Toplines
Russia and Belarus completed their combined nuclear exercises on May 21, highlighting Russia’s ability to leverage Belarus for future Russian military operations and Russia’s deepening de facto control over Belarus. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko presided over the second stage of combined Russian-Belarusian nuclear force exercises on May 21.[1] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces delivered nuclear munitions to Belarus and that Belarusian forces practiced receiving, equipping, and moving specialized munitions and launch vehicles for the Iskander-M ballistic missile system.[2] The Russian MoD claimed that the exercises included the launch of a Yars intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) from the Plesetsk State Test Cosmodrome, a Zircon hypersonic missile from the Barents Sea, a Sineva ICBM from a submerged nuclear-powered strategic submarine, cruise missiles from Tu-95MS aircraft, a Kinzhal hypersonic missile from MiG-31I aircraft, and an Iskander-M missile from the Kapustin Yar Training Ground.[3] The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, Northern and Pacific Fleets, Long-Range Aviation (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]), and Leningrad and Central Military Districts took part in the missile launches.[4] Putin claimed that Russia and Belarus plan to hold the biennial “Union Shield” exercises in 2027. The next Union Shield exercises may include a nuclear component for the first time.
The exercises with Russian nuclear weapons deployed on Belarusian territory highlight the extent to which Russia has absorbed Belarus under its de facto control. The Belarusian Constitution previously stated that Belarus was a non-nuclear state, but Belarus amended its constitution in 2022 to renounce the country’s neutrality and non-nuclear status, likely under Kremlin pressure and influence over Belarusian decision-making.[5] The exercises reflect the deterioration of Belarusian sovereignty and Russia’s expanding capacity to leverage Belarus as a springboard for its own military purposes.
Ukrainian strikes continue to constrain Russian oil refining and energy revenues, even as the war in the Middle East has provided a budget windfall in the short term. Reuters reported on May 20, citing unspecified official data and sources, that virtually all major oil refineries in central Russia have halted or scaled back their fuel output following recent Ukrainian drone strikes.[6] Reuters reported that the affected refineries total over 30 percent of Russian gasoline output and 25 percent of Russia’s diesel output. The source told Reuters that the Kirishi Oil Refinery in Leningrad Oblast, one of Russia’s largest oil refineries that has a processing capacity of 20 million metric tons per year, has fully halted operations since May 5. Ukrainian forces struck the Kirishi refinery on the night of May 4 to 5.[7] Reuters noted that it is unclear if the Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez Oil Refinery, which has an annual processing capacity of 17 million tons, has been able to maintain partial operations following a Ukrainian strike on May 20.
Reuters also reported on May 20 that Russian oil and gas revenues are set to rise 39 percent year on year in May to 700 billion rubles (about $9.8 billion) due to rising oil prices from the war in the Middle East but that these revenues are expected to decline by 17 percent from April 2026.[8] Reuters noted that Russia’s oil and gas revenues from January to May 2026 declined by about a third year on year to three trillion rubles (about $42.1 billion). Reuters attributed the revenue loss from April to May to increased Russian subsidies for oil refineries and cyclical payments of profit-based tax. Declines in Russian oil revenues from April to May in particular are likely also partially the result of Ukraine’s strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure. Ukrainian forces have significantly increased the frequency, range, and intensity of such strikes since March 2026, creating outsized impacts on Russian oil exports and refining capacity and undercutting Russia’s ability to profit from increased global oil price spikes.[9] ISW observed reporting in summer-fall 2025 that Russia struggled to repair damage to its oil refineries from Ukrainian strikes, as Western sanctions have restricted Russia’s access to the necessary parts.[10] Russia will likely struggle to repair damages from this most recent intensification in Ukraine’s strike campaign as well. Future Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure will likely continue to strain Russian revenues and prevent Russia from reaping any long-term benefits from the current surge in oil prices.
Russia continues to tap into its gold reserves to cover its budget deficit. The Russian Central Bank reported on May 20 that Russia’s gold reserves declined for the fourth consecutive month in April 2026.[11] The bank reported that the reserves totaled 73.9 million ounces of gold bars as of May 1, the lowest since March 2022. The report stated that the volume of gold bars decreased by 200,000 ounces in April 2026 and by 900,000 ounces since January 2026. Russian independent newspaper The Moscow Times reported, citing the World Gold Council, that Russia lost 27.9 metric tons of gold reserves from January to April 2026, setting a record decline since 2002.[12] The Russian Central Bank resorted to selling its gold reserves for the first time in November 2025 to sustain high wartime spending while Russia has also steadily depleted its sovereign wealth fund’s liquid reserves in order to fund its war in Ukraine.[13] Russia’s growing reliance on its gold reserves underscores its mounting debt pressures as it undertakes difficult decisions to sustain its war in Ukraine.
The Kremlin is attempting to manipulate Russian media coverage to downplay the Kremlin’s censorship campaign, likely to improve the public perception of the United Russia Party ahead of the September 2026 State Duma elections. Russian opposition source Meduza, citing three employees of pro-Kremlin and state media publications, reported on May 21 that the political bloc of the Russian Presidential Administration has urged state-run and pro-government media sources to avoid using the word “ban” in their articles.[14] The sources stated that the Presidential Administration advised media sources to reduce their coverage of Kremlin bans, restrictions, and fines concerning freedom of speech and expression. One source stated that the media is allowed to cover the Russian government decisions to lift bans, however. One of the sources also noted that the Kremlin expects the media sources to highlight “positive and therapeutic” initiatives from the United Russia Party, including when party members speak out against bans. United Russia General Council Secretary Vladimir Yakushev stated on May 19 that the party is not a “party of prohibitions” and is publicly explaining why the Kremlin should not impose bans and censorship.[15] Russian President Vladimir Putin has recently faced a downturn in public support amidst intensified efforts to restrict access to virtual private networks (VPNs), foreign messaging platforms, and the mobile internet, imposing tangible hardships in the everyday lives of Russians.[16] The Kremlin’s latest restrictions on the media come against the background of brutal efforts to ban the freedom of speech, sending critical milbloggers to frontline assault units in Ukraine or imprisoning them.[17]
Key Takeaways
- Russia and Belarus completed their combined nuclear exercises on May 21, highlighting Russia’s ability to leverage Belarus for future Russian military operations and Russia’s deepening de facto control over Belarus.
- Ukrainian strikes continue to constrain Russian oil refining and energy revenues, even as the war in the Middle East has provided a budget windfall in the short term.
- Russia continues to tap into its gold reserves to cover its budget deficit.
- The Kremlin is attempting to manipulate Russian media coverage to downplay the Kremlin’s censorship campaign, likely to improve the public perception of the United Russia Party ahead of the September 2026 State Duma elections.
- Ukrainian forces advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
- Russian forces launched one ballistic missile and 116 drones toward Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil refinery in Samara Oblast on May 21. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on May 21 that Ukrainian forces struck the Syzran Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast, over 800 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.[18] Russian opposition source Astra, citing local residents, reported that a fire started in Syzran after a strike and assessed that eyewitness footage shows smoke rising from the city’s industrial zone.[19] Geolocated footage published on May 21 shows a fire near the refinery.[20] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from May 21 shows heat anomalies in Syzran.[21] Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev acknowledged on May 21 that Ukrainian drones struck industrial targets in Syzran.[22] Rosneft’s Syzran oil refinery has a processing capacity of seven to 8.9 million tons of oil per year and produces gasoline, diesel fuel, aviation kerosene, and bitumen.[23]
Ukrainian forces reportedly struck rail infrastructure in Bryansk Oblast on May 21. Russian Railways claimed on May 21 that a Ukrainian drone struck a switcher locomotive (a locomotive that maneuvers railway vehicles for short distances) at the Unecha station in Bryansk Oblast.[24] Acting Bryansk Oblast Governor Yegor Kovalchuk claimed that Ukrainian forces struck transport infrastructure in Unecha.[25]
Russia is reportedly building protective structures at an air base in Kaliningrad Oblast. A Ukrainian source reported that satellite imagery recently collected on May 19 shows that Russian authorities began constructing four aircraft hangers at Kaliningrad’s Chkalovsk Naval Air Base in late April 2026, likely to protect aircraft from reconnaissance and drone strikes.[26]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Sumy direction. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces reached Ivolzhanske (north of Sumy City) and entered Zapsillya (northeast of Sumy City), indicating that Russian forces are likely infiltrating north of Ivolzhanske and Zapsillya.[27] Geolocated footage published on May 20 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces north of Kindrativka (north of Sumy City) and in eastern Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[28]
Russian forces are conducting glide bomb strikes against border settlements in Sumy Oblast, possibly to shape the battlefield ahead of future offensive operations. Geolocated footage published on May 20 shows Russian FAB-500 glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces near Chernatske and Novi Vyrky (both northwest of Sumy City near the international border).[29]
Russian forces are attempting to disrupt Ukrainian vehicle movements in Sumy City. Geolocated footage published on May 21 shows a Russian fiber optic drone striking Ukrainian vehicles within northern Sumy City.[30]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and a Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Kharkiv City. The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized Shesterivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[31] The Russian MoD identified advances to the west (right) bank of the Siverskyi Donets River toward Rubizhne (southwest of Shesterivka) as Russian forces’ next tactical objective.[32] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Starystya and advanced north of Rybaklyne (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[33] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces retook lost positions south of Vovchansk.[34]
Russian drone strikes against civilian vehicles are closing major roads in Kharkiv City, forcing Ukrainian forces to use alternative routes and disrupting Ukrainian logistics. Ukrainian officials reported on May 21 that Russian forces conducted at least four drone strikes against vehicles on the Kharkiv City M-03 ring road since the morning, two of which struck police cars.[35] Ukrainian authorities closed a section of the ring road near the site of the strikes.[36] Bohdan Hladkykh, the director of Kharkiv City’s emergency department, reported that Russian forces conduct drone strikes against police cars as the police officers provide assistance after earlier Russian drone strikes.[37] Kharkiv Oblast Patrol Police Head Viktor Levchenko stated that Russian forces often use sleeper drones against passing vehicles and then strike the police who respond to the scene.[38] Russian forces have been conducting a “human safari” – using tactical drones to “hunt” civilians and civilian infrastructure – in Kherson Oblast and have started to spread the practice to other frontline areas.[39]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on May 21.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued ground activity toward Kupyansk itself and east and southeast of Kupyansk on the east (left) bank of the Siverskyi Donets River on May 21 but did not advance.[40] Russian forces also attacked east and northeast of Borova on May 21 but did not advance.[41]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on May 21 but did not advance.[42]
The Russian military command continues to move troops from the Kupyansk direction to reinforce efforts in the Lyman direction. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces reported on May 21 that the Russian military command plans to move over 1,000 servicemembers to the to the area of responsibility of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) in the Slovyansk direction, mostly from the Russian 272th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], MMD) operating near Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[43] This reported tactical control reassignment is the third observed instance of Russia piecemealing forces for the 144th Motorized Rifle Division in recent days.[44] These reports, if true, would indicate that the Russian military command may have abandoned its efforts to seize Kupyansk at this time.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on May 21 but did not advance.[45]
Geolocated footage published on May 21 shows Russian forces shelling a Ukrainian position in southern Novodmytrivka (north of Kostyantynivka) in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[46]
The Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on May 21 that Russian forces struck Druzhkivka with five guided FAB-250 glide bombs, injuring five civilians.[47]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dobropillya tactical area on May 21 but did not advance.[48]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 21 but did not advance.[49]
Russian forces are deploying additional drone and artillery crews and attempting to innovate tactics in the Pokrovsk direction as they fail to advance. An officer of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported May 21 that Russian forces are deploying additional drone and artillery crews in the Pokrovsk direction and dropping a greater number of KAB guided glide bomb.[50] The officer reported that Russian forces struggle to both conduct assaults and advance. An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported May 21 that Russian forces are launching fewer assaults in the units’ area of responsibility compared to this time last year, indicating that Russian forces have taken significant losses.[51] The officer reported that Russian forces are using electric bicycles to move more stealthily than on motorcycles. The officer reported that Russian forces are increasing their use of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) but use them five to seven kilometers behind the front line, prioritizing keeping the UGVs over servicemembers.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on May 21 but did not advance.[52]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on May 21 but did not advance.[53]
Russian forces are not advancing in the Oleksandrivka direction despite receiving reinforcements. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on May 21 that Russian forces do not have the initiative and are not advancing or using armored vehicles in the brigade’s area of responsibility.[54] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces attack at most ten times a day, a fivefold decrease from winter 2025-2026. The spokesperson also noted that Russian forces sent reinforcements to units in the Ukrainian brigade’s area of responsibility three times. The spokesperson reported that Russian servicemembers in this area still do not have enough food because of logistical problems, however, and that many Russian servicemembers are convicts or forced conscripts.
Ukrainian forces conducted a long-range strike against a Russian drone pilot training facility in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and USF Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on May 20 that Ukrainian forces struck a drone pilot training facility of the Russian Academy of Rocket and Artillery Sciences training servicemembers of the Russian 78th Spetsnaz Sever-Akhmat Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) in occupied Snizhne (roughly 135 kilometers from the front line).[55] The USF and Brovdi reported that the strike inflicted 65 casualties, including a lieutenant colonel with call sign “Buryi” who headed the facility, and destroyed production and repair facilities as well as four Tiger armored inside them. Geolocated footage shows an explosion and fire after the strike.[56]
Ukrainian forces conducted medium- and long-range strikes against logistics targets in occupied Donetsk oblast in a continuation of their battlefield air interdiction campaign (BAI) campaign. Geolocated footage published on May 20 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian Ural-4320 truck near occupied Yenakiye (roughly 60 kilometers from the frontline).[57] Geolocated footage published on May 20 shows a burning fuel truck near occupied Manush (roughly 150 kilometers from the front line) along the E-58 Manhush-Osypenko highway, likely after a Ukrainian strike.[58]
Ukrainian forces conducted additional frontline, medium-, and long- range strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Brovdi reported May 21 that Ukrainian forces struck a BM-27 Uragan multiple rocket launcher in Zeleny Hai (on the frontline), a command and observation point of an element of the Russian 6th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) in occupied Bahatyr (roughly 20 kilometers from the front line), a command post of the drone unit of the 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) in occupied Selidove (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline), a drone workshop of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) in occupied Donetsk City (roughly 80 kilometers from the frontline), a Russian mobile fire group in occupied Monakhove (roughly 70 kilometers from the frontline), an S-300V air defense system radar and a refueling tanker truck in occupied Shyroka Balka (roughly 160 kilometers from the front line), and additional Russian forces logistics in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[59]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued infiltration missions northwest to southwest of Hulyaipole on May 20 but did not advance.[60] Geolocated footage published on May 20 shows Ukrainian strikes against Russian forces in northern Varvarivka, central Pryluky, and west of Pryluky(all northwest of Hulyaipole) after what ISW assesses were infiltration missions.[61]
Ukrainian forces continue counterattacking and advancing southeast and northwest of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[62] Geolocated footage published on May 17 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv), supporting Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets’ May 20 statement that Ukrainian forces liberated Mala Tokmachka.[63]
Ukrainian forces continue their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military and logistics assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on May 21 reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tor air defense system and a semi-truck in occupied Berestove (about 66 kilometers behind the frontline), a gathering of elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) in occupied Novoukrainka (about 39 kilometers behind the front line), and a port crane in occupied Berdyansk (about 97 kilometers behind the frontline).[64]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on May 21, but are reportedly struggling to conduct assaults against Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) and fiber optic drone strikes.[65]
A Ukrainian strike against a portion of the Arabat Spit in occupied Kherson Oblast on the night of May 16 to 17 reportedly struck a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) command post, killing and wounding about 100 Russian personnel.[66] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported the Arabat Spit strike and noted that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system near occupied Shchaslyvtseve (roughly 190 kilometers from the front line).[67] ISW observed reports of Ukrainian forces striking a Russian ammunition depot near the Arabat Spit and a drone and missile storage area in Shchaslyvtseve on the night of May 16 to 17.[68]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces continued missile and long-range drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on May 20 to 21. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Rostov Oblast and 116 Shahed, Gerbera, and Italmas-type drones and Parodiya decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[69] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 109 drones, that the Iskander-M and five drones hit five locations, and that drone debris fell on four locations. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast officials reported that Russian forces struck residential areas in Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, injuring at least 14 civilians.[70] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck Konotop, Sumy Oblast, killing at least one civilian and injuring at least 12.[71] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck trains near Kamyanske and Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[72]
Russia is reportedly expanding its capacity to launch jet-powered Shahed-type drones at Ukraine. A Ukrainian source focusing on Russian long-range aviation published satellite imagery on May 20 showing that Russia is constructing 10 new drone launch ports compatible with Russian Geran-4 and Geran-5 (Shahed-type) strike drones at the Tsimbulova Airfield in Oryol Oblast.[73] Geran-4 and Geran-5s are newer variants of the Shahed-type long-range strike drones that have jet-powered engines.[74] The Ukrainian source reported that Russian forces are also constructing at least eight new concrete structures to store drones at the airfield. Russia has long been increasing the size of its strike packages against Ukraine and likely intends to use additional drone launch points to increase both the size and diversity of drones used in its nightly strike packages.
Ukraine continues to expand its capacity to counter Shahed-type drones, including jet-powered Shaheds. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated on May 21 that Ukrainian forces doubled their interception rate of Russian long-range drones using interceptor drones from January to May 2026 even though Russian forces also increased the number of drones in their strike packages by about 35 percent in the same period.[75] Fedorov stated that Ukraine has also increased the supply of its interceptor drones by 2.6 times from January to May and intends to scale up production by “dozens of times” in order to stockpile interceptor drones to use against jet-powered Shahed drones ahead of fall-winter 2026.
Ukraine is expanding its air defense umbrella to include volunteers from private businesses and regional or local formations. Fedorov reported that 27 Ukrainian businesses have joined a private air defense project, authorizing Ukrainian companies to perform counter-drone efforts in collaboration with the Ukrainian Air Force.[76] Fedorov reported that two of these businesses are now fully performing air defense operations in Kharkiv and Odesa oblasts. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Ukrainian local governments can finance air defense groups as part of territorial communities, whose operational leadership is in the Ukrainian Air Force and Ukrainian Armed Forces.[77]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated on May 21 that Belarus has no intention of entering the war in Ukraine.[78] Lukashenko stated that Belarus would only conduct offensive operations against Ukraine in self-defense. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently warned that Russia was pressuring Belarus to enter the war in Ukraine as a belligerent.[79]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79802
[2] https://t.me/mod_russia/63828
[3] https://t.me/mod_russia/63847; https://t.me/mod_russia/63848; https://t.me/mod_russia/63848; https://t.me/mod_russia/63850;
[4] https://t.me/mod_russia/63834
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_20-17/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_11-24/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_26-18/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_20-23/
[6] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-refining-standstill-central-russia-after-ukrainian-drone-strikes-sources-say-2026-05-20/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2026/
[8] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-refining-standstill-central-russia-after-ukrainian-drone-strikes-sources-say-2026-05-20/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2026/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2025/
[11] https://www.cbr dot ru/statistics/macro_itm/external_sector/ir/#a_164877; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2026/
[12] https://ru.themoscowtimes dot com/2026/05/20/tsbsoobschil-osilneishem-zachetvert-veka-sokraschenii-zolotogo-zapasa-rossii-a195843; https://www.gold dot org/goldhub/data/gold-reserves-by-country#from-login=1
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2026/
[14] https://meduza dot io/feature/2026/05/21/kak-vyyasnila-meduza-kreml-zapretil-podkontrolnym-smi-pisat-o-zapretah
[15] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/20/05/2026/6a0ca15c9a7947f147f74d9a
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2026/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/
[18] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19152
[19] https://t.me/astrapress/113297; https://t.me/astrapress/113303
[20] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2057440868144152594 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/20975; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2057493647676031034
[21] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@48.391,53.079,13.871z
[22] https://t.me/fedorishchev_official/858; https://t.me/fedorishchev_official/856
[23] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/u-rosijskij-syzrani-goryt-npz-pislya-udaru-droniv/; https://t.me/astrapress/113303
[24] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/05/21/v-bryanskoy-oblasti-pod-udar-ukrainskogo-bespilotnika-popal-teplovoz-pogibli-tri-sotrudnika-rzhd; https://t.me/telerzd/8094
[25] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/27486687
[26] https://x.com/avivector/status/2057124558260289543?s=20; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rosiya-gotuye-aerodrom-u-kaliningradi-do-potentsijnyh-atak-na-stoyanky-litakiv/#google_vignette
[27] https://t.me/severnnyi/8085
[28] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11961; https://t.me/tenrai_bbs/108; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2057250297404092912; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2057106689329889686; https://t.me/DPSUkr/33013
[29] https://x.com/juss_men/status/2057228486603903079?s=20; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/29226; https://x.com/franfran2424/status/2057425222001688631?s=20 ; https://x.com/juss_men/status/2057228486603903079?s=20
[30] https://x.com/OSINTRoshen/status/2057469810431119547?s=20; https://t.me/lost_armour/9449
[31] https://t.me/mod_russia/63838; https://t.me/mod_russia/63840
[32] https://t.me/mod_russia/63840
[33] https://t.me/rybar/80437
[34] https://t.me/severnnyi/8085
[35] https://suspilne dot media/1313554-rf-rozgladae-mozlivosti-napadu-na-pivnicni-regioni-ukraini-ta-gotue-mediakampanii-z-diskriminacii-1548-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1779361804&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/police_kh_region/52905; https://suspilne dot media/1313554-rf-rozgladae-mozlivosti-napadu-na-pivnicni-regioni-ukraini-ta-gotue-mediakampanii-z-diskriminacii-1548-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1779355424&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[36] https://t.me/suspilne_kharkiv/89331; https://t.me/police_kh_region/52905
[37] https://suspilne dot media/1313554-rf-rozgladae-mozlivosti-napadu-na-pivnicni-regioni-ukraini-ta-gotue-mediakampanii-z-diskriminacii-1548-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1779361804&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps;
[38] https://suspilne dot media/1313554-rf-rozgladae-mozlivosti-napadu-na-pivnicni-regioni-ukraini-ta-gotue-mediakampanii-z-diskriminacii-1548-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1779361804&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps;
[39] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intentional-civilian-harm-as-a-tool-of-war/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-22-2026/
[40] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2386; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/21/ukrayinski-drony-urazyly-miscze-provedennya-narady-okupantiv-portovyj-kran-i-zrk-tor/; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38904; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20716; https://t.me/wargonzo/34324; https://t.me/dva_majors/93247
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38939; https://t.me/gvZapad/18611; https://t.me/gvZapad/18613
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38901; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20716; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38904; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38939; https://t.me/wargonzo/34324; https://t.me/dva_majors/93247; https://t.me/gvZapad/18611
[43] https://t.me/gvZapad/18615
[44] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2026/; https://t.me/gvZapad/18538; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2026
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38901; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38904; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38939; https://t.me/wargonzo/34324; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72399; https://t.me/dva_majors/93247
[46] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2057432255698526322; https://t.me/Bahmut_Klehseevka/5210
[47] https://t.me/Donetsk_obl_prokuratura/5880; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/21/u-druzhkivczi-cherez-udary-rf-zagynuly-chetvero-lyudej-ye-poraneni/
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38901; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38939; https://t.me/wargonzo/34324
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38901; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38904; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38939; https://t.me/wargonzo/34324; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/115474
[50] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/21/vorogu-ne-vse-vdayetsya-jomu-duzhe-vazhko-poblyzu-pokrovska-bombarduyut-kabamy-cze-sygnal-pro-nevdachi-rosiyan/; https://youtu.be/1JapYaIQ5UQ?t=619
[51] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/21/ivan-odnorazovyj-vyhodyt-bere-paky-vody-i-tyagne-poblyzu-pokrovska-rosiyany-viddayut-zhyttya-za-robotiv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38939
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38901; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38904; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14025; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38939; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14035; https://t.me/dva_majors/93247; https://t.me/voin_dv/19584
[54] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/21/protyvnyk-ne-fantazuye-yak-vmyraly-tak-i-vmyrayut-okupanty-vtratyly-inicziatyvu-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku/; https://youtu.be/1JapYaIQ5UQ?t=2917
[55] https://t.me/usf_army/1944; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2380
[56] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2057141715450892718; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2057141719024455854;
https://t.me/robert_magyar/2380
[57] https://x.com/blinzka/status/2057232523508290008
https://x.com/blinzka/status/2057232526255530413
[58] https://x.com/blinzka/status/2057209035116470719;
https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2057117220472304079; https://t.me/istrebin/41687
[59] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2386; https://t.me/usf_army/1944; https://t.me/army_1usc/984
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38901; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38904; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14025; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38939; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14035
[61] https://x.com/juss_men/status/2057090397227155880; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1640600506992601;https://x.com/juss_men/status/2057090511907738081; https://x.com/juss_men/status/2057090413484212639; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1640600506992601; https://x.com/juss_men/status/2057090511907738081; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2057103784397136317; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/35902
[62] https://t.me/dva_majors/93247; https://t.me/wargonzo/34324
[63] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11964; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2057277790517399607; https://t.me/orehovsparta/447; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2026/
[64] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2386; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/21/ukrayinski-drony-urazyly-miscze-provedennya-narady-okupantiv-portovyj-kran-i-zrk-tor/
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38939; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14035; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/21/dronu-vse-odno-jde-bezzuba-mavpa-z-avtomatom-chy-desantnyky-morpihy-polyuyut-na-rosiyan-v-oleshkah/; https://youtu.be/1JapYaIQ5UQ?t=1412
[66] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2057424398982742115; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2057439439580803278?s=20; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2057426191246672163 ; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/nalit-droniv-znyshhyv-shtab-fsb-z-desyatkamy-okupantiv-na-arabatskij-striltsi/; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/35908;
[67] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2057424398982742115;
[68] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/20774 ; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/syly-oborony-atakuvaly-komandnyj-punkt-rosiyan-na-arabatskij-striltsi/; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/35765
[69] https://t.me/kpszsu/62362
[70] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/29575; https://t.me/borys_filatovv/3355; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/21/pyatero-lyudej-poraneno-vnaslidok-rosijskogo-udaru-po-dnipru/; https://t.me/astrapress/113365; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/29602; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/05/21/rossiyskie-voyska-nanesli-udar-po-dnepru-povrezhdeny-dva-mnogoetazhnyh-doma-est-ranenye; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/21/u-dnipri-zrosla-kilkist-poranenyh-unaslidok-udaru-rf/
[71] https://t.me/UA_National_Police/66945; https://t.me/astrapress/113300;
[72] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/43370; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/211303
[73] https://t.me/StrategicaviationT/31567; https://t.me/StrategicaviationT/29981; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rosiya-za-misyats-dodaye-shhe-10-puskovyh-dlya-reaktyvnyh-geranej-na-dronoporti-tsymbulova/
[74] https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/missile-dialogue-initiative/2026/01/russias-new-jet-powered-gerans/
[75] https://suspilne dot media/1313672-fedorov-rozpoviv-pro-rozvitok-privatnih-ppo-ta-pokrasenna-zahistu-neba-vid-rosijskih-atak/; https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/4125734-fedorov-ukraina-testue-desevi-raketi-dla-zbitta-sahediv-i-gotue-ih-masove-virobnictvo-do-osenizimi.html
[76] https://suspilne dot media/1313672-fedorov-rozpoviv-pro-rozvitok-privatnih-ppo-ta-pokrasenna-zahistu-neba-vid-rosijskih-atak/; https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/4125734-fedorov-ukraina-testue-desevi-raketi-dla-zbitta-sahediv-i-gotue-ih-masove-virobnictvo-do-osenizimi.html
[77] https://mod dot gov.ua/news/gromadi-zmozhut-napryamu-finansuvati-grupi-ppo-1; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/21/organy-misczevogo-samovryaduvannya-zmozhut-bezposeredno-finansuvaty-grupy-ppo/
[78] https://t.me/belta_telegramm/376353 ; https://t.me/pul_1/21229; https://t.me/modmilby/55970
[79] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2026/
