Africa File Special Edition: M23 March Threatens Expanded Conflict in DR Congo and Regional War in the Great Lakes

Africa File Special Edition: M23 March Threatens Expanded Conflict in DR Congo and Regional War in the Great Lakes

Author: Liam Karr

Contributor: Yale Ford

Data Cutoff: January 30, at 5 p.m.

Editor's Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War.

The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaway: Rwandan-backed M23 rebels captured Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu, which marks the most significant escalation in the conflict in the eastern DRC since the group last seized Goma in 2012. The group will seek to consolidate control over Goma, nearby mineral-rich areas, and the surrounding supply lines. The war in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) will likely continue to escalate in the short term because M23’s military gains have not forced the DRC to agree to negotiations with M23, and Rwanda is better positioned to deter potential sanctions that caused it to cut its vital support for M23 in 2012. M23 and its Rwandan backers are likely trying to maximize their leverage with the DRC in negotiations and will continue advancing along three axes in the eastern DRC in the absence of an agreement that addresses their maximalist negotiation stance. Some members of M23 and its broader political coalition have signaled that they seek regime change in Kinshasa, which is a threat that would expand the war far across the DRC. The conflict could become a full-blown regional war given Burundi’s current support for the DRC and Uganda’s alleged support for M23. The war is continuing to cause a humanitarian crisis for hundreds of thousands of Congolese refugees in the eastern DRC.

Rwandan-backed M23 rebels captured Goma, which marks the most significant escalation in the conflict in the eastern DRC since the group last seized the provincial capital in 2012. The group will seek to consolidate control over Goma, nearby mineral-rich areas, and the surrounding supply lines. M23 captured Goma between January 26 and 28 after a series of offensives and counteroffensives against Congolese forces that began in December 2024. M23 launched concerted offensives in the Lubero and Masisi districts in December.[1] Congolese forces eventually halted the rebel group’s offensive in Lubero on December 24, but M23 captured Masisi town in early January 2025.[2] M23 then took several key towns on Lake Kivu on January 21 after a failed Congolese army (FARDC) counteroffensive to secure key supply lines that connect Goma and the Masisi district in mid-January.[3] UN troops and soldiers from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) initially supported the FARDC against M23 but retreated into a defensive posture after the multilateral forces suffered significant casualties, including the deaths of 17 South African soldiers.[4]

Figure 1. M23 Advances in Eastern DRC

 

Note: The UN reports that 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan troops are fighting alongside M23 in the eastern DRC and “de facto control” M23 operations.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

The UN and several countries report that Rwandan forces have been supporting M23 and were directly involved in the fighting in Goma. The UN reported in December 2024 that Rwanda already had 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan troops in the eastern DRC fighting alongside M23.[5] The United States condemned Rwanda on December 20 for continuing to provide artillery, troop reinforcements, and resupply convoys to the rebel group as it advanced toward Lubero.^[6] DRC Foreign Minister Thérèse Wagner and UN officials in northern Goma said on January 26 that Rwandan reinforcements had entered the Goma area from the border with Rwanda in recent days.^[7] French media reported the presence of Rwandan special forces in Goma and said that Kigali had deployed an additional 500 to 1,000 troops to support M23 in its offensive.^[8]

Figure 2. M23 Advances Toward Goma and Masisi

 

Note: The UN reports that 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan troops are fighting alongside M23 in eastern DRC and “de facto control” M23 operations.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

M23 seeks to set up an administration to govern Goma as it has in other areas under its control in the eastern DRC.[9] The UN reported in December 2024 that cadres from M23 and their broader political coalition, Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), “systematically held meetings in newly conquered territories to promote its narrative, recruit new members, and consolidate parallel administration.”[10] AFC-M23 signaled they would apply the same strategy when AFC chief Corneille Nangaa held a press conference, declaring “we are not leaving Goma city, and we are here to stay.”[11] Past efforts in AFC-M23-seized zones included sophisticated, “state-like” administrations in key areas, such as mineral-rich areas around Rubaya.[12] The administration in Rubaya involved a mining ministry that awarded permits to, enforced taxes on, and paid salaries to traders and miners in the area.[13] M23 militants also patrolled the town to ensure compliance with the administration’s rules on selling minerals exclusively to M23.[14] M23 and AFC spent 2024 strengthening their capacity to replicate this administrative system. This effort included recruiting and training police, intelligence services, and political leaders.[15]

M23’s advances have strengthened the group’s control over critical mineral resources in eastern DRC and supply lines to Rwanda. M23 captured several areas along the North Kivu and South Kivu provincial border that are rich in gold, tantalum (coltan), and tin (cassiterite) ores between January 16 and 21.[16] The area also contains tungsten, which along with tantalum and tin comprise the “3T” minerals that the United States defines as critical minerals for their use in computers, phones, and other electronics.[17] The UN reported in December 2024 that M23 had generated nearly $800 million in taxes on the production, trade, and transport related to the coltan mines around Rubaya since April 2024.[18] Former UN investigator Jason Stearns claimed that Rwandan mineral export revenue has doubled over the last two years and now exceeds $1 billion.[19] This growth includes a jump in gold exports despite Rwanda not being a major gold producer.[20]

Figure 3. M23 Activity in Mineral-Rich Areas of the Eastern DRC

 

Source: Liam Karr; International Peace Information Service.

The war in the eastern DRC will likely continue to escalate in the short term because M23’s military gains have not forced the DRC to agree to negotiations with M23, and Rwanda is better positioned to deter potential sanctions that caused it to cut its vital support for M23 in 2012. The DRC has refused repeatedly to negotiate directly with M23 and called direct talks with M23 a “red line.”[21] Congolese officials have called M23 “terrorists” regularly and claimed that Rwanda supports M23 to expropriate the eastern DRC’s mineral resources.[22]

The DRC’s stance on M23 and Rwanda’s insistence on direct DRC-M23 negotiations have been an insurmountable obstacle to Kenyan-mediated peace talks between the DRC and armed groups in the eastern DRC and Angolan-mediated peace talks between the DRC and Rwanda.[23] DRC President Félix Tshisekedi accused Kenyan President William Ruto of mismanaging the Nairobi process and “taking up Rwanda’s cause” after Ruto entered office in 2022.[24] Tshisekedi kicked out regional troops that were in eastern DRC to help facilitate the Nairobi process by enforcing a ceasefire, protecting supply routes, and returning displaced civilians because the regional force did not take an aggressive enough approach to insurgents.[25] The Angolan-mediated Luanda Process between the DRC and Rwanda collapsed in December 2024 after Rwanda insisted that the DRC “hold a direct dialogue with the M23” for talks to continue.[26]

Tshisekedi has limited options to deviate from this hardline, military-first stance without undermining support among his support base. Prominent political and religious leaders criticized Tshisekedi for cooperating with Rwanda against armed groups early in his first term.[27] Tshisekedi responded in subsequent years by leaning into anti-Rwandan rhetoric, especially during his successful campaign to be re-elected in January 2024. Tshisekedi likened Kagame to Adolf Hitler and promised to declare war on Rwanda.[28] An anonymous European ambassador told La Libre Afrique after the fall of Goma that they “do not see how Tshisekedi and Kagame will be able to sit down at the same table again.”[29]

Tshisekedi and regional officials have leaned into anti-Rwandan rhetoric to mobilize the population in support of the Congolese government. Congolese government officials have called for a large-scale “patriotic mobilization” to “fight against the aggressor [Rwanda].”^[30] Tshisekedi and other officials have called for increased funding for the FARDC and encouraged civilians to enlist in the FARDC.^[31] Congolese government officials and civilians in at least six of DRC’s 26 provinces have encouraged popular demonstrations against Rwanda.^[32] Thousands of civilians marched on the streets of Bukavu, the provincial capital of South Kivu, on January 27 to demand that the international community enforce punitive measures on Rwanda.^[33] Protestors violently attacked the embassies of Belgium, France, Japan, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, and the United States in Kinshasa on January 28 to “denounce the passivity of the international community.”^[34]

Rwanda has strengthened its partnerships with the West over the last decade, and these partnerships have partially deterred sanctions on Rwanda, unlike the last time that M23 seized Goma in 2012. Rwanda cut its support for M23 and let the group collapse under pressure from UN and FARDC forces in 2012 and 2013 after the international community suspended $240 million in aid to Rwanda as part of widespread sanctions.[35] At least a third of Rwanda’s budget comes from foreign aid, and World Bank figures from 2021 show that the $1.25 billion that Rwanda received in official development assistance was equal to 74 percent of central government spending that year.[36]

Rwanda has boosted its image since 2012 by positioning itself as a critical stabilizing force in other African conflicts that affect Western interests more directly than the DRC conflict. Rwanda is the second-largest police and troop contributor to UN peacekeeping operations and the largest in Africa, with over 5,000 personnel deployed as part of UN missions in South Sudan and the Central African Republic.[37] Rwanda has also deployed thousands of troops bilaterally to quell conflicts in the Central African Republic and Mozambique and has discussed a third bilateral deployment to contain the Salafi-jihadi insurgency in Benin.[38] These bilateral deployments align heavily with Western interests, especially amid growing aversion from some African governments toward UN and Western military interventions. Rwanda serves as an alternative to Russian mercenaries that are active in the Central African Republic, while Rwandan forces have contained Islamic State–affiliated insurgents in Mozambique that threaten French and US gas projects. These aligned interests have led the West to strongly support and fund the Rwandan deployments as a way to support “African solutions to African problems.”[39]

Rwanda has also focused on growing its economy to position itself as a hub for foreign investment for Western countries and businesses, including Western efforts to secure strategically important critical mineral supply chains. The EU signed a memorandum of understanding with Rwanda in February 2024 to strengthen the EU-Rwanda critical mineral supply chains.[40] The EU has also invested more than €900 million in Rwanda as part of the EU Global Gateway program.[41] Rwanda has courted major sports entities to boost its image, similar to the “sportswashing” that many Gulf countries and Russia are accused of. The NBA has a partnership with Rwanda to host the Basketball Africa League, Formula 1 is choosing between Rwanda and South Africa as two of the leading options for a race in Africa, and Rwanda’s tourism agency sponsors major European soccer teams in England, France, and Germany.[42]

The United Kingdom and a handful of countries have discussed imposing sanctions on Rwanda, but there has not been coordinated action against Rwanda like in 2012. The UK ambassador to the UN said that M23 attacks on UN forces “can be considered war crimes punishable by sanctions,” and the UK foreign secretary warned Kagame that Rwandan actions had put Rwanda’s global aid under threat during a phone call on January 26.[43] Both the EU and the United States said that they would examine all means necessary to punish Rwanda for M23’s attack on Goma but did not explicitly mention using sanctions.[44] Belgian politicians had previously been strongly critical of Rwanda’s activity in eastern DRC and urged the EU to sanction Rwanda after the seizure of Goma.[45] Germany canceled foreign aid–related talks with Rwanda and demanded that M23 and Rwanda withdraw their troops from the eastern DRC.[46]

The DRC and M23 are unlikely to agree to a multilateral force occupying contested territory in eastern DRC. M23 agreed to cede captured territory to regional forces from the East African Community in January 2023 as part of the Nairobi process.[47] Tshisekedi kicked these regional forces out for not taking stronger action against M23, however, and opted to rely on SADC forces, foreign mercenaries, and 40,000 local militia fighters known as Wazalendos.[48] This move ended the fragile ceasefire that had been in place and led M23 to recapture most of these areas. M23 has clashed with multilateral forces since 2012 on numerous occasions and has warned the UN and SADC against interfering in the ongoing conflict multiple times in January.[49] The group’s moves to administer Goma and other captured territories further signal that its long-term intent to unilaterally control these areas, not turn them over to multilateral forces.

M23 and its Rwandan backers are likely trying to maximize their leverage with the DRC in negotiations and will continue advancing along three axes in eastern DRC in the absence of peace talks that address their maximalist demands. M23 and its Rwandan backers likely aim to secure an agreement that legitimizes M23’s control of parts of eastern DRC. Rwanda has continued to insist that the DRC negotiate with M23, which demands that the Congolese government implement the 2013 Nairobi peace deal. The deal stipulated that M23 would demilitarize and become a political party and that the Congolese government would facilitate the return of refugees, release prisoners, reintegrate former rebels, and launch a national reconciliation and justice initiative as well as social security and economic reforms.[50] M23’s efforts to set up an administrative system within the eastern DRC indicate that it intends to continue to govern these areas, possibly after a peace agreement in which AFC-M23 became a legitimate political party. This arrangement would also benefit Rwanda, which “de facto controls” M23 according to the UN and seeks an economic and security buffer zone in the eastern DRC.

Rwanda and M23 will likely be open to ceasefires as they seek to consolidate their recent gains, but they will retain their maximalist demands. Kagame said on January 28 that he “agreed” on the need for a ceasefire in the eastern DRC after a phone call with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio.[51] The New York Times reported that M23 is “demanding direct peace negotiations” with Kinshasa after seizing Goma.[52] Pro-government militia fighters in eastern DRC accused M23 of taking advantage of previous ceasefires to reset its forces without fear of counterattacks, however.[53] Armed Conflict Location and Event Data loosely supports this trend and shows a general uptick in M23-related clashes two to four months after previous ceasefires have taken effect.[54]

M23 has continued to push southward toward the South Kivu provincial capital Bukavu after capturing critical locations on the RN2 highway and Lake Kivu in the early stages of its offensive on Goma.[55] Kinshasa-based Actualite.cd reported that the rebels advanced in Kalehe district on January 29 and took control of Kiniezire and Mukwidja towns, which are roughly 62 miles (80 kilometers) north of Kavumu.[56] Kavumu is a major operational objective for M23 due to the Burundian-FARDC military base in the town and the nearby airport that lies 15 miles (24 kilometers) north of Bukavu.[57] Local reports warned of the presence of hostile drones over the Kavumu airport on January 29.^[58] The South Kivu governor outlawed civilian boat traffic on Lake Kivu and enacted heightened security measures in Bukavu on January 29 in anticipation of M23’s advance.^[59] Independent French journalist Christophe Riguad reported that M23 had repositioned troops from nearly a dozen towns that it controls in Rutshuru territory for the offensive on this axis after the group seized Goma.[60]

Figure 4. M23 Advances Southwards Toward Bukavu

 

Note: The UN reports that 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan troops are fighting alongside M23 in the eastern DRC and “de facto control” M23 operations.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

M23’s capture of Masisi in early January risks expanding the conflict westward into the interior of the DRC. Masisi is the gateway to Walikale town, which is the westernmost district capital in the North Kivu region and serves as the gateway to the interior of the DRC along the RN3 highway. M23’s advances expand its access to gold, tantalum, and tin ores.[61] M23 has also maintained pressure around Pinga since October 2024, a garrison town in Walikale district 30 miles north of Masisi that lies on an alternative route toward Walikale.[62]

Figure 5. M23 Advances Westwards Toward DRC Interior

 

Note: The UN reports that 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan troops are fighting alongside M23 in the eastern DRC and “de facto control” M23 operations.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

M23 advanced north toward Lubero, which is the last district capital before the military and commercial hub Butembo, in December. M23 made several operationally significant breakthroughs in the Lubero district in mid-December.[63] Congolese forces eventually halted the M23 advance in the Lubero district near Mambasa on December 24, less than 15 miles south of Lubero town, but have failed to regain any operationally significant areas so far.[64] Lubero is 20 miles (33 kilometers) south of Butembo, which is a major trade hub and hosts an airport and FARDC base. The Islamic State Central Africa Province, locally known as the Allied Democratic Forces (ISCAP-ADF), is a major obstacle to further M23 expansion north of Lubero town, but the UN reported in December that M23 has liaised with ISCAP-ADF and sought to secure a non-aggression pact that would grant M23 access to areas where the ISCAP-ADF operates.[65]

Figure 6. M23 Advances Northwards Toward Lubero

 

Note: The UN reports that 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan troops are fighting alongside M23 in the eastern DRC and “de facto control” M23 operations.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Leaders of the M23 and the broader AFC alliance have signaled that they seek regime change in Kinshasa, which is a threat that risks expanding the conflict far across the DRC. Multiple senior leaders, including AFC head Corneille Nangaa, have told international outlets that “2025 is not 2012” and that the group plans to continue fighting all the way to Kinshasa.[66] The UN published the transcript of an M23 commander urging troops to march to Kinshasha during a rally in May 2024.[67] M23-AFC has also forged alliances with some armed groups in Ituri Province in northeastern DRC and is attempting to recruit and build a wider coalition that creates a united front with the major armed groups that operate in the area.[68] M23 did not have the capacity to achieve these aims or build such alliances when it last seized Goma in 2012, and FARDC forces have shown to be ineffective in the face of better-motivated and better-equipped M23 and Rwandan forces.[69] M23 would require Rwandan support to achieve this objective, however, and it remains unclear if Rwanda seeks regime change. The UN reported that Rwandan support has given M23 a significant personnel and hardware advantage, which has contributed to the group’s rapid advances.[70]

The conflict could become a full-blown regional war given Burundi’s current support for the DRC and Uganda’s alleged support for M23. Burundi has deployed several thousand soldiers to fight alongside FARDC forces to both counter Rwanda and contain Burundian rebels that operate in eastern DRC.[71] The UN reported in 2023 that Burundian forces had suffered significant casualties and that Rwandan forces prioritize targeting Burundian forces during battles. Burundian military officials refuted M23’s claim that the group killed over 200 Burundian soldiers in clashes in mid-January 2025.[72]

Burundi and Rwanda view their competition in the DRC as potentially existential. Burundi has collaborated with the FDLR, a militia group in the DRC linked with the Rwandan genocide that the Rwandan government has labeled as a national security threat.[73] The Hutu-dominated Burundian government suspects that Rwanda funds Tutsi opposition groups in Burundi, and regional diplomats told the International Crisis Group that Rwanda may intend to topple the Burundian government.[74]

Uganda already supports M23 according to the UN and could become more involved in the conflict. Uganda’s role is complex given its ongoing joint operations with the FARDC against ISCAP-ADF in the eastern DRC and its historically turbulent relationship with Rwanda.[75] Uganda and Rwanda have oscillated between collaboration and competition in the DRC.[76] Both countries were initially on the same side in the First and Second Congo Wars but then began to diverge and support separate rebel groups as they sought to carve out their own sphere of influence.[77] Uganda has avoided taking a strong position in the current M23 conflict but thawed its relations with Rwanda since 2022 and grown its ties with M23.[78]

The war is continuing to cause a humanitarian crisis for hundreds of thousands of Congolese refugees in the eastern DRC. The UN reported before M23’s seizure of Goma that the group’s recent advances have displaced over 237,000 total since the start of 2025.[79] Some of these refugees had no choice but to flee to Goma, where more than 400,000 internally displaced persons were already living in camps on the city’s outskirts.[80] The fighting in Goma has severely limited humanitarian activities and basic services in the area, displaced an additional 300,000 people, and overwhelmed health facilities with injured civilians.[81] The closure of Goma airport and surrounding roadways has also prevented humanitarian cargo and personnel from reaching Goma.[82]

[1] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-december-19-2024-russia-reinforces-libya-amid-syria-withdrawal-drc-rwanda-talks-collapse-ethiopias-counter-fano-campaign-issp-strangles-roadways-in-niger-ankara-declaration#DRC; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-january-9-2025-islamic-state-suicide-attack-in-somalia-aussom-dysfunction-m23-captures-district-capital-in-eastern-drc#DRC

[2] https://actualite dot cd/index.php/2024/12/28/nord-kivu-les-fardc-ont-repris-linitiative-et-stoppe-la-progression-du-m23rdf-vers-le; https://actualite dot cd/index.php/2024/12/22/rdc-m23-larmee-congolaise-recupere-mambasa-et-progresse-alimbongo; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2024/12/24/actualite/securite/lubero-les-fardc-et-le-m23-saffrontent-pour-le-controle-de-mambasa; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2024/12/23/actualite/securite/les-fardc-et-le-m23-saffrontent-autour-de-mambasa-lubero

[3] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-january-9-2025-islamic-state-suicide-attack-in-somalia-aussom-dysfunction-m23-captures-district-capital-in-eastern-drc#_edn2316f0ca56a69de424b3377ef1bc53e6ref51; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-january-24-2025-russia-continues-pivot-to-libya-and-mali-saf-advances-in-khartoum-m23-marches-on-goma-is-somalia-down-but-not-out-aes-joint-force#_edn729d4a024ba0a4ca93caed05fa4e671eref51; https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2025-01-23/statement-attributable-the-spokesperson-for-the-secretary-general-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-scroll-down-for-french-version; https://www.voanews.com/a/fighting-reaches-outskirts-of-eastern-congo-s-largest-city-as-rebels-close-in-/7948493.html

[4] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250125-conflit-est-rdc-goma-inqui%C3%A9tude-de-la-communaut%C3%A9-internationale-la-monusco-sur-le-front; https://x.com/MONUSCO/status/1883119472711696607; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2025/01/29/guerre-en-rdc-le-president-felix-tshisekedi-ne-participera-pas-a-la-reunion-prevue-avec-son-homologue-rwandais_6521248_3213.html

[5] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf

[6] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf; https://usun.usmission.gov/explanation-of-vote-following-the-adoption-of-a-un-security-council-resolution-renewing-the-mandate-of-monusco-3

[7] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250126-rdc-r%C3%A9union-urgence-du-conseil-de-s%C3%A9curit%C3%A9-onu-combats-font-rage-autour-de-goma

[8] https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2025/01/27/en-rdc-goma-a-la-merci-du-m23-une-rencontre-tshisekedi-kagame-evoquee_6517915_3212.html; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250126-rdc-r%C3%A9union-urgence-du-conseil-de-s%C3%A9curit%C3%A9-onu-combats-font-rage-autour-de-goma

[9] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf

[10] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf

[11] https://x.com/ktpressrwanda/status/1884988117934850286

[12] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf

[13] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf

[14] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf

[15] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf

[16] https://apnews.com/article/congo-rebels-m23-displaced-conflict-bdd3579ee7852722a2dbc5aa37c75d62; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/01/07/actualite/securite/les-fardc-reprennent-le-controle-de-ngungu-au-nord-kivu; https://kivumorningpost dot cd/2025/01/10/masisi-violents-combats-entre-m23-et-fardc-wazalendo-a-ngungu

[17] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-rebel-gains-boost-illicit-mineral-trade-through-rwanda-analysts-say-2025-01-28; https://www.energy.gov/cmm/what-are-critical-materials-and-critical-minerals

[18] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf

[19] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-rebel-gains-boost-illicit-mineral-trade-through-rwanda-analysts-say-2025-01-28

[20] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-rebel-gains-boost-illicit-mineral-trade-through-rwanda-analysts-say-2025-01-28

[21] https://www.radiookapi.net/2025/01/20/actualite/revue-de-presse/econews-jamais-un-dialogue-avec-le-m23-tshisekedi-deboute; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1649741/politique/rdc-rwanda-felix-tshisekedi-exclut-tout-dialogue-avec-le-m23

[22] https://www.africanews.com/2023/12/11/drc-incumbent-president-tshisekedi-vows-to-rid-country-of-m23-rebels-at-goma-campaign-rall; https://trtafrika dot com/africa/drc-government-rejects-talks-with-m23-rebels-13468982; https://www.mediacongo dot net/article-actualite-143779_agression_les_fdlr_sont_des_minerais.html; https://ipisresearch.be/weekly-briefing/why-the-dr-congo-is-putting-apple-on-the-spot; https://www.ft.com/content/ecf89818-949b-4de7-9e8a-89f119c23a69; https://greatlakescrisis dot org/is-peace-possible-without-dialogue

[23] https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/what-state-un-and-regional-interventions-eastern-drc-interview-pascal-kambale

[24] https://www.theeastafrican dot co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/ruto-mismanaged-nairobi-peace-process-tshisekedi-says-4704180

[25] https://issafrica.org/iss-today/bold-african-union-role-needed-to-stabilise-east-drc

[26] https://www.voanews.com/a/dr-congo-rwanda-peace-talks-canceled-/7901906.html; https://apnews.com/article/rwanda-congo-m23-paul-kagame-rebels-fe10a96587d03a29161b8c5f6f1b7e1c

[27] https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/04/28/the-limits-of-president-tshisekedis-security-strategy-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo

[28] https://www.aljazeera dot com/features/2023/12/21/analysis-could-tshisekedi-declare-war-on-rwanda-if-re-elected; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-full-plate-challenges-after-turbulent-vote

[29] https://afrique.lalibre.be/79401/rdc-les-rebelles-congolais-progressent-lobjectif-nest-pas-goma-mais-kinshasa-explique-corneille-nangaa

[30] https://www.bbc.com/news/live/c5y6j6gwgnzt; https://www.mediacongo dot net/article-actualite-146785_guerre_a_l_est_a_mbandaka_jean_pierre_bemba_appelle_les_jeunes_de_plus_de_18_ans_a_rejoindre_les_fardc.html

[31] https://www.mediacongo dot net/article-actualite-146852_tshopo_des_manifestations_a_kisangani_pour_soutenir_les_fardc_a_eradiquer_l_ennemi_au_nord_kivu.html; https://www.mediacongo dot net/article-actualite-146854_agression_rwandaise_a_l_est_l_assemblee_provinciale_du_haut_uele_appelle_a_une_mobilisation_generale_pour_soutenir_les_fardc.html; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/01/29/actualite/securite/paralysie-des-activites-bunia-la-suite-des-appels-manifester-contre; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/01/29/actualite/securite/des-manifestants-contre-lagression-rwandaise-pillent-le-marche-central

[32] https://www.mediacongo dot net/article-actualite-146852_tshopo_des_manifestations_a_kisangani_pour_soutenir_les_fardc_a_eradiquer_l_ennemi_au_nord_kivu.html; https://www.mediacongo dot net/article-actualite-146854_agression_rwandaise_a_l_est_l_assemblee_provinciale_du_haut_uele_appelle_a_une_mobilisation_generale_pour_soutenir_les_fardc.html; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/01/29/actualite/securite/paralysie-des-activites-bunia-la-suite-des-appels-manifester-contre; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/01/29/actualite/securite/des-manifestants-contre-lagression-rwandaise-pillent-le-marche-central; https://x.com/pascal_mulegwa/status/1884721332731944963; https://www dot mediacongo.net/article-actualite-146868_kasai_oriental_le_gouverneur_favorable_a_la_marche_en_soutien_aux_fardc_mobilise_la_population.html; https://www.mediacongo dot net/article-actualite-146871_maniema_les_organisations_de_la_societe_civile_annoncent_une_marche_de_soutien_aux_fardc_ce_jeudi.html; https://www.mediacongo dot net/article-actualite-146889_kongo_central_le_gouvernement_provincial_annule_la_marche_de_soutien_aux_fardc_prevu_ce_jeudi_communique.html  

[33] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rebels-enter-centre-congos-goma-after-claiming-capture-city-2025-01-27; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/01/27/actualite/securite/manifestation-populaire-et-pacifique-bukavu-en-soutien-aux-fardc

[34] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250128-rdc-echanges-tirs-goma-m23-rwanda-deplaces-humanitaire; https://www.mediacongo dot net/article-actualite-146809_manifestations_contre_l_agression_rwandaise_ce_que_la_population_a_fait_aujourd_hui_est_un_sursaut_patriotique_blaise_kilimbalimba-click-video.html; https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2025/1/28/protesters-attack-french-us-rwandan-embassies-in-drc

[35] https://files.ebuteli.org/assets/9152943b-ca84-455d-8c00-a0f3e020cb1a; https://www.ft.com/content/8bae4ecd-9fd8-48c6-824c-41b929b640d7

[36] https://www.ft.com/content/8bae4ecd-9fd8-48c6-824c-41b929b640d7; https://files.ebuteli.org/assets/9152943b-ca84-455d-8c00-a0f3e020cb1a

[37] https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors

[38] https://acleddata.com/2024/09/27/the-rwanda-defence-force-rdf-operations-abroad-signal-a-shift-in-rwandas-regional-standing

[39] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/11/18/european-peace-facility-council-tops-up-support-to-the-deployment-of-the-rwanda-defence-force-to-fight-terrorism-in-cabo-delgado

[40] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_822

[41] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_6724

[42] https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/41438845/nba-responds-senators-letter-rwanda; https://www.bbc.com/sport/formula1/articles/cdd6e1jep42o; https://visitrwanda.com/partnerships

[43] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250126-rdc-r%C3%A9union-urgence-du-conseil-de-s%C3%A9curit%C3%A9-onu-combats-font-rage-autour-de-goma

[44] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250126-rdc-r%C3%A9union-urgence-du-conseil-de-s%C3%A9curit%C3%A9-onu-combats-font-rage-autour-de-goma; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250125-conflit-est-rdc-goma-inqui%C3%A9tude-de-la-communaut%C3%A9-internationale-la-monusco-sur-le-front

[45] https://www.brusselstimes.com/1413430/belgian-politicians-call-for-eu-sanctions-against-rwanda

[46] https://x.com/KivuMorningPost/status/1884261341646504321; https://actualite.cd/2025/01/28/lallemagne-suspend-ses-discussions-avec-le-rwanda-sur-laide-au-developpement

[47] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congos-m23-rebels-withdraw-seized-positions-goodwill-gesture-2022-12-23

[48] https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20231204-east-africa-force-starts-withdrawal-from-drcongo; https://files.ebuteli.org/assets/9152943b-ca84-455d-8c00-a0f3e020cb1a; https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/12/19/the-wazalendo-patriots-at-war-in-eastern-drc_6356363_4.html; https://adf-magazine.com/2024/01/wazalendo-add-to-eastern-drcs-complex-brew-of-combatants

[49] https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/1882418685207548151; https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/1882716663721914617

[50] https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2013/12/17/making-sense-drc-declarations-m23

[51] https://www.voanews.com/a/rwanda-s-kagame-says-he-agrees-with-us-on-need-for-ceasefire-in-congo/7955179.html

[52] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/podcasts/revue-de-presse-afrique/20250128-%C3%A0-la-une-la-poursuite-des-combats-%C3%A0-goma

[53] https://kivumorningpost dot cd/2024/10/24/guerre-du-m23-pour-le-wazalendo-le-processus-de-luanda-est-un-danger-pour-la-republique-democratique-du-congo

[54] Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, available at https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool

[55] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rwandas-kagame-says-he-agrees-with-us-need-ceasefire-congo-2025-01-29/

[56] https://actualite.cd/2025/01/29/rdc-le-m23-signale-dans-les-villages-de-kiniezire-et-de-mukwidja-kalehe

[57] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/23/world/africa/rwanda-rebels-congo.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rwandas-kagame-says-he-agrees-with-us-need-ceasefire-congo-2025-01-29/

[58] https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/1884673440780530095

[59] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250129-rdc-goma-m23-troupes-rwandaises-pillages-rencontre-kagame-tshisekedi

[60] https://x.com/afrikarabia/status/1884645896916173175

[61] https://www.dw.com/en/congos-m23-rebels-on-the-trail-of-mineral-resources/a-70715387; https://www.ipisresearch.be/mapping/webmapping/drcongo/v6; https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf; https://www.ipisresearch.be/mapping/webmapping/drcongo/v6

[62] https://www.barrons.com/news/dr-congo-accuses-rwanda-backed-rebels-of-abusing-truce-af28bfab; https://actualite dot cd/index.php/2024/12/19/rdc-walikale-apres-buleusa-les-rebelles-du-m23-controlent-la-localite-de-kanune

[63] https://www.theafricareport.com/371588/clashes-in-eastern-drc-day-after-aborted-peace-summit; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1641604/politique/est-de-la-rdc-retour-a-la-case-depart-entre-felix-tshisekedi-et-paul-kagame; https://kivumorningpost dot cd/2024/12/12/lubero-fardc-et-m23-saffrontent-a-luofu-et-matembe; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2024/12/17/actualite/securite/lavancee-du-m23-pousse-des-milliers-dhabitants-affluer-vers-lubero; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2024/12/17/actualite/securite/lubero-alimbongo-occupee-par-les-rebelles-du-m23; https://www.mediacongo dot net/article-actualite-145422_lubero_alimbongo_occupee_par_les_rebelles_du_m23.html; https://actualite dot cd/2024/12/17/rdc-m23-pourquoi-alimbongo-etait-strategique https://actualite dot cd/2024/12/16/rdc-le-m23-atteint-alimbongo-le-grand-verrou-des-fardc-depuis-le-debut-du-cessez-le-0

[64] https://actualite dot cd/index.php/2024/12/28/nord-kivu-les-fardc-ont-repris-linitiative-et-stoppe-la-progression-du-m23rdf-vers-le; https://actualite dot cd/index.php/2024/12/22/rdc-m23-larmee-congolaise-recupere-mambasa-et-progresse-alimbongo; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2024/12/24/actualite/securite/lubero-les-fardc-et-le-m23-saffrontent-pour-le-controle-de-mambasa; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2024/12/23/actualite/securite/les-fardc-et-le-m23-saffrontent-autour-de-mambasa-lubero

[65] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf

[66] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1652899/politique/est-de-la-rdc-apres-la-prise-de-goma-jusquou-compte-aller-le-m23/; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckgn1k9nleno

[67] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf

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[70] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf

[71] https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-burundi-afford-to-pull-its-troops-out-of-somalia; https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/118/80/pdf/n2411880.pdf

[72] https://www.burunditimes dot com/m23-rebels-burundi-ministry-refutes-casualty-claims

[73] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo/fall-drcs-goma-urgent-action-needed-avert-regional-war

[74] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo/fall-drcs-goma-urgent-action-needed-avert-regional-war

[75] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c134kgdpd6do

[76] https://africacenter.org/spotlight/escalating-tensions-between-uganda-and-rwanda-raise-fear-of-war

[77] https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo; https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/rwandan-ugandan-troops-battle-congo-city

[78] https://www.csis.org/analysis/rwandas-strained-relations-neighbours; https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2022/4/24/rwandas-kagame-in-uganda-on-rare-visit-as-ties-warm; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo-uganda-burundi-rwanda/easing-turmoil-eastern-dr-congo

[79] https://apnews.com/article/congo-rebels-m23-displaced-conflict-bdd3579ee7852722a2dbc5aa37c75d62; https://www.unhcr.org/us/news/press-releases/unhcr-sounds-alarm-worsening-humanitarian-situation-dr-congo

[80] https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/escalation-conflict-eastern-drc-situation-report-1-january-29-2025-0

[81] https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-flash-update-3-escalation-violence-significantly-affects-humanitarian-situation-north-kivu-and-south-kivu-28-january-2025; https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/escalation-conflict-eastern-drc-situation-report-1-january-29-2025-0; https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2025/1/29/rwanda-backed-m23-strengthens-its-control-over-drcs-goma; https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/01/1159506; https://actualite dot cd/2025/01/30/guerre-du-m23-goma-toujours-sans-eau-electricite-et-internet-la-population-lance-un-cri

[82] https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-flash-update-3-escalation-violence-significantly-affects-humanitarian-situation-north-kivu-and-south-kivu-28-january-2025