Toplines
Note: A portion of the following text appeared in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment on July 25, 2026.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russia is preparing to receive about 30,000 new North Korean troops. Zelensky stated that Russia has been preparing bases in Voronezh Oblast to receive another 30,000 North Korean soldiers and additional North Korean ballistic missiles since June 2026 in response to staggeringly high Russian battlefield casualties.[1] Zelensky did not specify when these North Korean soldiers or munitions would arrive in Russia.[2] Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov did not comment on Zelensky’s remarks.[3]
North Korea has sent an estimated 15,000 soldiers to Russia, who have supported Russia’s effort to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast in late 2024 into 2025 and have since performed rear area functions.[4] It is unclear what functions these additional North Korean personnel would perform or where in the theater they would operate. ISW has not observed reports of North Korean forces fighting in Ukraine. Russia and North Korea likely remain hesitant to deploy North Korean military personnel to occupied Ukraine due to the risk of inciting a Western response. The South Korean Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) reported that North Korea earned $620 million from four separate troop deployments in March 2026.[5] Ukrainian Military Intelligence (HUR) has additionally previously reported that North Korea has provided over 100 KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles to Russia, which has used at least 80 of these missiles.[6] These additional troop deployments and ballistic missile shipments are likely to bring further significant economic benefits for North Korea and continue to elevate North Korea-Russia relations.[7]
North Korea may be preparing to launch a military reconnaissance satellite for the first time since 2024. North Korea’s efforts to enhance its space-based reconnaissance capabilities could be intended to support North Korea’s emerging precision strike complex. NK News reported on July 21 that satellite imagery of North Korea’s Sohae Satellite Launching Grounds showed that North Korea had renovated launching facilities at the grounds.[8] North Korea also likely conducted a rocket engine test in early July at the same site.[9] North Korea previously tested a rocket engine at the facility in May and has constructed a VIP viewing stand at the complex.[10] These developments suggest that North Korea is preparing to launch a military reconnaissance satellite in the near future, something which Kim designated as a key priority at the Ninth Party Congress in February.[11]
North Korea attempted to launch several reconnaissance satellites from 2023 to 2024, but only one launch has been successful.[12] North Korea, therefore, has an extremely limited space-based reconnaissance capability, a critical enabler of modern military operations.[13] North Korea may be seeking to revive its satellite program with Russian assistance, as South Korean intelligence has assessed that Russia provided North Korea with assistance during its only successful satellite launch in 2023.[14] North Korea’s continued military support for Russia could have prompted Russia to provide the technical assistance required to restart North Korea’s satellite program.
North Korea may be pursuing an expanded military reconnaissance satellite network to support its emerging strike complex. ISW-CDOT has assessed that North Korea is investing in a wide array of precision strike capabilities that are designed to enhance North Korea’s ability to penetrate South Korea’s air defenses.[15] North Korea likely lacks the robust targeting infrastructure required to make these precision systems maximally effective, however.[16] A North Korean space program that can consistently launch reconnaissance satellites without difficulty could substantially improve North Korean real-time targeting capabilities. North Korea is far from demonstrating this capability, however, and a single successful launch would be unlikely to improve its space-based reconnaissance network substantially.
Key Takeaways
- North Korean Troop Deployment: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russia is preparing to receive another 30,000 North Korean soldiers in response to Russian battlefield casualties. It is unclear what functions these additional North Korean personnel will perform, but Russia and North Korea will likely remain hesitant to deploy the soldiers to Ukraine.
- North Korean Military Development: Satellite imagery shows that North Korea may be preparing to launch a military reconnaissance satellite for the first time since 2024. North Korea may be seeking to support its emerging strike complex, but it likely lacks the targeting infrastructure to make these systems maximally effective.
North Korean Domestic Politics
Nothing significant to report.
North Korean Military Developments
North Korea is likely expanding port facilities at Rason and Nampo to support the development of larger surface combatants and create basing architecture for North Korea’s nascent green-water navy. NK News reported on July 17 that satellite imagery showed that North Korea has begun constructing worker camps in Rason near the Rajin Shipyard.[17] This construction indicates that North Korea plans to undergo significant construction efforts at Rajin Port.[18] The guided-missile destroyer Kang Kon was towed to Rason for repairs after its failed launch and subsequent partial capsizing at Chongjin Port in May 2025.[19] This could indicate that Rajin Port is more suitable than Chongjin Port, where Kang Kon was constructed, for larger warship sustainment. NK News also reported on more minor expansion preparations at Nampo Shipyard, where the guided-missile destroyer Choe Hyon was constructed.[20]
ISW-CDOT has assessed that Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) General Secretary Kim Jong Un will likely expand North Korea’s naval base and shipbuilding infrastructure to support a larger surface fleet.[21] Kim has set ambitious goals for North Korea’s shipbuilding industry, including building two Choe Hyon-class guided missile destroyers every year through 2030.[22] Kim also suggested during Choe Hyon’s commissioning ceremony on June 23 that North Korea should aim to build two 10,000-ton cruisers per year but did not state if this was in addition to his destroyer shipbuilding goals or in lieu of them.[23] North Korea currently lacks the shipbuilding infrastructure to support that rate of surface vessel construction and the naval basing architecture required to maintain these vessels once constructed. Kim partially acknowledged North Korea’s shortcomings in these respects during Choe Hyon’s commissioning ceremony.[24] Expanding facilities at Rason is likely an effort to make up for these shortcomings. Rason was likely selected because its harbor does not freeze over during winter and is far from South Korea, making vessels docked there less exposed to attack.[25]
Expansion at Rason could indicate that Kim intends for North Korea’s emerging green-water navy to play a role beyond nuclear deterrence. Constructing sustainment and shipbuilding facilities is a major investment that would be unnecessary if North Korea intended its surface fleet to only act as an additional vector for nuclear strikes.[26] Significant investments in additional naval basing on both coasts could indicate that Kim intends North Korea’s surface fleet to also conduct deployments beyond North Korea’s immediate waters to secure North Korean sea lines of communication (SLOCs), harass adversary SLOCs, and possibly conduct anti-surface warfare missions.[27] Significant investments in multi-mission surface combatants and the facilities required to sustain them could create a dilemma for North Korea, as it will increasingly have to allocate resources to defend these valuable assets against enemy attack.
North Korea’s oceangoing surface fleet will almost certainly remain inferior to the South Korean Navy and the US Navy in both size and quality. South Korean and US submarines would likely pose a major threat to North Korea’s larger combatants that will be difficult for North Korea to counter due to US advantages in submarine stealth.[28] North Korea may calculate, however, that forcing South Korea and the United States to allocate high-end naval assets to counter a North Korean surface threat will prevent them from participating in other critical missions, such as air defense of the Korean Peninsula and hunting North Korean nuclear-armed submarines. The problem of defending high-end surface vessels from a superior adversary could force North Korea to invest in smaller combatants specialized in anti-submarine warfare and fleet air defense to ensure its surface fleet can have its desired effects.
North Korean Foreign Relations
North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui visited Moscow to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov amid North Korea’s continued support for the war in Ukraine and Russia’s support of North Korea’s nuclearization. Choe arrived in Moscow on June 18 and met with Putin and Lavrov.[29] Lavrov reiterated the importance of continued communication between Putin and WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un. Choe confirmed North Korea’s continued commitment and support to Russian military operations in Ukraine during her meeting with Putin.[30] Choe also confirmed that the Tumen River car bridge is almost complete.[31] Choe and Lavrov accused the United States and its allies of increasing “military activity” around the Korean Peninsula.[32] Choe and Lavrov additionally reviewed the 2024 North Korea-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and reconfirmed North Korea-Russia security cooperation.[33] North Korean state media stated that Russia supports North Korean efforts to defend itself against “hostile acts.”[34] Lavrov stated that Russia no longer supports denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on July 22.[35]
This meeting underscores North Korea’s interest in continuing to support Russia’s war in Ukraine and signals Russia’s increased support for North Korea’s security goals on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has provided vital support for Russia in the war in Ukraine, including through military personnel, artillery ammunition, and ballistic missiles.[36] Russia has increased its public support of North Korea’s nuclear program and interacted with the PRC on aerial military exercises to enter South Korea’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and degrade South Korean territorial integrity.[37] Kim and Putin last met in September 2025, during which Putin invited Kim to Russia. Kim visiting Russia would be a symbolic reflection of the increased strength of North Korea-Russia relations, as Kim travels infrequently for diplomatic engagements.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea increased bilateral trade in the first half of 2026 and are continuing to expand infrastructure to facilitate increased trade. North Korea likely aims to secure increased trade volumes and access to PRC currency while mitigating Beijing’s leverage over Pyongyang. Voice of America reported on July 21 that PRC-North Korea bilateral trade was $1.5 billion between January and June 2026 — their highest level since 2017.[38] Satellite imagery similarly revealed renewed construction on the new Yalu River Bridge between the PRC and North Korean borders and the development of a logistics zone on the North Korean side of the border, likely in preparation for increased cross-border cargo traffic.[39] The new Yalu River Bridge is expected to open by the end of 2026 after the PRC resumed construction on its side of the bridge in 2025.[40]
Trade between the PRC and North Korea declined in 2017 and 2018 following North Korean missile tests that the PRC viewed as risky and intentionally provocative.[41] The recent recovery in bilateral trade likely reflects Pyongyang’s efforts to secure greater economic benefits from the PRC while maintaining its growing relationship with Russia. North Korea has historically relied on the PRC as an economic lifeline but likely seeks to avoid overreliance on Beijing. ISW-CDOT previously reported on the construction of a new bridge over the Tumen River connecting North Korea with Russia and assessed that infrastructure developments along both the PRC and Russian borders likely reflect Pyongyang’s efforts to deepen its ties with each country while balancing its relationships with both.[42] Beijing likely seeks to recover some of its influence over Pyongyang as North Korea’s relationship with Russia has deepened since its deployment of troops to Russia in 2024.
North Korea is expanding trilateral people-to-people exchanges with the PRC and Russia. North Korea invited PRC and Russian youth to the Songdowon International Children’s Camp, which Pyongyang uses to promote North Korean regime ideology.[43] The camp commenced on July 20 and will likely continue for three to four weeks.[44] The Ministry of International and External Economic Relations of Russia’s Primorsky Krai stated on July 21 that approximately 400 Russian students are participating in the camp.[45] Pyongyang only invited Russian students in 2025.[46] The inclusion of PRC students this year is likely a reflection of improved North Korea-PRC ties. The United Kingdom sanctioned the Songdowon camp in May over allegations that the camp was involved in ideological brainwashing and forced deportation of Ukrainian children in support of Russia.[47] Vladivostok-based travel agency Vostok Intur separately launched a joint tour package visiting Russia, the PRC and North Korea on July 21, targeting Russian students and parents.[48] The Russian Border Service stated that a record-high 9,985 Russian nationals visited North Korea in 2025, with 5,075 individuals traveling for tourism purposes.[49] North Korea reopened its border to Russia in 2024 following the COVID-19 pandemic, hosting 1,957 tourists in that year.[50]
Pyongyang seeks ways to secure steady revenue streams through tourism and present itself as a “normal” state to the global community by hosting international events. ISW-CDOT previously assessed that North Korea’s decision to readmit PRC nationals to the 2026 Songdowon Camp serves as a strategic mechanism to deepen bilateral economic ties.[51] Beijing and Moscow also likely seek to facilitate trilateral economic exchange through North Korea.[52] North Korea will likely leverage its strategic geopolitical position with Russia and the PRC to expand economic cooperation with both partners and use them to ensure a stable influx of revenues.
South Korea detained a likely PRC-operated cargo ship on suspicion of exporting North Korean coal and iron ore in violation of United Nations (UN) sanctions. North Korea’s illegal coal exports may have increased as much as fivefold since 2019, partly enabled by the lapse in UN sanctions monitoring. South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed on July 21 that South Korean authorities detained the Tanzania-registered cargo ship, Prada, at the port of Pyeongtaek at some point since March.[53] The ship is one of seven that the United States, South Korea, and several other countries urged the UN to designate for sanctions in 2025 and 2026.[54] Prada has sailed under several names and national flags in recent years, according to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and ship-tracking data.[55] Prada is operated from Hong Kong and owned by a Marshall Islands-based company called Zhongxiang Shipping, which is very likely a PRC-managed firm registered overseas.[56] Prada originally sailed under a PRC flag under the name Huataishan from 2008 to 2020.[57] Ship-tracking data shows that the ship docked in multiple PRC, Malaysian, and Indonesian ports since July 2025, as well as the Russian Pacific port of Nakhodka.[58] A 2025 Open Source Centre investigation revealed satellite imagery of the ship loading coal in Nampho, North Korea, while its transponder signal showed it in Russia, indicating that it was manipulating its location data.[59]
The South Korea-based Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR) reported on June 30 that North Korea’s exports of coal and minerals to the PRC and Russia have dramatically increased since 2019, based on counts of cargo vessels in North Korean ports captured in satellite imagery.[60] NKHR counted 3,756 vessels at five major North Korean ports in 2025, a nearly fivefold increase since 2019.[61] Over 3,000 of the ships were docked at Nampho, the same port where Prada reportedly docked, and many of the vessels there were registered in the PRC.[62] South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) estimated that North Korea shipped at minimum 1.5 million tons of coal to the PRC in 2025. NKHR stated NIS’s estimate was the “bare minimum” of North Korea’s likely exports given the carrying capacity of the ships it monitored.[63] NKHR attributed the surge partially to Russia’s termination of a UN North Korean sanctions monitoring body in 2024 and the post-COVID-19 pandemic reopening of PRC-North Korean trade in 2023.[64] North Korea is exploiting the end of the UN sanctions monitoring mechanism to raise revenue by increasing illegal exports to the PRC and Russia.
North Korean Cognitive Warfare
Nothing significant to report.
Inter-Korean Relations
South Korean Minister of Unification Chung Dong-young announced the “Seven Major Reforms” on July 23, reiterating the Ministry of Unification’s (MOU) commitment for South Korea to conciliate with North Korea and work towards inter-Korean dialogue. North Korea will likely not respond to the MOU’s efforts. North Korea will likely not respond to the MOU’s efforts. Chung’s “Seven Major Reforms” include: maintaining the MOU’s organizational stability, restoring inter-Korean peace, transitioning to a peaceful coexistence policy, reframing South Korea’s strategy for North Korean nuclear and peace, reforming South Korea’s education on peace and unification, and reforming South Korean perceptions of North Korean-born citizens.[65]Chung stated that a complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) plan does not work and South Korea must pursue a “peace first” approach.[66] Chung reemphasized the plan to halt North Korean nuclear production first before achieving complete Korean Peninsula denuclearization. Other reforms include listening to academic scholars and civilians on North Korea topics, expanding North Korean studies with scholarships for graduate studies, expanding elementary school curriculum on Korean Peninsula peace, and reducing South Korean drone flights near the inter-Korea border. Chung stated that South Korea must also prepare in August and September before the September and November summits between PRC General Secretary Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump.[67]Chung also mentioned strengthening Russia-South Korean relations through the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, Russia.[68] Chung’s new plan supports South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s Exchange, Normalize, and Denuclearization (E.N.D.) policy, which presents a three-phased approach to Korean Peninsula denuclearization.[69]
Chung stated that the United States has also abandoned CVID.[70] The US Department of State stated on July 8 that it is committed to “North Korean denuclearization,” which contradicts Chung’s statement instead of “Korean Peninsula denuclearization” that the Lee administration has been aiming for.[71] North Korea will likely welcome reducing South Korean drones near the inter-Korea border but will probably not respond to the other efforts made by the MOU and the Lee administration. North Korea has accepted South Korea’s 2025 apology for the drones near the inter-Korean border but has consistently stated it has no interest in inter-Korean dialogue in 2025.[72] North Korea criticized South Korea’s commitment to complete Korean Peninsula denuclearization, stating that South Korea-United States-Japan cooperation is a “regional threat” and declared that denuclearization is an “irreversibly and finally concluded matter.”[73] WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jong also stated that denuclearization has no legal grounds and reiterated North Korea’s commitment to nuclearization in defense of its sovereignty.[74] The Lee administration is also taking steps to pursue Russia-South Korea dialogue to request that Russia to take a role in supporting Inter-Korean dialogue.[75] Russia likely will not be open to dialogue, however. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently reiterated Russian support for North Korean nuclearization and has criticized United States-South Korea joint military exercises for “escalating” tensions on the Korean Peninsula.[76]
South Korean Domestic Politics
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s approval rating reached their second lowest level in July since his inauguration in June 2025, following his lowest-ever ratings in June. Realmeter reported Lee’s approval rating started at 47 percent in early July, increased to 48 percent in the third week of July, and fell to 46.3 percent in the fourth week of July.[77] Lee received his lowest approval rating, 46.7 percent, in June. Lee’s disapproval ratings exceeded his approval ratings for the first time since his inauguration in June 2025.[78] Lee’s disapproval ratings were 49.2 percent in the first week of July, declined to 47.7 percent in the second week of July, and rose back up to 49.5 percent in the fourth week of July.[79] Realmeter attributed this fluctuation to the real estate market, domestic investigation powers conflicts, and the economy to Lee’s low approval ratings.[80] Gallup reported that Lee’s approval ratings declined from 54 to 51 percent in July, one percent each week.[81] These ratings indicate an increase from June, when Gallup also reported Lee’s lowest-ever approval rating, 51 percent, in the third week of June. Gallup also reported Lee’s disapproval ratings increased from 36 to 38 percent in July.[82] Gallup reported that Lee’s approval ratings remained in the 50thpercentile because of his foreign policies, welfare policies, and the economy.[83] Gallup reported that the high KRW-to-USD exchange rate, real estate policy, North Korea policy, and labor policies mainly contributed to Lee’s disapproval rating.[84] Realmeter and Gallup also published Lee’s approval ratings from supporters of each of the South Korean political parties. Realmeter reported that Lee received a 41.3 percent approval rating from supporters of the ruling South Korean Democratic Party (DP) and a 40.6 percent approval rating from the opposition People Power Party (PPP).[85] Gallup reported that 44 percent of the South Korean DP and 23 percent of the PPP approved of Lee.[86] Gallup noted a widened gap of 21 percent between the parties’ approval rates compared to June, when the gap was 12 percent.[87]
Counter-North Korean Coalition Building Efforts
Nothing significant to report.
[1] https://t dot me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20161
[2] https://t dot me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20161
[3] https://ria dot ru/20260727/kreml-2107252905.html; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1105816; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8845610
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/north-korea-joins-russias-war-against-ukraine/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-30-2025/ https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Russian20Offensive20Campaign20Assessment2C20April2092C20202520PDF-compressed.pdf; https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Russian20Offensive20Campaign20Assessment20December20172C2020242028PDF29.pdf
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-march-25-2026/; https://inss dot re.kr/common/viewer.do?atchFileId=F20260313155057021&fileSn=0
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-july-14-2026/; https://www.kyivpost dot com/post/79862
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/north-korea-joins-russias-war-against-ukraine/; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1104210 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/north-korea-economy-success-e80f7062; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1104399 ; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1104778
[8] https://www.nknews.org/pro/north-korea-renovates-launchpad-in-latest-sign-of-spy-satellite-preparation/
[9] https://www.nknews.org/pro/north-korea-appears-to-ramp-up-military-satellite-plans-with-another-engine-test/?pk_vid=cd5cf86187a76732178477460988447f
[10] https://www.nknews.org/pro/north-korea-appears-to-test-rocket-engine-build-satellite-launch-viewing-area/?pk_vid=cd5cf86187a76732178477465988447f
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-may-27-2026/
[12] https://www.nknews.org/pro/north-korea-renovates-launchpad-in-latest-sign-of-spy-satellite-preparation/
[13] https://www.csis.org/analysis/chapter-8-extending-battlespace-space
[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-received-russian-aid-satellite-launch-south-korea-lawmakers-2023-11-23/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-july-7-2026/
[16] https://www.asaninst dot org/data/file/s1_1_eng/222742fa858281cd85cc5db0e71d3150_OKVNG8cP_98d2abeff76170516df75f6ecca93ca419f6b3b9.pdf?__cf_chl_f_tk=S9Fi54iV_MR7nGUZClq67fBz55aPGryrh71W7BeFhsw-1783345475-1.0.1.1-dVDfqIgStbtqZbo86QT0aOw.h5fZgOhbLJ0EswXBWrI; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-june-2-2026/
[17] https://www.nknews.org/pro/north-korea-boosts-warship-project-with-new-construction-at-rason-shipyard/
[18] https://www.nknews.org/pro/north-korea-boosts-warship-project-with-new-construction-at-rason-shipyard/
[19] https://www.nknews.org/pro/new-north-korean-destroyer-sails-back-to-shipyard-where-failed-launch-took-place/
[20] https://www.nknews.org/pro/north-korea-boosts-warship-project-with-new-construction-at-rason-shipyard/
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-june-30-2026/
[22] https://www.janes.com/defence-intelligence-insights/defence-news/sea/north-korean-leader-calls-for-two-choe-hyon-destroyers-annually
[23] https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1782251300-869393945/comrade-kim-jong-uns-congratulatory-speech-at-commissioning-ceremony-of-destroyer-choe-hyon/
[24] https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1782251300-869393945/comrade-kim-jong-uns-congratulatory-speech-at-commissioning-ceremony-of-destroyer-choe-hyon/
[25] https://www.gem.wiki/Rason_Port; https://www.marineinsight.com/6-major-ports-of-north-korea/
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-june-30-2026/
[27] https://news.usni.org/2026/04/15/north-korea-test-launches-anti-ship-cruise-missiles-from-first-in-class-destroyer
[28] https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/united-states-submarine-capabilities/
[29] https://ria dot ru/20260719/putin-2105712974.html; https://ria dot ru/20260720/lavrov-2105816668.html
[30] https://ria dot ru/20260720/kndr-2105843399.html; https://ria dot ru/20260720/kndr-2105842679.html; https://ria dot ru/20260720/putin-2105823579.html ; https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260720157451108?section=nk/news/all; https://www.nknews.org/2026/07/north-korea-vows-to-support-russia-in-ukraine-war-until-victory-top-envoy/; https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260720000900108?section=nk/news/all; https://unitv.unikorea.go.kr/unitv/web/vod/view.do?id=8679&aid=79
[31] https://www.nknews.org/2026/07/russia-north-koreas-top-envoys-accuse-u-s-of-destabilizing-korean-peninsula/?t=1784639430; https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1784634420-73144008/press-statement-on-third-strategic-dialogue-between-foreign-ministers-of-dprk-and-russian-federation/; https://nk.news1.kr/news/articles/6234051
[32] https://ria dot ru/20260720/lavrov-2105900323.html
[33] https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1784634420-73144008/press-statement-on-third-strategic-dialogue-between-foreign-ministers-of-dprk-and-russian-federation/; https://nk.news1.kr/news/articles/6234051; https://www.nknews.org/2026/07/russia-north-koreas-top-envoys-accuse-u-s-of-destabilizing-korean-peninsula/?t=1784639430
[34] https://www.nknews.org/2026/07/russia-north-koreas-top-envoys-accuse-u-s-of-destabilizing-korean-peninsula/?t=1784639430; https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1784634420-73144008/press-statement-on-third-strategic-dialogue-between-foreign-ministers-of-dprk-and-russian-federation/; https://nk.news1.kr/news/articles/6234051
[35] https://ria dot ru/20260722/lavrov-2106192322.html
[36] https://www.aei.org/commentary/china-has-quietly-accepted-a-nuclear-north-korea/; https://www.nknews.org/2026/03/north-korea-has-sent-5k-containers-of-munitions-to-russia-since-august-seoul/
[37] https://ria dot ru/20260722/lavrov-2106192322.html; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-july-7-2026/
[38] https://nk.news1.kr/news/articles/6233865
[39] https://www.rfa.org/english/korea/2026/07/21/north-korea-china-new-yalu-bridge/; https://nk.news1.kr/news/articles/6234995
[40] https://www.rfa.org/english/korea/2026/07/21/north-korea-china-new-yalu-bridge/
[41] https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/China-North_Korea_Strategic_Rift.pdf
[42] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-june-16-2026/
[43] https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1785071224-707732895/%e3%80%8a%ec%86%a1%eb%8f%84%ec%9b%90%ec%b9%9c%ec%84%a0%ec%95%bc%ec%98%81-2026%e3%80%8b%ec%97%90-%ec%b0%b8%ea%b0%80%ed%95%9c-%ec%95%bc%ec%98%81%ec%83%9d%eb%93%a4%ec%9d%98-%e3%80%8a%ec%b9%9c%ec%84%a0/; https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260720057400504?section=nk/news/all
[44] https://www.nknews.org/2026/07/north-koreas-songdowon-camp-welcomes-hundreds-of-russian-chinese-children/
[45] https://t dot me/ams_primorsky/2409; https://www.nknews.org/2026/07/north-koreas-songdowon-camp-welcomes-hundreds-of-russian-chinese-children/
[46] https://www.nknews.org/2026/07/north-koreas-songdowon-camp-welcomes-hundreds-of-russian-chinese-children/; https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260720057400504?section=nk/news/all
[47] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-june-23-2026/
[48] https://vostokintur dot ru/tours/kndr/473-kolcevoj-marshrut-kndr-knr.html
[49] https://verstka dot media/rossiyane-ustanovili-rekord-po-poezdkam-v-severnuyu-koreyu-v-2025-godu ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/02/09/rossiyane-za-god-s-ezdili-v-kndr-pochti-10-tysyach-raz-takogo-ne-bylo-nikogda ; https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260210128800009
[50] https://ru.themoscowtimes dot com/2026/02/09/rossiyane-postavili-rekord-po-vizitam-v-severnuyu-koreyu-a186762; https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260210128800009
[51] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-june-30-2026/
[52] https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25430065
[53] https://www.voakorea.com/a/prada-detained-by-rok-072126/8174468.html ; http://maritime-executive.com/article/south-korea-confirms-detaining-vessel-smuggling-for-north-korea
[54] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-wants-un-sanctions-seven-vessels-over-north-korea-exports-2025-11-03/ ; https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/world/20260530/s-korea-us-other-countries-call-for-designation-of-vessels-over-nk-sanctions-breaches
[55] https://www.nknews.org/2026/07/south-korea-detains-cargo-ship-over-suspected-north-korean-sanctions-violations/
[56] https://maritime-executive.com/article/south-korea-confirms-detaining-vessel-smuggling-for-north-korea
[57] https://www.voakorea.com/a/prada-detained-by-rok-072126/8174468.html
[58] https://www.nknews.org/2026/07/south-korea-detains-cargo-ship-over-suspected-north-korean-sanctions-violations/
[59] https://stories.opensourcecentre.org/back-in-black/
[60] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-july-7-2026/ ; https://en.nkhr.or dot kr/?act=board&bbs_code=survey&bbs_mode=view&bbs_seq=3523 ; https://www.nknews.org/2026/06/north-korean-illicit-coal-exports-rising-due-to-lax-sanctions-monitoring-report/
[61] https://www.nknews.org/2026/06/north-korean-illicit-coal-exports-rising-due-to-lax-sanctions-monitoring-report/
[62] https://www.nknews.org/2026/06/north-korean-illicit-coal-exports-rising-due-to-lax-sanctions-monitoring-report/
[63] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-koreas-sanctioned-coal-trade-rebounds-un-monitoring-lapses-rights-group-2026-06-29/
[64] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-july-7-2026/ ; https://www.nknews.org/2026/06/north-korean-illicit-coal-exports-rising-due-to-lax-sanctions-monitoring-report/
[65]https://nk.news1.kr/news/articles/6236779 ; https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260723151051504?section=nk/news/all ; https://www.yonhapnewstv.co.kr/news/MYH20260724053523QSd ; https://www.newsis dot com/view/NISX20260723_0003720835
[66]https://nk.news1.kr/news/articles/6236779 ; https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260723151051504?section=nk/news/all ; https://www.yonhapnewstv.co.kr/news/MYH20260724053523QSd ; https://www.newsis dot com/view/NISX20260723_0003720835
[67]https://nk.news1.kr/news/articles/6236779 ; https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260723151051504?section=nk/news/all ; https://www.yonhapnewstv.co.kr/news/MYH20260724053523QSd ; https://www.newsis dot com/view/NISX20260723_0003720835
[68]https://nk.news1.kr/news/articles/6236779 ; https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260723151051504?section=nk/news/all ; https://www.yonhapnewstv.co.kr/news/MYH20260724053523QSd ; https://www.newsis dot com/view/NISX20260723_0003720835
[69] https://www.38north.org/2025/12/lee-jae-myungs-end-strategy-path-to-progress-or-dead-end/ ; https://www.chosun.com/politics/north_korea/2026/07/24/DWWZEIAVGFEDPE5GWHTB2ELNXM/
[70] https://www.chosun.com/politics/north_korea/2026/07/24/DWWZEIAVGFEDPE5GWHTB2ELNXM/
[71] https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4076/view.do?seq=372344&page=2 ; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/07/united-states-japan-republic-of-korea-rok-trilateral-foreign-ministers-meeting/ ; https://www.chosun.com/politics/north_korea/2026/07/24/DWWZEIAVGFEDPE5GWHTB2ELNXM/
[72] https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1782978485-142194355/%ea%b9%80%ec%97%ac%ec%a0%95-%ec%a4%91%ec%95%99%ec%9c%84%ec%9b%90%ed%9a%8c-%eb%b6%80%ec%9e%a5-%eb%8b%b4%ed%99%94-%eb%b0%9c%ed%91%9c/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-calls-south-koreas-peace-overtures-great-miscalculation-2025-07-28/
[73] https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4078/view.do?seq=368856&page=1 ; https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1784878406-888853040/press-statement-of-dprk-foreign-ministry-spokesperson/ ; https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1784878419-10672335/%ec%99%b8%eb%ac%b4%ec%84%b1-%eb%8c%80%eb%b3%80%ec%9d%b8-%eb%8b%b4%ed%99%94-%eb%b0%9c%ed%91%9c/ ; https://www.nknews.org/2026/07/kim-yo-jong-lambasts-stupid-denuclearization-calls-by-asean-forum/
[74] https://www.nknews.org/2026/07/kim-yo-jong-lambasts-stupid-denuclearization-calls-by-asean-forum/ , https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1785103824-951601962/press-statement-of-kim-yo-jong-department-director-of-c-c-wpk/ , https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260727079700504?section=nk/news/all
[75] https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4078/view.do?seq=368856&page=1
[76] https://www.nknews.org/2026/07/russia-vows-support-for-north-koreas-nuclear-military-buildup-lavrov/
[77] http://www.realmeter dot net/%ec%97%90%eb%84%88%ec%a7%80%ea%b2%bd%ec%a0%9c%ec%8b%a0%eb%ac%b8-%eb%a6%ac%ec%96%bc%eb%af%b8%ed%84%b0-7%ec%9b%94-4%ec%a3%bc-%ec%b0%a8-%ec%a3%bc%ea%b0%84-%eb%8f%99%ed%96%a5-%e6%9d%8e-%eb%8c%80/?ckattempt=1
[78] http://www.realmeter dot net/%ec%97%90%eb%84%88%ec%a7%80%ea%b2%bd%ec%a0%9c%ec%8b%a0%eb%ac%b8-%eb%a6%ac%ec%96%bc%eb%af%b8%ed%84%b0-6%ec%9b%94-4%ec%a3%bc-%ec%b0%a8-%ec%a3%bc%ea%b0%84-%eb%8f%99%ed%96%a5-%e6%9d%8e-%eb%8c%80-2/?ckattempt=1
[79] http://www.realmeter dot net/%ec%97%90%eb%84%88%ec%a7%80%ea%b2%bd%ec%a0%9c%ec%8b%a0%eb%ac%b8-%eb%a6%ac%ec%96%bc%eb%af%b8%ed%84%b0-7%ec%9b%94-4%ec%a3%bc-%ec%b0%a8-%ec%a3%bc%ea%b0%84-%eb%8f%99%ed%96%a5-%e6%9d%8e-%eb%8c%80/?ckattempt=1
[80] http://www.realmeter dot net/%ec%97%90%eb%84%88%ec%a7%80%ea%b2%bd%ec%a0%9c%ec%8b%a0%eb%ac%b8-%eb%a6%ac%ec%96%bc%eb%af%b8%ed%84%b0-7%ec%9b%94-4%ec%a3%bc-%ec%b0%a8-%ec%a3%bc%ea%b0%84-%eb%8f%99%ed%96%a5-%e6%9d%8e-%eb%8c%80/?ckattempt=1
[81] https://www.gallup.co dot kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=1651
[82] https://www.gallup.co dot kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=1651
[83] https://www.gallup.co dot kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=1651
[84] https://www.gallup.co dot kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=1651
[85] http://www.realmeter dot net/%ec%97%90%eb%84%88%ec%a7%80%ea%b2%bd%ec%a0%9c%ec%8b%a0%eb%ac%b8-%eb%a6%ac%ec%96%bc%eb%af%b8%ed%84%b0-7%ec%9b%94-4%ec%a3%bc-%ec%b0%a8-%ec%a3%bc%ea%b0%84-%eb%8f%99%ed%96%a5-%e6%9d%8e-%eb%8c%80/?ckattempt=1
[86] https://www.gallup.co dot kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=1651
[87] https://www.gallup.co dot kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=1651
