Toplines
Russian forces continue experimenting with new technological innovations to restore mechanized maneuver at the tactical level and break out of positional warfare. Russian forces are experimenting with equipping tanks with modernized active protection systems (APS) — systems that provide kinetic defenses to protect vehicles from incoming strikes — to enhance tanks’ survivability against Ukrainian drones in the kill zone. Geolocated footage posted on August 7 shows Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drones striking a Russian T-72B3M tank equipped with an Arena-M APS that was likely depleted near occupied Volodymyrivka (east of Dobropillya).[1] Russian forces previously conducted a notable reduced company-sized mechanized assault in the Dobropillya direction, one of Russia’s priority sectors, with between seven and nine tanks and two armored fighting vehicles in late July 2026, and Ukrainian forces eliminated at least one T-72B3A tank equipped with an Arena-M APS at that time.[2] The footage published on August 7 is likely from the July mechanized assault. Russian engineers initially designed the Arena-M system to protect armored vehicles from incoming rockets, missiles, and high explosive anti-tank shells in their immediate vicinity by intercepting them with counter-munitions, but Russian forces reportedly developed and introduced an “anti-drone” capability to intercept approaching FPV drones in 2025.[3] Ukrainian sources reported on August 9 that one Arena-M system equipped on a Russian tank intercepted seven Ukrainian FPV drones during the Russian mechanized assault, increasing the number of FPV drones Ukrainian forces needed to destroy the tank by 15 to 20.[4]
Russian forces appear to be deploying Arena-M systems in an effort to increase the survivability of their tanks against Ukraine’s “tactical reconnaissance strike complex” (TRSC) — a system of persistent drone threats coupled with legacy crewed weapons, artillery, and prepared defenses in depth — in order to restore mechanized maneuver to the battlefield.[5] The Arena-M system, by itself, likely will not be an effective countermeasure to Ukrainian FPVs alone, as the system can be overwhelmed and only increases the cost and effort required of Ukrainian forces defending against the Russian mechanized assault.
The Arena-M system alone is currently insufficient to protect Russian mechanized assaults from Ukrainian drones, let alone all of the other weapons that Ukrainian forces use to create the kill zone. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that the Arena-M holds only 12 counter-munitions, a magazine depth which could have been sufficient for lower-tempo operational environments featuring lower FPV drone density, such as the battlefield in Ukraine from 2023 to 2025, but that these capabilities are insufficient in current combat conditions that feature a significantly greater and ever-growing density of drones.[6] Another Russian milblogger acknowledged that Arena-M by itself is insufficient to restore maneuver to the battlefield and called for Russian forces to integrate the Arena-M and other APS systems into a layered air defense that could allow Russian forces to increase the survivability and maneuverability of their armored vehicles and personnel.[7] The Arena-M APS also notably does not incapacitate Ukrainian defensive measures (such as crewed weapons, field fortifications, landmine fields, indirect fires, and other systems) that, along with FPV drones, create the kill zone. Russian forces previously attempted to restore operational maneuver in 2025 through their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign but were largely ineffective.[8] The July 2026 deployment of the Arena-M in a mechanized assault demonstrates continued Russian efforts to employ novel innovations and tactics in an attempt to break out of positional warfare.
Russian forces will likely continue efforts to restore maneuver despite the failure of the late July 2026 Dobropillya mechanized assault. Ukraine has also been undertaking efforts to restore mechanized maneuver to the battlefield at the tactical level since late 2025.[9] Combat in Ukraine will likely become less positional and feature more tactical maneuver as both sides continue employing novel tactics and technologies.[10]
Russian forces continued to heavily target Odesa Oblast on the night of August 8 to 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 11 missiles of various types, most of which were ballistic missiles or travelled on ballistic trajectories, and up to 100 drones and loitering munitions, including jet-powered drones and six Banderol loitering munitions, against Odesa Oblast on the night of August 8 to 9.[11] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed one missile, five of the Banderols, and 72 percent of the drones; that three missiles did not reach their targets; and that missiles and drones hit nine locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 9 that Russian forces struck residential and port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast, injuring at least eight people.[12] Odesa Oblast’s primary utility and water management company, Infoxvodokanal, reported energy and water outages in several raions in the region following the strikes.[13] Russian forces have intensified their strike campaign against Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast and vessels calling at Ukrainian Black Sea ports since at least July 10.[14] The Ukrainian Ministry of Community and Territorial Development reported that Russian forces struck 67 seaport facilities, 35 civilian vessels in ports, and 22 ships in the Ukrainian sea corridor in total in July 2026.[15]
Russian forces struck the Mayaki bridge on the M-15 Odesa City-Reni highway connecting southern Ukraine to Moldova and Romania on August 9. Russian milbloggers reported that Russian forces struck the Mayaki road bridge on the M-15 highway.[16] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces destroyed the bridge, while other Russian milbloggers published footage purporting to show that the bridge remains operational.[17] A local news outlet for Izmail City (located near the bridge) reported on August 9 that a Russian strike damaged the bridge, and Ukraine’s State Border Guard Service reported on August 9 that Ukrainian authorities temporarily restricted traffic on the M-15 highway following Russian strikes.[18] Russian forces previously struck the Mayaki bridge in December 2025.[19]
Russian forces likely targeted the Mayaki bridge to disrupt Ukrainian grain and other exports via the alternative land corridor that Ukraine has been using since Russian strikes disrupted Ukrainian maritime exports. Russian forces have been intensifying their efforts to degrade Ukraine’s export capacity since July 2026.[20] Then Ukrainian Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food Mykola Solskyi reported that Russian strikes destroyed 60,000 tons of grain in the Chornomorsk port in Odesa Oblast on the night of July 19, and Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on July 31 that Russian strikes damaged more than 20 ships near the Black Sea and substantially slowed cargo flows in the shipping corridor, for example.[21] Ukraine’s main farmers union, Ukrainian Agri Council, stated on July 15 that Ukraine has lost about one third of its grain export capacity due to Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian port infrastructure.[22] Ukrainian Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food Taras Vysotskyi recently reported that Russian strikes have forced Ukraine to seek alternative routes via the Danube River for its grain and cargo exports.[23] Russian forces are likely shifting their strike targets from the Ukrainian sea corridor to the land corridor to specifically prevent Ukrainian grain exports and generally degrade the Ukrainian economy.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated on August 9 that Turkey proposed a Russian Ukrainian moratorium on strikes against merchant ships in the Black Sea.[24] Fidan stated that Russia and Ukraine received the proposal and that Turkey is waiting for a response.
Russia is reportedly preparing to receive as many as 50,000 North Korean troops. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview on August 8 that Russia and North Korea have agreed to deploy 30,000 to 50,000 North Korean personnel to an unspecified location (or locations) in Russia in an unspecified time frame.[25] Zelensky previously warned on July 25 that Russia has been preparing bases in Voronezh Oblast since June 2026 to receive another 30,000 North Korean soldiers.[26] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Chernyak told Reuters in an article published on August 5 that an unspecified North Korean missile unit has started to deploy to western Russia, possibly equipped with 120 ballistic missiles of an unspecified model and six missile launchers.[27] Chernyak stated that Russia plans to base the North Korean missile unit, which includes about 90 North Korean soldiers, in Voronezh Oblast within Russia’s 112th Missile Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District). ISW continues to assess that North Korean deployments of personnel and provisions of missiles to Russia for its war against Ukraine will provide North Korea with valuable frontline combat experience and weapons testing — as Russia and North Korea have done in the past.[28]
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces continue experimenting with new technological innovations to restore mechanized maneuver at the tactical level and break out of positional warfare.
- The Arena-M system alone is currently insufficient to protect Russian mechanized assaults from Ukrainian drones, let alone all of the other weapons that Ukrainian forces use to create the kill zone.
- Russian forces will likely continue efforts to restore maneuver despite the failure of the late July 2026 Dobropillya mechanized assault.
- Russian forces continued to heavily target Odesa Oblast on the night of August 8 to 9.
- Russian forces struck the Mayaki bridge on the M-15 Odesa City-Reni highway connecting southern Ukraine to Moldova and Romania on August 9.
- Russian forces likely targeted the Mayaki bridge to disrupt Ukrainian grain and other exports via the alternative land corridor that Ukraine has been using since Russian strikes disrupted Ukrainian maritime exports.
- Russia is reportedly preparing to receive as many as 50,000 North Korean troops.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD / DEAD) campaign against air defense assets in Russia.
- Russia launched 202 drones and 17 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic, Onyx anti-ship, and Kh-31P anti-radar missiles against Ukraine overnight.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk and Borova directions.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD / DEAD) campaign against air defense assets in Russia. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 9 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian S-400, Pantsir-S1, and Tor air defense systems and Kasta 2E2 and Podlet-K1 radar systems in Krasnodar Krai and Rostov Oblast.[29] Satellite imagery collected on August 7 shows the aftermath of a recent Ukrainian strike against a Russian Volna Kupol Garnat electronic warfare (EW) system, likely belonging to the Russian Federal Security Service’s (FSB) 32nd Border Detachment, in Gelendzhik, Krasnodar Krai (approximately 370 kilometers from the frontline).[30] The Volna Kupol Garnat EW system is designed to disrupt Starlink satellite communications by targeting spacecraft directly rather than local ground terminals.[31]
Ukrainian long-range strike campaign is forcing Russia to redeploy air defense assets from across the country to protect Moscow City. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 8 that Russian authorities have concentrated three rings of air defenses around Moscow City, reinforced by redeploying air defense systems from throughout Russia.[32] Zelensky stated that Russian authorities are also pulling air defense systems from across the country to defend St. Petersburg, but to a lesser extent than Moscow City. Ukraine’s ability to deliver long-range strikes across a wide variety of objects indicates that Russian forces are struggling to defend Russia’s vast territory and airspace beyond the immediate area of operations in Ukraine and major Russian cities.[33] Ukrainian forces can likely further exploit Russia’s degraded air defenses provided additional targeting, communications, and strike capabilities.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 8 and 9 but did not advance.[34]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 8 and 9 but did not make confirmed advances.[35] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Kozacha Lopan (northwest of Kharkiv City).[36] The source claimed that several Russian groups are cut off from the main force grouping near Vilcha (northeast of Kharkiv City and south of Vovchansk) and are experiencing supply issues.
A source reporting on the Russian Northern GoF complained about recent official Russian claims about alleged Russian seizures in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[37] The source refuted the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) July 24 claim that Russian forces seized Zakharivka (southeast of Vovchansk), alleging that Russian forces do not maintain a presence near Zakharivka beyond one to two servicemembers and are struggling to advance to the settlement.[38] The source added that only 10 percent or fewer of the Russian soldiers who attacked toward Zakharivka reached their destination. The source assessed that Russian forces are likely trying to attack Zakharivka after Russian commanders recently submitted reports falsely claiming that Russian forces seized Ivanivka (just southeast of Zakharivka). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 8 that Russian forces seized Ivanivka.[39] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger repeated recent Russian MoD claims of seizures in northern Kharkiv Oblast and claimed that Russian attacks near Ivanivka and Ivashkyne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk and about 17 kilometers southeast of Ivanivka) could threaten to encircle Ukrainian forces located in the area between the Velykyi Burluk and Vovchansk sectors.[40] Such an encirclement remains extremely unlikely, however. ISW has only observed evidence to assess that Russian forces operating in the Velykyi Burluk and Vovchansk directions are roughly 45 kilometers apart from each other. This is a significant distance that will be very difficult for Russian forces to close given Russian forces’ inability to break out of positional warfare in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on August 8 shows smoke rising over a likely Ukrainian position northeast of Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north and northeast of the settlement.[41] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on August 9 that Russian forces advanced in central Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).[42]
A Russian source acknowledged Ukrainian advances in the Borova direction. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 9 that Ukrainian forces advanced south of Bohuslavka (north of Borova) and near Novoplatonivka (northeast of Borova).[43] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on August 9 that Ukrainian forces are attempting to advance toward Zelenyi Hai (east of Borova).[44]
Russian forces continue to use frontline Geran drone strikes to hinder Ukrainian logistics in the Borova direction. The Russian MoD claimed on August 9 that Russian forces conducted Geran drone strikes against a Ukrainian warehouse with drones and electronic components in Kharkiv Oblast.[45] Geolocated footage confirms that Russian forces conducted a Geran strike against Savyntsi (west of Borova).[46]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continue infiltration missions in the Slovyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on August 9 shows a Russian servicemember throwing an explosive into a Ukrainian-held dugout in northwest Rai-Oleksandrivka (southeast of Slovyansk).[47]
Russian forces continue efforts to shape the battlefield for future offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction. Footage published on August 8 shows a Russian drone strike against Ukrainian vehicles in Slovyansk.[48] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are intensifying their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign to shape the battlefield in and near Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, although Russian forces remain unlikely to advance quickly to or through these cities in the near term.[49]
The head of medical services of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces do not take significant effort to evacuate their wounded from the battlefield in the area.[50] The medical services head stated that Russian prisoners of war (POWs) often talk about having to remain at positions for months without supplies. The medical services head added that Russian forces continue to conduct infiltration tactics in the area.
Russian forces continue offensive operations in Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on August 8 and 9 but didn’t make confirmed advances.[51] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 9 that Russian forces seized Vasyutinske (north of Kostyantynivka) and Toretske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces were along the H-20 Kostyantynivka-Slovyansk highway in eastern Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (northwest of Kostyantynivka).[53]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on August 8 and 9 but did not make confirmed advances.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 9 that Russian forces reached the eastern outskirts of Dobropillya and Hannivka (northeast of Dobropillya).[55]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 8 and 9 but did not advance.[56] Geolocated footage published on August 9 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position east of Chernihivka (formerly Krasnoyarske, north of Pokrovsk), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the area contrary to Russian claims.[57]
Newly arrived Russian troops are infiltrating in the Pokrovsk direction. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 9 that Russian forces have rotated new troops into the area over the last month and that the new forces are conducting more infiltration missions in groups of one to three personnel.[58] The deputy commander stated that the “kill zone” in the area is 20 kilometers from the frontline and that FPV drones are targeting Ukrainian bomber drones in the area.
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 8 and 9 but did not advance.[59]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on August 8 and 9 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 9 that Ukrainian forces have become more active in the Oleksandrivka direction in the past month and largely control Zelenyi Hai and Tovste (both northeast of Oleksandrivka).[61] The milblogger also acknowledged that a large number of Ukrainian soldiers are operating in Zirka (northeast of Oleksandrivka) and Piddubne (south of Oleksandrivka) but that the settlements are contested “gray zones.”
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian Center for the Study of Occupation Head and former Mariupol official Petro Andryushchenko reported on August 8 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian substation in occupied Mariupol (roughly 110 kilometers from the frontline), causing power outages.[62] Mariupol occupation head Anton Koltsov claimed on August 9 that occupation authorities are struggling to fully restore electricity and water in the city.[63]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Ukrainian forces maintain control over Zirnytsya (northwest of Hulyaipole), contrary to official Russian claims. Geolocated footage published on August 8 shows Ukrainian forces raising a Ukrainian flag and capturing a Russian servicemember in eastern Zirnytsya, indicating that Ukrainian forces likely cleared the eastern outskirts of Zirnytsya of Russian infiltrators.[64] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on August 8 that it took a Russian soldier prisoner whom Russian military authorities ordered to conduct a flag-raising in Zirnytsya for a video to allege false Russian advances.[65] Russian milbloggers claimed on August 9 that Russian forces are attacking northwest of Zirnytsya.[66]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 8 and 9 but did not make confirmed advances.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 9 that Russian forces seized Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[68] ISW has not observed other Russian sources claiming recent Russian advances in the area. ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces likely maintain control over Mala Tokmachka. Another Russian milblogger claimed on August 9 that fighting continues in Prymorske (west of Orikhiv), despite a Russian source’s acknowledgement on August 8 that Russian forces no longer maintain positions in southern Prymorske.[69]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 9.
Russian forces continue to strike religious sites in Ukraine.[70] Stanislav Head Ivan Samoilenko reported on August 7 that Russian forces struck the Pokrovsky church in Stanislav (west of Kherson City).[71]
A Ukrainian military official reported that Ukrainian forces have “trapped” Russian forces on the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast.[72] Commander of the Ukrainian Odesa Operational-Tactical Group Lieutenant General Denis Nosikov reported that Russian forces — mostly elements of the 337th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) — withdrew from the northern and western parts of the Kinburn Spit after Ukrainian strikes on Russian supply lines and heavy Russian losses. Nosikov stated that Ukrainian forces do not maintain a presence on the spit but have it under fire control. Nosikov reported that Russian forces on the spit continue to experience issues with ammunition, food, and fuel supplies and are unsuccessfully trying to exploit poor weather conditions to bring vehicles to the area. Novikov added that Russian forces are struggling to withdraw from the area due to anti-personnel mines on logistics routes. Sources first began reporting on Russian withdrawals from the northern and western parts of the spit in early June 2026 after Ukrainian strikes on Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Ukraine began causing supply issues.[73]
Ukrainian strikes against occupied Crimea continue to cause water and power outages and fuel shortages. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian logistics depot in Perekop (roughly 90 kilometers from the front) on the night of August 8 to 9.[74] The Crimean State Water Enterprise reported that occupation authorities limited water supply in Simferopol, Kerch, Yany Kapu, Yedy-Kuiu, and Feodosia on August 9 due to repair work on the supply network.[75] Crimea occupation energy operator Krymenergo reported on August 9 power outages in Crimea due to damage to power facilities and the main power grids.[76] Chairperson of the occupation Crimean Council of Ministers Yuri Gotsanyuk stated on August 7 that authorities will temporarily reduce fuel sales at TES and Atan gas stations in the coming days.[77] Gotsanyuk claimed that gasoline sales will increase after the next shipment arrives and that diesel fuel prices will decrease to 109 rubles per liter (about $5 per gallon) next week (the week of August 9 to 15). A Russian milblogger criticized Russian efforts to use mobile generators to address power outages in northern Crimea and mobile fire groups to repel Ukrainian strikes as insufficient.[78]
Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian vessels in the Black Sea. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 9 that Ukrainian forces struck an oil tanker and two dry cargo ships in the Black Sea.[79]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
See topline text for additional reports on Russian missile and drone strikes on Ukraine.
Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 8 to 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 17 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles, Onyx anti-ship missiles, and Kh-31P anti-radar missiles from occupied Crimea and the Black Sea region and 202 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Parodiya-type drones and Banderol loitering munitions from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[80] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 174 drones and five Banderols, that missiles and drones hit 22 locations, and that missile debris fell on six locations. The Ukrainian Air Force added that several missiles did not reach their intended targets. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, energy, commercial, agricultural, rail, and port infrastructure in Odesa, Kharkiv, Zhytomyr, Mykolaiv, Kyiv, Kherson, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Chernihiv, and Donetsk oblasts.[81] Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs Ivan Vyhivksyi reported on August 9 that Russian forces conducted a double-tap strike during the day on August 9 against Ukrainian emergency workers responding to the overnight Russian strikes in Zaporizhia Oblast, killing a firefighter.[82]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 9 that Russian forces continue to heavily rely on ballistic missiles in their strike packages against Ukraine as part of efforts to exploit Ukrainian shortages of interceptor missiles.[83] Zelensky stated that Russian forces launched 61 missiles, including 56 ballistic missiles; more than 1,560 strike drones; and 1,540 glide bombs against Ukraine between August 3 and 9.
Russian forces are increasingly striking Ukrainian railway infrastructure. Geolocated footage published on August 9 shows Russian forces conducting Shahed-type drone strikes against a locomotive near Kudashivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; a railway crane, repair train, and locomotive in Lozova, Kharkiv Oblast; and a locomotive near Bilany, Sumy Oblast.[84] Ukraine’s railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia reported on August 8 that Russian forces struck a passenger train in Sumy Oblast on the Sumy City-Kyiv City route.[85]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xBad0WLr288; https://x.com/klinger66/status/2086190556330291579?s=20
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2026/; https://x.com/RALee85/status/2086188280408903894; https://x.com/kriegsforscherD/status/2086165753917509724
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_14-2/; https://t.me/rostecru/5547; https://t.me/milinfolive/163512
[4] https://x.com/kriegsforscherD/status/2086165753917509724
[5] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Ukraine20and20the20Problem20of20Restoring20Maneuver20in20Contemporary20War_final.pdf; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/
[6] https://t.me/rybar/82326
[7] https://t.me/arx_spn/30588
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/; https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/insights-papers/emergent-approaches-combined-arms-manoeuvre-ukraine
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/
[11] https://t.me/kpszsu/72080
[12] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20347
[13] https://t.me/infoxvodokanal/1230
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2026/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2026/
[16] https://t.me/rybar/82328 ; https://t.me/sashakots/63627 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/121007 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/97222 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/23476 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36126 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/177401 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/28560
[17] https://t.me/dva_majors/97222 ; https://t.me/bomber_fighter/26188 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/177408
[18] https://www.facebook.com/SouthernBorderUkraine/posts/pfbid0emb66oFdQrYDSqv9osAYBH6rz8kJUwU5r4epncZddzAcCwT1LHMmv5wu7rtj4EPzl?cft[0]=AZbh4sUzTmBbAMFlQ2-qFkdMKETkrdo64u934JR05YiPGt6GF6Aw5MvtoGloJ9jWLVZlJ0eFfdyRv_oVi5pB4qKDtEgH72niiop60-jciFNj8OKtkhM5lTJcershymgJC53a0bVmjf1nwUsFxvFhc56SibYIttS1xOwNzeDfe8JH3w&tn=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://izmacity dot com/articles/475360/nichna-ataka-na-odeschinu-ruh-cherez-mist-u-mayakah-povnistyu-zablokovano
[19] https://t.me/milinfolive/162774 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/162814
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2026/
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_19-16/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/
[23] https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-turns-alternative-grain-export-routes-counts-losses-russia-blocks-ports-2026-08-04/
[24] https://suspilne dot media/1374824-golova-mzs-tureccini-zaklikav-rf-ta-ukrainu-rozrobiti-mehanizm-moratoriu-na-udari-po-korablah-u-cornomu-mori/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J4rIYmlZeIk&t=877s
[25] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2086145876662083676
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2026/
[27] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/north-korean-missile-unit-deploys-russia-ukraine-war-kyiv-says-2026-08-05/
[28] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2026/
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41814; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2718
[30] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8029; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2086163388392972652; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2086238903275815297; https://x.com/GarbuzYe/status/2086150074925469867
[31] https://www.techradar.com/pro/russia-debuts-anti-starlink-ew-system-that-can-blind-terminals-by-overloading-satellites-receiving-antennas
[32] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2086138223177117926; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20344
[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2026/
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41811; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41809; https://t.me/wargonzo/36118; https://t.me/severnnyi/8967
[35] https://t.me/severnnyi/8967; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41811; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41809; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/15868; https://t.me/wargonzo/36118
[36] https://t.me/severnnyi/8967
[37] https://t.me/severnnyi/8968
[38] https://t.me/severnnyi/8968; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/
[39] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2026/
[40] https://t.me/rybar/82314
[41] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2086085065587458053?s=20; https://t.me/hisnikii/1657
[42] https://t.me/grvZapad/19387
[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/54950 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/54953
[44] https://t.me/grvZapad/19387
[45] https://t.me/mod_russia/66369
[46] https://t.me/Osintpen/3312 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/66369
[47] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12653 ; https://t.me/OMSBr_123/2505
[48] https://x.com/franfran2424/status/2086439959058133045 ; https://x.com/RALee85/status/2086218503925666119; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2086195795645350312; https://t.me/dva_majors/97213
[49] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2026/
[50] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1374884-evakuacia-poranenih-inodi-trivae-dnami-nacalnik-medicnoi-sluzbi-125-ovmbr-3-ak-pro-limanskij-napramok/; https://youtu.be/1lf00PxHFCE?t=2595
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41811; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41809; https://t.me/wargonzo/36118; https://t.me/z_arhiv/33660
[52] https://t.me/mod_russia/66377
[53] https://t.me/wargonzo/36118
[54]https://t.me/RVvoenkor/121004 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41811 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41809
[55] https://t.me/wargonzo/36118
[56]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41811 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41809 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/121004
[57] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2086384681482678691; https://t.me/Don_Guards_51st/1553
[58] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1374832-pidrozdili-sil-protivnika-proveli-rotaciu-zastupnik-komandira-bataljonu-bezpilotnih-sistem-pro-pokrovskij-napramok/; https://youtu.be/1lf00PxHFCE
[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41811 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41809
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41811 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41809
[61] https://t.me/divgen/83070
[62] https://t.me/andriyshTime/65095
[63] https://t.me/KoltsovAnton/3848
[64] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12655; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1034954692851728
[65] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2026/
[66] https://t.me/wargonzo/36118; https://t.me/voin_dv/20597
[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41811; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41809; https://t.me/wargonzo/36118
[68] https://t.me/motopatriot78/54925; https://t.me/motopatriot78/54930; https://t.me/motopatriot78/54937; https://t.me/motopatriot78/54951
[69] https://t.me/wargonzo/36118; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2026/
[70] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-10-20/
[71] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2086373560461762903; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2086373566568649061; https://most [dot] ks.ua/news/url/rosijani-artobstrilom-znischili-dzvinitsju-hramu-u-stanislavi-foto/
[72] https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1374940-rosijski-vijska-opinilisa-v-pastci-na-kinburnskij-kosi-komandir-otu-denis-nosikov/; https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/video-krym-realiyi-kinburnskyy-pivostriv/33824149.html
[73] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/
[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41814
[75] https://t.me/vodacrimearu/8923
[76] https://t.me/tvcrimea24/113670
[77] https://t.me/YuriyGotsanyuk/7628
[78] https://t.me/dva_majors/97219
[79] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2718
[80] https://t.me/kpszsu/72056
[81] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20347 ; https://t.me/I_Vyhivskyi/95 ; https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=122176721588971242&id=61579137283645&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=wgfbioag9fx9g74E# ; https://t.me/synegubov/24627 ; https://t.me/DSNS_Kharkiv/24667; https://t.me/DSNS_Kharkiv/24703 ; https://t.me/synegubov/24631 ; https://t.me/synegubov/24633 ; https://t.me/mykolaiv_ova/1900 ; https://t.me/mykolaiv_ova/2034 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/71097 ; https://t.me/odesa_prokuratura/3923 ; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/8367 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/71120 ; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/30964; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31280
[82] https://t.me/I_Vyhivskyi/95
[83] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20347
[84] https://t.me/Osintpen/3314; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/30449 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/66391
[85] https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/8367 ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1374414-rosijskij-bpla-atakuvav-pasazirskij-potag-sumi-kiiv/
