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Africa File, February 6, 2025: M23 Unilateral Ceasefire; SAF Closes in on Khartoum; US Airstrikes in Northern Somalia; al Shabaab Reinfiltrates Central Somalia; IS Sahel Kidnapping Campaign; US-Algeria Relationship Grows
Feb 6, 2025 - ISW Press
Africa File, February 6, 2025: M23 Unilateral Ceasefire; SAF Closes in on Khartoum; US Airstrikes in Northern Somalia; al Shabaab Reinfiltrates Central Somalia; IS Sahel Kidnapping Campaign; US-Algeria Relationship Grows
Authors: Kathryn Tyson, Liam Karr, and Yale Ford
Contributors: Jean-Philip Banane and John Reece
Data Cutoff: February 6, 2025, at 10 a.m.
Editor's Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War.
The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.
Key Takeaways:
Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) is poised to secure a major victory by recapturing Khartoum and pushing the RSF west of the Nile. Securing these objectives would support the SAF’s grand strategic aim of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan. SAF control over Khartoum would allow the SAF to consolidate control over the eastern bank of the Nile River and prepare for future offensives that aim to defeat the RSF in its strongholds in western Sudan. The RSF continues to attack the SAF in el Fasher, the capital of North Darfur in western Sudan and the last SAF holdout in Darfur, amid SAF gains in Khartoum. The RSF attacks around el Fasher threaten hundreds of thousands of refugees in the city.
DRC. Rwandan-backed M23 rebels declared a unilateral “humanitarian” ceasefire in the eastern DRC ahead of peace talks scheduled for February 7 and 8. A long-term political solution remains unlikely, however. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) still refuses to negotiate with M23, M23 and Rwanda still hold a military advantage to push for their maximalist demands, and there is low confidence in regional blocs as impartial mediators. The DRC, M23, and Rwanda may be open to short-term ceasefires, however, as they seek to reset and set conditions for future offensives. M23’s unilateral ceasefire does not indicate that the group has dropped its expansionist ambitions and may aim to enable M23 to set conditions for future offensive operations by allowing the group to reset and potentially ease international pressure to sanction the group’s primary patron, Rwanda.M23 may have already broken its ceasefire and continued to advance further into South Kivu.
Sahel. The Islamic State has launched a kidnapping campaign targeting foreign nationals across its areas of influence in West Africa. The locations of the kidnappings signal that IS is expanding its areas of operation further from its core areas in the Sahel and Lake Chad, likely through collaboration with local criminal groups. The regional kidnapping campaign is another indicator that ISSP has developed a greater external reach in recent years.
Northern Somalia. US Africa Command conducted airstrikes that killed a senior Islamic State Somalia Province attack planner and several other ISS fighters in northern Somalia on January 1. The strike supports an ongoing counter–IS Somalia Province (ISS) offensive by the Puntland government that came after warnings from US officials that ISS posed a growing transnational threat. ISS will likely reconstitute itself and resume its global functions if the Puntland offensive fails to adequately degrade the group’s revenue streams or set conditions to maintain pressure on ISS’s porous support zones.
Central Somalia. Al Shabaab launched a January offensive in central Somalia to reestablish itself on the east bank of the Shabelle River and disrupt a vital highway that connects Ethiopia to Mogadishu via central Somalia. Somali forces responded to the attempted incursion with a counteroffensive to remove al Shabaab from the east bank of the Shabelle River and degrade the group’s support zones on the west bank of the river. CTP continues to assess that the remaining al Shabaab support zones on the west bank of the Shabelle River will continue to make central Somalia vulnerable to al Shabaab offensives that aim to reinfiltrate previously cleared areas. Degrading al Shabaab’s capabilities is an important US national security interest, as the group has demonstrated its intent to attack the US homeland and its capability to conduct attacks beyond East Africa since 2019.
Algeria. Algeria and the United States have tightened their relationship in 2025 as Algeria likely seeks to diversify its partnerships beyond its traditional defense partner, Russia. More balanced Algerian ties with Russia and the United States will likely cause the Kremlin to rely on Libya more heavily to access the Mediterranean Sea and support its activity in the Sahel as the Kremlin seeks to offset its reliance on Syria. A stronger Algerian-US relationship would position the United States to undercut Iranian influence in the region by mediating between Algeria and Morocco on the Western Sahara dispute and advance US counterterrorism objectives by encouraging cooperation between the two regional leaders to contain instability in the Sahel.
Assessments:
Sudan
The SAF is poised to secure a major victory by recapturing Khartoum and pushing the RSF west of the Nile. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have advanced in Gezira state, central Sudan, and said that it cleared Rapid Support Forces (RSF) “remnants” in three towns 50–70 miles south of Khartoum.[1] The SAF has simultaneously made significant breakthroughs in northern Khartoum, also known as Bahri, since late January and is advancing from the southeast of Khartoum.[2] SAF sources told Sudanese media that the SAF would advance toward the Soba Bridge in southeastern Khartoum, which would cut RSF supply lines and split RSF forces in central and eastern Khartoum by connecting SAF forces in eastern Khartoum and the city center.[3]
Figure 1. Area of SAF and RSF Operations in Khartoum
Source: Kathryn Tyson; Thomas van Linge.
Recapturing Khartoum and pushing the RSF across the Nile River is a military and political victory for the SAF that supports the SAF’s grand strategic aim of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan. SAF control over Khartoum would allow the SAF to consolidate control over the eastern bank of the Nile River and prepare for future offensives that aim to defeat the RSF in its strongholds in western Sudan. The RSF would struggle to recross the Nile River as the SAF controls several key bridges on the river.[4] Drone footage from February 4 shows lines of RSF military vehicles attempting to flee across the Jebel Awliya Bridge from southwestern Khartoum to western Sudan.[5] This bridge is the RSF’s last remaining route into and out of the city.[6] Khartoum also has airports and military infrastructure that are better positioned to support future offensives in Western Sudan than the SAF’s current command and logistics hub in Port Sudan, which is over 400 miles northeast of Khartoum on Sudan’s Red Sea coast.
SAF control over Khartoum would additionally be a political victory that would boost the SAF’s claim to be Sudan’s only legitimate force. SAF Chief General Abdel Fatteh al Burhan has conducted several regional and international tours since 2023 to garner international support. Burhan met with the leaders of Egypt, Qatar, South Sudan, and Turkey in 2023 to boost SAF legitimacy in the international community.[7] Burhan took a diplomatic tour of West Africa in mid-January 2025 for the first time since the war began in 2023 to boost regional support for the SAF.[8] Burhan has also attempted to delegitimize the RSF and called for the RSF to be designated as a terrorist group during a speech to the UN in September 2024.[9]
Figure 2. The Situation in Sudan
Source: Thomas van Linge
The RSF continues to attack the SAF in el Fasher, the capital of North Darfur in western Sudan and the last SAF holdout in Darfur, which threatens hundreds of thousands of refugees in the city.[10] The RSF conducted its largest attack to date on the SAF in el Fasher between January 21 and 25 as the RSF attempted to respond to its setbacks in Khartoum.[11] International research organizations have expressed concern over the possibility of mass violence against internally displaced persons at Zamzam refugee camp in el Fasher, as the RSF has blocked an exit route from the camp.[12] The RSF has shelled the camp repeatedly and disrupted the delivery of humanitarian aid into the camp.[13] The United States and international humanitarian organizations have condemned the RSF for violence against civilians and acts of genocide in Darfur.[14]
DRC
Rwandan-backed M23 rebels declared a unilateral “humanitarian” ceasefire in the eastern DRC ahead of peace talks scheduled for February 7 and 8. M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka announced the ceasefire on February 3.[15] The rebel group blamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC’s) government for recent fighting in the eastern DRC and claimed that it had “no intention” of continuing its advance toward the South Kivu provincial capital of Bukavu.[16] M23 forces and Rwandan troops captured the North Kivu provincial capital of Goma in late January, a key economic and trade hub in the eastern DRC.[17]
Figure 3. M23 Advances in Eastern DRC
Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.
M23 announced the ceasefire ahead of a joint summit between member countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC) scheduled for February 7 and 8 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.[18] Kenyan President William Ruto said that DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame agreed to participate in the summit to discuss the security situation in the eastern DRC.[19] The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported that France is closely involved with the joint summit and spearheading efforts to “build [a] multi-state mediation group to resolve” the eastern DRC conflict.[20]
A long-term political solution remains unlikely given that the DRC still refuses to negotiate with M23, M23 and Rwanda still hold a military advantage to push for their maximalist demands, and there is low confidence in regional blocs as impartial mediators. The DRC has labeled M23 as “terrorists” and ruled out direct talks with M23 representatives as a “red line” that the DRC would never cross.[21] The DRC’s stance on M23 and Rwanda’s insistence on direct DRC-M23 negotiations have been an insurmountable obstacle to Kenyan-mediated peace talks between the DRC and armed groups in the eastern DRC and Angolan-mediated peace talks between the DRC and Rwanda.[22] M23 and Rwanda have reiterated their demands for direct dialogue between M23 and the Congolese government numerous times since capturing Goma.[23]
Tshisekedi has continued to emphasize a military-first approach to the current crisis. Congolese officials have demanded greater enlistment and funding for the Congolese army (FARDC) as part of a large-scale “patriotic mobilization” to “fight against the aggressor [Rwanda].”[24] DRC Transport Minister Jean-Pierre Bemba said he wanted 20,000 civilians from each of the country’s 26 provinces to enlist in the army immediately.[25] The DRC likely lacks the capacity to train and equip hundreds of thousands of soldiers quickly, however. Tshisekedi requested that the SADC reinforce its troop deployments to the eastern DRC during the emergency SADC session, but there are growing calls among multiple SADC troop-contributing countries to withdraw the SADC force altogether.[26]
Tshisekedi has limited options to deviate from this hardline, military-first stance without undermining his legitimacy among his support base. Tshisekedi heavily leaned into anti-Rwandan rhetoric during his successful campaign to be reelected in 2024 and has continued to use this playbook in the face of M23’s advances.[27] Further M23 advances or direct negotiations with M23 would, therefore, likely undermine the Congolese government’s legitimacy and could foment internal instability.[28]
M23 and its Rwandan backers likely aim to secure an agreement that legitimizes M23’s already de-facto control of parts of eastern DRC, a situation that would be a nonstarter for Tshisekedi. Corneille Nangaa, the head of M23’s political branch Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), said during the January 30 press conference in Goma that AFC-M23 is “here to stay” and “open to dialogue” with the DRC.[29] M23 has previously stated that the implementation of the 2013 Nairobi peace deal is a key demand in any potential peace talks. The deal stipulated that M23 would demilitarize and become a political party and that the Congolese government would facilitate the return of refugees, release prisoners, reintegrate former rebels, and launch a national reconciliation and justice initiative as well as social security and economic reforms.[30] M23 has set up “state-like” administrations in areas under its control.[31] These governance measures indicate that the group intends to continue governing these areas after any peace agreement in which AFC-M23 becomes a legitimate political party. This arrangement would benefit Rwanda, which “de facto controls” M23 according to the UN and seeks an economic and security buffer zone in the eastern DRC.[32]
The prospect of a long-term peace agreement at the peace summit is unlikely given that Tshisekedi and Kagame are biased toward the SADC and EAC, respectively, which limits the leverage the blocs will collectively have to push the sides into a deal. Kagame skipped the SADC emergency session on January 31 but attended the Kenyan-mediated EAC videoconference on January 29 that called for DRC-M23 dialogue.[33] Tshisekedi opted out of the EAC summit to fly to Luanda and meet with SADC-aligned Angolan President João Lourenço on January 29 and then participate in the SADC meeting two days later.[34] Rwanda has labeled SADC as a threat to its security but said that it “welcomes the proposed joint summits” and that it has “consistently advocated for a political solution to the ongoing conflict.”[35] Tshisekedi has repeatedly criticized the EAC and accused Ruto of “mismanaging” the failed EAC-led peace process after Ruto entered office in 2022.[36] France-based investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported that Tshisekedi “turned to Angola and is banking on SADC as the last regional bloc capable of putting pressure in Kigali.”[37]
The DRC, M23, and Rwanda may be open to short-term ceasefires as they seek to reset and set conditions for future offensives. Both M23 and FARDC have used previous pauses in fighting to reset militarily and launch new offensives. The UN reported that FARDC and M23 took advantage of a lull in fighting to “reinforce troops and replenish weaponry” following a July 2024 ceasefire between the DRC and Rwanda.[38] FARDC has used military stalemates to consolidate its forces and mount counteroffensives, including in October 2022, October 2023, and January 2025.[39] These FARDC counteroffensives have collapsed quickly or failed to regain any operationally significant areas, however.[40] M23 continued to seize territory and relocate troops after it relinquished control of Kibumba town in North Kivu as part of an EAC-brokered ceasefire in December 2022.[41] The group’s activities during the brief ceasefire period helped it to then capture the operationally significant town of Kitchanga in February 2023.[42] Pro-government fighters in eastern DRC have accused M23 of exploiting previous ceasefires since to 2022 to reset its forces without fear of counterattacks.[43]
M23 has likely already begun to reinforce its positions in South Kivu. Independent French journalist Christophe Rigaud reported on January 29 that M23 had redeployed troops southward from nearly a dozen towns that it controls in Rutshuru district after the group seized Goma.[44] Spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General Stéphane Dujarric said on January 30 that the UN received reports of Rwandan troops crossing into eastern DRC and heading toward Bukavu.[45] A local source in Bukavu told Agence France-Presse on February 3 that M23 “is reorganizing with reinforcements and arms shipments to probably go to the front now that fighting has ended in Goma.”[46] Congolese media outlet Acualite.cd reported on February 4 that local civil society members in South Kivu near Mukwidja town witnessed troop and equipment reinforcements and M23 convoys moving through the area.[47] Locals told French media that both M23 and FARDC have reinforced their positions in recent days.[48]
M23’s unilateral ceasefire does not indicate that the group has dropped its expansionist ambitions and may aim to enable M23 to set conditions for future offensive operations by allowing the group to reset and potentially ease international pressure to sanction the group’s primary patron, Rwanda. M23 had said on multiple occasions before taking Goma that it did not want to capture the city despite surrounding the town and likely possessing the capability to capture it for over a year.[49] M23’s claim that it has no plans to march on Bukavu directly contradicts what Rwandan and M23 leaders said after M23 captured Goma. AFC head Corneille Nangaa said that the group’s ultimate military objective was to conquer “neither Goma nor Bukavu but Kinshasa.”[50] A senior Rwandan diplomat in North Kivu said that South Kivu was the next stage in M23’s advance after Goma.[51]
A ceasefire would enable M23 to give greater priority to its efforts to legitimize and solidify its control over Goma. AFC-M23’s rule in Goma has thus far mirrored its past behavior in newly conquered territories to establish a “state-like” administration that includes political meetings and recruitment drives to generate security forces to patrol the town.[52] AFC announced on February 5 that it had appointed a mayor and two deputy administrators to lead the new administration in Goma.[53] Nangaa held a press conference at a local hotel in Goma on January 30 where he told local citizens to “go back to normal activities,” as the group works to restore essential services in the city.[54] Local media reported that daily life in Goma resumed and cross-border trade with Rwanda slowly returned to normal.[55] The rebel group recently allowed humanitarian groups into the city to bury bodies scattered in the streets and render aid to civilians.[56]
The unilateral ceasefire may also be an M23 effort to avoid significant international sanctions on Rwanda for backing M23. The United Kingdom and a handful of countries have halted aid to Rwanda or warned Rwanda about the potential for greater sanctions, but there has not been coordinated action against Rwanda.[57] The EU began discussing more serious sanctions against Rwanda during an EU Parliament special session on January 30.[58] Some MPs floated revoking the EU’s military cooperation with Rwanda under the bloc’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, suspending the EU-Rwanda mineral supply chain agreement as part of Rwanda’s €900 million allocation under the EU’s Global Gateway initiative, and banning international sporting events in Rwanda.[59] Rwanda cut its support for M23 and let the group collapse under pressure from UN and FARDC forces in 2012 and 2013 after the international community suspended $240 million in aid to Rwanda as part of widespread sanctions.[60] The loss of Rwandan support would severely undermine M23’s military capability and capacity given that the UN reports that advanced Rwandan military technology and equipment and an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan troops in the eastern DRC are key to M23’s “superior combat strength.”[61]
M23 may have already broken its ceasefire and continued to advance further into South Kivu. M23 forces continued to push southward toward Bukavu after capturing Goma and took control of Kiniezie and Mukwidja towns in Kalehe district on January 29 before FARDC repelled further attacks and dislodged M23 from the area two days later.[62] M23 fighters flanked the FARDC’s position and captured Nyabibwe on February 5, however, two days after its unilateral ceasefire.[63] Nyabibwe is 12 miles (20 kilometers) north of the district capital Kalehe and just over 20 miles (35 kilometers) north of the operationally significant town of Kavumu.[64] French journalist Christophe Rigaud published uncorroborated footage claiming to show M23 fighters near the Kalehe outskirts in Ihusi village on February 6.[65] Kavumu is a key military position because of the Burundian-FARDC base in the town and the nearby airport that lies 15 miles (24 kilometers) north of Bukavu.[66] Reuters reported that a contingent of 1,500 FARDC and Burundian troops along with allied militia fighters deployed 30 miles (50 kilometers) north of Bukavu to fortify the provincial capital from an impending M23 offensive.[67]
Figure 4. M23 Advances Southward Toward Bukavu
Source: Liam Karr.
Sahel
IS has launched a kidnapping campaign targeting foreign nationals across its areas of influence in West Africa. Unknown militants abducted an Austrian national in Agadez, northern Niger; a Spanish national in southern Algeria near the Algeria-Mali border; and four Moroccan truck drivers in the Burkina Faso–Niger border region in three separate incidents between January 12 and 18.[68] Militants captured two Chinese nationals working for the China National Petroleum Corporation in Agadem, northeastern Niger, in a fourth attack on February 2.[69] France 24 journalist Wassim Nasr reported that Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) is behind the attacks and is offering $150,000 to $400,000 (100 to 250 million CFA francs) per foreign hostage.[70] Tuareg separatists secured the release of the Spanish national before the kidnappers turned the hostage over to ISSP, the kidnappers released the Moroccans under unknown circumstances, and militants continue to hold the Austrian and Chinese nationals.[71]
Kidnapping for ransom has been a common fundraising strategy for Salafi-jihadi militants in the Sahel since the 2000s. A report from a German think tank estimated that al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb received $77 million (€60 million) in ransom payments between 2006 and 2012.[72] High-profile kidnappings of foreigners have decreased since 2012 due to a decrease in available targets after foreigners began to avoid the region, but ISSP and Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) still use kidnappings as a revenue stream.[73] A joint report from Interpol, the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GITOC), and the UN-affiliated Norwegian Center for Global Analyses estimated that $8 million in ransom payments made up somewhere between 22 and 44 percent of JNIM’s budget in 2017.[74]
The locations of the kidnappings signal that IS is expanding its areas of operation further away from its core areas in the Sahel and Lake Chad, likely through collaboration with local criminal groups. The attack on the Moroccan truck drivers was the only kidnapping that occurred in a regular area of operations for ISSP or IS West Africa Province (ISWAP). Two of the other kidnappings in Niger took place in Agadem and Agadez. Agadem is closer to ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin, while Agadez is closer to ISSP in northwestern Niger, but neither affiliate has claimed attacks in either town or southern Algeria previously.
Figure 5. Islamic State Kidnapping Campaign in West Africa
Source: Liam Karr.
Kidnappings and collaboration with local criminal groups have been entry points and precursors to insurgent infiltration in the Sahel. A 2023 GITOC report said that kidnappings are entry points for violent extremist groups and that the nascent stages of violent extremist group territorial infiltration are typically accompanied often by higher levels of criminal activities, including kidnappings.[75] The report also notes that part of this expansion includes recruiting or working with criminal groups that are already active in the area.[76] Kidnap-for-ransom attacks in Burkina Faso were a precursor to JNIM’s and ISSP’s expansion into Burkina Faso in 2015 as insurgent cells sought to generate resources for their expansion.[77]
The campaign also signals that ISSP has strengthened and expanded its support zones in its core areas of operation in recent years. ISSP was historically less active than JNIM in the kidnapping-for-ransom economy because the group lacked the support zones and logistic capacity and capabilities to hold and hide hostages for more than several months.[78] The group has expanded its support zones in the tri-border area significantly since 2022, however, and these areas contribute to the group’s ability to conduct its current kidnapping campaign.[79]
The regional kidnapping campaign is yet another indicator that ISSP has developed a greater external reach in recent years. ISSP has become more regionally connected and evolved into a hub for IS activity in West Africa as it has strengthened. Multiple UN reports since 2023 have highlighted that ISSP has strengthened its ties with ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin, which hosts the regional IS office for West Africa, al Furqan.[80] The al Furqan office is part of the General Directorate of Provinces, the IS institution that coordinates external activity across multiple provinces through regional offices.[81] ISWAP demonstrated its interest in attacking the United States when the group was likely behind a credible security threat to the US embassy in Nigeria in 2022.[82] Moroccan security forces also disrupted three IS cells that facilitated foreign fighters’ travel to ISSP in Mali between October 2023 and February 2024.[83] The presence of foreign fighters has led to an increase in Salafi-jihadi groups’ external attack plots historically since foreign fighters are usually more hardened ideologues than local recruits and often aim to eventually return to their homeland to organize attacks.[84]
African security officials have connected ISSP to an increasing number of attack plots outside of the Sahel, as the group’s regional connections have expanded. The UN reported in July 2023 that IS recruiters and facilitators in the Sahel had established transit corridors between southern Europe and the Sahel and established a thwarted attack cell that operated out of Morocco and Spain.[85] CTP assesses that ISSP was likely connected to a terror cell in Angola that had ties to Burkina Faso and planned to conduct attacks when then-US President Joe Biden visited Angola in December 2024.[86] Moroccan security officials said in late January 2025 that police foiled another IS attack cell with suspected ISSP links and “direct ties” to an ISSP leader.[87] The attack cells in Angola and Morocco both consisted entirely of nationals from those countries, but security officials’ statements indicate that ISSP played a training and advisory role for the plots, respectively.[88]
Northern Somalia
US AFRICOM conducted airstrikes that killed a senior ISS attack planner and several other ISS fighters in northern Somalia on January 1.[89] US Africa Command (AFRICOM) said that it conducted the strikes with cooperation from the Puntland government and that the airstrikes killed multiple Islamic State Somalia (ISS) operatives in Puntland and did not cause any civilian harm.[90] The information minister for Puntland state said that AFRICOM targeted areas in the Cal Miskaad mountains, where ISS has its primary support zones.[91] A senior US official said that it is still unclear whether the strikes killed the unspecified main target but that the strike would set ISS back at least six months, presumably referring to ISS’s ability to carry out its responsibilities as an administrative and logistic hub for the global IS network.[92] US President Donald Trump said that the strikes targeted a “Senior ISIS Attack Planner,” which could refer to former ISS emir and suspected head of IS’s Global Directorate of Provinces Abdulqadir Mumin.[93] AFRICOM attempted to kill Mumin in another airstrike in May 2024.[94] The Foundation for Defense of Democracies reported that anonymous security sources said that the strike may have targeted current ISS emir Abdirahman Fahieye Isse Mohamud or an unnamed IS leader who moved to Somalia from the Middle East.[95]
Figure 6. Puntland and the United States Coordinate on Counter-ISS Offensive
Source: Kathryn Tyson.
The strike supports an ongoing counter-ISS offensive by the Puntland government that came after warnings from US officials that ISS posed a growing transnational threat. The Puntland government said on February 1 that the strike marked a “significant advancement as [Puntland] progresses into the second phase of our operation.”[96] The Puntland government launched the offensive in late December to degrade ISS’s support zones in the Cal Miskaad mountains and has destroyed numerous ISS outposts, training areas, weapons manufacturing facilities, and a court to adjudicate internal issues.[97] The Puntland Defense Forces have also seized ISS weapons, including armed commercial quadcopter drones, and destroyed wells and food supplies.[98]
UN and US officials warned multiple times in 2024 that ISS had grown in size, been boosted by an influx of foreign fighters, and played a pivotal role in the global IS network.[99] ISS hosts the regional East Africa IS office, al Karrar, which oversees financing, training, and other support for the group’s personnel in East and South Africa and the global IS network.[100] Al Karrar and ISS function as a logistic node that disperses funds and trainers around the world, including to IS affiliates in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, and Yemen.[101]
Figure 7. ISS Financial Networks Map
Source: Kathryn Tyson
ISS will likely reconstitute and resume its global functions if the Puntland offensive fails to significantly degrade the group’s revenue streams or set conditions to maintain pressure on ISS’s porous support zones. The Puntland government has worked to disrupt ISS financial networks. Puntland media reported on February 4 that the Puntland government seized money in dozens of ISS-linked accounts and shut down the accounts.[102] ISS generates hundreds of thousands of US dollars per month for regional IS financing efforts through racketeering networks in Bossaso, Puntland’s port capital.[103] Puntland security forces have detained hundreds of suspected foreign ISS operatives in Bossaso and implemented measures to block the illegal entry of foreigners, presumably to counter the influx of foreign fighters to the group and disrupt ISS’s financial networks.[104]
Puntland has set some conditions to maintain pressure on ISS’s support zones in the mountains by cooperating with local civilians against the group. Puntland forces and Puntland government officials have held several meetings with local leaders in the Bari region to gain local support for the Puntland operations and counter a potential ISS resurgence.[105] ISS has taken advantage of the ungoverned and difficult terrain of the Cal Miskaad mountains to retreat and regroup across the mountain chain, however. Puntland forces discovered several abandoned ISS outposts in caves, which suggests that ISS militants fled elsewhere in the mountains in anticipation of the counterterrorism offensive.[106] Puntland forces claim that the offensive has killed at least 100 ISS fighters and led to the capture of dozens more, which would be a notable blow to the group’s capacity given the UN estimated that ISS consisted of 600 to 700 total fighters.[107]
Central Somalia
Al Shabaab launched a January offensive in central Somalia to reestablish itself on the east bank of the Shabelle River and cut a vital highway that connects Ethiopia to Mogadishu via central Somalia. Somali media reported that local clan fighters clashed with al Shabaab after the militia observed al Shabaab fighters trying to cross the Shabelle River and establish new positions on the east bank of the river on January 3.[108] The clan militia later destroyed the al Shabaab hideouts in the same area on January 8.[109]
Al Shabaab launched similar unsuccessful offensives to cross the river further south in the Middle Shabelle region in 2023 and 2024 as al Shabaab sought to reinfiltrate areas that Somali forces had cleared during a 2022 offensive.[110] The Somali Federal Government cleared the highway that connects Mogadishu, central Somalia, and Ethiopia in 2022.[111] Control over the road is a major revenue generation opportunity for al Shabaab, clan militias, and the Somali government given the numerous taxation checkpoints on the road that affect local trade and trucks traveling between the port of Mogadishu and Ethiopia.[112]
Somali forces responded to the attempted incursion with a counteroffensive to remove al Shabaab from the east bank of the Shabelle River and degrade the group’s support zones on the west bank of the river. An unspecified senior military officer told Somali media that the Somali National Army (SNA) seeks to “secure rural areas and dismantle al Shabaab’s logistic networks.”[113] The SNA has dislodged al Shabaab from underground bunkers and “extensive fortifications.”[114] The SNA on January 31 recaptured Jicibow, an operationally significant town due to its position on a local road that connects several towns along the west bank of the river and a nearby bridge that connects to the main highway on the east bank of the river.[115] Al Shabaab has increased attacks on SNA forces in the area to disrupt the counterterrorism operations.[116]
CTP continues to assess that the SNA’s inability to clear al Shabaab support zones on the west bank of the Shabelle River will continue to make central Somalia vulnerable to al Shabaab offensives that aim to reinfiltrate previously cleared areas.[117] The SNA previously captured Jicibow from al Shabaab in October 2022 as part of the 2022 offensive.[118] The SNA offensive stalled in central Somalia in 2023, however, as Somali forces faced high costs from large-scale, complex al Shabaab attacks.[119] This failure left large al Shabaab support zones intact on the western side of the Shabelle River and north-central Somalia that the group has used to stage offensives repeatedly. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has expressed a tacit desire for US support against al Shabaab during an interview with the Washington Post on January 31.[120]
Figure 8. Al Shabaab Contests the Shabelle River Valley in the Hiraan Region of Central Somalia
Degrading al Shabaab’s capabilities is an important US national security interest, as the group has demonstrated its intent to attack the US homeland and its capability to conduct attacks beyond East Africa since 2019. The FBI thwarted an al Shabaab-directed 9/11-style terror plot targeting the United States in 2019.[121] A Kenyan national had been training to be a pilot in the Philippines since 2016, researched how to breach a cockpit and obtain a US visa, and explored potential targets in the United States.[122] Investigators tied the plot to a global al Qaeda campaign that the group and its affiliates launched in response to the United States moving its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.[123] Experts have testified to the US Congress that this plot is one of the first indicators that al Shabaab has “both the capability and intent to strike targets outside of the East Africa region, and likely inside the United States.”[124]
Suspected al Shabaab members attempted to enter the United States through the US-Mexico border multiple times in 2023, which underlines the risk of US-based al Shabaab cells. A suspected al Shabaab member illegally entered the United States at the southern border and lived in Minnesota for nearly a year.[125] US immigration officials corrected an earlier error that let the person stay in the country and arrested the individual in January 2024.[126] Costa Rican security forces arrested two other suspected al Shabaab members—one of which was the son of an al Shabaab commander—who attempted to migrate north toward the United States’ southern border in April and November 2023.[127]
Algeria
Algeria and the United States have tightened their relationship in 2025 as Algeria likely seeks to diversify its ties beyond its traditional defense partner, Russia. Algeria and the United States signed a military memorandum of understanding (MOU) when US AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley met with Algerian Defense Minister and Army Chief of Staff General Saïd Chanegriha in Algeria on January 22.[128] Anonymous US defense officials described the deal as a “first-of-its-kind agreement” for the Algeria-US partnership and said that the agreement sets up a joint military commission to explore potential cooperation in arms sales, counterterrorism, maritime search and rescue, military exercises and training, and military healthcare initiatives.[129] Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General CQ Brown Jr. spoke with Chanegriha on February 3 to discuss the MOU and instability in the Sahel.[130] The conversation was the highest-ever level of engagement between Algerian and American military personnel. Secretary of State Marco Rubio discussed Gaza, economic and energy cooperation, and instability in the Sahel with Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf in a phone call on January 28.[131]
Algeria has sought greater cooperation with Europe and the United States despite its historically strong ties to Moscow due to the knock-on effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s destabilizing activity in the Sahel. Algeria has maintained a strong relationship with Russia that includes significant defense ties and cooperation in international institutions that dates back to the Soviet Union and has persisted after Russia invaded Ukraine in March 2022.[132] Algeria emerged as a primary energy supplier for Europe after Europe sought to decouple its energy supply chains from Russia in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion, however.[133] Russia’s invasion has disrupted Russian arms transfers worldwide, which has highlighted Algeria’s overreliance on Russian arms supplies.[134] The growing ties between the United States and Algeria also help the West mitigate the impact of Algeria’s increasingly tense relations with France.[135]
Russia’s military cooperation with the Malian junta has strained its relationship with Algeria by undermining an Algerian-brokered peace agreement with rebel groups in northern Mali and destabilizing Algeria’s southern border. Algeria strongly supported the 2015 peace agreement due to fears that renewed hostilities in Mali would mobilize the Tuareg population in Algeria and cause refugees to flee into Algeria.[136] Algeria and other Western countries have maintained ties with the rebels for over a decade as an anti-jihadist bloc in northern Mali, where the Malian government continues to lack presence and local legitimacy outside of a handful of major population centers.[137] Mali launched an offensive with Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps personnel to clear longtime rebel sanctuaries along the border in July 2024 that was unsuccessful but killed dozens of civilians near the border and forced refugees to flee to Algeria.[138] Algeria’s representative to the UN called for an “immediate end” to mercenary activities and related human rights abuses in Mali in August 2024, presumably referring to Russian forces in Mali.[139]
More balanced Algerian ties with Russia and the United States will likely force the Kremlin to rely on Libya more heavily to access the Mediterranean Sea and support its activity in the Sahel, as the Kremlin seeks to offset its reliance on Syria. Russia appears likely to lose or at least downgrade its military positions in Syria—including Tartus naval base and Hmeimim air base—after the fall of Bashar al Assad in December 2024.[140] The loss of Russia’s Syrian bases jeopardizes Russia’s effort to threaten NATO’s southern flank in the wider Mediterranean theater given that most Russian activity in the Mediterranean Sea, North Africa, and the Sahel was heavily reliant on logistics hubs and military facilities in Syria.[141]
Russia has turned to Libya to be its new logistics hub in the aftermath of Assad’s ouster, but Algeria represents another potential option for the Kremlin to support its Mediterranean naval operations.[142] Algeria already has well-established naval infrastructure that is compatible with some Russian vessels since Algeria uses some Russian-made naval systems.[143] Algeria hosted Russian naval exercises in the Mediterranean Sea in October 2022.[144] The Algerian government will likely be less willing to grant Russia maintenance access, much less full basing rights, that would jeopardize its efforts to balance ties with the United States.
A stronger Algeria-US relationship will also position the United States to undercut Iranian influence in the region by mediating between Algeria and Morocco on the Western Sahara dispute and encourage cooperation between the two regional leaders to contain instability in the Sahel. Spain withdrew from Western Sahara in 1975, which left Morocco, Mauritania, and the Algeria-backed, Sahrawi Arab–affiliated Polisario Front to battle for control of the region. Morocco consolidated control over 80 percent of the region, while the Polisario militants retained 20 percent after several victories that forced Mauritania to withdraw before an ensuing military stalemate led to a UN-mediated ceasefire in 1991.[145]
Figure 9. Morocco and the Polisario Front Contest the Western Sahara Region
Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.
The ceasefire collapsed in 2020, after which the Polisario Front resumed low-intensity attacks and Algeria cut diplomatic ties with Morocco and cooperated with Iran to support the Polisario Front.[146] Moroccan officials claim that this support included Algerian transfers of Iranian drones to the Polisario Front.[147] Iran likely views the Polisario Front as a low-risk, high-reward potential proxy that can undermine a longtime adversary in Morocco and is strategically positioned to possibly harass Western activity near Western Europe in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea.[148] Morocco is a historic ally of the United States, and President Donald Trump recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara in his first term, but US officials have maintained contact with all stakeholders and have worked with the UN to push mediation efforts.[149]
The United States can also encourage Algeria and Morocco to cooperate to prevent the spillover of instability from the Sahel into North Africa and Europe. French media linked ISSP to the kidnapping of a Spanish national in southern Algeria in early January 2025.[150] Moroccan authorities announced that security forces had thwarted an attack cell with links to ISSP in late January.[151] Algeria and Morocco will continue to compete for influence in the Sahel, but greater stability would benefit the regional economic and political projects of both countries. A UN report that ISSP used networks in Morocco to create attack cells with ties to Morocco and Spain highlights the shared threat that the group poses to Europe.[152] AFRICOM is already working with countries south of the Sahel to prevent the spillover of the insurgency into the littoral countries on the Gulf of Guinea.
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[2] https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1886443106326790354; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-january-30-2025-rwandan-backed-m23-captures-goma-saf-breakthroughs-in-khartoum-is-sahel-linked-to-angola-plot-targeting-biden-visit-is-calls-for-jihad-in-sudan-somalia-agrees-with-e; https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1886339179413409958; https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1886337760283210186
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[11] https://medicine.yale.edu/lab/khoshnood/news-article/humanitarian-research-lab-special-report-decisive-assault-launched-on-el-fasher-in-sudan/
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[31] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf
[32] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf
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[35] https://www.minaffet.gov.rw/updates/news-details/le-rwanda-rejette-les-accusations-du-sommet-de-la-sadc-contre-les-rdf
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