Terrorist Networks Project

The SAF launched an offensive to relieve several besieged units in Khartoum. Iranian or Turkish drones likely helped set conditions for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) offensive. The end of the rainy season in Sudan will likely increase fighting across the country in the coming months, which will compound the humanitarian crisis and continue to stall peace talks.

Amhara ethno-nationalist militias known as Fano have waged an offensive in northern Ethiopia’s Amhara region since July that has involved militants expanding control over several key roadways and included an attack on Ethiopia’s second-largest city in September. The offensive likely aims to establish control over key lines of communication to degrade the federal government’s access to northern Amhara and disputed territories in Tigray region.

Russia and several countries in the Middle East, including Iran, are taking advantage of conflicts that have emerged in Sudan and Somalia to grow military engagement with some of the factions involved in the crises. These countries are advancing their economic, military, and political objectives in the Horn of Africa and the greater Red Sea area at the expense of the interests of the local populations and the United States. Shifting regional alliances in the Middle East have shaped some of the external engagement in the Horn of Africa as powers compete for economic, military, and political influence in the Red Sea.

Jama’at Nusrat al Islam (JNIM) attacked the main military air base and a gendarmerie base in Bamako, its first attacks in the capital since 2015. JNIM likely conducted the attacks to undermine the legitimacy of the Malian junta and reduce both elite and popular support for the junta.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced the highest total investment through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) since the peak of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the subsequent COVID-19 pandemic as it discussed plans to continue diversifying cooperation in Africa beyond hard-infrastructure BRI projects. Many of the new agreements and funding plans from FOCAC 2024 are areas of emphasis in its 2021 Global Development Initiative, including green energy and tech, food and health development, and governance and military cooperation.

Egypt is growing military cooperation with Somalia and deployed troops to Somalia, which is increasing tensions with Ethiopia and raising the risk of direct or proxy military clashes between Egypt and Somalia against Ethiopia. The Somali Federal Government is trying to pressure Ethiopia to withdraw its military forces from Somalia and annul its port agreement with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region. Egypt wants to counter Ethiopia’s growing influence on the Nile and Red Sea, which are economically vital waterways for Egypt.

North Africa–Sahel Engagement. Algeria and Morocco are vying for economic and political influence in the Sahel to assert themselves as regional leaders and legitimize their positions on the Western Sahara, a disputed territory on the coast of northwest Africa. Morocco is spearheading its engagement with the Sahel through an initiative to connect the landlocked central Sahel states to the Atlantic Ocean via a Moroccan port in Western Sahara.

The African Union (AU) and UN are advancing plans for an AU-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia after the current AU mission expires, at the end of 2024.

Tuareg insurgents with likely ties to the Tuareg separatist rebel coalition and al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate repelled a Malian-Russian offensive in northern Mali in the deadliest engagement for Russian forces since they arrived in Mali in 2021.

Tuareg insurgents with likely ties to the Tuareg separatist rebel coalition and al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate repelled a Malian-Russian offensive in northern Mali in the deadliest engagement for Russian forces since they arrived in Mali in 2021.