Toplines
Russian sources falsely and baselessly claimed that Russian forces encircled 2,000 Ukrainian forces northeast of Kharkiv City. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 3 that elements of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) seized Vasylivka, Blahodatne, and Dovzhanka (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[1] The Russian Northern GoF additionally claimed on September 3 that Russian forces seized Slyzneve (northeast of Kharkiv City) and baselessly claimed that Russian forces completed an encirclement of 2,000 Ukrainian soldiers.[2] Several Russian milbloggers amplified claims about a Russian encirclement of Ukrainian forces northeast of Kharkiv City along the international border on September 3 and 4.[3] Russian sources did not present any visual evidence to support their claims, and some Russian sources even cast doubt on the claims about a grand encirclement. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger acknowledged on September 3 that claims about Russian forces’ complete encirclement of Ukrainian forces required further confirmation, for example.[4] The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps directly refuted the Russian claims about the seizures of the mentioned settlements on September 3, directly refuting claims that Russian forces had encircled any Ukrainian forces in the corps’ area of responsibility.[5] The 16th Corps emphasized that Russian false encirclement claims emerged against the backdrop of a growing gasoline crisis in Russia, Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries and warehouses, and the upcoming State Duma elections. Russian high-ranking officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the Russian MoD have continuously made exaggerated claims about Russian battlefield performance — including false claims about large encirclements of Ukrainian forces — as part of Russia’s systematic cognitive warfare effort to portray Russian forces as making sweeping advances and Ukrainian defenses as collapsing. Putin recently and baselessly claimed that the Russian Western GoF encircled 13 Ukrainian battalions with a total of around 5,000 servicemembers on the eastern shore of the Oskil Reservoir near Pisky-Radkivski (south of Borova and roughly 16 kilometers from the frontline) on September 2, for example.[6]
Russian forces attempted to assassinate Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) head Oleksandr Poklad with a Geran-type drone strike on September 4. Russian forces conducted a strike against the SBU headquarters in Kyiv City on September 4, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces specifically targeted Poklad’s office.[7] Zelensky held an in-person meeting with Poklad following the strike.[8] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov stated on September 4 that a Russian remote-controlled Geran-type drone struck the SBU building.[9] Beskrestnov added that Russian forces likely maintained connection with the drone through a device with a mesh network repeater and internet access that a Russian agent activated within a five-kilometer radius of the SBU headquarters during the strike.[10] Russian forces similarly attempted to assassinate Beskrestnov in a targeted strike with four Shahed drones on April 20, 2026.[11]
The Russian Geran drone platform adaptations are improving their ability to conduct successful high-precision strikes. Beskrestnov stated on September 4 that Russian forces are prioritizing the production of jet-powered Geran-4 drones that can reach speeds up to 550 kilometers per hour — significantly faster than Geran-3 drones — complicating Ukrainian interception efforts.[12] Beskrestnov added that Russia is attempting to increase the speed of low-cost strike vehicles that increasingly reach speeds comparable to subsonic cruise missiles, including Geran-5, S8000 Banderol, Dan-T and Dan-M, and the new UMPB-5R glide bomb. Ukrainian sources also estimated that Russian forces can maintain live operator control via a chain of mesh-controlled Geran-type drones up to 150-175 kilometers from the furthest mesh ground control station, a twofold increase in the technology’s previous range compared to 2025.[13] The increasing Russian jet-powered drone speed and flight range at which Russian operators can remotely control them are allowing Russian forces to conduct high–precision strikes against valuable and dynamic targets.
The Kremlin’s behavior indicates Russia’s unwillingness to guarantee the safety of the US delegation during their reported upcoming visit to Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 4 that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner will visit Ukraine on September 6 following a visit to Russia.[14] Kremlin newswire TASS confirmed the US delegation’s upcoming visits to Russia and Ukraine.[15] Witkoff and Kushner reportedly had concerns about their safety during their trip to Ukraine, according to sources close to US President Donald Trump’s Administration.[16] Ukraine ceased its long-range strikes against Moscow Oblast during CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow City on August 26.[17] Russian President Vladimir Putin has made no indication that Russia will cease its strikes against Ukraine during Witkoff and Kushner‘s visit to Ukraine. Putin’s apparent unwillingness to guarantee the safety of the US delegation in Ukraine indicates the Kremlin’s unwillingness to accept the United States as a mediator in peace negotiations and highlights Russia’s efforts to coerce the United States to negotiate solely with Russia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin appears committed to his existing expensive and inefficient force generation mechanism through volunteer recruitment. Putin again denied any plans for mobilization and claimed that Russian forces are not experiencing personnel shortages during an address to the Eastern Economic Forum on September 3.[18] Putin claimed that Russian people voluntarily sign military service contracts with the Russian MoD and that rumors about military mobilization are attempts to influence the State Duma elections slated for September 18-20. Putin is likely attempting to appease and reassure Russian society amidst growing fears of involuntary mobilization, as it remains unpopular in Russia.[19] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev similarly denied the need for Russia to conduct involuntary reserve call-ups on August 28.[20]
Russia’s expedited efforts to establish its Rassvet satellite constellation as a replacement for Starlink are facing significant challenges which may degrade the constellation’s lifespan. ISW assessed on August 31 that Russia will need to significantly increase the number of successful Rassvet satellite launches in order to achieve capabilities analogous to SpaceX’s Starlink constellation.[21] Russia’s development and use of the Rassvet constellation reportedly already presents significant risk for Ukraine as the constellation enhances the accuracy of Russian strike and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in real time. Stable and 24/7 connectivity over Ukraine, however, will require significant expansion of the constellation.[22] Russia remains constrained by both its launch capacity and the success rate of its satellite launches despite efforts to expedite satellite deployment. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on September 4 that half of Russia’s 36 satellites failed to reach their intended orbits, reportedly due to engine defects, but noted that Russia is already preparing the next batch of satellites for launch.[23] ISW initially assessed — and available data continues to indicate — that Russia’s most recent Rassvet satellites have not yet reached their planned orbital altitude, with some satellites exhibiting signs of technical issues.[24] Satellites orbiting at lower altitudes have shorter operational lifespans due to increased atmospheric drag from upper layers of Earth’s atmosphere and greater fuel expenditure than satellites operating at higher altitudes. Rassvet satellites’ slow — but incomplete — ascension thus may negatively impact the planned service life of the constellation.
Key Takeaways
- Russian sources falsely and baselessly claimed that Russian forces encircled 2,000 Ukrainian forces northeast of Kharkiv City.
- Russian forces attempted to assassinate Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) head Oleksandr Poklad with a Geran-type drone strike on September 4.
- The Russian Geran drone platform adaptations are improving their ability to conduct successful high-precision strikes.
- The Kremlin’s behavior indicates Russia’s unwillingness to guarantee the safety of the US delegation during their reported upcoming visit to Ukraine.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin appears committed to his existing expensive and inefficient force generation mechanism through volunteer recruitment.
- Russia’s expedited efforts to establish its Rassvet satellite constellation as a replacement for Starlink are facing significant challenges which may degrade the constellation’s lifespan.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military, oil, and defense-industrial infrastructure on September 3 and 4. Russian forces launched one Kh-31P anti-radar missile and 121 drones against Ukraine overnight.
- Ukrainian forces advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military, oil, and defense-industrial infrastructure on September 3 and 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a radar station in Bobrik, Bryansk Oblast (either 10, 25, or 44 kilometers from the frontline) and a mesh network repeater antenna in Gustomoy, Kursk Oblast (approximately 50 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of September 3 to 4.[25] Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-300 or S-400 air defense system, two oil depots, and an ORL-A air traffic control radar in Adler, Krasnodar Krai (approximately 560 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on September 3 and 4.[26] Open sources reported on September 4 that Ukrainian forces struck the Sterlitamak Petrochemical Plant and Avangard defense-industry plant in Sterlitamak, Republic of Bashkortostan (approximately 1,300 kilometers from the international border).[27] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that an August 26 Ukrainian strike on the Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod (approximately 775 kilometers from the frontline) caused the facility to suspend its operations and that a September 1 Ukrainian strike on the NOVATEK Ust-Luga oil refinery in Slobidka, Leningrad Oblast (approximately 1,100 kilometers from the international border) damaged the facility’s pipelines, a primary gas condensate processing unit, and two columns of the hydrocracking unit, and also caused oil spillages.[28]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
A Ukrainian official source refuted Russian claims of advances northeast of Sumy City. A Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Sumy Oblast refuted an August 29 Russian MoD claim that Russian forces seized Khrapivshchyna (northeast of Sumy City), stating that Russian forces have not made any breakthroughs in this area.[29] Ukrainian and open sources have repeatedly refuted Russian claims of control over Khrapivshchyna.[30]
The Russian military command is reportedly planning a rotation of units operating southeast of Sumy City. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on September 4 that the Russian military command is planning a rotation of the 19th Battalion of the 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) operating near Ryasne and Taratutyne (southeast of Sumy City), gradually replacing them with elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Territorial Control) (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces).[31] This is the first evidence ISW has observed of the 80th Tank Regiment having a 19th Battalion operating in Ukraine.
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
See topline text for Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Odradne (east of Kharkiv City), according to a Ukrainian unit operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast, indicating that Ukrainian forces control Odradne contrary to Russian claims.[32]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kharkiv Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation post in occupied Petrivka (northeast of Kupyansk).[33]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian milbloggers claimed on September 4 that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[34]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 3 and 4 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Ridkodub-Nove area (southeast of Borova) is a contested “gray zone” where Ukrainian forces are counterattacking.[36]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast but did not advance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel and lubricants storage site in occupied Rovenky, Luhansk Oblast (roughly 125 kilometers from the frontline).[37]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continue to infiltrate the area south of Lyman, as Russian forces are struggling to enter the town itself and likely aim instead to threaten Ukrainian positions and supply lines in and near Lyman and Slovyansk through gradual infiltration missions. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position south of the northern section of Dibrova (south of Lyman) according to geolocated footage published on September 1, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[38]
Ukrainian officials refuted official Russian claims about the Russian seizure of Svyatohirsk (northwest of Lyman). Russian milbloggers continued to claim on September 4 that Russian forces are clearing Svyatohirsk, with one milblogger assessing that the alleged seizure of the settlement and potential future advances northward will allow Russian forces to establish firmer fire control over the M-03 Izyum-Slovyansk highway.[39] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated, however, that Russian infiltrators are still far from the Siverskyi Donets River and Svyatohirsk.[40] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking on the southern outskirts of Lyman and near Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman and east of Svyatohirsk), indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions significantly east of Svyatohirsk and that Russian forces have likely not advanced west of Drobysheve.[41] Russian President Vladimir Putin baselessly claimed on September 1 that the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces seized Svyatohirsk — an extreme claim disconnected from all available evidence.[42]
Russian forces will likely intensify their attacks in the Lyman direction as the weather worsens in coming weeks and months. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction forecasted that Russian forces would intensify their attempts to advance as cold and rainy weather sets in, as they have done in the past.[43] The spokesperson added that the Russian military command is regularly replenishing elements of the 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) in the area but that the soldiers are poorly trained.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Slovyansk, as Russian forces have been trying to seize local tactical heights in the area to create more favorable conditions for a future offensive against Slovyansk.[44] Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position in northwestern Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk) according to geolocated footage published on September 3, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 4 that Russian forces seized Nykonorivka (southeast of Slovyansk and east of Kramatorsk).[46]
Evidence continues to contradict Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov’s August 27 claims about alleged Russian advances east of Slovyansk. Geolocated footage published on September 3 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in Orikhuvatka (west of Rai-Oleksandrivka) and along the western bank of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal southeast of the settlement, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the area contrary to Gerasimov’s August 27 claim that Russian forces seized Orikhuvatka.[47] A Russian milblogger acknowledged on August 27 that Russian forces do not maintain a presence in Orikhuvatka.[48]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on September 3 and 4 but did not advance.[49]
Ukrainian forces continue to maintain positions that pose a challenge for Russian forces’ attempts to advance in and near Kostyantynivka. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged on September 3 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Stinky, Chervone, and Mykolaivka (all northeast of Kostyantynivka).[50] The milblogger assessed that a Russian advance in this current Ukrainian pocket would straighten the front and free up reserves for a continued push toward Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (west of Stinky), the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal, and the Maiske-Markove line (north of Stinky).
A Russian milblogger assessed that Russian forces are employing the same tactics that they have been using in the Kostyantynivka area in order to threaten Ukraine’s ability to maintain supplies to positions in Druzhkivka. A milblogger assessed that Russian advances near Mykolaipillya (west of Kostyantynivka) would allow Russian forces to move their drone repeaters closer to Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Druzhkivka in order to disrupt Ukrainian logistics and threaten Ukraine’s ability to hold positions — as Russian forces have been trying to do to seize Kostyantynivka.[51]
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Dobropillya direction. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in eastern Dobropillya, according to geolocated footage published on September 3, after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[52] The Russian MoD claimed on September 4 that Russian forces seized Hruzke (northeast of Dobropillya).[53]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on September 3 and 4 but did not advance.[54]
Russian forces are reportedly intensifying operations in the Pokrovsk direction after deploying additional personnel to the area. A Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion reported on September 4 that Russian forces have intensified offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction from August to September 2026 and have almost doubled the amount of Russian infantry personnel deployed in the area.[55]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction. Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Kotlyarivka (just east of Novopavlivka) according to geolocated footage published on September 3.[56]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on September 3 and 4 but did not advance.[57]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone launch site in occupied Donetsk City (roughly 55 kilometers from the frontline) and a Russian command post in occupied Fedorivka (one of several settlements between six and 100 kilometers from the frontline).[58]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 3 and 4 but did not advance.[59]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 4.
Russian forces continue to employ “human safari” tactics targeting civilians in Kherson City. The Kherson Oblast Military Administration reported on September 4 that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian minibus in Kherson City, killing one civilian and injuring 12.[60]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea, as gas stations in Crimea continue suffering from gasoline shortages. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck posts for Grenadier APTS automated technical reconnaissance in Suvorovo (roughly 224 or 98 kilometers from the frontline) and Rysove (roughly 105 kilometers from the frontline) on September 3 or 4.[61] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from September 3 and 4 shows heat anomalies at the airfield and railway near occupied Dzhankoy (roughly 153 kilometers from the frontline), a parking lot near the Kerch Bridge ferry crossing near Kerch (roughly 331 kilometers from the frontline), and west of the Hvardiivske Air Base near Hvardiivske (roughly 203 kilometers from the frontline) — all locations that Ukrainian forces reportedly struck.[62] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Bastion missile system that can carry Zirkon and Onyx missiles, two fuel tankers, and a command and staff vehicle in occupied Crimea in August 2026.[63] Geolocated footage from the GUR confirms that Ukrainian forces struck a Bastion coastal defense missile system in northern Feodosia (approximately 274 kilometers from the frontline).[64] A local Crimean-based Telegram channel claimed on September 4 that many gas stations in occupied Crimea are out of stock despite Russian government promises to increase AI-95 gasoline supplies from September 1.[65]
Russian forces are struggling to locate a safe seaport for ship maintenance. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Second Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on September 4 that Russian forces are looking for ports beyond Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, to which they can transfer Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) ships and vessels involved in Russia’s military-economic activities.[66] Pletenchuk noted that Russian forces cannot use their main ship repair base in occupied Crimea and that a ship staying in one place for a prolonged period places it at risk — both likely due to the threat of Ukrainian drone strikes. Pletenchuk added that Russian submarines — which can launch Russian cruise missiles — have not been active in the area “for a long time,” possibly due to the need to conserve resources and problems with submarine maintenance, but noted that Russian forces are now striking Odesa Oblast from the Black Sea with Banderol loitering munitions instead of submarine-launched cruise missiles. Pletenchuk stated that Russian forces are increasingly trying to protect the submarines at their home bases from Ukrainian strikes.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[67]
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on September 3 to 4. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Kh-31P anti-radar missile from over the Black Sea and 121 Shahed-type strike drones (about half of which were jet-powered), Gerbera-type strike drones, Parodiya-type decoy drones, and S8000 Banderol loitering munitions from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Oryol and Kursk cities; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[68] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 103 drones and Banderol loitering munitions, that an unspecified number of air targets struck 15 locations, and that debris fell on six locations.[69] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, commercial, and logistics infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Poltava oblasts.[70] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy stated on September 4 that Russian strikes in part caused power outages in Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Odesa oblasts.[71]
Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper stated on September 4 that Russian forces conducted a double-tap strike against Ukrainian food and industrial warehouses in Odesa Oblast.[72]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-3-2026/; https://t.me/mod_russia/66997
[2] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/21688
[3] https://t.me/wargonzo/36680; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/74579
[4] https://t.me/rybar/82878
[5]https://www.facebook.com/16ArmyCorps/posts/pfbid02GzaxRFK8FaktNFjToGbiCBxQ8Lpc6zZ86KapmCbwQXB9SAyxetJE4YRvqdd46uXsl
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2026/
[7] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2095862982018203657
[8] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20701
[9] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7733
[10] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7733
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2026/
[12] https://dou dot ua/lenta/interviews/flash-about-jet-drones-and-attacks-on-kyiv/?from=tg
[13] https://www.calibredefence.co.uk/mesh-networks-how-russia-is-increasing-the-range-of-its-drones/
[14] endnote https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20703; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/stiv-vitkoff-ta-dzhared-kushner-vidvidayut-moskvu-i-v-nedily-106257
[15] https://t.me/tass_agency/393686
[16] https://kyivindependent dot com/trump-envoys-witkoff-kushner-to-visit-kyiv-moscow-sept-5-6-source-says/
[17] https://abcnews.com/International/ukrainian-drone-attacks-moscow-resume-hours-after-ratcliffe/story?id=135962437
[18] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80677
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2026/
[20] https://tass dot ru/politika/28054781; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2026/
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2026/
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2026/;
[23] https://dou dot ua/lenta/interviews/flash-about-jet-drones-and-attacks-on-kyiv/?from=tg
[24] https://militarnyi/ dot com/en/news/second-batch-of-rassvet-satellites-was-prematurely-declared-failure-analysis-of-their-altitude-gain/
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42120
[26] https://x.com/blinzka/status/2095662060948316326; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2095640052781228109?s=20; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2095752279718539665?s=20; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2095638887104385231; . https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2095773605120352719; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/30337; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2095849337892810856; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13463; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/30370;
[27] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/30323; https://t.me/supernova_plus/59334
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42119; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2026/
[29] https://t.me/brygada47/2552 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2026/
[30] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2026/
[31] https://t.me/severnnyi/9226
[32] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1EG422ppHn/
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42120
[34] https://t.me/dva_majors/98503 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36680
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42116 ; https://t.me/red_war_machina/885 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/29600
[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47252
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42120
[38] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12869; https://t.me/trozsusumy117/2190
[39] https://t.me/wargonzo/36680; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47252
[40] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/09/04/holodiv-vony-chekayut-ne-prosto-tak-shho-zadumaly-rosiyany-na-lymanshhyni/; https://youtu.be/TXXOv27KdzM?t=1738
[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47252
[42] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2026/
[43] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/09/04/holodiv-vony-chekayut-ne-prosto-tak-shho-zadumaly-rosiyany-na-lymanshhyni/; https://youtu.be/TXXOv27KdzM?t=1738
[44] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/
[45] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2095552233886843032; https://t.me/OMSBr_123/2635
[46] https://t.me/divgen/83690
[47] https://x.com/meowqai/status/2095805705584312788; https://t.me/omsbr_88_official/584; https://t.me/mod_russia/6680;
[48] https://t.me/motopatriot78/55521
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42114; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42116; https://t.me/rybar/82877 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36680
[50] https://t.me/rybar/82877
[51] https://t.me/rybar/82877
[52] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2095676345388769508; https://t.me/pravytsia_sirka/160
[53] https://t.me/mod_russia/67034
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42114 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42116 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/122580
[55] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/04/rosiyany-majzhe-vdvichi-posylyly-shturmy-vovky-da-vinchi-rozpovily-pro-sytuacziyu-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/
[56] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2095536796562252017?s=20; https://t [dot] me/urga_74/9564; https://t [dot] me/zvizdecmanhustu/3580
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42114 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42116
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42120
[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42114; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42116; https://t.me/voin_dv/20971; https://t.me/dva_majors/98503; https://t.me/wargonzo/36680; https://t.me/rybar/82883
[60] https://t.me/khersonskaODA/66658; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/14975; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/66657; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/66650; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/66648 ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/66659; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/66648; https://t.me/astrapress/124227; https://t.me/astrapress/124241
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42120
[62] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@34.398,45.679,12.760z; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/108683; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/108678; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/108709; https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@36.56,45.26,10.77z; https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@33.978,45.123,13.276z
[63] https://t.me/DIUkraine/9314;
[64] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2095793341392658901; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2095767567537250773
[65] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/108712
[66] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hVzUW1v6xjE; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/04/novorosijsk-ne-gumovyj-dmytro-pletenchuk-poyasnyv-chomu-rosiyany-hovayut-flot-i-ne-mozhut-normalno-remontuvaty-korabli/
[67] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[68] https://t.me/kpszsu/76336
[69] https://t.me/kpszsu/76336
[70] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/31558; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/73679; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31822; https://t.me/synegubov/25434; https://t.me/kirovogradskaODA/15342; https://t.me/mykolaiv_ova/3500; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/34572; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/73692; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/20365; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/20366; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/20367 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7428;https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7412; https://t.me/kyivoda/56072; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/20348; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7425; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid09CgBH4kyvkEkABCCeqz5jRtYTpWhQjfs2p6bBaWrnNQ9jdAePMmcrsXVDcBvcZjFl; https://www.facebook.com/dtekoem/posts/pfbid02iuyQyeGqs5VUQ7h1H5MP8F2Mwj7yhRT9U9T7BPbexYppeF11jgTmaLQJZc4d5JAil;
[71] https://t.me/energyofukraine/7758
[72] https://t.me/odeskaODA/19643
