Africa File Special Edition: Tigray Threatens to Spark the Next Eritrean-Ethiopian War and Plunge the Horn of Africa into Crisis

Africa File Special Edition: Tigray Threatens to Spark the Next Eritrean-Ethiopian War and Plunge the Horn of Africa into Crisis

Authors: Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson

Contributor: John Reece and Nick Markiewicz

Data Cutoff: March 13, 2025, at 10 a.m.

Editor's Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War.

The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaway: A violent power struggle in northern Ethiopia’s Tigray region risks sparking another civil war in Ethiopia, which could, in turn, expand quickly to include Eritrea. Renewed conflict in Tigray or between Ethiopia and Eritrea would generate an economic, humanitarian, and security crisis that would have reverberations across Africa and even into Europe. External powers, such as Iran and Russia, have demonstrated interest in exploiting conflict in the region to consolidate their own influence around the Red Sea. Salafi-jihadi groups would benefit from such crises as well, given that it would produce a wall of instability across Africa, stretching from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa. A war would exacerbate the refugee crisis in the region and increase migration flows to Europe and the Gulf states.

Tigrayan forces aligned with the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) leader attacked the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) on March 11, which risks sparking another civil war in Ethiopia. Tigrayan forces aligned with TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael dismantled local offices of the federally backed TIA, opened fire on civilians, and detained TIA cabinet members in at least three areas in Tigray on March 11.[1] Eritrean and Ethiopian media released conflicting reports on whether the anti-TIA forces attacked the TIA in Mekelle, the capital of Tigray.[2] The TPLF posted on March 13 that they had “entered offices” and “started services” in Mekelle and the Eastern zone of Tigray.[3] The TIA had suspended high-ranking officers and ordered Tigrayan forces to all military movement in the days before the attacks after warning that some Tigrayan forces were preparing “an outright coup.” [4] The TIA on March 12 called on the international community and the Ethiopian federal government to “exert all necessary pressure” on the anti-TIA forces.[5] Several European governments have since warned against travel to Ethiopia and encouraged their citizens to either leave or stock up on supplies in case the situation deteriorates.[6]

Figure 1. Attacks against Tigray Interim Administration

 

Source: Liam Karr.

The TPLF is an ethno-nationalist paramilitary group and political party based in the northern Tigray region in Ethiopia and fought the Ethiopian government in a civil war from 2020 until the Pretoria peace treaty in 2022.[7] Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed appointed the TIA as a temporary government in May 2023 as part of the Pretoria agreement and selected Getachew Reda—the former deputy head of the TPLF—as its leader.[8] The appointment of Reda split the TPLF into two factions. TIA critics have accused the TIA of acting in the interests of the federal government, while the TIA has accused the TPLF of trying to regain control over Tigray.[9] Many aspects of the Pretoria agreement, including the complete disarmament of the Tigray Defense Forces, have not been implemented. These failures have driven tensions between the TIA, TPLF, and Ethiopian federal government.[10]

The battle for legitimacy between the TPLF and TIA began in October 2023 and culminated in the violent power grabs in March 2025. The TIA dismissed several members of the TPLF in October 2023 for trying to attend a TPLF meeting without the approval of the TIA.[11] Tensions worsened when Ethiopia’s election board denied the TPLF’s request to be fully reinstated as a political party in August 2024.[12]  The TPLF and TIA exchanged accusations of corruption, and the TIA accused the TPLF of “plotting a coup” in September 2024.[13] Over 200 officers aligned with the TPLF called for the dissolution of the TIA in January 2025.[14]

Figure 2. Tigray Conflict: 2022–2025 Timeline

 

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

A reignited civil war in Tigray may escalate rapidly into a proxy or a regional war between longtime rivals Ethiopia and Eritrea, as Eritrea seeks to weaken and fragment Ethiopia and Ethiopia seeks Red Sea access. Recent developments indicate that a wider war between Eritrea and Ethiopia is imminent. The TIA leader accused “external forces” of supporting the armed seizures of government offices in Tigray.[15] The attacks against the TIA occurred days after Lieutenant General Tsadkan Gebretensae, the TIA Vice President and former ENDF chief of staff, warned on March 10 that Eritrea and Ethiopia are in the “final stages” of preparations for war and that a conflict between the two sides—likely in Tigray—“seems” inevitable.[16] Eritrea also implemented a nationwide military mobilization in February, and Ethiopia deployed troops toward the Eritrean border in March.[17] The former US deputy special envoy for the Horn of Africa and the EU special representative for the Horn of Africa warned again on March 12 that “the speed and scale of mobilization and deployment on all sides” indicates an imminent conflict.[18]

Eritrea and Ethiopia have been fierce rivals since the mid-1990s—shortly after Eritrea officially gained independence with Ethiopian consent in 1993. Economic tensions and border disputes led to the Eritrean-Ethiopian war in May 1998, and the two continued to militarize their shared border and support opposition groups to destabilize the other in the decades following a peace agreement in 2000.[19]

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s rise to power in 2018 seemed to reset Eritrean-Ethiopian relations and led to Eritrean-Ethiopian cooperation during the Tigray war, but this alliance of convenience has not lasted. Abiy sought to curb the influence of the TPLF, which had dominated Ethiopia since it overthrew the previous government alongside Eritrean forces in 1991, upon taking power.[20] This blossoming relationship and Eritrea’s historic distrust of the TPLF led Eritrea to quickly back the Ethiopian government when the TPLF rebelled against Abiy in November 2020.[21] The 2022 Pretoria agreement excluded Eritrea as a signatory and left Eritrean security objectives unaddressed by leaving the TPLF intact, however.[22]  Some reports even said that Eritrea believed that the Pretoria agreement heightened the threat from Ethiopia because the deal increased alignment between the TPLF and the Ethiopian federal government.[23] 

Eritrea and Ethiopia have returned to their old rivalry since the end of the Tigray war in nearly all aspects.[24] Abiy has made inflammatory statements since 2023 that Ethiopian Red Sea access, which it lost when Eritrea became independent in 1993, was an existential issue and “natural right” that Ethiopia would fight to acquire if not through diplomacy.[25] Eritrea increased cooperation with Egypt, which is one of Ethiopia’s main geopolitical rivals due in large part to Egypt’s staunch opposition to Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project on the Nile River, as part of a de facto anti-Ethiopian axis throughout 2024.[26] Ethiopia began hosting prominent Eritrean opposition groups in Addis Ababa in 2025, while Eritrea has preexisting ties with Amhara rebels and met with TPLF leadership in March 2024.[27]

Eritrea will likely use its ties with the anti-TIA TPLF faction to weaken and fragment the TPLF and Ethiopia. Ethiopian officials have accused Eritrea and the TPLF of establishing an alliance against Ethiopia, but Eritrean and TPLF officials have denied the accusations.[28] Anonymous Western diplomatic sources told French media that there has been a noticeable rapprochement between TPLF factions and Eritrea that involves “at least some communication” and may include a series of meetings in early 2025.[29] Africa Intelligence reported that these meetings included a summit in Asmara in January that involved Eritrean President Isais Afwerki.[30]

Figure 3. Eritrea-Ethiopia Tensions Timeline

 

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

A renewed war in Tigray or a regional war between Eritrea and Ethiopia would be an economic, humanitarian, and security crisis in the Horn of Africa that would have ripple effects across the continent and Europe. The Netherlands-based Clingendael Institute published an alert on March 6 warning that a conflict would likely lead to “immense” death and destruction given Eritrea’s and Ethiopia’s large militaries.[31] The Eritrean-Ethiopian war killed at least 70,000 people with the highest estimates going up to 300,000.[32] The most recent war in Tigray killed between 300,000 and 800,000 civilians alone.[33] The war could spread across Ethiopia and lead to ethnically motivated violence given the myriad ethnic-based armed groups in Ethiopia. The most prominent group is a loose collection of Amhara militias known as Fano. Fano militias have rebelled against the Ethiopian government since 2023 after fighting alongside the government in the Tigray war and are embroiled in a long-standing territorial dispute with Tigray.[34]

External powers, including Iran and Russia, have shown an interest in capitalizing on regional conflicts to advance their objectives around the Red Sea. Iran and Russia have sought separately to partner with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in Sudan to secure their own Red Sea naval bases.[35] CTP has previously assessed that these bases would support Iran’s and its Axis of Resistance’s attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea and Russia’s power projection into the Mediterranean Sea.[36] Russian and Sudanese officials said in February 2025 that they had finalized a deal for a Russian naval base in Sudan, but Sudan’s foreign minister has repeatedly insisted that Sudanese parliament, which has been vacant since 2019 following failed elections in 2022 and the beginning of the civil war in 2023, must ratify the deal before it enters effect.[37] The deal is actually a realization of a 2017 deal signed with the former Sudanese regime for a Russian ”service center” that can host four ships and up to 300 personnel.[38]

Russia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are all competing for the rights to mining deposits and Red Sea port access in Sudan. The UAE has supported the opposing Rapid Support Forces to secure its investments in Sudan’s gold mining and port infrastructure.[39] Turkey sent at least $120 million of weapons, including TB2 Bayraktar drones, to the SAF in 2024 in exchange for considerations to copper, gold, and silver mines.[40] The UAE owned the development rights to the Abu Amama port near SAF-controlled Port Sudan before civil war began, but The Washington Post reported in March 2025 that SAF has since offered to Turkey and will grant to Russia if Turkey declines.[41]

Figure 4. Competition in the Greater Red Sea Area

 

Source: Liam Karr.

International parties, such as China, Turkey, and the Gulf states, could seek to stabilize the situation due to their significant ties and investments in Eritrea and Ethiopia. China has invested billions of US dollars in Ethiopia, is Ethiopia’s top trading partner, and has a defense agreement with Ethiopia for joint training and technology transfers.[42] Turkey is the second-largest foreign investor in Ethiopia behind China, provided drones to Ethiopia during the Tigray war, and demonstrated its strong ties with the Abiy regime when it brokered a port access agreement between Ethiopia on Somalia in 2024.[43] The UAE has been a staunch supporter of Abiy since 2018, established an air bridge to support Ethiopia in the Tigray war, and has sponsored Ethiopian efforts to gain Red Sea access to secure more Emirati client ports on the Red Sea.[44] The UAE also established a military base in Eritrea at the peak of Emirati involvement in the Yemeni civil war, but has since withdrawn from Eritrea.[45] The UAE and Saudi Arabia both helped mediate the 2018 peace deal between Eritrea and Ethiopia, although the two Gulf allies have a more rivalrous relationship in 2025.[46] Russia has a strong relationship with Eritrea and even discussed securing a port on Eritrea’s Red Sea coast as recently as 2023 but engages with Ethiopia regularly in forums such as the Russia-Africa summit and BRICs.[47]

A war between Eritrea and Ethiopia—and the potential regionalization of the conflict—would further destabilize the Red Sea region, which could impose a global economic toll. Houthi attacks in the Red Sea since the start of the Israel-Hamas conflict in 2023 have raised shipping costs due to heightened insurance rates and logistic challenges posed by alternative routes around Africa.[48] These costs have yet to return to their pre-October 2023 levels, even though the Houthis have conducted no attacks since November 2024.[49] The Houthis announced in March that they would resume attacks on international shipping.[50] A regional conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea increases the risk of added disruptions in the Red Sea. European and US analysis of the shipping crisis note that Red Sea disruptions caused short-term inflation and constrained economic growth but said that the long-term impact was manageable.[51] A wider conflict in the Red Sea would alter this calculus.

Figure 5. Average Global Price to Ship a 40-Foot Container: September 2023–March 2025

 

Source: Katherine Wells; Institute for the Study of War.

A war in Ethiopia would create opportunities for malignant nonstate terrorist actors by expanding the wall of instability stretching across Africa from the jihadist-afflicted Sahelian countries in West Africa to the numerous conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Sudan has been in a civil war since 2023, and rapidly escalating tensions in South Sudan have caused concerns that it could descend back into open civil war for the first time since 2018.[52] Somalia continues to be heavily fragmented between the internationally backed federal government and al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate al Shabaab in the latest chapter of its decades-long civil war.[53] The Islamic State (IS) has capitalized on Somalia’s instability to establish northern Somalia as its main leadership hub and a key financial node in its global network.[54] The Iranian-backed Yemeni Houthis have reached out to al Shabaab to support its efforts to destabilize the Red Sea.[55] Al Qaeda and IS have also encouraged their followers to capitalize on the Sudanese civil war to establish havens in Sudan and would likely do the same in Ethiopia, especially given IS’s recruitment efforts among ethnic groups in Ethiopia.[56]

Figure 6. Conflict Across Africa

 

Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data; Critical Threats Project.

War in Ethiopia would exacerbate the refugee crisis in the Horn of Africa and increase migration flows that would impact Europe and the Gulf States. Clingendael’s March 2025 report noted that Ethiopia has twice the population of Sudan, where the Sudanese civil war already has increased refugee flows to North Africa and southern Europe.[57] Ethiopia also already hosts over one million refugees from the various conflicts in neighboring states.[58] The EU has highlighted migration as a critical issue since the Syrian refugee crisis of the 2010s destabilized the continent by overwhelming the EU asylum system.[59] Saudi Arabia is a leading destination for refugees from the Horn of Africa.[60]

 

[1] https://addisstandard.com/tigray-interim-admin-urges-federal-govt-for-necessary-assistance-warns-of-looming-danger/; https://x.com/reda_getachew/status/1899501893509955655; https://borkena.com/2025/03/11/tigray-ethiopia-debretsion-faction-launches-attacks-multiple-casualties-in-mekelle/; https://x.com/breaking_bre/status/1899472486728654919; https://x.com/Wolde_Yabele/status/1899499344690110645; https://x.com/WegahtaFacts/status/1899572738450493725; https://x.com/sajid_nadeem78/status/1899531712717353298; https://www.bbc.com/tigrinya/articles/ckg8z77278wo

[2] https://borkena.com/2025/03/12/ethiopia-pro-debretsion-military-commanders-reportedly-in-control-of-airport-in-mekelle/; https://x.com/WegahtaFacts/status/1899765914939072998

[3] https://www.facebook.com/tplf.officia/posts/1253193412836604; https://www.facebook.com/tplf.officia/posts/1253226699499942

[4] https://addisstandard.com/tigray-interim-admin-urges-federal-govt-for-necessary-assistance-warns-of-looming-danger/

[5] https://addisstandard.com/tigray-interim-admin-urges-federal-govt-for-necessary-assistance-warns-of-looming-danger/; https://web.facebook.com/TigrayCAO/posts/pfbid0ye29TTAjsuSp2Axrwh658uxR7uSFrazvz2aDCayMKtPeYGSG1be7wWsn954KBmRql; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopias-tigray-region-urges-federal-intervention-after-town-seized-2025-03-12/ 

[6] https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2025/03/12/tigray-escalation-worries-western-embassies,110386426-gra

[7] https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ethiopia

[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-says-tigray-interim-administration-set-up-part-peace-plan-2023-03-23/

[9] https://theafricainsight.substack.com/p/the-sub-saharan-security-review-a72

[10] https://x.com/reda_getachew/status/1612928216192192514; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/11/ethiopias-tigray-rebels-start-handing-over-heavy-weapons;  https://epo.acleddata.com/2024/03/19/epo-monthly-update-february-2024-clashes-in-tigrays-disputed-territories-threaten-peace-deal/; https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-tigray-eritrean-troops-abducting-farmers-livestock-bd11f55a42b4705a2da5c01afbd7cc74

[11] https://epo.acleddata.com/2023/11/01/epo-weekly-21-27-october-2023/; https://www.facebook.com/addismaleda/posts/pfbid02VRLJsbRbEm9bM16Z8L9EH39kS34ddJXaZBTJgbvw2ZqzY9pdnH3aTgKDiVen4LAml 

[12] https://epo.acleddata.com/2024/08/15/ethiopia-weekly-update-13-august-2024/

[13] https://addisstandard.com/news-getachew-redas-faction-accuses-debretsion-led-group-of-coup-plot-against-tigray-interim-admin/; https://umdmedia.com/2024/12/tplf-central-committee-faction-accuses-getachew-reda-of-national-treason-amid-deepening-divisions-after-meeting-with-abiy-ahmed/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-october-17-2024-egypt-eritrea-somalia-summit-challenges-tigray-peace

[14] https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/43483/; https://addisstandard.com/senior-leaders-of-tigray-forces-call-for-dissolution-of-interim-admin-alleging-weaknesses-and-external-influence/

[15] http://borkena dot com/2025/03/11/tigray-ethiopia-debretsion-faction-launches-attacks-multiple-casualties-in-mekelle; https://x.com/reda_getachew/status/1899501893509955655

[16] https://www.theafricareport.com/378644/tigray-cannot-be-the-battleground-for-ethiopia-and-eritrea

[17] https://borkena dot com/2025/02/21/eritrea-mobilizes-military-reserves-imposes-travel-restrictions-amid-rising-tensions-with-ethiopia; https://hrc-eritrea.org/eritrea-orders-nationwide-military-mobilization-raising-fears-of-renewed-conflict; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-eritrea-path-war-tigray-officials-warn-2025-03-13

[18] https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/03/12/ethiopia-eritrea-tigray-abiy-isaias-tdf-tplf-war-red-sea

[19] https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/The%20Eritrea%E2%80%93Ethiopia%20Armed%20Conflict.pdf; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/ethiopia-and-eritrea-stopping-slide-war; https://www.clingendael.org/publication/dangerous-frenemy-averting-showdown-between-eritrea-and-ethiopia;

[20] https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2022/the-remaking-of-the-ethiopian-state; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44376298; https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2019/summary

[21] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/09/navigating-regionalization-ethiopias-tigray-conflict/03-key-regional-players-and-their; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/eritrea-ethiopia/eritreas-long-bitter-feud-ethiopias-tigray

[22] https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/07/ethiopia-eritrea-war-tplf; https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/12/taking-ethiopia-eritrea-tensions-seriously

[23] https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/07/ethiopia-eritrea-war-tplf; https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/12/taking-ethiopia-eritrea-tensions-seriously

[24] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b194-ethiopias-ominous-new-war-amhara; https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/07/ethiopia-eritrea-war-tplf

[25] https://www.theafricareport.com/327485/ethiopia-abiy-stirs-up-region-in-his-quest-for-a-port; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67332811; https://www.aljazeera dot com/program/inside-story/2023/7/26/how-will-landlocked-ethiopia-get-direct-access-to-a-port

[26] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdje7pkv1zxo; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/10/somalia-eritera-and-egypt-pledge-to-bloster-security-ties; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-october-17-2024-egypt-eritrea-somalia-summit-challenges-with-tigray-peace-process#Somalia; https://www.aljazeera dot com/economy/2020/6/30/egypt-warns-of-existential-threat-from-ethiopia-dam; https://www.sis.gov dot eg/Story/189557/Ethiopia%E2%80%99s-unilateral-GERD-operation-an-%E2%80%98existential-threat%E2%80%99-to-all-Egyptians-Irrigation-ministers

[27] https://borkena dot com/2025/01/29/eritrean-opposition-organizing-in-ethiopia-aims-to-topple-eritrean-govt; https://www.voanews.com/a/tigray-leader-reports-talks-with-archrival-eritrea/7779628.html; ﷟HYPERLINK "https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2025/02/07/eritrean-diaspora-s-brigade-nhamedu-set-to-open-addis-ababa-branch,110372794-bre"https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2025/02/07/eritrean-diaspora-s-brigade-nhamedu-set-to-open-addis-ababa-branch,110372794-bre; ; https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2024/11/12/who-fano-inside-ethiopia-amhara-rebellionhttps://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b194-ethiopias-ominous-new-war-amhara; https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2024/11/12/who-fano-inside-ethiopia-amhara-rebellion

[28] https://www.theafricareport.com/377503/ex-ethiopian-president-mulatu-teshome-accuses-eritrea-of-plotting-war-as-tensions-flare; https://www.aljazeeradot com/opinions/2025/2/17/to-avoid-another-conflict-in-the-horn-of-africa-now-is-the-time-to-act; https://x.com/hawelti/status/1891837074325508563; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=95a1DP2hN5o&lc=Ugw2iDNjBnBN3ExSzWR4AaABAg

[29] https://www.theafricareport.com/377503/ex-ethiopian-president-mulatu-teshome-accuses-eritrea-of-plotting-war-as-tensions-flare; https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2025/02/24/tigray-leaders-dangerously-torn-between-addis-ababa-and-asmara,110378687-eve; https://x.com/hawelti/status/1891837074325508563; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=95a1DP2hN5o&lc=Ugw2iDNjBnBN3ExSzWR4AaABAg

[30] https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2025/02/24/tigray-leaders-dangerously-torn-between-addis-ababa-and-asmara,110378687-eve

[31] https://www.clingendael.org/publication/dangerous-frenemy-averting-showdown-between-eritrea-and-ethiopia

[32] https://www.clingendael.org/publication/dangerous-frenemy-averting-showdown-between-eritrea-and-ethiopia; http://journal-of-conflictology.uoc.edu/joc/ca/index.php/journal-of-conflictology/article/download/vol5iss2-bezabih/1919-8683-1-PB.pdf; https://journals.openedition.org/cea/pdf/384

[33] https://epo.acleddata.com/2023/02/08/

[34] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-september-26-2024-fano-offensive-in-ethiopias-amhara-egypt-arms-somalia-rebel-drones-in-mali-burkina-thwarts-another-coup#Ethiopia; https://epo.acleddata.com/amhara-conflict-fano-insurgency; https://epo.acleddata.com/2024/02/21/epo-weekly-update-20-february-2024; https://epo.acleddata.com/2024/04/24/epo-weekly-update-23-april-2024

[35] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-for-the-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-africa#Sudan

[36] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-for-the-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-africa#Sudan; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-february-20-2025-m23-advance-continues-unchallenged-saf-grows-partnerships-with-iran-and-russia-rsf-creates-parallel-government-in-sudan#SudanInt 

[37] https://www.memri.org/tv/sudan-fm-ali-youssef-buy-weapons-iran-ukraine-russia-naval-base; https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-sudan-agree-red-sea-naval-base-sudanese-foreign-minister-says-2025-02-12; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c30del8dz51o

[38] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2020/11/13/russia-plans-naval-base-in-sudan; https://www.memri.org/tv/sudan-fm-ali-youssef-buy-weapons-iran-ukraine-russia-naval-base

[39] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-for-the-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-africa#Sudan

[40] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/03/07/sudan-war-turkey-baykar-rsf-saf

[41] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/03/07/sudan-war-turkey-baykar-rsf-saf

[42] https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/01/despite-high-stakes-ethiopia-china-sits-sidelines-peace-efforts

[43] https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/africa/turkey-eyeing-more-investments-in-ethiopia-envoy/2144828; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/ethiopia-tigray-dedebit-drone-strike; https://www.mfa.gov dot tr/etiyopya-federal-demokratik-cumhuriyeti-ve-somali-federal-cumhuriyeti-nin-ankara-bildirisi.en.mfa

[44] https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1KT1RS; https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.theeastafrican dot co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/ethiopia-stake-in-port-of-berbera-3845366; https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-january-11; https://www.newarab.com/analysis/how-israel-egypt-and-uae-view-ethiopias-red-sea-deal

[45] https://thearabweekly dot com/uae-dismantles-eritrea-base-it-continues-pull-back-yemen-war

[46] https://www.clingendael.org/publication/dangerous-frenemy-averting-showdown-between-eritrea-and-ethiopia

[47] https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/eritreas-growing-ties-china-russia-highlight-americas-inadequate-approach-east-joshua-meservey; https://www.theeastafrican.co dot ke/tea/news/rest-of-africa/afwerki-to-putin-remake-world-order-to-end-us-dominance-4255960; https://jamestown.org/program/russia-in-the-red-sea-port-options-in-eritrea-part-two; https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-russia-ethiopia-rethink; https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/13/russia-is-building-military-influence-in-africa-challenging-us-france.html; https://www.voanews.com/a/russian-fm-lavrov-heads-to-ethiopia-seeking-closer-ties/6674221.html; https://apnews.com/article/russia-africa-putin-ukraine-grain-food-be35ba24397aaac84d36764a5ce7db95; https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-russia-ethiopia-rethink; https://tass dot com/politics/1741207

[48] https://www.csis.org/analysis/global-economic-consequences-attacks-red-sea-shipping-lanes

[49] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/756ca769315d4b879ca7fdd6bd4a82bel; https://www.drewry.co.uk/supply-chain-advisors/supply-chain-expertise/world-container-index-assessed-by-drewry

[50] http://x.com/army21ye/status/1899563866599678368; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1899883401034842138

[51] https://www.csis.org/analysis/global-economic-consequences-attacks-red-sea-shipping-lanes; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/the-long-shadow-of-the-red-sea-shipping-disruption; https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12657; https://www.freightos.com/freight-blog/red-sea-crisis-impact/#-mitigating-the-impact-of-the-

[52] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/south-sudan-precipice-renewed-full-blown-war; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59035053

[53] https://mecouncil.org/publication/engaging-al-shabaab-in-somalia-military-failures-and-the-merits-of-dialogue/

[54] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-june-13-2024-houthi-shabaab-weapons-deal-sfg-boost-in-central-somalia#Aden; https://editorials.voa.gov/a/al-shabaab-still-a-threat-in-somalia/8005499.html

[55] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-islamic-states-global-long-game-and-resurgence-in-syria-poses-an-evolved-threat-to-the-west;

[56] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-islamic-state-somalia-propaganda-coalitions-regional-language-push; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/islamic-state-somalia-a-growing-global-terror-concern

[57] https://www.clingendael.org/publication/dangerous-frenemy-averting-showdown-between-eritrea-and-ethiopia; https://mixedmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/QMMU-2024-Q4-North-Africa.pdf;

[58] https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-refugees-and-asylum-seekers-31-january-2025

[59] https://www.politico.eu/article/climate-refugee-crisis-europe-policy; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53925209; https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2018/04/europes-great-challenge-integrating-syrian-refugees.html; https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-the-far-right-has-reshaped-the-refugee-debate-in-europe

[60] https://eastandhornofafrica.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl701/files/documents/2024-09/ec-july-2024_0.pdf; https://www.clingendael.org/publication/dangerous-frenemy-averting-showdown-between-eritrea-and-ethiopia