Toplines
US President Donald Trump stated that the United States will grant Ukraine a license to produce an unspecified type of interceptor missile for Patriot air defense systems, which are critical for Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian ballistic missiles. Trump stated on July 8 that the United States will provide Ukraine a license to produce unspecified Patriot air defense interceptors and that the production could begin in two to three months.[1] It is unclear whether Trump will approve licensing for Ukraine to produce more capable PAC-3 interceptors or the simpler PAC-2 interceptors. Trump noted that the United States has not yet informed the US manufacturer about licensing Ukraine to produce Patriot interceptors. It is unclear how long it will take for Ukraine to begin producing the interceptor missiles, however, as production capacity will depend on the availability of the base components that go into the Patriot interceptor and the scaling of the entire supply chain that produces those components. Ukrainian forces are quite successful at intercepting cruise missiles and drones, but struggle to intercept ballistic missiles due to Ukraine’s insufficient supply of interceptor missiles. Ukrainian forces notably did not intercept any ballistic missiles in Russia’s two most recent massive strike packages overnight on July 1 to 2 and July 5 to 6.[2] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated on July 8 that Russia can produce between 60 and 65 Iskander ballistic missiles per month.[3] Russia may exploit the gap before Ukraine can produce its own Patriot interceptor missiles and intensify ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine to inflict maximum damage before Ukraine is able to more reliably defend itself.
Ukrainian forces are intensifying strikes against Russian fuel tankers as Russia increasingly relies on seaborne transportation of gasoline to occupied Crimea from Russia. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on July 8 that Russia has shifted to using fuel tankers to transport fuel between Russia and occupied Ukraine, particularly from occupied Mariupol and Berdyansk ports via the Sea of Azov, to address gasoline shortages in occupied Crimea, as Ukrainian strikes are denying Russia the use of the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway.[4] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 8 that Ukrainian forces struck nine Russian fuel tankers in the Azov Sea overnight on July 7 to 8, and that Ukrainian forces struck 19 Russian fuel tankers, a cargo ship, and a ferry over the past 72 hours.[5] The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on July 8 that a Ukrainian Sea Baby naval drone struck the Suezmax-class Russian shadow fleet tanker Blue off the coast of occupied Yalta (roughly 263 kilometers from the frontline).[6] The SBU noted that Russia previously used the Blue tanker to transport significant volumes of oil and petroleum products to circumvent international sanctions. Ukrainian forces struck eight Russian shadow fleet tankers, including Venera-3, Sanar-1, Sanar-17, Klimena, Teti, Alexei Savrasov, Ivan Cheremisinov, and Penelopa tankers on the night of July 6 to 7 in an effort to inhibit Russian gasoline transports to occupied Crimea.[7] Ukraine’s continuous intermediate- and long-range strike campaign against Russian land transportation routes is degrading the logistics routes between Russia and occupied Crimea, forcing occupied Crimea to rely on seaborne fuel supplies to address fuel shortages.[8]
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets deep into Russia on July 7 and 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the TAIF-NK JSC oil refinery in Nizhnekamsk, Republic of Tatarstan (roughly 1,115 kilometers from the international border), overnight.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the TAIF-NK oil refinery is one of the largest refineries in Russia with a production capacity of over 8 million tons. Geolocated footage published on July 8 shows a fire at the TAIF-NK JSC oil refinery in Nizhnekamsk, Republic of Tatarstan, following the Ukrainian strike.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Saratov Oil Refinery in Saratov Oblast (roughly 600 kilometers from the frontline) overnight, causing explosions and fires at the refinery.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the refinery has a production capacity of about 7 million tons of petroleum products per year and produces gasoline, diesel, and aviation fuel for Russian forces. Geolocated footage published on July 8 shows a fire at the Saratov oil refinery in Saratov Oblast following the strikes.[12] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin acknowledged on July 8 that Ukrainian forces struck and damaged infrastructure in Saratov Oblast.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Borisoglebsk military airfield in Voronezh Oblast (roughly 335 kilometers from the frontline).[14] The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) noted that the Borisoglebsk military airfield houses Russian Su-34, Su-35S, and Su-30M aircraft, which Russian forces regularly use to strike Ukrainian territory and train flight crews.[15] Geolocated footage published on July 8 shows a fire at the Borisoglebsk military airfield, and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from July 8 shows heat anomalies at the airfield following the Ukrainian strikes.[16] Ukrainian defense source Militarnyi published satellite imagery collected on July 7 that showed several Su-35s, two Mi-8 helicopters, eight Yak-130 training aircraft, and one Mi-26 helicopter at the airfield.[17] The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on July 8 that Ukrainian forces struck the Cherkasy linear production and dispatching station (LVDS) in the Bashkortostan Republic (roughly 1,500 kilometers from the international border with Ukraine), causing a fire near the oil tank farm and production facilities.[18] The SBU noted that the station is one of Russia’s key facilities within the Transneft-Ural petroleum network and transports almost two million tons of light petroleum products from the Ufa Oil Refinery per year. Geolocated footage published on July 8 shows smoke rising from the station following the Ukrainian strikes.[19] Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom claimed on July 8 that unspecified drones struck the Krasnodarskaya compressor station in Smolenskaya, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 370 kilometers from the frontline), a key part of the Russian gas supply chain through the Blue Stream pipeline that transports Russian gasoline to Turkey.[20] Ukrainian forces have been intensifying the scope and scale of their long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure in Russia over the last several months, exploiting overstretched Russian air defenses.[21] The Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil production and transport infrastructure will likely intensify the spread and severity of fuel shortages in Russian regions and occupied Ukraine.[22] Russia has largely failed to repel and adapt to Ukrainian long-range strikes, and numerous Russian milbloggers recently blamed the Russian federal government for failing to create a cohesive air defense system that can adequately protect private businesses and critical infrastructure from Ukrainian long-range strikes that continue to degrade Russia’s industrial capabilities and oil refining capacity.[23]
Ukrainian forces conducted a second phase of Operation Auchan in June 2026 aimed at disrupting Russian offensive capabilities, specifically targeting Russian artillery. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces conducted the second phase of Operation Auchan “a few weeks ago” (in June 2026) and struck 231 Russian artillery targets, completely destroying 171 of the targets.[24] Fedorov noted that Ukrainian forces specifically developed a new munition to defeat Russian artillery systems for this phase of the operation. Ukrainian forces conducted the first phase of the operation in Summer 2025, which significantly reduced Russia’s ability to conduct mechanized offensive operations in an unspecified sector of the theater for six months. Ukrainian strikes have been increasingly striking Russian artillery systems in recent months, with Ukrainian General Staff reports indicating that Ukrainian forces struck 1,447 in March 2026, 1,834 in April 2026, 2,043 in May 2026, and 2,053 in June 2026.[25] Operation Auchan demonstrates the maturation of Ukrainian operational planning and technological adaptations to achieve operational effects to support combined arms warfare on the battlefield.
Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US-produced weapons and joint drone production. NATO published a declaration on July 8 promising to allocate 70 billion euros (about $80 billion) for military equipment, assistance, and training to Ukraine in 2026 and to sustain the level of military aid in 2027.[26] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on July 7 that Ukraine signed defense cooperation agreements with Estonia, the Netherlands and Denmark for joint drone production in Ukraine and in Europe.[27] Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced on July 7 that Canada will allocate 925 million Canadian dollars (about $653 million) in military assistance to Ukraine, including 475 million (about $335 million) for purchasing ammunition, 400 million (about $282 million) for 35 Canadian-made armored vehicles, and 50 million (about $35 million) for critical technology and engineering equipment.[28] Norway announced on July 7 that it will allocate 268 million euros (about $306 million) to Ukraine for the purchase of Patriot air defense missiles in partnership with Denmark, Germany, and Canada through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which funds NATO states’ purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine.[29] Unspecified government sources told Spanish outlet El País on July 7 that Spain will allocate an additional 50 million euros ($57 million) to purchase US weapons for Ukraine under the PURL initiative.[30]
Key Takeaways
- US President Donald Trump stated that the United States will grant Ukraine a license to produce an unspecified type of interceptor missile for Patriot air defense systems, which are critical for Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian ballistic missiles.
- Ukrainian forces are intensifying strikes against Russian fuel tankers as Russia increasingly relies on seaborne transportation of gasoline to occupied Crimea from Russia.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets deep into Russia on July 7 and 8.
- Ukrainian forces conducted a second phase of Operation Auchan in June 2026 aimed at disrupting Russian offensive capabilities, specifically targeting Russian artillery.
- Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US-produced weapons and joint drone production.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City.
- Russian forces launched two Kh-31P anti-radar missiles, five Iskander-M and S-400 ballistic missiles, and 169 drones against Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
See topline text.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission north of Sumy City. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces reported on July 8 that Russian forces infiltrated throughout Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[31]
Russia is conducting an information operation against residents of Sumy Oblast. The Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation reported on July 8 that Russia is spreading narratives alleging that Ukrainian forces are preparing Sumy City for surrender, including by creating deepfake videos of local officials and residents.[32] The Center reported that Russian forces continue to strike civilian infrastructure in Sumy City and that Russia is using fake narratives to reduce societal resilience.
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City. Geolocated footage published on July 3 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian underground bunker southwest of Zhuralyovka, Belgorod Oblast (north of Sumy City and on the international border).[33]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 7 and 8 but did not advance.[34]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 7 and 8 but did not advance.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 8 that Russian forces advanced into Mala Shapkivka and into fields south of Kindrashivka (both north of Kupyansk), in northern and central Kupyansk, and in western Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).[36]
Footage published on July 7 and geolocated by ISW shows destroyed road bridges near Shelayevo (roughly 25 kilometers from the frontline) and Urazovo (roughly 20 kilometers from the frontline) in Belgorod Oblast after reported Ukrainian strikes.[37]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 7 and 8 but did not advance.[38]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 8 that Ukrainian forces struck electrical substations near occupied Kalynove (either roughly 44 or 80 kilometers from the frontline) and occupied Troitske (roughly 42 kilometers from the frontline) and a repair base of the Russian 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) near occupied Pysarivka (roughly 95 kilometers from the frontline) between July 1 and 8.[39]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Slovyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on July 7 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian servicemembers in Pryshyb (north of Slovyansk) and in the fields south of Pryshyb after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[40]
Ukrainian and Russian forces both recently advanced or maintained positions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage published on July 1 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian-occupied building in eastern Illinivka (south of Kostyantynivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced in the area.[41] Geolocated footage published on July 2 shows Ukrainian forces striking two Russian-occupied buildings in western Kostyantynivka, indicating that Russian forces maintain positions or have recently advanced in the area.[42] Geolocated footage published on July 6 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied basement in southwestern Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[43] Geolocated footage published on July 1 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in northern Kostyantynivka in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[44]
Russian forces continue to commit large numbers of troops to efforts in the Kostyantynivka direction but are struggling to advance. The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported on July 8 that Russian forces publish footage of Russian soldiers being killed by strikes in order to claim that the footage indicates that Russian forces advanced, whereas in reality the attacking force was eliminated.[45] The commander reported that Russian forces continue to press in the Kostyantynivka direction, including conducting between 10 and 15 mechanized assaults in the last three months, but that none of the assaults led to Russian advances. The commander reported that Russian company commanders continue to instruct their soldiers to advance and have already lost 300 to 400 soldiers without accomplishing any objectives. The commander stated that Russian forces lost about 1,200 soldiers fighting for Rusyn Yar (southeast of Kostyantynivka) but have failed to capture the settlement.
Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the 81st Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating in the Chasiv Yar – Druzhkivka direction after operating in the Kherson direction, as ISW observed on July 7, 2025.[46]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on July 7 and 8 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya).[48]
Russian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Pokrovsk direction as Ukrainian forces counterattacked. Geolocated footage published on July 5 and 8 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces in central and southeastern Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) respectively, indicating that Russian forces maintain positions or recently advanced in the area.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk).[50]
The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on July 8 that it destroyed a Russian forces logistics hub near Pokrovsk containing drones, unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), and ammunition.[51]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on July 8.
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Oleksandrivka direction. Geolocated footage published on July 7 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember in the fields northeast of Novohryhorivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[52]
Russian forces continue to conduct infiltration missions in the Oleksandrivka direction. The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on July 8 that Russian forces slightly changed tactics and now carry out infiltration missions in small groups.[53] The commander noted that Russian forces use Molniya strike drones and first-person view (FPV) drones to deliver ammunition to their positions.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 8 that Ukrainian forces struck 1RL131 P-18 radars near occupied Zelenyi Yar (roughly 76 kilometers from the frontline) and occupied Starodubivka (roughly 82 kilometers from the frontline) and a 1L22 Parol-4 radar near occupied Starodubivka between July 1 and 8.[54] The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported on June 8 that Ukrainian forces struck military warehouses near Hranitne (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline) and Styla (roughly 90 kilometers from the frontline) in occupied Donetsk between July 1 and 8.[55] Geolocated footage published on July 7 shows a partially collapsed bridge following a Ukrainian drone strike in occupied Mariupol (roughly 118 kilometers from the frontline).[56]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on July 7 and 8 but did not advance.[57]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on July 7 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position southeast of Stepnohirsk (southeast of Zaporizhzhia City), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[58]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on July 8 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone pilot deployment points in occupied Kamianka and Komysh-Zorya (roughly 41 and 46 kilometers from the frontline, respectively).[59] Geolocated footage published on July 7 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian logistics vehicles along the M-18 Melitopol-Novooleksiivka highway near occupied Volodymyrivka (roughly 90 kilometers from the frontline) and near occupied Kyrpychne (roughly 85 kilometers from the frontline) with Hornet drones.[60] Additional geolocated footage published on July 7 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian logistics vehicles along the T-08-05 road south of Novomykolaivka (roughly 74 kilometers from the frontline) with Hornet drones.[61]
Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign continues to strangle Russian logistics in southern Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Ukrainian drone operators operating in southern Zaporizhia Oblast told Reuters on July 8 that Russian forces are installing electronic warfare (EW) systems near Russian military assets that can jam Starlink satellite technology in order to counter Ukrainian intermediate-range strikes against Russian logistics.[62] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov told Reuters that Russian forces installed around 10 “Volna Kupol Garant“ EW jamming systems that can destabilize Starlink service over an area of 20 square kilometers. Ukrainian drone operators stated that Russian forces are also attempting to disguise military vehicles as civilian transport and are escorting fuel tankers with trucks equipped with machine guns to counter Ukrainian strikes. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Dnipropetrovsk direction reported on July 8 that Russian forces are experiencing significant logistical difficulties and have to carry ammunition for 10 to 11 kilometers on foot toward infantry positions.[63] The spokesperson noted that Ukrainian forces have an artillery advantage and added that Russian forces have trouble advancing to the Dnipro River. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are withdrawing their artillery but continue using Shahed drones against Kherson City and periodically use guided aerial bombs and Molniya-type strike drones.
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on July 8. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 8 that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian Hvardiisky training ground in occupied Oleksandrivka (roughly 79 kilometers from the frontline) between July 1 and 8.[64]
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets assessed on July 8 that Ukraine’s strike campaign against Russian logistics in the Kherson direction is likely impacting Russian reinforcement efforts in western Zaporizhia Oblast, generating operational effects on the frontline. Mashovets stated on July 8 that the Kherson direction is the most stable area of the frontline and that the Russian Dnepr Group of Forces continues to hold forward positions along the west (left) bank of the Dnipro River.[65] Mashovets stated that both Ukrainian and Russian forces are using drones and small watercraft in the “gray zone” along the riverbed. Mashovets stated that Russian forces are actively striking Ukrainian positions and civilian infrastructure in Kherson Oblast. Mashovets stated that the Dnepr Group of Forces is prioritizing the Orikhiv and Zaporizhzhia City sectors and is seeking to repel Ukrainian counterattacks in the area and break through Ukrainian defenses in Orikhiv.[66] Mashovets noted that the Russian Dnepr Group of Forces command may be considering reinforcing the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) operating in the Orikhiv direction at the expense of other elements of the Russian Dnepr Group of Forces operating in the Kherson direction but assessed that such a decision is unlikely.[67] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces are intensifying their strike campaign against Russian command-and-control (C2) communications and logistics in the Kherson direction and might launch counterattacks in the area to exploit weakened Russian positions if Russian forces redeploy to western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 227th Artillery Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in both the Dnipro and Zaporizhia directions, the first evidence ISW has observed of this unit on the frontline.[68] Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 10th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Dnipro direction.[69] ISW last observed elements of this brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction in April 2025.[70] Mashovets reported that elements of the 74th Separate Artillery Regiment (Dnepr Grouping of Forces) and 385th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Territorial Forces, classified as “mobilized reserve”), are operating in the Dnipro direction, the first evidence ISW has observed of these units on the frontline. Drone operators of the 116th Detachment of the 4th Military Base (58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[71] Mashovets reported that the 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, SMD) is operating in both the Dnipro and Zaporizhia directions. The Russian Ministry of Defense previously claimed that the 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade seized Novodmytrivka (southeast of Sumy City) in Sumy Oblast on April 29.[72]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea, causing continued power outages. The Ukrainian Security Services (SBU) reported on July 8 that Ukrainian forces struck the Dzhankoi military airbase (roughly 140 kilometers from the frontline), port infrastructure near occupied Kerch (roughly 240 kilometers from the frontline), and ammunition and fuel warehouses near occupied Novohryhorivka (either roughly 173 or 211 kilometers from the frontline) and Chervone (one of several settlements between roughly 113 and 187 kilometers from the frontline).[73] The SBU reported that Russian forces store military equipment and repeaters for Oriona strike and reconnaissance drones at the Dzhankoi military airbase. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 8 that Ukrainian forces struck the PP-2 “Crimea” Kuban-Crimea electricity transfer point near occupied Hlazivka (roughly 288 kilometers from the frontline), the Nasosna-3 electrical substation near occupied Zelenyi Yar (roughly either 122 or 255 kilometers from the frontline), and the Novotroitske and Nyzhniohirsk electrical substation (roughly 182 kilometers from the frontline) in occupied Crimea between July 1 and 8.[74] Local Telegram channels claimed on July 8 that Ukrainian drone strikes overnight on July 7 to 8 caused power outages near occupied Kerch and eastern and northwestern Crimea.[75] The Russian Ministry of Energy claimed on July 8 that they are implementing measures to increase petroleum product deliveries to occupied Crimea and Sevastopol to meet civilian and economic demand.[76]
Local sources provided additional battle damage assessment (BDA) after recent Ukrainian strikes on occupied Crimea. A local Crimea-based Telegram channel reported on July 8 that satellite imagery of the Saky military airfield (roughly 183 kilometers from the frontline) shows that Ukrainian forces destroyed gates at the airfield meant to shield Russian planes from Ukrainian strikes, indicating that Ukrainian forces targeted Russian aircraft located within hardened hangars.[77]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 7 to 8. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 8 that Russian forces launched two Kh-31P anti-radar missiles from the Black Sea, five Iskander-M and S-400 ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea and Bryansk Oblast, and 169 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Mollerovo, Rostov Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Cape Chauda and Hvardiiske, Crimea.[78] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 139 drones and that the two Kh-31P missiles did not reach their targets. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that five Iskander-M and S-400 ballistic missiles struck four locations, 20 drones struck 11 locations, and that drone debris fell on eight locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 8 that Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian Su-35 fighter jet in the eastern sector.[79] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck gasoline, energy, industrial, and residential infrastructure in Chernihiv, Poltava, Odesa, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, and Kyiv cities.[80] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported on July 8 that Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure caused power outages in Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts.[81]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-remarks-bilat-volodymyr-zelenskyy-ukraine-ankara-july-8-2026/ ; https://www.euronews dot com/my-europe/2026/07/08/us-to-give-patriot-air-defence-licence-to-ukraine-trump-said; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bnceRWjeF2w&t=1s
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-6-2026/
[3] https://t.me/DIUkraine/8860
[4] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uOntga5OQrs ; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1350114-rf-pereorientuvala-postacanna-palnogo-do-krimu-na-tankeri-pletencuk/
[5] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2573 ; https://t.me/usf_army/2172 ; http://x.com/414magyarbirds/status/2074757778753659067
[6] https://ssu.gov dot ua/novyny/morskyi-dron-sbu-sea-baby-urazyv-tanker-tinovoho-flotu-rf-blue-u-chornomu-mori-video ; https://t.me/SBUkr/18043
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2026/
[9] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40901
[10] https://x.com/blinzka/status/2074825755301728544 ; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2074788434946764940 ; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/2074694517001777231
[11] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40901 ; https://t.me/usf_army/2173
[12] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2074643397374071150 ; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2074643890678677608 ; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2074647433385001230 ; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/2074645476767326562 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/24675 ; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7829 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2074650529813397553 ; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/goryat-naftozavody-u-saratovi-ta-nyzhnokamsku-pislya-urazhennya-dronamy/
[13] https://t.me/busargin_r/11738
[14] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40901 ; https://t.me/usf_army/2173
[15] https://t.me/usf_army/2173
[16] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2074664492231790842 ; https://t.me/Falconins/9442 ; https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@42.180,51.362,14.735z
[17] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rosiya-pered-udarom-droniv-zoseredyla-sim-su-35-na-aerodromi-borysoglebsk/
[18] https://ssu.gov dot ua/novyny/sbu-urazyla-naftoperekachuvalnu-stantsiiu-u-bashkortostani-yaka-ye-odnym-iz-kliuchovykh-obiektiv-systemy-transneft-ural
[19] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2074745535500607892 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/37031 ; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7830
[20] https://t.me/gazprom/2470
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-strike-campaigns-will-likely-continue-to-hurt-russias-economy-and-military-operations-in-ukraine/
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/
[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-17-2026/
[24] https://t.me/zedigital/6864 ; https://suspilne dot media/1349660-ukrainski-droni-zupinili-mehanizovanij-nastup-rosijskih-vijsk-na-piv-roku-fedorov/
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40879; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40832; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40795 [data from the Ukrainian General Staff between February 22, 2026, to July 8, 2026]
[26] https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2026/07/08/the-ankara-summit-declaration
[27] https://www dot president.gov.ua/news/prezident-ukrayini-j-premyer-ministr-estoniyi-uklali-drone-d-105297 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19831; https://www dot president.gov.ua/news/prezident-ukrayini-j-premyer-ministr-niderlandiv-obgovorili-105305 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19834 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19835 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19837;
[28] https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/readouts/2026/07/07/prime-minister-carney-meets-president-ukraine-volodymyr-zelenskyy ; https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2026/07/07/declaration-defence-security-and-resilience-bank ; https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2026/07/07/eight-countries-commit-supporting-canada-led-defence-security-and ; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/kanada-ogolosila-pro-novij-paket-pidtrimki-na-900-miljoniv-d-105293 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19832
[29] https://www.regjeringen dot no/en/whats-new/nye-norske-bidrag-til-ukrainas-luftvern/id3168923/; https://suspilne dot media/1350042-norvegia-vidilae-268-mln-evro-na-zakupivlu-raket-do-patriot-dla-potreb-ukraini/
[30] https://elpais dot com/espana/2026-07-07/espana-financia-con-50-millones-mas-la-compra-de-armas-estadounidenses-para-ucrania.html
[31] https://t.me/severnnyi/8626
[32] https://cpd.gov dot ua/international-direction/ssha/informaczijna-operacziya-rf-proty-zhyteliv-sum-novi-fejky-ta-manipulyacziyi/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/07/08/informaczijna-operacziya-rf-proty-zhyteliv-sum-novi-fejky-stari-metody-ta-spravzhni-czili-kremlya/
[33] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2073054276016906621?s=20; https://t.me/ua_16_ompb_58_ompbr/308
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40880; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40878
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40911; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40880; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40878; https://t.me/wargonzo/35372; https://t.me/grvZapad/19088
[36] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33513
[37] https://t.me/milinfolive/175652
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40911 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40880
[39] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2574
[40] https://t.me/ukrliberatio/22163; https://x.com/ukrliberation/status/2074537092818833467
[41] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2074524492974440541; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/34328
[42] https://x.com/RackhamLeRousse/status/2073057994972004572; https://t.me/armycorps19/298
[43] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2074506305767661958 ; https://t.me/official24ombr/2391
[44] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2074520831363776647 ; https://t.me/verumreactor/38766
[45] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ZhbaacebjE; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/07/07/odna-noga-tut-insha-tam-kombryg-holodnogo-yaru-poyasnyv-shho-take-deepstate-po-rosijsky/
[46] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3490; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2025/
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40878; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40880; https://t.me/wargonzo/35372; https://t.me/dva_majors/95781
[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45062
[49] https://x.com/meowqai/status/2073775784003555686; https://t.me/skala425/921 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/37035; https://t.me/soniah_hub/16796
[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45062
[51] https://www.facebook.com/SecurSerUkraine/posts/pfbid02LjE8GhjSAhrr2tLvwmSJqArmAdN4SrAHQCdi5aFGcSFN2AQf3FgBzt3QKiMYpTWjl
[52] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12429; https://t.me/burpobeda/19679; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2074587737684922491?s=20
[53] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MVaCx2_Zf9U ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/08/prapor-video-i-kvytok-v-odyn-kinecz-yak-zminylasya-taktyka-okupantiv-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku/
[54] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2574
[55]https://www.facebook.com/SecurSerUkraine/posts/pfbid02LjE8GhjSAhrr2tLvwmSJqArmAdN4SrAHQCdi5aFGcSFN2AQf3FgBzt3QKiMYpTWjl
[56] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2074794002235158587 ; https://x.com/hochu_dodomu/status/2074481601098989872 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/62398
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40880 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40878 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/40911 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/35372 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/95781
[58] https://t.me/Stavrubezh/89 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2074496450172514668?s=20; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2074496455830565025?s=20; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2074498930394492949
[59] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2074539456829493395 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2074542866983174454 ; https://x.com/3sofua/status/2074085960980295853
[60] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2074519952472805772 ; https://x.com/3sofua/status/2074085960980295853 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2074527726804013440
[61] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2074539456829493395 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2074542866983174454 ; https://x.com/3sofua/status/2074085960980295853
[62] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/russia-tries-jam-musks-starlink-systems-counter-ukrainian-drones-2026-07-08/
[63] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MVaCx2_Zf9U&t=1407s; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/07/08/okupanty-zmusheni-dolaty-ponad-10-km-pishky-do-pozyczij-na-prydniprovskomu-napryamku/
[64] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2574
[65] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3490
[66] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3493
[67] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3494
[68] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3490
[69] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3490
[70] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-30-2025/
[71] https://t.me/dva_majors/95798
[72] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/; https://t.me/mod_russia/63028; https://t.me/mod_russia/63029
[73] https://www.facebook.com/SecurSerUkraine/posts/pfbid02LjE8GhjSAhrr2tLvwmSJqArmAdN4SrAHQCdi5aFGcSFN2AQf3FgBzt3QKiMYpTWjl ; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1350088-sbu-povidomila-pro-udari-po-aviabazi-dzankoj-ta-portu-krim-u-kerci/
[74] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2574
[75] https://t.me/rian_crimea/98296 ; https://t.me/rian_crimea/98302 ; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1349778-kerc-bez-svitla-pereboi-z-elektronergieu-u-feodosii-ta-simferopoli-okupanti-zaavili-pro-ataku-droniv-na-krim/ ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/104198; https://t.me/forpost_sev/34959; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2074760563381416084; https://t.me/kerch_news/85779; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2074714199637328039;
[76] https://t.me/tass_agency/384345; https://vk dot com/minenergo_rf?w=wall-202109152_8334; https://www.rbc dot ru/economics/08/07/2026/6a4e4dd69a7947f31a5d33e2; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/27899501
[77] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/104140
[78] https://t.me/kpszsu/67709
[79] https://x.com/KpsZSU/status/2074835884944277907; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2074840795186626988; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2074841278274040157
[80] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/30384 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30690 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30691 ; https://x.com/MVS_UA/status/2074773643431662056 ; https://t.me/synegubov/23586 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4287 ; https://t.me/synegubov/23611 ; https://t.me/synegubov/23575 ; https://t.me/synegubov/23576 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4281 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4284 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4285 ; https://www.rbc dot ua/ukr/news/ob-ekt-komu-buli-vibuhi-vishnevomu-nalezhit-1783443498.html ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2583 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7041 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7042 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7043 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7045 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7046 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7048 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7060 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7061 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7063 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7064 ; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/33825 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/17372 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/17375 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/17383 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/43577 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/43582 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/63833 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/43614 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/63861 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/43625 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/63870 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/43631 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/63873 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/43661 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/63903 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/43623 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/63869 ; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/59721
[81] https://t.me/energyofukraine/7377
