Toplines
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to reiterate Ukraine’s willingness to engage in a mutual energy strikes moratorium in line with US President Donald Trump’s recent statement regarding a strikes moratorium. Trump stated on September 14 that Ukraine and Russia have agreed to not strike each other’s energy infrastructure but did not provide further details.[1] Zelensky responded that Ukraine proposed a potential agreement to its partners in which Ukraine would halt strikes against Russian food, energy, and other critical infrastructure if Ukraine’s partners can ensure that Russia would reciprocate the same terms.[2] Zelensky stated that Ukraine “expect[s] specifics” from its partners regarding this proposal. Russian officials have not responded to either Trump or Zelensky’s September 14 statements as of this writing.
Zelensky has repeatedly, including recently, offered a mutual ceasefire in which both Russia and Ukraine refrain from striking each other’s energy infrastructure, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has rejected each offer thus far.[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on September 14, ahead of Trump’s September 14 statement, that the Kremlin welcomes Trump’s September 13 call for Ukraine to refrain from striking Russian diesel infrastructure.[4] Peskov refused to answer a media question about Russia’s willingness to stop striking Ukrainian infrastructure in return, however.[5] Ukraine‘s ongoing strikes against Russian energy infrastructure aim in part to incentivize Russia to stop striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure, which Russia does consistently each winter as part of its long-standing campaign to demoralize the Ukrainian populace.[6]
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to reiterate Ukraine’s willingness to engage in a mutual energy strikes moratorium in line with US President Donald Trump’s recent statement regarding a strikes moratorium.
- Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on September 14.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Krasnodar Krai overnight. Russia launched 102 drones against Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Krasnodar Krai on the night of September 13 to 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian 92N6 multifunction radar station for the S-400 Triumph anti-aircraft missile system in Sochi, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 310 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of September 13 to 14.[7] The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters acknowledged the Ukrainian strike in Sochi.[8]
Satellite imagery provided updated battle damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes against Krasnodar Krai and Rostov Oblast. Satellite imagery published on September 13 shows large smoke plumes at the Slavyansk Oil Refinery in Slavyansk-on-Kuban, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 300 kilometers from the frontline), following Ukraine’s September 13 strike, and indicates that the strike likely destroyed two oil tanks at the refinery.[9] Satellite imagery published on September 13 indicates that Ukraine’s September 11 strike against the Atlant Aero plant in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast (approximately 165 kilometers from the frontline), destroyed three production and warehouse facilities at a Molniya-type drone production site.[10]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian milbloggers and a source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces reported that Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 14, but ISW has not observed evidence of Russian advances.[11]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian storage, preparation, and launch site for long-range strike drones near Kursk City, Kursk Oblast (roughly 99 kilometers from the international border) and radar stations in Litizh, Trostenchik, and Lipovka and Russian repeaters in Rokhmanovo, Krasny Styag, and Kamen in Bryansk Oblast (all between 25 and 51 kilometers from the international border).[12]
Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in northern Kharkiv Oblast as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area. Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions west of Veterynarne, in western and southern Kozacha Lopan, and east of Hoptivka (all north of Kharkiv City) after likely Russian infiltration missions, according to geolocated footage published on September 13.[13] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 14 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked twice near Hoptivka in the past 24 hours.[14] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 14 that Russian forces seized Shevchenkove (north of Kharkiv City).[15]
Russian milbloggers continue to baselessly claim that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces northeast of Kharkiv City, contrary to all available evidence. A Russian milblogger claimed on September 14 that Russian forces continue to destroy allegedly encircled Ukrainian servicemembers between the Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk direction.[16] ISW has not observed any evidence to substantiate these claims since Russian sources first made claims about encircling these Ukrainian forces on September 3.[17] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on September 14 that Russian sources often claim the seizure of settlements and other tactical successes prematurely and contrary to a far more dynamic battlefield situation.[18]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 13 but did not make confirmed advances.[19] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 14 that Russian forces seized Shyroke (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[20] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 14 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Krasnyi Yar (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[21]
Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations southeast of Kupyansk on September 13 and 14 but did not advance.[22] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Kivsharivka (southeast of Kupyansk) and near Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk).[23]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations east and southeast of Borova on September 13 and 14 but did not advance.[24]
Ukrainian sources and satellite imagery provided an updated battle damage assessment (BDA) of a recent Ukrainian strike against occupied Luhansk Oblast. Satellite imagery published on September 13 indicates that Ukraine’s September 7 strike destroyed a Russian field artillery ammunition depot near occupied Teple, Luhansk Oblast (roughly 130 kilometers from the frontline).[25]
Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest
Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements
Russian forces concentrated attacks toward and southeast of Lyman on September 13 and 14 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks northeast of Lyman.[26] Russian milbloggers reported that the situation north and northeast of Lyman remains difficult for Russian forces, particularly near Zarichne, Ivanivka, Kolodyazi, and along the Ridkodub-Nove line.[27] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian forces reached the Zherebets River in an unspecified location, but noted that the extent of Ukrainian advances remains unclear at this time.[28]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east
Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements
Russian forces concentrated offensive operations east of Slovyansk toward Mykolaivka and Rai-Oleksandrivka on September 13 and 14 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rai-Oleksandrivka.[30] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the eastern outskirts of Vasylivska Pustosh (east of Kramatorsk) and are consolidating positions in the area.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south
Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements
Russian forces continued offensive operations near and southwest of Kostyantynivka on September 13 and 14 but did not advance.[31]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest
Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions southwest of Dobropillya. Ukrainian forces hold positions northeast of Novopidhorodne, according to geolocated footage published on September 13, contrary to Russian claims.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 14 that Russian forces advanced in northern and eastern Dobropillya, into western Svyatohorivka (just northwest of Dobropillya), and south of Vesele Pole (north of Dobropillya).[33]
Russian forces are heavily relying on drone and glide bomb strikes in the Dobropillya area, likely due to localized Russian personnel shortages following tactical failures to advance in the killzone. An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Dobropillya area reported on September 14 that Russian forces are increasingly attempting to bypass Ukrainian positions from the flanks and are launching hundreds of first-person view (FPV) strike drones and intensifying airstrikes in the area.[34] The officer stated that local Russian forces are trying to act more cautiously, likely due to personnel shortages after failing to consolidate positions and advance in the grey zone. A Ukrainian artillery commander operating in the Dobropillya area reported on September 14 that Russian forces have a numerical drone advantage and have significantly increased drone strikes in the area, complicating Ukrainian logistics.[35] The Ukrainian commander reported that up to 10 Russian combat aircraft operate in his brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR) per day and conduct large glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions. The officer noted that Russian drone activity and airstrikes have strained Ukraine’s ability to operate artillery. The officer assessed that colder weather (which hinders certain drone operations) may prompt Russian forces to resume using wheeled and armored vehicles more regularly but noted that Russian forces cannot do so now as Ukrainian drones detect and destroy large vehicle groupings before they reach the line of contact.
Russian forces have prioritized attacks toward Dobropillya as part of their intended campaign design to encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest even after Ukrainian forces collapsed the intended northern pincer around Lyman.[36] The Russian military command has likely not yet internalized recent Ukrainian counterattacks around Lyman, which could be leading to a continued high offensive tempo toward Dobropillya. The Russian military command may also decide to continue offensive efforts from the southwest even after realizing that the Lyman effort has failed to try to cut Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the Fortress Belt from the south and west. Previous Russian advances around Dobropillya have been largely opportunistic, including the Dobropillya penetration in August 2025, and Russian forces may be continuing intensified offensive operations in the area to try to identify an exploitable weakness in the Ukrainian defensive line.[37]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range and frontline strikes against occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian strike drone storage, preparation, and launch site in occupied Donetsk City (roughly 55 kilometers from the frontline) on September 13 or overnight to September 14, after striking the same type of target in Donetsk City on September 12 or overnight to September 13.[38] It is unclear if Ukrainian forces struck the same location in both instances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian ground control station in occupied Novohrodivka (roughly 20 kilometers from the frontline).[39]
Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 14 but did not make confirmed advances.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 14 that Russian forces advanced southwest of Novopavlivka.[41]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations southeast of Oleksandrivka near Rybne and towards Ternove on September 13 and 14 but did not advance.[42]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on September 13 and 14 but did not advance.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 14 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Novoselivka.[44]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 13 and 14 but did not make confirmed advances.[45] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 14 that the Russian Dnepr Grouping of Forces seized Novoandriivka (west of Orikhiv).[46] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 14 that Russian forces advanced in southeastern Novopavlivka (northwest of Orikhiv), west of Chervona Krynytsya (northeast of Orikhiv), and south of Lukyanivske (northwest of Orikhiv).[47]
Russian forces continue to use the occupied Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) for military purposes. The Ukrainian Marine Corps Spokesperson Pavlo Drohal stated on September 14 that Russian forces are actively placing electronic warfare (EW) systems at the occupied ZNPP and are using territory immediately around the plant to launch drones against Nikopol (northwest of the ZNPP).[48]
Russian forces continue to employ “human safari” tactics, purposefully hunting civilians in Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian officials reported on September 13 and 14 that Russian forces conducted a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a civilian car in Kushuhun, Zaporizhia Oblast, killing one, and geolocated footage published on September 14 shows the aftermath of the strike.[49]
A Russian milblogger claimed on September 14 that Russian forces continued strike missions in the Kherson direction, but neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground offensive operations in the Kherson direction.[50]
Ukrainian strikes against Russian positions in the Kherson direction are complicating Russian offensive activity in the area. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian Marine Corps unit operating in the Kherson Direction stated on September 14 that Russian forces have virtually ceased offensive activity in the Kherson direction, especially in the island delta southwest of Kherson City, in September 2026 thus far.[51] Drohal stated that Russian forces struggle to gain a foothold along the shores of the Dnipro River due to a high density of Ukrainian drones. Drohal stated that Ukrainian strikes against Russian logistics in the Kherson direction forced Russian forces to decrease their offensive operations in the area. Russian forces now rely more on the use of drones to strike civilian infrastructure along the right bank of the Dnipro River near Kherson City and Nikopol in an effort to make these areas uninhabitable.
Russian forces continue to employ “human safari” tactics, purposefully hunting civilians in Kherson City. Regional Ukrainian officials reported on September 14 that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a civilian car in Dniprovskyi raion, Kherson City, killing one.[52] Kherson Oblast Military Administration reported on September 14 that Russian forces struck a hospital in Kherson City, injuring an employee.[53] Geolocated footage published on September 14 shows the Russian 18th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) striking civilians in Kherson City with drone-dropped munitions.[54]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian short-range navigation radio system near the Saky Airfield in occupied Crimea (roughly 180 kilometers from the frontline).[55]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[56]
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on September 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 108 Shahed- (including jet-powered) and Gerbera-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea overnight.[57] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 85 Russian drones and that an unspecified number of air vehicles struck seven locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk and Chernihiv oblasts.[58] Geolocated footage published on September 14 shows drone operators of the Russian 50th Separate Varyag Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Brigade striking gas stations in Kyiv City.[59] Large Ukrainian retail chain EVA reported that a Russian strike destroyed its sorting center in Odesa Oblast on the night of September 12 to 13.[60]
Russia continues to target Ukrainian locomotives with jet-powered drones. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on September 14 that Russian jet-powered Geran-4 drones struck locomotives among other targets in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Poltava, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.[61] The Russian MoD claimed that the trains were military trains and that the relevant locomotive infrastructure supports Ukrainian military logistics. ISW is unable to verify the Russian MoD’s characterization of the locomotive infrastructure.
Russian forces continue to increase their usage of jet-powered drones and other innovations to maximize damage from their strike packages, particularly against western Ukraine. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on September 14 that Russian forces fielded about 2,800 jet-powered drones in August 2026, a significant increase compared to about 1,500 in July 2026 and about 350 in June 2026.[62] Ihnat stated that the jet-powered drones likely have shorter ranges, so Russian forces are also launching standard Shahed-type drone variants in several waves toward western Ukraine. Ihnat indicated that Russian forces are experimenting with adding mesh network connectivity to Shahed-type drones but have not yet deployed this technology in Shahed-type drones at scale.
Russia reportedly continues scaling up its ballistic missile production ahead of the winter. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated on September 12 that Russia may produce at least 100 ballistic missiles in September 2026.[63] Skibitskyi stated that Russia leverages between 17 and 19 ballistic missile launchers in Kursk, Voronezh, and other oblasts bordering Ukraine for its strike packages against Kyiv City and other areas of Ukraine. Skibitskyi previously reported that Russia was leaning back into the production and launch of ballistic missiles, as Russia likely seeks to exploit Ukraine’s shortage of Patriot air defense interceptors in its strike packages.[64] This shortage will likely continue into the winter, and Russia will likely seek to use larger ballistic missile strike packages to strike Ukrainian energy and other infrastructure going into the coming winter in efforts to freeze out Ukraine, as it has done in every winter since the start of the full-scale invasion.[65] Ukraine likely can degrade Russian forces’ ability to strike Ukraine with ballistic missile launchers located in Russia’s border regions, provided Ukraine receives enhanced Starshield technology to be able to precisely target military objects located in Russia.
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Russia continues to subsume elements of Belarus’ defense industrial base (DIB) as part of Moscow’s larger effort to reequip the Russian military and support a protracted war in Ukraine. Belarusian opposition organization BELPOL reported on September 14 that Belarus is preparing its 558th Aviation Repair Plant in Baranovichi to produce components for the Su-25 ground attack aircraft.[66] BELPOL reported that it obtained a document indicating that the Belarusian State Military Industrial Committee reportedly stated that the repair plant has new facilities of over 20,000 square meters and is already manufacturing parts for a wide range of aircraft, including the Su-25, Su-27, Su-30, and MiG-29. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko first stated in February 2023 that Belarus was ready to localize production of the Su-25 for the Russian military.[67]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/117270009579288120
[2] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20871
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/ukrayina-gotova-dotrimuvatisya-rezhimu-pripinennya-povitryan-106265; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/
[4] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/09/14/peskov-privetstvoval-prizyv-trampa-k-ukraine-ostanovit-udary-po-rossiyskim-npz-prekratit-li-udary-rossiya-v-kremle-ne-otvetili
[5] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/09/14/peskov-privetstvoval-prizyv-trampa-k-ukraine-ostanovit-udary-po-rossiyskim-npz-prekratit-li-udary-rossiya-v-kremle-ne-otvetili
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2025/
[7] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42229
[8] https://t.me/tass_agency/395269; https://t.me/opershtab23/17175
[9] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8152 ; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/drony-znyshhyly-dva-naftovi-rezervuary-na-npz-u-slov-yansku-na-kubani-13-veresnya/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2026/
[10] https://t.me/absolutely_reliable/97; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/urazheno-sklady-atlant-aero-u-taganrozi/
[11] https://t.me/dva_majors/98955; https://t.me/wargonzo/36927; https://t.me/severnnyi/9311
[12] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42229
[13] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12946; https://t.me/jacksons_dairy/13319 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2099136069161656635
[14] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/15989
[15] https://t.me/mod_russia/67329
[16] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47593 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/15989
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2026/
[18] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/14/znykayut-u-ruyinah-a-potim-znovu-jdut-upered-shho-vidbuvayetsya-na-harkivshhyni/ ; https://youtu.be/v_hgVy3tUZM
[19] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42223; https://t.me/dva_majors/98955 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9311
[20] https://t.me/mod_russia/67327
[21] https://t.me/divgen/83939; https://t.me/divgen/83915
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42223; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42226 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36927
[23] https://t.me/grvZapad/19766
[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42223 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42226
[25] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8158 ; https://t.me/ukr_sof/3355 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-7-2026/
[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42223 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42226 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98955 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36927 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19766 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/15989
[27] https://t.me/dva_majors/98955 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/15989 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19766
[28] https://t.me/grvZapad/19766
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42223 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42226 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36927
[30] https://t.me/wargonzo/36927
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42223 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42226
[32] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2099142645050134628; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/38384
[33] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33881
[34] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/14/%c2%abchervona-zona%c2%bb-rozshyryuyetsya-u-%c2%abrubezhi%c2%bb-rozpovily-pro-taktyku-rf-na-dobropilskomu-napryamku/ ; https://youtu.be/v_hgVy3tUZM
[35] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1402916-vijsko-rf-narostilo-vikoristanna-bpla-na-pokrovskomu-napramku-so-vidbuvaetsa-bila-dobropilla/
[36] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2026/
[37] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2025/
[38] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2026/; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42229
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42229
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42226
[41] https://t.me/divgen/83939; https://t.me/divgen/83931
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42223 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42226
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42223 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42226 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98955 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36927 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/21106
[44] https://t.me/divgen/83939; https://t.me/divgen/83934
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42223 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42226 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36927 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98955
[46] https://t.me/mod_russia/67331
[47] https://t.me/divgen/83939; https://t.me/divgen/83934
[48] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/14/atakuyut-czyvilnyh-i-povertayutsya-na-miscze-prylotu-morpihy-rozpovily-pro-rosijskyj-teror-na-hersonshhyni/ ; https://youtu.be/EHiuKvFUr2w
[49] https://t.me/kushugumrada/34646 ; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/76747 ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2099227805305229372; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2099476065332646337
[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47586
[51] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/14/rosiyany-hotily-prorvatysya-ale-shhos-pishlo-ne-tak-shho-vidbulosya-na-ostrovah-dnipra/ ; https://youtu.be/EHiuKvFUr2w
[52] https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/15294 ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/67433
[53] https://t.me/khersonskaODA/67438
[54] https://x.com/giK1893/status/2099458750591431049?s=20 ; https://x.com/giK1893/status/2099458753909121332?s=20 ; https://t.me/zona_Red/1453
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42229
[56] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[57] https://t.me/kpszsu/78165
[58] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32066 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/32067 ; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28674; https://t.me/vilkul/17903; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1402764-rosijski-vijska-atakuvali-seredmista-priluk-na-cernigivsini/; https://t.me/gunpChernihiv/12853
[59] https://t.me/Osintpen/3543; https://t.me/Brigada_VARYAG/237; https://t.me/Osintpen/3544
[60] https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1403396-v-odesi-cerez-rosijsku-ataku-znisili-sortuvalnij-centr-merezi-eva/; https://www.facebook.com/EVA.dp.ua/posts/pfbid02nJfc4hsFms9xGpHzBfETePhTMfAMfJrxi9Q2X8c5dYt9iV2aU6FSSpFNpLbkWk2vl?rdid=ojRj2BSQ7OdCswRu#
[61] https://t.me/mod_russia/67320
[62] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/14/%c2%abdrony-jdut-odyn-za-odnym%c2%bb-u-povitryanyh-sylah-rozpovily-pro-zminu-taktyky-rosijskyh-atak/; https://youtu.be/v_hgVy3tUZM
[63] https://24tv dot ua/zahist-vid-balistiki-gur-nazvali-klyuchovi-kroki-dlya-protidiyi_n3140998
[64] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/
[65] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2025/
[66] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/u-bilorusi-planuyut-lokalizuvat-su-25/; https://youtu.be/FUg5CIMgQn4?t=537
[67] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_17-19/
