,000 killed in the first quarter of 2025 and almost 10,000 in the first quarter of 2024. Kluge extrapolated these total compensation figures from data from 17 Russian federal subjects. ISW is unable to verify the underlying data and conclusions in Kluge’s analysis, but his conclusions are consistent with multiple other indicators that ISW has observed that Russia is increasingly suffering recruiting and manpower challenges, such as reported recruiting shortfalls relative to casualties, the commitment of strategic reserves, increased signing bonuses, and expanded covert mobilization efforts.[8] Ukraine’s “I Want to Live” initiative reported on April 6 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recruited 940 soldiers a day for a total of roughly 80,456 in the first three months of 2026, fewer than the 1,100 to 1,150 soldiers a day that it would need to recruit to be on track to meet its 2026 recruiting target of 409,000 contract soldiers, and insufficient to replace the roughly 85,290 casualties that Ukrainian General Staff data indicates that Russian forces suffered during the same period.[9] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces have likely begun committing strategic reserves to the battlefield to compensate for mounting casualties and successful Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions as of April 10.[10] ISW has also observed reports that at least 12 Russian federal subjects increased signing bonuses by between 50 and 80 percent since mid-February 2026, and that Russian forces have also recently intensified their forced covert mobilization effort to businesses and universities.[11]
Russian and Ukrainian officials issued competing Orthodox Easter ceasefire violation accusations, demonstrating the challenges of implementing a sustainable ceasefire without clearly defined terms, monitoring mechanisms, and dispute resolution mechanisms. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 13 that Russian forces violated the ceasefire 10,721 times, including launching 119 ground assaults, 1,567 artillery strikes, 2,205 Italmas-type strike drones, Lancet loitering munition, and Molniya-type fixed-wing first-person view drone strikes, and 6,830 other FPV drone strikes.[12] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces violated the ceasefire 6,558 times, including launching five ground assaults, 5,844 artillery strikes, and 694 drone strikes, and claimed that Russian air defenses downed 11 Ukrainian drones over Belgorod and Kursk Oblasts during the ceasefire.[13] Kherson Occupation Governor Vladimir Saldo claimed that Ukraine struck civilian and residential infrastructure in occupied Stara Zubrivka and Zaliznyi Port, Kherson Oblast, at 0400 local time on April 12, after the ceasefire took effect at 1600 local time on April 11.[14] Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets reported on April 12 that Russian forces executed four Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) near Veterynarne, Kharkiv Oblast, and a Ukrainian evacuation group near Hulyaipilske, Zaporizhia Oblast after the ceasefire began on April 11.[15] The prevalence of mutual accusations and continued localized activity from the early hours of the ceasefire highlights the fact that ceasefires without explicit enforcement mechanisms, credible monitoring, and defined dispute resolution processes are unlikely to hold.[16] Any durable cessation of hostilities will require both sides to establish clear terms, implement third-party monitoring systems, and withdraw forces from the line of contact to reduce the risk of violations and escalation.
Kremlin officials may be continuing to set rhetorical conditions to engage in operations in the airspace of Finland and the Baltic states. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev claimed to Russian state-run newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta on April 13 that the Baltic states and Finland allowed Ukrainian drones to fly through their airspace and that such actions signify direct NATO participation in strikes against Russia.[17] Patrushev’s statements may signal that Russian forces plan to violate the airspace of Finland and the Baltic states in retaliation for allegedly allowing Ukrainian strike drones to use their airspace.
Key Takeaways
- The Kremlin is downplaying Viktor Orban’s election defeat as Russia loses a key European ally.
- An open-source analysis of Russian contract recruitment reports that Russian recruitment continues to decline as battlefield casualties rise, consistent with other indicators of Russian recruiting and manpower challenges that ISW has observed.
- Russian and Ukrainian officials issued competing Orthodox Easter ceasefire violation accusations, demonstrating the challenges of implementing a sustainable ceasefire without clearly defined terms, monitoring mechanisms, and dispute resolution mechanisms.
- Kremlin officials may be continuing to set rhetorical conditions to engage in operations in the airspace of Finland and the Baltic states.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction. Russian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.
- Ukrainian forces may have continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian defense industrial infrastructure. Russian forces launched 98 drones against Ukraine.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces may have continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian defense industrial infrastructure overnight on April 12 to 13. Geolocated footage published on April 13 shows fires at the Cherepovets Azot Plant in Cherepovets, Vologda Oblast, after a reported Ukrainian drone strike.[18] The plant reportedly has a total production capacity of 900,000 tons of ammonia per year.[19] Vologda Oblast Governor Georgy Filimonov claimed on April 13 that Russian forces downed 13 drones that approached the Cherepovets industrial zone overnight.[20]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on April 13 but did not make confirmed advances.
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on April 12 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian servicemembers east of Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[21]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into eastern Novodmytrivka (southeast of Sumy City).[22]
Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Korchakivka, Kostyantynivka, and Kindrativka, and southeast of Sumy City near Novodmytrivka and toward Taratutyne on April 12 and 13.[23] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Mala Korchakivka (north of Sumy City) and near Myropilske (east of Sumy City).[24]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on April 13 that Russian small group infiltrators are unable to control large areas of forest in northern Sumy Oblast due to frequent Ukrainian counterattacks and warned that it is premature to claim a near-term seizure of Krasnopillya (southeast of Sumy City).[25]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 15th Tank Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), the 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]), and the 74th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Myropillya.[26]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 13 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Veterynarne (north of Kharkiv City).[27]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Zybyne, Vovchansk, Synelnykove, Starytsya, Izbytske, Lyman, and Tsehelne on April 12 and 13.[28]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Department from Kurchaloyevsky Raion, Republic of Chechnya, the 128th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), the 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD), and the 116th Rosgvardia Special Purpose Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Vovchanski Khutory (northeast of Kharkiv City).[29] Drone operators of the pro-Russian Chechen Sheikh Mansur volunteer battalion (subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[30]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on April 13.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 13 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Podoly, and southeast of Kupyansk near Kurylivka and toward Novoosynove on April 12 and 13.[31] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Kurylivka.[32]
Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Borova toward Novoplatonivka and northeast of Borova toward Zahryzove on April 12 and 13 but did not advance.[33]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Lyman.[34]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Lypivka and Fedorivka-Druha (both southeast of Slovyansk).[35] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern and northeastern Lyman, south of Ozerne, and west of Kryva Luka (both southeast of Lyman).[36]
Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve and Yarova; north of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; southeast of Lyman toward Ozerne; south of Lyman near Dibrova; northeast of Slovyansk toward Staryi Karavan; southeast of Slovyansk near Fedorivka Druha; and east of Slovyansk near Kalenyky and Riznykivka and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka on April 12 and 13.[37]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are shelling Ukrainian forces in Lyman.[38] Artillery crews of the 2nd Artillery Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly shelling Ukrainian forces near Rai-Oleksandrivka.[39] Molniya drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Shrama Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kryva Luka.[40] Elements of the 123rd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Rai-Oleksandrivka.[41] Elements of the 254th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[42]
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on April 11 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions within and south of Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assessed were both Russian infiltration missions that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[43]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in southwestern and southern Kostyantynivka and southwest of Illinivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[44]
Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Markove and toward Tykhonivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Novopavlivka on April 12 and 13.[45]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are striking Ukrainian forces in northern Kostyantynivka.[46] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Druzhkivka direction, including near Novomykolaivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[47] Elements of the 77th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD), the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division), the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA), and the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) reportedly continue to operate in the Kostyantynivka direction.[48]
Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on April 12 and 13 but did not advance.[49]
Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[50]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on April 13 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zatyshok; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Molodetske on April 12 and 13.[51]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself and northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka on April 12 and 13 but did not advance.[52]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 12 shows Ukrainian forces shelling an ammunition cache in southeastern Berezove (southeast of Oleksandrivka), indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the settlement.[53]
Assessed Russian infiltrations: The geolocated footage published on April 12 indicates that Russian forces likely operate beyond the immediate area around the ammunition cache in Berezove.[54] ISW assesses that this event did not change the control of terrain or the FEBA at this time.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai and Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad and Sichneve; and southeast of Oleksandrivka toward Kalynivske, Verbove, Vorone, and Novohryhorivka on April 12 and 13.[55]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Orestopil (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[56] Elements of the 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[57]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces recently infiltrated in the Hulyaipole direction.
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on April 12 shows Russian forces operating southeast and southwest of Nove Zaporizhzhia during what ISW assesses were both Russian infiltration missions that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[58] Geolocated footage published on April 12 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember south of Kosivtseve after what ISW assesses was also a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the FEBA.[59]
Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Varvarivka; southwest of Hulyaipole near Hulyaipilske and Myrne and toward Charivne; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and Hirke and toward Staroukrainka on April 12 and 13.[60]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[61] Elements of the 57th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Zaporizhia direction.[62]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 13 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk on April 13.[63]
Ukrainian forces continued to clear Stepnohirsk and destroy Russian equipment near the settlement. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on April 13 that Ukrainian forces are clearing Stepnohirsk and have recently destroyed over 20 armored vehicles, including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and electronic warfare equipment.[64] GUR reported that Russian forces have concentrated elite first-person view (FPV) units near Stepnohirsk but that Ukrainian forces maintain air superiority in the area.
Russian forces continue limited ground operations east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge and southwest of Kherson City toward Bilohrudyi Island on April 13 but did not advance.[65]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces resumed their long-range drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 12 to 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 98 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones, of which about 65 were Shaheds, from the directions of Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[66] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 87 drones, that nine drones struck nine locations, and that downed debris fell on one location. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged residential infrastructure in Kharkiv and Zaporizhia oblasts and an unspecified infrastructure facility in Kirovohrad Oblast.[67] Chernihiv Oblast energy operator Chernihiv Oblenergo reported that Russian strikes against an energy facility in Chernihiv Raion left 12,000 residents without power.[68]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing Significant To Report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cd9vg782kx7o
[2] https://t.me/Yunashev_Live/107584
[3] https://tass dot ru/politika/27090719
[4] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2094212/
[5] https://t.me/sashakots/61080; https://t.me/dva_majors/91198; https://t.me/tenirusi/6606; https://t.me/notes_veterans/27580;
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_6-5/; https://tass dot ru/politika/25237541
[7] https://janiskluge.substack.com/p/russian-recruitment-fell-by-20-in
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2026/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/
[12] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37227
[13] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/27088219; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/27088225; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/27088327; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/27088233; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/27088213
[14] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/14766
[15] https://t.me/dmytro_lubinetzs/11441 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2026/
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2026/
[17] https://rg dot ru/2026/04/13/piraty-xxi-veka.html
[18] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12792; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/18704; https://t.me/supernova_plus/50473; https://x.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/2043657278515982537; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2043661585563164938; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2043666296215363876; https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/2043659570250207706; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2043667827840974921 https://t.me/exilenova_plus/18704; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/18703
[19] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12792
[20] https://t.me/filimonov_official/35874
[21] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11681; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1444912164316179
[22] https://t.me/rybar/79450
[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37250; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37227; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37224; https://t.me/uvkkursk/316; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/71760
[24] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/71760
[25] https://t.me/rybar/79450
[26] https://t.me/severnnyi/7551
[27] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/206844
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37250; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37227 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20447; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37224
[29] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6503
[30] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6501
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37250 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37227 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20447 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37224 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33490 ; https://t.me/gvZapad/18300 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/91193
[32] https://t.me/gvZapad/18300
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37250 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37227 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20447 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37224
[34] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042986297942253842; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1276588714604059/
[35] https://t.me/rybar/79477
[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/206844; https://t me/DnevnikDesantnika/41841; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/206903
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37250; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37227 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20447; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37224; https://t.me/wargonzo/33490; https://t.me/gvZapad/18300; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41841; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/206903; https://t.me/rybar/79477
[38] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2043452631033807039; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2043452633084793067; https://t.me/Molodoy_37_msp/56;
[39] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/206856
[40] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6502
[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41841
[42] https://t.me/gvZapad/18304
[43] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042986297942253842; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1276588714604059/ ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042986869810462746;
[44] https://t.me/rybar/79474 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41838
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37250 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37227 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37224 ; https://t.me/rybar/79474 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41838
[46] https://t.me/Osintpen/2775; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/1355; https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2043697315710427612
[47] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15235 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/91183
[48] https://t.me/dva_majors/91189 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/91201 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/113008 ; https://t.me/Bahmut_Klehseevka/4709; https://t.me/motopatriot78/50627;
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37250 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37227 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37224
[50] https://t.me/mamayagivoi/14887; https://t.me/motopatriot78/50625;
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37250 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37227 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37224
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37250 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37227 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37224
[53] https://x.com/meowqai/status/2043332406782968201; https://www.facebook.com/reel/2001717850701580
[54] https://x.com/meowqai/status/2043332406782968201; https://www.facebook.com/reel/2001717850701580
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37250; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37227; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37224
[56] https://t.me/voin_dv/19250
[57] https://t.me/voin_dv/19248
[58] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2043410461794939023; https://www.facebook.com/reel/24833569116341144 ; https://x.com/davinci_army/status/2043343385180746152?s=20; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2043451208804041016
[59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11684 ; https://t.me/assaultregiment33/2780 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2043620061307715777
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37250 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37227 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37224
[61] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/206797
[62] https://t.me/voin_dv/19246
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37250; https://t.me/dva_majors/91193
[64] https://t.me/DIUkraine/8211
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37250
[66] https://t.me/kpszsu/59863
[67] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/28206 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/13/pislya-velykodnogo-peremyrya-vorozhi-bezpilotnyky-vdaryly-po-bogoduhovu-ye-rujnuvannya/ ; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/28226 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/13/vorozhi-bpla-vdaryly-po-pidpryyemstvu-v-dergachah-poraneno-praczivnykiv/ ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/38088 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/61614 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/13/vnochi-okupanty-zavdaly-udary-po-obyektu-infrastruktury-na-kirovogradshhyni/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/109604 ; https://www.facebook.com/andriy.raykovich/posts/pfbid02ARoLADC5v32Ma7nfhgAHL9TaVNBfrpkuZK2mawq3nFGySEWxqJ2ETbRTGsD8XFW9l?__cft__[0]=AZYm3GCdEW90ZYHv0sLddwXEwX2fbgbn9TVtUvfdotnOgzwTWIIpEQ-XeUY0DPMZXtddWE2sKcl6EG4LPSHQmzNjznjjeqvgAwp49WfvK95aoSrCivS3EFFJ3hebE8WbuakCB4oUyFQQAiZIe8QzTFglei6EKjjJDJf5k8ank9rDWQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://suspilne dot media/kropyvnytskiy/1287733-na-kirovogradsini-vnaslidok-dronovoi-ataki-rf-vinikla-pozeza/
[68]https://www.facebook.com/chernihiv.oblenergo.1998/posts/pfbid02jDuq2qmfVHhYUih61QoQGgraSvAC35UbHSACHP2SXegR5rsKouWLx3nGWWCm4Wg5l?__cft__[0]=AZZbSKvwfYzpj9gwRNfYqBM749wMCUp9ibxn2GLLrnkbJzlciGImojT8qBGQ-n2j_t6NLpoCxnroMO0_5SaN37djo0czVrN2VaOuy_GBIHBW1aQjn3JPqNvnZtHuNR46Vy_63o7MHFHbM9pibvn3udZXVbN2zgDnlzCsfkod8NzmBA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1287717-kinec-velikodnego-peremira-rosiani-vnoci-atakuvali-energoobekt-v-cernigivskomu-rajoni/ ; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/28550
