Toplines
Russian forces conducted another combined ballistic/quasi-ballistic missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of August 10 to 11, heavily targeting civilian and industrial infrastructure in Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia cities. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Iskander-M ballistic missiles, North Korean-provided KN-23 ballistic missiles, and Zirkon anti-ship missiles (which fly on ballistic trajectories) from Kursk, Rostov, Voronezh, and Oryol oblasts.[1] Russian forces also launched 120 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type strike drones, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force added that most of the Shahed-type drones were jet-powered. Ukrainian forces reportedly downed 98 drones; an unspecified number and type of Russian air targets struck 21 locations; and debris fell at five. The Ukrainian Air Force typically reports how many missiles Russian forces launch and how many Ukrainian forces down. Bloomberg reported on August 11, noting the shift in the Air Force’s reporting, that a source stated that Ukrainian authorities changed the format as a security measure in response to Russian strikes.[2]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the main targets of the overnight strikes were Kyiv Oblast and Zaporizhzhia City.[3] Ukrainian officials reported that a Russian ballistic missile struck a children’s hospital in Kyiv City, damaging a gas pipe and the building’s glazing.[4] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian missile and guided glide bomb strikes against Zaporizhzhia City killed at least six and injured at least 19.[5] The Metinvest Group confirmed that Russian forces conducted a ballistic missile strike against Zaporizhstal, a steel and pig iron manufacturer in Zaporizhzhia City, killing seven employees and injuring 21.[6] Metinvest reported that the strikes damaged Zaporizhstal’s coke and blast furnace production plants and stopped production. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Russian forces struck Zaporizhstal and also claimed strikes against Ukraine’s postal service Nova Poshta and a transport and logistics center in Kyiv City.[7] Zelensky stated that Russian forces also struck electrical substations in Kherson and Kharkiv oblasts overnight and unspecified infrastructure in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts.
Russian forces are likely launching small numbers of North Korean-provided KN-23 ballistic missiles in nightly strike packages in an attempt to battle-test the missiles and improve their accuracy. Zelensky reported on August 11 that Russian forces launched a North-Korean provided KN-23 missile against Zaporizhzhia City.[8] Russia recently resumed using KN-23 missiles to strike Ukraine, striking Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the night of July 29 to 30 with a KN-23 for the first time since Summer 2025.[9] Ukrainian officials recently reported that North Korea sent at least 40 KN-23 missiles to Russia, and Russia appears to be launching very few KN-23 missiles at a time.[10] Russia may be testing the missiles after reports that earlier North-Korean provided KN-23s were highly inaccurate and that Russia has since worked with North Korea to improve the missiles.[11] ISW continues to assess that the addition of more North Korean missiles to Russia’s arsenal will allow Russia to intensify its ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine in the near future without having to dip into its S-400 and Zirkon missile stocks.[12]
Russia may be preparing to base North Korean missileers and ballistic missiles at a training center currently under construction in Voronezh Oblast. South Korean outlet EToday reported on August 11 that it obtained Voronezh Oblast government documents outlining ongoing plans to finish construction on a Rosgvardia training center in the region by the end of 2026.[13] EToday suggested that North Korean forces may deploy to the new training center, citing Ukrainian officials’ recent reports that Russia plans to base a North Korean missile unit in Voronezh Oblast. It is unclear if North Korean forces are going to deploy to the base in Voronezh Oblast. However, if they were to deploy, it is unclear if the North Koreans would deploy before construction is complete. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Chernyak stated in early August 2026 that a North Korean missile unit would deploy to Russia’s 112th Missile Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District) in Voronezh Oblast and that the North Korean unit may be equipped with 120 ballistic missiles — likely KN-23s.[14] The 112th Missile Brigade is permanently based in Shuya, Ivanovo Oblast, and received Iskander-M ballistic missiles in 2014.[15] Russia likely created a temporary forward base for the brigade in Voronezh Oblast, which is closer to Ukraine than Ivanovo Oblast, in order to reduce the distance and flight time between the missile launch point and the intended targets in Ukraine.
The Russian Supreme Court disqualified Russian opposition party Yabloko from the September 2026 State Duma elections, likely in order to prevent Russians from having the option to support the party’s anti-war platform. The Russian Supreme Court upheld a lawsuit from the Rodina Party on August 10 and annulled the registration of Yabloko candidates from the Duma elections.[16] Rodina’s lawsuit from August 7 advocated for Yabloko’s disqualification from the Duma elections for violating copyright and promoting extremist slogans.[17] Former Russian space agency Roscosmos head and current Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin founded Rodina in 2003.[18] A Russian Central Electoral Commission representative cited Russian Federal Service for Financial Monitoring (Rosfinmonitoring) data in court, alleging that the Yabloko Party received foreign funding from the United States and Germany.[19]
Yabloko’s exclusion from the upcoming Duma elections represents a further consolidation of the Russian political system around the war in Ukraine. Yabloko has been campaigning under the slogan “For peace and freedom” while advocating for a ceasefire in Ukraine.[20] Yabloko was the only registered party that opposed the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.[21] The Kremlin has repeatedly cracked down on Yabloko Party members in recent years, opening criminal cases against them for alleged violations of foreign agent laws and disqualifying top Yabloko candidates from pre-war Duma elections.[22] Yabloko Party founder Grigory Yavlinsky stated on August 10 that the Supreme Court’s decision shows that the Kremlin is frightened of Yabloko’s anti-war rhetoric and noted that Yabloko will appeal the decision.[23] The Kremlin is likely aware of growing public discontent about the war in Ukraine as Ukrainian strikes against the Russian rear lead to mounting costs at home, and fears that Yabloko may be able to capture some of this discontent, even if marginally.
The Kremlin likely also aims to reduce the risk of the ruling United Russia Party not achieving the Kremlin’s desired outcome in the upcoming elections. Yabloko secured only 1.34 percent of the federal party-list proportional vote during the 2021 Russian State Duma elections, failing to pass the five percent threshold to secure Duma seats.[24] Yabloko has not run a candidate since the full-scale invasion began in 2022. Yabloko has been gaining marginal popularity in recent months, and party supporters protested in front of the Supreme Court on August 10, but Yabloko nonetheless likely poses only a limited threat to United Russia and the Kremlin-controlled opposition parties.[25] The Kremlin’s efforts against Yabloko show that it is unwilling to risk even losing a few percentage points in the elections, suggesting that the Kremlin intends to use the Duma elections as a referendum on its war in Ukraine. Russian elections are neither free nor fair, and the Kremlin controls the final tallies, but Moscow is likely fearful that too much visible public support for Yabloko will jeopardize the public’s willingness to believe the numbers the Kremlin puts forward in September.[26]
The Kremlin was permissive of Yabloko in earlier years of the war, but the growing persecution of the party and its eventual disqualification show how its priorities have shifted. Yavlinsky advocated for a ceasefire in Ukraine as part of his presidential bid in December 2023, and the Kremlin likely allowed Yavlinsky to criticize the Russian government’s war policies at that time in order to preserve its veneer of electoral legitimacy.[27] The party’s 2026 disqualification suggests that the Kremlin is less concerned about making its elections seem free and fair to the Russian people and international observers than it was at the start of the full-scale invasion and is more worried about anti-war sentiment gaining popularity in the country.
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces conducted another combined ballistic/quasi-ballistic missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of August 10 to 11, heavily targeting civilian and industrial infrastructure in Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia cities.
- Russian forces are likely launching small numbers of North Korean-provided KN-23 ballistic missiles in nightly strike packages in an attempt to battle-test the missiles and improve their accuracy.
- Russia may be preparing to base North Korean missileers and ballistic missiles at a training center currently under construction in Voronezh Oblast.
- The Russian Supreme Court disqualified the Russian opposition party Yabloko from the September 2026 State Duma elections, likely in order to prevent Russians from having the option to support the party’s anti-war platform.
- Yabloko’s exclusion from the upcoming Duma elections represents a further consolidation of the Russian political system around the war in Ukraine.
- The Kremlin likely also aims to reduce the risk of the ruling United Russia Party not achieving the Kremlin’s desired outcome in the upcoming elections.
- The Kremlin was permissive of Yabloko in earlier years of the war, but the growing persecution of the party and its eventual disqualification show how its priorities have shifted.
- Ukrainian forces continue their long-range strike campaigns against Wildberries warehouses and oil refineries in Russia.
- Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on August 11.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continue long-range strike campaigns against Russian Wildberries warehouses and oil refineries. Russian opposition source Astra reported on August 11 that eyewitness footage shows a fire after a Ukrainian strike against the Wildberries warehouse in Aleksandrovka, Novoumansky Raion, Voronezh Oblast.[28] Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed that a drone crashed and started a fire at two warehouses of an unspecified large company in Novousmansky Raion, while the Wildberries press service confirmed a strike and fire at its logistics facilities in Voronezh Oblast.[29]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Orsknefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Orsk, Orenburg Oblast on the night of August 10 to 11.[30] Astra reported that footage shows a smoke plume at the refinery.[31] Orenburg Oblast Governor Evgeny Solntsev claimed that drone debris caused a fire at an unspecified industrial facility in the region.[32] An open-source channel assessed that footage suggests Ukrainian forces struck the refinery’s ELOU-AVT installation.[33]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 10 and 11 but did not advance.[34] A source reporting on Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on August 11 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Turya (east of Sumy City).[35] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 11 that Ukrainian forces also counterattacked near Mohrytsia (northeast of Sumy City).[36]
The Russian MoD claimed on August 11 that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian drone control center in Porozok (southeast of Sumy City).[37] Geolocated footage published on August 10 shows Russian forces conducting the LMUR helicopter-launched air-to-surface missile strike against Porozok.[38]
Ukrainian forces continued striking Russian military assets in border areas of Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 11 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation post near Terebreno, Belgorod Oblast (roughly three kilometers from the international border).[39] Geolocated footage published on August 11 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian TOS-1A thermobaric artillery system in Titovka, Belgorod Oblast (roughly 16 kilometers from the international border).[40] Geolocated footage published on August 8 shows Ukrainian forces striking three all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) near Snagost, Kursk Oblast (roughly 10 kilometers from the international border).[41]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 10 and 11 but did not make confirmed advances.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 11 that Russian forces advanced east of Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City).[43] The Russian MoD claimed on August 11 that Russian forces seized Shcherbakivka (north of Kharkiv City) — the former name of a forested area north of Kudiivka.[44]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 11 but did not advance.[45]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 10 and 11 but did not advance.[46]
The Russian MoD claimed on August 11 that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian temporary deployment point near Boldyrivka (south of Kupyansk).[47]
A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 11.[48] The source claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Ridkodub (southeast of Borova).[49]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast on August 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system near Topol (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline) and Russian material and technical equipment warehouses in Rovenky (roughly 130 kilometers from the frontline).[50]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian sources continue to claim Russian advances within Lyman. The Russian MoD continued to claim on August 11 that Russian forces are clearing Lyman.[51] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces reported on August 11 that Russian forces have seized approximately half of Lyman and that fighting continues in the rest of the town.[52] ISW has not observed evidence of a Russian presence in Lyman. The source reported that Drobysheve (northwest of Slovyansk) and Yarova (north of Slovyansk) remain contested “gray zones.”
Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage posted on August 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions southwest of Stinky (north of Kostyantynivka) and in Chervone (northeast of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[53] Russian milbloggers claimed on August 11 that Russian forces seized Molocharka (north of Kostyantynivka) and Osykove (northwest of Kostyantynivka) and advanced north of Molocharka, south of Izhevka (north of Kostyantynivka), in southern Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (northwest of Kostyantynivka), and northwest of Toretske (northwest of Kostyantynivka).[54]
Ukrainian forces are reportedly counterattacking and striking Russian infiltrators in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.[55] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger stated on August 10 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Mykolaipillya (west of Kostyantynivka) from which small Ukrainian groups are attacking southward and eastward.[56]
Geolocated footage published on August 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian light motorized vehicle concentration near occupied Malynivka (around 15 kilometers from the frontline).[57]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on August 10 and 11 but did not make confirmed advances.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 10 that Russian forces advanced north of Chernihivka (south of Dobropillya) and in eastern Novohryshyne (southwest of Dobropillya).[59] Geolocated footage published on August 4 shows Russian forces shelling a Ukrainian position south of Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya) — an area in which Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained a presence.[60]
A Russian source continued to claim Russian advances south of Dobropillya and north of Pokrovsk but acknowledged that Ukrainian drone defenses are slowing the tempo of advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 11 that Russian forces are only advancing “tens of meters” due to the large numbers of Ukrainian drones in the area.[61] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces cleared Shevchenko (south of Dobropillya) and are fighting on the southeastern outskirts of Dobropillya. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are trying to encircle Ukrainian forces southeast of Shevchenko and near Rodynske (southeast of Shevchenko). ISW has not observed evidence of Russian forces almost encircling or enveloping Ukrainian forces in the area. ISW has observed evidence of Russian infiltrators operating west of Rodynske and within and north of Shevchenko, but Russian forces have not seized or consolidated the positions into which they have infiltrated. A reconnaissance platoon leader in a Russian battalion claimed on August 11 that Russian infiltrators have been operating in the Ukrainian near rear in Shevchenko for two months (since roughly mid-June 2026), likely referring to the Shevchenko south of Dobropillya.[62] Military analyst Rob Lee reported on August 10 that Russian forces aim to encircle Dobropillya from the south and east and noted that Russian forces are using drones and glide bombs to strike Dobropillya and nearby settlements — likely to degrade Ukrainian logistics and generate battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects to facilitate future offensive operations in the area.[63]
Order of Battle: Footage posted on August 10 shows drone operators of the Russian 86th Unmanned Systems Regiment operating in the Dobropillya direction.[64] This is the first time ISW has observed this unit involved in combat operations in Ukraine.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 10 and 11 but did not make confirmed advances.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have almost seized Novopidhorodne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[66]
A spokesperson for a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 11 that Russian forces continue attacks with infantry groups mostly composed of new recruits who have been in the Russian military for less than one month and who received no more than one week of training.[67] The spokesperson added that Russian forces almost never use armored vehicles in the area but use unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for logistics and evacuations.
Ukrainian forces likely recently cleared Russian infiltrators from an area in the Novopavlivka direction. A Russian milblogger acknowledged on August 11 that Ukrainian forces advanced northwest of Filiya (southwest of Novopavlivka) — an area in which ISW previously observed evidence of a Russian infiltration mission.[68] The milblogger also acknowledged that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Filiya.
Russian sources continue to amplify likely AI-altered footage to support Russian MoD claims of Russian seizures in the Oleksandrivka direction. The Russian MoD claimed on August 11 that Russian forces seized Nove Pole (southwest of Oleksandrivka).[69] A Russian milblogger posted footage on August 11 showing Russian service members raising flags in the settlement.[70] ISW assesses that the footage is likely AI-altered.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range and frontline strike campaign against Russian energy assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on August 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking a gas station just east of Donetsk City (roughly 70 kilometers from the frontline).[71] The commander of a Russian air defense battery claimed on August 11 that Russian mobile fire groups intercept up to six Ukrainian drones per day along logistics routes of occupied Donetsk Oblast.[72]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on August 10 and 11 but did not advance.[73]
Russian milbloggers continue to claim Russian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 10 that Russian forces cleared Plavni (west of Orikhiv).[74] ISW has observed evidence of Russian infiltrations into northern Plavni, but not of Russian advances. Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attempting to perform a double envelopment of Orikhiv given that Russian forces seized Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv).[75] A different Russian milblogger claimed on August 11 that Russian advances in Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) and Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv) suggest that Russian forces will soon envelop or encircle Orikhiv.[76] ISW has not observed evidence of Russian advances in either settlement or of a Russian envelopment.
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline and intermediate-range strike campaign against Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control points in Zaliznychne (southwest of Hulyaipole) and Nesteryanka (southwest of Orikhiv) on August 10.[77] Ukrainian Center for the Study of Occupation Head and former Mariupol official Petro Andryushchenko reported on August 11 that Ukrainian forces struck two substations and a gas station in occupied Berdyansk (about 100 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on August 10 to 11.[78]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 11.
A Russian milblogger claimed on August 11 that Ukrainian forces are consistently striking Russian positions and logistics on the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast with drones.[79] Ukraine’s strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Ukraine reportedly has been disrupting supplies to the Kinburn Spit since at least June 2026 and has forced Russian forces to withdraw from the northern and western parts of the spit.[80]
Ukrainian intermediate-range strikes against occupied Crimea continue to hinder power supply and naval activity on the peninsula. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi stated that Ukrainian forces struck 43 military and energy facilities in occupied Crimea and southern Ukraine on the night of August 10 to 100, hitting one dry cargo vessel in the Black Sea, a Buk-M3 air defense system, material and technical equipment warehouses, ammunition warehouses, and energy hubs.[81] The leading electric grid company of occupied Sevastopol, Sevastopolenergo, stated on August 11 that authorities have introduced temporary power supply restrictions in the city due to significant power shortages in the Crimean power grid.[82] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on August 11 that occupied Crimea is no longer a full-fledged base for the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) but that Russian forces continue to use it for military purposes.[83] Pletenchuk stated that Russian forces mostly use Crimea to conduct strikes against Ukraine.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
See topline text for more reports on Russia’s overnight strike series.
Russia’s recent strikes against logistics infrastructure are disrupting the operation of Ukraine’s railways and some grocery supplies. Ukraine’s rail service Ukrzaliznytsia announced on August 11 that it will suspend ticket sales for some trains and dates starting August 28 as the latest Russian strikes have forced the company to adjust routes and schedules.[84] Ukrzaliznytsia reported that recent Russian strikes have killed rail workers and destroyed and damaged locomotives, rail cars, and other rail infrastructure.
Ukrainian media source Dzerkalo Tyzhnya reported that some Ukrainian supermarket chains, such as Novus, Silpo, and Fora stores in Kyiv City, are temporarily running low on food products after recent Russian strikes against the retailers’ warehouses and cold storage facilities caused delivery delays.[85]
Russian forces continue to routinely target Ukrainian maritime vessels along the Black Sea in order to disrupt Ukrainian shipping.[86] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian drones struck a patrol boat in the Black Sea south of Odesa City during the day on August 11.[87]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/kpszsu/72368
[2] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas
[3] https://t.me/kpszsu/72368
[4] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/71272; https://t.me/gunpKyiv/16441; https://kyivcity.gov dot ua/news/unaslidok_vorozho_ataki_v_nich_na_11_serpnya_u_kiyevi_poshkodzheno_dityache_infektsiyne_viddilennya__diti_ta_medpratsivniki_ne_postrazhdali/; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1376148-rosia-atakuvala-kiiv-balistikou-odna-ludina dot poranena-vlucilo-na-teritorii-litacoi-likarni/ ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20361
[5] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20361
[6] https://metinvestholding dot com/ua/media/news/pdprimstva-metnvestu-v-zaporzhzh-zaznali-teroristichno-ataki-zagibl-ta-poranen
[7] https://t.me/mod_russia/66417
[8] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20361
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2026/; https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/north-korean-missile-unit-deploys-russia-ukraine-war-kyiv-says-2026-08-05/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2026/; https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/north-korean-missile-unit-deploys-russia-ukraine-war-kyiv-says-2026-08-05/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2026/
[13] https://www.etoday dot co.kr/news/view/2613174; https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/2087101911803502728
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2026/
[15] https://ria dot ru/20140718/1016544020.html
[16] https://www.vsrf dot ru/press_center/news/36246/; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/08/10/verhovnyy-sud-snyal-yabloko-s-vyborov-v-gosdumu; https://t.me/tass_agency/389622
[17] https://x.com/novayagazeta_eu/status/2086737513700290653; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/08/10/verhovnyy-sud-snyal-yabloko-s-vyborov-v-gosdumu
[18] https://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2012/10/121001_rodina_resurrection_rogozin
[19] https://www.vsrf dot ru/press_center/news/36246/; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/08/10/verhovnyy-sud-snyal-yabloko-s-vyborov-v-gosdumu; https://t.me/tass_agency/389622
[20] https://eng dot yabloko.ru/
[21] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/08/10/verhovnyy-sud-snyal-yabloko-s-vyborov-v-gosdumu
[22] https://apnews.com/article/russia-yabloko-political-party-parliament-election-fffdd68de22ad70cebc81e5aa308202c; https://t.me/severrealii/33423; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_10-15/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_57/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_20-19/; https://t.me/tass_agency/276681; https://t.me/tass_agency/276701
[23] https://t.me/gr_yavlinsky/645 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/08/10/eto-samorazoblachenie-politicheskoy-sistemy-yavlinskiy-o-reshenii-snyat-yabloko-s-vyborov-v-gosdumu
[24] https://www.yabloko dot ru/node/42886
[25] https://t.me/endoflaw/3432; https://t.me/sotaproject/117139; https://t.me/endoflaw/3451; https://t.me/sotaproject/117155; https://t.me/severrealii/34010; https://t.me/russian_field_soc/3563; https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2026/08/11/the-kremlin-let-russia-s-only-anti-war-party-yabloko-onto-the-ballot-to-bleed-protest-votes-but-when-it-started-polling-at-6-the-supreme-court-stepped-in
[26] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-presidential-vote-starts-final-day-with-accusations-kyiv-sabotage-2024-03-17/; https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2026/08/10/russias-state-duma-elections-are-for-show-but-theyre-still-worth-paying-attention-to-a93448; https://freedomhouse.org/country/russia/freedom-world/2022
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_30-10/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russia-in-review-putins-deepening/
[28] https://t.me/astrapress/121776
[29] https://t.me/gusev_36/6968; https://t.me/rwb_press_service/1693
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41837
[31] https://t.me/astrapress/121814
[32] https://t.me/solntsev_official/5994
[33] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/28561; https://t.me/worldmilitares/43884 ; https://t.me/worldmilitares/43887
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41832 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41834 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/97312 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/8988 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36152
[35] https://t.me/severnnyi/8988
[36] https://t.me/wargonzo/36152
[37] https://t.me/mod_russia/66419
[38] https://x.com/hgtvgloober/status/2087048898405617752; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/30476
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41838
[40] https://x.com/markito0171/status/2087081466060472464; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2087145432132563072
[41] https://x.com/Danspiun/status/2086831440247902448?s=20 ; https://x.com/Danspiun/status/2086832860330131561?s=20 ; https://t.me/operationalcommandwest/1885
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41832 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41834 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/97312 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/8988 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36152 ;
[43] https://t.me/divgen/83104
[44] https://t.me/mod_russia/66421 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/121146 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/74111
[45] https://t.me/severnnyi/8988 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/97312
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41832 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41834 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19404
[47] https://t.me/mod_russia/66419
[48] https://t.me/grvZapad/19404
[49] https://t.me/grvZapad/19404
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41838
[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/66425
[52] https://t.me/grvZapad/19404
[53] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2086853119602827596; https://x.com/24th_brigade/status/2086845028077281725; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12663
[54] https://t.me/divgen/83094; https://t.me/z_arhiv/33670;
[55] https://t.me/dva_majors/97312
[56] https://t.me/rybar/82355
[57] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/37500; https://t.me/azov_brigade_ngu/1709; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2086908208031936524?s=20 ; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2086896400525136240
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41832; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41834; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/121131; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46343
[59] https://t.me/divgen/83097
[60] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12667; https://t.me/Don_Guards_51st/1485
[61] https://t.me/arx_spn/30611; https://x.com/RALee85/status/2086771229193601322; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/
[62] https://t.me/tass_agency/389675 ; https://nsk.tsargrad dot tv/news/razvedchik-rasskazal-o-proryve-oborony-vsu-v-shevchenko_1820353
[63] https://x.com/RALee85/status/2086771229193601322; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/
[64] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6791
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41832; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41834; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/121131; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46343
[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46343
[67] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/11/tyzhden-pidgotovky-misyacz-na-fronti-polon-pid-pokrovskom-rosiyany-kydayut-u-bij-novobrancziv/; https://youtu.be/dc52l5s5_qM
[68] https://t.me/divgen/83119
[69] https://t.me/mod_russia/66423
[70] https://t.me/voin_dv/20622
[71] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2087061548380401934; https://x.com/hochu_dodomu/status/2086878176383320405
[72] https://t.me/tass_agency/389643; https://t.me/tass_agency/389649; https://t.me/tass_agency/389659
[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41832; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41834; https://t.me/wargonzo/36152
[74] https://t.me/motopatriot78/55094
[75] https://t.me/wargonzo/36172
[76] https://t.me/voin_dv/20620
[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41838
[78] https://t.me/andriyshTime/65240
[79] https://t.me/arx_spn/30612
[80] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/
[81] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2725
[82] https://t.me/sev_energo/4126
[83] https://www.rbc dot ua/ukr/news/rf-vtratila-krim-k-bazu-flotu-vms-rozkrili-1786456446.html
[84] https://ua dot news/en/ukraine/rosiiski-udari-zmusili-ukrzaliznitsiu-prizupiniti-prodazh-kvitkiv
[85] https://t.me/znua_live/260786; https://united24media dot com/war-in-ukraine/supermarkets-in-ukraine-face-empty-shelves-as-russian-strikes-hit-warehouses-21580; https://glavcom dot ua/amp/kyiv/news/mi-vse-privezemo-ne-vpershe-jak-pratsjujut-supermarketi-silpo-pislja-rosijskoji-ataki-na-rozpodilchi-tsentri-1135976.html
[86] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2026/
[87] https://t.me/mod_russia/66429
