Africa File Special Edition: Ankara Declaration Reduces Ethiopia-Somalia Tensions but Leaves Unresolved Gaps

Africa File Special Edition: Ankara Declaration Reduces Ethiopia-Somalia Tensions but Leaves Unresolved Gaps

Author: Kathryn Tyson

Contributor: Liam Karr

Data Cutoff: December 18, 2024, at 10 a.m.

Editor's Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War. 

The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaway: Ethiopia and Somalia agreed on December 11 to work toward securing Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea as part of a Turkish-mediated deal that will likely benefit Ethiopia and Turkey and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy. Ethiopia will likely withdraw from or at least pause its controversial naval base agreement with the breakaway Somaliland region because of the new agreement with Somalia, which is known as the Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia’s withdrawal from the Somaliland agreement would likely lead the Somali Federal Government (SFG) to reverse its decision to exclude Ethiopian troops from the new African Union (AU) mission in Somalia to combat al Shabaab in 2025. Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea would significantly benefit Ethiopia’s economy by reducing Ethiopia’s reliance on Djibouti, while the Ankara Declaration benefits Turkey by protecting Turkey’s investments and relationships with Ethiopia and Somalia and bolstering Turkey’s status as an international powerbroker and key player in the broader Red Sea area. The Ankara Declaration could cause political backlash against the SFG and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy to the benefit of al Shabaab because the deal contradicts the SFG’s earlier stances on Ethiopian access to Somalia’s coast. The agreement could lead to future tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia as it does not address Ethiopia’s naval ambitions, Somalia’s military cooperation with Egypt that was intended to counter Ethiopia, or the feasibility of ensuring safe passage between Somali ports and Ethiopia given al Shabaab’s threat throughout southern Somalia.

Ethiopia and Somalia agreed on December 11 to work toward securing Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea as part of the Turkish-mediated Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to finalize “mutually advantageous commercial arrangements” that will allow Ethiopia to “enjoy reliable, secure, and sustainable access to and from the sea” as part of the agreement.[1] Ethiopia and Somalia signed the Ankara Declaration after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held separate talks with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Ankara, Turkey, on December 11.[2] Turkey mediated two previous rounds of negotiations between Ethiopia’s and Somalia’s foreign ministers in July and August 2024.[3]

Ethiopia will likely withdraw from or at least pause its controversial naval base agreement with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region as a result of the Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia signed an agreement with Somaliland in January 2024 that granted Ethiopia land for a naval base on Somaliland’s Red Sea coast in return for Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence.[4] Ethiopian officials also said the deal included commercial aspects, but Somaliland officials maintained that the deal was naval only.[5] The Somali Federal Government (SFG) rejected the deal as an illegal violation of its sovereignty—as the SFG considers Somaliland to be part of its territory—and called for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from the country.[6] Ethiopia has deployed approximately 10,000 troops in Somalia as part of the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia and through other bilateral agreements to fight al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate, al Shabaab.[7] Abiy and Mohamud implied that the discussions in Ankara addressed the nearly yearlong political dispute between over the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal even though the Ankara Declaration does not directly mention the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal.[8]

Figure 1. Ethiopia-Somalia Dispute: 2024 Timeline

Source: Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson.

Ethiopia has little room to balance between the SFG and Somaliland and their competing deals after it agreed to the Ankara Declaration due to the zero-sum positions of the SFG and Somaliland on Somaliland’s sovereignty. Somali officials insisted that Ethiopia withdraw from its deal with Somaliland in previous Turkish-mediated discussions and called the Somaliland agreement a violation of Somali “territorial integrity.”[9] The Ankara Declaration implicitly acknowledges the SFG’s position without directly mentioning Somaliland when the text says that Ethiopia and Somalia “reaffirmed their respect and commitment to one another’s sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity.”[10] Somaliland officials have insisted that Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland is required if Somaliland is to follow through on its agreement to lease Ethiopia land for a naval base.[11]

The Ankara Declaration gives Ethiopia an alternative to the Somaliland deal because the agreement theoretically provides Ethiopia access to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Ethiopia has sought to acquire sea access since it became landlocked, after Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993.[12] The Ankara Declaration recognized the “potential benefits” of Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea and stipulated that Ethiopia and Somalia will hold technical talks in February to ensure this access no later than June 2025.[13]

Officials from Somalia and Somaliland have made contradictory statements about whether Ethiopia will follow through on the Somaliland deal. Somali officials said on December 12 that Ethiopia retracted its agreement with Somaliland as part of the Ankara talks.[14] Somaliland officials said that the Ankara Declaration “does not concern” Somaliland and that Ethiopia has insisted privately that it will not withdraw from the Somaliland deal.[15]

Future international recognition of Somaliland’s statehood would give Ethiopia greater political cover and legitimacy to resume talks on a port deal with Somaliland. No countries currently recognize Somaliland, although many countries have consulates and diplomatic relations with Somaliland. US policymakers are increasingly contemplating giving US recognition to Somaliland’s independence, however. US State Department officials who worked on Africa policy during US President-elect Donald Trump’s first term have voiced public support for the US to recognize Somaliland.[16] US Republican House Representative Scott Perry introduced a bill on December 12 for US recognition of Somaliland independence.[17] The US news outlet Semafor reported in December that Trump advisers and US congressional Republicans plan to encourage Trump to recognize Somaliland’s independence when he takes office, in January 2025.[18] US recognition of Somaliland could encourage other countries, including Ethiopia, to extend recognition to Somaliland.

Ethiopia’s withdrawal from the Somaliland agreement would likely lead the SFG to reverse its decision to exclude Ethiopian troops from the new AU mission in Somalia in 2025. Somali officials in June ordered Ethiopian forces to withdraw from Somalia at the end of the current AU mission at the end of 2024 if Ethiopia followed through on its deal with Somaliland.[19] Somalia shifted its tone in the Ankara Declaration, however, and acknowledged “the sacrifices of Ethiopian soldiers within the African Union Missions.”[20] The Somali national security adviser said on December 15 that the SFG is reviewing the decision to exclude Ethiopian forces from the new AU mission.[21]

Ethiopia’s continued military presence in Somalia as part of the new AU mission would allow Ethiopia to continue fighting al Shabaab. Ethiopia seeks to maintain troops in Somalia to counter al Shabaab and create a buffer zone to prevent cross-border incursions. Al Shabaab demonstrated its strength near the Ethiopian border and threat to Ethiopia when it conducted a multiday campaign inside Ethiopia for the first time in July 2022.[22] Several hundred militants from the 2022 offensive established a rear base along Ethiopia’s southeastern border with Kenya.[23] Al Shabaab also regularly attacks Ethiopian forces in Somalia and uses anti-Ethiopian propaganda as a recruiting tool.[24] Local politicians in Somalia and Somalia’s international partners had signaled their support for Ethiopia’s continued participation in the new AU mission, and CTP previously assessed that Ethiopia would likely remain in Somalia despite the SFG’s demands.[25]

Figure 2. Ethiopian Forces and Bases in Somalia

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

It is unclear how the Ankara Declaration and subsequent agreements between Ethiopia and Somalia will affect Somalia’s military cooperation with Egypt. Somalia signed defense deals with Egypt in August 2024 for nearly 10,000 Egyptian troops to replace Ethiopian forces in Somalia, ostensibly to combat al Shabaab.[26] Egypt has also sent three shipments of weapons to Somalia since August.[27] Egypt sought to threaten Ethiopia over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, while the SFG aimed to retaliate against Ethiopia and counter Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland.[28] Ethiopia views Egypt’s military presence on its border in Somalia as a national security risk and has warned against Egyptian military participation in the new AU mission.[29] The presidents of Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia formalized a de facto anti-Ethiopian alliance during a trilateral summit on October 10 and agreed to strengthen Somalia to “confront various internal and external challenges.”[30] The Egyptian and Somali foreign ministers discussed the Ankara Declaration on December 15 and agreed to continue joint coordination and to hold a trilateral ministerial meeting with Eritrea at an unspecified date.[31]

Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea through Somalia would significantly benefit Ethiopia’s economy and reduce Ethiopia’s reliance on Djibouti. Ethiopia relies on Djibouti’s main port for approximately 95 percent of its international trade and pays at least $1 billion in annual port fees to Djibouti.[32] Ethiopia previously sought to gain Red Sea access to decrease this reliance through an agreement with the SFG in 2018 to invest in ports and accompanying road links between Ethiopia and Somalia.[33] Abiy also attempted to secure a stake in the Emirati-owned and operated Berbera port in Somaliland in 2019.[34] Both efforts collapsed, however, after Ethiopia and the SFG failed to follow through on their deal and Ethiopia failed to make the necessary payments to secure its stake in the Berbera port.[35] Abiy continued to highlight Ethiopia’s landlocked status as a problem and framed Red Sea access as an existential issue and “natural right” in 2023.[36]

The Ankara Declaration does not address Ethiopia’s naval ambitions. The Ankara Declaration does not refer to any Ethiopian naval access, contrary to the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal. Ethiopia signed an agreement with France to develop Ethiopia’s navy in 2019, but France withdrew from the deal in 2021 due to human rights concerns related to the Ethiopian civil war in Tigray.[37] However, French President Emmanuel Macron is traveling to Ethiopia in late December and is reportedly prepared to reengage with the deal.[38]

Turkey benefits from its role in the Ankara Declaration as Turkey seeks to strengthen its economic, military, and political footprint in the Horn of Africa. The Ankara Declaration protects Turkey’s investments and relationships with Ethiopia and Somalia by keeping its two partners from an open conflict. Turkey has been a major defense and economic partner in Somalia since the early 2010s and signed a maritime and defense deal with the SFG in February 2024 to reconstruct the Somali Navy in exchange for 30 percent of the revenue from the Somali’s offshore economic zone.[39] Somalia and Turkey also signed an oil and gas cooperation agreement in March 2024 that allows Turkey to engage in oil and natural gas exploration in Somalia’s offshore waters.[40] Turkey is simultaneously the second-largest foreign investor in Ethiopia, with an estimated $2.5 billion in projects in the country at the end of 2021.[41] Turkey sent drones to Ethiopia to help turn the tide in the federal government’s favor during the Ethiopian civil war in 2021 and 2022.[42]

The Ankara Declaration and Turkey’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa bolster Turkey’s status as an international powerbroker and key player in the greater Red Sea area. The AU, European Union, and United States praised Turkey for its role in mediating the Ankara Declaration.[43] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan offered to mediate an agreement in Sudan’s civil war between the United Arab Emirates—which backs the opposing Rapid Support Forces—and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) during a phone call with the SAF head on December 13.[44] Turkey has also framed its naval presence in the broader Horn of Africa–Red Sea region as an opportunity to combat piracy, illegal fishing, and other multilateral issues in the area.[45]

The Ankara Declaration could cause political backlash against the SFG and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy to the benefit of al Shabaab because the agreement contradicts the SFG’s earlier stances on Ethiopian access to Somalia’s coast. The SFG played upon anti-Ethiopian sentiment to turn popular Somali sentiment against the Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal as part of its strategy to undermine the deal. Mohamud said in January that “not an inch of Somalia can or will be signed away by anybody,” and the Somali foreign minister led thousands of Somali civilians in protest against the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal in Mogadishu in January 2024.[46] Al Shabaab has attempted to exploit anti-Ethiopian sentiment repeatedly to gain recruits and accuses Ethiopia of “occupying” Somalia.[47] Al Shabaab rejected the Somalia-Ethiopia deal on December 12 and reiterated that Ethiopia seeks to “dominate Somalia.”[48] There is no immediate evidence that the Somali public or Somali government officials are widely dissatisfied with the Ankara Declaration, but protests against the SFG’s decision to mend ties with Ethiopia would indicate public dissatisfaction with the SFG.

The Ankara Declaration does not address the feasibility of ensuring safe passage for Ethiopian access to the Red Sea through Somalia. Ethiopia would presumably secure preferential access to a commercial port near or in the existing major ports in Mogadishu or Kismayo in southern Somalia. Al Shabaab maintains extortion networks in both ports, regularly carries out attacks in both cities, and also controls or heavily contests the areas and roads between both ports and the Ethiopian border.[49] These challenges previously contributed to the failure of Ethiopia’s 2018 deal with the SFG. The SFG launched an offensive in central Somalia in 2022 that cleared one of the main roadways between Mogadishu and central Somalia that runs to Ethiopia.[50] However, the SFG was unable to completely clear al Shabaab from central Somalia and failed to expand the offensive to al Shabaab’s main havens in southern Somalia due to clan rivalries and al Shabaab counterattacks.[51] A lack of security across these regions would pose significant challenges to secure any overland route for Ethiopia to transport goods to a Somali port.

Figure 3. Al Shabaab’s Area of Operations in Southern Somalia

Source: Kathryn Tyson and Liam Karr.

[1] https://x.com/MOFASomalia/status/1867120512822022244

[2] https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1866956708297179388; https://www.reuters.com/world/erdogan-meets-somalia-ethiopia-leaders-separately-amid-somaliland-dispute-2024-12-11

[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/turkey-mediating-somalia-ethiopia-talks-port-deal-officials-2024-07-01/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/second-round-somalia-ethiopia-talks-turkey-ends-with-no-deal-progress-made-2024-08-13

[4] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalias-cabinet-calls-emergency-meet-ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal-2024-01-02

[5] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia-somaliland/stakes-ethiopia-somaliland-deal

[6] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-insists-ethiopia-not-be-part-of-new-au-mission-/7858887.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-expel-ethiopian-troops-unless-somaliland-port-deal-scrapped-official-2024-06-03; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-accuses-ethiopian-troops-illegal-incursion-2024-06-24

[7] https://ecfr.eu/article/threes-a-crowd-why-egypts-and-somalias-row-with-ethiopia-can-embolden-al-shabaab/

[8] https://www.barrons.com/news/turkey-says-ethiopia-somalia-reach-compromise-deal-to-end-feud-51034d60; https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/a-port-deal-puts-the-horn-of-africa-on-the-brink

[9] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgr7v1evvgo; https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240927-ethiopian-actions-flagrantly-violate-somali-territorial-integrity-somali-pm

[10] https://www.mfa.gov dot tr/etiyopya-federal-demokratik-cumhuriyeti-ve-somali-federal-cumhuriyeti-nin-ankara-bildirisi.en.mfa#:~:text=The%20Leaders%20of%20Somalia%20and,Act%20of%20the%20African%20Union

[11] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/01/ethiopia-and-somaliland-reach-historic-agreement-over-access-to-red-sea-ports

[12] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/what-the-ethiopia-somaliland-deal-means-for-washingtons-strategy-in-the-red-sea/

[13] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/12/11/turkey-somalia-ethiopia-joint-declaration/3a2759fa-b80f-11ef-8afa-452ab71fe261_story.html; https://x.com/TheVillaSomalia/status/1866984029347803525

[14] https://x.com/TomGardner18/status/1867114091816550709; https://www.bbc.com/somali/articles/cp9n1dn2v7zo

[15] https://x.com/Ismail_Shirwac/status/1866972545712259467; https://x.com/RAbdiAnalyst/status/1867811339789271403; https://www.bbc.com/somali/articles/cp9n1dn2v7zo

[16] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somaliland-votes-with-leaders-seeing-international-recognition-reach-2024-11-13/

[17] https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/10402

[18] https://www.semafor.com/article/12/10/2024/somaliland-trump-white-house-looks-set-to-recognize-the-region

[19] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-wants-all-ethiopian-troops-to-leave-by-december/7641135.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-expel-ethiopian-troops-unless-somaliland-port-deal-scrapped-official-2024-06-03

[20] https://x.com/TheVillaSomalia/status/1866984029347803525

[21] https://www.alaraby.co dot uk/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D9%85%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A9

[22] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-al-shabaab-attacks-ethiopia

[23] https://www.hudson.org/terrorism/faltering-lion-analyzing-progress-setbacks-somalia-war-against-al-shabaab-james-barnett; https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-al-shabaab-attacks-ethiopia

[24] https://jamestown.org/program/al-shabaab-threatens-ethiopian-security-ahead-of-atmis-withdrawal-from-somalia/; https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-attacks-ethiopian-military-convoys-in-somalia-/7271962.html; https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/al-shabaab-militants-launch-attack-on-ethiopian-military-base-in-somalia

[26] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-insists-ethiopia-not-be-part-of-new-au-mission-/7858887.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-expel-ethiopian-troops-unless-somaliland-port-deal-scrapped-official-2024-06-03/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-accuses-ethiopian-troops-illegal-incursion-2024-06-24; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-september-5-2024-egypt-ethiopia-and-somalia-conflict-looms-is-gains-in-niger-russia-aids-burkina-fasos-nuclear-energy-push#Horn

[27] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cglk038p1d3o; https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/egyptian-warship-docks-in-mogadishu-with-third-arms-shipment-amidst-regional-tensions

[28] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-for-the-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-africa#Somalia

[29] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-for-the-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-africa

[30] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdje7pkv1zxo; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/10/somalia-eritera-and-egypt-pledge-to-bloster-security-ties; https://www.barrons.com/news/leaders-of-egypt-eritrea-somalia-meet-amid-regional-tensions-7eccc9a9

[31] https://x.com/PatrickHeinisc1/status/1868315060172640515; https://x.com/mahmouedgamal44/status/1868346810068357217; https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1868352708610043990

[32] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/07/20/addis-djibouti-corridor-to-get-major-upgrade-that-is-key-to-unlocking-connectivity-and-trade-for-ethiopia-afe-hoa; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/02/world/africa/ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal.html; https://www.mei.edu/publications/djibouti-needs-plan-b-post-guelleh-era; https://www.aljazeera dot com/features/2023/11/7/is-landlocked-ethiopia-starting-another-war-over-ports-in-horn-of-africa

[33] https://www.middleeastmonitor dot com/20180616-somalia-ethiopia-to-jointly-invest-in-four-seaports-on-the-red-sea/; https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/ethiopia-seeks-to-legitimise-port-deals-with-somalia-55700; https://www.reuters.com/article/world/somalia-ethiopia-to-jointly-invest-in-four-seaports-on-the-red-sea-idUSKBN1JC0JK

[34] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2024/1/6/why-is-somalia-angry-about-neighbouring-ethiopias-new-port-deal

[35] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia-somaliland/stakes-ethiopia-somaliland-deal

[36] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67332811; https://www.aljazeera dot com/program/inside-story/2023/7/26/how-will-landlocked-ethiopia-get-direct-access-to-a-port

[37] https://somaliguardian dot com/news/africa/france-suspends-military-cooperation-agreement-with-ethiopia/; https://www.state.gov/war-crimes-crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-in-ethiopia/; https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/06/crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-ethiopias-western-tigray-zone; https://www.reuters.com/article/world/ethiopia-france-sign-military-navy-deal-turn-new-page-in-ties-idUSKBN1QT2VZ/

[38] https://x.com/Tuuryare_Africa/status/1867637502854803907; https://x.com/martinplaut/status/1866904409726206462

[39] https://www.mei.edu/publications/far-benefactor-turkish-government-exploiting-somalias-fragility; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/turkey-signed-two-major-deals-with-somalia-will-it-be-able-to-implement-them

[40] https://apnews.com/article/turkey-somalia-sign-oil-gas-agreements-312fcdf58789767f94b6c36a3444faec

[41] https://www.theafricareport.com/141761/ethiopia-turkey-ankaras-ongoing-economic-and-military-support; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/africa/turkey-eyeing-more-investments-in-ethiopia-envoy/2144828

[42] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/exclusive-us-concerned-over-turkeys-drone-sales-conflict-hit-ethiopia-2021-12-22; https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/ethiopia-tigray-dedebit-drone-strike/

[43] https://www.aa.com dot tr/en/africa/african-union-welcomes-somalia-ethiopia-pact-praises-mediation-by-turkish-president-erdogan/3422654; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ethiopiasomalia-statement-spokesperson-ankara-declaration_en; https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-welcomes-the-ankara-declaration-by-ethiopia-and-somalia

[44] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-can-step-resolve-sudan-uae-disputes-erdogan-tells-burhan-2024-12-13/; https://x.com/PatrickHeinisc1/status/1867562489627517116

[45] https://www.newarab.com/news/turkey-leads-anti-piracy-maritime-mission-gulf-aden

[46] https://www.aljazeera dot com/features/2024/1/4/ambiguous-ethiopia-port-deal-fuels-uncertainty-over-somaliland-statehood; https://www.ftlsomalia dot com/fiqi-addresses-huge-anti-ethiopia-protest-in-mogadishu/; https://www.aa.com dot tr/en/africa/protest-against-ethiopia-s-red-sea-access-deal-rocks-somali-capital/3106328; https://x.com/SONNALIVE/status/1742661068760006984

[47] https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2007-01-06-voa9-66763232/563779.html; https://www.reuters.com/article/world/anti-ethiopian-protests-erupt-in-mogadishu-idUSL06725344/; SITE Intelligence Group, ”Shabaab Video Raises Alarm Over Ethiopian Ambitions in Somalia, Documents Major Ambush on Convoy Leaving 284 Dead,” April 4, 2024, available by subscription at http://www.siteintelgroup.com

[48] https://x.com/Tuuryare_Africa/status/1867261152075325683

[49] https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-attacks-somali-base-handed-over-by-au-forces/7179521.html; https://acleddata.com/2023/09/01/special-report-kenya-somalia-border-rising-al-shabaab-threat-in-the-wake-of-atmis-drawdown/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/scores-killed-clashes-between-somali-forces-al-shabaab-2024-07-22/; https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/al-shabaab-remains-active-in-southern-somalia/

[50] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/somalias-stalled-offensive-against-al-shabaab-taking-stock-of-obstacles/

[51] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-somali-national-army-versus-al-shabaab-a-net-assessment/; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-february-1-2024; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-march-8-2023#:~:text=Source%3A%20Kathryn%20Tyson.-,Somalia.,-The%20SFG%20will; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-march-8-2023#:~:text=Source%3A%20Kathryn%20Tyson.-,Somalia.,-The%20SFG%20will