Toplines
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US President Donald Trump in Washington, DC, on July 28 to discuss strengthening Ukrainian air defenses and diplomatic efforts to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. Zelensky stated that he had a “good” meeting with Trump and that they discussed US licenses for Ukraine to produce unspecified Patriot interceptor missiles and efforts to intensify the diplomatic process to end the war.[1] The Financial Times (FT) reported on July 28, citing a source familiar with the meeting, that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner have agreed to visit Kyiv City for the first time as part of efforts to end the war.[2] US political activist Laura Loomer, citing a White House source, reported that Witkoff and Kushner may visit within the next two weeks (by August 11).[3] Witkoff and Kushner have visited Moscow City multiple times since Trump came into office in January 2025.[4]
Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to present himself as well informed about the battlefield situation in Ukraine, as Russian milbloggers continue to complain about Russian commanders lying about Russian advances. Putin answered a question at a staged event with Russian Navy personnel on July 26 about the sources he uses to get information about the frontline.[5] Putin stated that he primarily relies on information from official sources but that he analyzes the entire range of information he receives to draw his final conclusions. Putin reported that he gets information from Russian commanders, soldiers, special services, and officials. Putin noted that there are also “bloggers” that he sometimes reads, claiming that some of the bloggers “hit the nail on the head” and produce good work while others only pursue their own interests. Putin claimed that information from unspecified public groups is also sometimes useful but can include “information garbage” and be “dangerous” for those who do not have a “basic understanding of…current events.” Russian milbloggers have long complained that Russian commanders and officials lie about Russian advances on the battlefield, however.[6] ISW has previously observed a leaked Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) map from April 2026 featuring heavily exaggerated Russian frontline claims in western Zaporizhia Oblast, for example.[7] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 28 that the situation for Russian forces is only positive in the Oleksandrivka direction but that “things are worse” in other areas of the front even as Ukrainian officials are reporting less frequently on Ukrainian battlefield successes.[8] Another Russian milblogger responded, stating that Russian commanders have repeatedly sent assault units on missions based on an inaccurate understanding of the frontline, assuming Russian soldiers are close to the Ukrainian positions they are meant to attack when they are in fact still as far as four kilometers away.[9] The Kremlin has notably coopted several prominent milbloggers who accept and promote the Kremlin’s fabricated narrative of such sweeping Russian advances, calling into question the degree to which Putin’s consumption of “blogger” sources improves his understanding of the real situation on the battlefield.[10]
Kremlin officials are reportedly considering a wide range of options to support a potential mobilization in the future, as Russian President Vladimir Putin likely continues to weigh his options. Russian opposition source Verstka reported on July 28, citing sources in and close to the Russian government, that Russian officials are discussing the potential introduction of new restrictions on the Russian population in the event of a mobilization after the September 2026 Russian State Duma elections.[11] Verstka cited two political strategists working with the Kremlin who stated that a “serious” failure on the frontline or in Russian recruitment efforts may trigger a mobilization and that some security officials are advocating for full or partial martial law to prevent civil unrest in the event of mobilization. The security officials are reportedly advocating for tougher penalties for currency law violations, tightened controls over foreign assets, virtual private network (VPN) restrictions, and the introduction of exit visas. Russian officials appear to be debating the implementation of mobilization in the fall, but Putin has likely not yet made a final decision. The Kremlin is setting conditions to facilitate a mobilization, should Putin choose to do so in the future, however. Putin signed a law on July 26 expanding Rosgvardia’s and the Russian MoD’s access to information about Russian military personnel and their families in the Unified State Registry of Civil Registry Offices, which the Russian MoD noted will reduce bureaucratic procedures and paperwork processing times.[12] This law follows proposals from Rosgvardia on July 21 to expand its civil defense regulations to protect Russian society from unspecified “dangers” during mobilization, martial law, and wartime.[13] The Kremlin has been streamlining the bureaucracy associated with mobilization since 2025, with Putin signing a law in November 2025 changing the Russian military conscription administrative process to a year-round cycle in place of the previous semi-annual cycles, thereby significantly expanding the rate at which Russia could call up and process a larger volume of conscripts and reservists.[14] ISW continues to assess that mobilization is a very personal decision for Putin that is contingent on his personal perception of the battlefield situation and the integrity of the Kremlin, and that it remains unclear whether or how Putin will decide to implement mobilization.[15]
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US President Donald Trump in Washington, DC, on July 28 to discuss strengthening Ukrainian air defenses and diplomatic efforts to end Russia’s war against Ukraine.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to present himself as well informed about the battlefield situation in Ukraine, as Russian milbloggers continue to complain about Russian commanders lying about Russian advances.
- Kremlin officials are reportedly considering a wide range of options to support a potential mobilization in the future, as Putin likely continues to weigh his options.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian logistics and industrial infrastructure from July 27 to 28.
- Russian forces launched 131 drones against Ukraine overnight on July 27 to 28.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.
- Russian forces recently advanced in Kostyantynivka.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian logistics and industrial infrastructure on July 28. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on July 28 that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire at the Koledino 3Pl logistics complex in Podolsk, Moscow Oblast (roughly 420 kilometers from the international border).[16] Astra reported that Unix LLC owns the warehouse and noted that Unix claims to be the largest Russian supplier and manufacturer of non-food products.[17] Geolocated footage published on July 28 shows a fire at the warehouse.[18] Astra also reported on July 28 that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire in the boiler room of the Chekhov Regenerative Rubber Plant in Chekhov, Moscow Oblast (roughly 390 kilometers from the frontline).[19] On July 28, Chekhov Okrug head Mikhail Sobakin confirmed a fire at the Chekhov Regenerative Rubber Plant.[20] Geolocated footage published on July 28 shows a drone striking a chimney at the facility.[21]
The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck the Prioritet Federal State Budgetary Institution in Sarapul, Udmurt Republic, on July 27 and reported that the strike resulted in a fire.[22] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces use the Prioritet Federal State Budgetary Institution for long-term fuel storage and to store other petroleum products.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 27 and 28 but did not make confirmed advances.[23] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 28 that Russian forces advanced in southeastern Mohrytsia and to the north of Velyka Rybytsia (both northeast of Sumy City).[24]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Geolocated footage published on July 28 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in western Karaichne (east of Vovchansk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[25]
A Russian milblogger claimed on July 28 that Russian forces advanced into western Ivanivka (southeast of Vovchansk).[26]
Russian sources continue to disseminate artificial intelligence (AI) altered footage to falsely claim advances. Putative footage posted by a Russian source on July 27 and geolocated by multiple sources purportedly shows a Russian servicemember holding a Russian flag in the eastern outskirts of Bilyi Kolodyaz (southeast of Vovchansk).[27] An analysis conducted with commercially available AI detection software indicates that the footage may have been modified or generated with AI, and ISW cannot guarantee the veracity of the footage. The Ukrainian MoD’s news agency ArmyInform reported on July 28, citing a geolocator, that Russian sources altered the footage with AI.[28] ISW continues to assess that Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, are using AI-altered footage to aggrandize Russian gains.[29]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 27 and 28 but did not make confirmed advances.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 28 that Russian forces advanced in southern Ustynivka (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[31]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kupyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on July 28 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in central Kupyansk after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[32]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Borova direction. Geolocated footage published on July 27 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in Bohuslavka (north of Borova), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the area.[33]
Order of Battle: Geolocated footage published on July 27 shows the Russian Roy Unmanned Systems Detachment (reportedly of the 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Tank Army) striking Ukrainian positions in Bohuslavka, the first battlefield evidence ISW has observed of this unit.[34]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 27 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone warehouse in occupied Chervonpopivka (roughly 22 kilometers from the frontline).[35] Geolocated footage published on July 28 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian logistics trucks along the P-66 Lysychansk-Toshkivka highway near occupied Toshkivka (roughly 40 kilometers from the frontline).[36]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Slovyansk direction. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces reported on July 28 that Russian forces infiltrated on a road immediately southeast of Lyman.[37]
On July 28, the Russian MoD continued to claim that Russian forces are clearing and consolidating positions in Lyman, but ISW has not observed evidence supporting this claim.[38]
Russian forces continue to rely on small groups to advance in the Slovyansk direction. A Ukrainian servicemember from an unmanned systems battalion operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on July 28 that Russian forces rarely conduct large-scale mechanized assaults and instead operate in groups of one to two servicemembers.[39] The servicemember noted the Russian drone operators are very active and have a high level of training.
Russian forces recently advanced in Kostyantynivka and continued infiltration missions within the city. Geolocated footage published on July 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Kostyantynivka.[40] Geolocated footage published on July 28 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in northern and central Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to southern Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka (just north of Kostyantynivka) and east of Novopavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[42]
The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized Krasnyi Kut (southwest of Druzhkivka).[43] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) with the claimed seizure of Krasnyi Kut.[44]
Russian forces attacked in the Dobropillya direction on July 27 and 28 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Hannivka (north of Dobropillya).[46]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 27 and 29 but did not advance.[47]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on July 27 and 28 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in Novopavlivka and Filiya (south of Novopavlivka) and that Ukrainian forces have substantially increased drone activity in the area.[49]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on July 27 and 28 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking from several directions toward Komar (east of Oleksandrivka), including near Piddubne (northwest of Komar) and east of Voskresenka (southwest of Komar).[51] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Hrushivske, north of Hrushivske, and north of Zirka (all northeast of Oleksandrivka). Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces are destroying small Ukrainian groups in the Oleksandrivka direction and are stabilizing the situation despite intensified Ukrainian counterattacks, and that the presence of a Ukrainian servicemember does not mean that Ukrainian forces control the area.[52]
Geolocated footage published on July 25 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian Sarma 300-millimeter multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), likely belonging to the Russian 8th CAA (SMD), near occupied Shakhtarsk (roughly 68 kilometers from the frontline).[53]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction. A Russian milblogger acknowledged on July 28 that Ukrainian forces advanced east of Solodke (north of Hulyaipole) and in Solodke itself.[54] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are successfully attacking toward Uspenivka (northeast of Hulyaipole). A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces surrounded Dolynka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[55]
Russian milbloggers offered conflicting assessments about the Russian battlefield situation in western Zaporizhia Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed on July 28 that the situation near Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv) is developing “very unfavorably” for Russian forces.[56] Another Russian milblogger claimed, however, on July 28 that the frontline near Stepnohirsk has stabilized and that Russian forces, including airborne (VDV) elements, are gradually pushing Ukrainian forces back toward Zaporizhzhia City.[57] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have stopped their local counterattacks in the area.
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on July 28.
Order of Battle: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 28 that the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment coordinated FAB glide bomb strikes on Ukrainian forces in Tyhanivka (northeast of Kherson City).[58] This is the first evidence ISW has observed of this unit operating in the Kherson direction.
Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea, causing power and water outages on the peninsula. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel and lubricants warehouse near Ichki (roughly 261 kilometers from the frontline) overnight.[59] Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind reported on July 28 that an electrical substation connected to the Feodosia high-voltage main power grid on the Kerch highway burned down, likely after Ukrainian strikes, leaving most of occupied Feodosia without power.[60] Crimean occupation energy operator Krymenergo reported on July 28 that Ukrainian forces struck energy facilities in eastern Crimea on the night of July 27 to 28, causing power disruptions across most of the peninsula.[61] The Crimean occupation Unitary Water Enterprise reported on July 28 that it will limit water supply in occupied Crimea due to emergency repair work.[62]
Russian opposition source Astra reported on July 27 that local Sevastopol residents submitted an appeal to Crimean occupation authorities to support businesses, as residents regularly experience power outages and gasoline shortages.[63]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 27 to 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 131 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[64] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 107 drones, that 16 drones struck nine locations, and that drone debris fell on six locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck logistics, civilian, agricultural, and port infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[65] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported on July 28 that Russian strikes caused power outages in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Sumy oblasts.[66]
Russian forces reportedly continue to target Ukrainian ports and Black Sea infrastructure. The Russian MoD claimed on July 28 that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian bulk carrier in the northwestern Black Sea, a keelboat and a fuel and lubricant facility in the port of Mykolaiv, and a naval vessel roughly 11 kilometers east of Odesa City.[67]
A Russian milblogger claimed on July 28 that Russian forces struck critical infrastructure facilities in Kyiv Oblast with jet-powered drones, and that Russian forces are now launching jet-powered drones from occupied Donetsk Oblast.[68] Russian forces have been increasingly using jet-powered drones, including to inflict harm against civilians, because Ukrainian forces have more difficulty intercepting jet-powered drones.[69]
Russian forces continued their strike campaign against Ukrainian gas stations. Chernihiv Oblast Military Administration Head Vyacheslav Chaus reported on July 28 that Russian forces struck a gas station in Khomly, Chernihiv Oblast, with a Gerbera-type strike drone, injuring one.[70] Kharkiv Oblast councilor Oleksandr Skoryk reported on July 28 that Russian forces destroyed over 200 gas stations in Ukraine and over 80 gas stations in Kharkiv Oblast.[71] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source reported on July 28 that Russian forces destroyed every gas station between Dnipro and Kharkiv cities and between Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia cities.[72]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20200
[2] https://www.ft.com/content/5dca4c81-be8a-4555-971f-181eebf53e62?syn-25a6b1a6=1
[3] https://x.com/LauraLoomer/status/2082158240226292089
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-4-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2026/
[5] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80341
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-23-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-23-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2026/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/
[8] https://t.me/motopatriot78/54406
[9] https://t.me/mobikontrabas/446
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2026/
[11] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/9321
[12] http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202607260023?index=1#print ; https://t.me/mod_russia/66029
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/
[14] https://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/document/0001202511040014 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2025/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/
[16] https://t.me/astrapress/120333; https://t.me/astrapress/120336; https://t.me/astrapress/120341; https://t.me/astrapress/120355
[17] https://t.me/astrapress/120333; https://goods-pro dot ru/company/
[18] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2081959856630841383 ; https://t.me/supernova_plus/56790 ; https://t.me/supernova_plus/56811
[19] https://t.me/astrapress/120322
[20] https://t.me/sobakin_mn/27305
[21] https://x.com/NotWoofers/status/2081919245865120072; https://t.me/supernova_plus/56750; https://x.com/RoyStew78036358/status/2081929523655049261
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-27-2026/; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41568
[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41577; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41548; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41546; https://t.me/wargonzo/35822; https://t.me/dva_majors/96641; https://t.me/severnnyi/8837
[24] https://t.me/divgen/82661; https://t.me/divgen/82658
[25] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12556; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DbU1LfYtzmk
[26] https://t.me/divgen/82655
[27] https://t.me/bez_retyshi/14841; https://t.me/Osintpen/3226?single; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2081782536578232477; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2081784471616106669; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/2081783159515947287; https://t.me/divgen/82629?single
[28] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/28/shestymetrovyj-okupant-rf-%c2%abzahopyla%c2%bb-bilyj-kolodyaz-shturmovykom-zgenerovanym-za-dopomogoyu-shi/; https://x.com/Playfra0/status/2081821990030049575 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2081782536578232477; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2081784471616106669; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/2081783159515947287
[29] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41577; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41548; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41546; https://t.me/wargonzo/35822; https://t.me/severnnyi/8837
[31] https://t.me/divgen/82650
[32] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2082085894832468286?s=20; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2082085900197011806?s=20; https://t.me/ombr41/2935
[33] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12553; https://t.me/geraniumlpr/4729
[34] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12553 ; https://t.me/geraniumlpr/4729; https://vk dot ru/wall40434971_440
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41568
[36] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2082064627228193106 ; https://t.me/OMEGA_5_UA/1042
[37] https://t.me/grvZapad/19271
[38] https://t.me/mod_russia/66054 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-27-2026/
[39] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/28/%c2%abodnorazovi%c2%bb-shturmovyky-ta-royi-droniv-shho-vidbuvayetsya-na-slov%e2%80%99yanskomu-napryamku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA
[40] https://t.me/soniah_hub/17278; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/37304
[41] https://t.me/ombr_28/3193; https://x.com/Mocca2X/status/2082028104416215219?s=20; https://x.com/Mocca2X/status/2082033186796888324?s=20; https://x.com/Mocca2X/status/2082033449901408746?s=20; https://x.com/Mocca2X/status/2082037773851300263?s=20; https://x.com/Mocca2X/status/2082033449901408746?s=20; https://x.com/Mocca2X/status/2082053680078230016?s=20 ; https://x.com/Mocca2X/status/2082040423942602781; https://x.com/Mocca2X/status/2082044316160307422; https://x.com/Mocca2X/status/2082045971693994228; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12558 ; https://x.com/Mocca2X/status/2082098386979996062?s=20 https://www.instagram.com/fenix.team.17csp/reel/DbVa7jYsGHS/
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[43] https://t.me/mod_russia/66050
[44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/54423 ; https://t.me/sashakots/63409
[45]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41577; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41548; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41546; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/73805 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/35822; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45854
[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45854
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41577; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41548; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41546; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/120067
[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45838 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41577 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41548 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41546
[49] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45838
[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45838 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41577 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41548 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41546
[51] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45838
[52] https://t.me/voin_dv/20415
[53] https://x.com/giK1893/status/2081884048582975733?s=20 ; https://x.com/giK1893/status/2081884051569324099?s=20 ; https://x.com/giK1893/status/2081884054291374116?s=20 ; https://t.me/azov_media/8608 ; https://x.com/giK1893/status/2081886200982331837?s=20
[54] https://t.me/motopatriot78/54406
[55] https://t.me/sashakots/63395
[56] https://t.me/philologist_zov/4105
[57] https://t.me/motopatriot78/54430
[58] https://t.me/dva_majors/96654
[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41568
[60] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/105899; https://t.me/sotaproject/116514; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1365502-u-krimu-vnoci-28-lipna-lunali-vibuhi-gorit-elektropidstancia-u-feodosii-u-kilkoh-mistah-nemae-svitla/;
[61] https://crimea-energy dot ru/about/news/13408-28-07-2027;
[62] https://t.me/vodacrimearu/8860; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1365502-u-krimu-vnoci-28-lipna-lunali-vibuhi-gorit-elektropidstancia-u-feodosii-u-kilkoh-mistah-nemae-svitla/
[63] https://t.me/astrapress/120311
[64] https://t.me/kpszsu/70462
[65] https://t.me/synegubov/24272 ; https://t.me/synegubov/24288 ; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/72545?single ; https://www.facebook.com/DSNSKHARKIV/posts/pfbid02kcTb5TRRSKUB1H16Z4jHqKEtbJCkZTM6kk9fPFB1EsWbYWc2Ho4mBmh8ZrmjozGtl?cft[0]=AZbHns201L80_4UYMP9kBKALYc45ajSA0tQAlWJM7R9INk8bDFGKcSmXe-I4XiIVuENwJQv7w_dZrC2NkT7GsgSl2eu-ik8kADcf324JEFzL8QE_NnUPxEQyEbVGe1ZciiEa3rjqPlSH8-EMTUpGKWFdeTttXTYFQu6FwE0XvuCbqA&tn=%2CO%2CP-R#?cha ; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1365266-naslidki-ataki-po-portu-na-mikolaivsini-zaginuv-colovik-se-odin-u-tazkomu-stani/ ; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid0mQL2m2x2dALHa3VZoXt9e9JxS7YqbYKh34WHNemKpwqqz6UyjyAc1EwyrmedWUs7l?cft[0]=AZb8U6pcZ3XrhDzLE5Wp3MyEBqXzJ14OEdJ1OKNarTyAg1T49b0OslC6K7x2BFnv222cUm1uEGtyHmjIV08nbz_qazB_Spryi9NBrudRuLlbYVUuRVoLgRWrhAFNnsXufk0jBbP2x8oIq6D7jAmWOIXpnpLp7_-SxeXibtFJyo5trA&tn=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://t.me/mykolaiv_ova/1484; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/30750 ; https://www.facebook.com/policechernigivshchini/posts/pfbid0ES9eLXBdtbwUAcCWQMCwcHM4ZxDiimqjESunitWqoUX9tmqZgL7dLn7DpwSszFaRl?cft[0]=AZaI0_00bI3u0aV88lG7zb7V-0tcKRoA7AN32_YFQA0ryuHbCv1el7X8fJ2Ydfo4yirUekGP-piJDfU5-VL0N7q2o8fz3Q0h5AchJaGxpoOu1n1BxC1IwkXY_7UB1FSH6yfoX4FNYpAFrPu4-_JIkQDAZ9N4gISv2B9UYGJDO0lPDQ&tn=%2CO%2CP-R#?hih
[66] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5256
[67] https://t.me/mod_russia/66055 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/66041
[68] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/120063
[69] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025/
[70] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/30750
[71] https://espreso dot tv/viyna-z-rosiyeyu-vsi-azs-vid-kharkova-do-poltavi-povnistyu-znishcheni-deputat-kharkivskoi-oblradi-skorik#goog_rewarded
[72] https://x.com/dim0kq/status/2081752601389904236
