Toplines
Russia maintains expansive territorial goals in Ukraine beyond demands for Ukraine’s withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa told Ukrainian news agency RBK-Ukraine on April 8 that Russian forces have ambitious battlefield plans for 2026 and beyond, but that Russian forces have not set preconditions for any operational-level frontlines changes and lack the strength to carry out such plans.[1] Palisa reported that Russian forces will mainly focus on seizing the remainder of Donbas and intensify efforts in the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area in 2026. Palisa stated that Russia’s military objectives include creating a buffer zone along the northern Ukrainian-Russian border in Kharkiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv oblasts; setting conditions to seize the entirety of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts; and seizing Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts in the long term. Palisa also noted that Russia is planning for the first time to create a buffer zone in Ukraine’s southwestern Vinnytsia Oblast from the territory of Transnistria — the pro-Russian Moldovan parastate. Palisa emphasized that Russian forces currently lack the offensive capabilities to accomplish any of these goals, however. Palisa previously assessed in June 2025 that Russian forces aimed to seize an operationally significant area of Donetsk Oblast by September 1, 2025; the rest of Kherson Oblast and a buffer zone in northern and southern Ukraine by the end of 2025; and all land east of the Dnipro River in northern and eastern Ukraine and most of Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts by the end of 2026.[2] Russian forces have failed to complete any of these reported operational objectives as of April 2026 and have thus far been unable to restore operational maneuver to the battlefield, which would be a prerequisite for making the operationally-significant breakthroughs required to meet these objectives.[3]
Palisa’s reporting on Russia’s military plans for 2026 aligns with ISW’s long-standing assessment that Russia maintains expansive territorial objectives in Ukraine. The Kremlin regularly claims that Russia “needs” to create a buffer zone in northern Ukraine, signaling broader territorial demands and setting conditions to later demand that Ukraine cede some or all of this territory, including in oblasts where Russian forces have minimal to no military presence.[4] Kremlin officials routinely invoke the Kremlin’s concept of “Novorossiya” — an amorphous region in southern and eastern Ukraine that extends beyond Crimea and the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed — to justify ever-expanding Russian territorial ambitions in eastern and southern Ukraine.[5] Russian officials have also previously characterized Kharkiv and Odesa as “Russian” cities.[6] Russia’s purported desire to extend a buffer zone to Vinnytsia Oblast aligns with the broader rhetorical pattern of Russian officials making claims to Ukrainian territory beyond Donbas and undermines the Russian narrative that negotiations over an end to the war are solely hinged on Ukraine ceding Donetsk Oblast.[7]
Ukrainian technological adaptations and drone innovations continue to grant Ukraine tactical and operational leverage as Russian forces suffer from high casualties. Palisa reported that Russian forces suffered 316 casualties per square kilometer of advance in Donetsk Oblast in the first quarter of 2026 (roughly from January 1 to March 31, 2026).[8] Palisa stated that Russian forces suffered roughly 120 casualties per square kilometer of advance across the theater in 2025 and roughly 160 casualties per square kilometer of advance in the Pokrovsk direction alone in 2025. Palisa reported that Ukrainian forces have broadly regained numerical drone superiority over Russian forces on the frontline and now have 1.3 strike drones to every one Russian strike drone. Palisa noted that Russian forces do maintain the quantitative advantage in some areas where they are concentrating offensive operations, however. Palisa added that 32 percent of Ukrainian drones are electronic warfare (EW)-resistant fiber-optic drones, compared to 24 percent of Russian drones. Palisa also noted that Ukraine’s mid-range strike campaign against Russian drone launch sites and infrastructure, including strikes against occupied Donetsk City Airport and drone repeaters in occupied Crimea, has prevented Russian forces from launching ”up to 1,000 drones” simultaneously and has forced Russian forces to stagger drone launches throughout the day. Ukraine’s defensive successes, drone adaptations, and mid-range strike campaign are evidently creating compounding effects which are degrading both Russian frontline forces and Russia’s long-range strike campaign. Recent Ukrainian advances in southern Ukraine since late January 2026 have also created cascading operational effects on the frontline that have forced Russian forces to choose between defending against Ukrainian counterattacks or allocating manpower and resources to other sectors of the frontline.[9] Ukraine’s recent successes are accomplishing tactical, operational, and strategic battlespace effects that undermine the Russian narrative that the Ukrainian frontlines are on the verge of collapse.[10]
The Kremlin continues to engage in a coordinated information effort designed to elevate nuclear escalation rhetoric, likely in an attempt to drive a wedge between the United States and the European Union. The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed on April 8 that unspecified EU leaders are having discussions about developing EU nuclear weapons production capabilities.[11] The SVR specifically claimed that Russia is bringing this accusation to the attention of the United States for help to prevent the EU from developing nuclear weapons. The SVR appears to be making these baseless accusations as part of the Kremlin’s continued effort to fracture US-EU relations to Russia’s benefit by portraying the EU as acting counter to US nuclear interests. The Kremlin frequently uses the SVR to bolster baseless claims about Ukraine’s alleged nuclear aspirations and to make nuclear threats against Ukraine, the UK, and France.[12] The SVR similarly accused the UK and France in February 2026 without evidence of attempting to transfer a ”dirty bomb” or nuclear weapon to Ukraine, likely to disrupt the ongoing discussions about Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[13]
The Kremlin may be leveraging its “Time of Heroes” program to replace the Belgorod Oblast governor with a veteran of the war in Ukraine as part of a wider effort to staff government positions with a cadre of loyal veterans. A local Belgorod Oblast Telegram channel reported on April 8, citing unspecified sources, that Russian authorities may replace Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov with Irkutsk Oblast Deputy Governor Major General Alexander Shuvayev, after initial reports on April 7 suggested that the Kremlin may be replacing Gladkov.[14] The Telegram channel noted that Shuvayev previously commanded the 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) in Ukraine. An unnamed source told Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazata Europe that Shuvayev could replace Gladkov as early as April 13.[15] Russian opposition outlet Meduza, citing a source close to the Russian Presidential Administration, noted that the Kremlin has not finalized its decision to replace Gladkov as he retains a relatively high approval ratings in Belgorod Oblast.[16] Gladkov has notably been outwardly critical of the impacts of the internet and Telegram shutdowns in the Belgorod Oblast border area, and the Kremlin may seek to replace Gladkov with someone the Kremlin deems loyal.[17] The Kremlin has been engaged in a concerted effort to appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine to local, municipal, regional, and federal positions to serve the dual purposes of reintegrating servicemen into Russian society to mitigate the social impacts of their return and bolstering civil-military relations in an effort to sustain support for the war.[18] The Kremlin first appointed a Time of Heroes program participant to a federal-level position in November 2024 when Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Yevgeny Pervyshov as Acting Head of Tambov Oblast.[19] The Kremlin may replace Gladkov with Shuvayev as part of its long-term effort to militarize Russian society and form a new cadre of loyal Russian officials ahead of the September 2026 elections.[20]
Key Takeaways
- Russia maintains expansive territorial goals in Ukraine beyond demands for Ukraine’s withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast.
- Ukrainian technological adaptations and drone innovations continue to grant Ukraine tactical and operational leverage as Russian forces suffer from high casualties.
- The Kremlin continues to engage in a coordinated information effort designed to elevate nuclear escalation rhetoric, likely in an attempt to drive a wedge between the United States and the European Union.
- The Kremlin may be leveraging its “Time of Heroes” program to replace the Belgorod Oblast governor with a veteran of the war in Ukraine as part of a wider effort to staff government positions with a cadre of loyal veterans.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
- Russian forces launched 176 drones against Ukraine.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure continue to impact Russian production capabilities. Reuters reported on April 7, citing two industry sources, that Ukraine’s April 5 drone strikes against the Russian Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez Refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, halted refinery operations.[21]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy and Kursk oblasts on April 8 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including northwest of Sumy City near Sopych; northeast of Sumy City toward Myropillya; and southeast of Glushkovo, Kursk Oblast near Kucherov, on April 7 and 8.[22]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment and the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly coordinating Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) airstrikes against Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[23]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces recently infiltrated in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on April 6 shows Ukrainian forces shelling a Russian-occupied building in central Vilcha (northeast of Kharkiv City) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[24]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Prylipka, Vovchansk, Lyman, Hrafske, and Synelnykove on April 7 and 8.[25]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Vakha Battalion (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment), the SKAD 697 Gorets Detachment, and the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[26]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on April 8.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 8 but did not advance.
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on April 7 shows Ukrainian forces shelling a Russian position in southern Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration operation that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of battle (FEBA).[27]
Russian forces attacked in Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, and Kurylivka, and toward Kivsharivka and Novoosynove on April 7 and 8.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Myrove (northwest of Kupyansk) and Sobolivka (west of Kupyansk).[29]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), including its 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, are reportedly operating near Novoosynove and Hlushkivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[30]
Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Borova near Novoplatonivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Tverdokhlibove on April 8, but did not advance.[31]
Ukrainian forces conducted mid-range strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast overnight on April 7 to 8. Geolocated footage published on April 8 by Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian equipment depot in occupied Sukhodilsk (roughly 134 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of April 7 to 8.[32] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck an ammunition depot near occupied Uralo-Kavkaz (roughly 143 kilometers behind the frontline) overnight.[33]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on April 8 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; north of Lyman near Stavky and Drobysheve; south of Lyman near Dibrova and toward Brusivka and Staryi Karavan; and east of Slovyansk near Ozerne, Kalenyky, Kryva Luka, and Riznykivka and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka on April 7 and 8.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in northern Nykyforivka and in Fedorivka Druha (both southeast of Slovyansk).[35]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 254th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[36] Elements of the 85th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating toward Rai-Oleksandrivka.[37] Artillery elements of the Pyatnashka International Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Slovyansk direction.[38]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on April 8 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Minkivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[39]
Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka and Illinivka and toward Dovha Balka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Pavlivka on April 7 and 8.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kostyantynivka.[41]
Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian Fakel Detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are shelling Ukrainian positions in Tykhonivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[42] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 57th Separate Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Petrivka, Torske (both southwest of Druzhkivka), and Dovha Balka in coordination with reconnaissance drone operators of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA).[43] FPV drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Druzhkivka.[44]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas and northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar on April 7, but ISW has not collected evidence to assess that Russian forces made any advances.[45]
Order of Battle: Reconnaissance elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[46]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 7 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Molodetske (southwest of Pokrovsk).[47]
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on April 8 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember in northern Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[48]
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad and Rivne; southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Kotlyne; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on April 7 and 8.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryshyne and Molodetske (southwest of Pokrovsk).[50]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 35th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in Hryshyne.[51]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne; and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on April 7 and 8.[52]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on April 8 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove and toward Lisne; east of Oleksandrivka near Sichneve; and southeast of Oleksandrivka toward Vorone, Kalynivske, Verbove, Sosnivka, Berezove, and Ternove on April 7 and 8.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Dobropasove (east of Oleksandrivka) and Hai (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[54]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Velykomykhailivka (east of Oleksandrivka).[55]
Ukrainian forces continued their short- and mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast overnight on April 7 to 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 8 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian equipment depot near occupied Velyka Novosilka (roughly 24 kilometers from the frontline), a field artillery depot near occupied Yalta (roughly 4.5 kilometers from the frontline northeast of Oleksandrivka), and a drone depot near occupied Stepne (roughly 59 kilometers from the frontline).[56] Geolocated footage published on April 7 and 8 shows Ukrainian forces striking a battalion command and observation post of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (120th Naval Infantry Division, Baltic Fleet) in eastern Velyka Novosilka and a drone depot and pre-launch drone preparation point in Stepne.[57] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi also reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tor-M2 air defense system in occupied Donetsk Oblast overnight.[58]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on April 8 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northwest of Hulyaipole near Varvarivka, Svyatopetrivka, Pryluky, Olenokostyantynivka, Dobropillya, Liubytske, and Tsvitkove and toward Vozdvyzhivka and Verkhnya Tersa; west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and Hirke; and southwest of Hulyaipole near Charivne and toward Hulyaipilske on April 7 and 8.[59]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drones near Myrne (southwest of Hulyaipole).[60] Drone operators of the 38th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment near Novoselivka (west of Hulyaipole).[61]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 8 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk and toward Novoyakovlivka on April 7 and 8.[62]
Order of Battle: Lancet loitering munition operators of the Russian 291st Artillery Brigade (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions north of Novoselivka (northeast of Orikhiv).[63] Elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[64]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military and logistics assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported April 8 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian material and technical equipment warehouse near occupied Svitle (roughly 40 kilometers behind the frontline).[65] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on April 8 that Ukrainian forces struck a Buk-M3 air defense system and a Zoopark-1 radar system in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[66] Geolocated footage published on April 8 shows Ukrainian forces striking two locomotives, which Russian forces used to export grain and natural resources from occupied Ukraine, south of occupied Mala Bilozerka (roughly 20 kilometers behind the front line).[67]
Russian forces continued limited ground operations in the Kherson direction on April 7 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge on April 6 and 7.[68]
A Russian milblogger claimed on April 7 that Russian forces struck Kherson City with a FAB-3000 guided glide bomb and plan to escalate their strikes on dual-use targets in the city over the summer of 2026, despite the continued civilian presence there.[69]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Antonivka (east of Kherson City).[70]
Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against frontline Russian military targets in occupied Kherson Oblast. Geolocated footage published on April 7 shows Ukrainian forces recently striking a Russian troop concentration in occupied Nova Kakhovka (northeast of Kherson City).[71]
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military and energy assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 8 that Ukrainian forces struck oil depots in occupied Feodosia (roughly 240 kilometers from the frontline) and Hvardiiske (roughly 195 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of April 7 to 8, causing fires.[72] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian signals intelligence (SIGINT) station near occupied Novoozerne (roughly 135 kilometers from the frontline) and a Bastion-M coastal missile system near Sofiivka (roughly 190 kilometers from the frontline). Brovdi published geolocated footage on April 8 showing Ukrainian drone operators striking fuel tanks at the Maritime Oil Terminal in occupied Feodosia.[73] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published geolocated footage on April 8 showing Ukrainian forces striking and disabling the Slavyanin railway ferry in the Kerch Strait, which supplied Russian forces in occupied Crimea with fuel, lubricants, weapons, and ammunition.[74]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 7 to 8. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 176 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which about 120 were Shaheds — from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[75] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 146 drones, that 24 drones struck 12 locations, and that downed debris fell on one location. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones targeted civilian, port, and energy infrastructure in Kharkiv, Sumy, and Odesa oblasts.[76]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing Significant To Report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/okupovaniy-kilometr-donechchini-voroga-316-1775564047.html; https://suspilne dot media/vinnytsia/1284112-rf-rozgladae-bufernu-zonu-na-vinniccini-z-boku-pridnistrova-pavlo-palisa/; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1284120-vtrati-rf-na-donbasi-zrosli-majze-vtrici-vid-pocatku-roku-palisa/
[2] ttps://understandingwar.org/map/ukraines-assessment-of-russian-operational-objectives-by-the-end-of-2026-published-on-june-5-2025-by-ukrainian-presidential-office-deputy-head-colonel-pavlo-palisa/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025/
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/future-of-war/the-russian-military-forecasting-the-threat/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-and-problem-restoring-maneuver-contemporary-war
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_31-6/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2025/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlins-occupation-playbook-coerced-russification-and-ethnic-cleansing-occupied; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225
[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlins-occupation-playbook-coerced-russification-and-ethnic-cleansing-occupied; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/
[8] https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/okupovaniy-kilometr-donechchini-voroga-316-1775564047.html
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2026/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/
[11] http://www dot svr.gov.ru/smi/2026/04/o-stremlenii-evrosoyuza-k-sozdaniyu-sobstvennogo-yadernogo-oruzhiya.htm
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2025/ ; ] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/
[14] https://t.me/belpepel/19728 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2026/
[15] https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2026/04/08/posle-otstavki-gladkova-belgorodskuiu-oblast-vozglavit-uchastnik-voiny-v-ukraine-shuvaev-news
[16] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/04/08/pepel-i-novaya-gazeta-evropa-vyacheslava-gladkova-na-postu-gubernatora-belgorodskoy-oblasti-mozhet-smenit-uchastnik-voyny-aleksandr-shuvaev
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2026/
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-18-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-unlikely-demobilize-event-ceasefire-because-he-afraid-his-veterans ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-february-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-february-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-7-2025/
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_5/
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2026/
[21] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-major-norsi-oil-refinery-halted-operations-after-sunday-drone-attack-2026-04-07/
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37054; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37021; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37019; https://t.me/uvkkursk/309; https://t.me/severnnyi/7467; https://t.me/dva_majors/90925; https://t.me/wargonzo/33388
[23] https://t.me/dva_majors/90908
[24] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2041084016779030661; https://www.facebook.com/reel/2379021219285605
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37054 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37021 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20410 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37019 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/15395
[26] https://t.me/dva_majors/90907
[27] https://www.facebook.com/reel/2160618444505696; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11646
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37054; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37021 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20410; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37019; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/15395; https://t.me/wargonzo/33388; https://t.me/gvZapad/18252; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/08/na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-zbilshylasya-kilkist-shturmiv/; https://youtu.be/DiriOhkLn6E?t=1400; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41667
[29] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41667
[30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41667
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37054
[32] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2186; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/08/sbs-vlashtuvaly-vorogu-vognyanu-pysanku-urazheno-naftoterminal-buk-tor-ta-zoopark/; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34789
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37055
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37054; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37021; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20410; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37019; https://t.me/wargonzo/33388; https://t.me/gvZapad/18252; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41672
[35] https://t.me/basurin_e/25840; https://t.me/dva_majors/90925
[36] https://t.me/official144msd/4366; https://t.me/dva_majors/90909; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/206118;
[37] https://t.me/motopatriot78/50348
[38] https://t.me/wargonzo/33398
[39] https://t.me/wargonzo/33388
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37054; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37021; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37019; https://t.me/motopatriot78/50341; https://t.me/wargonzo/33388
[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/90925
[42] https://t.me/DobroKor/2813; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2041606472426254534
[43] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15211
[44] https://t.me/dva_majors/90965; https://t.me/dva_majors/90929
[45] https://t.me/rybar/79300
[46] https://t.me/motopatriot78/50348
[47] https://t.me/motopatriot78/50324; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2041595414986813783
[48] https://t.me/yokaiUA/477; https://x.com/meowqai/status/2041840153849741768
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37054 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37021 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37019 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33388 ; https://t.me/rybar/79300
[50] https://t.me/rybar/79300
[51] https://t.me/Sib_army/10309; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2041610348399358261
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37054 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37021 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37019
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37054; https://t.me/wargonzo/33388; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37021; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37019
[54] https://t.me/voin_dv/19209
[55] https://t.me/voin_dv/19210
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37055
[57] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34778; https://t.me/raid_413/1176; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2041576677109633085; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34789; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2186;
[58] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2186
[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37054; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37021; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37019; https://t.me/voin_dv/19209
[60] https://t.me/voin_dv/19211;
[61] https://t.me/voin_dv/19207
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37021; https://t.me/wargonzo/33388; https://t.me/dva_majors/90925
[63] https://t.me/brigada291art/215; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2041626818139320327
[64] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41651
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37055
[66] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34789; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2186;
[67] https://t.me/luftwaffe422/866; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2041795080856424634
[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37054; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37021; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37019
[69] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/33806; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/33807
[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41651
[71] https://t.me/soniah_hub/15234; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34775
[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37055
[73] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34789; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2186
[74] https://t.me/DIUkraine/8162; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34787; https://t.me/sotaproject/111481 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/08/dobyly-slavyanina-speczpryznachenczi-gur-urazyly-ostannij-zaliznychnyj-porom-okupantiv-u-kerchi/
[75] https://t.me/kpszsu/59689
[76] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1284190-pidpriemstvo-zaznalo-znacnih-zbitkiv-unoci-rosijski-vijska-vdarili-po-naftopererobnomu-zavodu-u-merefi/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/20977 ; https://t.me/ampu_uspa/479; https://t.me/IzmailRDA/45123 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1284046-v-izmaili-prolunali-vibuhi-misto-pid-atakou-droniv/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/08/odeshhyna-zaznala-masovanoyi-ataky-bpla-poshkodzheno-portovu-infrastrukturu/ ; https://t.me/IzmailRDA/45132 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/59688 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1284130-rf-vdruge-za-den-atakuvala-izmailskij-rajon-pid-udarom-portova-infrastruktura/ ; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/42061; https://t.me/astrapress/109263; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1284240-zaginuv-colovik-se-tri-zinki-postrazdali-i-zrujnovanij-budinok-so-vidomo-pro-ataku-rf-na-romni/ ; https://t.me/police_su_region/36141 ; https://www.facebook.com/olehstogniy/posts/pfbid0HmprUACGCXb5PBF4LnCwgfLA11zAWgZEuCKENsMhjfCBsDqk1yG1f69S9wWfeCful?locale=uk_UA; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/08/odna-lyudyna-zagynula-troye-poraneni-naslidky-vorozhyh-obstriliv-sumshhyny/; https://npu.gov dot ua/news/odna-liudyna-zahynula-troie-poraneno-politsiia-dokumentuie-naslidky-vorozhykh-obstriliv-sumshchyny?v=69d5da80396aa ;
