Toplines
Ukrainian forces struck a Russian strategic bomber at the Engels-2 Airbase in Saratov Oblast, demonstrating Ukraine’s ability to strike heavily defended targets in Russia’s rear. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a Tu-95MS strategic bomber at Engels-2 Airbase.[1] Satellite imagery purportedly of the Engels-2 Airbase shows damage to the right wing of a Tu-95MS bomber.[2] The Tu-95MS is a nuclear-capable strategic bomber that Russian forces regularly use to fire air-launched cruise missiles against Ukraine.[3]
Russian budgetary challenges resulting from its costly war effort, Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign, international sanctions, and economic mismanagement are manifesting in concrete operational problems. Bloomberg reported on August 28, citing insider sources, that Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov warned Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin in April 2026 about a negative budget balance in the Russian Federal Treasury budget account, prompting immediate spending restrictions.[4] The Russian Federal Treasury budget account reportedly ran a 5.5 trillion-ruble (roughly $63.8 billion) shortfall in April 2026, causing a temporary operational problem for Russian authorities. Bloomberg reported that authorities imposed austerity measures in April 2026 that required 35 percent cuts in funding for spending other than for the war effort and that the Russian government instructed federal agencies to prepare for a 15 percent reduction in staffing. Bloomberg had previously reported that Russian authorities unsuccessfully petitioned Russian President Vladimir Putin to cut defense spending amidst Russia’s growing budgetary crisis.[5] ISW has observed numerous indicators that these issues — which reportedly came to a head in April 2026 — continue to trouble Russian officials, prominent Russian economists, and ordinary Russians.[6]
This operational problem was reportedly short-term and apparently manageable, but it indicates that structural flaws and chronic economic mismanagement are requiring Russian authorities to engage in more complex and challenging fiscal management than is necessary under normal economic circumstances. The economic and fiscal challenges resulting from Russia’s war in Ukraine, compounded by the effects of Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign, are imposing significant economic hardship on Russian society, including in the major urban centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg that Russian President Vladimir Putin has traditionally sought to protect from the effects of the war.[7] Putin continues to renege on his tacit social contract with Russians in which he would shield them from the impacts of the war in return for their continued support. That such reports are emerging less than a month before the September 20 State Duma elections that Putin has turned into a high-stakes referendum on his war in Ukraine emphasizes the magnitude of the fiscal challenges that the war is presenting to the Kremlin.[8] Putin’s choice to prioritize the war effort is generating avoidable operational problems for Russian officials who will have to continue to react dynamically and with painful mitigations to increasingly adverse economic conditions. Russian officials will likely remain able to respond such that Russia will be able to continue its war effort even as the economy struggles for a considerable time, and there is no near-term or imminent likelihood that the Russian economy will collapse.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will likely expand its access to Russians’ personal and medical information ahead of rumored involuntary reserve call-ups after the September 20 State Duma elections. The Russian MoD published a draft amendment to a law on August 28 that would expand the personal data Russian defense officials would be able to obtain from Russian federal bodies, companies, and organizations when assessing citizens and servicemembers for certain military positions.[9] The draft amendment would allow Russian military officials to access personal information including registration, income and employment, education, disability, tax, banking, and medical information for Russian citizens liable for military service. This most recent Russian MoD draft amendment is part of a long-term Russian effort to establish a unified digital system to support the conscription and mobilization process.[10] The Russian MoD may be seeking greater access to the personal information of Russians relevant to their ability to serve in the military to set conditions for a more rapid involuntary mobilization that Russian President Vladimir Putin is reportedly considering to be conducted after Russia’s September State Duma elections.[11] This draft amendment is not an indicator that Putin has definitely chosen to conduct mobilization but rather that the MoD is preparing in case Putin makes such a decision. Access to this personal information would likely benefit Russian conscription and force generation mechanisms regardless of an involuntary reserve call-up. ISW continues to assess that the decision to order an involuntary reserve call-up in Russia remains a highly personal decision for Putin that he will make based on his perception of the battlefield situation and his assessment of his regime’s stability.[12]
Russian forces conducted an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test launch as part of the Kremlin’s nuclear saber-rattling to project military strength. The Russian Ministry of Defense reported on August 28 that Russian forces conducted a training launch of an unspecified solid-propellant mobile ICBM from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk Oblast.[13] Russian forces conducted a Yars ICBM test launch in late May 2026.[14] The test launch is almost certainly unrelated to US CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s August 25 visit to Moscow, as such tests are normally pre-planned well in advance.[15] ICBM test launches are part of Russia’s long-term nuclear saber-rattling campaign to project military strength and deter Western countries from actions contrary to Russian interests, including providing military support to Ukraine.[16]
Russia is portraying its Starlink-jamming electronic warfare (EW) system as a breakthrough capability as part of its cognitive warfare effort to dissuade the United States from granting Ukraine access to Starlink over Russian territory. Russia reportedly launched serial production of the Volna Kupol Garant EW system that can allegedly disrupt connections to the Starlink satellite internet constellation, according to a Russian defense industry source speaking to Kremlin newswire TASS.[17] The source stated that the Volna Kupol Garant system disrupts the operation of Starlink satellites in low Earth orbit, rather than targeting local ground terminals, by directing a powerful narrow radio signal that blinds the satellites’ receiving antennas. The source claimed that the simultaneous use of several Volna Kupol Garant systems could temporarily collapse Starlink services and that Russia could share this technology with other countries. Ukrainian forces have repeatedly struck Volna Kupol Garant systems in occupied Ukraine and Russia using drones equipped with alternative communication technologies.[18] The Volna Kupol Garant system appears to be largely stationary, limiting its effectiveness in protecting mobile equipment, the primary targets of Ukrainian Starlink-equipped drones.[19] TASS likely intends to signal to both Russians and the West that the Volna Kupol Garant system is capable of defending objects in deep rear areas of Russia and that there is therefore no point in giving Ukraine access to Starlink over Russian territory. Russian forces already possess air-defense systems capable of countering Ukrainian drones but lack the quantities of such systems and the manpower to operate them needed to defend Russia’s vast rear areas.[20] The Volna Kupol Garant system will likely suffer from the same problems due to its high cost — $1.5 million dollars per system — and limited 20-square-kilometer range.[21]
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian forces struck a Russian strategic bomber at the Engels-2 Airbase in Saratov Oblast, demonstrating Ukraine’s ability to strike heavily defended targets in Russia’s rear.
- Russian budgetary challenges resulting from its costly war effort, Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign, international sanctions, and economic mismanagement are manifesting in concrete operational problems.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will likely expand its access to Russians’ personal and medical information ahead of rumored involuntary reserve call-ups after the September 20 State Duma elections.
- Russian forces conducted an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test launch as part of the Kremlin’s nuclear saber-rattling to project military strength.
- Russia is portraying its Starlink-jamming electronic warfare (EW) system as a breakthrough capability as part of its cognitive warfare effort to dissuade the United States from granting Ukraine access to Starlink over Russian territory.
- Ukrainian forces made limited tactical advances in the Kostyantynivka direction.
- Ukrainian forces are conducting repeat strikes against Russian oil refineries to keep them offline. Russia launched 164 drones against Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
See topline text for Ukrainian strikes against the Engels-2 Airbase in Saratov Oblast.
Ukrainian forces are conducting repeat strikes against Russian oil refineries to keep them offline, delay repairs, and prolong fuel shortages in Russia. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Slavneft-YANOS Oil Refinery in Yaroslavl City overnight on August 27 to 28, causing a fire.[22] Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Mikhail Yevraev acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes damaged industrial infrastructure in Yaroslavl City.[23] Ukrainian forces have been conducting repeat strikes against Russian oil refineries at a higher tempo since intensifying their strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure in March 2026. Ukrainian forces have struck the Yaroslavl Oil Refinery at least eight times since January 1, 2026.[24] Bloomberg reported on August 28 that Russian forces struck four of Russia’s 10 largest refineries in August 2026 and that Russia’s oil refining volumes fell to a 20-year low.[25] Bloomberg reported that Russia refined about 3.8 million barrels of oil per day in August 2026 compared to an average of 5.3 to 5.5 million per day during the summer months, also representing a decrease of almost 20 percent compared to August 2025. Repeated Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries likely aim to keep Russia’s refining capacity reduced and prevent repairs, forcing Russia to seek international partners to refine Russian crude oil as Russia continues to struggle with mounting fuel supply crises.[26] Russian business outlet Kommersant reported on August 27 that AI-92 and AI-95 gasoline prices rose in 55 Russian federal subjects during the week of August 16 to 24 and that the Russian government is considering imposing price controls over the sale of lower-quality Euro-2, Euro-3, and Euro-4 standard gasolines, which require less refining, in efforts to mitigate the ongoing gasoline shortages.[27]
The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on August 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Kasta radar system near Karaichev, Rostov Oblast (around 165 kilometers from the frontline) on August 24.[28]
Russian online retailer Ozon is reportedly selling dual-use and military equipment and likely facilitating Russia’s war against Ukraine. Russian opposition source Verstka reported on August 28 that Ozon sold over 2.13 million units of dual-use and military goods, including body armor, firearm components, and drones worth 25 billion rubles (approximately 290.2 million dollars) between August 2025 and July 2026.[29] Verstka previously reported that Wildberries sold military gear worth hundreds of millions of rubles as well.[30] Ukrainian forces have extensively targeted Wildberries and Ozon facilities in Russia as part of their long-range strike campaign.[31]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 27 and 28 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[32]
Russian sources continue to post likely AI-altered footage of flag-raising events as part of a cognitive warfare effort aimed at exaggerating Russian advances. Russian servicemembers reportedly waived a flag in southern Mohrytsya (northeast of Sumy City) according to geolocated footage published on August 28.[33] ISW has not been able to verify the veracity of the footage and has reason to suspect that the footage is likely AI-altered and part of the Russian cognitive warfare campaign aimed at inflating Russian claimed advances across the frontline.
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 27 and 28 but did not advance.[34]
Russian forces reportedly used Kh-39 air-to-surface tactical missiles to strike Ukrainian positions in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Velykyi Burluk direction. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 28 that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian drone control point near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) and a temporary deployment point near Hryhorivka (east of Velykyi Burluk and Kharkiv City).[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces used Kh-39 air-to-surface tactical missiles for both strikes.[36]
Order of Battle: A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces reported on August 28 that Colonel Andrei Yelagin is the acting commander of the 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]).[37] The source reported that a Russian servicemember with the callsign ”Sochi” is the commander of the 128th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], LMD).[38]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 27 and 28 but did not advance.[39]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
A source reporting on Russian Western Grouping of Forces and Russian milbloggers claimed on August 28 that Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction as Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dvorichna and Zapadne (both north of Kupyansk).[40]
Russian forces are reportedly increasing the use of light multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) in the Kupyansk direction. A commander of a Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) battalion reported on August 27 that Russian forces are increasingly using MLRS artillery, including Kozerog-1 and Partizan, for area of effect strikes in the Kupyansk direction.[41] The commander noted that Russian forces are increasingly concealing artillery systems in forests while deploying unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) along the frontline to support logistics in a drone-saturated environment.
A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on August 28 that Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Borova but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[42] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on August 27 that Ukrainian forces seized several strongholds between Nove and Katerynivka, and expanded the contested “gray zone” near Ridkodub (all southeast of Borova).[43]
Russian forces continue targeting Ukrainian logistics routes in the Borova direction. Borova Military Administration Head Olena Klymenko reported on August 28 that Russian forces intensified the first-person view (FPV) drone, MLRS, and glide bomb strikes across the Borova Hromada, Kharkiv Oblast, restricting movement along key logistics routes.[44]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure and military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 28 that Ukrainian forces struck the Luhansk Thermal Power Plant (TPP) near occupied Shchastya (roughly 94 kilometers from the frontline), the Alchevska electrical substation near occupied Alchevsk (roughly 76 kilometers from the frontline), and the Luhansk electrical substation near occupied Luhansk City (roughly 108 kilometers from the frontline).[45] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov published footage on August 28 showing a Ukrainian FPV drone striking a Russian BM-27 Uragan MLRS near occupied Kreminna (roughly 22 kilometers from the frontline).[46]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian sources are more frequently acknowledging the effectiveness of Ukrainian counterattacks in the Lyman direction. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on August 28 that Ukrainian forces hold the initiative in several areas of the frontline and are counterattacking southeast of Lyman, including west of Zherebets River, near Dibrova and Ozerne, and toward Yampil.[47] The milblogger noted that it is unclear if Russian forces are present on the salient east of Svyatohirsk (northwest of Lyman) and that there is evidence of Ukrainian activity in the area. The milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces can operate relatively freely in central Lyman, indicating that Russian forces do not have any significant presence in the city. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces implied on August 28 that Russian territorial claims are significantly exaggerated in the Lyman direction and that Russian forces do not control Ozerne or Dibrova, despite the Russian MoD claiming that Russian forces seized Dibrova in December 2025 and Ozerne in April 2026.[48] The source also claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions southeast of Lyman, contrary to Russian claims, and have some presence in the Dibrova and Ozerne areas. Russian sources claimed on August 26 and 27 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in the Lyman direction.[49] Lyman is a key settlement in Russia’s planned advances towards Slovyansk from the northeast, but certain geographic limitations, including the Siverskyi Donets River, and Ukrainian defenses have likely complicated Russian forces’ ability to expand offensives from the Lyman direction.[50]
Russian forces are reportedly preparing to intensify offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction as early as September 2026. An officer in a Ukrainian brigade reported on August 28 that Russian forces are deploying recently trained personnel to the near-rear areas and replenishing manpower in preparation for an intensification of offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction as early as September 2026.[51] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are preparing the battlespace for intended future offensive ground operations against Slovyansk.[52]
Ukrainian forces are reportedly making limited tactical gains in and near Kostyantynivka as Russian forces reduced ground activity in the area in the short-term. A Ukrainian soldier operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on August 28 that Russian forces have decreased infiltration missions in Kostyantynivka and that Ukrainian forces have stymied Russian advances and made tactical gains in some unspecified areas.[53] The soldier reported that Ukrainian forces cleared the areas of Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka and Osykove (northwest of Kostyantynivka) of Russian infiltrators. The soldier stated that Russian forces are redeploying forces between Kostyantynivka and Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka) and are concentrating personnel near Stepanivka, but that the purpose of these redeployments is unclear. The soldier stated that there are no Russian soldiers currently in Raiske (west of Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka) and that Ukrainian forces either eliminate Russian personnel attempting to infiltrate Raiske or force them to withdraw from their positions.
Geolocated footage from early to mid-August 2026 provides more granularity about Ukrainian advances and Russian infiltrations in and near Kostyantynivka. Ukrainian forces previously struck Russian positions and personnel in and west of Dovha Balka (west of Kostyantynivka), south of Chervone, and in southern Chasiv Yar (both northeast of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions, according to geolocated footage published between August 2 and 17.[54] Russian forces also previously struck Ukrainian positions in northwestern, central, and southeastern Kostyantynivka, according to geolocated footage published on August 20 and 21.[55]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian weapons and vehicle concentration near Krasna Hora (northeast of Kostyantynivka and north of Bakhmut) on August 27 or overnight into August 28.[56]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions northeast and southeast of Dobropillya. Russian forces recently struck Ukrainian positions in eastern Hannivka (just northeast of Dobropillya) and eastern Chernihivka (just southeast of Dobropillya) according to geolocated footage published on August 27, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in those areas contrary to previous Russian claims.[57]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions on August 27 and 28 but did not advance.[58]
Russian forces continued limited ground activity northeast and southeast of Oleksandrivka on August 27 and 28 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Komar (east of Oleksandrivka).[59]
Ukrainian forces conducted intermediate-range strikes against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast in recent days. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Kurakhove (about 32 kilometers from the frontline) on August 27 or overnight into August 28.[60] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 28 that Ukrainian forces struck substations near Lisne (one of multiple settlements between 55 and 92 kilometers from the frontline), Volodymyrivka (either 24 or 57 kilometers from the frontline), Pavlivka (44 kilometers from the frontline), Dmytrivka (either 75 or 112 kilometers from the frontline), Lyubivka (either 71 or 107 kilometers from the frontline), Novotroitske (likely about 66 kilometers from the frontline), and Novoazovsk (about 140 kilometers from the frontline) from August 26 to 28.[61]
A Ukrainian strike against a Russian military command post in occupied Donetsk City on August 26 reportedly killed a senior officer of the Russian 41st Combined Arms Army (CAA, Central Military District).[62] A source reporting on Russian casualties in Ukraine claimed on August 28 that the August 26 Ukrainian strike against Donetsk City killed Lieutenant Colonel Andrey Moiseyenko, a senior officer of the headquarters of the 41st CAA’s Operational Directorate.[63]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northwest of Hulyaipole on August 27 and 28 but did not advance.[64] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Uspenivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[65]
Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in western Zaporizhia Oblast, as Ukrainian forces either advanced or maintained positions in southeastern Orikhiv. Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian position in southern Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) and Russian forces recently cleared a Ukrainian position in southeastern Orikhiv, according to geolocated footage published on August 28.[66] The geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the areas and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in southeastern Orikhiv contrary to Russian claims.
A Russian milblogger claimed on August 28 that Russian forces advanced west of Charivne (east of Orikhiv), north of Novodanylivka (southeast of Orikhiv), and into central Bilohirya (southeast of Orikhiv).[67]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 28 that Ukrainian forces struck gas distribution stations in occupied Staropetrivka and Marynivka (roughly 98 and 80 kilometers from the frontline respectively).[68]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on August 27 and 28 but did not advance.[69]
Russian forces continue their “human safari” tactics, targeting civilians in Kherson Oblast. Russian forces struck a civilian on a bicycle near Dariva (northeast of Kherson City) according to geolocated footage published on August 27.[70]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure in occupied Kherson Oblast. Brovdi reported on August 28 that Ukrainian forces struck electrical substations near occupied Tymofiivka and Henichesk (roughly 68 and 116 kilometers from the frontline respectively).[71]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Nebo-SV radar station and a P-18 hardware radar and mobile communications complex near occupied Olenivka (either roughly 120, 141, or 225 kilometers from the frontline); Nikolayevka radio relay station near occupied Frunze (either roughly 130, 186, or 188 kilometers from the frontline); and a Russian training center near occupied Sevastopol on August 27 or overnight on August 28.[72] Brovdi reported on August 28 that Ukrainian forces struck 315 energy nodes in occupied Crimea and other occupied territories in Ukraine during the “Crimean Switch Off” operation that lasted from July 1 to August 28.[73] Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck electrical substations near occupied Kovylne (either roughly 120 or 124 kilometers from the frontline), occupied Novoozerne (roughly 133 kilometers from the frontline), occupied Krainie (roughly 173 kilometers from the frontline), and occupied Nyva (either roughly 119 or 150 kilometers from the frontline), and gas distribution centers in occupied Rozdolne (either 110 or 188 kilometers from the frontline), occupied Novopavlivka (either roughly 107, 147, or 220 kilometers from the frontline), and occupied Partizany (roughly 221 kilometers from the frontline) between August 26 and 28. A local Crimea-based Telegram channel claimed on August 28 that parts of Kirovskyi Raion lost gas supply after Ukrainian strikes against occupied Partizany.[74] The source also claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Russian ammunition depots near occupied Voinka (roughly 109 kilometers from the frontline).[75]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[76]
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 27 to 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on August 28 that Russian forces launched 164 Shahed- and Gerbera-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones — of which half were jet-powered Shahed drones — from the directions of Bryansk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[77] The Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces intercepted 137 drones, that an unspecified number of air targets struck 16 locations, and that drone debris fell at four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, civilian, industrial, commercial, and energy infrastructure in Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhia, Zhytomyr, and Kherson oblasts; a gas station and commercial and residential infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast; and logistics infrastructure in Kyiv and Sumy oblasts.[78] Sumy City Military Administration Head Serhiy Kryvosheyenko reported on August 28 that Russian forces launched two unspecified missiles against an industrial zone in Sumy City, injuring seven people.[79] Kharkiv Oblast officials reported on August 27 and 28 that a Russian Geran-4 drone struck the last Epicenter home improvement shopping center in Kharkiv City, injuring five people.[80] Ukraine’s largest energy company DTEK reported on August 28 that Russian strikes caused power outages in Odesa Oblast.[81]
Ukrainian Agrarian Policy Minister Taras Vysotsky reported on August 28 that Russian strikes destroyed approximately 90 percent of Ukrainian retail-chain food logistics but noted that Ukraine will not suffer from food shortages.[82]
Russian forces reportedly continue to shift toward prolonged strike series to maximize civilian damage and disrupt daily civilian functions. Russian forces reportedly launched small drone waves every 30 to 60 minutes to prolong air raid alerts which lasted for 14 hours in Kyiv City on August 27.[83] Russia adopted daytime strike patterns in addition to its nighttime strikes in early April 2026 to maximize civilian damage and disruption.[84] These strikes aim to force Ukrainians to seek shelter more often during the day, disrupt public transportation schedules, and force businesses to temporarily cease operations – resulting in significant disruptions in daily life and the Ukrainian economy.
Russian forces continue adapting their Geran-type drones to increase flight ranges and interception difficulty. Open-source intelligence analysts reported on August 28 that a Russian jet-powered Geran-type drone flew about 960 kilometers from occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea toward Torchyn, Volyn Oblast — a record distance from the occupied Hvardiiske launch site.[85] Russian milbloggers published footage on August 28 purporting to show Russian Geran drones conducting an abrupt 180-degree turn in Kyiv City — a characteristic of lighter first-person view (FPV) drones that would make the drones harder for Ukrainian forces to intercept.[86] Ukrainian drone manufacturer Wild Hornets published footage on August 27 showing a Ukrainian brigade intercepting a Russian Geran mothership drone carrying two FPV drones.[87]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko began talks with Russian government officials in Moscow before his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on August 29.[88] Lukashenko met with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin in Moscow on August 28 to discuss bilateral trade, economic, investment, and other areas of industrial cooperation.[89] Lukashenko stated that Russia and Belarus will solve their “common problem” at their southwestern borders (likely referring to Ukraine) and that Belarus intends to fulfill all obligations to Russia, including providing fuel supplies to Russia.[90]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2093259531937587213
[2] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/29956
[3] https://t.me/kpszsu/57903; https://t.me/kpszsu/43889; https://t.me/kpszsu/43263; https://t.me/kpszsu/35037
[4] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-27/russia-was-forced-to-cut-spending-after-running-out-of-cash
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2026/; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-01/russia-finance-officials-tell-putin-war-spending-is-unaffordable
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/cognitive-warfare/putins-internet-crackdown-is-rooted-in-weakness-and-a-need-to-demand-greater-war-sacrifices/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2026/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/
[9] https://regulation.gov dot ru/projects/170590/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-september-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-14-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-september-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_28-7/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2024/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_17-18/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2026/;
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2026/
[13] https://t.me/mod_russia/66841
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2026/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2025/;
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2026/
[17] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/28053225
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2026/
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2026/
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-strike-campaigns-will-likely-continue-to-hurt-russias-economy-and-military-operations-in-ukraine/
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2026/; https://t.me/serhii_flash/7481
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42055 ; https://t.me/usf_army/2387; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2093259531937587213; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20620
[23] https://t.me/evraevmikhail/22249
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2026/;
[25] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-28/ukraine-s-record-strikes-push-russians-back-to-gasoline-lines
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_8-8/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/
[27] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8910049
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42056
[29] https://verstka dot media/na-ozon-za-god-prodali-bolee-2-mln-tovarov-voennogo-naznacheniya-na-25-mlrd-rublej
[30] https://verstka dot media/cherez-wildberries-prodali-tovarov-voennogo-naznacheniya-na-sotni-millionov-rublej
[31] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2026/;
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42050; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42052; https://t.me/wargonzo/36510; https://t.me/severnnyi/9159
[33] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/21578; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2093322597840613725; https://t.me/Osintpen/3409
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42050 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42052; https://t.me/wargonzo/36510; https://t.me/severnnyi/9159
[35] https://t.me/mod_russia/66832
[36] https://t.me/sashakots/64029
[37] https://t.me/severnnyi/9163; https://t.me/severnnyi/8685
[38] https://t.me/severnnyi/9160
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42050 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42052; https://t.me/wargonzo/36510
[40] https://t.me/grvZapad/19595 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19596 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36510
[41]
https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/27/%c2%abkozerog-1%c2%bb-pid-pryczilom-yak-vystezhuyut-rosijski-rszv-na-kup%e2%80%99yanshhyni/
[42] https://t.me/grvZapad/19595
[43] https://t.me/rybar/82706
[44] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1389480-fpv-droni-kontroluut-dorogi-obstrili-posililis-prote-dosi-zalisautsa-976-ludej-situacia-v-borivskij-gromadi/; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1314243-fpv-droni-pocinaut-distavati-po-pravoberezzu-borivskoi-gromadi-skilki-ludej-tam-lisautsa/
[45] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2770
[46] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/32684
[47] https://t.me/rybar/82706 ; https://t.me/rybar/82707
[48] https://t.me/grvZapad/19595 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-27-2026/
[49] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2026/
[50] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2026/
[51] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1389670-rosiani-gotuut-novi-sili-dla-nastupu-na-doneccini-so-vidbuvaetsa-na-slovanskomu-napramku/
[52] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/
[53] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xGNuBUL0x4k
[54] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2093291483990200385?s=20; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2093292580695953854?s=20; https://t.me/official24ombr/2562; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2093276496882184404?s=20; https://t.me/official24ombr/2543; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2093276507418288305?s=20; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2093256495630533012?s=20; https://t.me/armycorps19/411; https://www.facebook.com/reel/2266143044129474; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2093256508632952876?s=20; https://www.facebook.com/reel/2266143044129474; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2093256530942427473?s=20; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2093256495630533012?s=20
[55] https://t.me/z4lpr/1888 ; https://t.me/huginbps/250 ; https://t.me/zayndi_zingiev/495; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2093303613179232258?s=20; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2093304204395778115?s=20 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2093304214671798678?s=20; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2093304235462910352?s=20; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2093304246217162969?s=20; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2093305174097907821?s=20 ; https://t.me/OMSBR72/7361 ; https://t.me/Zerkalo_NewZ/107114/; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2093305174097907821?s=20
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42056
[57] https://x.com/meowqai/status/2092985062182498744 ; https://tme/icpbtrubicon/2491
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42050 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42052 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/122056
[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42050; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42052 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/55538;
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42056
[61] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2770
[62] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2026/
[63] https://x.com/KilledInUkraine/status/2093237074308583634
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42050; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42052
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42056
[66] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12820 ; https://t.me/ZS42MSD/8855 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2092991114013749441 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12816 ; https://t.me/intelligencecompany/254
[67] https://t.me/divgen/83500; https://t.me/divgen/83503
[68] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2770
[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42050; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42052
[70] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2093053699929112788?s=20; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DcjJu0CICu5/
[71] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2770
[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42056
[73] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2770
[74] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/108287
[75] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/108296
[76] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[77] https://t.me/kpszsu/74983
[78] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2253783708718243; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28349; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31697; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4551 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4552 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4555 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4556 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4557 ;; https://suspilne.media/kharkiv/1390218-bojovij-dron-vluciv-po-azs-u-slobidskomu-rajoni-harkova-aki-naslidki/; https://suspilne dot media/1389500-zatrimki-potagiv-zrujnovani-skladi-ta-udari-po-budivlah-rf-dobu-atakue-kiiv-1647-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1787908117&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/72984; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/72929;; https://t.me/GalinaMinaeva/6292; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/14817 ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/65952 ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/66006; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/72939; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/28/kyyivshhyna-perezhyla-masovanu-rosijsku-ataku-bpla-gorily-sklady-j-avtomobili/;
https://www.facebook.com/anton.ovsiienko/posts/pfbid02RWeckEcjUfE7Sai74ekJbTL5Sj5HcmLDVztRLFCv6dBd1JSKYDdfzRC6hfxLQEfPl?rdid=UwSYpQCGV4ZHShw8# ; https://suspilne dot media/1389500-zatrimki-potagiv-zrujnovani-skladi-ta-udari-po-budivlah-rf-dobu-atakue-kiiv-1647-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1787895007&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://www.facebook.com/anton.ovsiienko/posts/pfbid02RWeckEcjUfE7Sai74ekJbTL5Sj5HcmLDVztRLFCv6dBd1JSKYDdfzRC6hfxLQEfPl ; https://suspilne dot media/1389500-zatrimki-potagiv-zrujnovani-skladi-ta-udari-po-budivlah-rf-dobu-atakue-kiiv-1647-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1787910412&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/hryhorov_oleg/3157; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/28/okupanty-vdaryly-po-sumah-iz-rszv-semero-lyudej-gospitalizovani-odyn-postrazhdalyj-u-vazhkomu-stan/ ; https://t.me/zhytomyrskaODA/18177; https://suspilne dot media/1389500-zatrimki-potagiv-zrujnovani-skladi-ta-udari-po-budivlah-rf-dobu-atakue-kiiv-1647-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1787893828&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps;
[79] https://t.me/serhii_kryvosheienko/2233; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1390068-rosijska-armia-zavdala-udaru-dvoma-raketami-nevidomogo-tipu-po-promislovij-zoni-sum/
[80] https://suspilne dot media/1389472-po-ostannomu-epicentru-v-harkovi-rosiani-vdarili-reaktivnim-dronom-suspilne-videonovoni/ ; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1389580-rosijski-vijska-zavdali-udaru-po-torgovomu-centru-epicentr-u-zaporizzi-28-serpna-so-vidomo/ ; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1389706-naslidki-udaru-rosijskih-bpla-po-tc-epicentr-u-zaporizzi-28-serpna-fotoreportaz/ ; https://suspilne dot media/1389500-zatrimki-potagiv-zrujnovani-skladi-ta-udari-po-budivlah-rf-dobu-atakue-kiiv-1647-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1787898671&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1389544-obstrili-rf-zaporizza-ta-oblasti-28-serpna-so-vidomo/ ; https://suspilne dot media/1389500-zatrimki-potagiv-zrujnovani-skladi-ta-udari-po-budivlah-rf-dobu-atakue-kiiv-1647-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1787917164&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://suspilne dot media/1389500-zatrimki-potagiv-zrujnovani-skladi-ta-udari-po-budivlah-rf-dobu-atakue-kiiv-1647-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1787917164&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://suspilne dot media/1389500-zatrimki-potagiv-zrujnovani-skladi-ta-udari-po-budivlah-rf-dobu-atakue-kiiv-1647-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1787903624&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[81]https://www.facebook.com/dtekoem/posts/pfbid0whQ1xRfwbvfqnX78b8YB38ajSSrKmsVGK84VMjdECH474RAyzjvjpgsWK5GASDmWl; https://suspilne dot media/1389500-zatrimki-potagiv-zrujnovani-skladi-ta-udari-po-budivlah-rf-dobu-atakue-kiiv-1647-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1787905839&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[82] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-economy/4158531-vorog-znisiv-blizko-90-skladiv-torgovelnih-merez-ale-ukrainci-ne-zalisatsa-bez-produktiv-visockij.html
[83] https://x.com/wartranslated/status/2093303435219095895?s=46
[84] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/
[85] https://t.me/mon1tor_ua/71559; https://t.me/oko_gora/20423; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/jet-shahed-record-distance-reaches-volyn
[86] https://t.me/rybar/82720; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/122027
[87] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/sting-zbyv-shahed-dvoma-fpv-dronamy-na-sobi/; https://t.me/wild_hornets/4972
[88] https://t.me/tass_agency/392435; https://t.me/tass_agency/392413; https://suspilne dot media/1389688-lukasenko-priletiv-do-rf-de-zustrinetsa-iz-putinim-ta-golovou-rosijskogo-uradu-misustinim/
[89] https://t.me/pul_1/22489
[90] https://t.me/tass_agency/392471; https://t.me/tass_agency/392475
