Note: Today’s update includes static maps only of areas in which noteworthy changes or events occurred.
Toplines
Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to militarize Russian society and to shift the responsibility for the war in Ukraine onto the Russian State Duma deputies and the Russian population. Putin gave a speech on July 26 for Russia’s Navy Day in which he heavily emphasized the importance of Russia’s national unity around the war effort in Ukraine.[1] Putin claimed that Russia needs to “imbue the consciousness” of its civil society with the importance of the war and to preserve this sense of national unity even after the war ends. Putin emphasized that there is nothing more important at this time than Russian forces fighting in Ukraine. Putin also claimed that Russian volunteers are eager to help the Russian military and are worried that Russian forces will no longer need their help in peacetime — an attempt to portray the Russian population as willing to continue the war and bear the necessary sacrifices to achieve victory in Ukraine. Putin also held a meeting with Russia State Duma deputies on July 27, during which he highlighted the unity of the Russian government around the war effort and claimed that the Duma has passed a total of nearly 3,000 bills in the past five years (since 2021), with two-thirds of the bills passing with support from all factions to support Russian forces, defense enterprises, society, and domestic economy during the war.[2] Putin noted that Duma deputies collectively passed laws to integrate illegally occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts into Russia. Putin likely highlighted the role of Duma deputies and ordinary citizens in Russia’s military effort to deflect personal responsibility for the continuing costly war and to portray them as fully supportive of Putin’s decisions ahead of the Duma elections in September 2026.
Putin continues efforts to persuade personnel mobilized in 2022 to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and continue fighting in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Putin had likely scripted an encounter with a mobilized Russian Caspian Flotilla sailor during his meeting with Russian Navy commanders on Russia’s Navy Day on July 26. The sailor claimed that he intends to sign a contract with the Russian MoD after he was mobilized and had fought in Ukraine since September 2022. Putin responded that the sailor’s story is a great example of a mobilized serviceman finding their calling during this war.[3] Putin likely highlighted the sailor’s story as an example of a mobilized servicemember who has achieved professional fulfillment through military service while embracing his duty to defend the Russian state. The Russian MoD notably attempted to survey and coerce Russian mobilized servicemen to switch to contract service in mid 2025, likely in an attempt to retain these forces in the event of demobilization.[4] ISW has previously observed reports of Russian military authorities incentivizing and coercing mobilized servicemembers into signing Russian MoD contracts.[5] The Kremlin likely continues to promote narratives and pursue measures aimed at retaining mobilized personnel within the Russian Armed Forces and to alleviate some societal concerns over lack of demobilization for personnel mobilized in 2022.
Putin continues to marginally increase the authorized end strength of the Russian Armed Forces as part of ongoing Russian military reforms. Putin signed a decree on July 27 setting the strength of the Russian Armed Forces at 2,426,130 total personnel, including 1,535,000 military personnel.[6] The decree aims to create military construction units within the Russian Armed Forces.[7] Putin last issued such a decree on June 12, increasing the authorized end strength to 2,399,130 total personnel, including 1,510,000 military personnel.[8] Putin’s July 27 decree marks an increase of 27,000 total personnel, of which 25,000 are military personnel. Russia has expanded the authorized end strength of the Russian Armed Forces nearly every year since launching the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, increasing the size by 137,000 personnel in 2022, 170,000 in 2023, and 180,000 in 2024.[9] The 2026 increases have been marginal in comparison to previous expansions. ISW continues to assess that the increases in authorized end strength support the expansion of the Russian force structure that then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in January 2023, since the formation of new Russian military districts, formations, and subordinate units requires more personnel to fully staff them.[10]
Key Takeaways
- Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to militarize Russian society and to shift the responsibility for the war in Ukraine onto the Russian State Duma deputies and the Russian population.
- Putin continues efforts to persuade personnel mobilized in 2022 to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and continue fighting in Russia’s war against Ukraine.
- Putin continues to marginally increase the authorized end strength of the Russian Armed Forces as part of ongoing Russian military reforms.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian export and oil infrastructure from July 26 to 27.
- Russia launched 147 drones against Ukraine overnight on July 26 to 27.
- Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on July 27.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian infrastructure on the night of July 26 to 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 27 that Ukrainian forces struck an export terminal in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast (roughly 68 kilometers from the border and 200 kilometers from the frontline), causing fires.[11] Rostov Oblast Governor Yuri Slyusar acknowledged on July 27 that Ukrainian drones struck Rostov-on-Don.[12] Russian opposition source Astra reported that Ukrainian drones likely also struck the Prioritet Federal State Budgetary Institution in Sarapul, Udmurt Republic (roughly 1,270 kilometers from the border), which is a long-term storage facility for state material reserves, including large stockpiles of fuel and petroleum products and special tanks for emergency or military needs.[13] Russian sources reported that Wildberries (the closest Russian equivalent to Amazon) temporarily evacuated its logistical center in Sarapul on July 27 following repeated Ukrainian drone strikes against Wildberries centers in recent days but that Ukrainian strikes did not damage the center.[14] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed on July 27 that Ukrainian forces struck oil facilities in Yaroslavl Oblast and Udmurt Republic overnight — over 1,300 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.[15]
Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian oil infrastructure are reportedly impacting Kazakhstan’s oil output. An industry source told Reuters on July 27 that Kazakhstan more than halved its daily oil output after Ukrainian drone strikes forced Kazakhstan to close its main exporting terminal on the Black Sea.[16] The industry source stated that Kazakhstan’s oil and gas condensate production averaged about one million barrels per day as of July 26 — compared to June 2026 averages of 2.16 million barrels per day. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy stated on July 27 that the Caspian Pipeline Consortium resumed operations after a weeklong suspension following Ukrainian strikes on vessels in the Black Sea.[17]
Russia is reportedly building new Pantsir air defense sites around Moscow City as part of continued attempts to adapt to Ukraine’s long-range strikes. An open-source intelligence account reported on July 27 that Russian authorities have built about 24 new Pantsir air defense towers in and near Moscow City in the last two months (since about late May 2026).[18] The open-source account noted that Russian authorities placed additional towers near key facilities in the area, including at the Moscow Oil Refinery, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residence, and Vnukovo International Airport. The open-source account reported that Russian authorities also placed three to four new Pantsir-SMD systems and two S-400 systems in Moscow City.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 26 and 27 but did not advance.[19]
Ukrainian forces intercepted a Russian drone that can carry glide bombs over Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces intercepted a Russian Forpost-R heavy strike and reconnaissance drone, which carries laser-guided KAB-20 guided glide bombs, over Kursk Oblast on July 27.[20] Brovdi noted that this is only the sixth confirmed downing of a Forpost-R drone since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 26 and 27 but did not advance.[21]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk and Borova directions on July 26 and 27 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[22]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on July 26 and 27 but did not advance.[23] The Russian MoD, citing a commander of a Russian Western Grouping of Forces company, claimed on July 27 that Russian forces pushed out the main Ukrainian group in Lyman and are clearing the town.[24] ISW has not observed geolocated evidence confirming this claim, however.
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage published on July 26 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember southeast of Vasiutynske (north of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[25] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized Torske (southwest of Druzhkivka and roughly three kilometers from the furthest extent of Russian infiltrations in the area).[26]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on July 26 and 27 but did not advance.[27]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 26 and 27 but did not make confirmed advances.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 26 that Russian forces advanced west of Shevchenko (northwest of Pokrovsk).[29]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on July 27.
Russian sources continue to post likely artificial intelligence (AI)-altered footage to claim Russian advances in the Oleksandrivka direction. Russian sources published likely AI-altered footage on July 27 purporting to show elements of the Russian 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) raising flags in Khrystoforivka (southwest of Oleksandrivka and roughly eight kilometers from the furthest extent of Russian infiltrations).[30] The Russian MoD also claimed that Russian forces seized the settlement.[31]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck an electrical substation in occupied Novyi Svit (roughly either 48 or 78 kilometers from the frontline) between July 25 and 27.[32]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continue infiltration missions in the Hulyaipole direction. Geolocated footage published on July 25 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember north of Hulyaipilske (southwest of Hulyaipole) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[33] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 27 that the westernmost Russian infiltration areas in the Hulyaipole direction are near Novoselivka (just west of Hulyaipilske), southwest of Charivne (south of Hulyaipilske), and near Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole), and that the northernmost infiltrations are near Zarichne and Nove Zaporizhzhia (both northwest of Hulyaipole).[34] Mashovets also reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions north of Myrne (southwest of Hulyaipole) and near Zaliznychne, Svyatopetrivka (both west of Hulyaipole), Varvarivka, and Dobropillya (both northwest of Hulyaipole). Mashovets noted that Russian offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction are mostly limited to infiltration missions in groups of three to four servicemembers and with motorized vehicles and that Russian forces rarely conduct larger group attacks in groups of 10 to 20 personnel or with armored vehicles.[35] Mashovets assessed that Russian forces in the Hulyaipole direction have a numerical advantage over Ukrainian forces in manpower and materiel, are able to conduct guided glide bomb strikes largely unhindered, and can regularly replenish their units in the area.[36] Mashovets reported that logistics of elements of the Russian 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) in the area are “vulnerable” due to Ukraine’s ongoing intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage posted on July 25 shows Russian forces surrendering to a Ukrainian drone in northern Plavni (west of Orikhiv) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[37]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kherson Oblast. Geolocated footage posted on July 26 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian drone control point in Oleshky (east of Kherson City on the right bank of the Dnipro River and roughly five kilometers from the frontline) with two glide bombs.[38] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 27 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ground relay to control Geran and Gerbera drones near Zalizny Port (southwest of Kherson City and roughly 48 kilometers from the frontline) and a road bridge across the Henichesk Strait in Kherson Oblast.[39] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Robert “Magyar” Brovdi stated that Ukrainian forces struck two electrical substations in occupied Tavrichanka (either roughly 44 or 48 kilometers from the frontline) and Tavria (roughly 43 kilometers from the frontline) between July 25 and 27, for a total of 154 struck substations in July 2026.[40]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian energy and military infrastructure in occupied Crimea on July 26 and 27. Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck 14 electrical substations in occupied Simferopol, Bakhchysarai, Muromske, Sudak, Nyva, Novoozerne, Perevalne, Dozorne, Zhaivoronky, Skvortsove, Alushta, Hurzuf, and Feodosia on July 26 and 27.[41] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies at the Bakhchysarai electrical substation.[42] Crimean occupation energy operator Krymenergo reported on July 27 that Ukrainian strikes overnight caused power outages in northwestern, eastern, and southern Crimea.[43] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on July 27 that Ukrainian forces struck and destroyed a Russian S-400 air defense launcher and radar in Crimea on the night of July 25 to 26.[44] Geolocated footage published on July 27 shows Ukrainian strikes on the air defense system east of Hlazivka (roughly 240 kilometers from the frontline).[45]
Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea likely forced Russian forces to reduce their aviation and naval activity in the Black Sea. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on July 27 that Russian forces have reduced their aviation and naval activity in occupied Crimea for “some time,” possibly due to the intensified Ukrainian strike campaign aimed at isolating the peninsula.[46] Pletenchuk stated that Russian submarine activity has also decreased, with only three operational submarines left in the Black Sea, but that they have remained inactive for a “long time.” Pletenchuk noted that the submarines are permanently based at the Novorossiysk port in Krasnodar Krai along with the rest of the vessels of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF).
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 147 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[47] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 123 drones, that 21 drones struck 10 locations, and that downed debris fell on seven locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, commercial, energy, transport, and port infrastructure in Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Chernihiv oblasts.[48]
Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian port infrastructure on the Black Sea. The Ukrainian Seaports Administration reported on July 27 that Russian forces overnight struck civilian merchant vessels in ports in Mykolaiv Oblast, killing one person.[49] The Russian MoD claimed on July 26 and 27 that Russian forces struck two cargo ships in the Dnipro-Bug estuary; three cargo ships at the port of Mykolaiv City; transshipment facilities and fuel and lubricant stores at the port of Odesa City; and fuel and lubricant tanks in the port of Chornomorsk, Odesa Oblast.[50] ISW continues to assess that the resumption of Russia’s strike campaign against port infrastructure aims to degrade the Ukrainian economy and reduce Ukraine’s export capacity and is likely in part a response to Ukraine’s strikes on Russian vessels in the Azov and Black seas in recent weeks.[51]
Russian forces are increasingly using faster jet-powered drones to strike Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. Head of Ukraine’s railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia, Oleksandr Pertsovskyi, reported on July 27 that a Russian jet-powered Shahed drone struck railway workers repairing damaged infrastructure in Donetsk Oblast, killing one worker and injuring two.[52] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on July 27 that elements of the Russian Grom-Kaskad drone brigade (reportedly of the 4th Air Force and Air Defense Army, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) launched a Geran-4 jet-powered drone against a supermarket in Chernihiv City on the afternoon of July 26, killing two people and injuring 25.[53] Geolocated footage published on July 26 shows the aftermath of the strike.[54] Chernihiv Oblast Military Administration Head Vyacheslav Chaus reported on July 27 that Russian forces are increasingly using jet-powered drones to strike Ukraine.[55] Russian forces have deliberately used the high-speed jet-powered drones, including to inflict greater civilian harm, as they are harder for Ukrainian forces to intercept.[56]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80341
[2] https://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80346
[3] https://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80341
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-23-2025/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-september-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-unlikely-demobilize-event-ceasefire-because-he-afraid-his-veterans
[6] http://publication.pravo.gov dot ru/document/0001202607270022?index=2;
https://meduza dot io/news/2026/07/27/putin-uvelichil-shtatnuyu-chislennost-armii-v-tretiy-raz-za-polgoda-i-shestoy-raz-s-nachala-voyny; https://t.me/mod_russia/66027
[7] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1105905; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/27/07/2026/6a6772db9a7947634fbb50c3?utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-13-2026/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-13-2026/; https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/8480206; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/document/0001202409160006; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/document/0001202312010116; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202208250004; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2026/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-military-restructuring-and-expansion-hindered-by-the-ukraine-war/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-13-2026/
[11] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41539
[12] https://t.me/Yuri_Slusar/6500
[13] https://t.me/astrapress/120251
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/ ; https://avoshop dot ru/company/news/2026/wildberries_sklad_sarapul_snova_prinimaet_postavki/; https://t.me/tass_agency/387325; https://t.me/kommersant/112120
[15] https://www.facebook.com/reel/2750675471969848
[16] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/kazakhstans-daily-oil-output-halves-after-exporting-terminal-closure-source-says-2026-07-27/
[17] https://astanatimes dot com/2026/07/kazakhstan-resumes-cpc-oil-exports-as-marine-terminal-reopens/
[18] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/navkolo-moskvy-zvely-novi-vezhi-ppo/ ; https://x.com/jembobineuse/status/2081190838751592882?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E2081190838751592882%7Ctwgr%5Ed8e7a028ba257c6bd313bcf7638fc960a833aaa3%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fmilitarnyi.com%2Fuk%2Fnews%2Fnavkolo-moskvy-zvely-novi-vezhi-ppo%2F ; https://x.com/jembobineuse/status/2081190843243704794?s=20 ; https://x.com/jembobineuse/status/2081190856501973290?s=20 ; https://x.com/jembobineuse/status/2081190869957218605?s=20 ;
[19] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41540; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41515; https://t.me/wargonzo/35804; https://t.me/dva_majors/96609; https://t.me/motopatriot78/54371; https://t.me/severnnyi/8825
[20] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2664; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/27/nad-kurshhynoyu-sbs-zbyly-ridkisnyj-bpla-forpost-r-na-vysoti-ponad-4-kilometry/
[21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41540 https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41515 ; https://t.me/synegubov/24243; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41513; https://t.me/dva_majors/96609 https://t.me/wargonzo/35804 https://t.me/dva_majors/96609; https://t.me/severnnyi/8825; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2664; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/27/nad-kurshhynoyu-sbs-zbyly-ridkisnyj-bpla-forpost-r-na-vysoti-ponad-4-kilometry/
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41540; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41515; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41513 https://t.me/wargonzo/35804; https://t.me/synegubov/24243; https://t.me/grvZapad/19258; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41540; https://t.me/wargonzo/35804; https://t.me/grvZapad/19258
[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41540 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41515 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41513 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/35804 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/96609 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/54386 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/8825
[24] https://t.me/mod_russia/66021
[25] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12545; https://t.me/pidrozdilshadowoficial/815; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/2081726745686749518
[26] https://t.me/mod_russia/66017
[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41540; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41515; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41540; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41513; https://t.me/feniksdpsu/2191; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/2081473927356805593; https://t.me/nm_dnr/15648
[28]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41540 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41515 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41513 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/120006
[29] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33584
[30] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12548; https://t.me/voin_dv/20398; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2081669756705480924; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2081721152846856458; https://t.me/Osintpen/3222
[31] https://t.me/mod_russia/66018
[32] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2663
[33] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12550; https://t.me/bat1brigade5/666
[34] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3529
[35] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3529
[36] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3530
[37] https://t.me/uda_army/21000
[38] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/37283
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41539
[40] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2663
[41] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2663
[42] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@33.867,44.754,13.477z
[43] https://t.me/crimeainform/46331
[44] https://t.me/DIUkraine/8985
[45] https://x.com/DI_Ukraine/status/2081615023970078775; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2081614430094164441; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2081614432715599912
[46] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/27/ne-do-polotiv-aktyvnist-vorozhoyi-aviacziyi-v-krymu-suttyevo-zmenshylasya/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_hgVy3tUZM
[47] https://t.me/kpszsu/70292
[48] https://t.me/chernihivrada/4125 ; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/27749 ; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/27757 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31044 ; https://t.me/synegubov/24243 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4386 ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/63100; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/14119 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/44953 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/44971 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/44972 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/45017 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/45024 ; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid038PUQLqenMQQJuJsgsLXXqC2nkkChPnosVSNth4ABXQ9c2sikA3n9rAvdXZvJMd7El?cft[0]=AZbY_BIMMQeVCCQppVx7zUW6lDvhhIDUPtGEZp8v4lI6OowJeNCK7Tas3eUZeOnHGF2-m2CO_cClLx3d_jam8R2Nm3MaVnJsY7hCi7wANsZ33XMMDhxkD38rufmqPdKsbLjtwXOurwcCRVX9nfI5qM1FW_-Cc0uMEdosbMA5tXQBXQ&tn=%2CO%2CP-R#?ibj ; https://t.me/mykolaiv_ova/1434
[49] https://t.me/ampu_uspa/585
[50] https://t.me/mod_russia/65987; https://t.me/mod_russia/66013 https://t.me/mod_russia/66026
[51] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2026/
[52] https://www.facebook.com/oleksandr.pertsovskyi/posts/pfbid02wjzwQC29Byn8nQAcdLUuzi9r2rWBYKM3GezhwhuvMoCPorfGczD1fceHSkfuCavVl?cft[0]=AZZo7mHtG7opMaShpFOusa4LeWqjjQWMxuQdYGfAsb_qws1IXX4wec19ecL_W95J6cuFE9ffAZxHIibDlscPRPOrBdpl2Dtp7R4J6rsWXKrh9oDxns5x1xwnnqDBQVGYj2p0jUmnBvTxqFGJQ6Hkz5Fmrg1xWfasQQBt0od5Q3aOe-pK2_Ih75j9_lczIqSmcZg&tn=%2CO%2CP-R
[53] https://t.me/DIUkraine/8988
[54] https://x.com/johnspectator/status/2081427771654275499; https://x.com/johnspectator/status/2081417882399899805; https://x.com/johnspectator/status/2081418711479484615
[55] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/30737
[56] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025/
