China–Taiwan Weekly Updates

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, February 27, 2025

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Alison O’Neil, and Karina Wugang of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek and Yeji Chung of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Nicholas Carl of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: March 5, 2025

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

Taiwan. Recall campaigns against 32 legislators in the KMT opposition advanced to the next stage. Successful recalls could shift the balance of power in the Taiwanese legislature to favor the ruling DPP.
Taiwan. The PRC launched a sudden military exercise south of Taiwan likely as a coercive show of force. This follows similarly provocative PRC exercises near Vietnam, Australia, and New Zealand.
South Korea. Anti-PRC sentiments have surged in South Korea, following President Yoon Suk-yeol mentioning PRC espionage repeatedly in his impeachment trial. A leading presidential candidate reversed his pro-PRC position in response to this public frustration.
The Philippines. The Philippines arrested PRC nationals for espionage targeting military and government sites, including the presidential palace. This alleged espionage is part of the PRC’s and United Front’s clandestine activities in the Philippines.
Russia. PRC President Xi Jinping met Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu in Beijing. The PRC in the meeting reaffirmed its strategic cooperation with Russia while trying to project an image of neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The Taiwanese Central Election Commission (CEC) advanced 32 recall campaigns targeting Kuomintang (KMT) legislators. Successful recall campaigns against the KMT opposition could shift the balance of power in the Legislative Yuan (LY) in favor of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The CEC announced that 13 recall cases against KMT legislators have moved to the second stage and three recall cases against DPP legislators failed to gather enough signatures.[1] This announcement comes after 19 recall proposals for KMT legislators reached the second stage and nine recall proposals against DPP legislators failed to gather enough signatures at the end of February.[2] KMT legislators face a total of 32 recall motions in the second stage, while DPP legislators have no recall motions in the second stage of recall to date. DPP legislative caucus Chair Ker Chien-ming called for a mass recall campaign against opposition legislators on January 4. The KMT responded by launching its own recall campaigns against the DPP. [3] These results illustrate the low popularity of the KMT-initiated recall campaign in the wake of massive KMT-led government budget cuts. The second stage requires 10 percent of eligible voters in the relevant legislator’s district to sign the recall petition within 60 days — 10 times the number of signatures needed at the first stage — so it is unclear how many of the 32 recall motions will advance further in the coming months. Gathering signatures from 10 percent of eligible voters would trigger a special election in the relevant legislator’s district, providing the DPP an opportunity to win seats that the KMT currently holds.

The DPP would need to flip six seats and maintain its current seats for a simple majority of 57 seats. Winning 12 seats would yield the DPP a firm majority over all opposition parties in the LY. The LY is comprised of 113 members and currently has no majority party; the DPP holds 51 seats, the KMT holds 54 seats (including two KMT-aligned independents), and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) holds eight seats.[4] The KMT and TPP have recently aligned to gain majority control, obstructing DPP President William Lai Ching-te’s agenda through measures, such as passing a motion to slash the government budget by record levels in January 2025. The motion sought to cut some department budgets by over 90 percent. The large cuts to defense spending and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs budget in particular undermine the Taiwanese ability to resist PRC coercion and threats.

The PRC launched a sudden live-fire exercise 40 miles south of Taiwan on February 26, likely as a coercive display of force. This exercise follows similarly provocative exercises near Vietnam, Australia, and New Zealand. The PRC broadcasted radio warnings that it would conduct live-fire military exercises in an approximately 1,850 square-mile area near Kaohsiung and Pingtung off Taiwan’s southern coast, overlapping with busy international shipping lanes.[5] The PRC gave no advanced warning of the drills through usual channels, such as notices to airmen or mariners, which endangers nearby air and sea traffic. Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported at least 32 PRC military aircraft around Taiwan on February 26, 22 of which crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).[6] The aircraft included fighter jets, surveillance planes, and drones. [7] Seven People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships operated within the designated drill zone, which was far outside of Taiwan’s territorial waters.[8] Two unnamed senior Taiwanese officials told Reuters that Taiwan detected no live fire in the drill zone, contrary to what the PRC had announced. [9] Both the MND and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) condemned the military exercise as a “blatant provocation to regional security and stability.” [10] Their PRC counterparts issued dismissive statements downplaying the significance of unannounced live-fire drills. PRC Ministry of Defense (MOD) spokesperson Wu Qian called the exercise “routine” and described the Taiwanese reaction as “hype.” [11]

The PRC conducted an unprecedented series of unannounced live-fire drills in the Indo-Pacific in a single week. The PRC first launched live-fire drills in the Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand on February 21.[12] Australia and New Zealand were provided only a couple of hours of notice instead of the standard Notice to Airmen (NOTAM). Australia’s military notably observed no ships firing even though the PRC declared a live-fire exercise. [13] New Zealand's defense ministry reported a second live-fire drill warning on February 22, again without a NOTAM.[14] The PRC began four days of live-fire drills in the Gulf of Tonkin on February 24 with only a few hours of notice in response to Vietnam announcing a new coastal baseline on February 21.[15] The PRC gave minimal warning instead of the customary 12-to-24-hour notice in all these cases, likely to maximize disruptiveness and intimidation while technically remaining compliant with international law.[16]

The PRC has conducted other major, unannounced exercises around Taiwan in the past year as well — Joint Sword A in May 2024, Joint Sword B in October 2024, and an unnamed exercise in December 2024. The United States notably unfroze 870 million US dollars of military aid to Taiwan on February 26 — the same day as the PLA exercises. PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian denounced the resumption of US aid to Taiwan as a violation of the “one-China principle and the three Sino-US joint communiqués.”[17]

PLA aircraft flew into Taiwan's de-facto ADIZ 348 times in February 2025. The PRC has normalized a higher frequency of ADIZ incursions to degrade Taiwan’s threat awareness and response threshold. The PRC dramatically increased the frequency of ADIZ incursions after the inauguration of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te in May 2024. The PRC views Lai as a “separatist” due to his administration’s focus on preserving Taiwanese sovereignty in the face of intensifying PRC efforts to advance its goal of annex Taiwan. PLA incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ have exceeded 200 every month since Lai took office, whereas this volume was unusual before then.

This new normal of ADIZ incursions represents one of the many elements of intensifying PRC coercion against Taiwan and Lai’s administration. The normalization of more frequent ADIZ incursions by PLA aircraft raises the threshold of coercive activity that would trigger a Taiwanese response, making it more difficult for Taiwan to detect and respond to a real threat in time. Taiwan must put personnel on standby to respond to ADIZ incursions, which strains resources and exhausts the personnel.

The PRC calibrates its military activities around Taiwan to intimidate and deter it from practicing policies that the PRC perceives as supportive of Taiwanese sovereignty. PLA aircraft incursions into Taiwan’s de-facto ADIZ are a near daily occurrence that typically serve as a barometer for the PRC’s reactions to political developments regarding Taiwan. Spikes in ADIZ incursions often correspond to political incidents in Taiwan that the PRC opposes, including high-level meetings between Taiwanese and foreign officials or expressions of Taiwanese sovereignty by ROC leaders.

China

The PRC imposed retaliatory economic measures and released a white paper in response to US tariffs on PRC goods. The PRC imposed 15-percent tariffs on US agricultural goods and placed 10 US companies on its unreliable entity list on March 4 in response to the United States’ imposition of 20-percent tariffs on all PRC imports.[18] The unreliable entity list identifies foreign entities that harmed PRC businesses and restricts these entities’ ability to invest in the PRC. The PRC likewise placed fifteen US firms, including defense contractor General Dynamics Land Systems, on an export control list.[19] The PRC frequently sanctions United States-based aerospace and defense firms by freezing their assets based in the PRC. The PRC is signaling its disapproval of US policy through these retaliatory measures rather than trying to harm the United States economically.

The PRC imposition of tariffs on US agricultural goods represents the latest escalation in a series of economic disputes between the United States and PRC. The PRC already imposed 15-percent duties on liquefied natural gas products and coal following US President Donald Trump’s return to office and subsequent imposition of 10-percent duties on imports from the PRC.[20] The PRC also imposed export controls on five critical minerals — tungsten, bismuth, indium, molybdenum, and tellurium — in February, in a retaliatory move meant to restrict US access to products with defense applications.[21]

The PRC released a white paper in response to US accusations regarding the PRC role in the fentanyl trade — an issue the Trump administration has raised in conjunction with tariffs. The United States imposed tariffs on the PRC, Canada, and Mexico in part to stem the flow of fentanyl into the United States. Fentanyl precursors, which pharmaceutical companies can use to make legal drugs, pass from the PRC to Mexico, where cartels process the ingredients into fentanyl.[22] The US Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) accused the PRC of subsidizing the export of fentanyl precursors, financially supporting firms that trafficked “fentanyl materials and other synthetic narcotics,” and benefitting “strategically and economically” from the fentanyl crisis.[23] The PRC has repeatedly deflected accusations of involvement in the fentanyl trade. The PRC MFA commented that the United States “spread all kinds of lies on the fentanyl issue, smeared China, shifted the blame, and insisted on imposing tariffs” on March 4.[24] The PRC continues to employ strong rhetoric amid the tariff escalations. PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian said on March 4 that, if the United States “insists on a tariff war, trade war or any other war, China will fight to the end.”[25]

The PRC hosted its Two Sessions meetings, during which it highlighted its ongoing disapproval of the Lai administration and its plans to continue supporting pro-reunification elements in Taiwan. The National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress (CPPCC), collectively known as the Two Sessions, began to convene in Beijing in early March 2025. The NPC is the PRC’s legislative body, and the CPPCC convenes scholars and business leaders.[26] Two Sessions discussions bring together nearly 3000 NPC delegates and 2100 CPPCC delegates to approve decisions made by top-level leadership and disseminate information on decision-making to the media.[27] The NPC is expected to last approximately one week, during which legislators will endorse decisions made by the CCP and discuss political priorities for the upcoming year.[28] High-level officials’ Two Sessions speeches often highlight PRC perceptions, intentions, and budgeting priorities. The PRC announced an 8.4-percent increase in funding toward diplomatic initiatives — a growth from last year’s 6.6-percent increase. Military budget growth rates remained the same at 7.2 percent.[29]

PRC Premier Li Qiang delivered a government work report emphasizing “reunification” with Taiwan during the Two Sessions on March 5.[30] The report mentioned working with “fellow Chinese in Taiwan” for reunification, marking a change in language from the 2024 report.[31] The Global Taiwan Institute noted that the 2024 report on Taiwan dropped previous language on “peaceful reunification” in favor of rhetoric on “reunification.”[32] ISW noted following the 2024 NPC that PRC Premier Li Qiang’s report to the NPC also omitted the term “peaceful reunification” in 2016 and 2020 — the years that ROC President Tsai Ing-wen won the presidential elections. Li’s rhetoric could indicate PRC disapproval of the Lai administration, which the PRC frequently accuses of separatism.[33]

Li’s delivered the work report after the Taiwan Work Conference, which occurred shortly before the NPC and CPPCC meetings from February 25-26. CPPCC Chairman Wang Huning delivered a speech emphasizing that the CCP must “unswervingly advance the great cause of national reunification.”[34] Wang is chairman of the CPPCC, which is a primary United Front work organization, as well as and deputy leader of the Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs, making him one of the top CCP officials responsible for overseeing PRC policy toward Taiwan. Wang called for cross-strait cooperation as part of ongoing PRC efforts to restart cross-strait tourism.[35] Wang also called on the PRC to “firmly support the patriotic unification forces” in Taiwan — a change from the previous year’s rhetoric.[36] This statement, along with Li’s rhetoric in the government work report, highlights the PRC’s efforts to support pro-reunification entities in Taiwan to undermine Taiwanese independence.

The United States sanctioned six entities based in the PRC and Hong Kong for procuring unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components for Iran. US sanctions have targeted multiple instances of PRC support for Iranian drone and ballistic missile programs. The sanctioned firms include Dingtai Industrial Technology Co Limited, Yonghongan Trade Limited, Hong Kong Tianle International Co Limited, DDC Develop Industry Hong Kong Limited, Shenzhen Zhiyu International Trade Co Ltd, and JP Oriental International Holdings Limited. The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) accused these entities of acting as front companies for the OFAC-sanctioned Iranian firm Pishtazan Kavosh Gostar Boshra (PKGB) and its subsidiary Narin Sepehr Mobin Isatis (NSMI), which support the Iranian ballistic missile and UAV programs.[37]

The United States has sanctioned PRC-based entities for their support of Iranian UAV procurement efforts previously. OFAC sanctioned a PRC-based network of five companies and one individual for supporting an Iranian firm in exporting drones to Russia in March 2023.[38] OFAC similarly sanctioned seven entities and five individuals based in the PRC, Hong Kong, and Iran for their support to subordinates of the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics in July 2024.[39] ISW has noted that Hong Kong has emerged as a hub for PRC companies to circumvent sanctions on Iran, Russia, and North Korea, as its lenient regulatory environment facilitates relatively easy concealment of corporate ownership and the rapid creation and dissolution of shell companies.[40]

Northeast Asia

South Korea

President Yoon Suk-yeol's repeated mentions of PRC espionage during his final impeachment trial on February 25 have fueled anti-PRC sentiment across the political spectrum in South Korea. Presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung has reversed his pro-PRC stance, aligning with many public sentiments. This comes as the PRC was working to cultivate friendlier ties with South Korea in order to suppress anti-PRC attitudes and influence South Korea’s upcoming presidential election. Yoon argued that declaring martial law on December 3 was necessary to raise public awareness about espionage activities by anti-state actors, such as North Korea and the PRC, and inability to prosecute them under the current law during his final impeachment trial.[41] Yoon said, “Last year, PRC nationals were repeatedly caught flying drones to photograph our military bases” and “industrial spies leaking national key technologies have surged. . . with two-thirds of it flowing to the PRC,” referencing past instances of PRC interference and industrial espionage.[42] Yoon argued that the opposition-led National Assembly has blocked the passage of legislation aimed at punishing foreigners arrested on espionage charges. South Korea’s current espionage law prevents the prosecution of foreign suspects except those from North Korea. The law specifies that anyone who engages in espionage, aids enemy spies, or leaks military secrets to an enemy could face death or life imprisonment (Article 98 of the Criminal Act).[43] The Constitutional Court precedents have limited the definition of an “enemy country” to North Korea.[44] The opposition Democratic Party (DP) had postponed the revision of the Criminal Act in the National Assembly’s Legislation and Judiciary Committee, where the DP holds the majority, in December 2024.[45] The DP denied opposing the bill, claiming that Yoon’s martial law declaration disabled them from processing the bill.[46][47]

Yoon argued that declaring martial law falls within the scope of presidential power and that the opposition's obstruction of necessary legislation for the national security equates to a national emergency. The constitution allows for the declaration of a state of emergency “in times of war, invasion, or a national emergency equivalent to these, when the country is in a state of combat with the enemy or when social order is severely disrupted, making the execution of administrative and judicial functions significantly difficult” (Article 77, Section 1 of the Constitution).[48] The Constitutional Court is expected to decide by mid-March whether to impeach or reinstate Yoon. The constitution mandates that a presidential election be held within 60 days of an impeachment, meaning an early election could be held by mid-to-late May.

Yoon’s consistent references to PRC espionage are contributing to rising anti-PRC sentiment, with protesters holding anti-PRC demonstrations, including in front of the PRC embassy. Protesters have held signs that read “No China” and “CCP OUT.”[49] One of Yoon’s supporters attempted to break into the PRC embassy on February 14, allegedly stating that his goal was to “give people a chance to experience anti-PRC sentiment firsthand.”[50] A petition calling for a revision of the “National Security Act to punish foreign spies, such as those from the PRC” has garnered 42,733 signatures--85 percent of its target to be referred to the National Assembly’s standing committee.[51]

DP leader Lee Jae-myung — a leading candidate for the potential presidential election — has distanced itself from pro-PRC positions likely in response to the growing anti-PRC sentiments. Lee stated his support for strengthening ties with Japan and continuing trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan in an interview with the Economist on January 30.[52] Public backing for the revision bill and Lee’s shift in foreign policy, coupled with mass protests by Yoon supporters, indicate that Yoon’s campaign on anti-PRC rhetoric has successfully generated strong public momentum across the political spectrum.

The PRC is signaling its intent to restore relations with South Korea despite the growing anti-PRC rhetoric in the country. South Korea’s National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik met with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping on February 10, and a PRC official hinted at the possibility of lifting the “K-Culture ban” that the PRC imposed in 2017.[53] Xi will likely visit South Korea for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, reflecting the PRC’s continued desire to improve bilateral relations.[54] The PRC is seeking ways to decrease anti-PRC sentiment by offering cultural and economic opportunities and influence voter sentiment ahead of the expected early election in May.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The Philippine government has arrested multiple PRC nationals on espionage charges targeting military camps and the presidential palace as part of its expanded campaign against PRC espionage and United Front activity throughout the country. The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) announced on February 25 that it had arrested two suspected PRC spies accused of targeting the Presidential palace, Camp Aguilando, Camp Crane, Villamor Air Base, and the US Embassy in Manila with the assistance of three Philippine citizens.[55] The NBI stated that the two PRC nationals employed the Filipinos to drive around targeted areas in vans equipped with surveillance, data theft, and network disruption technology, collecting “thousands” of pieces of data before being apprehended.[56]

Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. identified PRC espionage and influence in Philippine politics as a major issue following the arrest of five PRC nationals conducting “illegal intelligence gathering” on Philippine Navy and Coast Guard facilities, ports, and ships near the South China Sea on January 24.[57] The five individuals targeted areas and equipment that have been utilized in Philippine military operations in the South China Sea and joint exercises with the United States and Australia. The NBI announced on February 28 that four of the arrested individuals led the Philippine China Association of Promotion of Peace and Friendship and Qiaoxing Volunteer Group--civic groups that are overseen by the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (ACFROC), which is a CCP-led organization engaged in United Front work.[58] United Front Work Department officials have previously spoken at meetings for the Philippine-based groups, with the latest event occurring in May 2024. The two Philippine-based groups advertised their affiliation with the CCP, and leaders stated that the groups would focus on promoting Chinese culture and expanding Chinese-Philippine friendships.[59] The groups also made donations of cash and patrol vehicles to local police and city government officials, likely an effort to ingratiate themselves with local officials and increase their standing in local Philippine communities.[60]

Statements from President Marcos and other Philippine officials indicate that efforts to neutralize PRC espionage networks and reduce CCP influence in Philippine domestic politics will remain a focus of the administration due to high levels of concern over what is likely PRC-sponsored behavior.[61] The nature of the PRC’s espionage and United Front activity indicates that the PRC views the Philippines as an important target for influence operations, particularly given tensions in the South China Sea.

Europe

Russia

Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu met with PRC President Xi Jinping and PRC Premier Wang Yi in Beijing. The PRC reaffirmed its strategic cooperation with Russia while trying to project an international image of neutrality in the Ukraine war. PRC Premier Wang Yi also attended the meeting. Russian media reported that the discussions focused on “strategic security,” including counterterrorism.[62] Shoigu himself noted the short notice of the bilateral meeting and said that it “highlights the special nature of bilateral dialogue.”[63] The PRC MFA readout echoed these sentiments, emphasized “comprehensive strategic cooperation,” and called for the two sides to “continue to strengthen coordination in international and regional affairs.”[64] This statement echoes Lin’s February 27 statement that it is “completely futile for the United States to sow discord between China and Russia” after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed concerns about Russian dependence on the PRC.[65]

PRC rhetoric reflects simultaneous efforts to signal strong and consistent support for Russia while shirking the international opprobrium directed at Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. ISW has assessed that the PRC leverages its alleged neutrality on the war in Ukraine to benefit reputationally on the international stage.[66] The meeting between Xi, Wang, and Shoigu occurred shortly before US President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Washington, DC. PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian commented on this meeting by saying that “China will continue to be committed to playing a constructive role in the political settlement of the Ukrainian crisis” but that “China is neither the creator nor a party to the Ukrainian crisis” on March 3.[67] The PRC has consistently supported the Russian war effort via the export of dual-use goods throughout the war. NATO allies called the PRC the “decisive enabler” of the war in a July 2024 communique.[68]

PRC rhetoric beyond official readouts echoes these statements and indicates the PRC’s intent to position itself as an international leader amid the Ukraine crisis. Fudan University professor Shen Yi reportedly wrote in PRC news outlet Guancha that “clinging to the U.S. comes with risks” and that “if one sees the risks of relying on the US but finds Moscow unappealing, then there is another path.”[69] The PRC’s public affirmations of support for Russia aim to retain a key diplomatic and security partner, all while attempting to abnegate responsibility for the Russian war effort and cast the PRC as an ideal leader among “Global South” states.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, February 20, 2025

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Alison O’Neil, and Karina Wugang of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek and Yeji Chung of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Nicholas Carl of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: February 27, 2025

Key Takeaways

The Taiwanese Central Election Commission approved recall votes for 19 KMT legislators, which could diminish the influence of the opposition parties in the legislature.
The Taiwanese executive vetoed legislation that contains drastic budget cuts that risk compromising the ability of Taiwan to resist PRC coercion.
A PRC-owned commercial vessel likely sabotaged a Taiwanese undersea cable, highlighting the growing PRC willingness to attack Taiwanese infrastructure, especially telecommunications.
The PRC is exploiting recent US behavior to frame itself as an international leader that upholds multilateralism and international cooperation.
The PRC reportedly plans to lift a ban on South Korean media products, possibly as part of an effort to strengthen ties ahead of the expected South Korean presidential election.
The PLA conducted unannounced, live-fire exercises near Australia and New Zealand, likely to intimidate the two countries.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The Taiwanese Central Election Commission (CEC) approved recall votes for 19 Kuomintang (KMT) legislators, which could diminish the influence of the opposition parties in the Legislative Yuan (LY). The CEC announced on February 26 that recalls against the 19 legislators will proceed to the second stage, which entails the collection of signatures in the legislator’s respective constituencies over 60 days.[1] A recall vote occurs if at least 10 percent of eligible voters sign. The third stage requires a majority vote with a voter turnout of at least 25 percent of that constituency’s eligible voters.[2] Supporters of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) are more likely to vote in legislator recall campaigns than supporters of the opposition KMT or Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), according to a poll conducted by Taiwanese media outlet Mirror Media.[3] The 19 approved recall cases are all targeting KMT legislators, while the nine cases against DPP legislators failed to reach the threshold to move to the next stage.[4] The CEC announced February 27 that it had received a total of 54 recall motions against legislators.[5] The 19 approved cases consisted of those proposals that were submitted on the earliest possible date of February 3. The CEC will review recall vote proposals for other legislators submitted after February 3 in the coming days.[6]

DPP legislative caucus Chair Ker Chien-ming called for a mass recall campaign against opposition legislators on January 4 amid increasing partisan disunity and the KMT's and TPP’s passage of controversial legislation.[7] That legislation included extensive cuts to the central government budget, which threatened to compromise Taiwan’s resilience against PRC influence and coercion. The KMT responded to recall efforts against it by launching its own recall campaigns against the DPP.[8]

The LY currently has no majority party with the DPP holding 51 seats, the KMT holding 54 (including two KMT-aligned independents), and the TPP holding eight. The KMT and TPP hold a majority in practice, however, given their recent alignment on key issues. A DPP net gain of six seats would earn them a simple majority, while a net gain of at least 12 seats would give the DPP more seats than the opposition, improving their ability to pass legislation in line with the stated goals of President William Lai Ching-te.

DPP legislators are trying to counter KMT- and TPP-led efforts to enforce amendments to the Recall Act that would raise identification requirements for recall petition signatures. The amendments required that citizens provide photocopies of their national ID cards--instead of their ID numbers and addresses--in order to initiate and sign a recall petition.[9] The DPP requested an injunction and constitutional interpretation from the Constitutional Court on February 20 in order to prevent the recall amendments, which President Lai promulgated as required by the constitution on February 18, from taking effect.[10] Ker stated that such an injunction is necessary to “maintain constitutional order,” as Taiwan’s constitution gives citizens the right to recall.[11]

Taiwan’s Executive Yuan (EY) vetoed the LY’s budget bill, which contains drastic budget cuts that risk compromising Taiwan’s ability to resist People’s Republic of China (PRC) coercion. Republic of China (ROC) Premier Cho Jung-tai said on February 27 that the EY will veto the fiscal year 2025 budget and fiscal law amendment bill due to the their violating the separation of powers of the different branches of government, undermining Taiwan’s constitution, infringing on the people’s rights, affecting the operation of Taiwan’s democratic government, and weakening the country financially.[12] Cho said that President Lai Ching-te would approve the veto before submitting the controversial budget bill back to the LY.

The budget cuts would be the largest in Taiwan’s history and include reductions of up to 40 percent of some ministries’ total operating budgets. The DPP-controlled government ordered the LY to review the budget after KMT and TPP legislators passed it on January 21.[13] The LY completed its review of the budget on February 19, leaving it unchanged.[14] The total amounts of budget cuts and freezes are unclear because legislators made overlapping cuts during different phases of review.[15] The government’s request for the LY to review the budget was likely primarily aimed at delaying the budget cuts, while recall efforts against KMT legislators progress. President Lai Ching-te convened a meeting on February 10 between the heads of the branches of government, including KMT LY Speaker Han Kuo-yu, in an unsuccessful attempt to reconcile party differences and dissuade the KMT from proceeding with harmful legislation.[16]

The veto also applies to a fiscal planning law that was passed on December 20, 2024, and would redirect 40 percent of Taiwan’s total taxation and other revenue to local governments--up from 25 percent currently.[17] Cho said that the central government is willing to hold another round of discussions on the fiscal planning law with local governments to develop a more suitable means of revenue allocation.[18]

The KMT-TPP budget cuts specifically target ROC agencies and efforts central to Taiwan’s resilience against ongoing PRC efforts to coerce and isolate Taiwan. Cuts to public affairs budgets undermine the ability of Taiwan to counter PRC information operations. Delays in submarine procurement and cuts to drone development program compromise ROC efforts to deter and defend against potential PRC invasion or blockade scenarios. Cuts to diplomatic programs risk further isolating Taiwan amid ongoing PRC efforts to coerce the international community into accepting the PRC as the legitimate government of Taiwan.[19] The KMT’s and TPP’s explanations for the budget cuts focus on domestic Taiwanese political considerations; KMT officials have framed the budget cuts as an attempt to reduce wasteful government spending, for instance. But they have yet to clarify why the cuts target programs and activities that are central to protecting Taiwan against PRC coercion, malign influence, and deterring and defending against a possible PRC attack.

The LY has 15 days to vote on the bill again. The bill’s re-passage requires a majority or at least 57 legislators.[20] The KMT and TPP caucuses collectively hold 62 seats, indicating that they will likely vote in support of the bill and thus uphold it.

A PRC-owned cargo ship likely sabotaged a Taiwanese undersea cable on February 25, highlighting the increasing PRC willingness to strike critical infrastructure in Taiwan. on Taiwanese territory. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) announced that it detained the Hong Tai 58 on February 25 after Chunghwa Telecom--Taiwan’s largest telecom provider--notified the CGA that an undersea cable was severed between the main island of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands.[21] The incident occurred approximately seven miles off Taiwan’s west coast, past Taiwan’s coastal baseline and well within its internal waters.

The Hong Tai 58 is a Togo-registered cargo ship owned by Hong Kong-based Dongguan Jinlong Shipping Co.[22] The eight crew members on board were PRC nationals.[23] The vessel has several inconsistencies in its identification and registration information, including three different names tied to its unique identifiers. The Taiwanese government created on January 26 a blacklist of 52 PRC-owned ships that warrant greater scrutiny to monitor the growing “shadow fleet” of ostensible merchant vessels that act on behalf of the PRC.[24] The Hong Tai 58 is on the shadow fleet blacklist.[25]

The Taiwanese National Defense Ministry launched on January 15 new protocols that supported surveillance and law enforcement efforts against vessels that authorities suspect of sabotaging undersea cables in Taiwanese waters.[26] The ROC government enacted the new measures after another undersea cable-cutting incident on January 3, involving the PRC-owned, Cameroon-flagged cargo vessel Shunxing 39.[27] That incident also occurred in Taiwan’s internal waters, approximately seven miles off its northern coast.

The incident on February 25 marks the sixth instance of damage to undersea cables connected to Taiwan in 2025. ROC Ocean Affairs Council Minister Kuan Bi-ling noted on February 26 the possibility that frequent submarine cable breakages are PRC sabotage.[28] Kuan said that there have been 40 cases of submarine cable breakage in the past five years. Some of these cases were due to natural causes, such as harsh sea conditions or old age, while others were due to interference by “external forces.”[29] Taiwan’s Digital Affairs Ministry announced in an emergency press release on February 17 that the CGA is investigating the cause of recurring damage to two undersea cables connecting to the offshore island of Matsu, which occurred immediately after their recent repair.[30] The government originally attributed this damage to natural deterioration.

The PRC’s likely involvement in the destruction of submarine cables reflect its increasing focus on disrupting Taiwan’s telecommunications. Taiwan’s National Security Bureau reported on January 5 that PRC hacking activities targeting Taiwan’s telecommunications increased by 650% from 2023 to 2024.[31] The surge in hacking activities targeting telecommunications was by far the most dramatic increase of any critical infrastructure sector. Malign activities targeting Taiwan’s telecommunications infrastructure are aimed at disrupting, denying, and degrading the efficiency of communication and the flow of information. PRC military doctrine emphasizes achieving “information dominance,” which the PRC defines as gaining superiority over an adversary in terms of information acquisition, transmission, processing, utilization, and confrontation capabilities.[32] Achieving information dominance entails the destruction of the enemy’s information networks and communications systems to cripple its decision-making. The PRC’s use of sabotage and cyber operations against Taiwan’s telecommunications would be a critical component of a PRC campaign to informationally isolate Taiwan and sow chaos in a future short-of-war coercion campaign, blockade, or full-scale invasion.[33]

The Taiwanese Education Ministry ended exchanges with three PRC educational institutions in an apparent effort to reduce United Front (UF) influence within Taiwan, particularly UF activities targeting youth. Taiwanese officials identified Huqiao University, Jinan University, and Beijing Chinese Language and Culture College as falling under the jurisdiction of the United Front Work Department (UFWD) and thus acting on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).[34] Taiwanese Education Minister Cheng Ying-yao said on February 20 that Taiwanese universities are prohibited from conducting exchanges with these universities and that degrees from the universities will no longer be recognized.[35]

The PRC seeks to coopt Taiwan’s youth to spread CCP ideology and pro-PRC beliefs in Taiwan. Surveys have shown that younger populations within Taiwan are less likely to self-identify as Chinese, instead preferring to self-identify with the Taiwanese nationality; a change highlighted by the 2014 student-led Sunflower Movement protesting the passage of a cross-strait agreement and increased PRC influence over Taiwanese society.[36] The PRC seeks to reduce anti-CCP ideology among Taiwanese youth through UF-led information operations and direct exchanges that portray the PRC positively.

The UF is a whole-of-government and society effort to advance the CCP’s ideology and interests by co-opting non-government segments of Chinese society. United Front activities against Taiwan support PRC efforts to politically assimilate Taiwan, particularly by inculcating in the Taiwanese public CCP notions that the PRC is the only legitimate government of China and Taiwan is a part of that China. UF work can also support covert and clandestine activities, such as infiltration, manipulation, co-optation, and intelligence gathering on target groups.[37] The UFWD is a department of the Central Committee of the CCP responsible for conducting UF work outside the PRC, particularly in communities of the overseas Chinese diaspora.[38]

Educational exchanges between Taiwanese and PRC universities provide an opportunity for the PRC to influence Taiwanese students and encourage cross-strait connection through shared culture and history as well as creating opportunities for cross-strait dialogue. Creating a sense of unity or acknowledgement of the PRC’s “one family” on both sides of the strait supports the stated PRC goal of “peace reunification.” The Taiwanese government seeks to halt the spread of UF activities in Taiwan in order to reduce CCP influence over the Taiwanese populace.

China

The PRC is exploiting recent US behavior to promote itself as an international leader that upholds multilateralism and international cooperation. The PRC is diplomatically emphasizing its commitment to upholding multilateralism and free trade as it condemns US trade measures as “unilateral” in international forums. PRC Ambassador to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Li Chenggang condemned US tariffs at a WTO meeting on February 18, arguing that the tariffs violated WTO rules.[39] PRC officials have sent messages to their US counterparts to discuss the tariffs. PRC Commerce Minister Wang Wentao condemned the tariffs in a letter to US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick. PRC Vice Premier He Lifeng held a phone call with US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent on February 21 to discuss economic and trade relations between the two countries.[40] Foreign Minister Wang Yi called the PRC a “staunch defender of the current international order” at the G20 Foreign Ministers Meeting with WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala.[41] The PRC is likely trying to present itself as a responsible steward of international norms in contrast with Donald Trump’s “America First” policies.[42] Wang chaired a meeting of the United Nations Security Council themed “Practicing Multilateralism, Reforming and Improving Global Governance” on February 18 and outlined the PRC's four-point proposition to promote representation for disenfranchised “Global South” amid the “turbulent and changing international landscape.[43]

The PRC is trying to benefit reputationally from recent US behavior vis-a-vis the Russia-Ukraine war. The PRC is leveraging its claimed neutrality on the war to maintain a strategic partnership with Russia while promoting an inclusive resolution to the war. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated at the Munich Security Conference on February 14 that the PRC hopes “that all parties and stakeholders directly involved participate in the peace talks in due course.”[44] Wang’s statements follow US-Russia negotiations that excluded Ukraine and other European countries. PRC President Xi Jinping spoke on the phone with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the third anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[45] The Russian and PRC readouts reaffirmed friendly relations between the two countries. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi also met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the G20 summit in Johannesburg on February 20.[46] The PRC has consistently advocated for a peaceful settlement of the war on terms that would favor Russia while avoiding openly supporting Russia. The PRC abstained from voting on a UN General Assembly resolution that recognized Russia as the aggressor, called for just peace in Ukraine, and supported Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.[47] The United States voted against the resolution along with Belarus, Russia, and North Korea.

Four China Coast Guard (CCG) ships entered the restricted waters around Taiwan’s Kinmen Islands on February 20 and 25 as part of the PRC effort to normalize coast guard incursions.[48] There have been 60 such incursions since February 14, 2024, and a total of four in February 2025. Kinmen is a group of Taiwan-controlled islands with a large military garrison roughly three kilometers from the coast of the PRC. Taiwan designates “prohibited” and “restricted” waters around Kinmen, which it treats as equivalent to territorial waters and a contiguous zone. The bar graph below shows monthly incidents from September 2024 to February 25, 2025. There are discrepancies in the available information between February 2024 and August 2024 that ISW was unable to corroborate at the time of this writing, so it is omitted from the graph. The CCG has normalized three to four patrols into Kinmen’s restricted waters per month in the last six months of data.

The CCG intrusions into the waters south of Kinmen resemble a rehearsal for an operation to cut Kinmen off from resupply or intervention by sea, which would require PRC ships to position themselves to the south of the island. The CCG performing simultaneous entries into the restricted waters around Kinmen provides the CCG with experience in choreographing the initial actions that would be required for a blockade to isolate Kinmen. Conducting the incursions also enables the PRC to gauge the Taiwanese coast guard’s response patterns and the resources that it can deploy to challenge the stronger CCG. The CCG is trying to desensitize Taiwan and its partners to such intrusions, which could help cultivate surprise in an actual blockade scenario.

Northeast Asia

Japan

Japan and the Philippines agreed to establish a new framework for expanding defense technology cooperation and hold further discussions on an intelligence-sharing agreement to monitor PRC military activity in the Indo-Pacific and especially the South China Sea. Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani announced on February 22 that he plans to visit the Philippines to discuss further defense and intelligence cooperation, including efforts to detect and surveil PLA activity.[49] Japan offered to export a control system that manages data used to detect aircraft and missiles provided by multiple radar sources to the Philippines.[50] Additional details on the date of export have not yet been revealed. Japan and the Philippines are currently holding discussions regarding signing an intelligence sharing agreement and developing frameworks for joint development of ships and surveillance technology.

Japan and the Philippines signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement in July 2024 allowing for the deployment of Japanese forces on Philippine territory for combat training purposes.[51] Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa and Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro stated that the agreement was the first step toward greater defense cooperation between the two states, both of whom are involved in intensifying territorial disputes with the PRC. Japan signed similar agreements with Australia and the United Kingdom in 2022 and 2023, respectively.[52]

The PRC has criticized defense cooperation between states that it perceives as likely to oppose its interests in the Indo-Pacific, asserting that such actions increase instability and push the region toward a “new Cold War.”[53] Similar rhetoric was published in the state-owned outlet Global Times following the February 22 announcement, with the PRC placing the blame for escalation and tensions on Japanese and Philippine efforts to enhance their military capabilities and “pander to the United States’ ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy.’”[54]

North Korea

At least a dozen PRC fishing vessels in the Indian Ocean have reportedly employed North Korean labor since 2019, likely in violation of international sanctions and enabling the heavily sanctioned North Korean regime to earn foreign currency.[55] London-based NGO Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) reported that at least 12 PRC-flagged tuna fishing vessels operating in the Southwest Indian Ocean used North Korean workers. EJF interviewed Indonesian and Filipino crew members who worked alongside North Koreans on these vessels between 2019 and 2024. The crew indicated that the PRC captains falsely reported the number of passengers to immigration authorities when docking and transferred North Korean workers to sister vessels at sea to conceal their identities. Mauritian authorities arrested six North Koreans working on a PRC boat for illegally entering Mauritius on December 5, 2022, demonstrating the past North Korean presence on PRC fishing vessels in the Indian Ocean.[56] PRC fishing vessels’ employment of North Koreans would constitute a violation of UN Security Council sanctions, which prohibit member states from employing North Korean workers. The United Nations estimates that around 100,000 North Korean workers were employed abroad in 2023, generating roughly 500 million US dollars annually for the North Korean regime.[57] North Korea is suspected of supporting its nuclear and ballistic missile programs through foreign currency earnings generated by dispatching North Korean nationals to work abroad.[58]

South Korea

The PRC reportedly plans to lift the “K-Culture ban,” which prohibits the import of South Korean content into the PRC, as early as May 2025, signaling PRC efforts to strengthen ties with South Korea ahead of a possible PRC-friendly presidency.[59] The ban was imposed in retaliation for South Korea’s deployment of the US-provided Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in 2017. The ban has restricted the import of South Korean dramas, movies, games, and K-pop performances into the PRC. A senior official from the China-Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Center, which organizes PRC participation in the APEC summit, met with a South Korean reporter on February 19 and stated, “Starting next month, we plan to send a civilian cultural delegation to South Korea and expand cultural exchanges, aiming for a full reopening in the first half of this year.”[60] The potential lift comes after CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping met with South Korean National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik on February 7 and discussed opportunities for cultural exchange.[61] The foreign ministers of South Korea, the PRC, and Japan are set to meet in Tokyo in March 2025 and further discuss cultural exchanges.

The reports of the PRC lifting the ban comes as South Korea is expected to hold an early presidential election in mid-May. The impeachment trial of South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol concluded on February 25.[62] The Constitutional Court is expected to issue its final ruling by mid-March, as previous presidential impeachment trials took roughly two weeks to reach a decision. If the Constitutional Court rules in favor of impeachment and removes Yoon from office, the next presidential election must be held within 60 days of the ruling, likely in mid-May. Leading presidential candidates have already begun preparing for the possible early election, with opposition Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung appealing to moderate voters, and Daegu Mayor Hong Joon-pyo, a member of the ruling People Power Party, signaling his candidacy in a social media post.[63] Recent polls indicate that Lee is the leading presidential candidate with 34 percent support.[64] Lee has consistently argued that South Korea should avoid getting caught up in a "new Cold War" between the United States and China, suggesting that his presidency could mark a shift away from the pro-US positions adopted by President Yoon.[65] The PRC’s economic and diplomatic behavior suggests that it is positioning itself to build favorable ties with South Korea ahead of the next administration. Such a move would give the PRC significant leverage in countering US-led efforts to economically restrict the PRC through its Asian neighbors, particularly amid the escalating tariff war with the United States.

A former Samsung Electronics senior manager was sentenced to prison for leaking semiconductor technology to the PRC. The extent of these leaks could inflict substantial losses on Samsung Electronics specifically and South Korean semiconductor technology more broadly. The Seoul Central District Court’s 25^th Criminal Division sentenced the former senior manager, identified by the surname Kim, to seven years in prison and a 200 million Korean Won fine for violating the Act on Protection of Industrial Technology.[66] Kim and other suspects were prosecuted for leaking Samsung’s 18nm DRAM process technology to PRC firm ChangXin Memory Technologies (CXMT) in January 2024. Kim allegedly accessed trade secrets from Samsung and its partners and attempted to establish his own semiconductor equipment company in the PRC to facilitate additional leaks.[67] Kim and his associates, in addition to leaking technological information, poached 20 engineers from Samsung and its affiliates and offered them generous salaries to work for PRC-affiliated firms.

CXMT is a leading company in the PRC semiconductor industry that has experienced rapid advancement in its DRAM output, nearing the output levels of DRAM market leaders Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron. CXMT reports that its output increased from 70,000 wafers per month in 2022 to 200,000 wafers per month by late 2024, making up nearly 15 percent of global DRAM supply.[68] South Korean prosecutors allege that this CXMT expansion was aided by the information leaked by Kim and other Samsung employees. While CXMT has not yet reached the market share of South Korean firms, the rate of the PRC’s progress has prompted concern within the South Korean semiconductor industry. The Korea Institute of Science and Technology Evaluation and Planning--a South Korean think tank--released a report in February 2025 stating that the PRC has now surpassed or is on par with South Korean production in five areas of semiconductor technology.[69] PRC domination of crucial semiconductor technologies could have significant impacts on the South Korean economy, as semiconductors currently amount to approximately 20 percent of South Korea’s total exports.[70] South Korean semiconductor firms and other high-tech industry manufacturers have reported previous leaks of their critical technology to the PRC, further enabling PRC technological advancement.[71] PRC domination of semiconductor markets is of significant concern to South Korea, the United States, and Taiwan due to potential impacts on global supply chains and national security.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The PLA expelled three Philippine aircraft from the airspace near the Spratly Islands, the latest confrontation amid a period of high tensions between the PRC and the Philippines. PLA Southern Theater Command spokesperson Colonel Tian Junli stated that three Philippine aircraft “illegally entered” the airspace near the Spratly Islands on February 20.[72] The Spratly Islands are a disputed archipelago in the South China claimed by Malaysia, the PRC, the ROC, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Brunei. The PRC has engaged in extensive artificial island-building and dredging in the Spratlys, with analysts determining that seven PLA outposts have been completed throughout PRC-occupied territory in the Spratlys.[73] The Philippines has criticized the PRC presence and militarization of the Spratly islands previously and competing territorial claims between the two states in the Spratlys and elsewhere in the South China Sea have resulted in multiple confrontations between PRC and Philippine vessels and aircraft.

Tian criticized the most recent of these incidents as another example of the Philippines’ disregard for PRC territorial sovereignty.[74] The PLA expelled a Philippine aircraft from the airspace over Scarborough Shoal, which is occupied by the PRC, on February 18.[75] The Philippines Coast Guard accused the PLA of carrying out unsafe aerial maneuvers against a Philippines Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources plane completing a maritime domain awareness flight. The Philippines Coast Guard stated that a PLA Navy helicopter flew within three meters of the Philippine plane. The recent spate of confrontations between the Philippines and PRC reflects a general increase in bilateral tensions.

Vietnam

The PRC began a live-fire military exercise in the Gulf of Tonkin in response to Vietnam announcing a new coastal baseline on February 21.[76] This exchange highlights the mounting tensions between the two countries over territorial disputes in the South China Sea. A coastal baseline is a conceptual line that a state uses to define its territorial waters, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and continental shelf, which extends seaward from the baseline. Vietnamese state media claimed that the baseline is in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2000 Agreement on the Delimitation of the Gulf of Tonkin.[77] The latter agreement established a maritime boundary in the disputed Gulf of Tonkin between the PRC and Vietnam, although it only bisects a relatively small portion of the gulf. Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry stated on February 21 that the baseline provides an additional legal basis to protect Vietnamese sovereign rights and jurisdiction over Vietnamese-claimed territory.[78]

The PRC defined its own coastal baseline along the southwestern coast of in the Gulf of Tonkin on March 1, 2024, which it framed as a “necessary act for exercising national sovereignty and jurisdiction.”[79] Vietnam urged the PRC at the time to adhere to UNCLOS when determining the baseline to measure territorial waters and comply with the 2000 delimitation agreement.[80]

The PRC began four day, live-fire drills in the Gulf of Tonkin on February 24, two days after Vietnam announced the new baseline, in what is likely an expression of dissatisfaction with Vietnam’s actions.[81] The PRC’s and Vietnam’s conflicting maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea extend beyond the Gulf of Tonkin to the Paracel and Spratly islands. PRC-Vietnam tensions over the South China Sea are less public than the PRC’s disputes with other rival claimants, such as the Philippines, and are typically confined to closed-door negotiations. Vietnam occasionally resorts to public criticisms of the PRC when negotiations fail to resolve tensions.[82] PRC MFA Spokesperson Guo Jiakun publicly criticized Vietnam’s land reclamation in the Spratly Islands on February 19, two days before Vietnam’s announcement, and referred to Vietnam’s presence there as an illegal occupation.[83]

Oceania

The PRC conducted unannounced live-fire drills involving three warships near Australia and New Zealand between February 21-22. The warships involved in the drills were the cruiser CNS Zunyi, the frigate CNS Hengyang, and the replenishment vessel CNS Weishanhu.[84] The live-fire exercises occurred in the Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand, approximately 340 nautical miles from Sydney.[85] Australia reported sighting the ships in the Coral Sea on February 13, shortly after a PRC jet released flares within 30 meters of an Australian maritime patrol aircraft over the South China Sea on February 11.[86] The PLA Navy reportedly warned airliners that they were crossing a secret live-fire exercise.[87] Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles said that the PRC had not notified Australian authorities, however, and that the Australian government learned of the drill from the airlines.[88] PRC Defense Ministry Spokesperson Wu Qian deflected Australia’s accusations and said that “During the exercise, China organized live-fire exercises with naval guns against the sea on the basis of repeatedly issuing safety notices in advance.”[89] Wu added that the PRC’s actions were in line with international law and “will not affect aviation safety.”[90]

The PRC appears to have organized the exercises to be provocative. New Zealand Defense Minister Judith Collins said the live fire exercises took place with “a couple of hours’ notice” instead of the expected 12-24 hours usually notified via a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM).[91] The governments of Australia and New Zealand both reported that the PRC did not issue a NOTAM.[92] Airspace Australia CEO Rob Sharp stated that 49 flights were reportedly forced to reroute due to the exercises.[93] Collins said that drills of this type, involving ships of these capabilities, occurring in those waters were unprecedented.[94] Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said that the exercise was legal and had occurred outside Australia’s EEZ.[95] Albanese said that the PRC “could have given more notice,” however.[96] Albanese told reporters that “Australian defense were certainly aware” and that Australian frigates had been monitoring the PRC vessels, which were 218 nautical miles east of Hobart, Tasmania, as of the time of this writing.

Conflicting narratives have emerged regarding the nature of the drills. The plurality of sources described the exercises as live-fire drills and cited officials who claimed the PRC had not warned the Australian military. Newsweek cited a source claiming that PRC officials had warned Australian officials, however.[97] Albanese said that it was not clear whether a live firing had actually occurred; Australian media reported that the PRC ships moved in a pattern consistent with live-fire exercises but that the Australian military had not observed the ships firing on a target.[98] Australian media reported that the vessels crossed back into the Australian EEZ on February 25.[99] New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters met with PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi on February 26 and expressed concern about the drills’ short notice.[100] Peters said that Wang “took our concerns on board.”[101] The PRC MFA readout did not specifically mention Wang’s discussion of the drills but said that the PRC and New Zealand would resolve “specific differences” through “constructive dialogue.”[102]

Unannounced military drills may be part of a PRC effort to intimidate Australia and New Zealand. The exercises illustrate the PRC’s increasingly assertive stance in the Indo-Pacific. Oceania is a key region in which the PRC seeks to increase its influence and access. The PRC follows a naval doctrine of “near seas defense and far seas protection,” which involves prioritizing the defense of the first island chain (including Taiwan) while building the capability to project naval power globally.[103] These global power projection efforts encompass the Indo-Pacific, which hosts a number of US allies, partners, and Compact of Free Association countries. The PRC likely seeks to deny US and allied access to a region it views as critical to its own defense.

The PRC ships’ transit to the Tasman Sea coincided with defense talks between the PRC and Australia, suggesting that the PRC could have timed the transit and subsequent live-fire drills as a show of strength. ABC Australia reported that PRC military officials told Australia that they had canceled planned live-fire exercises to avoid disrupting these defense talks, which took place between PRC General Xu Qiling and Australian Air Marshal Robert Chipman. The PRC had not mentioned future exercises, however.[104] It is also possible that the PRC launched the drills specifically to signal opprobrium against Australia and New Zealand following diplomatic spats. The PRC has employed sudden and unannounced military drills as a coercive tool to signal disapproval of political or diplomatic actions, particularly around Taiwan. The live-fire exercises came shortly after the PRC signed several deals with the Cook Islands, a move that drew concern from authorities in New Zealand, which holds a compact of free association with the islands. They also come shortly after the encounter between PRC and Australian aircraft over the South China Sea, which prompted the Australian military to file formal objections against the PRC military.[105] The live-fire drills between Australia and New Zealand could signal the PRC’s disapproval of Australia following the South China Sea encounter, the PRC’s dismissal of New Zealand’s concerns about the Cook Islands, or both.

The Cook Islands published documents detailing the Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) signed with the PRC. The documents detail maritime cooperation, indicating the PRC’s intent to expand its Pacific presence while driving a wedge between US allies in Oceania. The documentation included a memorandum of understanding on “blue economy cooperation” encompassing “port wharves, shipbuilding and ship repair, ocean transportation,” and other forms of maritime cooperation.[106] Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown had kept the terms of the deal private prior to his trip to the PRC, a move that New Zealand officials criticized as a violation of the Cook Islands’ compact of free association with Wellington. Brown also demurred when pressed for details about the agreements after signing them, claiming he did not think he needed to provide exact wording.[107] Cook Islands opposition leaders called for a no-confidence vote against Brown.[108]

The PRC’s efforts to establish a foothold in the Cook Islands exemplify a trend of increasingly assertive PRC behavior in the Pacific. PRC military diplomacy has sought to expand its reach and influence in Oceania, and the PRC could use an agreement with the Cook Islands to gain a naval foothold near Australia and New Zealand. New Zealand is a member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network that also includes the United States, Canada, and Britain. The PRC’s choice of the Cook Islands as such a foothold indicates possible intent to drive a wedge between New Zealand – which other Five Eyes states have criticized as friendly to the PRC — and its intelligence-sharing partners. PRC efforts to frustrate US coalition-building in the Pacific risk destabilizing alliances critical to the defense of Taiwan and other US regional partners.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, February 13, 2025

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Grant Morgan of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek and Yeji Chung of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: February 18, 2025

Key Takeaways

Taiwanese civil society groups have now submitted 52 recall petitions, 36 of which target opposition legislators and 16 of which target legislators from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The 2024 legislative election results and recent polling suggest that up to 12 Kuomintang (KMT) and 6 DPP legislators are at risk of getting recalled.
Taiwanese prosecutors indicted former KMT legislator Chang Hsien-yao on February 12 for allegedly acting on behalf of the PRC to interfere in Taiwan's 2024 presidential election.
The US State Department revised its Taiwan Fact Sheet to remove language that states it does not support Taiwan independence. The PRC criticized the change and may use it to frame future PRC actions toward Taiwan as responses to US escalation.
Russian and PRC military and surveillance assets operated in southern Japanese waters and airspace in February, according to the Japanese government.
South Korea expressed support for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations for the first time, as part of a trilateral joint statement issued with the United States and Japan at the Munich Security Conference in Germany on February 15.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

Taiwanese civil society groups have now submitted 52 recall petitions, 36 of which target opposition legislators and 16 of which target legislators from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The 2024 legislative election results and recent polling suggest that up to 12 Kuomintang (KMT) and 6 DPP legislators are at risk of getting recalled. The 52 recall election petitions have received signatures from over one percent of eligible voters in their respective districts, meeting the threshold to advance the recall process.[1] Some of the 52 recall petitions target the same legislator, though each petition is considered an independent proposal. The next step is for recall petitioners to get signatures from at least 10 percent of eligible voters within the relevant electoral district within 60 days. Once Taiwan’s Central Election Commission verifies these signatures, the recall vote commences. A special election must be held within three months if a majority of voters vote to recall the elected official and this majority exceeds 25 percent of eligible voters in the district.

The Legislative Yuan (LY) currently has no majority party with the DPP holding 51 seats, the KMT holding 54 seats (including two KMT-aligned independents), and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) holding eight seats. The KMT and TPP have a majority in practice, however, given the recent alignment between them. The DPP could regain control of the LY if its supporters can recall and replace six KMT legislators and maintain all contested DPP seats. DPP legislative caucus chair Ker Chien-ming called for a mass recall campaign against opposition legislators on January 4 in response to significant polarization and major disagreements between the opposition and ruling party. The KMT responded by announcing a recall campaign of its own.

Twelve KMT legislators and six DPP legislators are likely the most vulnerable to being recalled. Seven of the KMT legislators and three DPP legislators won their 2024 legislative races by slim margins, which their opposition could overcome in a special election. Legislators Yeh Yuan-chih (KMT-New Taipei City VII), Niu Hsu-ting (KMT-Taoyuan City I), Tu Chuan-chi (KMT-Taoyuan City II), Lu Ming-che (KMT-Taoyuan City III), Sean Liao Wei-hsiang (KMT-Taichung City IV), Yu Hao (KMT-Nantou County II), Huang Chien-pin (KMT-Taitung County), Wu Pei-yi (DPP-Taipei City V), Chang Hung-lu (DPP-New Taipei City VI), and Wu Chi-ming (DPP-New Taipei City X) all won their races by roughly five percentage points or less in 2024.[2] All but Lu Ming-che, Chang Hung-lu, and Wu Chi-ming flipped their seats in the 2024 election, making them more vulnerable to flipping to the previous party.[3] Taiwanese political commentators identified eight additional high-risk candidates based on their relatively slim margins of victory (ten percentage points or less), high numbers of signatures collected for the recall movement, and significant public movements against them. Those include Wang Hung-wei (KMT Taipei City III), Lee Yen-hsiu (KMT-Taipei City IV), Lo Chih-chiang (KMT Taipei City VI), Hsu Chiao-hsin (KMT-Taipei City VII), Fu Kun-chi (KMT-Hualian County), and Rosalia Wu Szu-yao (DPP-Taipei City I).[4] Fu Kun-chi and Rosalia Wu are notably the KMT majority leader in the LY and the secretary general of the DPP’s legislative caucus, respectively. Indigenous DPP legislators Chen Ying (Lowland Aborigine Constituency) and Wu Li-hua (Highland Aborigine Constituency) are also considered high risk due to the unique election procedures for Indigenous legislators and the lack of strong support for the DPP in these constituencies. Indigenous legislators have six reserved seats within the LY, and the top three candidates from each constituency are given seats.[5]

While it is unlikely that all high-risk candidates will be removed from their seats, it is possible that Taiwanese civil society groups can shift the balance of power within the LY to favor the ruling DPP. The LY, under KMT leadership, has proposed budget cuts that would hinder certain Taiwanese defense efforts, despite the DPP urging to increase defense spending. These budget cuts and general disunity within the Taiwanese government could leave Taiwan more vulnerable to PRC coercion.

KMT- and TPP-backed amendments to Taiwan’s Public Officials Election and Recall Act could make additional recall efforts more difficult, however. President William Lai Ching-te promulgated amendments on February 18 requiring those who initiate and sign recall petitions to provide photocopies of their identification cards instead of their ID numbers and addresses.[6] The amendment comes into effect on February 20, impacting all ensuing recall petitions.

Taiwanese prosecutors indicted former KMT legislator Chang Hsien-yao on February 12 for allegedly acting on behalf of the PRC to interfere in Taiwan's 2024 presidential election.[7] Prosecutors allege that Chang took directions from PRC officials beginning in June 2023 to advocate for business magnate Terry Gou’s nomination as the KMT presidential candidate. The indictment accuses Chang of engaging in illegal activity, such as fabricating polling data and organizing election-related events to support Gou’s candidacy.[8] The indictment claims that Chang signed and sent a document titled “Variables and Possible Developments in the 2024 Taiwan Presidential Election” to CCP officials and met with Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Chairman Wang Huning in September 2023. Wang is the second highest CCP policymaker on Taiwan (after Xi Jinping) and led the PRC effort to influence Taiwan’s presidential election.[9]

The KMT had already designated New Taipei City Mayor Hou Yu-ih as its presidential candidate in May 2023.[10] Prosecutors claim that Chang was trying to replace Hou with Gou on the KMT presidential ticket on behalf of the PRC.[11] The PRC very likely favored Gou due to his outspoken advocacy for greater cross-strait engagement compared to Hou, who held a ran on a comparatively moderate platform. The KMT nominated Hou over Gou based on polls that showed Hou’s support surpassing Gou’s by a slight margin, indicating that Hou was the more competitive candidate against the DPP.[12] The PRC’s apparent insistence on Gou’s accession as KMT candidate despite Hou’s popularity reveals that it prioritized promoting a candidate who was more closely aligned with the PRC rather than one who was most likely to win against the DPP.

Chang served his first legislative term for the KMT-aligned, pro-unification People First Party (PFP) from 2005–2008 before a second term as a KMT legislator from 2008–2012. Chang later held the position of deputy minister of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) — the primary agency responsible for handling cross-strait relations —under KMT President Ma Ying-jeou from September 2013 to August 2014.[13] The government removed Chang from his position on suspicion of leaking state secrets to the PRC but did not prosecute him, citing a lack of evidence.[14]

Chang’s alleged co-optation by the PRC underscores the PRC’s stratagem of targeting Taiwanese citizens who sympathize with the concept of a shared national identity between the PRC and Taiwan. Kaohsiung investigators discovered Chang's activities through his interaction with For Public Good Party Vice Chairman Hsu Shao-tung, who is similarly under investigation for illegal election-related activities on behalf of the PRC. The For Public Good Party, like the PFP, is a nationalist pro-unification party with no presence in the ROC government.

There have been several other cases of members of pro-unification organizations acting on behalf of the PRC in recent months. Taiwanese authorities detained six Taiwanese individuals led by retired ROC Lieutenant General Kao An-kuo on January 22 on charges of collaborating with the CCP to form a pro-unification armed group that would support a PLA invasion of Taiwan.[15] The ROC Ministry of Interior dissolved the Chinese Unification Promotion Party (CUPP) on January 2 for its involvement in organized crime and intelligence activities on behalf of the PRC.[16]

The CCP and the KMT-led Pan-Blue coalition both recognize “one China” that includes Taiwan but differ on whether that “China” is the PRC or the ROC. The acceptance of “one China” under the ROC flag and the need for eventual unification was prevalent in Taiwan for decades under KMT rule. Chinese identity has fallen dramatically among Taiwanese citizens in the 38 years since Taiwan’s democratization, however, while Taiwanese national identity became dominant.[17] The PRC co-optation of Taiwanese citizens exploits remaining Chinese nationalist sentiment throughout the KMT-aligned coalition of pro-unification parties and other segments of Taiwanese society. The PRC appeals to shared nationality to persuade Taiwanese agents that the PRC champions the cause of unification, despite this outcome conflicting with KMT-led opposition to unification under the PRC and its principle that the ROC is the legitimate government of China.

The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) accused the DPP government on February 12 of blocking the resumption of cross-strait tourism that the PRC announced last month.[18] Taiwan has maintained that the resumption of cross-strait tourism depends on the PRC’s engagement with the ROC government and the PRC’s desisting from exploiting tourism as a tool of coercion against Taiwan.

The PRC Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT) currently allows only Fujian Province residents to visit Taiwan’s outlying Kinmen and Matsu islands but no other locations in Taiwan. The PRC announced on January 17 that it was preparing to allow residents of Fujian Province and Shanghai to book group tours to Taiwan for the first time since 2020. Tour groups traveling from the PRC to the ROC had been suspended during the COVID-19 pandemic. Taiwan’s MAC stated that it had received applications from tour groups but was not approving them for now. The council called for the two sides to first negotiate and coordinate the reopening of tourism through the Taiwan Strait Tourism Association (TSTA) and Association For Tourism Exchange Across the Taiwan Straits (ATETS), both of which are semi-official organizations created by the ROC and PRC, respectively, to facilitate coordination and negotiations for cross-strait tourism.[19] The two tourism associations have yet to begin negotiations at the time of writing.[20] PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Zhu Fenglian stated on February 12 that the PRC was unopposed to negotiating through the two associations but that this was not a prerequisite for cross-strait tourism.[21] Zhu accused the DPP of obstructing tourism and being insincere in welcoming PRC tourists.[22]

The TAO’s criticisms come shortly after ROC officials rejected multiple PRC requests from Shanghai hoping to attend the Taipei Lantern Festival.[23] KMT Taipei City Councilor Lee Ming-hsien accused the DPP of using cross-strait tourism as a “political bargaining chip” and said that cross-strait exchanges took place via the private sector in the past.[24] MAC Minister Chiu Chui-cheng had said that a Shanghai TAO delegation that hoped to attend the festival from February 2–16 submitted its application to enter Taiwan too late for the MAC to review. The MAC previously blocked PRC media figures and Shanghai TAO director Jin Mei from entering Taiwan for the Taipei-Shanghai Twin Cities Forum in December 2024, citing the PRC’s military and legal coercion against Taiwan in 2024.^[25]

The PRC exploits delays in cross-strait tourism negotiations to portray the DPP as obstructing the normalization of cross-strait relations and frame itself as a promoter of peaceful cross-strait exchanges. Accusing the DPP of politicizing cross-strait tourism amid resumption negotiations benefits the PRC’s dual aims of strengthening cross-strait economic linkages while framing itself as the constructive party and the DPP as uncooperative.

The PRC has normalized incursions into the restricted waters of Taiwan’s Kinmen Islands in the past year with three to four incursions per month. Four China Coast Guard (CCG) ships conducted “law enforcement patrols” into the restricted waters around Kinmen on February 14. The incursion was consistent with previous incursion in recent months despite slight changes in timing and specific activities.[26] February 14 marked one year since a Taiwanese Coast Guard vessel collided with a PRC fishing boat in Kinmen’s prohibited waters, leading to the deaths of two PRC fishermen. This incident seemed to prompt the PRC to begin normalizing CCG incursions into waters around Kinmen. There have been 57 such incursions as of February 14, 2025.

The CCG has normalized three to four patrols into Kinmen’s restricted waters per month in the last six months. These follow a regular pattern of four CCG ships simultaneously entering Kinmen restricted waters from the south of the island. Incidents earlier in 2024, particularly around Lai Ching-te’s inauguration as president of Taiwan, saw wider variance in the number of CCG ships and number of monthly incidents. May 2024 notably saw nine confirmed CCG incursions and an incident where two PLA supply ships entered Kinmen restricted waters, which is the highest level of activity that ISW could confirm in one month.[27]

The bar graph below shows monthly incident counts from September 2024 to February 14, 2025. There are discrepancies in the available information between February 2024 and August 2024 that ISW was unable to corroborate at the time of this writing, so it is omitted from the graph.

China

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) protested the US and Canadian warship transits through the Taiwan Strait, asserting that the transits violated PRC sovereignty and territorial integrity. Two US Navy vessels transited the Taiwan Strait from February 10 to 12, and a Canadian Navy vessel transited the Taiwan Strait on February 16.[28] This was the first US Navy transit in the Taiwan Strait under the second Trump administration. The United States refrained from publicizing the transit in the way that the Biden administration ordinarily did.[29] The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense (MND) stated that the US ships were the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Ralph Johnson and the Pathfinder-class survey ship USNS Bowditch. [30] The Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) identified the Canadian ship as Halifax-class frigate HMCS Ottawa and noted that the transit was the first time a Canadian warship transited the Taiwan Strait in 2025 and the sixth time since Canada released the Indo-Pacific strategy in November 2022.[31] The PRC MFA and PLA Eastern Theater Command responded to both transits with typical rhetoric, stating that the PRC opposes “provocations” under the “pretext” of freedom of navigation.[32] The PRC MFA first began arguing that the Taiwan Strait was under PRC sovereignty and jurisdiction in June 2022, contradicting its long-standing acceptance of the Taiwan Strait as international waters, and has maintained the position since then.[33]

The PRC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) placed Liu Weidong, deputy head of the major state-owned defense contractor China South Industries Group Corporation (CSGC), under investigation for corruption. The CCDI announced that Liu was under investigation on suspicion of “serious violations of Communist Party discipline and the law,” a reference to corruption, though official details have yet to be released.[34] Liu was appointed deputy general manager of CSGC in 2018. CSGC, also known as China Ordinance Equipment Group Corporation, is a leading producer of armaments for the PLA. CSGC produces equipment, including mobile assault weaponry, advanced munitions, optoelectronic products, and “anti-terrorism technology.”[35] The PRC’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) reported that CSGC-produced equipment is used by all PLA services, the People’s Armed Police, and PRC security forces.[36]

CCDI has conducted numerous corruption investigations into individuals connected with defense contracting and equipment procurement for the PLA in recent years. Mid-2023 to early 2024 saw a wave of purges and corruption investigations among high-ranking PLA officers associated with defense acquisitions, especially for the PLA Rocket Force, and civilian leaders of the PRC’s defense industry. These purges, which included the removal of former PRC Defense Minister Li Shangfu and former PLA Rocket Force commander Li Yuchao, drove speculation about the efficacy of PLA capabilities and leadership.[37] Xue Jianguo, a former executive for PRC defense giant Norinco, was placed under investigation for corruption in a similar manner to Liu in January 2025.[38] The PRC anti-corruption campaign in the defense sector shows that the CCP leadership maintains serious concerns about military readiness and the trustworthiness of the military and defense industry leadership.

The US State Department revised its Taiwan Fact Sheet to remove language that states it does not support Taiwan independence. The PRC criticized the change and may use it to justify future PRC aggression toward Taiwan. The State Department removed language stating that “we do not support Taiwan independence” in what it called a “routine” revision.[39] The updated readout states that “We expect cross-strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means, free from coercion, in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Strait.”[40] The updated fact sheet also reads that “The United States will continue to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations, including membership where applicable,” a change from earlier language in support of Taiwan’s membership in international organizations “where statehood is not a requirement.”[41] The United States had similarly revised its Taiwan Fact Sheet language around “Taiwan independence” in May 2022 but changed it back within weeks following a PRC rebuke.[42] The ROC in a statement to the Associated Press praised the updated webpage as “positive and friendly toward us, reflecting the close and amicable partnership between Taiwan and the United States.”[43]

PRC MFA spokesman Guo Jiakun criticized the change on February 17 and accused the United States of sending “a seriously wrong signal to the ‘Taiwan independence’ forces.”[44] The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) gave a statement containing similar language on the same day. TAO spokeswoman Zhu Fenglian called the revision a “serious regression” and warned the DPP against “relying on the US to seek independence.”[45]

The PRC may frame the new language on the fact sheet — as it did in 2022 — as an escalation and use it to justify further coercive actions against Taiwan, including actions it already intended to take. The PRC has repeatedly described Taiwanese independence as “separatism” and external support for it as the greatest threat to peace in the Taiwan Strait. It often repeats such language in admonishments of US support for Taiwan, including arms sales and high-level visits. The PRC has used what it claims to be pro-independence “provocations,” especially from the administration of Taiwan President William Lai Ching-te, to justify significant escalations in coercive activities against Taiwan in 2024, including large-scale military exercises. The PRC very likely planned this coercive escalation in advance, however, having labeled Lai a dangerous separatist regardless of the actions he has taken while in office.[46]

Northeast Asia

Japan

Russian and PRC military and surveillance assets operated in southern Japanese waters and airspace in February, according to the Japanese government. The Russian Navy Vishnya-class intelligence gathering vessel Kareliya (ship number “535”) transited the Osumi Strait on February 9 and Tsushima Strait from February 10 to 11. [47] The ship has a history of lingering around Japanese waters. The Kareliya notably sailed through the Tsushima Strait and Miyako Strait in November 2024 as well.[48] Japan’s military spotted Russian Steregushciy-class frigates near Yonaguni Island, the Japanese island closest to Taiwan, on February 5.[49] The PRC also had numerous assets around Japan. Two PRC drones flew between Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands on February 5, and a Y-9 patrol aircraft made a round trip to the Pacific Ocean by passing between Okinawa and Miyako Island on February 10.[50] PLA Navy vessels sailed through the Miyako Strait on February 10 and 11. These vessels included a Luyang III-class guided missile destroyer, Jiangkai II-class frigate, and Fuchi-class replenishment ship on February 10 and a different Luyang III-class guided missile destroyer, Jiangkai II-class frigate, Yujiao-class landing ship, and Yusheng-class landing ship on February 11. [51] A PLA Navy Dongdiao-class intelligence gathering ship sailed through the Miyako Strait on February 8. [52] These ships do not include the PRC’s daily coast guard patrols around the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands, which the PRC claims. Many of the PRC and Russian assets also passed through Tsushima Strait, which is a channel between Korea and Japan — this is an extremely important and busy maritime shipping route and is a key waterway for Russian naval access to the Pacific.[53]

This activity represents an apparent uptick in Russian and PRC activity around southern Japan, though such activity has precedent. The PRC conducted what is believed to be a blockade exercise in the Miyako Strait in December 2024.[54] The Miyako Strait is a key chokepoint between Taiwan and the Japanese archipelago as one of the widest gaps in the first island chain connecting the Pacific Ocean to the East China Sea.[55] The PRC and Russia have a history of conducting military exercises together — the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) China Power Project tracked eight joint exercises in 2021, 10 in 2022, seven in 2023, and seven between January and July 2024.[56]

North Korea

North Korea allowed foreign tour agency staff to enter the country for the first time since it closed its borders in 2020 due to COVID-19. North Korea likely aims to use tourism to acquire hard currency to fund government spending, including military programs.[57] Koryo Tours, a Beijing-based UK travel company specializing in North Korea tours, announced on its website that its staff crossed into the northeastern North Korean border city of Rason on February 14 as part of “a special trip for staff only” to inspect new tourism sites. The company stated that it “will be able to 100 percent confirm the opening of Rason, North Korea, to tourists.”[58] North Korea has been gradually opening its border to certain foreign guests since 2024. North Korea invited Russian citizens as their first foreign visitors since the COVID-19 shutdown in February 2024 and allowed Swedish diplomats to return to work at the country’s embassy in September 2024.[59] This growing sign of resuming tourism comes as North Korea completes the seven-year construction of Wonsan Kalma beach resort, one of North Korea’s biggest tourism sites, which covers 1.1 square miles and includes 17 hotels, 37 hostels, 29 shopping centers, and 35 public service establishments.[60] Vostok Intur agency, a Russian tour company, has started offering a tour package priced at $1,750, which includes a seven-night itinerary, all flights, and sightseeing tours.[61] New tourism sites, such as the Kalma resort, could offer North Korea’s biggest patrons, Russia and the PRC, a legitimate way to funnel cash into the North Korean regime despite international sanctions. Pyongyang could use this revenue to support military programs, including nuclear activities, either by directly funding them or freeing up other regime resources.

South Korea

South Korea expressed support for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations for the first time as part of a trilateral joint statement issued with the United States and Japan at the Munich Security Conference on February 15.[62] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Japanese Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi, and South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul held their first trilateral meeting since US President Donald Trump’s second term began. They released a joint statement that reaffirmed their shared commitment to the security of the Indo-Pacific, stating their opposition to “any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion in the waters of the Indo-Pacific, including the South China Sea.” The statement highlighted the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and expressed support for the ROC’s “meaningful participation in appropriate international organizations.” The three countries also agreed to strengthen trilateral security cooperation, address the North Korean threat, and enhance economic security and resilience.[63] PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun stated that the PRC “firmly opposes relevant countries’ attempts to put together small circles to interfere in [its] internal affairs.” [64]

The joint statement marks a significant shift with South Korea aligning more closely with the US and Japanese efforts to counter the PRC. The statement marks the first instance of South Korean support for ROC participation in international organizations, although South Korea reportedly requested the inclusion of the word “appropriate” before “international organizations” to reduce likely dissatisfaction from the PRC. This contrasts with a previous joint statement from February 7 by Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru, which excludes this qualifier.[65] The trilateral statement also added the phrase “by force or coercion” when opposing attempts to alter the status quo in the Indo-Pacific, a phrase not included in the November 2024 joint statement after the US-ROK-Japan summit.[66] These additions reflect South Korea’s increasing willingness to join US-led efforts in taking a tougher stance on the PRC, especially as the United States intensifies its rivalry with the PRC by imposing tariffs on PRC goods. It remains uncertain whether South Korea will maintain this level of support for Taiwan in the long term, as the country potentially faces an early presidential race in June that could shift its position on the PRC if a progressive, PRC-sympathetic administration comes to power.

South Korea’s data protection regulator has confirmed that the DeepSeek artificial intelligence (AI) chatbot, developed by a PRC-based startup, sent user data to ByteDance, the owner of TikTok.[67] The Personal Information Protection Commission (PIPC) announced on February 18 that it has temporarily halted new downloads of DeepSeek in South Korea due to concerns about its data collection practices. The PIPC identified the data leak by analyzing communication logs through a proxy server and found that user information was being transmitted to ByteDance when users accessed DeepSeek.[68] The PIPC stated that the leaked information amounts to approximately 1.2 million cases but cannot yet "confirm what data was transferred and to what extent."[69] DeepSeek responded by sending a representative to South Korea to discuss its data privacy policy. The PRC’s foreign ministry has stated that it expects its companies to comply with local laws.[70]

South Korea is part of a growing number of countries, including the United States, Italy, Japan, the ROC, and the United Kingdom, that have either restricted or banned the use of the app due to data protection concerns. PRC’s Data Security Law grants the government access to corporate data from PRC-based companies, such as DeepSeek and ByteDance.[71] It is not immediately clear why DeepSeek was sending data to ByteDance, however, as ByteDance is a separate company that does not have an ownership stake in DeepSeek. ByteDance is developing its own AI model called Doubao.[72]

Southeast Asia

The PLA engaged in dangerous air maneuvers to block Australian and Philippine aircraft traveling over the South China Sea. These incidents highlight growing PRC willingness to harass supposed violations of its claimed airspace over the South China Sea. Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles stated that an Australian P-8A Poseidon was traveling in international airspace near the disputed Paracel Islands on February 13 and was intercepted by two PLA Air Force (PLAAF) J-16 fighter jets. One of the PLA fighter jets conducted a dangerous maneuver, firing flares 100 feet from the Australian aircraft, according to the Australian defense minister.[73] The PRC claimed that the Australian aircraft violated its airspace and that it was quickly expelled in response.[74] Neither the pilot nor the aircraft were damaged or harmed.[75]

The Paracel Islands are a disputed archipelago in the South China Sea that the PRC controls and that Vietnam and Taiwan also claim. The islands have a small PRC population and military presence. The PRC also illegally claims a “straight baseline” around the entire archipelago, which means that it considers all the waters within the archipelago as well as the airspace above them to be PRC sovereign territory. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) holds that countries can claim 12 nautical miles of territorial waters around any islands and “rocks” (but not reefs or other kinds of maritime features) that they control, but only specially designated “archipelagic states” can draw straight-baseline “boxes” to claim sovereignty over the waters around entire archipelagos.[76] The PRC is not an archipelagic state, and its maritime claims around the Paracels have no status under international law. Countries, including Australia and the United States, sometimes conduct military operations around the Paracel Islands to challenge the PRC’s illegal maritime claims and ensure freedom of navigation.

A PLA naval helicopter intercepted a Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) plane on February 18 as it was conducting a maritime domain awareness flight over the disputed Scarborough Shoal. Philippine officials said that the helicopter came up to three meters (10 feet) from the plane in order to force it from the airspace of Scarborough Shoal.[77] PLA Southern Theater Command spokesperson Tian Junli accused the Philippines of illegally violating PRC sovereignty and claimed that the PLA dispatched air and naval forces to expel the plane “in accordance with laws and regulations.”[78] Scarborough Shoal is a disputed atoll that the PRC and Philippines both claim and is within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The PRC has controlled the shoal since 2012 and uses its Coast Guard, navy, and maritime militia to prevent other countries from accessing it.[79]

The PRC has a history of conducting dangerous maneuvers in response to purported “foreign encroachment.” It has repeatedly intercepted and fired flares in the path of foreign, especially Philippine, government aircraft over disputed territories in the South China Sea. CCG vessels have blocked, rammed, and fired water cannons at Philippine government ships attempting to conduct operations in places including Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands. A PRC destroyer approached and disrupted an Australian diving operation in Japan’s exclusive economic zone in 2023, injuring several divers.[80] A PLA Air Force jet intercepted an Australian Seahawk helicopter in the Yellow Sea and used flares to disrupt ongoing operations in 2024.[81]

The PRC signed deals with the Cook Islands focusing on seabed mining, disaster relief, cultural exchange, and hydrography. These deals could provide the PRC with increased access to key resources and political influence in the Pacific Islands. Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown toured the PRC and visited Harbin from February 10–14, attending the closing ceremony of the 9th Asian Winter Games.[82] Brown met with PRC Premier Li Qiang on February 14. A PRC MFA readout stated that the PRC is “willing to deepen cooperation in multilateral fields,” specifically in the “fields of ocean, infrastructure construction, agriculture and fisheries.” The readout said that the Cook Islands would continue to follow the one-China principle.[83]

The PRC is likely planning to mine critical minerals in the Cook Islands seabed. The Cook Islands Seabed Minerals Authority (SBMA) accompanied Brown and met with PRC counterparts to discuss joint seabed mineral exploration efforts, according to Nikkei.[84] Deep-sea sites in the Cook Islands contain nodules of cobalt and nickel. Cook Islands government sources have emphasized the economic value of the nodules, which they state have applications in clean-energy technology.[85] The Cook Islands issued three companies licenses to explore the seabed in 2022 but has yet to approve resource extraction, pending environmental impact assessments.[86] None of the three companies currently licensed in the Cook Islands have links with the PRC. The PRC does sponsor the highest number of exploration licenses across the International Seaboard Authority of any member state, however.[87]

The PRC established diplomatic relations with the Cook Islands in 1997 and announced a comprehensive strategic partnership with the nation in 2018 along with several other Pacific Island countries.[88] Increased cooperation between the PRC and Cook Islands further cements the relationship, paves the way for PRC critical mineral mining, and offers the PRC a means of expanding its influence in the islands. Cooperation on disaster relief, which would likely be conducted with military vessels, also offers the PRC military inroads into a strategically critical location near Australia and New Zealand. The PRC has used infrastructure, security, and tourism deals as a means of securing political support and access rights from small Pacific nations on numerous occasions, most notably a 2022 security agreement with the Solomon Islands that allowed for PRC port access and military presence in the country.[89]

The PRC-Cook Islands agreement has sparked concerns of PRC influence within the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance’s sphere of influence. The Cook Islands maintains its own government but is in free association with New Zealand. Cook Islands residents carry New Zealand passports.[90] New Zealand, a member of the Five Eyes along with the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, and Australia, has expressed dismay that the Cook Islands struck a deal with the PRC without consulting Wellington first. The agreement has prompted protests among Cook Islands citizens concerned about the PRC’s growing influence.[91] Approximately 400 people protested at the parliament in the Cook Islands’ capital, Avarua. The protesters, who were also demonstrating against proposals to give up the New Zealand passport, carried signs labelled “stay connected with NZ.”[92] Cook Islands President Mark Brown is facing a no-confidence vote in Parliament following the controversy over the PRC deal.[93]

Russia

PRC officials welcomed US-Russia talks to end the war in Ukraine but called for “all stakeholders” to be involved in negotiations. The PRC may exploit rifts in the US-European relationship to portray itself as a responsible and impartial mediator while seeking a role for itself in shaping negotiations. US and Russian officials concluded preliminary talks about the Ukraine war in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on February 18 without the presence of Ukrainian or other European officials. Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and other European officials expressed concerns about being excluded from the negotiations, though US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that both Ukraine and Europe will ultimately be involved and that “no-one is being sidelined.”[94] PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi said at the Munich Security Forum on February 14 that “all stakeholders” in the war, including the European Union, should participate in peace talks. PRC ambassador to the UN Fu Cong and MFA spokesperson Guo Jiakun welcomed the US-Russia talks in Riyadh but likewise reiterated Beijing’s hope that “all relevant parties and stakeholders involved in the Ukraine crisis will engage in the peace talks process.”[95]

The PRC has consistently claimed to be an impartial mediator and voice for peace in the war in Ukraine, despite adopting Russian rhetorical framing about the war and providing dual-use goods and economic support to Russia throughout the war. It previously called for Russia’s participation in Ukraine talks where Russia was absent, such as the Swiss Summit on Peace in Ukraine in June 2024.[96] It also co-founded the “Friends of Peace” group at the United Nations and proposed a six-point “peace plan” with Brazil as part of an effort to promote the involvement of “Global South” countries in Ukraine negotiations. The PRC considers itself to be part of the Global South and frames itself as a leader of Global South countries, though PRC officials have repeatedly said that it is not a party to the “Ukraine crisis.”[97]

The recent PRC advocacy for “all stakeholders” to be involved in peace talks suggests an effort to appeal to European and possibly Ukrainian fears of being sidelined in the negotiations. The PRC still wishes to maintain a beneficial economic relationship with Europe, which is a much larger trading partner for the PRC than Russia is.[98] Recent events including the Riyadh talks, the Trump administration’s imposition of tariffs on European goods, and US Vice President JD Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference that criticized European countries have all fed European fears of US abandonment.[99] The PRC may wish to exploit these divisions to improve its own relations with Europe and possibly gain European support for a role in Ukraine peace negotiations. Zelenskyy said on February 17 that there could be a role for the PRC at the negotiating table.[100] Beijing’s recent appointment of Lu Shaye, a notoriously abrasive “wolf warrior” diplomat, to the post of Special Representative for European Affairs may undermine its effort to charm Europe, however.[101] Beijing may also worry that a US-Russia negotiated deal that includes economic relief for Russia, which Rubio and Russian officials hinted at, will reduce Russia’s dependency on the PRC after the war ends.[102]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, February 7, 2025

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Frank Mattimoe of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek and Yeji Chung of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: February 11, 2025

Key Takeaways

Taiwanese civil society groups have now submitted recall petitions targeting 31 opposition Kuomintang (KMT) legislators and 13 legislators from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Recall efforts could shift the balance of power within the Legislative Yuan (LY) by reducing the KMT-led majority.
Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior (MOI) investigated claims that Taiwanese and PRC companies helped Taiwanese nationals illegally procure PRC identification cards in support of an expansion of CCP United Front soft power operations against Taiwan.
The ROC Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported sighting six PRC high-altitude balloons near Taiwan in one day, with one passing directly over the main island.
The PRC’s new directive restricting online publication of military-related information reflects the PRC’s heightened sensitivity to leaks that expose military capabilities and the reinforcement of CCP control over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by silencing narratives that challenge party authority.
PRC General Secretary Xi Jinping met with South Korea’s National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province on February 7, 2025. The meeting reflects the PRC’s growing efforts to strengthen ties with South Korea amid its escalating trade war with the U.S. and political instability in South Korea.
The PRC’s appointment of Lu Shaye as special representative for European Affairs signals that Beijing intends to take a more aggressive posture in negotiations with the European Union.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

Taiwanese civil society groups have now submitted recall petitions targeting 31 opposition Kuomintang (KMT) legislators and 13 legislators from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Recall efforts could shift the balance of power within the Legislative Yuan (LY) by reducing the KMT-led majority. These 44 recall petitions have received signatures from more than 1 percent of the eligible voters in their electoral district, clearing the first threshold to initiate a recall election.[1] The next step is for recall petitioners to get signatures from at least 10 percent of eligible voters within the relevant electoral district within 60 days. Once Taiwan’s Central Election Commission verifies these signatures, the recall vote can commence. If a majority of voters vote to recall the elected official, and this majority exceeds 25 percent of eligible voters in the district, a special election must be held within three months to fill the vacated seat. The LY currently has no majority party, with the DPP holding 51 seats, the KMT holding 54 (including two KMT-aligned independents), and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) holding 8 seats. The opposition has a majority in practice, however, because the KMT and TPP have typically aligned on key issues. The DPP could regain control of the LY if its supporters can successfully recall and replace six KMT legislators and maintain all contested DPP legislative seats.

KMT- and TPP-backed amendments to Taiwan’s Public Officials Election and Recall Act could make recall efforts more difficult, however. The opposition parties passed an amendment on December 20, 2024, requiring those who propose or sign a recall initiative to provide a copy of their ID card instead of their ID numbers and addresses.[2] The Executive Yuan requested a reexamination of the amendment in January 2025, but the LY voted along party lines to preserve the amendment on February 11.[3] The TPP, though not facing a potential recall of its elected legislators, has voiced its opposition to the mass recall campaign. Acting TPP Chairman Huang Kuo-chang called DPP efforts to recall KMT legislators an act of “green authoritarianism,” a reference to the DPP official party color. [4] President William Lai Ching-te has 10 days to sign the bill into law after the LY sends it to him. Petitions that complete both rounds of signature collection before the bill is signed into law will not be subject to the amendment, though it is possible that the KMT may use this amendment as an opportunity to challenge the legality of recall proceedings.

Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior (MOI) investigated claims that Taiwanese and PRC companies helped Taiwanese nationals illegally procure PRC identification cards in support of an expansion of CCP United Front soft power operations against Taiwan. The MOI initiated its investigation after Taiwanese Youtuber Pa Chiung made a video documentary alleging that between three to five Taiwanese travel companies and public relations firms, as well as two PRC companies, helped Taiwanese citizens apply for PRC ID cards during trips to the PRC.[5] Taiwanese media described Pa as an “anti-CCP” Youtuber, whose content investigates PRC United Front activity targeting Taiwanese nationals.[6]

The United Front is a whole-of-government and society effort to advance the CCP’s ideology and interests by co-opting non-government segments of Chinese society. United Front activities against Taiwan support PRC efforts to politically assimilate Taiwan, particularly by inculcating in the Taiwanese public CCP notions that the PRC is the only legitimate government of China and Taiwan is a part of that China. United Front work can also support covert and clandestine activities, such as infiltration, manipulation, co-optation, and intelligence gathering on target groups.[7]

The MOI is investigating whether the Taiwanese companies assisted the Taiwanese nationals in illegally obtaining the ID cards in breach of Taiwan’s Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.[8] The MOI also aims to determine whether the Taiwanese companies’ actions “were purely commercial” or part of a larger United Front operation to promote the PRC’s annexation of Taiwan, as Taiwan designates commercial activities by Taiwanese companies in the PRC as permissible by law.[9] Taiwan’s Interior Minister Liu Shyh-fang stated that Taiwan's and the PRC’s citizenship registration systems “are mutually exclusive,” making it illegal for Taiwanese citizens to simultaneously hold PRC citizenship documents or household registrations.[10] The MOI has interviewed over 30 individuals it identified as possessing PRC ID cards as part of its investigation, though Pa Chiung made an unverified claimed that up to 200,000 Taiwanese citizens may have obtained PRC IDs in the last decade.[11] Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau called Pa’s claims exaggerated.[12] Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council also announced that three Taiwanese nationals have had their citizenship revoked due to possession of illegal PRC ID cards since it began its investigation in January.[13]

The PRC’s issuance of IDs to Taiwanese nationals dovetails with efforts to encourage people-to-people exchanges between Taiwan and the PRC to promote the PRC’s political incorporation of Taiwan.[14] The Fujian United Front Work Department announced a plan in January to promote further Taiwanese visits to the PRC by increasing professional exchanges in various fields, adding more flights between Taiwan and Fujian Province, and encouraging first-time visitors to find jobs in the province.[15] Fujian is central to Beijing’s “peaceful reunification” efforts because it is the site of the “Fujian Cross-Strait Integration Zone,” which the PRC unveiled in 2023 to strengthen ties between Fujian and Taiwan and facilitate the integration of Taiwanese nationals into Fujian’s society, economy, and governance.[16] The issuance of PRC ID cards to Taiwanese people is one of many policies intended to make it easier for Taiwanese to live, work, study, invest, and travel in Fujian and elsewhere in the PRC.

These efforts may represent PRC “passportization” efforts against Taiwan, wherein the PRC seeks to legitimize its claim on the island by granting PRC documents to Taiwanese nationals and support rhetoric identifying Taiwan as a part of China. The PRC could attempt to use Taiwanese citizens’ possession of PRC ID cards as justification for intervention in Taiwan under the pretense of protecting “PRC citizens” from oppression under the DPP government. The passportization campaign against Taiwan bears similarities with Russia’s passportization campaign in occupied Ukrainian territory, wherein Russia uses those who have “willfully” adopted Russian citizenship to support assertions that its territorial claims “are incontrovertible and irreversible,” providing further justification for Russia’s military occupation of Ukraine.[17] Residents of Taiwan’s Kinmen and Matsu archipelagos, which the PRC consider to be part of Fujian province, may be particularly vulnerable to such “passportization” efforts. The islands’ residents rely on the PRC economically and often travel to and from the PRC mainland. Pa Chiung’s documentary showed that Taiwanese citizens who take the ferry from Kinmen to Xiamen, Fujian, are encouraged to register for a Taiwan Compatriot Certificate, which enables them to travel freely to the PRC, buy property and establish a bank account, the first steps in obtaining residency in the PRC.[18] Kinmen in particular is a target of United Front efforts, including an initiative called the “Kinmen-Xiamen Common Living Circle,” which seeks to promote economic and cultural ties between Taiwan and the PRC. National Chengchi University Taiwan-China affairs researcher Soong Kuo-cheng stated that with further economic and integration through transport links, the PRC could integrate Kinmen into Fujian province and demonstrate that the ‘one country, two systems’ policy could be replicated with all of Taiwan.[19] The islands’ reliance on the PRC and the PRC’s emphasis on economic integration makes it likely that the PRC’s passportization program has disproportionately affected the residents of the islands.

The ROC Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported sighting six PRC high-altitude balloons near Taiwan in one day, with one passing directly over the main island. This marked the highest number of PRC balloons in Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in one day since February 10, 2024.[20] The MND reported nine PRC military aircraft, two official ships, and six warships — a “normal” number of non-balloon ADIZ incursions — near Taiwan during the same period as the balloon sightings (February 6–7).[21] The MND began reporting PRC balloons in its ADIZ in December 2023. Balloon activity spiked in volume and increased to daily frequency during the weeks leading up to Taiwan’s election on January 13, 2024, then gradually tapered off until April 2024.[22] MND began reporting balloon sightings again in November 2024, which gradually increased in subsequent months.[23] At least 16 PRC balloons flew through Taiwan’s ADIZ in January 2025, including seven that flew directly over Taiwan, and 13 in February as of the time of writing (at least two of them over Taiwan).[24] The balloon overflights are part of a broader PRC effort to harass Taiwan, degrade its response capabilities, and strain its resources, consistent with the effect of normalizing ADIZ incursions more generally.[25] Balloons are able to enter Taiwan’s airspace without triggering a Taiwanese military response, unlike military aircraft.

The PRC balloons over Taiwan also likely serve surveillance and other data collection purposes that may help the PRC plan military activities such as airstrikes. The PRC has maintained that balloons sighted over Taiwan are “mostly” weather balloons.[26] Reuters reported that most weather balloons fly 80,000–120,000 ft above the ground; the balloons spotted in Taiwan between December 2023 and April 2024 flew between altitudes of 10,000–40,000 ft, however.[27] A similar PRC spy balloon crossed the United States in February 2023 at an altitude of 60,000 ft.[28] PRC surveillance balloons could provide the PRC with a low-cost, deniable means of collecting intelligence on Taiwan’s topography and meteorology, among other things.

The PRC is using its political influence in developing countries to create the impression of widespread international support for its goals to annex Taiwan. Studies by the Economist and the Lowy Institute found that dozens of “Global South” countries, especially in Africa, adopted language in support of “all” PRC efforts to achieve “national reunification” in the last two years. The Australian think tank The Lowy Institute’s January 2025 study broke UN member states into five distinct categories based on their stances on the status of Taiwan. No countries can have diplomatic relations with both the PRC and Taiwan due to Beijing’s insistence on its “one-China principle.” Only 11 UN states, plus Vatican City, formally recognize the ROC over the PRC. 40 countries, including the United States, recognize the PRC government in Beijing but stop short of recognizing the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan. 142 countries explicitly recognize the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan; of these, 119 have endorsed Beijing’s one-China Principle directly. A further subset of 89 “Beijing backer” countries recognize the PRC, support the one-China principle, and support the PRC’s actions to “achieve national reunification” without specifying a preference for peaceful means.[29] The Economist published a similar study on February 9 that identified 70 countries that recognize PRC sovereignty over Taiwan as well as “all” efforts by the PRC to achieve national reunification. The study noted that 97% of those 70 countries were in the Global South, and that the vast majority of them adopted that new wording in the past 18 months.[30] Many African countries joined this category for the first time during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in September 2024, when 53 African states signed a joint statement that said “Africa […] firmly supports all efforts by the Chinese government to achieve national reunification.”[31]

The PRC has sought to cultivate pro-PRC sentiment globally by portraying itself as a leader of the Global South and has used this diplomatic goodwill to garner support for its stance against the ROC. The PRC’s efforts to garner support for Taiwan “reunification” efforts suggests that the PRC is prioritizing information operations designed to create the appearance of a global consensus. PRC foreign policy officials likely understand that very few of the Global South countries that have expressed approval for reunification efforts would substantively aid either side in an invasion of Taiwan. The PRC likely aims instead to use the rhetorical support it has created among Global South countries to create the appearance of legitimacy for any actions it chooses to take against Taiwan. Beijing wishes to take a leadership role in the international system, including in existing institutions, and it needs the support of as many countries as possible. Gaining rhetorical support from a growing number of countries for “all efforts” at “reunification” can help insulate the PRC from some of the reputational damage it may incur if it takes aggressive action against Taiwan.

The Lowy Institute and Economist studies also reveal that the degree of “international consensus” behind the PRC stance on Taiwan is less overwhelming than it claims. The PRC often claims that the 180 UN member states that recognize the PRC rather than Taiwan, as well as UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, constitute an overwhelming international consensus in support of its “one China principle” that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the PRC. UNGA 2758 was the 1971 resolution that expelled “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek” (i.e., the ROC) from the United Nations and gave “China’s” UN seat to the PRC instead. The resolution does not mention the status of Taiwan, however. PRC officials reference this supposed consensus in response to any countries that they perceive to be supporting Taiwan’s independence or opposing the PRC’s sovereignty claim over Taiwan. Not all countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan explicitly recognize Beijing’s sovereignty over Taiwan, however. Even countries that recognize Beijing’s sovereignty claims do not necessarily endorse “reunification” by force. The UN as an institution has clarified that it does not endorse Beijing pursuing “reunification” by any means it wishes.[32]

China

The PRC’s new directive restricting online publication of military-related information reflects the PRC’s heightened sensitivity to leaks that expose military capabilities and the reinforcement of CCP control over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by silencing narratives that challenge party authority. The PRC published directives on February 8 that limit the information that PRC military bloggers and media outlets are permitted to share online regarding the PLA.[33] The directive prohibits online military information providers from “producing, copying, publishing, or disseminating” previously undisclosed information about the military, including troop activities, the development, testing, and deployment of weapons and equipment; information about military facilities, and more. The stated aims of the directives, according to the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), are to strengthen the management of information to prevent the leaking of military secrets, manage public opinion relating to the military, and stop the spread of disinformation.[34] Tighter restrictions on what content is allowed to be published online imply greater challenges for monitoring PRC military developments in the open source.

The directive signals the PRC’s increasing sensitivity over leaks that threaten to expose certain capabilities and possible intentions amid the PRC’s ongoing development of new military technology and equipment. The rules apply to any entities that publish online information about the military, such as media outlets, military units and departments, security-related education institutions, and individual scholars and bloggers. PRC military bloggers and social media users have previously circulated footage of military hardware that potentially undermines the confidentiality of PLA capabilities. PRC netizens shared pictures and videos of a previously unknown sixth generation stealth combat aircraft flying above Chengdu on December 26.[35]

The directive, which takes effect on March 1, also focuses on maintaining the CCP’s control over the PLA. The directive emphasizes the responsibility of publishers of military-related content not to spread notions that contradict the CCP’s absolute authority over the PLA and the CMC Chairman Responsibility System. The CMC Chairman Responsibility System refers to a concept that emphasizes the CMC Chairman (Xi Jinping)’s centrality in the military hierarchy and command structure.[36] The directive encourages publishers of military-related content to endorse Xi Jinping’s political theory, including Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military. This doctrine promotes the notion that Xi’s organizational reforms of the PLA, orientation of the CCP around Xi, and emphasis on strict CCP control of the PLA are necessary to strengthen the PLA as a fighting force. The explicit connection indicates that Xi regards insufficient consensus over the CCP’s governance of the military as an inhibitor of the PLA’s warfighting capability.

The issuance of the directive follows several recent incidents that may indicate tension in the PLA regarding party-military relations. The PRC Ministry of Defense (MOD) announced on November 28 that it had suspended Director of the Political Work Department of the CMC Miao Hua amid his investigation for suspected “serious violations of discipline.”[37] Miao Hua was the highest-ranking political commissar in the PLA, a position that carries the ultimate responsibility of instilling Xi’s vision of political loyalty throughout the military. Multiple PLA affiliated organizations published articles in December 2024 that emphasized tenets of collective leadership and intra-party democracy as the guiding principles of the party’s governance of the military, which is inconsistent with Xi’s vision of centralized hierarchy.[38] The CMC subsequently replaced the political commissar of the PLA Ground Force on December 23, possibly signaling that Xi held other high-ranking officers responsible for perceived failures to achieve his version of political loyalty.[39] The new directive outlined plans to increase scrutiny over public agencies and military commands’ dissemination of military-related content through media training.

The directive’s focus on silencing undesirable views regarding the CCP’s control over the military amid instability in the highest echelons of the PLA’s political commissars signals that the CCP perceives the sources of these narratives as threats that ultimately inhibit the PLA’s effectiveness as a fighting force.

Northeast Asia

Japan

The PRC strongly condemned a joint statement by US President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba for its comments on Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands. Trump and Ishiba met in Washington, DC, on February 7 for their first bilateral summit. A joint statement from the two leaders encouraged the “peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues” and “opposed any attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion.”[40] Japanese newspaper Nikkei reported that this was the first time the United States’ and Japan’s stated position on the Taiwan Strait explicitly opposed changes to the cross-strait status quo through “coercion.”[41] The joint statement also expressed support for Taiwan’s “meaningful participation” in international organizations.[42] PRC MFA spokesperson Guo Jiakun said that the PRC was “strongly dissatisfied” and lodged “solemn representations” with the US and Japanese governments over the statement, which he claimed “blatantly interferes in China's internal affairs, attacks and smears China, and exaggerates regional tensions.” He said that “the Taiwan issue is purely China's internal affairs and the core of China's core interests,” stressing that Japan, in particular, “should be more cautious in its words and deeds” due to its history of colonizing Taiwan. He argued that Japan and the United States should abide by the one-China principle and clearly oppose Taiwan’s independence if they truly want peace. He further stated that Taiwan “has no basis, reason or right” to participate in international organizations that only admit sovereign states.[43]

The PRC also objected to Trump's and Ishiba’s statements about the Senkaku Islands, a disputed but Japan-administered uninhabited archipelago in the East China Sea. Trump and Ishiba reaffirmed in their joint statement that the US-Japan mutual defense treaty of 1960 applies to the Senkaku Islands, which means that an attack on the islands would trigger US military intervention to aid Japan. The United States has held this position since 1972. The two leaders also stated their “strong opposition to any action that seeks to undermine Japan’s longstanding and peaceful administration of the Senkaku Islands.”[44] The PRC and Taiwan also claim the Senkaku Islands under the name “Diaoyu Islands,” and PRC coast guard vessels patrolled within the islands’ contiguous zone nearly every day of 2024 and 2023 to assert PRC legal jurisdiction there.[45] MFA spokesperson Guo stated that “the Diaoyu Islands and their affiliated islands are China's inherent territory. China's activities in the relevant waters are completely legitimate and legal.”[46]

The PRC’s especially strong objection to the Trump-Ishiba comments on Taiwan likely results from the fact that the comments signaled a new level of US-Japan alignment in opposition to what the PRC perceives to be its core interests. The US and Japanese opposition to cross-strait reunification by force is longstanding. The addition of “coercion” in the language of the joint statement, however, extends that opposition to a greatly expanded range of PRC “gray zone” activities including coast guard patrols around Taiwanese territory, coercive economic measures, cyberattacks, and other nonviolent means that the PRC has employed to intimidate or pressure Taiwan. The inclusion of “coercion” in the language also brings the joint statement more in line with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, which stipulates that the United States shall maintain the capacity “to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.”[47] The Trump-Ishiba joint statement did not include concrete commitments of action against PRC coercion but signified an intent by Japan and the United States to more strongly challenge tactics that the PRC regularly uses to advance its eventual goal of “reunification.” Beijing also views US-Japan rhetorical alignment on the Taiwan issue as part of a trend of anti-PRC coalition-building within the PRC’s home region. The PRC very likely fears that such a coalition will reduce its chance of successfully annexing Taiwan and will be used to “contain” the PRC within the First Island Chain. The PRC MFA’s reaction to the Senkaku Islands statement was relatively mild, by contrast, both because the US-Japanese position on that subject is not new and because the Senkaku Islands are of lesser importance to the PRC than Taiwan.

North Korea

A PRC regional bank is reportedly involved in facilitating financial transactions related to North Korean minerals, potentially enabling North Korea to circumvent international sanctions. South Korean media outlet Daily NK reported on February 5, citing sources in the PRC, that “Bank A” has been handling payments for mineral trade transactions between PRC companies and North Korean trading firms since January 23.[48] The UN Security Council’s sanctions under Resolution 2371 prohibit the export of North Korean minerals. The report claims that North Korea is earning “tens of thousands of yuan in monthly operating profit, with a 0.5-1% commission per transaction.” The report also accused the bank of “falsifying transaction records” to conceal large transfers of money from the PRC to North Korea and disguising the nature of the items traded. The report suggested that local PRC government officials may be cooperating with North Korean firms as import-export businesses are required to report their activities to the local authorities. Despite this, the PRC maintains that it “faithfully fulfills its due international obligations.”[49] The report’s allegations, nevertheless, would point to ongoing efforts by the PRC to help North Korea circumvent international sanctions and generate illicit revenues for its regime.

South Korea

PRC General Secretary Xi Jinping met with South Korea’s National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province on February 7, 2025.[50] The meeting reflects the PRC’s growing efforts to strengthen ties with South Korea amid its escalating trade war with the U.S. and political instability in South Korea. Woo, in China for the Asian Winter Games, invited Xi to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in South Korea in October. Xi indicated that he would seriously consider the invitation, which would mark his first visit to South Korea in 11 years.[51] Woo also addressed the PRC’s export restrictions on South Korean films and games, imposed in retaliation for South Korea’s deployment of the US-provided Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in 2017.[52] Xi acknowledged the importance of cultural exchange in bilateral relations and said that it should not be hindered by unnecessary complications.

The meeting could signal Xi’s efforts to leverage South Korea’s political instability to strengthen economic ties with South Korea amid the PRC’s intensifying trade war with the United States. US President Donald Trump imposed 10% duties on all PRC imports, to which the PRC responded with retaliatory duties.[53] South Korea, a key-US ally, is especially important to PRC efforts to weaken a US-led economic coalition. South Korea faces a leadership vacuum and an expected early presidential election in June after President Yoon Suk-yeol's impeachment. The potential presidency of Lee Jae-myung, the opposition party leader, could signal a South Korean foreign policy shift from a pro-US stance to a more balanced approach between the PRC and the United States. Xi’s meeting with Woo may indicate the PRC’s strategy to position itself favorably ahead of potential leadership changes in South Korea.

South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) accused the PRC’s artificial intelligence (AI) start-up DeekSeek of “excessively” collecting and storing user data on February 10.[54] The NIS said, “unlike other generative AI services, it has been confirmed that chat records are transferable as it includes a function to collect keyboard input patterns that can identify individuals and communicate with Chinese companies’ servers.” Several South Korean government agencies such as the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy; Ministry of National Defense; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and state-run Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power restricted or blocked access to DeepSeek for their employees due to security concerns on February 6.[55] PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said the PRC “attaches great importance to and legally protects data privacy and security,” adding that the PRC has “never demanded, nor will it require, enterprises or individuals to collect or store data in an illegal manner,” in response to the South Korean government agencies’ ban on the app.[56] South Korea joins a growing list of countries, including the United States , Australia, Italy, and the ROC, that have banned the app for government employees due to security risks.[57] The concerns are linked to the PRC’s National Intelligence Law, which could allow the state to access corporate data.[58]

Oceania

The PRC appears to be exploiting divisions between the Cook Islands and New Zealand, which have a free association arrangement.[59] The Cook Islands will sign a comprehensive strategic partnership with the PRC as the PRC seeks to expand influence and access in the South Pacific. PRC MFA spokesman Guo Jiakun said that the Cook Islands has been “an important partner of China in the South Pacific region” since relations were established in 1997 and that bilateral ties are “not directed against any third party” in a regular press conference on February 10.[60] The MFA has not released information detailing the terms of the comprehensive strategic partnership at the time of writing. A Cook Islands government readout detailed that Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown would travel to Beijing from February 10–14 to sign the agreement, which “presents an opportunity to enhance cooperation across key sectors, including trade, investment, and tourism; infrastructure; climate resilience and renewable energy; agriculture; maritime and oceans, including shipping and seabed minerals development.”[61]

New Zealand and the Cook Islands have maintained a compact of free association, through which New Zealand funds aid and defense for the Cook Islands. The Cook Islands were administered by New Zealand until 1965. The islands are now self-governing, but citizens have New Zealand passports and citizenship, and the country does not have a UN seat. The United States recognizes the Cook Islands as an independent state, however. The Cook Islands and New Zealand agreed in 2001 to maintain regular discussions on foreign policy issues of mutual interest.[62] New Zealand officials expressed surprise amid the Cook Islands’ decision to sign a deal with the PRC. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of New Zealand Winston Peters said that New Zealand was “blindsided” by the development.[63] Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown argued that the Cook Islands were not obligated to inform New Zealand because the agreement with the PRC was not germane to policing or security issues.[64] Brown also rejected accusations of “secretive” Cook Islands-PRC engagement and argued that the agreement was in the Cook Islands’ “best interest.”[65]

ISW has tracked PRC diplomatic outreach in the South Pacific and noted that foreign direct investment (FDI), security cooperation, and military diplomacy can all offer the PRC a path to improve its power projection in Oceania.[66] The Solomon Islands signed a security agreement with the PRC in March 2022 that included granting the PRC access and replenishment rights to Solomon Islands ports, as well as the right to use its armed forces to protect Chinese projects and personnel in the Solomon Islands.[67] PRC agreements with other Pacific Island states have not included such overt concessions to PRC military interests but serve to expand PRC political influence in the countries to advance Beijing’s strategic ambitions and in some cases convince the countries to abandon their support for Taiwan. A comprehensive strategic partnership with the Cook Islands could present the PRC with an opportunity to make political inroads with a country located close to New Zealand and the US territory of American Samoa. The Cook Islands has shown a willingness to reduce its dependence on New Zealand, including an announcement by Mark Brown on February 7 that the country could issue its own passports.[68]

PRC efforts to expand influence in the Pacific have faced backlash from the Five Eyes intelligence sharing group, most notably the United States and Australia. New Zealand is a Five Eyes member state but has faced criticism for taking a softer approach toward the PRC than its counterparts.[69] Current New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters expressed interest in expanding engagement with the Five Eyes and led the development of the Pacific Reset strategy, which sought to cultivate New Zealand’s ties with Pacific neighbors.[70]

Europe

The PRC’s appointment of Lu Shaye as special representative for European Affairs signals that Beijing intends to take a more aggressive posture in negotiations with the European Union. Lu Shaye was the PRC’s ambassador to France from July 2019 to December 2024. He was one of Beijing’s most controversial ambassadors due to his combative “wolf warrior” style, a term Lu embraced. The French foreign ministry summoned Lu seven times in his five-year tenure over various high-profile disputes, including his comment in April 2023 that ex-Soviet states do not have “effective status” under international law, which he made when asked whether he considered Crimea to be part of Ukraine. The Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post cited “people familiar with the case” who said Lu had lost access to any relevant French government organs by the time he left Paris.[71] Lu replaced Wu Hongbo as the PRC Special Representative for European Affairs, a role that Wu held since it was created in 2019.[72] Lu’s special representative role is distinct from the post of PRC Ambassador to the EU, which is held by another diplomat. “Special representative” is an ad hoc role that the PRC MFA creates when it sees a need to have one chief negotiator responsible for a broad region or issue area, such as European affairs, the Korean Peninsula, or climate change.

Lu’s appointment follows signs from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen that the EU may be softening its stance on the PRC. Von der Leyen, widely described in Western and PRC media as a prominent “China hawk” for her efforts to reduce the EU’s reliance on the PRC, said in a speech at the EU Ambassadors Conference on February 3 that there is “room to engage constructively with China — and find solutions in our mutual interest,” including “agreements that could even expand our trade and investment ties.”[73] She said the EU would continue “de-risking” policies to “rebalance” EU-PRC trade and investment relations, however.[74] Von der Leyen’s apparent shift toward the PRC may stem from uncertainty about the future of the US-EU economic relationship in the near term, as US President Donald Trump had promised tariffs on EU goods.[75] Trump announced on February 11 that the United States would raise tariffs on foreign aluminum and steel to 25%, prompting condemnation and a promise of “firm and proportionate countermeasures” from von der Leyen.[76]

The PRC’s promotion of Lu Shaye as its top representative to the EU likely signals Beijing’s intent to aggressively negotiate against European “de-risking” policies. The PRC may seek to take advantage of the shakiness of the EU’s economic relationship with the United States, its largest trading partner.[77] Lu’s “wolf warrior” approach is more likely to offend and alienate his European interlocutors, however, than to improve the EU-PRC trade relationship.

Lu’s appointment may also portend the PRC taking a more overtly pro-Russia stance on the war in Ukraine. The PRC’s main negotiator on the Ukraine War is Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs Li Hui, but Lu Shaye’s new role may position him as an important voice as well.[78] The PRC has consistently claimed to be an impartial mediator and voice for peace in the war in Ukraine, despite providing dual-use goods and economic support to Russia throughout the war. It has refrained from overtly endorsing Russia’s invasion and political aims, but has adopted Russian framing in many ways including defending Russia’s “legitimate security concerns” about NATO expansion, criticizing Western aid to Ukraine for “adding fuel to the fire,” opposing unilateral sanctions on Russia, proposing peace plans that do not call for withdrawing Russian troops, and refusing to call the war a war.[79] The PRC distanced itself at the time from Lu’s comments undermining the sovereignty of former Soviet states.[80] Its elevation of Lu to such a key position may signal a tacit acceptance of his views, however.

PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi is scheduled to visit the UK on February 13 to hold talks with British Foreign Secretary David Lammy for the first UK-China Strategic Dialogue since 2018.[81] The UK under Conservative leadership experienced strained relations with the PRC over issues such as the Hong Kong crackdown and allegations of human rights abuses in Xinjiang.[82] The Labour Party has made improving relations with the PRC one of its main foreign policy objectives.[83] The party acted on this rhetoric by holding numerous meetings between top UK and PRC officials since Prime Minister Keir Starmer took power in July 2024. Lammy visited Beijing in mid-October where he met with Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang and Foreign Minister Wang Yi.[84] PRC President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Kier Starmer met at the G20 summit in November 2024, the first meeting between a British PM and Xi since 2018 — the press statement stated that talks would continue.[85] British finance minister Rachel Reeves visited Beijing in mid-January in an effort to revive economic and financial talks, which were last held in 2019.[86] PRC-UK relations appear to be warming as a result of increased diplomatic engagement, which contrasts with the appointment of Lu Shaye as special representative for European Affairs due to his combative approach to foreign policy. The PRC has previously criticized the UK’s participation in the Five Eyes and AUKUS alliances due to PRC beliefs that these alliances tools used by the United States to constrain PRC activity and prevent the PRC from achieving its strategic and foreign policy goals.[87] The UK is unlikely to halt its participation in Five Eyes or AUKUS, but the PRC could be attempting to create points of division between the US and its allies.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 30, 2025

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Grant Morgan of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Nicholas Carl of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: February 4, 2025

Key Takeaways

Taiwanese civil society groups are leading a large-scale recall campaign targeting legislators from the KMT opposition party. These recalls could erode the current KMT-led majority in the LY.
The PLA flew aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ 255 times in January 2025. The PRC has normalized over 200 ADIZ incursions per month, degrading Taiwan’s threat awareness and response threshold.
PRC-based DeepSeek’s newly released reasoning model demonstrates the ineffectiveness of current US export controls to prevent PRC access to advanced semiconductors.
The PRC’s export controls on critical minerals will impede US access to materials that are essential to economic and national security.
The PLA is increasing its air and naval presence around the disputed Scarborough Shoal to solidify PRC control amid perceived encroachment by the Philippines and its allies.
Panama announced that it would withdraw from the PRC’s BRI and consider canceling PRC contracts for two ports on the Panama Canal.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

Taiwanese civil society groups are leading a large-scale recall campaign targeting legislators from the Kuomintang (KMT) opposition party. These recalls could erode the current KMT-led majority in the Legislative Yuan (LY). The Central Election Commission (CEC) has received recall petitions against 19 KMT legislators.[1] The legislative minority leader of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Ker Chien-ming, has called for mass recalls against all 41 KMT and KMT-aligned legislators in response to the KMT and its allies passing controversial cuts and freezes to the national budget, which could paralyze the government, and measures that are temporarily preventing the Constitutional Court from functioning ordinarily.[2] The DPP has criticized the budget cuts and freezes and measures against the Constitution Court, describing these actions as damaging to Taiwan’s ability to resist PRC efforts to undermine its sovereignty. The KMT retaliated by initiating recall petitions against four DPP legislators, two of which have received enough signatures to be submitted to the CEC. [3]

Taiwanese billionaire and United Microelectronics founder Robert Tsao has helped lead the anti-KMT recall campaign.[4] Tsao has previously accused the KMT and its allies of “sabotaging” the government to the benefit of the PRC. Tsao is an active supporter of strengthening Taiwan’s resilience against a potential PRC invasion, which is also a primary focus of President Lai Ching-te’s administration.

The CEC is reviewing the petitions at time of writing to assess whether they meet the threshold to initiate a recall election. Recall petitions meet the threshold if 1 percent of the electorate submits a valid signature. Any recall petitions that got the requisite number of signatures will trigger a recall election. The next step is to pass the recall motion in the recall election. The CEC currently mandates that a recall motion is passed “if the number of valid votes in favor is greater than the number of votes against” and “the number of votes in favor reaches more than one-quarter of the total number of voters in the original electoral district.”[5] Not every legislator targeted by recall petitions is from a politically competitive district; it is thus likely that many recall elections will fail to remove the targeted official.

Successful recalls of KMT legislators could empower the DPP in the LY and neutralize the opposition parties’ efforts to counter Lai’s agenda. Recall efforts offer the DPP the opportunity to regain control of the LY for the first time since the January 2024 elections. The LY currently has no majority party, with the DPP holding 51 seats, the KMT holding 54 (including two KMT-aligned independents), and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) holding eight seats. The TPP has aligned with the KMT in the LY, giving the opposition a majority in practice.[6] The DPP needs to flip at least six seats (for a total of 57) in order to gain control of the LY; a mere plurality would be insufficient as long as the TPP continues to vote with the KMT.

KMT and TPP-sponsored amendments to the Public Officials Election and Recall Act may help preserve their influence in the LY, however. They passed an amendment that requires citizens to provide copies of their ID cards — rather than just their ID numbers and addresses — when initiating or signing recall petitions. The DPP-controlled Executive Yuan returned this amendment to the LY for reconsideration on February 2, which is unlikely to prevent the amendment’s passage again but will buy additional time for recall petitions to move forward before the ID requirement is in place. The LY has 15 days to pass a bill on a second review, after which President Lai must sign the bill within 10 days.[7] KMT legislators have also proposed (but not yet passed) an amendment to raise the threshold for a recall to succeed. The amendment stipulates that a recall will only remove an official from power if more voters vote to recall the official than voted to elect the official originally.[8]

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) blocked 13 Shanghai officials from entering Taiwan for the Taipei Lantern Festival in response to allegations that the PRC obstructed PRC-based Taiwanese businesspeople from returning to Taiwan for cross-strait events. The 13 officials included the director of Shanghai’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Jin Mei. Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Minister Chiu Chui-cheng said that the decision to block the Shanghai delegation was largely based on the PRC obstructing Taiwanese businesspeople living in the PRC from returning home to join activities organized by the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF). The SEF is a semi-official Taiwanese group that organizes cross-strait exchanges and often invites PRC-based Taiwanese businesspeople to its Lunar New Year events. Chiu said that Taiwanese businesspeople based in Shanghai should logically be the largest portion of PRC-based Taiwanese who participate in such events, as Shanghai is home to many Taiwanese businesses, but there have been “very few” in recent years. Chiu added that he asked the Shanghai TAO to freely allow Shanghai-based Taiwanese to join SEF events in Taiwan the last time Shanghai officials were “testing the waters” in a cross-strait event--likely a reference to the Taipei-Shanghai Twin Cities Forum in December 2024--but there has been no improvement.[9] The SEF hosted a Spring Festival (Lunar New Year) event for PRC-based Taiwanese businesspeople on February 3 in Taipei but saw reduced attendance compared to previous years.[10] Chiu also said that the TAO delegation submitted its application to enter Taiwan too late for the MAC to review before the festival.[11] The Taipei Lantern Festival is taking place from February 2 to 16.[12] The MAC previously blocked Jin and nine PRC media figures from entering Taiwan for the Taipei-Shanghai Twin Cities Forum, citing the PRC’s military and legal coercion against Taiwan in 2024.[13]

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) flew aircraft into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) 255 times in January 2025. The PRC has normalized over 200 ADIZ incursions per month since President Lai’s inauguration in May 2024 in order to degrade Taiwan’s threat awareness and raise the threshold for its threat response. PLA incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ have exceeded 200 per month every month since May 2024 but only did so four times prior to 2024. The volume of ADIZ incursions in January was the second lowest since May but was still significantly higher than the pre-2024 average. ADIZ incursion numbers do not include PLA activity around Taiwan’s outlying islands of Kinmen and Matsu, which are west of the median line of the Taiwan Strait.[14]

This “new normal” volume of ADIZ incursions raises the threshold of coercive activity that will trigger a Taiwanese response, making it more difficult for Taiwan to detect and respond to a real threat in time. Taiwan must put personnel on standby to respond to each ADIZ incursion if necessary, which strains resources and exhausts the personnel. Taiwan does not typically scramble its own aircraft to respond to such incursions, however, because the incursions are so frequent. Taiwanese media revealed in late 2024 that the Republic of China (ROC) Ministry of National Defense (MND) quietly shortened the warning distance for air raid warnings from 70 to 24 nautical miles at the end of 2022 because the increased volume of PLA activity would have required near-daily air raid alerts under the previous threshold. The new threshold would give residents of some Taiwanese regions just three minutes to seek shelter in a real air raid, however.[15]

The MND also detected 16 PRC high-altitude balloons in Taiwan’s ADIZ in January, including seven that flew directly over Taiwan, over a total of 10 days of the month. The PRC has resumed and gradually escalated such balloon incursions since November 2024, after carrying out a much higher-volume campaign of balloon incursions in the winter of 2023–2024. The MND reported 57 balloons in Taiwan’s ADIZ in January 2024, including incursions nearly every day of the month.[16] The greatly reduced volume of balloon activity this January compared to last year strengthens ISW’s previous assessment that the 2024 balloon incursions were in part politically motivated to influence Taiwan’s election in January 2024. The balloons also support the broader ADIZ incursion campaign of wearing down Taiwan’s threat awareness, however, and may be conducting reconnaissance. The PRC TAO claimed in January 2024 that the balloons were “mostly” meteorological and “mostly” launched by private enterprises, even though they flew much lower than most meteorological balloons.[17] The balloons’ true purpose and intelligence gathering potential remains unclear, but even collecting standard meteorological data over Taiwan can be useful for planning missile strikes.[18]

China

The success of PRC-based artificial intelligence (AI) company DeepSeek’s newly released reasoning model demonstrates the ineffectiveness of current US export controls to prevent PRC access to advanced semiconductors. DeepSeek released its new reasoning model called R1 in January. R1 demonstrated competitive performance that is on par with leading models from the United States, such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT. One of the primary goals of US export controls on advanced semiconductors to the PRC is to inhibit the PRC’s development of AI to support its military modernization efforts, including applying AI to improve the speed and accuracy of military decision making, planning, and logistics.[19]

US government entities, including the White House, Department of Commerce, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), are investigating whether DeepSeek used semiconductors that are subject to PRC-focused export restrictions to develop R1.[20] Investigating agencies are specifically trying to determine whether DeepSeek used intermediaries in Singapore to circumvent US export controls and purchase Nvidia chips, according to Bloomberg.[21] Nvidia is the dominant provider of advanced semiconductors that are optimized to train generative AI models, maintaining a market share of approximately 80 percent.[22]

Singapore’s Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) stated on February 1 that many of Nvidia’s customers use their business entities in Singapore to purchase chips that are produced for consumption in the United States and Western countries.[23] Nvidia’s financial and regulatory statements disclosed that approximately 22 percent of the company’s revenue was attributed to shipments to Singapore in 2024 but that “most shipments associated with Singapore were to locations other than Singapore, and shipments to Singapore were insignificant.”[24] Nvidia’s financial and regulatory statements disclosed that approximately 22 percent of the company’s revenue was attributed to shipments to Singapore in 2024 but that “most shipments associated with Singapore were to locations other than Singapore, and shipments to Singapore were insignificant.”[25] MTI stated that it expects US companies to comply with US export controls and that Singapore’s customs and law enforcement agencies would continue to work with US counterparts to uphold the restrictions.[26] MTI noted in the same statement that “Nvidia has also stated that there is no reason to believe that DeepSeek obtained any export-controlled products from Singapore.”

The US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) implemented expanded export controls in October 2023 on advanced semiconductors to more than 40 additional countries that presented a risk of diversion to the PRC, but this list did not include Singapore.[27] US legislators John Moolenaar and Raja Krishnamoorthi of the House Select Committee on the CCP wrote in a January 30 letter to National Security Advisor Mike Waltz that “countries like Singapore should be subject to strict licensing requirements absent a willingness to crack down on PRC transshipment through their territory.”[28] BIS placed additional entities from the PRC and Singapore on the Entity List on January 15 for violating US export controls on advanced semiconductors, however.[29]

DeepSeek’s development of R1 could have used either chips that were shipped before export restrictions were implemented or chips that are currently excluded from export restrictions, which would demonstrate the need to further tighten the performance limits of chips that currently qualify for shipment to the PRC. Nvidia released two downgraded variants of its top AI semiconductors, the H800 and H20, to accommodate increasingly stringent performance limits for the chips that it can sell to the PRC. The United States expanded export restrictions in October 2023 to include Nvidia’s H800 chips.[30] DeepSeek’s researchers stated in a December 27 report that the company used 2,048 H800 chips to train its V3 model, which it may have legally purchased before October 2023.[31] The H20 chip is currently outside the scope of US export controls and accessible to PRC companies, such as DeepSeek.

DeepSeek’s competitive AI performance highlights the failure of current semiconductor export controls against the PRC in inhibiting AI development, whether due to illegal trans-shipment or insufficiently inclusive restrictions.

The PRC is constructing a massive military complex in western Beijing that is estimated to be ten times the size of the Pentagon, according to anonymous current and former US officials that spoke to the Financial Times (FT).[32] US intelligence officials are reportedly examining satellite images of the approximately 1,500-acre construction project, which began in mid-2024. The exact purpose of the facility is still unclear. Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) geospatial intelligence analyst Decker Eveleth noted that the satellite imagery suggests significant portions of the facility will be underground.[33] Taiwanese security experts expressed doubts about the facility’s utility as a bunker, however. Hsu Yen-chi of the Council on Strategic and Wargaming Studies, a Taiwan-based think tank, speculated that the new military facility could serve administrative or training purposes due to its size.[34]

The PRC currently lacks an equivalent to the Pentagon or a centralized Ministry of Defense facility that integrates facilities across domains. These new facilities could reflect a PRC effort to integrate command and control as the PLA works to improve interoperability across domains. An unnamed US official told FT that the facility will likely replace the PRC’s Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Operations Command Center in the Western Hills of Beijing, which is currently near the top of the chain of command to alert or use nuclear weapons.[35] This would align with ongoing PRC efforts to centralize and streamline the command and control of the PLA. The US Department of Defense (DoD) 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR) assessed that the PLA is working toward improving its ability to conduct joint operations.[36] The PRC has taken several measures to this end in recent years, including the creation of a new military support branch in April 2024 that is focused on optimizing information networks to achieve rapid and informed decision-making.

The PRC announced retaliatory economic measures against the United States on February 4 in response to the US implementation of 10 percent tariffs on PRC imports. The PRC’s measures include a 15 percent tariff on US coal and liquefied natural gas (LNG) products and a 10 percent tariff on crude oil, agricultural machinery, large-displacement cars, and pickup trucks.[37] The tariffs will take effect on February 10. The comparatively narrow scope of PRC tariffs on US imports indicates the PRC’s reluctance to enact reciprocal measures, which likely stems from a desire to limit the impact of trade tensions on domestic consumption. The PRC Ministry of Commerce stated its intent to file a lawsuit against the United States with the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the grounds that the US 10 percent tariffs on PRC imports violate WTO rules and disrupt global supply chains. The PRC’s appeal to a supranational authority and framing of US tariffs as detrimental to the global economy is consistent with PRC narratives that aim to portray it as a champion of multilateralism and free trade while characterizing the United States as protectionist and unilateral.[38]

The PRC State Administration for Market Regulation announced an anti-monopoly investigation against Google the same day.[39] The PRC also added biotechnology company Illumina and PVH, the holding company for clothing brands such as Calvin Klein and Tommy Hilfiger, to the “unreliable entity list” for “discriminatory measures against Chinese enterprises,” which could potentially subject the companies to fines and sanctions. [40]

The PRC’s export controls on critical minerals will inhibit US access to materials that are essential to economic and national security. The PRC implemented export controls on 25 products related to bismuth, indium, molybdenum, tellurium, and tungsten on February 4, likely as part of its retaliation for US tariffs. The PRC Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) framed the measures as a legitimate and “internationally accepted practice” taken out of concern for national security.[41]

The US Department of Interior designates all five of these minerals as critical minerals. These minerals have a range of applications in civilian and defense production. Tungsten is used in military-grade steel production, aerospace components, armor-piercing munitions, missiles, and ground vehicle armor.[42] Molybdenum is used in the production of aerospace parts, heat radiation shields, jet engines, missiles, vehicle and body armor, and as an alloying agent to strengthen steel.[43] Indium is used in the production of phone screens, television displays, fiber optics, solar cells, control rods for nuclear reactors, and semiconductors.[44] Bismuth is used in the production of ammunition, thermoelectric devices, solder, and as an alloying agent.[45] Tellurium is used in the production of night vision and thermal imaging devices, solar batteries, radar, explosives detectors, and thermoelectric devices.[46] Unclassified inventories of US National Defense Stockpiles (NDS) of critical minerals did not include bismuth, indium, molybdenum, or tellurium as of September 2022.[47] The PRC is the dominant producer for all five of these critical minerals, and in some cases, the largest source supplier of US imports.[48]

The PRC’s dominant position in the supply chain extends to a variety of other critical minerals, many of which already have restricted US access. The PRC issued an outright ban on the export of critical minerals gallium, germanium, antimony, and superhard materials to the United States and implemented tighter controls on exports of graphite on December 3 in response to US semiconductor export restrictions directed at the PRC.[49] The United States’ annual demand for some of those critical minerals, such as antimony, exceeds any other single country’s mining production.[50] The PRC’s latest export controls on critical minerals are likely part of its asymmetric response to US tariffs that aims to use targeted measures to pressure the United States without escalating into a trade war.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The Philippines National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) arrested five PRC nationals from January 24–25 for spying on Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) ships and photographing military bases while posing as Taiwanese tourists.[51] The PRC nationals allegedly installed surveillance cameras on coconut trees facing the sea to monitor PCG activity, operated drones without authorization, and photographed military facilities.[52] Philippine authorities recovered footage from the drones and military-grade, high-resolution video cameras disguised to look like CCTV. Philippine Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Romeo Brawner Jr. said during a press conference on January 30 that the recovered video footage was sent in real time to a remote location.[53] NBI Director James Santiago said that the alleged spies monitored the activities of a naval detachment, coast guard ships, an air base, a naval base, and a dockyard in the Philippines’ Palawan province. Palawan the closest major landmass to the Spratly Islands, which is a group of islands in the South China Sea that the Philippines contests with the PRC. Philippine officials discovered photographs in the suspects’ mobile devices of a PCG station, small navy crafts and assets, and PCG vessels BRP Teresa Magbanua and BRP Gabriela Silang.[54] The former PCG vessel is frequently deployed to the South China Sea and is the victim of aggressive PRC coercion tactics during confrontational encounters near disputed features.[55]

Philippine authorities suspect the PRC nationals operated in a spy network and are trying to identify other potential accomplices. The NBI stated that the five individuals in this case were working with PRC national Deng Yuanqing, who was arrested on January 17 on espionage charges for driving around a car that transmitted topographic information as well as for surveilling military bases and other critical infrastructure in the Philippine island of Luzon.[56] The five PRC nationals arrested on January 24-25 claimed to be members of civic groups Qiaoxing Volunteer Group of the Philippines and the Philippine-China Association of Promotion of Peace and Friendship. NBI Director Santiago said that they also befriended local officials.[57]

The PRC condemned the Philippine military’s announcement that the US-supplied Typhon missile system would be used during unilateral drills in mid-February. The PRC views the missile system, which is stationed in Luzon, as a threat to its security. The upcoming Philippine exercise, which is a continuation of previous drills from 2024, will help to prepare Philippine forces for larger, joint drills with the United States that are scheduled for later this year.[58] The United Stated began deploying the Typhon missile system within the Philippines for joint operations as part of the Balikatan Exercise in April 2024.[59] The system was placed on the north side of the island of Luzon and has remained deployed there despite criticism from the PRC and premature announcements from Philippine officials that it would be removed.[60] The Philippines said in December 2024 that it plans to acquire the missile system from the United States.[61]

The PRC has stated that the system’s deployment could represent a new regional arms race that could jeopardize regional security and increase geopolitical confrontation.[62] The PRC likely views the Typhon system’s deployment as a threat to potential future naval operations, as the system can launch Tomahawk missiles with the range to reach targets in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the mainland PRC.[63] The PRC views expanding US-Philippines military cooperation more broadly as undermining its long-term strategy of achieving regional hegemony and solidifying control of its claimed territory, such as Taiwan and the South China Sea.[64]

Philippine President Ferdinand "Bongbong" Romualdez Marcos Jr in response to ongoing PRC criticism said on January 31 that he was willing to remove the Typhon system from the Philippines if the PRC would cease its operations in the West Philippine Sea--the part of the South China Sea where the Philippines claims territory.[65] Marcos called on the PRC to “Stop claiming our territory, stop harassing our fishermen and let them have a living, stop ramming our boats, stop water cannoning our people, stop firing lasers at us, and stop your aggressive and coercive behavior, and we’ll return the Typhon missiles.”[66] PRC officials have yet to comment on the statement from Marcos.

The PLA is increasing its air and naval presence around the disputed Scarborough Shoal to solidify PRC control amid perceived encroachment by the Philippines and its allies. The PLA Southern Theater Command (STC) conducted “combat readiness patrols” in the territorial sea and airspace around Scarborough Shoal on January 31. It conducted additional “routine patrols” on February 4 and 5.[67] The STC stated that it has “consistently enhanced patrols and vigilance in the surrounding waters and airspace of Huangyan Dao (Scarborough Shoal)” since the beginning of January to strengthen the PRC’s control over the area.[68] The PLA air patrol on February 4 coincided with a joint US-Philippine air patrol and interception drill over the South China Sea, including near Scarborough Shoal.[69] STC spokesperson Tian Junli accused the Philippines of “collud[ing] with a foreign country to organize a so-called ‘joint patrol’ to deliberately undermine peace and stability in the South China Sea.” There were no reports of confrontations between the militaries, however. The PLA previously confronted Philippine aircraft on patrol near Scarborough Shoal in August 2024 and fired flares in their flight path, triggering condemnation from the Philippine government.[70] The increased PLA activity around Scarborough Shoal is in addition to the China Coast Guard’s continuous presence west of the Philippine province of Zambales, which is near Scarborough Shoal, since the beginning of 2025.[71]

Scarborough Shoal is an uninhabited atoll that the Philippines, PRC, and ROC all claim. The PRC seized the shoal from the Philippines in 2012 by surrounding it with coast guard vessels to block Philippine entry. It has not built any infrastructure on the shoal, however, apparently in keeping with the 2002 PRC-ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which stated that signatories shall not inhabit any previously uninhabited islands, reefs, or other features in the sea.[72] The Philippines has attempted to reassert control over Scarborough Shoal by conducting air and sea patrols in the area as well as using government ships to resupply Philippine fishermen that maintain a consistent presence in the area. The PRC has opposed such efforts with its own coast guard and military forces, including by blasting Philippine ships with water cannons and warding off Philippine planes with air interceptions and flares.

A PLA destroyer sailed through the Basilan Strait between the Philippine islands of Mindanao and Basilan for the first time. A PLA Navy (PLAN) Type 055 stealth missile destroyer, a type 054A frigate, and a Type 903 replenishment ship sailed through the Basilan Strait toward the Sulu Sea on February 2. PRC state broadcaster CCTV later aired footage of the ships carrying out far-seas combat training at an undisclosed location in the Pacific Ocean. Philippine officials expressed concern about the PLA warships so close to Philippine territory, while the Philippines’ Western Mindanao Command stated that it was tracking the three ships in what it described as “Philippine waters.”[73] STC spokesperson Tian Junli disputed the Philippine characterization of the transit and criticized the Philippines for “hyping” what he called a “normal transit” that was “fully in line with international law.”[74]

Russia

A US-sanctioned tanker unloaded Russian oil in the PRC after being forced to change its destination from Shandong Province, whose main port authority banned sanctioned tankers at its ports. The threat of US secondary sanctions is increasing PRC sanctions compliance and raising costs on sanctioned countries that trade with the PRC. Bloomberg reported that the tanker Huihai Pacific unloaded 770,000 of crude oil from the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline at the major PRC port of Tianjin after an unusually long sea journey of nearly four weeks. The ship loaded its cargo at the Russian Pacific port of Kozmino on January 5 and departed for the port of Dongjiakou in the PRC’s Shandong province, a journey that typically takes about one week.[75] Reuters reported on January 7 that the Shandong Port Group, a provincial state-owned enterprise that operates Shandong’s major ports, banned US-sanctioned tankers from unloading goods at its ports. The Huihai Pacific was not on that sanctions list when it left Kozmino. The US Department of Treasury imposed sanctions on the Huihai Pacific on January 10, however, as one of 183 oil tankers that it identified as part of Russia’s “shadow fleet.” The Huihai Pacific is registered in Panama and owned by a Hong Kong company, which until recently allowed it to operate unhindered by the sanctions imposed on Russia.[76] The tanker ultimately had to change its destination from Shandong to another PRC port, which greatly delayed its journey.

Shandong is home to many independent oil refiners that are the biggest importers of oil from US-sanctioned countries in the PRC. Shandong imported about 1.74 million barrels per day of oil from Russia, Iran, and Venezuela in 2024, accounting for about 17 percent of the PRC’s oil imports.[77] The Shandong Port Group controls many major Chinese ports, including Yantai, Rizhao, and Qingdao. The threat of secondary sanctions, including the potential loss of access to the US financial system, has been effective at compelling some PRC entities, such as Shandong Port Group and many banks, to cease business with sanctioned Russian entities. Shandong’s compliance with US sanctions will increase shipping costs for independent refiners, possibly to the point of making them unprofitable, since many of them operate on thin margins and buy sanctioned oil because it is sold at a discount. It will also make it more difficult and less profitable for US-sanctioned countries, such as Russia, to sell oil in the PRC. The sanctions will likely push Chinese oil refineries to seek alternative sources elsewhere in the Middle East, Africa, and the Americas and curb the PRC’s access to cheap oil resources.[78] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Guo Jiakun claimed on January 8 to be unaware of Shandong Port Group’s ban but stated that the PRC opposes “illegal unilateral sanctions” by the United States.[79]

Africa

South Africa

South Africa demanded that Taiwan's representative office leave the administrative capital of Pretoria by the end of March in an effort by South Africa to strengthen ties with the PRC. The Taiwanese foreign ministry stated that it received a letter in late January from the South African government reiterating demands for the de-facto Taiwanese embassy, the Taipei Liaison Office, to leave Pretoria and rename itself as a trade office.[80] South Africa and Taiwan have no formal diplomatic relations but maintain unofficial ties. South Africa first verbally requested that the Taipei Liaison Office move from Pretoria in December 2023, then issued another request in April 2024, before finally giving an ultimatum on October 7, 2024, for the office to move or close.[81] The Taiwanese foreign ministry suggested that the renewed demands are a result of the PRC sanctioning the federal chairman of the South Africa’s Democratic Alliance, Ivan Meyer, after he visited Taiwan in January 2025.[82] The Democratic Alliance is a major political party in South Africa that has been part of the ruling coalition with the African National Congress (ANC) since the 2024 elections.

Latin America

Panama

Panama announced that it would withdraw from the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and consider canceling contracts that allow a Hong Kong-based company to operate two ports on the Panama Canal after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned Panama to curtail PRC influence in the country. Rubio told Panamanian President Jose Raul Mulino during a meeting between the two in Panama City on February 2 that the United States would “take measures necessary to protect its rights” if Panama failed to curtail PRC influence over the Panama Canal.[83] The Donald Trump administration has accused the PRC of undue influence over the canal, a strategic waterway through which up to 40 percent of US seaborne trade passes.[84] Bloomberg estimated that 75 percent of the cargo passing through the canal is traveling to or from the United States.[85] A US State Department readout stated that “President Trump has made a preliminary determination that the current position of influence and control of the Chinese Communist Party over the Panama Canal area is a threat to the canal and represents a violation of the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal.”[86] The 1977 treaty, which returned the Panama Canal from the United States to Panama, stipulates that the United States may intervene militarily if a conflict or foreign power affects the canal’s operations.[87] Rubio and the Trump administration specifically objected to the presence of two Panama Canal ports controlled by a Hong-Kong based company, which they claimed violated the treaty.[88] Ports situated at either end of the canal—Cristobal and Balboa—are run by Panama Ports Co., which is part of Hutchison Ports, a subsidiary of Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison Holdings.[89] US Senator Ted Cruz objected to the construction of a PRC-funded bridge over the Panama Canal as well, arguing that the PRC could use the bridge to block the canal without warning.[90]

PRC MFA spokeswoman Mao Ning stated in a press conference on January 22 that “China does not participate in the management and operation of the canal and never interferes in canal affairs.”[91] Hutchison is not a state-owned enterprise and does not control access to the canal. It is responsible only for supplying and loading container ships at its ports.[92] Hutchison’s involvement in the port also predates BRI, which PRC President Xi Jinping inaugurated in 2013. Hutchison has provided logistical services at the two ports since 1997.[93] There are three other ports in the Panama Canal, which are owned and operated by US, Singaporean, and Taiwanese companies.

Panama’s withdrawal from BRI represents a loss of one of the PRC’s key soft power tools in Latin America. Panama was the first Latin American country to sign onto BRI in 2017, shortly after it switched its diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC. Panama renewed this memorandum of understanding in 2020 and 2023. Panamanian President Mulino, after his meeting with Rubio, said that Panama will not renew its participation in 2026, the next time it comes up for renewal, and will consider early withdrawal.[94] Twenty-two Latin American and Caribbean countries, including Panama, were formal BRI members at the end of 2024.[95] Western observers have accused the PRC of using BRI to spread its influence and advance its model of governance and portray itself as a leader of the Global South.[96] PRC economic and political influence in Panama via BRI contributes to US concerns over neutrality in a place where the United States has significant economic security concerns.[97]

The impact of Panama’s withdrawal from BRI on existing infrastructure projects, as well as projects currently under construction, is unclear. Rubio’s visit appears to have set in motion controversies against CK Hutchison, however. Two Panamanian lawyers accused the Hutchison subsidiary of violating Panama’s constitution and failing to pay taxes and benefits; they filed to cancel this 1997 concession on February 4.[98] Panamanian President Jose Raul Mulino has also announced that Panama is considering cancelling Hutchison’s contracts over its two Panama Canal ports.[99] The PRC-backed bridge over the canal is still under construction at the time of writing, however. PRC MFA spokesman Lin Jian deflected a question about Panama’s withdrawal from BRI and said that PRC-Panama cooperation was “proceeding normally” in a regular press conference on February 5.[100] A spokesperson for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) said that the Hong Kong government does not interfere in the affairs of Hong Kong businesses and that Hong Kong opposes any country’s interference in normal business operations.[101]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 24, 2025

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Frank Mattimoe of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek and Yeji Chung of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: January 28, 2025

Key Takeaways

New restrictions on Taiwan’s Constitutional Court procedures went into effect without a constitutional review after President William Lai Ching-te signed them into law. The amendments will paralyze the court’s ability to review laws until the Legislative Yuan (LY) approves new judicial nominees to fill vacant seats.
Constituents and political organizers in Taiwan have begun recall campaigns for 35 KMT legislators and 4 DPP legislators amid rising discord within the LY. Mass recalls of KMT legislators are unlikely to give the DPP control of the LY but could increase partisan infighting and anti-DPP sentiment in the opposition.
Taiwan indicted retired Lieutenant General Kao An-kuo and five others for organizing an armed group in collaboration with the CCP to aid the PLA in the event of an invasion against Taiwan. Kao is Taiwan's highest-ranked former military officer to be accused of espionage.
The Chinese Coast Guard and Philippines Coast Guard continued their standoff in the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone for the 4th week as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) “allowed” a resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal and prevented Philippines fisheries bureau vessels from collecting sand samples at Sandy Cay for scientific research.
Anonymous security officials from two Western countries said that two Iranian-flagged cargo vessels will deliver over 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate, a key ingredient in missile propellant, from the PRC to Iran in the next few weeks.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

New restrictions on Taiwan’s Constitutional Court procedures went into effect without a constitutional review after President William Lai Ching-te signed them into law. The amendments will paralyze the court’s ability to review laws until the Legislative Yuan (LY) approves new judicial nominees to fill vacant seats. Republic of China (ROC - Taiwan) President Lai signed amendments to the Constitutional Court Procedure Act (CCPA) into law on January 23. The law went into effect on January 25, though Lai and his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) requested a constitutional review and an injunction.[1] The new law requires at least 10 justices (out of a total of 15 seats on the court) to be present to hear a case, and at least nine of them to vote a law unconstitutional. The current court has only eight sitting justices, since the terms of seven justices expired in October. The LY rejected all of Lai’s nominees to fill the vacancies in December. The law will thus impede the court from striking down any legislation that the LY passes until the LY approves at least two new justices, removing the DPP’s last recourse for preventing the implementation of laws passed by the opposition-controlled legislature.

The Constitutional Court said that it was handling the case “in accordance with the law” and had not made a ruling as of January 24. “In accordance with the law” may mean that the court will not hear the case until it has at least 10 justices; the court did not clearly state this, however. A constitutional review of the new CCPA amendments without the requisite 10 justices would violate the new law and trigger a constitutional crisis in Taiwan.[2] The court can strike down the law in the future when it does have at least 10 justices, however. The current eight justices are all DPP appointees. The Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) thus have an incentive to continue blocking Lai’s judicial nominees as long as possible if they wish to remove the court as an obstacle to their legislative agenda, such as the large budget cuts they passed on January 21 – including to the defense budget – and the recall procedure amendments. Lai has yet to nominate replacement candidates for the court.

Both the paralysis of the court and the constitutional crisis that will ensue if it violates the law to make a ruling will increase the dysfunction in Taiwan’s government to the benefit of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The paralysis of the court will make the Lai administration unable to block major budget cuts and other obstacles to executive power that will hamper Taiwan’s ability to fund and operate its military, coast guard, and various civil defense initiatives which it uses to resist PRC coercion and infiltration. A constitutional crisis, on the other hand, will worsen the deep divisions between the ruling and opposition parties and further the impression that Taiwan’s government cannot function properly, an impression that will reduce the faith that the Taiwanese people and Taiwan’s international partners have in the Lai administration.

Taiwan’s Executive Yuan asked the LY to hold a revote on new legislation that would alter the requirements for recalling elected officials. DPP legislators criticized the KMT's and TPP’s proposed legislation for making it much more difficult to recall elected officials.[3] The LY passed the KMT’s proposed changes to the Public Officials Election and Recall Act on December 20, with provisions requiring petitioners to submit copies of their IDs when initiating or signing a recall effort.[4] The DPP has widely criticized these new amendments for placing an undue burden on voters and making it more difficult to recall elected legislators. The KMT-led Legislative Yuan submitted the amendment to the Executive Yuan for deliberation just before the end of the workday on January 24, ahead of the week-long Lunar New Year holiday, an act that Taiwan Premier Cho Jung-tai called a “nakedly political calculation.” The Cabinet asked the Legislative Yuan to reconsider the legislation in a second vote. The LY is likely to pass the legislation again on a second vote, the request for which must first be approved by President Lai, as it can do so with a simple majority, after which President William Lai Ching-te will have to sign the amendments.[5]

Constituents and political organizers in Taiwan have begun recall campaigns for 35 KMT legislators and 4 DPP legislators amid rising discord within the LY. Mass recalls of KMT legislators are unlikely to give the DPP control of the LY but could increase partisan infighting and anti-DPP sentiment in the opposition.[6] DPP Legislative Minority leader Ker Chien-ming proposed recalling all 41 KMT and KMT-aligned directly elected legislators on January 21 following the announcement of KMT-led budget cuts, though not all DPP legislators agree with widespread recalls of KMT legislators.[7] Various civic groups have initiated signature campaigns to recall 35 of the legislators across the country. The KMT has retaliated with recall petitions against four DPP legislators so far. Taiwanese law states that at least 1% of the total voters in a district need to sign proposals for recall to trigger a recall election. If a majority votes to recall the official and the number of “yes” votes is at least one-quarter of the total number of voters in the original election district, the official is removed from their position. A special election must be held within three months to fill the position.[8]

The LY currently has no clear majority party, with the DPP holding 51 seats, the KMT holding 54 (including two KMT-aligned independents), and the TPP holding 8 seats. The TPP has largely aligned with the KMT in the LY, thus giving the opposition a majority in practice. 13 KMT lawmakers, 13 DPP lawmakers, and all eight TPP lawmakers were appointed to their seats through proportional representation rather than direct election and thus have no direct constituency that can recall them. Not all of the 35 KMT legislators targeted by recall efforts so far live in politically competitive districts, so a mass recall of all KMT legislators is highly unlikely. The DPP could gain the 57 seats necessary for a majority if it can successfully recall six KMT legislators, win the special elections to replace them, and maintain all of its current seats, however. Recall group organizers have stated their desire to hold these votes as quickly as possible in order to initiate a recall before the KMT and TPP-proposed amendments come into effect and make such efforts more difficult.[9]

Taiwan indicted retired Lieutenant General Kao An-kuo and five others for organizing an armed group in collaboration with the CCP to aid the PLA in the event of an invasion against Taiwan. Kao is Taiwan's highest-ranked former military officer to be accused of espionage. The Taiwan High Prosecutors Office indicted retired Army Lieutenant General Kao An-kuo and five others for violating Articles Two and Seven of the National Security Act.[10] The Ministry of National Defense’s Political Warfare Bureau initially reported the group’s activities in 2022.[11] Kao allegedly formed and led the pro-unification group "Republic of China Taiwan Military Government” in 2018 in order to establish armed units and operational bases in Taiwan to assist the PLA in the event of an invasion of Taiwan.[12] The group allegedly also received funding from the CCP amounting to NT$9.62 million (over a quarter million USD) and met with CCP intelligence officers in the PRC as cross-strait “exchanges.”[13] China Unification Promotion Party (CUPP) President Chang An-lo notably assisted the group’s travel between the PRC and Taiwan. The Ministry of the Interior is currently trying to forcibly disband the CUPP for interfering in Taiwanese politics on behalf of the CCP. [14]

Kao and his group allegedly attempted to recruit active-duty military personnel to gather classified information and surveil strategic deployments. They also allegedly used drones to practice surveillance operations on mobile military radar vehicles and over combat exercises.[15] Kao’s indicted co-conspirators included his girlfriend Liu Yi-chen, Taiwan military spokesman Hou Shao-kang, retired Army Command Logistics Department Major Chang Sheng-hao, retired Army Lieutenant Chiu Rong-hung, and an individual named Chen Jing-huai.[16] A spokesperson from the Ministry of National Defense said that no active-duty personnel are involved in the case and there have not been significant leakages of national defense information.[17] Kao had previously attended a forum in Xiamen, PRC, in 2014 with other retired generals to call on the Taiwanese army to not prevent the PLA from attacking Taiwan, and he also published a highly controversial YouTube video calling for the military to overthrow the DPP-led government in 2021.[18] Taiwan's National Security Bureau report on January 12 highlighted that PRC intelligence operatives have actively attempted to recruit retired and active-duty military officers, as noted in previous ISW coverage, and that two-thirds of spies had a ROC military affiliation.[19] This particular case differs from typical espionage cases in that Kao is the highest-ranked former military official charged with espionage in Taiwanese history, and he was allegedly actively organizing and training armed collaborators on behalf of the CCP. [20]

KMT legislator Jessica Chen Yu-jen from Kinmen met with the Director of the PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Song Tao at a PRC-organized Lunar New Year ball in Fujian and called on Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) to allow PRC tourists to visit Taiwan. Chen stated that Beijing already allowed tour groups from Shanghai and Fujian Province to visit Taipei, though Taipei has not yet approved the applications for any PRC tour groups. She called for the MAC to continue to welcome tourists and restart issuing visas for trips to Kinmen.[21] Taiwan’s Kinmen County, an archipelago located just two miles from the PRC, holds broadly pro-KMT and PRC-friendly views. Local KMT politicians have expressed support for a free trade zone with the PRC and the construction of a bridge between Kinmen and Xiamen, a nearby PRC city.[22]

Chen has previously been active in negotiations and ties with the PRC. She joined a delegation of KMT legislators visiting Beijing in April 2024 as part of a trip to “break the ice” between Taiwan and the PRC before President Lai’s inauguration and participated in negotiations to release a Taiwanese fisherman who had been held in the PRC for nearly five months.[23] Secretary-general of the DPP Legislative Yuan Caucus Rosalia Wu Szu-yao criticized Chen for attending the TAO-organized ball. She criticized the lawmaker’s efforts to cut the Ministry of Culture’s public television budget and then go to a TAO-organized event “to please China.[24]

The PRC has sought to expand economic integration between its Fujian province and Taiwan, particularly in the last few months. Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Wang Huning, the CCP’s top-ranked official responsible for Taiwan Affairs, unveiled a plan for the “integrated development” of Taiwan with the PRC in 2023 to make Fujian “into a model region for attracting Taiwanese businesspeople and youthful immigrants.”[25] Fujian’s efforts to increase cross-strait integration include measures to make it easier for Taiwanese nationals, especially from the offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu, to live, work, study, and travel in Fujian. Measures have included issuing PRC ID cards to Taiwanese residents of Fujian and recruiting Taiwanese officials in local governments.[26] The PRC has likely de-emphasized coercive measures against Kinmen that it began in early 2024, including incursions into Kinmen’s prohibited waters, military exercises near Kinmen, and aggressive law enforcement against Kinmen fishermen, to avoid alienating Kinmen residents and politicians as it promotes policies of “peaceful integration.”

The Taiwanese government has created a blacklist of 52 PRC-owned ships that warrant greater scrutiny to keep track of the PRC’s growing “shadow fleet” of ostensibly commercial vessels that act on behalf of the PRC.[27] The Tokyo Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), an inter-governmental co-operative organization in the Asia-Pacific devoted to ensuring effective port state control, passed on a list of “problematic” ships to Taiwan, which the Taiwanese government later narrowed down to certain ships owned by PRC individuals or entities. The list focuses on cargo ships that are registered in Cameroon, Tanzania, Mongolia, Togo, and Sierra Leone. These five countries have the largest number of ships with problematic documentation, violations of maritime safety and labor regulations, or evasion of sanctions, according to Tokyo MOU.[28]

Taiwan’s creation of the list follows an incident on January 3 in which the PRC-owned, Tanzania-flagged cargo ship Xing Shun 39 severed an undersea cable off the coast of Taiwan, in what the Taiwanese Coast Guard noted was a possible act of PRC sabotage. The ship was also registered in Cameroon as the Shun Xing 39. Public ship tracking data revealed the vessel’s erratic voyage path off the northern coast of Taiwan coast for several months, during which time it switched its automatic identification system (AIS) code to display different names and countries of registration over a dozen times.[29] The ship departed the area for Busan, South Korea, after the cable damage occurred, prompting the Taiwanese Coast Guard to ask South Korean authorities to question the captain and crew of seven PRC nationals when the ship arrived at its destination. The Taiwanese Coast Guard Administration (CGA) stated on January 7 that its parent agency, the Ocean Affairs Council, convened an interagency meeting to create contingency plans for responding to and investigating future undersea cable damage incidents.[30] Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced on January 15 that it would strengthen maritime surveillance by the coast guard and navy in four areas around Taiwan where undersea cables are located.[31]

The Taiwanese Coast Guard also boarded the Mongolia-flagged, PRC-owned freighter Bao Shun on January 23. Taiwan’s blacklist designates the ship as a medium threat.[32] The Taiwanese Coast Guard instructed the ship to leave Taiwanese waters after it had lingered off the coast for two months near areas with a high density of undersea cables.

Chief Executive Officer Ho Cheng-hui of the Taiwanese non-profit civil defense organization Kuma Academy characterized the cable-cutting incident on January 3 as a test by the PRC to gauge international tolerance for its gray zone activities against Taiwan.[33] Ho noted the that PRC sabotage against Taiwanese infrastructure has created a strategic imperative for Taiwan to increase its telecommunications resilience with low and medium Earth orbit satellites. An AEI-ISW report from May 2024 on PRC short-of-war coercion against Taiwan highlighted the high likelihood that the PRC would attempt to informationally isolate the island in a concerted coercion campaign through undersea cable-cutting and other forms of sabotage and electronic warfare.[34]

ROC legislative speaker Han Kuo-yu and his delegation met with US officials to discuss opportunities for US-ROC cooperation following US President Donald Trump’s inauguration in Washington, DC. The ROC delegation met with 24 members of the US Congress including House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman Michael McCaul and Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation chairman Ted Cruz on January 21.[35] The Taiwanese group also met with US think tanks. Discussions focused on US-Taiwan relations, culture, education, technology, and commerce as well as ROC security.[36] Taiwanese delegates discussed the pharmaceutical industry and maritime patrols as potential areas for US-ROC cooperation. The delegation was united in its stance against double taxation.[37]

Han said that he was impressed with the “strength of cross-party support for Taiwan in the U.S. Congress.”[38] Han’s tripartisan delegation of legislators from the KMT, DPP, and TPP were in Washington to attend Donald Trump’s inauguration but were initially unable to attend it in person after the event was moved indoors. Han told Taiwanese media, however, that he and Taiwan’s representative to the United States Alexander Yui Tah-ray ultimately were able to view the inauguration from Emancipation Hall at the Capitol Visitor Center, a short distance from Trump.[39]

The Trump administration has given early signals of its intent to maintain informal defense ties with Taiwan despite maintaining a hardline stance economically. Trump’s first administration increased the frequency of US naval transits through the Taiwan Strait while presiding over lower levels of arms sales to Taiwan than the Obama administration.[40] Trump reportedly called Taiwan “a major issue for world peace” and signaled his administration’s intent to address the situation in Taiwan in a meeting with former Japanese first lady Akie Abe in December 2024.[41] ROC National Security Council deputy secretaries-general Lin Fei-fan and Hsu Szu-chien traveled to Washington, DC, to meet with “people connected to President-elect Donald Trump’s transition team” in December 2024.[42] Trump announced new tariffs against Taiwanese steel, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors on January 27.[43] ROC Economic Affairs Minister Kuo Jyh-huei said that he anticipated that Trump’s tariffs would have little economic impact. The Ministry said that it would “cooperate between the two sides to ensure that Taiwan’s and US’ industries and national interests can develop in a mutually beneficial way in the face of global challenges.”[44] The Trump administration has yet to appoint new officials to lead the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the de facto US embassy in Taiwan, at time of writing.[45]

China

PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi held a phone call with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio to discuss the direction of US-PRC relations during President Donald Trump’s second term. Secretary Rubio told Wang that the United States does not support Taiwanese independence. Secretary Rubio called for cross-strait issues to be resolved peacefully and said that the United States would speak frankly and properly handle differences between both sides.[46] Wang asked the United States to respect Beijing’s position on Taiwan. He also told Rubio to “comport [him]self well” (好自为之).[47] The PRC sanctioned then-Senator Rubio twice over his comments, bills, and other actions that were critical of the PRC’s human rights record.[48] The PRC has not clarified whether it would lift the sanctions on Rubio now that he is the US Secretary of State. US State Department spokeswoman Tammy Bruce gave a statement after Rubio’s phone call in which she expressed serious concern over the PRC’s coercive actions against Taiwan and in the South China Sea and stated that the United States would support allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.[49] Secretary Rubio expressed the same sentiments about the South China Sea when speaking with Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son before the call with Wang.[50]

The PRC’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) placed Xue Jianguo, a former executive for China North Industries Corporation (Norinco), one of the PRC’s largest defense contractors, under investigation for corruption. The CCDI reported that Xue was placed under investigation for suspected “serious violations of discipline and law,” though specific details on the nature of Xue’s actions have not yet been released.[51] Xue was the chairman and Communist Party Secretary of Harbin First Machinery Group, a Norinco subsidiary, until 2010. Xue continued to work with Norinco from 2010-2015, primarily working to promote the use of the PRC GPS system Beidou and overseeing the commercial and civilian applications of the system. In 2015 Xue was appointed chairman and party secretary of a Norinco financial subsidiary based in Shanghai. Norinco Group is one of the world’s largest defense contractors producing a wide variety of military equipment including artillery, air defense and anti-missile systems, anti-tank missiles, precision-guided missiles, and armored vehicles, among others. Norinco Group has hundreds of subsidiaries and affiliated research institutes within the PRC and internationally.[52]

The PRC has announced numerous corruption investigations over the last few years of individuals connected with defense contracting and equipment procurement for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Mid-2023 to early 2024 saw a wave of purges and corruption investigations among high-ranking PLA officers associated with defense acquisitions, especially for the PLA Rocket Force, and civilian leaders of the PRC’s defense industry.[53] This series of purges, which included former PRC Defense Minister Li Shangfu and former PLA Rocket Force commander Li Yuchao, resulted in significant speculation regarding PLA capabilities and leadership.[54] A more recent series of PLA purges including the removal of top PLA political commissar Miao Hua appeared to be centered around ideological alignment. Xue’s corruption charges are more likely an indication of additional corrupt elements within the PRC defense sector rather than of ideological disloyalty, however.

Northeast Asia

North Korea

The US Department of Justice indicted two North Koreans and foreign facilitators for generating revenue for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) by securing remote information technology (IT) work with US companies on January 23. The North Koreans allegedly used a Chinese bank account to launder the proceeds.[55] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Cyber Division Assistant Director Bryan Vorndran described the case as “a years-long plot to install North Korean IT workers as remote employees,” generating funds for the DPRK regime while evading sanctions. The indicted individuals, Jin Sung-il and Pak Jin-Song, and their co-conspirators allegedly worked with at least 64 US companies between April 2018 and August 2024, generating over $866,255, which was laundered through “a Chinese bank account.” US nationals Erick Ntekereze Prince and Emanuel Ashtor allegedly helped facilitate the scheme by operating a “laptop farm” to deceive companies into thinking they hired US-based workers. The operation involved wire and mail fraud and the theft of sensitive data. The FBI issued a public advisory on January 23 and warned about the North Korean IT workers engaged in cybercrime, including extorting companies by holding stolen data hostage for ransom.[56] Estimates from a UN Panel of Experts report suggest that around 3,000 North Korean IT workers generate about $250 million to $600 million annually, with funds supporting North Korea’s weapons programs and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[57] Research from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) indicates that the PRC not only assisted DPRK IT workers by providing technical training and job opportunities but also hosts DPRK cyber units in Shenyang and Dandong. Dandong is on the PRC-DPRK border while Shenyang is the capital of the same province, Liaoning.[58] The recent indictment highlights the PRC’s continued role in facilitating illicit North Korean cyber operations.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and Philippines Coast Guard (PCG) continued their standoff in the Philippine EEZ for the 4th week as the PRC “allowed” a resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal and prevented Philippines fisheries bureau vessels from collecting sand samples at Sandy Cay for scientific research. The PCG sent the BRP Cabra to prevent the CCG-3103 vessel from approaching the Zambales coastline. The CCG-3103 was lurking within 90 nautical miles of the coastline, and appears to have been relieved by the CCG-3104 on January 28.[59] PCG spokesperson for the West Philippine Sea Commodore Jay Tarriela stated that the Chinese Coast Guard also deployed the CCG 3304 to relieve the CCG-3103, and the CCG-5901 (the 12,000-ton “monster ship”) has also been in the vicinity.[60] The CCG incursion into waters near the Philippine islands has now lasted a fourth week as the PRC continues its gray zone operations to challenge Philippine maritime claims.

The CCG claimed that it “allowed” the Philippines to conduct a resupply mission on January 24, to Second Thomas Shoal, where the Philippines has operated a small military outpost from the grounded warship BRP Sierra Madre since 1999.[61] CCG Spokesperson Liu Dejun said that the CCG gave permission and supervised the Philippines’ civilian ship delivering daily necessities to the warship grounded on the shoal, which serves as a Philippine military outpost.[62] This is the 5th resupply mission since the signing of the provisional agreement between the PRC and the Philippines in July 2024. The PRC attempted to stop several resupply missions to the shoal in 2024, including one incident that resulted in a violent clash between CCG and Philippine navy personnel, but has not interfered with resupply missions to the shoal since the agreement.[63] The PRC continued to act aggressively towards official Philippine vessels in other areas of the South China Sea, however, including an incident on December 4 in which a CCG ship blocked, sideswiped, and deployed a water cannon against a Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) vessel near Scarborough Shoal.[64]

Two Philippine BFAR vessels were harassed by three CCG ships and a PRC Navy helicopter on the same day, forcing them to stop their survey operations.[65] The Philippine ships intended to collect sand samples at Sandy Cay. The CCG claimed that the Philippine ships were attempting to “illegally land on the reef and collect sand samples.” Sandy Cay is an unoccupied reef that the Philippines, PRC, Taiwan, and Vietnam all claim. It is only a few miles away from Thitu Island in the Spratly Islands.[66] A similar incident also occurred on March 21, 2024, when CCG ships and a military helicopter attempted to block Philippine researchers from accessing Sandy Cay.[67] The PRC has tried to prevent the Philippines from establishing a presence on any currently unoccupied features in the South China Sea on several occasions, which led to confrontations near Sandy Cay and Sabina Shoal in 2024.

Middle East

Iran

Anonymous security officials from two Western countries said that two Iranian-flagged cargo vessels will deliver over 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate, a key ingredient in missile propellant, from the PRC to Iran in the next few weeks. The Financial Times reported that the officials said that the Iranian cargo vessel Golbon was loaded with 34 containers of sodium perchlorate at the port of Taicang, north of Shanghai. It departed the nearby island of Daishan on January 21, bound for the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. The officials said that another ship, the Jairan, is expected to depart for Iran in early February with 22 containers of the chemical.[68] The Jairan is docked at the PRC island of Liuheng, near Ningbo, Zhejiang Province, as of January 27. [69] The officials said that the ships will deliver the chemical to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) after three weeks of sailing with no port calls.[70] The officials could not say whether the PRC government was aware of the shipments. Spokesperson for the PRC’s embassy in the United States Liu Pengyu stated that he was unfamiliar with the matter.[71]

Two of the officials said that the 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate could produce 960 tons of ammonium perchlorate. Ammonium perchlorate comprises 70% of the propellant of solid-fuel missiles. They said that that amount of ammonium perchlorate could produce 1,300 tons of propellant, enough to fuel 260 Iranian mid-range or ballistic missiles.[72] Both ships are already under US sanctions and subject to secondary sanctions.[73]

PRC authorities are likely aware of the shipments despite their denial because Iran has negotiated with the PRC to acquire missile propellant. Politico cited unspecified diplomats in April 2023 who said that Iran was negotiating with both Russia and the PRC to acquire large quantities of ammonium perchlorate. The diplomats said at the time that Iran could use the chemical to produce missile propellant for missiles that it exports to Russia for the war in Ukraine.[74] Those negotiations took place before the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war on October 7, 2023, however, and before Iran launched two major missile attacks on Israel on April 13 and October 1, 2024, cumulatively using up hundreds of ballistic and cruise missiles.[75] Israeli strikes on October 25 also seriously damaged Iranian missile production facilities, destroying “planetary mixers” used to produce solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[76] Iran thus is likely to use the missile propellant chemicals from the PRC to replenish its stocks.

The PRC has been a key lifeline for Iran’s economy and at times has provided military or dual-use products to Iran, even though Beijing does not fully support Tehran’s regional or nuclear ambitions. The PRC purchases around 90% of Iran’s oil exports at a discount at a time when Iran is the target of heavy international sanctions. The PRC ramped up these oil purchases after helping to negotiate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 to restrict Iran’s development of nuclear weapons. The United States sanctioned PRC and Iranian individuals and firms in 2023 for contributing components to Iran’s drone and ballistic missiles programs.[77] The PRC has not been a significant supplier of arms to Iran since the imposition of UN sanctions on Iran in 2007, however.[78]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 16, 2025

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Grant Morgan of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek and Yeji Chung of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: January 21, 2024

Key Takeaways

The KMT-led Taiwanese legislature passed significant cuts and freezes to the 2025 national budget. The budget reductions will almost certainly impede the DPP-led administration's ability to function and will undermine Taiwan's resilience against PRC pressure.
Taiwan’s two undersea internet cables between Taiwan itself and its offshore Matsu Islands were disconnected within one week due to natural deterioration. Taiwan restored the internet to Matsu with an emergency microwave transmission system, showing significant progress in strengthening emergency communications infrastructure since 2023.
The PRC announced that it will soon resume group travel to Taiwan for residents of Shanghai and Fujian Province. PRC officials and media continued to blame Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for creating obstacles to cross-strait exchanges, however.
The Philippines and PRC agreed to strengthen dialogue and bilateral cooperation efforts during the first high-level bilateral exchange to discuss South China Sea disputes to occur since July 2024. These talks occurred amid a spike in tensions between the two countries due to coercive PRC behavior in the Scarborough Shoal and the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The KMT-led Taiwanese legislature passed significant cuts and freezes to the 2025 national budget. The budget reductions will almost certainly impede the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)-led administration's ability to function and undermine Taiwan's resilience against PRC pressure. Opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) legislators, who hold a collective majority in the Legislative Yuan (LY), finalized amendments on January 21 that cut a total of 6.6% from the Executive Yuan’s proposed expenditure, making the largest budget cut in Taiwan’s history.[1] The Executive Yuan originally approved the budget in August 2024, which projected a slight surplus.[2]

ROC Premier Cho Jung-tai, who leads the DPP-controlled Executive Yuan, accused the opposition parties during a press conference on January 21 of “indiscriminately cutting budget items” for the purpose of disrupting the government’s operations.[3] Cho stated that the budget cuts would affect Taiwan in five key ways: harming national competitiveness, weakening national defense capabilities, undermining technological advancement, constraining public services, and diminishing the government’s ability to communicate to the public.[4] The KMT has framed the budget cuts as a necessary measure to exercise oversight of the DPP administration and rein in its excessive and wasteful spending.[5]

The Ministry of National Defense (MND) experienced a freeze of 30% of its operating budget and a 3% cut to its military equipment expenditure, which will affect the military’s basic functions, including weapons and materiel maintenance.[6] Deputy Minister of Military and Political Affairs Alex Po Horng-Huei stated during an MND press conference on January 20 that the PRC benefits from MND-related budget reductions, which negatively affect Taiwan’s combat readiness. Taiwan’s domestic submarine program experienced a 50% freeze, effectively halting construction of submarines until completed submarines pass sea trials, at which time the LY may decide to unfreeze the funds. The budget amendments also froze 50% of the budget for the Minxiong Aerospace and Drone Park, an industrial manufacturing and testing facility that is at the center of Taiwan’s drone development. Taiwan’s state-owned National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) manages the park and is responsible for R&D and production of new defense technology and weapons. Constraints on Taiwan’s drone production capability constitute a significant setback for its ability to defend itself from a PRC invasion, which would heavily rely on the use of drones to thwart the advancement of enemy forces.

Po stated that the more than 15% reduction in personnel travel expenses constrains the military’s ability to transport new equipment from abroad for installation and train service members to use it.[7] He noted that the 60% reduction in media and publicity expenses will hurt the military’s ability to recruit new personnel and combat PRC disinformation and political warfare tactics.[8] Po stated that the cuts and freezes together affect up to 44% of the total defense budget.[9]

The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), which is the agency responsible for conducting cross-strait policy, experienced cuts or freezes amounting to approximately 21% of its budget.[10] MAC Spokesperson Liang Wen-chieh stated at a press conference on January 16 that the budget cuts would “paralyze” the agency and hinder its ability to combat PRC United Front infiltration into Taiwan, which is disguised in cross-strait exchanges.[11] United Front activities against Taiwan include overt and covert influence operations that primarily aim to inculcate in the Taiwanese public CCP notions that the PRC is the only legitimate government of China and that Taiwan is a part of that China. Liang warned that Taiwan will be even more vulnerable to subversive activities, including theft of military intelligence, developing espionage networks, information operations, and poaching technology industry talent.[12]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) experienced significant reductions to its operating budget and international assistance programs. MOFA stated on January 20 that the affected funds are used to support the ministry’s basic administrative work, including that of overseas missions, as well as to support international exchanges and the rotation of personnel stationed abroad. MOFA stated that freezing operational expenses would result in insufficient diplomatic resources that weaken Taiwan’s international influence and damage its competitiveness, while the PRC strengthens its diplomatic offensive to isolate Taiwan.[13] Diplomatic isolation is a key aspect of the PRC’s overall strategy to undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty by eroding its legitimacy on the international stage and depriving it of supporters. The PRC advances Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation by pressuring sovereign governments not to engage with the Taiwanese government, rejecting Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, and inducing Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies to recognize the PRC as the legitimate government of China and Taiwan. MOFA budget cuts may make it more difficult for Taiwan to counter recent PRC efforts to sway Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in the South Pacific, for example, several of which switched diplomatic relations from the ROC to the PRC in recent years.[14]

DPP officials have indicated that the party would take measures to resist the budget reductions. DPP Caucus Whip Ker Chien-ming stated on January 23 that the DPP would file for a court injunction to prevent the budget amendments from going into effect.[15] DPP Caucus Secretary-General Rosalia Wu Szu-yao stated on January 21 that the Executive Yuan would seek constitutional interpretation to challenge budget cuts, on the grounds that the LY cannot use its budgetary review powers to infringe on the rights of other constitutional organs.[16] It is unclear when the Constitutional Court will be able to accept the case, however, as recent KMT-led Constitutional Court reforms require at least 10 sitting justices to hear a case. The court currently has only eight justices, and the KMT-TPP alliance rejected all of the DPP's nominees to fill the vacancies in December 2024. Premier Cho Jung-tai stated on January 23 that the Executive Yuan is considering asking the LY to hold a revote on the budget plan with the aim of reversing the spending cuts.[17] This course of action is unlikely to yield a different result, however, as the opposition parties still maintain enough votes to confirm the amendments.

The budget reductions and freezes will fundamentally constrain government agencies’ capacity to carry out their core functions. The government’s degraded ability to operate is potentially disastrous for the policy agenda of President Lai Ching-te’s administration, which is intensely focused on combatting pervasive PRC efforts to undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty.

The KMT-TPP budget cuts specifically target ROC agencies and efforts central to defending against the PRC’s ongoing campaigns to weaken Taiwan as the PRC prepares for a possible blockade or invasion. Cuts to public affairs budgets deprive Taiwan of the ability to counter the PRC’s expanding information operations and explain policies to the public. Delays in Taiwan's submarine procurement undermine Taipei's efforts to deter and defend against potential PRC invasion or blockade scenarios. Cuts to Taiwan’s drone development program delay and hamper Taiwan's efforts to implement lessons learned from the Ukraine conflict to prepare for future defense against aggression, even as the PRC continues to militarize and expand its own drone development. Cuts to Taiwan's diplomatic programs constrain its ability to challenge relentless PRC efforts to coerce the international community into accepting the PRC as the legitimate government of Taiwan. The KMT and TPP’s explanations for the budget cuts focus on domestic Taiwanese political considerations. However, they do not clarify why the cuts target programs and activities that are central to protecting Taiwan against PRC coercion, malign influence, and deterring and defending against a possible future PRC armed attack.

[18]

The DPP legislative caucus launched a mass recall effort against opposition KMT legislators in response to the KMT and TPP’s passage of bills that will reduce the national budget and hamper the Constitutional Court. The KMT may retaliate with its own recall effort against DPP legislators. A mass recall wave would further destabilize Taiwan’s fractured political environment. DPP legislative caucus chair Ker Chien-ming proposed a mass recall campaign against the opposition legislators, including Speaker of the Legislative Yuan (LY) Han Kuo-yu and Deputy Speaker Johnny Chiang Chi-chen. The effort would target the 39 KMT and two KMT-aligned independent lawmakers who were directly elected. Civic groups have begun canvassing for signatures to recall some of the legislators already.[19] The remaining 13 members of the KMT caucus in the LY as well as the eight TPP legislators were appointed to their seats by proportional representation and are not eligible for recall. KMT legislator Lai Shyh-bao claimed the KMT is planning its own recall campaign against the 38directly elected DPP legislators.[20] KMT Chairman Eric Chu has publicly called for the recall of two DPP legislators already.[21]

Mass recall efforts by both major parties against each other’s legislators indicate serious divisions in Taiwan’s politics that continue to undermine the government’s functioning. The DPP itself is internally divided about launching a mass recall wave. DPP Secretary-General Lin Yu-chang expressed concern about the consequences of launching an “all-out war” on the KMT less than one year into Lai Ching-te’s presidency and said the DPP Central Committee had not discussed a mass recall campaign. Lai himself did not endorse the recall campaign but said that citizens have a right to initiate recall efforts.[22] It is unclear the extent to which the recall efforts by either side will succeed, or how they will affect the distribution of power in the LY. The recall efforts will likely be made more difficult by recent amendments to the Public Officials Election and Recall Act that the KMT and TPP passed in December, which require people who initiate or sign a recall petition to provide a copy of their national identification card.

The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense (MND) launched new protocols to make it easier to surveil and potentially board international vessels that are suspected of cutting cables in Taiwanese waters. The MND established four “key surveillance zones” in the maritime regions offshore of the counties of Yilan, Pingtung, Penghu, and in the Bali District of New Taipei.[23] These zones will utilize existing naval intelligence and radar systems to monitor for suspicious activities and movements by international vessels that are within 24 nautical miles of the Taiwanese coast.[24] The ROC Navy will notify the Joint Operations Command Center and the Taiwanese Coast Guard Administration (CGA) to facilitate information-gathering and boarding operations against any vessel that engages in suspicious activities near undersea cables. The protocols also introduced corresponding measures that are meant to proactively expand joint military and CGA cooperation on protecting undersea cables. These measures will largely involve the navy providing maritime support and deploying additional naval assets if needed.[25]

The change in policy was triggered by two separate incidents of potential PRC sabotage of Taiwanese internet cables that occurred in early January. The first incident, which took place on January 3, involved the Cameroon-flagged Shunxing 39 cargo ship dragging its anchor and cutting Taiwanese undersea internet cables near Keelung.[26] The Taiwanese Coast Guard Administration (CGA) was unable to apprehend the ship before it left Taiwanese waters due to bad weather conditions. The second incident, which occurred on January 6, involved the Mongolian-flagged Bao Shun taking an erratic course over undersea cables located north of Taiwan.[27] The CGA drove away the ship, which did not damage any cables, without boarding or questioning it.

The PRC and the Hong Kong owner of the Shunxing 39 have both continued to deny any involvement with the incident.[28] The PRC has claimed that such incidents are just common maritime accidents and that Taiwan is fabricating its claims of “so-called grey zone threats”.[29] This incident follows a similar cable-cutting incident by a PRC vessel that occurred in the Baltic Sea in November.[30] Active investigation of the vessel by Swedish authorities is ongoing.[31]

Taiwan’s Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA) said that Taiwan’s two undersea internet cables between Taiwan and its offshore Matsu Islands were disconnected within one week due to natural deterioration. Taiwan restored internet to Matsu with an emergency microwave transmission system, showing significant progress in strengthening emergency communications infrastructure since 2023. Chunghwa Telecom, Taiwan’s main telecommunications provider, said that the Matsu No. 3 cable was “completely disconnected” on January 15 and that the No. 2 cable was disconnected on January 21. The two cables are the only ones connecting Taiwan and the Matsu Islands.[32] Deputy Minister of Digital Affairs Chiueh Herming attributed the cause of disconnection to “natural deterioration” and said that Taiwan did not detect any suspicious ships in the area at the time, though he noted that instances of ships damaging Taiwan’s undersea cables had risen in recent years.[33] The cable disconnections are the third and fourth such incidents in January 2025, compared to three cable disruptions in 2024 and three in 2023. Chunghwa Telecom restored partial internet access to Matsu within an hour using a satellite-based emergency microwave backup system.[34] It also re-established connection on the No. 2 cable on January 21 using a temporary repair.[35] MODA possesses nine asynchronous satellite devices for Matsu. Chiueh said that the microwave bandwidth exceeds Matsu’s weekday peak traffic, but will be prioritized for infrastructure and services such as government facilities, banks, and hospitals to prevent interruptions in key services for the archipelago’s 14,000 residents.[36] MODA estimated that repairs on the undersea cables themselves will be completed near the end of February, however.[37]

The incidents highlight the fragility of Taiwan’s critical communications infrastructure but also show Taiwan’s progress in strengthening emergency communications since 2023. Chiueh said that more than 99% of Taiwan’s external communications rely on undersea cables, despite efforts to develop satellite communications.[38] Taiwan accused two PRC ships of cutting both of the Matsu cables in February 2023, though it stopped short of claiming that the PRC government was responsible. The damage caused an archipelago-wide internet outage that lasted for 50 days until the cables were repaired. Chunghwa Telecom set up a microwave-based backup in the meantime that beamed a signal from Yangmingshan, a mountain near Taipei.[39] The damage to the cables and the difficulty in repairing them shows a significant vulnerability in Taiwan’s critical communication infrastructure that the PRC could exploit to isolate Taiwan during a blockade or war. The rapid restoration of internet service to Matsu in the January 2025 outage through satellite-based backups, with relatively minor disruption for Matsu residents, shows that Taiwan has improved its resilience by developing good backups for communications outages for Matsu.[40]

The PRC announced that it will soon resume group travel to Taiwan for residents of Shanghai and Fujian Province. PRC officials and media continued to blame Taiwan’s DPP for creating obstacles to cross-strait exchanges, however. The PRC Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT) announced on January 17 that it was making preparations to allow PRC nationals from Shanghai and Fujian to book group tours to Taiwan for the first time since 2020. It did not specify when the measures would come into effect.[41] Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) said that it welcomed the announcement and was waiting for the PRC to announce the specific measures. It urged the PRC to open communications through the Taiwan Strait Tourism Association (TSTA) and the Association for Tourism Exchange Across the Taiwan Strait (ATETS), known as the “two small associations.” The TSTA and ATETS were established by the governments of Taiwan and the PRC, respectively, to facilitate communication and coordination on tourism issues.[42] PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua dismissed the call to communicate through the “two small associations” and called on the Taiwanese government to “remove various obstacles and restrictions on cross-strait tourism exchanges as soon as possible,” including resuming direct flights between the PRC mainland and Taiwan, to help normalize cross-strait exchanges.[43]

PRC and ROC authorities have regularly blamed each other for the lack of progress in resuming cross-strait travel. The PRC first banned individual travel to Taiwan in 2019, citing poor cross-strait relations. The PRC and ROC then both banned all cross-strait tourism during the Covid-19 pandemic. Taiwan ended Covid-related travel restrictions in 2022 but continues to prohibit organized group travel to the PRC.[44] It suspended plans to resume such group tourism in 2024 after a dispute about the PRC shifting flight routes in the Taiwan Strait.[45] The PRC has not resumed group or individual travel to the main island of Taiwan prior to the MCT announcement, but allowed Fujian residents to arrange group tours to the ROC islands of Kinmen and Matsu in 2024.[46] Taiwan’s Lai Ching-te administration has repeatedly said that it welcomes the resumption of cross-strait travel but would like this to happen on the basis of reciprocal policies from both governments. The PRC portrays the DPP administration as the source of obstacles to cross-strait travel, however.[47]

The PRC’s unilateral resumption of cross-strait tourism for Fujian and Shanghai residents may be part of a temporary focus on cross-strait integration initiatives, particularly in Fujian, over more coercive measures. The PRC is building Fujian Province into a “cross-strait integrated development pilot zone,” with a variety of programs to encourage Taiwanese to live, work, and study in Fujian. These measures include special ID cards to allow Taiwanese to access local services, incentives to start businesses and enroll in schools, and even programs promoting Taiwanese participation in Fujianese local governments. The Fujian TAO indicated that it is redoubling such cross-strait integration efforts in January 2025.[48] The PRC also promoted several major cross-strait exchange events in December 2024, including sending a rare educational delegation to Taiwan, participating in the Taipei-Shanghai Twin Cities Forum in Taipei, and welcoming former ROC President Ma Ying-jeou and other KMT officials to visit the PRC. The PRC is trying to balance between initiatives that advance “peaceful reunification” — which Beijing prefers over seizing Taiwan by force, if possible — and coercion of Taiwan’s incumbent DPP administration, which Beijing views as dangerous separatists. It is reopening travel in a piecemeal way, in this case only for Fujian and Shanghai residents, likely to encourage reciprocal concessions from Taiwan.

The United States and Taiwan signed a two-year specialized training program for Taiwan’s navy. This is the first time Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) has publicized a specialized training agreement with the United States. Taiwan’s MND revealed on January 17 that the ROC Navy signed an agreement on January 2 with the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the de-facto US embassy in Taiwan, to implement a two-year specialized training program with US instructors. The program has a budget of just under NT$50 million (just over US$1.5 million) and will be based in the southern city of Kaohsiung.[49] The MND’s announcement did not specify the nature of the training.[50] An anonymous Taiwanese military source said this is the first time the United States and Taiwan have publicly announced a “specialized training program,” though they have on rare occasions announced other joint training programs. The source said that the announcement is a shift from a confidential to a semi-public approach to joint training, testing political and public reactions.[51]

The ROC National Security Bureau (NSB) said that it has only found about one dozen Taiwanese applications for PRC ID cards so far in response to a widely-viewed YouTube video that claimed that over 200,000 Taiwanese had obtained PRC ID cards over the past decade. A documentary by Taiwanese Youtuber Pa Chiung that aimed to expose the PRC’s United Front efforts to recruit Taiwanese nationals claimed that the 200,000 Taiwanese nationals had applied for PRC ID cards while in Taiwan. NSB Director Tsai Ming-yen said that the claim was exaggerated, however. He said that his bureau has discovered only a dozen cases in New Taipei, Taichung, Yunlin County, and Kaohsiung since launching an investigation in response to the video. ROC Interior Minister Liu Shyh-fang said that the government has revoked the Taiwanese household registration of one of the 12 people under investigation.[52] The PRC and especially Fujian Province, which is located across the strait from Taiwan, has ramped up efforts to entice Taiwanese people to live, work, and study in the PRC in recent years. Such measures include issuing ID cards, making it easier for Taiwanese to enroll in PRC schools and universities, and recruiting Taiwanese nationals for civil service jobs.

Four China Coast Guard (CCG) ships entered restricted waters around Taiwan’s Kinmen Islands twice on January 21. Four CCG ships entered at four different locations in Kinmen’s southern restricted waters at 7:50 a.m., then split into two two-ship formations for patrols. The ships left at an unspecified time, re-entered later in the morning, and finally left again at noon. Taiwan’s CGA said that it was the 56th such incursion since the beginning of 2024.[53] Kinmen is an ROC archipelago located just two miles from the PRC mainland. Taiwan does not claim territorial waters or a contiguous zone around the islands due to their proximity to the PRC but maintains concentric prohibited and restricted zones around the islands that are roughly equivalent. Controlling the restricted waters south of Kinmen could enable the CCG to carry out a tight “quarantine” or blockade of the islands if it chooses, blocking passage between the islands and Taiwan proper.

The PRC normalized CCG incursions into the restricted waters around Kinmen in 2024 to assert its law enforcement jurisdiction in the waters and to strain the CGA’s resources and threat awareness around Kinmen. The PRC began these incursions after two PRC fishermen died when their speedboat capsized while fleeing a CGA ship in Kinmen’s prohibited waters in February 2024. The PRC has since established a regular pattern in which groups of four CCG ships have carried out “law enforcement patrols” three or four times each month in restricted waters, usually for two hours at a time. The CCG has varied its tactics in various ways, including grouping incursions back-to-back on the same day or consecutive days, carrying out incursions at different times of day, and experimenting with patrols in and out of formation. It has not increased the number of ships involved or crossed into Taiwan’s prohibited waters since May 2024, however. The CCG may be varying its tactics without escalating them because it wants to force Taiwan to maintain a high level of alertness but avoid alarming the residents of Kinmen, which is a relatively “China-friendly” jurisdiction and a target of some of the PRC’s “cross-strait integration” initiatives.

China

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Guo Jiakun stressed the PRC’s willingness to maintain dialogue with the United States, despite recent statements from US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and PRC sanctions placed on him.[54] The US Senate voted unanimously to confirm Secretary Rubio’s nomination on January 19, making Rubio the first member of President Donald Trump’s new cabinet. Secretary Rubio emphasized during his January 15 confirmation hearing the importance of continued US defense of Taiwan amid PRC aggression. Rubio described the PRC as "the most potent and dangerous near-peer adversary this nation has ever confronted."[55] MFA spokesperson Guo Jiakun responded to Rubio’s statement by accusing the United States of carrying out “unwarranted attacks” and smear campaigns against the PRC, despite PRC efforts for peaceful cooperation with the US. Guo also urged the US to stop “interfering” in internal PRC affairs.[56]

The PRC sanctioned then-Senator Rubio in 2020 for his criticisms of PRC behavior in Hong Kong and Xinjiang.[57] Guo did not indicate that these sanctions would be removed after Rubio became Secretary of State. Sanctions on officials have sometimes prevented high-level bilateral communication: former PRC Defense Minister Li Shangfu refused to hold talks with US defense officials due to sanctions placed on him by the United States. The PRC did not indicate that the sanctions placed on Secretary Rubio would hinder communication between the two states, instead stressing the importance of continued dialogue and maintaining peaceful bilateral relations.

The Biden administration’s US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued new export control regulations on advanced semiconductors and added entities in the PRC and Singapore to the Entity List. The Department of Homeland Security also expanded the list of companies on the Entity List whose imports are blocked to the US under the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. The US Commerce Department stated on January 15 that the new restrictions on advanced computing semiconductors are meant to prevent China from acquiring high-end chips that may be used for military purposes, especially for advanced AI capabilities.[58] This is the fourth round of restrictions since October 2022. The new rules “impose a broader license agreement for foundries and packaging companies,” tighten technical definitions, update the transaction reporting process, and create new processes for companies to “be added to the list of Approved IC designers and OSATs.” BIS deemed 16 entities to have acted in support of the PRC's development of indigenous advanced chip production and added them to the Entity List, a trade restriction list of foreign individuals, companies, and organizations deemed a national security concern.[59] These most recent restrictions are the Biden administration’s parting attempt to limit the PRC's growth in AI technology. The PRC has imposed export controls of its own on dual-use technologies as well as critical minerals in response to the previous round of US export controls, including a ban on exporting antimony, gallium, and germanium to the United States in December 2024.[60] PRC MFA spokesman Guo Jiakun criticized the United States for imposing semiconductor import restrictions on China. Guo stated that “this practice is a typical example of economic coercion and hegemony, and China is strongly dissatisfied with and firmly opposes it.”[61]

The Biden administration also expanded the number of PRC companies on the Entity List for their alleged involvement with forced labor from the Xinjiang region from 107 to 144.[62] It added 37 companies, particularly in the critical minerals, textiles, and solar technology industries.[63] MFA spokesman Guo criticized the United States for imposing these restrictions, calling them “completely nonsense.”[64] Notable companies affected include critical minerals supplier Zijin Mining and its three subsidiaries as well as textile company Huafu Fashion and its 25 subsidiaries. The other entities accused of violating the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act include multiple green energy technology manufacturers and their subsidiaries in solar technologies and silicon production as well as a real estate company.[65]

The PRC held high-level meetings and calls with US officials to coincide with the January 20 inauguration of US President Donald Trump. CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping spoke with Trump on the phone before the inauguration. PRC Vice President Han Zheng received an invitation to the inauguration and met with US Vice President JD Vance. Han’s discussions with Vance reportedly centered on trade relations, fentanyl, and the maintenance of a stable US-PRC relationship.[66] Han also met with US business leaders, Brookings Institution Honorary Chairman John L. Thornton, and Elon Musk. A PRC MFA stated that these discussions focused on US-PRC cultural and economic exchanges.[67] The PRC Embassy in the United States reported that Musk expressed an interest in deepening “investment and cooperation” in the PRC and that both sides hoped to deepen trade and economic cooperation.[68] The PRC may have an interest in using high-level US business leaders as a conduit for diplomatic and economic agreements with Trump.

Han’s meeting followed a January 17 phone call between Xi and Trump during which the two leaders reportedly discussed similar topics: fentanyl, trade issues, and TikTok.[69] Xi also congratulated Trump on his inauguration. A PRC MFA readout on the call said that the two leaders “exchanged views on major international and regional issues of common concern, such as the Ukrainian crisis and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” Xi stressed that the Taiwan issue is one of “national sovereignty and territorial integrity” and said that it is “hoped that the US side will handle it with caution.” The readout also said that Trump and Xi “agreed to establish a strategic communication channel to maintain regular contact on major issues of common concern.” It did not discuss the specific nature of this communication channel, however.[70]

The PRC is maintaining a precedent of high-level exchanges with the Trump administration; these early meetings with Trump administration officials signal an interest in continued diplomatic engagement. Trump invited Xi to attend his inauguration in December in what would have been the first official visit by any foreign head of state to a US inauguration.[71] (Trump also invited several other state leaders, four of whom attended: the heads of state of Italy, Argentina, Ecuador, and Paraguay.)[72] Xi declined the invitation but sent Han Zheng in his stead. Han is the most senior PRC official to attend a US inauguration to date. Sending such a high-level official to the inauguration signals that Beijing places a high priority on its relationship with the new US administration.[73] The Wall Street Journal cited unnamed officials who said that Trump has expressed an interest in visiting the PRC within his first 100 days in office.[74] The MFA readout on the Xi-Trump call said that Trump “cherished his great relationship with President Xi” and “looked forward to meeting with President Xi as soon as possible.”[75]

Taiwan also sent a cross-partisan delegation of seven lawmakers, led by ROC Legislative Speaker Han Kuo-yu of the KMT, to attend the inauguration together with Taiwanese Representative to the United States Alexander Tah-ray Yui. This the second time Taiwanese delegates have attended a US presidential inauguration; the first instance occurred in 2021.[76] Taiwan’s delegation viewed the inauguration ceremony on live stream from a separate venue after the event was moved inside due to weather conditions.[77] PRC Vice President Han Zheng sat inside the Capitol alongside PRC Ambassador to the United States Xie Feng, however.[78]

Northeast Asia

Japan

A PRC delegation from the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command visited Tokyo from January 13 to January 17 and a Japanese delegation of lawmakers from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito visited Beijing from January 13 to January 15. These exchanges follow Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya’s trip to Beijing on December 25, as well as a meeting between Japanese and PRC defense ministers in November during a regional defense gathering in Laos. Japanese government spokesman Yoshimasa Hayashi stated that “the promotion of mutual understanding and trust through frank communication at commanders’ level will contribute to the building of constructive and stable relations between Japan and China,” referring to the PRC delegation’s visit.[79] The PLA Eastern Theater Command said that the “visit will help enhance understanding and mutual trust between the two sides, and promote defense exchanges between China and Japan.”[80] The Japanese lawmakers visiting Beijing met with senior members of the CCP, including two members of the Politburo Standing Committee and five members of the larger Politburo. LDP Secretary-General Hiroshi Moriyama also delivered a letter from Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba inviting CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping to visit Tokyo.[81] PRC Premier Li Qiang said that the bilateral relationship is at a critical period for improvement and development.[82]

The high-level exchanges between Japan and the PRC took place just days before US President Donald Trump began his second term. Trump has pledged to impose higher tariffs on PRC exports to the United States.[83] The possibility of worsening US-PRC relations may prompt the PRC to seek to strengthen ties with neighboring countries such as Japan. Improving relations between Japan and the PRC will require addressing ongoing disputes, as both delegations highlighted during their meeting, however. Japan raised the PRC’s import restrictions on Japanese fishery products imposed in August 2023 following Japan’s decision to release treated wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear plant.[84] The Japanese delegation also proposed the creation of an Asian version of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, possibly in response to the PRC’s military activities near Japanese waters and airspace, including a PRC aircraft violating Japanese airspace and the CCG ships approaching the disputed Senkaku Islands.[85]

North Korea

The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two individuals and four entities on January 16 for generating illicit revenue for the DPRK government. Among those sanctioned one individual and one entity are based in the PRC, highlighting the continued and active presence of DRPK’s illicit money-generating operations in the PRC. Son Kyong Sik is the Shenyang-based chief representative of Department 53 of the DPRK’s Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces. Department 53 is a weapons-trading entity under the DPRK Ministry of National Defense that generates illicit revenue through front companies in industries like IT and software development. OFAC sanctioned Son for his role in representing one of these front companies, Korea Osong Shipping Co. Osong engages in cryptocurrency exchanges and operates websites and mobile applications through a network of covert DPRK IT workers in Laos. OFAC sanctioned another PRC-based entity, Liaoning China Trade Industry Co., Ltd. (Liaoning China Trade), for supplying Department 53 with IT equipment that supports its overseas cyber operations. The equipment includes notebook and desktop computers, graphics cards, HDMI cables, and network hardware.[86] The DPRK government relies heavily on its overseas IT workers, with an estimated 3,000 DPRK IT workers generating between $250 million and $600 million annually.[87] These workers play a key role in the regime’s effort to circumvent U.S. and United Nations (UN) sanctions.[88] Their activities include cyber heists targeting banks and financial services, such as the successful $81 million theft from Bangladesh Bank in February 2016.[89] The revenue generated by these illicit cyber operations finances the regime’s weapons programs and supports Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The PRC reportedly offered technical training to DPRK IT students through university systems and provided employment opportunities in related fields such as the gaming design industry.[90] The PRC also DPRK cyber units to operate in cities Shenyang and Dandong according to research by Victor Cha at the Center for Strategy and International Studies (CSIS).[91] The recent sanctions by OFAC reflect the continued role of the PRC in facilitating DPRK IT workers’ illicit operations.

The PRC firm Shenyang Machine Tools Company (SMTCL) reportedly violated United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions by supplying computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools to the DPRK government in 2015. New information revealed by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), a US think tank focused on nuclear proliferation issues, shows that the PRC government not only refused to cooperate with foreign authorities investigating the violation but also denied DPRK involvement. PRC-owned SMTCL manufactures CNC machines tools used to produce precise components for weapon systems. These machines contain subcomponents from Western suppliers, some of which are banned from re-export under the European Union (EU) sanctions due to concerns about their potential use in military programs.[92] The ISIS reported in 2017 that an unnamed European government gathered evidence showing that SMTCL exported at least two 6-axis CNC machine tools to North Korea without re-export authorization, with some SMTCL officials aware that the end user was the North Korean government.[93] The PRC government refused to cooperate with the European country’s investigation, instead conducting its own internal inquiry. The PRC reportedly concluded that three Shenyang machine tools arrived at Dandong, PRC, for a “small tulip trader,” deeming the sale legal.[94] Dandong is on the border with North Korea. PRC-made machinery has appeared in North Korea’s weapons factory in photos released by DPRK state media Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) as recently as July 5, 2024. U.S. outlet NK Pro identified the machinery in the factory to be “high-speed precision CNC lathes” produced by PRC firm Nanjing Jianke Machinery Co.[95] KCNA stated that the factory “[plays] an important role in increasing the defense capabilities of the country.” The UNSC resolution bans the sale of “all industrial machinery” to the DPRK, but none of the stated PRC suppliers have been sanctioned or penalized by the UNSC, United States, or EU.[96] The absence of penalties demonstrates the PRC government’s lax enforcement of international sanctions, which has enabled North Korea to accelerate its weapons programs using PRC- and European-made technologies. The new revelations mean that the PRC is supplying the DPRK with machine tools that can help the DPRK aid the Russian war in Ukraine. Russia uses North Korean artillery and ballistic missiles in its invasion of Ukraine, further reflecting the impact of such illicit technology transfers to North Korea.[97]

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The Philippines and the PRC agreed to strengthen dialogue and bilateral cooperation efforts during the first high-level bilateral exchange to discuss South China Sea disputes to occur since July. These talks occurred amid a spike in tensions between the two countries due to coercive PRC behavior in the Scarborough Shoal and the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ). PRC Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Chen Xiaodong and Philippine Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Maria Theresa Lazaro held talks on January 16 during the Tenth Meeting of the China-Philippines Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea.[98] Both sides lodged protests against the other during the meeting for infringing on maritime territory and violating international law.[99] The Philippines Coast Guard (PCG) has been closely monitoring the movements of the CCG 5901, one of the world’s largest coast guard vessels, and other CCG vessels since January 3. The PCG reported that the CCG came within 77 nautical miles of Zambales, Luzon on the Philippines’ northwestern coast.[100] The PRC urged the Philippines to abide by the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which calls on parties to settle disagreements through dialogue and consultation. The Ninth Meeting of the China-Philippines Bilateral Consultation Mechanism was held on July 2, 2024, during another spike in bilateral tensions centered around incidents in Scarborough Shoal and Sabina Shoal.[101]

The PRC carried out military exercises in the South China Sea in response to joint US-Philippine exercises and Philippine Naval patrols around Scarborough Shoal. The Philippines Coast Guard (PCG) marked its third week of actively challenging China Coast Guard (CCG) presence in the Philippines EEZ. The Philippine Navy conducted a patrol and live-fire drills near Scarborough Shoal from January 17-19.[102] The US Navy’s Carl Vincent carrier strike group joined two Philippine naval vessels for a Maritime Cooperative Activity (MCA) near the Philippines’ western Palawan province from January 17-18.[103] This marked the fifth bilateral naval patrol between the United States and the Philippines to occur in the South China Sea since 2023 and is the first joint effort between the two states to occur in 2025. The PLA Southern Theater Command (STC) responded to these exercises by carrying out its own two-day air and naval exercises in the South China Sea.[104] The STC stated that the exercise was for the purpose of maintaining peace and security within what the PRC views as its maritime territory. Tensions in the South China Sea have been high since the beginning of 2025, centered around a three-week standoff between the PCG and CCG off the western coast of Luzon.[105]

The actions of the Philippine Navy and PCG are necessary to prevent the PRC from altering the status quo in the South China Sea and operating in Philippine-claimed waters uncontested. The timing of the joint US-Philippines exercise is significant and is likely intended to convey the extent of continued US support for its ally in this period of tension and change in US leadership. The actions of the Philippines and PRC in the South China Sea indicate that despite high-level bilateral exchanges urging continued communication and a reduction in tensions, neither side is willing to reduce its coast guard presence in the South China Sea at this time.

Philippine law enforcement arrested a PRC national and two alleged Filipino accomplices for spying on critical infrastructure in the Philippines. Deng Yuanqing, the main suspect, was found to have surveyed critical infrastructure sites such as military installations, ports, and communication and power grids, and, when his vehicle was seized, investigators found espionage equipment.[106] Investigators said that the two Filipino nationals, Ronel Jojo Balundo Besa and Jayson Amado Fernandez, acted as Deng’s assistants and drivers.[107] Deng is affiliated with the People's Liberation Army University of Science and Technology according to the Philippine National Bureau of Investigation. The bureau also identified three more suspects based in the PRC linked to this case: two engineers and a financier.[108] Deng’s vehicle was found to have transmitted detailed topographic footage of infrastructure on Luzon island from December 13 to January 16, and, based on the maps seized from the suspects, they had plans to go to Visayas and Mindanao as well.[109] Sites used under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between the Philippines and the United States were included in the list of locations surveilled. Deng operated in a group that received funding through shell companies amounting to 1.5 to 12 million pesos a week.[110] NBI officials suspect that Deng is a sleeper agent; he has been in the Philippines for at least five years without drawing attention.[111]

This espionage case follows an incident earlier in January in which a PRC submarine drone was found in Philippine waters. The drone appeared to have surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, and the marking on it referred to a PRC underwater navigation and communication system, leading officials to believe that it is from the PRC.[112] Investigators are looking to see if the cases are linked. Philippine Navy spokesperson Roy Vincent Trinidad said in a January 21 press briefing, “There now seems to be a deliberate and calculated move to map out the country by a foreign power.”[113]

Deng’s efforts to transmit geographic information on critical infrastructure, including military facilities, and the surrounding terrain has very likely provided the PRC with valuable insights. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, General Romeo Brawner Jr., stated the transmitted data is dangerous for national security as there are many details observable from the ground that cannot be identified through satellite imagery.[114] This incident is also not the first PRC effort to map out the Philippines—there was a prior case in 2024 in which a suspect acted alone, driving his own vehicle and operating the equipment without assistance, as well as 5 incidents in which the Philippines seized drones that flew over critical infrastructure.[115]

The PRC brokered a ceasefire between the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Myanmar junta, following months of PRC pressure to halt fighting along the PRC-Myanmar border. A lasting PRC-led ceasefire could improve the PRC’s relationship with ASEAN member states and support PRC narratives portraying itself as a force for peace in the region. The MNDAA, an ethnic armed organization (EAO) in Myanmar’s northern Shan state, signed a truce with the junta on January 18 following seven rounds of PRC-brokered negotiations.[116] Shan state, which shares a border with the PRC’s Yunnan Province, has been the site of some of the most significant territorial gains by opposition forces following the October 2023 launch of Operation 1027, a massive offensive operation led by the MNDAA, Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Arakan Army (AA) that represented the most significant turning point in the conflict since its inception.[117] The PRC has become increasingly involved in peace efforts in Myanmar following Operation 1027, brokering a now-defunct peace agreement in January 2024.[118] The PRC’s most recent efforts to halt conflict have resulted in the PRC closing its border with Shan state, halting its trade and humanitarian aid provision to MNDAA-held territory, and urging PRC-backed EAOs to break off relations with the MNDAA.[119] This economic pressure resulted in the MNDAA's agreement to cease offensive efforts and to retreat from the city of Lashio, the location of the junta’s Northeastern regional headquarters, and one of the most significant territorial gains for the MNDAA in this conflict.

The PRC has significant economic interests in Myanmar, exporting $13.5 billion in goods to Myanmar in 2022 prior to the outbreak of conflict, and importing $9.62 billion in goods from Myanmar in the same year.[120] The PRC has invested $7.3 billion USD in the Kyaukphyu deep-water port in western Myanmar that will provide access to the Indian Ocean. The PRC has also invested heavily in oil and gas pipelines that run from Kyaukphyu into Kunming, Yunnan Province, PRC.[121] Myanmar provides the PRC an alternative shipping route through the Bay of Bengal, thereby reducing PRC reliance on the Strait of Malacca.[122]

A PRC-led ceasefire would also have significant geopolitical benefit to the PRC, due to the emphasis that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a ten-country regional bloc, has placed on bringing an end to the conflict in Myanmar. The PRC has significant economic and political influence in Southeast Asia, a cause for concern for many ASEAN states who worry about becoming too dependent upon the PRC and worry about PRC militarism, and have instead pushed for greater US economic and political involvement.[123] Many political analysts have voiced concerns that the Trump administration will decrease US engagement with Southeast Asia, providing an opportunity for the PRC to further increase its regional influence.[124] A PRC-brokered ceasefire could allow the PRC to disseminate narratives about being a “force for peace” in the Indo-Pacific, aligning with previous messaging campaigns and working to improve perceptions of the PRC in Southeast Asia.

Oceania

The PRC continued to try to persuade Pacific Island states to cut ties with Taiwan as ROC Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung attended Palauan president Surangel Whipps Jr.’s inauguration ceremony. Lin delivered a congratulatory message from ROC President William Lai Ching-te, and Whipps thanked Taiwan for its support to Palau. Envoys from the United States, Australia, India, Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, and Guam were also in attendance.[125] PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said that Taiwan is a province of China and cannot have a “foreign ministry” in a regular press conference on January 16. He claimed that “friendly people from Tuvalu, Palau, the Marshall Islands and other countries have recently expressed to China their willingness to establish or restore normal diplomatic relations with China,” which he said is “only a matter of time.”[126]

The PRC’s response to Lin’s Palau visit is consistent with its efforts to delegitimize Taiwan and use economic and rhetorical means to coerce Pacific Island nations into recognizing the PRC. Palau is one of three Pacific island nations, alongside the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu, to maintain diplomatic relations with the ROC.[127] ROC President William Lai visited these countries as part of his Pacific tour in November 2024.[128] The PRC condemned these visits and launched large-scale, though unannounced, military exercises around Taiwan shortly after.[129] ISW assessed that Palau plays a strategic role in US-PRC competition in the Pacific and that its re-election of Whipps — a vocal critic of the PRC — indicates the strength of its rising opposition to PRC influence.[130] Palau makes up part of the Second Island Chain, is part of the US-affiliated Compact of Free Association (COFA), and has vocally sought US support on security issues.[131] The PRC likely perceives a US-friendly Palau that is hostile toward the PRC and openly recognizes Taiwan as a threat to its security. Whipps has accused the PRC of subversive activities ranging from maritime incursions into Palau’s EEZ to economic coercion and organized crime in Palau.[132]

The ROC embassy in Tuvalu accused the PRC on January 15 of using a “disinformation” campaign to garner support for PRC talking points. The embassy objected to the release of videos showing Tuvalu residents claiming that Taiwan is part of the PRC and criticizing Lai’s 2024 visits to Pacific Island nations.[133] The PRC will likely maintain rhetorical and coercive efforts in Tuvalu, Palau, and elsewhere as part of its broader campaign to advance its security footprint and diplomatic recognition among Pacific islands.

Russia

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping held a video conference with Russian President Vladimir Putin on January 21, hours after US President Trump’s inauguration. The PRC readout of the meeting emphasized Xi’s advocacy for “comprehensive strategic cooperation,” especially in multilateral forums such as the Shanghai Security Organization (SCO) and among “greater BRICS” countries.[134] Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov stated in a briefing after the conference that Xi's and Putin’s conversation was not related to the inauguration of Trump the previous day.[135] He said that Xi briefed Putin about the content of Xi’s call with Trump on January 17, however, this statement was not present in the PRC readout of the call.[136] The timing of the call indicates the PRC's and Russia’s intent to maintain coordination in international affairs in the Trump administration.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 9, 2025

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Frank Mattimoe of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek and Yeji Chung of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: January 15, 2025

Key Takeaways

Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) passed opposition-backed amendments to the Constitutional Court after a Cabinet-mandated second review. The amendments will paralyze the Constitutional Court until the LY approves nominees to fill some of its vacant seats, and will make it temporarily impossible for the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to block opposition-sponsored legislation.
Taiwan’s National Security Bureau (NSB) released a report on January 12 highlighting organized crime and religious communities as infiltration channels to recruit agents and conduct espionage within Taiwan.
The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) reported that 50,000 people attended its protest decrying the detention of TPP founder Ko Wen-je on corruption charges, which the TPP claims to be politically motivated. The content of these protests and the amount of support they have received have been the focus of PRC coverage, aligning with previous anti-DPP narratives within PRC-backed media.
The PRC is building a fleet of barges with extendable piers that are likely designed to facilitate amphibious landings.
The South Korean authorities discovered a 164-foot tall and wide steel framework installed by the PRC within the Provisional Measures Zones (PMZ) of the Yellow Sea in December 2024. This installation is part of the PRC’s ongoing efforts to assert territorial control over the disputed waters, taking advantage of the leadership vacuum in South Korea amid its internal political turmoil following President Yoon Suk-yeol's martial law declaration on December 3, 2024.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) passed opposition-backed amendments to the Constitutional Court after a Cabinet-mandated second review. The amendments will paralyze the Constitutional Court until the LY approves nominees to fill some of its vacant seats, and will make it temporarily impossible for the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to block opposition-sponsored legislation. The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), which together hold a majority of seats in the LY, passed amendments to the Constitutional Court Procedure Act on December 20 despite strong opposition from the DPP. The Executive Branch asked the LY to do a second review of the bill. The LY passed the bill again on January 10 with a 62-51 vote, with all 51 DPP legislators voting against. President Lai Ching-te must now sign the bill. The amendments require that a supermajority of 10 justices (out of a total of 15 on the court) be present to hear a case and at least nine justices vote to rule a law unconstitutional. The court currently has only eight sitting justices, and the opposition parties rejected all seven of the Lai administration’s nominees to fill the vacant seats.[1] The court will therefore be unable to review the constitutionality of any laws until some of the vacancies are filled, eliminating the DPP’s last institutional means of blocking opposition-backed legislation. Taiwan does not have a presidential veto.

The DPP legislative caucus filed for a constitutional review of the bill and a temporary injunction against its implementation on January 15, though President Lai has not yet signed the bill into law. The court does not rule on bills that have not been promulgated into law, however, and has never done so even to issue temporary injunctions. The DPP and Lai’s Cabinet are considering proposing “preventive rights relief,” a legal tool to protect people’s rights before they are violated, to justify asking the court to make an exception. DPP politicians including Premier Cho Jung-tai argued that the paralysis of the Constitutional Court will seriously impact the rights of Taiwanese citizens, as most of the cases the court hears are submitted by citizens. Yang Hao-ching, director-general of the court's clerk department, said that the court handles temporary injunctions and preventive rights relief as separate matters.[2] KMT legislator Lo Chih-chiang argued that that if the Constitutional Court issues temporary sanctions against Constitutional Court Procedure Law amendments that have not yet taken effect, it would be undermining the Constitution and democratic system by infringing on the legitimate right of the legislature to pass laws. KMT-leaning newspaper United Daily News reported that the KMT internally assesses it will be difficult to justify the court hearing the case before the bill becomes law.[3]The hearing and injunction would normally have to happen after President Lai signs the bill. But the court’s current eight justices will be unable to hear the case concerning their powers without violating the new law after President Lai signs the bill, however. The dilemma may trigger a constitutional crisis in Taiwan. Lai is legally required to sign the bill by January 23.[4]

Taiwan’s National Security Bureau (NSB) released a report on January 12 highlighting organized crime and religious communities as infiltration channels to recruit agents and conduct espionage within Taiwan.[5] The report highlights PRC intelligence and United Front agencies’ exploitation of five major infiltration channels to support the PRC’s recruitment of agents: organized crime gangs, underground financial institutions, shell companies, religious groups, and civil society groups.[6] The report states that PRC intelligence operatives attempt to use these societal elements to convince retired military officers to recruit active-duty personnel, establish spy networks via the internet, and provide financial inducements to lure targets, especially those who have problems with debt.

The NSB report also notes that PRC collusion with gangs presents the risk of armed groups assisting in military operations against Taiwan.[7] An AEI-ISW report from May 2024 on PRC short-of-war coercion against Taiwan highlighted the risks of co-optation of military personnel and organized crime elements as part of the PRC’s lines of effort to weaken Taiwan’s will and capacity to defend itself.[8]

Lai has urged increased vigilance against the PRC’s infiltration of Taiwan’s religious community since taking office.[9] The PRC exploits cross-strait religious engagements as one of the less regulated forms of exchange to establish contact between its intelligence officers and Taiwanese targets that have potential to further recruit and develop agents within Taiwan. This tactic reflects the extent to which United Front and intelligence activities permeate PRC civil society and pervade superficially innocent cross-strait exchanges.

An October 2024 espionage case aptly illustrates the PRC’s process of exploiting certain segments of Taiwanese society to access military personnel and recruit agents. Taiwan’s High Prosecutor’s Office charged member of the Sun Alliance criminal gang Lee Huei-hsin, who also managed a temple in New Taipei City, with spying for the PRC after PRC intelligence officers established contact with Lee during a religious exchange in Macau a year prior. Lee allegedly used her connections in the underworld and religious community to recruit military officers with financial problems, whom she persuaded to exchange information for money.[10]

The number of yearly PRC espionage related prosecutions in Taiwan has increased sharply from 16 in 2021 to 64 in 2024. Retired and active duty military personnel accounted for 23% and 43% of all PRC espionage prosecution cases in 2024, respectively. PRC efforts to recruit military personnel for espionage have affected senior ranks of the ROC military.[11] The trend is already continuing into 2025 after Taiwanese authorities detained retired ROC Lieutenant General Kao An-kuo on January 10 on suspicion of taking money from the CCP to recruit active duty and other retired ROC military officers to spy for the PRC.[12]

The increase in prosecutions of PRC agents signals the Lai administration’s strong counterintelligence focus and is a likely indicator of the PRC’s intensifying campaign of subversion against Taiwan. This trend is consistent with the PRC’s escalating efforts in other aspects of its strategy to exert pressure on Taiwan after the election of President Lai Ching-te, including coercive military activity and intimidation by threatening punishment for Taiwanese “separatists.”

Lai’s administration, meanwhile, has taken greater steps to restrict the PRC’s infiltration channels. The ROC Ministry of Interior announced on November 6 that it would pursue the dissolution of the Chinese Unification Promotion Party (CUPP) for its involvement in organized crime and intelligence activities on behalf of the PRC.[13] The CUPP is a minor political party established in 2005 whose platform is based on support for unification with the PRC and the One China Principle, which recognizes the PRC as the legitimate representative of China and Taiwan as a part of that China.

The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) reported that 50,000 people attended its protest against the detention of TPP founder Ko Wen-je on corruption charges, which the TPP claims to be politically motivated. The content of these protests and the amount of support they have received have been the focus of PRC coverage, aligning with previous anti-DPP narratives within PRC-backed media. The Taipei District Prosecutors Office announced on December 26 that Ko had been indicted on charges of bribery, profiteering, embezzlement, and breach of public trust, which could carry a sentence of 28 and a half years in prison. The charges are connected to his actions while mayor of Taipei and while running for president in 2023-2024.[14] The TPP has maintained its support for Ko following the indictment, accusing the DPP of persecuting a political rival without sufficient evidence.

Acting TPP Chairman and Legislator Huang Kuo-chang stated that the January 11 protest was organized to oppose DPP authoritarianism and “Green Terror,” a reference to the DPP’s official color, green, and the 1949-1987 “White Terror” period, when tens of thousands of Taiwanese were murdered and imprisoned by the state.[15] The protest received support from the opposition Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), with several KMT lawmakers in attendance. Former DPP politicians Hsu Kuo-tai and Lin Cheng-chieh also spoke at the protest, criticizing current DPP lawmakers for “undemocratic behavior.”[16] Lin was one of the founders of the DPP but left the party 1991 and began supporting the opposition Pan-Blue (KMT-aligned) Coalition. Hsu served as a DPP representative to the LY from 1987-1996. Both Lin and Hsu have previously criticized the DPP‘s actions, and while neither of them represents the modern DPP movement. Their characterization as DPP founding members within Blue leaning Taiwanese media outlets could be intended to convey the idea that the current DPP is going against its founding principles. [17] The differing political affiliations of speakers and attendees indicate the extent of political disunity within Taiwan. The level of disunity could potentially have a significant impact on the ability of the DPP to effectively govern and may indicate a decrease in public support for the Lai administration.

PRC state media also covered narratives surrounding “Green authoritarianism" in reporting on the protests and strongly criticized the DPP for manipulating the Taiwanese judicial system and acting against the interests of the Taiwanese people.[18] The PRC reporting extended this criticism of DPP policy to the DPP stance on cross-Strait relations, calling on the Taiwanese people to unite against the DPP and pursue political reform and cross-Strait peace. Political disunity within Taiwan provides an opportunity for the PRC to exploit anti-DPP sentiments within the Taiwanese populace, instilling doubt over the legitimacy of the DPP government in accordance with PRC political and cognitive warfare campaigns.

The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) denied accusations of undersea cable-cutting off the coast of Taiwan. Cable-cutting offers the PRC one means by which to isolate Taiwan. TAO spokesman Chen Binhua called cable-cutting a “common maritime accident.” He said that “DPP authorities, without clarifying the basic facts and the responsibility for the accident, made up their own imaginations and deliberately hyped up the submarine cable accident as a so-called ‘gray zone threat’ from the mainland.”[19] Chen’s comments came as Taiwan began investigating a January 3 cable-cutting incident by a ship with a Chinese crew. Taiwan’s Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA) reported that the “Department of Digital Communications will work with the Coast Guard, the Ministry of Justice, the Communications Commission and judicial authorities to strengthen law enforcement against violations of relevant provisions of the Telecommunications Management Act” to protect undersea cables.[20] Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) said it convened an inter-agency meeting to “comprehensively review future measures” to protect undersea cables following the incident.[21] Taiwan’s National Security Bureau also said it would bolster surveillance of ships with flags of convenience that approach undersea cables within 24 nautical miles of Taiwan’s coast.[22]

ISW-AEI research has identified cable cutting as a short-of-war technique that could isolate Taiwan from its outlying islands as well as from international partners.[23] The PRC may have attempted to develop new technologies capable of isolating Taiwan via cable cutting in recent years. Newsweek found that PRC researchers from Lishui University in Zhejiang Province across from Taiwan developed a design for a “dragging type submarine cable device” in 2020. These designs built on a 2009 patent application for an “ocean towing type cutting device” ostensibly meant to destroy illegal cables off the PRC’s coast.[24] The authors of the 2020 design specified that undersea cables sometimes required cutting in “emergency situations” and that the “traditional cutting method needs first to detect the position of the cables, then excavate and salvage them for cutting. The process is complex, a lot of expensive equipment is needed, and the cost is too high.”[25] Newsweek’s link to the patent application no longer functioned at time of writing; Google Patent maintains a record detailing the design of the device, which would be pulled by a tugboat.[26] Newsweek stated that both the 2009 and 2020 patents were dropped and cited an unnamed undersea cable expert who said that “that the reasoning that the devices were necessary to remove illegal cables was absurd because the method was random and could also lead to damage to useful cables.”[27] The actual efficacy of such a device remains unclear but signals PRC intent to develop technologies with cable-cutting applications.

Taiwan has taken steps to reduce its digital vulnerability amid manmade and natural threats to its undersea cables. MODA’s statement outlined that Taiwan has improved its information resilience by “subsidizing the establishment of new international submarine cable stations and backup equipment rooms, improving the resilience of existing international submarine cable landing stations, and using multiple heterogeneous communication systems such as microwaves and satellites to back up important communication circuits of interrupted submarine cables.”[28] Diversification of its information space has protected Taiwan’s resilience following past cable-cutting incidents. Taiwan experienced widespread disruption to its internet connectivity with outlying Matsu islands following a cable-cutting incident in 2023. A MODA press release stated that MODA used low-earth orbit (LEO) satellites to create disaster relief networks following this incident.[29]

Four China Coast Guard (CCG) ships entered ROC restricted waters at four places south of Kinmen two times on January 9, the first such incursions of the calendar year. The four ships entered restricted waters at approximately 7:30 AM, sailed in two-boat formations, and left at 9:30 AM.[30] The same four ships returned at 10:00 AM into restricted waters and left at 12:00 PM. This incident occurred much earlier in the day than is typical, following a recent trend of varying CCG entry times into restricted waters, forcing the Taiwanese to remain alert at all times. Kinmen is an ROC archipelago located just two miles from the PRC mainland. Taiwan does not claim territorial waters or a contiguous zone around its outlying Kinmen and Matsu Islands due to the island chains’ proximity to the PRC but maintains concentric prohibited and restricted zones around the islands that are roughly equivalent.

The PRC normalized CCG incursions into the restricted waters around Kinmen in 2024 to assert its law enforcement jurisdiction in the waters and force the Taiwanese Coast Guard to expend resources. The PRC began these incursions after two PRC fishermen died when their speedboat capsized while fleeing a CGA ship in Kinmen’s prohibited waters in February 2024. The PRC has since established a regular pattern in which groups of four CCG ships have carried out “law enforcement patrols” three or four times each month in restricted waters for two hours at a time. The January 9 incident was not the first time the CCG has carried out two incursions in one day, though it was the shortest gap between incursions yet observed.

The PRC’s Fujian province established county-level Taiwan Affairs Offices (TAOs) to advance cross-Strait integration in the province. The PRC is doubling down on using Fujian as its key testing ground for “peaceful reunification” policies and to build political support in Taiwan for unification. Zhou Qingsong, director of the organization office of the Fujian provincial committee of the CCP, said that Fujian has established separate Taiwan Affairs Offices (TAOs) “in all counties with significant Taiwan-related responsibilities.” It is unusual for county-level governments and below to have their own TAOs, though some provincial governments do. Zhou said in an article in the state-owned magazine China Institutional Organization that the move was part of an institutional reform to strengthen the cross-strait affairs system.[31] He also said Fujian will introduce more supportive policies for Taiwanese people who seek to study or work in Fujian: vocational schools will recruit Taiwanese teachers, Fujian will make it easier for universities and public schools to enroll Taiwanese students, and Fujian will create a more attractive business environment for Taiwanese companies and businesspeople. The new offices are part of a broader initiative to develop Fujian into a test zone for cross-strait “integrated development,” which the PRC announced in 2023.[32]

Zhou’s announcement coincided with the anniversary of the PRC’s previous round of measures to aid “cross-strait integration” in Fujian and indicates that the PRC intends to double down on this effort to set conditions for “peaceful unification.” The state-owned tabloid Global Times quoted Li Zhenguang, deputy director at the Institute of Taiwan Studies at Beijing Union University, who said the establishment of county-level TAOs means that Fujian is devoting more manpower and resources to “give full play to their own local strengths at the county level.”[33] The county-level TAOs could also free up resources for the provincial-level TAO to focus on more far-reaching cross-strait integration efforts. The new measures Zhou previewed are in addition to several batches of measures such as the Fuzhou-Matsu City Pass, Fuzhou-Matsu industrial cooperation park, PRC residency and identification cards for Taiwanese to access services in the PRC, recruiting Taiwanese for local government positions, and other initiatives to make it easier for residents of Taiwan’s outlying islands and Taiwan in general to live and work in Fujian. [34]

The PRC’s attempts to facilitate the integration of Taiwanese into Fujian society serve to create the impression that Taiwan and mainland China are one country. The PRC can also point to any measures Taipei uses to discourage Taiwanese nationals from integrating with the PRC to argue that Taiwan’s government is unfairly persecuting “Taiwan compatriots” who want peaceful integration. Taiwanese law prohibits Taiwanese citizens from holding PRC government or military positions and from obtaining household registrations in the PRC.[35] A recent expose of the PRC’s “United Front” tactics by a Taiwanese YouTuber claimed that 200,000 Taiwanese had obtained identification cards in Fujian over the past decade. Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council Minister Chiu Chui-cheng did not confirm whether the number is accurate but warned that the PRC’s push for Taiwanese to apply for official PRC documents is part of its broader United Front strategy to undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty. He said that the Taiwanese government has invalidated the household registration papers, ID cards, and passports of 679 Taiwanese in the last 10 years after they obtained a PRC household registration or passport.[36] Spokesperson for the central TAO Chen Binhua claimed on January 15 that 359,000 Taiwanese people applied for Taiwan Compatriot Certificates in Fujian in 2024, which is up 25% year-on-year and exceeded pre-pandemic levels.[37] DPP China Affairs Director Wu Jun-zhi said that it is possible that the PRC aims to turn Taiwanese into PRC nationals to use this as an excuse to wage war on Taiwan in the future, a tactic similar to one Russia has employed in its war on Ukraine.[38]

The PRC’s continued emphasis on cross-strait integration in Fujian may explain why the PRC’s escalating military coercion against Taiwan in 2024 did not seriously impact Taiwan’s offshore islands in recent months. Taiwan’s Kinmen and Matsu islands are located just a few miles from the PRC’s shores and their residents hold relatively China-friendly views, often making trips to the PRC for business or family visits. The PRC’s December 9-11 military exercise around Taiwan and in the East China Sea did not include activities around the Kinmen or Matsu islands, in contrast to the exercises in May and October 2024. The Fujian CCG has normalized carrying out around four “law enforcement patrols” in Kinmen’s restricted waters each month, but these incursions have not entered Kinmen’s prohibited waters (roughly equivalent to territorial waters) since May. The Fujian CCG also has not attempted to detain Taiwanese nationals near these waters since July. Such escalations are precedented and would be relatively easy for the PRC to undertake, so the PRC’s relative restraint in recent months could be linked to renewed attempts to advance the Fujian cross-strait integration zone and avoid sending a hostile message to the Taiwanese who live closest to Fujian.

China

A PRC state-sponsored cyber threat actor breached the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS) as part of a larger operation that targeted the US Department of Treasury.[39] Three unnamed US officials disclosed the incursion to CNN but did not specify when it occurred. CFIUS is an interagency committee that reviews foreign investments for national security risks. CFIUS expanded its authorities in December to scrutinize real estate sales in proximity to US military installations, an expansion intended to mitigate national security risks stemming from foreign surveillance and intelligence-gathering activities.[40] Theft of sensitive data from CFIUS could undermine US counterintelligence efforts. It is unclear what information the threat actor was able to exfiltrate from CFIUS, if any.

The U.S. Treasury disclosed to the Senate on December 30 that it was the target of a PRC cyber operation earlier in the month, which gained control of Treasury Department workstations and accessed unclassified documents on them.[41] Unnamed US officials told the Washington Post that the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Office of the Treasury Secretary were targets of the operation, which was espionage-focused.[42] The PRC’s targeting of OFAC reflects its efforts to gather intelligence on US decision-making regarding sanctions, possibly including OFAC’s evidence collection methods, its designation criteria, or entities that the United States is scrutinizing. The revelations about the CFIUS breach appear to be separate from these compromised devices but may be part of the same operation.

The recent spate of discoveries of malicious PRC cyber operations demonstrates how aggressively the PRC is using cyber tools to undermine the United States and advance its own interests, especially intelligence collection. The hack comes amid the United States’ ongoing investigation into a separate extensive cyber espionage operation attributed to a PRC state-sponsored APT, which breached at least eight US telecommunications firms and affected dozens of countries.[43] The operation targeted the private communications of 100 known individuals, including former President Donald Trump, members of his family, his running mate JD Vance, members of the Kamala Harris campaign, and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer.[44] Investigators also confirmed that Salt Typhoon compromised systems that contain court orders for wiretapping requests, which could potentially subvert US counterintelligence efforts.[45]

The US Commerce Department issued new rules governing how artificial intelligence (AI) chip manufacturing can be shared with countries around the world, which could limit PRC access to AI chip technology. The new policy, The Interim Final Policy on Artificial Intelligence Diffusion, divides the world into three categories: partner countries that receive no restrictions on AI chips; countries that are banned from transferring AI technology from the United States; and all other countries that will be subject to caps on AI imports and must enter into special agreements with the United States to be able to produce US-patented chip technology.[46] The White House stated that these regulations are intended to “bolster US AI leadership,” give allies access to US made AI, and “ensure that adversaries cannot easily abuse advanced AI technology.”[47] Other countries not granted partner status under the new rules, such as Israel, Mexico, and Poland have the ability to dispute the regulations.[48] The PRC has not been named as an adversarial country under the new rules, but PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Guo Jiakun criticized the United States for overextending “the concept of national security” and for weaponizing trade and tech issues.[49]

The US Department of Defense added five PRC tech firms to a list of PLA-affiliated companies operating in the United States. Their inclusion on the DoD list could result in sanctions against these firms. The five firms added to the DOD’s Section 1260H list are Tencent, PRC multimedia giant and WeChat’s parent company; Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Limited (CATL), a battery manufacturer specializing in electric vehicle technology; Changxin Memory Technology, a semiconductor company; Quectel Wireless, which specializes in antennas and wireless modules; and Autel Robotics, a company producing drones, quadcopters, and UAVs.[50] The US Secretary of Defense is required to identify and publish an annual list of companies affiliated with the PRC military under Section 1260H of the National Defense Authorization Act.[51] Being placed on this list does not result in a ban or the imposition of sanctions but does carry reputational costs that could inhibit commercial progress in the United States. The DoD describes the 1260H list as an “important continuing effort in highlighting and countering the PRC’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy.”[52] The Military-Civil Fusion strategy is an element of PLA modernization that eliminates the divisions between PRC civilian research and commercial sectors with their military and defense industry. This allows the PLA to take advantage of all technological developments within the PRC in the service of achieving the PLA’s goal of becoming a “world-class military by 2049.”[53] Publicizing the 1260H list serves to increase awareness of Military-Civil Fusion within US markets and to communicate the potential national security risks of economic and technological cooperation with identified companies.

The PRC is building a fleet of barges with extendable piers that are likely designed to facilitate amphibious landings. The barges have long road bridges that extend from the bow of each vessel, which appear suitable for offloading tanks, trucks, and other military vehicles. The barges also have what appear to be large columns, whose purpose is likely to drop to the seabed to stabilize the vessels in choppier shallow waters, according to the analysts at defense website Naval News that who discovered the barges.[54] Satellite imagery of Guangzhou Shipyard International (GSI) shows what is likely five of the special barges under construction.[55] Naval News also noted the presence of a “self-supporting” stern ramp on the barges that would facilitate the docking of roll-on/roll-off (RORO) ferries. The PRC’s civilian RORO ferries are designed to carry military vehicles and have participated in the PRC’s naval and amphibious assault exercises since 2019.[56]

Taiwan has a limited number of beaches that are suitable for an amphibious landing, which would constrain the PRC’s options when attempting an amphibious landing. The long length of the ramps, which reach up to 393 feet, can possibly extend beyond a beach and connect directly with a coastal road. Long ramps could help the PRC bypass Taiwan’s beach defenses, including mines and barricades, which could save the PRC military precious time in a landing operation.[57]

The PRC’s state-owned tabloid Global Times emphasized the possibility that the barges could be used for civilian purposes, including disaster relief. The large size of the barges, however, along with the fact that GSI has a history of advancing the PRC’s naval expansion through the construction of special vessels, supports the notion that they are intended for military use.

The discovery of the barges follows the PRC’s recent launch of a new class of amphibious assault ship, highlighting the PRC’s continued pursuit of strengthening its navy’s capabilities to conduct amphibious operations. The PRC’s construction of the likely military-oriented barges signals its intent to achieve the military capabilities that it needs to annex Taiwan by force.

Northeast Asia

South Korea

South Korean authorities discovered a 164-foot tall and wide steel framework installed by the PRC within the Provisional Measures Zones (PMZ) of the Yellow Sea in December 2024. This installation is part of the PRC’s ongoing efforts to assert territorial control over the disputed waters, taking advantage of the leadership vacuum in South Korea amid its internal political turmoil following President Yoon Suk-yeol's martial law declaration on December 3, 2024. South Korean intelligence authorities detected through reconnaissance satellites that the PRC had installed a 164-ft tall and wide steel framework within the Provisional Measures Zones (PMZ) in December 2024.[58] South Korea and the PRC agreed to establish the PMZ in the overlapping area of both countries’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs) on August 3, 2000 to resolve disputes over fishing rights and oil exploration in the Yellow Sea.[59] The two governments have not agreed on maritime boundaries, and the PMZ regime prohibits the installations of facilities other than those for fishing activities.[60] The PRC has installed at least 10 buoys in and around the waters of the PMZ since the first such installation was reported in 2014. The PRC constructed its first steel framework in 2018 and built similar structures in April and May 2024 but halted further installations following protests from the South Korean government. The installation reported in December comes after a pause in official protests. The PRC has reportedly stated that the structure is a “fishing support facility,” and South Korean authorities believe that the PRC plans to install a total of 12 structures in the area.[61]

The PRC is likely preparing to territorialize the Yellow Sea by limiting South Korea’s use of the waters and seeking control over its sea and airspace, capitalizing on South Korea’s political turmoil following President Yoon Suk-yeol's martial law declaration on December 3, 2024. The PRC officially justifies the installation of buoys and other structures as being for the purpose of maritime data collection and fishing activities, but its previous behavior in the South China Sea suggests this installation may be part of its larger effort to assert control in the Yellow Sea.[62] The Yellow Sea is situated within the PRC-claimed First Island Chain and provides direct access to Beijing and Shanghai.[63] The PRC has used similar tactics in the South China Sea, building island bases that were eventually militarized.[64] The PRC can expand its physical presence and achieve similar strategic objectives in the Yellow Sea by gradually encroaching on the PMZ.

The PRC’s continued installations come amid South Korea’s political unrest following President Yoon's martial law declaration on December 3. This timing suggests that South Korea’s political instability provides the PRC an opportunity to continue activities in the PMZ without significant opposition. Key military positions, including the defense minister, army counterintelligence commander, army chief of staff, capital defense command chief, defense intelligence commander, and army special warfare commander, remain vacant due to resignations and investigations related to President Yoon’s impeachment trials.[65] The 43-day vacancy of the defense minister as of January 16, the longest since the Korean War, has likely weakened South Korea’s ability to respond to the PRC’s actions. South Korean authorities have condemned similar installations in the past, but no official response has been reported so far.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The Philippines accused the PRC of intimidating Philippine fishermen near Scarborough Shoal and off the coast of Zambales, Luzon. The CCG has maintained a constant presence around Scarborough Shoal since the beginning of January, which reinforces PRC territorial claims in the region. Assistant Director General of the Philippine National Security Council Jonathan Malaya reiterated official requests on January 14 for the CCG to withdraw its vessels, including the CCG 5901, one of the largest coast guard vessels in the world, from Scarborough Shoal.[66] The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) has been monitoring the CCG 5901’s movements within Philippine maritime territory since January 3, deploying the BRP Teresa Magbanua to follow the CCG vessel’s transit within the Philippines EEZ.[67] The PCG observed the CCG 5901 77 nautical miles from Zambales, Luzon in the Philippines’ northwestern coast. Malaya stated that the presence of the CCG within Philippine waters was “unacceptable.” PCG Spokesperson Commodore Jay Tarriela reiterated that the PCG would maintain its presence in the South China Sea to challenge PRC attempts to normalize CCG presence in Philippine maritime territory.[68]

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Guo Jiakun stated on January 13 that the CCG’s presence in Scarborough Shoal was for law enforcement activities within PRC rights under international law.[69] The PRC accused the Philippines of distorting facts and conducting a smear campaign against peaceful PRC activity.[70] The PRC has used similar rhetoric in the past, placing the blame for tensions in the South China Sea on other claimant states. The PCG’s continued deployment of its vessels and constant monitoring of CCG presence within Philippine waters is significant, communicating to the PRC that it will not permit the PRC to remain in its waters unchallenged.

Europe

Germany charged three individuals with spying for the PRC following a string of espionage-related arrests in 2024. A January 9 statement from the German Federal Prosecutor’s Office stated German nationals Herwig F., Ina F., and Thomas R. collaborated to provide the PRC with information on technologies with military and naval applications from 2017 until their arrest in April 2024. Thomas R. reportedly “acted as an agent for an employee of the Chinese intelligence service MSS”; Herwig and Ina F., a married couple, allegedly used their business contacts to collect information relevant to “expanding China’s maritime combat power.”[71] The office reported that the information collected included “findings on boat engines, sonar systems, aircraft protection systems, drives for armored vehicles and drones that could be used for military purposes.”[72] The accused also reportedly “purchased a total of three special lasers from Germany on behalf of and with payment from the MSS and exported them to China without authorization, even though the lasers are subject to the European Union (EU) Dual-Use Regulation.”[73] PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun accused Germany of “hyping up the so-called ‘Chinese espionage risk’” in a regular press conference on January 10.[74]

This instance follows several PRC espionage investigations in Germany within the past year. Spying within Germany – an EU hub and a key PRC trading partner – offers a window into European weapons exports as well as EU decision making that could affect the PRC. Some incidents of spying have followed patterns of PRC tradecraft seen elsewhere. Germany arrested a PRC citizen accused of photographing the Kiel-Wik naval base on the Baltic Sea on December 9, 2024.[75] This suspected incident of “gate crashing” resembles those seen in the United States: the Wall Street Journal reported up to 100 incidents of trespassing onto US military property in recent years.[76] The PRC Foreign Ministry’s response was consistent with its other reactions to espionage accusations. Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian accused Germany of “manipulating and smearing with the so-called ‘spy case’” during a regular press conference on December 20.[77]

Other PRC espionage efforts in Germany have encompassed a wider range of targets across both the public and private sector. German authorities arrested a PRC national accused of using her job in airport logistics to send “information on flights, cargo and passengers at the airport to an employee of a Chinese secret service” in October 2024. This included “information on the transport of military and persons with connections to a German arms company.”[78] Germany arrested a US citizen accused of attempting to use his position in the US Army to pass information to the PRC in November 2024.[79] German authorities also arrested the aide of an EU lawmaker accused of passing information on European Parliament decision making to the PRC and monitoring the activity of PRC dissidents in Germany in April 2024.[80] The breadth of these espionage incidents highlights the PRC’s interest in monitoring a wide range of activity in Germany and the EU, as well as its willingness to employ a variety of sources, collectors, and methods.

German authorities have sought to combat the risks of PRC spying amid these incidents. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz called the situation “very concerning” following the April 2024 arrests.[81] Germany’s Interior Ministry drafted legislation in October to improve security checks for employees in nationally sensitive infrastructure and engineering fields, the country’s Chancellery, government ministries and Office of the Federal President.[82] Germany’s security measures aim to address suspected espionage threats from Russia, which have increased since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, as well as from the PRC.[83]

Russia

The PRC’s Shandong Port Group has banned US-sanctioned tankers from docking, unloading, or receiving ship services at its ports following the US Department of State’s January 10 sanctions against the Russian energy sector. The US State Department enacted these sanctions to “curtail the Kremlin's ability to exploit the international financial system and generate revenue in furtherance of its war against Ukraine.” [84] Major Russian oil producers Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas are sanctioned alongside 183 vessels in Russia's so-called “shadow fleet,” which are old vessels that purposely obfuscate their origins and often lack insurance.[85] The shadow fleet helps Russia bypass Western sanctions that cap the price of Russian oil at $60.00 per barrel.[86] Morgan Stanley estimates the tankers carried roughly 1.5 million barrels of crude oil per day, or 1.4% of global oil demand, in 2024.[87] One hundred forty-three of the sanctioned ships are oil tankers that handle 42% of Russia’s total seaborne crude exports, and 300 million of the 530 million barrels were shipped to China.[88] Three tankers containing over two million barrels of Russian oil were docked off the Chinese coast on January 13, and ship data showed that at least 65 oil tankers have halted activities in various locations ranging from Iranian ports to waters near Russia.[89]

Independent refiners in Shandong are the main buyers of discounted sanctioned crude oil from Russia, Venezuela, and Iran. Shandong’s imports from these three countries amount to about 17% of China's total oil imports.[90] Shandong Port Group controls many major Chinese ports, including Yantai, Rizhao, and Qingdao (which hosts the headquarters of the PLA Navy’s North Sea Fleet).[91] The sanctions will push Chinese oil refineries to seek alternative sources elsewhere in the Middle East, Africa, and the Americas and curb Chinese access to cheap oil resources.[92] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs has responded to these measures, stating the country opposes such “illegal unilateral sanctions” that supposedly have no basis in international law nor authorization by the Security Council.[93]

Syria

PRC Representative to the United Nations (UN) Fu Cong expressed concern over Syria’s appointment to defense positions of Uyghurs associated with the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP). The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-controlled interim government appointed Uyghur militants to top defense positions – including one promoted to brigadier-general –in December 2024.[94] The UN Security Council convened to discuss humanitarian and security concerns in Syria on January 8.[95] Fu expressed concern that “the Syrian army has recently granted senior positions to a number of foreign terrorist fighters, including the leader of the terrorist organization ‘Turkic Islamic Party’ or ‘East Turkestan Islamic Movement’ listed by the Security Council.” Fu called on Syria to “fulfill its anti-terrorism obligations and prevent any terrorist forces from using Syrian territory to threaten the security of other countries.”[96] Fu also pointed to Syria’s humanitarian concerns and said that “Long-term illegal unilateral sanctions have further aggravated the suffering of the Syrian people.”[97] These sanctions remain in place as the HTS-led government consolidates powerwith the goal of projecting the appearance of moderate governance.

The containment of ETIM, TIP, and associated Uyghur militant activity will likely continue to shape the PRC’s Syria policy. Uyghur militants have been active in Syria since at least the mid-2010s; the PRC has sought to suppress this activity, shape Syrians’ views on Uyghur militancy, and promote favorable views of PRC policy in Xinjiang.[98] The website of the PRC embassy in Syria contains many inactive or outdated links from the early 2000s to Xinhua articles on Xinjiang and a Xinjiang tourism website.[99] The PRC maintained a strategic partnership with Syria under ousted former president Bashar al-Assad and used its ties to Syria to advance counterterrorism goals. The two sides agreed in 2023 to “continue to strengthen anti-terrorism and security cooperation and work together to combat terrorism.”[100] The PRC likely views the installation establishment of an HTS-controlled government in Syria as a disruption to these established counterterrorism channels.[101]

Syrian policy towards the PRC will likely seek to balance PRC interests and demands with HTS’ interest in granting the coalition’s Uyghur fighters a “token of recognition” through government appointments.[102] The presence of TIP members in the new Syrian government creates conflicting interests for the new Syrian government, which may require the PRC’s support as it seeks to lift international sanctions. ISW assessed that extremist elements within HTS could create friction within the coalition as al Qaeda-affiliated groups such as TIP clash with HTS leader Ahmed al Shara’s stated moderate approach to governance.[103]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, December 20, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, Frank Mattimoe and Grant Morgan of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek and Yeji Chung of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: January 7, 2025

Key Takeaways

The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Taiwan People's Party (TPP) pushed through new requirements on the Constitutional Court that will make it impossible for the court to carry out constitutional review until it fills some of its vacant seats. The KMT rejected all 7 of the ruling DPP’s judicial nominees to fill the vacancies, however, which makes it impossible for Lai to block legislation as long as the seats are unfilled.
The KMT and TPP passed a budget allocation reform that would require Taiwan to reallocate more of its revenue to local governments. The bill would benefit the KMT by redirecting money to KMT constituencies and forcing President Lai to choose between cutting defense spending or cutting funding for other programs.
Taiwan’s Presidential Office conducted its first tabletop wargame simulating PRC warfare against Taiwan. ROC President William Lai presided over the second meeting of the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee on the same day in a move consistent with broader efforts to bolster Taiwan’s civil defense resilience.
The ROC Coast Guard Administration (CGA) intercepted a likely PRC ship suspected of damaging an undersea cable north of Taiwan on January 4. The CGA drove away a different PRC ship as it approached an area with undersea cables on January 6. Cutting undersea cables is a way for the PRC to isolate Taiwan or disrupt Taiwanese society.
Instability in the highest echelons of the PLA’s political commissars likely signals Xi Jinping’s dissatisfaction with their effectiveness in instilling his ideals of political loyalty.
Naturalized US citizen Chen Jinping pled guilty to charges of operating an illegal police station in New York at the behest of the PRC.
Sources close to the Japanese government assess the PLAN and CCG likely conducted a joint maritime blockade drill in the Miyako Strait for the first time on December 22.
Relations between the PRC and North Korea (DPRK) likely deteriorated in 2024 despite the year being dubbed the PRC-DPRK "Year of Friendship” in January 2024.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) passed three controversial amendments following protests and a brawl among legislators. The amendments will likely restrict the power of the ruling Lai Ching-te administration and politically benefit the opposition Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). The KMT and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) passed three amendments on December 20 despite opposition from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which holds a minority of seats in the LY. The amendments target the Public Officials Election and Recall Act, the Constitutional Court Procedure Act, and the Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures. They will increase the difficulty of recalling public officials, raise the requirements for the Constitutional Court to rule on and strike down laws, and require the government to allocate more of its revenue to local governments. DPP lawmakers physically brawled with opposition lawmakers in the legislative chamber to prevent the passage of the bills. DPP-aligned civic groups including the Taiwan Economic Democracy Union (EDU) and Taiwan Citizen Front organized a rally of over 7,000 people, including some DPP lawmakers, to protest in front of the LY. The EDU argued that the amendments would “take away the people’s right to recall” officials and “paralyze” the Constitutional Court.[1]

All three amendments are likely to politically benefit the KMT. The recall amendments make it more difficult to recall elected officials, which benefits the KMT because the KMT controls most local governments in Taiwan. The KMT mayor of Keelung recently thwarted a recall motion against him.[2] The Constitutional Court amendments combined with the KMT’s rejection of the DPP’s new judicial nominees would paralyze the court in the short term, making it unable to carry out constitutional review of laws that the KMT-dominated legislature passes, and make the review process more difficult in the long term after the court’s vacant seats are filled. The budget reallocation bill will divert government funds to predominantly KMT constituencies and force Lai to make potentially unpopular national budget cuts that may hurt his approval rating.

The power struggles between Taiwan’s legislative, executive, and judicial branches as well as the brawl in the LY are emblematic of an unusually high level of disunity in Taiwanese politics. This partisan rancor hampers the functioning of the Taiwanese government and has the potential to seriously impact Taiwan’s national security.

The KMT and TPP pushed through new requirements on the Constitutional Court that will make it impossible for the court to carry out constitutional review until it fills some of its vacant seats. The KMT rejected all 7 of the ruling DPP’s judicial nominees to fill the vacancies, however, which makes it impossible for Lai to block legislation as long as the seats are unfilled. The opposition parties passed amendments in the LY on December 20 that will make it more difficult for Taiwan’s Constitutional Court to hear cases and issue rulings on the constitutionality of laws. The amendments include a requirement that a supermajority of 10 justices (out of a total of 15 on the court) be present to hear a case and a provision that at least nine justices must vote to rule a law unconstitutional. The court currently has only eight sitting justices, the fewest since the introduction of constitutional interpretation in 1947, because the eight-year terms of the other seven expired on October 31. The KMT and TPP voted on December 24 to reject all seven of the Lai administration’s judicial nominees, along with nominees for president and vice president of the judicial branch.[3] The reforms mean that the court cannot hear any cases until at least two of the vacant seats are filled.

Taiwanese law does not currently specify a minimum number of justices required to hear a case. It simply mandates the presence of two-thirds of sitting justices to hear a case and allows rulings to be determined by a simple majority of those present.[4] The court’s current makeup of eight justices means that as few as four justices could decide the constitutionality of a law under current rules, even though there are 15 seats on the court. The ROC Presidential Office expressed regret over the LY’s rejection of judicial nominees and said that President Lai would submit new nominations.[5]

The LY’s court reforms and rejection of the DPP’s judicial nominees could obstruct the DPP’s final institutional means of blocking KMT legislation because the president cannot veto laws the LY passes. The KMT and the much smaller TPP jointly hold a majority in the LY, though no one party has a majority by itself. The Lai administration requested that the LY carry out a second review of the amendments to the constitutional court procedure, citing “obstacles and difficulties” in implementing them.[6] This measure will likely only delay and not stop the bill’s passage, however, because the LY can pass the bill again unchanged with a simple majority vote. The president must then sign the bill. Submitting a law for constitutional review is the executive branch’s final recourse to prevent its implementation.[7] If the law goes into effect following constitutional review, the outcome of which is unclear, then the KMT and TPP will be able to pass any law they want as long as the court remains paralyzed, including further limitations on the executive branch or new cuts to defense programs.

Secretary-General of the DPP legislative caucus Rosalia Wu Szu-yao said that if the LY passes the amendment again on the second vote, the DPP legislative caucus would request a Constitutional interpretation and an injunction to halt the bill's implementation.[8] This effort would be the DPP’s last resort to prevent the court from being paralyzed, but the court would have to violate the new amendment simply to hear and adjudicate the case concerning its own powers. The dilemma could trigger a constitutional crisis in Taiwan. It will also increase government dysfunction, creating an opportunity for the PRC to undermine faith in the Lai administration and in Taiwan’s political system.

Wu called the opposition-backed amendments "an act of retaliation" to paralyze the Constitutional Court after recent rulings that favored the DPP.[9] The DPP successfully used the constitutional review process to prevent the implementation of a controversial series of legislative reforms that the LY first passed in May, which would have given the opposition-controlled legislature more power over the executive branch.[10]

The KMT and TPP passed a budget allocation reform that would require Taiwan to reallocate more of its revenue to local governments. The bill would benefit the KMT by redirecting money to KMT constituencies and forcing President Lai to choose between cutting defense spending or cutting funding for popular domestic programs. The amendment requires the government to reallocate NT$375.3 billion of revenue to local governments, accounting for 9% of Taiwan’s total government revenue. Director-General of Taiwan’s Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) Chen Shu-tzu said that NT$1.81 trillion (about 58%) of the government’s NT$3.13 trillion budget for 2025 cannot be reduced by law, which means that the reallocated funds must come at the expense of discretionary spending items such as defense. Chen estimated that the defense budget may have to be reduced by 28% (about NT$80 billion or US$2.45 billion), or else cuts would be made to already approved or ongoing projects.[11]

The KMT dismissed concerns that the budget bill would require large defense cuts, however. It said the purpose of the bill is to make the central government cut wasteful spending and redirect those funds to local governments, and that the budget reallocation would not affect defense spending unless the Lai administration chooses to make cuts to defense over other budget items. It called on the Lai administration not to spread “lies” and “conspiracies.” [12] Reallocating more funding to local governments would disproportionately benefit KMT constituencies and help the KMT in future elections, as the KMT controls most local-level governments and retains strong local patronage networks.[13] The new law would also force Lai to make difficult decisions about where to make spending cuts, which may hurt him and his party politically. Lai could choose to cut defense spending, which would constrain the progress of one of the administration’s top priorities and expose Taiwan to narratives that it is unserious about defending itself. He could alternatively choose to cut other government programs, which may negatively impact the material well-being of Taiwanese citizens and thus reduce satisfaction with his government, while amplifying opposition narratives that Lai is a warmonger who would choose building up the military over the welfare of his people. The political consequences of this bill will depend not only on Lai’s decisions but also on whom voters blame for the spending cuts.

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) and Coast Guard Administration (CGA) both warned that defense budget cuts would have a serious impact on their preparedness and development plans. The MND said major cuts would prevent the military from upgrading major weapons equipment and make it difficult to make payments for purchased items, resulting in delays or cancellations. The ministry said the defense budget for 2025 accounted for approximately 2.4% of Taiwan's GDP, but the possible cut of 28%, as estimated by the budget office, will take it down to below 2%. [14] The CGA estimated it would have to cut over NT$2.9 billion (US$88.49 million) of its 2025 budget if the estimated budget cuts are made. It said the cut would significantly affect its ability to counter PRC gray-zone tactics, manage the delivery of newly built vessels, and maintain its fleet.[15]

Taiwan President Lai Ching-te said he would sign the bill into law when it reaches his desk.[16] However, he also said in his New Year’s Day Speech that Taiwan must keep expanding its defense budget to ensure Taiwan’s security.[17] Lai and his party have very little ability to block the implementation of the legislation.

The Taipei district court indicted TPP founder Ko Wen-je on corruption charges that could carry a sentence of 28 and half years in prison. TPP leadership has accused the prosecution of being politically motivated and lacking substantial evidence. The Taipei District Prosecutors Office announced on December 26 that former TPP chair Ko Wen-je had been indicted on charges of bribery, profiteering, embezzlement, and breach of trust in violation of the Criminal Code and the Anti-Corruption Act.[18] Ko was briefly released on bail on December 30, during which period he resigned as TPP chair and approved TPP legislative caucus whip Huang Kuo-chang as acting chair. The Taiwan High Court revoked Ko’s bail on January 3. The prosecution emphasized that Ko’s alleged behavior, the mishandling of a real estate project and misreporting of campaign finances, netted him almost NT $100 million ($3 million) in illegal proceeds, undermined public trust in the ROC government and suggested that Taiwanese politicians are susceptible to bribery and interference from corporations and other outside actors.[19]

The TPP has stood behind Ko throughout the indictment, characterizing the investigation as being “politically motivated” to serve the interests of the ruling DPP.[20] The TPP accused the DPP of persecuting a political rival and “silencing” the 3.69 million Taiwanese people who voted for Ko in the 2024 presidential election.[21] TPP supporters claimed that Ko’s initial arrest was an act of “Green Terror” by the DPP.[22] “Green Terror” is a reference to the DPP’s official color, green, and the 1949–1987 “White Terror” period, when tens of thousands of people were murdered and imprisoned by the state. The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) has also used the phrase “Green Terror” on multiple occasions, including after Ko’s initial arrest in September 2024.[23] The PRC’s use of this phrase is likely intended to sow divisions between Taiwanese political parties and instill doubt in the Taiwanese public over the legitimacy of the DPP government. The TPP’s continued use of “Green Terror” rhetoric following Ko’s indictment could be repeated by the TAO, giving the PRC another opportunity for political and cognitive warfare against the Taiwanese public.

The Taiwanese Legislative Yuan has no clear majority party, with the DPP holding 51 seats and the KMT holding 54 (including two KMT-aligned independents). 57 seats are needed for a majority. The TPP is the only other party in the LY, with 8 seats. It therefore serves as a swing vote and has significant leverage in Taiwanese legislative politics. The current tensions between the TPP and DPP combined with the TPP’s adoption of the KMT “Green Terror” rhetoric will likely lead to a solidification of the TPP-KMT alliance, which will make it even more difficult for DPP-backed legislation to pass.

Taiwan’s Presidential Office conducted its first tabletop wargame simulating PRC warfare against Taiwan. ROC President William Lai presided over the second meeting of the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee on the same day in a move consistent with broader efforts to bolster Taiwan’s civil defense resilience. ROC Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim and National Security Council Secretary-general Joseph Wu held the three-hour tabletop exercise simulating a PRC attack on Taiwan as well as high-intensity “gray-zone” scenarios.[24] The exercise featured a PRC adversary cooperating with Iran, North Korea, and Russia.[25] An unnamed Taiwanese security official told Nikkei Asia that the wargame included “China's increasingly clear ambition to control the first island chain, including recent actions in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait.” The official added that “Beijing has also demonstrated its ability to project power at sea. We used this as a hypothetical scenario to test if Taiwan is able to cope with an attack or blockade.”[26] Unnamed defense officials also specified that the exercise explored the possibility of an “internet blackout caused by the severing of undersea cables.”[27] PRC state-owned news outlet Global Times decried the tabletop exercise and accused the DPP of trying to undermine cross-strait relations.[28]

ROC President William Lai said that the tabletop exercise illustrated the need for government agencies to establish standard operating procedures for wartime contingencies. He also said that civil society must bolster its resilience and that the ROC government would work to improve interoperability between government ministries.[29] The tabletop exercise incorporated both central and local government officials; the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee brought together government and civil society leaders to discuss bolstering Taiwan’s resilience. Lai said that the committee’s five goals included civilian training, material consolidation, energy and infrastructure maintenance, welfare and medical facilities, and network security.[30]

Lai’s efforts to boost civil society emergency preparedness are part of a broader push for societal resilience amid PRC coercion and harassment campaigns. Lai announced the creation of the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee in June 2024.[31] The committee met for the first time in September 2024. National Security Council Deputy-Secretary General Hsu Szu-chien noted Lai’s focus on “action with real operations in the field” over “theoretical discussions on paper.”[32] Lai also made defense resilience a key component of his National Day speech on October 10 and his New Year’s address. Lai called upon Taiwan on January 1 to “pool every ounce of our strength to improve the defense resilience of the whole society, build capabilities that can respond to large-scale disasters and deter threats and invasions, and strengthen counter-information warfare and counter-cognition.”[33] Lai also announced that Taiwan will combine its two nonmilitary exercises, the Wanan and Minan drills, into an Urban Resilience Drill starting in 2025.[34] Taiwan will reconvene the resilience committee in March and again in June 2025 to coincide with its Han Kuang defense drills.[35]

The Taiwanese Ministry of the Interior (MOI) sent a request to the Constitutional Court to formally dissolve the China Unification Promotion Party (CUPP). The CUPP is a minor far-right, pro-PRC political party that has ties to CCP officials and organized crime. The CUPP is a minor political party established in 2005 whose platform is based on support for unification with the PRC and the One China Principle, which recognizes the PRC as the legitimate representative of China and Taiwan as a part of that China. The MOI request follows months of claims by the ministry that the CUPP is involved in organized crime and that it harbors core members who have repeatedly violated the National Security Act, Anti-Infiltration Act, Cross-Strait Act, and election laws.[36] The MOI first announced on November 6 that it would petition for the disbandment of the CUPP for electoral interference on behalf of the PRC.[37]

The ministry’s allegations stem from years of investigations that directly connected CUPP member activity with illegal acts. The High Prosecutor’s Office charged three CUPP members in August with “developing a spy network to infiltrate the Taiwanese military.”[38] A Taiwanese couple was charged in November for making “radio and digital propaganda” for the PRC government “in exchange for NT$74 million (US$2.32 million).[39] Both were members of the CUPP. In total, Taiwanese law enforcement has “linked 134 CUPP members to serious crimes such as murder, robbery, transnational human trafficking, and gang violence.[40] CUPP founder Chang An-lo is a former mobster nicknamed the White Wolf who previously acknowledged the prevalence of criminals within the organization.[41] Chang founded the party while in the PRC and has previously called on Taiwan to not resist a possible PRC invasion.[42] ROC investigations of CUPP activities determined the party to be a PRC proxy organization that is focused on breeding subversive agents within Taiwan’s military and political institutions.[43] The MOI reiterated its support for political speech but stressed that it could not tolerate “repeated national security violations and acts of violence by party members.”[44]

The PRC sanctioned seven firms in response to a new US military aid package and equipment sale for Taiwan in a move consistent with past sanctions. It also added 28 US firms to an export control list. The United States announced a new $571.3 million drawdown of “defense articles and services” as well as “military education and training” on December 20 to assist Taiwan.[45] The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) also said that the State Department approved the possible sale of “Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Modernization and related equipment for an estimated cost of $265 million” on December 20. The DCSA said that this sale would speed Taiwan’s development of the Advanced Tactical Datalink System.[46] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) responded on December 27 by announcing that it would sanction Hudson Technologies, Raytheon Canada, Raytheon Australia, Saronic Technologies, Alcon, Insitu, and International Marine Engineering, as well as senior executives of these entities. These sanctions will freeze the companies’ assets within the PRC and prohibit entities within the PRC “prohibited from engaging in transactions, cooperation and other activities” with the sanctioned parties.[47] The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and Defense Ministry also condemned the sales as a signal to “Taiwan independence.”[48]

The PRC also added 28 US entities to its export control list on January 2. The PRC Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) added defense contractors including General Dynamics, Anduril Industries, Lockheed Martin Corporation, and Raytheon to an export control list “in order to safeguard national security and interests and fulfill international obligations such as non-proliferation.”[49] MOFCOM stipulated that the “export of dual-use items to the above-mentioned 28 US entities is prohibited; any related export activities currently underway should be stopped immediately.” The report added that export operators may apply to MOFCOM for exceptions under “special circumstances.”[50] RAND expert Raymond Kuo told Voice of America (VOA) that these export controls will likely have very little economic impact as these US defense contractors had no business with the PRC, however.[51]

These sanctions and export control listings are consistent with past PRC sanctions against Western firms in response to US support for Taiwan, even if their effect is more symbolic than economic. The PRC frequently uses sanctions to attempt to undermine and delegitimize US aid to the ROC and often targets the same US defense contractors. The PRC sanctioned Raytheon multiple times following announcements of aid to Taiwan in 2024.[52] The PRC’s decision to target Australian and Canadian branches of Raytheon signals its willingness to act against branches of firms in third countries as part of its punishment of US defense contractors. The sanctions against Raytheon Canada also come shortly after the PRC froze the assets of two Canadian groups, the Uyghur Human Rights Advocacy Project and the Canadian Tibet Committee, on December 21.[53]

The ROC Coast Guard Administration (CGA) intercepted a likely PRC ship suspected of damaging an undersea cable north of Taiwan on January 4. The CGA drove away a different PRC ship as it approached an area with undersea cables on January 6. Cutting undersea cables is a way for the PRC to isolate Taiwan or disrupt Taiwanese society. Taiwanese telecommunications company Chunghwa Telecom identified the Cameroon-flagged cargo ship Shun Xing 39, also listed as the Tanzania-flagged Xing Shun 39, as it passed near Yehliu, Taiwan on January 4.[54] Chunghwa accused the ship of damaging an undersea cable but said that the damage had not affected domestic communications. The CGA intercepted the ship and sent it for an investigation near Keelung, Taiwan.[55] Investigators could not board the ship due to weather conditions but collected records, including radar data, to send to prosecutors as the ship continued its planned journey to Busan, South Korea.[56] The ROC has requested help from South Korea in investigating the incident; investigations remain ongoing at time of writing.[57] The CGA found that the ship used two different AIS systems and had an all-Chinese crew of seven.[58] Chunghwa said that the cable damaged on January 4 would likely be repaired by late January.[59] The CGA later drove away the Bao Shun, a Mongolian-flagged freighter that had approached the shore while loitering off the coast of Shimen District in New Taipei, on January 6.[60] Taiwan did not report damage to nearby cables following this encounter.[61]

PRC-affiliated ships have severed undersea cables near Taiwan and elsewhere several times in the past few years. Taiwan’s National Communications Commission accused two PRC ships of damaging cables connecting Taiwan and its outlying Matsu Islands in 2023, causing internet outages on Matsu for over a month. Taiwan’s government refrained from accusing the PRC of orchestrating intentional sabotage at the time, however.[62] European authorities have also suspected PRC ships of damaging cables in the Baltic Sea, including the Yi Peng 3, a vessel suspected of cutting two undersea cables in November 2024. Finland investigated a PRC ship suspected of cutting an undersea gas line and a communications cable between Finland and Estonia in 2023.[63]

The PRC is likely setting conditions to isolate Taiwan informationally. ROC deputy digital ministry head Herming Chiueh said that cable-cutting incidents are unlikely to be unintentional, as they would require a ship to drop its anchor on a cable, turn the ship’s engine on with the anchor in position, and move until the cable broke.[64] Attempted and successful cable-cutting stretches CGA resources and forces the ROC to expend effort investigating suspicious vessels and repairing damage. Even “unsuccessful” or easily repaired cable cuts inconvenience ROC authorities and contribute to an atmosphere of discontent in Taiwan. Intentional sabotage of undersea cables could provide the PRC with an ostensibly deniable means of isolating Taiwan, including cutting off Taiwan’s critical communications during a blockade or invasion. ISW-AEI research has identified cable cutting as a short-of-war technique that could isolate Taiwan from its outlying islands as well as from international partners.[65] Seemingly isolated incidents of cable cutting in a non-military context illustrate the PRC’s capability to isolate Taiwan at will and may represent PRC efforts to “practice” or test means of cutting off Taiwan’s communications.

PRC efforts to isolate Taiwan informationally will likely prompt commensurate ROC efforts to protect and diversify its means of information access. The ROC has initiated efforts to shore up its digital resilience amid natural and manmade threats to its cables. ROC National Security Bureau (NSB) Director-General Tsai Ming-yen called upon Taiwan’s legislators to “harden” the ROC’s undersea cables in a meeting of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee in May 2024. Tsai said that Taiwan’s undersea cables had been cut 20 times — a higher number than normal — in 2023; he could not definitively attribute these cuts to sabotage, however.[66] Taiwan’s Ministry of Digital Affairs has called the ROC “highly dependent” on submarine internet cables but stated that “We plan to build additional international submarine cable landing stations, strengthen submarine cable safety protection mechanisms and increase backup to ensure the safety of submarine cables and external networks.”[67] Taiwan’s December 2024 civil defense wargame included a cable-cutting scenario and resulting “internet blackout,” according to unnamed defense officials.[68]

Taiwan’s National Security Bureau (NSB) said that the average daily number of cyberattacks against Taiwan’s government network doubled in 2024, with most originating from the PRC. The NSB said in a report that the average daily number of cyber intrusions reached 2.4 million in 2024 compared to 1.2 million in 2023. The NSB said that most of the cyberattacks were detected and blocked. The government service network supports electronic communication between government agencies and provides online government services to the public. Taiwan’s intelligence community reported a total of 906 cyberattack cases in 2024, an increase of more than 20 percent from the 752 cases in 2023. More than 80 percent of the cases in 2024 targeted government agencies. The report said that PRC cyberattacks in the field of communications rose 650 percent in 2024, the highest increase of any field. Cyberattacks on transportation targets increased by 70 percent and attacks on the defense supply chain increased by 57 percent. The PRC also launched denial-of-service attacks on the financial and transportation sectors when conducting military drills.[69] The increase in PRC cyberattacks in 2024 was very likely in part a response to Taiwan’s election of Lai Ching-te as its president. The PRC considers Lai a dangerous separatist. cyberattacks offer the PRC a low-cost means of harassing Lai’s administration and Taiwan as a whole.

A Taiwanese NSB report revealed that the amount of disinformation circulating on Taiwanese social media more than doubled in 2024, with most of it originating in the PRC. Pieces of disinformation that the NSB identified increased by 60% in total.[70] The disinformation appeared to target social media applications that are predominantly used by younger people. In total, the NSB said the PRC spread 2.16 million pieces of disinformation, which were largely geared toward increasing skepticism about the reliability of US assistance to Taiwan, the competence of President Lai Ching-te’s administration, and the efficacy of the Taiwanese military.[71] The increase in disinformation follows a larger trend of PRC attempts to use disinformation and fake accounts to mass-produce pro-PRC sentiment in Taiwan.[72]

The most common method of disinformation used fake accounts or bots to spread manipulated memes, pictures, and videos.[73] Hacking operations also targeted Taiwanese citizens and military personnel in attempts to disseminate disinformation from their social media accounts. The PRC also used artificial intelligence (AI) to mass-produce fake content and deepfakes of Taiwanese political figures.[74]

The platform most affected by the rise in disinformation was Facebook, experiencing a 40% increase in traffic and over 900,000 pieces of reported disinformation in 2024. Other outlets experienced more substantial jumps, with a 244% increase in Taiwan-targeted disinformation on X and a 664% increase on three popular online forums, though the overall amount of such disinformation was still lower than on Facebook. The NSB also discovered a total of 28,216 fraudulent accounts, more than double the number that were discovered in 2023. [75]

The China Coast Guard (CCG) carried out three incursions into Taiwan’s restricted waters around Kinmen in the final days of 2024. Kinmen is an ROC archipelago located just two miles from the PRC mainland. Four CCG vessels simultaneously sailed into Kinmen’s southern restricted waters on December 27, 30, and 31 and stayed for two hours each time. The ships on December 27 and 31 sailed in two two-ship formations, while the one on December 30 involved the four ships entering at four different locations and patrolling independently.[76] Taiwan does not claim territorial waters or a contiguous zone around its outlying Kinmen and Matsu Islands due to the island chains’ proximity to the PRC but maintains concentric prohibited and restricted zones around the islands that are roughly equivalent.

The PRC has normalized CCG incursions into the restricted waters around Kinmen in 2024 to assert its law enforcement jurisdiction in the waters. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) said that the CCG deliberately entered restricted waters around Kinmen 52 times since February.[77] It entered restricted waters around the Matsu Islands at least four times in the same period, all during the Joint Sword 2024-series military exercises.[78] These numbers include only deliberate “law enforcement patrols” in the waters and not “innocent passage” through restricted zones.[79] The PRC began these incursions after two PRC fishermen died when their speedboat capsized while fleeing a CGA ship in Kinmen’s prohibited waters. It increased the number of patrols and varied the patrol patterns around the time of Lai Ching-te’s inauguration in May, likely as a gray-zone tactic to assert PRC jurisdiction and strain Taiwan’s resources. The incursion pattern has become more regular since then: groups of four CCG ships have carried out “law enforcement patrols” three or four times each month for two hours at a time. None of the ships have patrolled in the prohibited waters around Kinmen or Matsu since May.

The PLA’s monthly total air incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ in December was 211, the lowest since before Taiwan President William Lai Ching-te’s inauguration in May 2024, even though major PLA naval drills occurred around Taiwan in mid-December. The monthly total is still much higher than pre-2024 averages, however. The ADIZ incursion numbers do not include aerial activities near Taiwan’s outlying Kinmen and Matsu Islands, which are west of the median line of the Taiwan Strait. The normalization of PLA incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ wears down Taiwan’s response readiness and forces Taiwan to continually expend resources monitoring and responding to these instances. The ROC Ministry of National Defense also detected four Chinese balloons in Taiwan's ADIZ: three on December 20 (including two directly over Taiwan) and one on December 25.[80] PRC balloons also flew into Taiwan’s ADIZ last winter in the lead up to the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election, increasing to daily frequency in January 2024 and gradually tapering off in the months after the election. Taiwan’s MND again began to report occasional PRC balloon overflights in its ADIZ reports beginning in November 2024, but the balloon incursions remain much less frequent than they were at the same time the previous year.

China

Instability in the highest echelons of the PLA’s political commissars likely signals Xi Jinping’s dissatisfaction with their effectiveness in instilling his ideals of political loyalty. The Central Military Commission (CMC) confirmed its appointment of General Chen Hui as the new political commissar of the PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) on December 23.[81] Chen’s predecessor, General Qin Shutong, and other PLA generals and admirals were conspicuously absent from the ceremony, including Navy Political Commissar Yuan Huazhi, Army Commander Li Qiaoming, and People’s Armed Police Commander Wang Chunning—all of whose whereabouts are unknown. Qin’s replacement follows the PRC Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) announcement on November 28 that it had suspended Director of the Political Work Department of the CMC Miao Hua amid his investigation for suspected “serious violations of discipline.”[82] The CMC is the PRC’s highest military decision-making body. The Political Work Department of the CMC is responsible for instilling ideological discipline and loyalty to the CCP in the PLA by controlling propaganda, political education, and organization.[83] The Director of the CMC’s Political Work Department is the highest-ranking political commissar in the CCP. Miao’s suspension and Qin’s replacement are likely due to their perceived failure to instill Xi’s version of political loyalty in the military, which revolves around upholding Xi’s absolute leadership and authority.

The official CCP theoretical journal Qiushi publicized a January 2024 speech by CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping on December 15 that called for upholding centralized party leadership and “turning the knife inward” to eliminate sources of weakness that degrade the party’s integrity. The timing of the speech’s release by Qiushi, which disseminates high-level CCP policy directives and governing philosophy throughout the CCP’s rank and file, points to a re-emphasis on political education amid perceived failures to achieve loyalty.

Recent signals from the PLA military establishment indicate possible resistance to Xi’s agenda for governance of the military. The Central Theater Command Political Work Department published an article on December 1 about the 83rd Group Army’s “study session” to implement the spirit of the Political Work Conference of the Central Military Commission (CMC), which displayed a political slogan that emphasizes tenets of collective leadership and intra-party democracy.[84] The political work conference in question was a rare meeting in June that Xi Jinping himself convened, during which he urged strengthening the military’s loyalty to the CCP, commitment to a centralized hierarchy, and continued efforts to root out corruption.[85] PLA Daily, the military’s official newspaper, published two articles on December 9 and 11 that called for upholding collective leadership and intra-party democracy as the guiding principles of the party’s governance of the military.[86] All three of the articles uncharacteristically omitted mention of Xi, whose name is almost always invoked alongside themes of political education.

One of the PLA Daily’s articles highlighted the need to pursue “correct” centralization on the basis of democracy.[87] The article clarified the meaning of so-called democratic centralism as “democracy first and then centralization,” and that under the party’s organization, a secretary, deputy secretary, and committee members have an equal say in making decisions.[88] The essence of this definition is divergent from Xi’s doctrine, which emphasizes a hierarchical authority structure.[89]

The principles of collective leadership and intra-party democracy featured prominently in the CCP’s ideological messaging in the years before Xi took power and even appear in the PRC’s constitution.[90] The phrases became increasingly rare after Xi assumed leadership of the CCP, however, and were gradually replaced by tenets that affirm Xi’s centrality within the party and insist on upholding his centralized leadership over it.[91] Xi has not explicitly condemned the principles of collective leadership and intra-party democracy as incompatible with his doctrine of centralized hierarchy. These tenets still coexist in party governance parlance alongside Xi’s newer dogma but are often minimized or glossed over in comparison. The lack of harmony and the divergent emphasis between these doctrines possibly signals competing priorities for party-military relations among Xi and certain segments of the military establishment, however.

The US Department of Defense (DoD)’s 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR) reported that the PLA is continuing to enhance its overall military power, including its nuclear arsenal, but faces widespread corruption and other challenges. The CMPR is an annual report that provides a detailed overview of the structure, capabilities, and strategy of the PLA. Xi Jinping, who is also the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), remains committed to transforming the PLA into a “world-class military” by 2049. Sweeping modernization plans involving all branches of the PLA have resulted in continued growth and technological advancements. The CMPR reported that the PRC spends 40% to 90% more than it announces in its public defense budget, approximately $330 billion–$450 billion in 2024. These investments have allowed the PRC to enhance its military power projection, particularly in the nuclear and maritime domains. The DOD reported that the PLA likely possesses over 600 operational nuclear warheads, a stockpile increase of 100 since 2023. The CMPR estimated that the PRC will have the ability to deploy more than 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030.[92]

The PRC’s investments in its nuclear arsenal are likely intended to increase the credibility of the PRC’s nuclear deterrent and send a message to the United States and its allies about the potential risks of engaging in a conflict with the PLA. The CMPR also highlighted developments within the PLA Navy (PLAN), including investments in a new class of amphibious assault ships, nuclear-powered submarines, and advanced auxiliary vehicles, which would greatly enhance the PLA’s ability to carry out an amphibious invasion of Taiwan.

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lin Jian accused the DoD of disseminating false information as a way to justify continued American military hegemony. Lin urged the US to stop publishing such “irresponsible” reports and instead focus its efforts on working towards peace and stability.[93]

A PRC state-sponsored cyber threat actor breached US Department of Treasury workstations on December 8 in an espionage operation that targeted the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Office of the Treasury Secretary.[94] The incident became public knowledge after Assistant Treasury Secretary Aditi Hardikar informed the Senate Banking Committee on December 30 that an assessed PRC state-sponsored advanced persistent threat actor (APT) gained control of Treasury Department workstations and accessed unclassified documents on them.[95] The Treasury Department has not disclosed the number of workstations accessed or the nature of the documents potentially obtained by the threat actor. It is not yet clear which PRC-based APT is responsible for the operation. Treasury stated that it was working with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), FBI, and other investigators in the intelligence community to determine the impact of the hack. CISA stated on January 6 that there is currently no indication that the breach affected other federal agencies.[96]

Unnamed US officials stated that the incident affected OFAC, which is responsible for administering economic sanctions, according to the Washington Post.[97] The PRC’s targeting of OFAC signifies its motivation to gather intelligence on US decision making regarding sanctions, possibly including OFAC’s evidence collection methods, its designation criteria, or entities that the United States is scrutinizing.

The hack comes amid the United States’ ongoing investigation into a separate extensive cyber espionage operation attributed to a PRC state-sponsored APT, which breached at least eight US telecommunications firms and affected dozens of countries.[98] Investigators are calling the unprecedented campaign Salt Typhoon, following the Microsoft naming convention for cyber threat actors attributed to the PRC government.[99] Salt Typhoon targeted the private communications of 100 known individuals, including former President Donald Trump, members of his family, his running mate JD Vance, members of the Harris campaign, and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer.[100] Investigators also confirmed that Salt Typhoon compromised systems that contain court orders for wiretapping requests, which could potentially subvert US counterintelligence efforts.[101] The scale of the PRC’s recent malicious cyber activity demonstrates how aggressively the PRC is using cyber tools to undermine the United States and advance its own interests, especially intelligence collection.

Two new Chinese “6th generation” stealth planes from Shenyang Air Corporation and Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group made their first public appearance, signaling that the PRC is claiming to make rapid advancements in aviation technology and Air Force modernization. The Chengdu fighter features a diamond-delta wing planform with five trailing edge flaps to reduce radar signature and increase maneuverability, and it has three engines.[102] The Shenyang Aircraft Corporation’s design is a smaller aircraft by comparison and appears to be a twin-engine aircraft design with a sharply-swept wing shape without a vertical stabilizer.[103] Forbes noted this plane resembles the Sukhoi Su-27.[104] Tailless aircraft offer many stealth advantages such as reducing radar signature from sight and rear perspectives and improving broadband low-observability against a wider variety of radar types, but the design may reduce maneuverability.[105] Stealth plays a critical role in increasing the odds of aircraft avoiding radar detection and evading radar guided weapons, and this announcement follows the J-35 stealth jet debut in November 2024 and the J-20 stealth jet debut in 2016.[106] The appearance of another two stealth planes in development is a signal from the PRC to the rest of the world on their advancements in aviation technology. The operational capabilities of these stealth planes in practice remain unclear, however.

The PRC launched its Type 076 amphibious assault class ship Sichuan, the first of its kind. This “miniature aircraft carrier” could increase the PRC’s at-sea power projection capabilities. The Sichuan is significantly larger and more technologically advanced than previous generations of PRC amphibious assault ships. The vessel displaces 40,000 tons and is wider than both the preceding Type 075 and its closest U.S. counterpart, the America-class amphibious assault ship. The Sichuan hosts an electromagnetic catapult to launch fixed-wing aircraft, the first amphibious assault ship possessing this technology in the world. The ship can accommodate dozens fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, 1,000 marines, and landing craft. [107] A report from CSIS, a US think tank, from August 2024 assessed that the ship could be used as a massive platform to carry the PRC‘s growing UAV fleet, including the GJ-11 Sharp Sword UCAV, mockups of which CSIS sighted near the Sichuan’s construction site.[108] PRC state media reported that the Sichuan will significantly increase the PRC’s power projection capabilities at sea and support the PRC’s goals to possess a capable blue-water navy.

Naturalized US citizen Chen Jinping pled guilty to charges of operating an illegal police station in New York at the behest of the PRC. US authorities arrested Chen for operating the police station in 2023.[109] The US Department of Justice (DOJ) reported that Chen and co-conspirator Lu Jianwang “worked together to establish the first overseas police station in the United States on behalf of the Fuzhou branch of the [PRC Ministry of Public Security (MPS)].”[110] Chen and Lu also destroyed evidence of their involvement with MPS. DOJ reported that the overseas police station occupied an entire floor of an office building in Chinatown, Manhattan and was searched by the FBI in October 2022.[111] Chen pled guilty to acting as an illegal agent of the PRC on December 18.[112]

The charges Chen faces are consistent with past PRC influence and coercion campaigns within the US. US authorities charged three people in two separate cases for operating as unregistered PRC agents to harass Chinese dissidents and fugitives in the United States in July 2023.[113] New York authorities also convicted three men for participating in “Operation Fox Hunt,” a campaign to induce PRC nationals living within the US to return to the PRC, in June 2023.[114] FBI director Christopher Wray gave a statement describing Fox Hunt as “a sweeping bid by General Secretary Xi and the Chinese Communist Party to target Chinese nationals here in the United States and across the world who are viewed as threats to the regime” during a press conference in 2020.[115] Fox Hunt, which the PRC describes as an anti-corruption campaign, has existed since 2014.[116]

US officials have tracked reports of the PRC police stations for several years. Wray expressed concern over the reports of PRC overseas police stations in 2022.[117] European research group Safeguard Defenders reported in 2022 that the PRC maintains a global network of such overseas police stations. Over a dozen countries launched investigations of PRC police stations within their borders following the release of the Safeguard Defenders report.[118]

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) denied reports of overseas police stations in response to Chen’s guilty plea in a regular press conference on December 19.[119] The PRC has regularly denied such accusations. PRC officials have maintained that these stations exist for administrative purposes, are operated by volunteers, and serve no policing function. Former MFA spokesman Wang Wenbin said that the “activities of the relevant institutions are to assist Chinese citizens who are unable to return to China during the COVID-19 pandemic to handle the medical examination services for the renewal of Chinese driver's licenses” in a May 2023 press conference.[120]

California authorities charged a local government campaign manager with acting as an illegal agent of the PRC. A US Department of Justice (DOJ) report said that Yaoning “Mike” Sun served as the “campaign manager and close personal confidante” of councilwoman Eileen Wang, who ran for the city council of Arcadia, California in 2022 and won.[121] Wang and Sun also served as co-officers of a nonprofit to support Chinese-American businesses.[122] The DOJ reported that Sun had worked with co-conspirator Jun “John” Chen, who acted as a handler and served as an intermediary between Sun and PRC officials, in order to influence politics in the PRC’s favor.[123] Sun prepared reports on Wang’s election and sent them to PRC officials in 2022 and 2023. He also traveled to the PRC with Wang in 2023, communicated with Chen proposing actions against “anti-China forces” in the US and “proposed that the PRC government provide an $80,000 budget to support his and Chen’s efforts in the United States.”[124]

This incident is not the first in which John Chen attempted to orchestrate actions in the PRC’s interests within the United States. New York authorities charged Chen and an accomplice, PRC citizen Lin Feng, with conspiring to bribe a government official to participate in transnational repression of Falun Gong in 2023.[125] Chen was sentenced to 20 months in prison “for acting as unregistered agents of the PRC and bribing an IRS agent in connection with a plot to target U.S.-based practitioners of Falun Gong,” a spiritual practice banned in the PRC, in November 2024.[126]

The FBI investigated Eileen Wang’s role in the incident. The City of Arcadia released a statement saying that both Wang and the city government cooperated with the investigation, that Sun has “no affiliation” with the City of Arcadia, and that “Sun had no involvement whatsoever with City of Arcadia business or decision-making.”[127] The City of Arcadia’s statement added that Sun made his initial appearance at United States District Court for the Central District of California.[128] Wang has not been charged with any crimes.[129] The New York Times reported that “it is not clear from the complaint that Ms. Wang was aware of the conversations Mr. Sun and Mr. Chen were allegedly having between themselves and with Chinese government officials about her candidacy. Nor is it obvious from Ms. Wang’s social media posts or the criminal complaint against Mr. Sun that Ms. Wang is pro-Beijing.”[130]

Northeast Asia

Japan

Sources close to the Japanese government assess that the PLAN and CCG likely conducted a joint maritime blockade drill in the Miyako Strait for the first time on December 22. The drill involved three PLAN vessels and three CCG vessels. The Japanese Joint Staff identified the PLAN vessels to be two Jiangkai II-class frigates and a Jiangkai I-class frigate.[131] The CCG ships included the 2901 vessel, one of the largest law enforcement vessels in the world with a displacement of 12,000 tons. Two CCG ships were equipped with 76mm cannons, which are typically reserved for military vessels.[132] The PLAN ships circumnavigated the southern tip of Taiwan and Japan’s Sakishima islands before entering the strait, which is located between the islands of Okinawa and Miyako in Japan’s Ryukyu island chain. [133] The ships then sailed through the Miyako Strait toward the East China Sea.[134] The CCG vessels turned off their transponders in the strait according to Automatic Identification System (AIS) data.[135] A PLAN Dongdiao-class intelligence gathering vessel sailed northwest through the same waters between Okinawa and Miyako island toward the East China Sea the following day.[136]

This joint drill between the PLAN and CCG follows a pattern of increasing cooperation and coordination between military and ostensibly law enforcement forces. The PLAN and CCG also operated together in the May 23–24 Joint Sword-2024A drills, October 14 Joint Sword-2024B drills and the December 9-11 naval exercises off the coast of Taiwan.[137] The PRC has heavily armed its coast guard ships, as the 76mm cannons are typically used by navies around the world. The Japanese Coast Guard, by contrast, utilizes 40mm cannons, which only has approximately a third of the firing range of to the 76 millimeter cannons.[138] The joint blockade drill is the first time the PRC has conducted such activities in the Miyako Strait, and it indicates the PRC is making preparations to block the chokepoint between Taiwan and the Japanese archipelago in a variety of situations. The Miyako Strait is strategically important as one of the international waterways connecting the Pacific Ocean with the East China Sea and one of the widest gaps in the First Island Chain.[139] Okinawa Island is situated on one side of the strait and is home to a major U.S. military base. Cutting off Western and Japanese access to the strait would make it significantly harder for Taiwan to receive aid in the event of an PRC invasion or blockade of Taiwan.

North Korea

Relations between the PRC and North Korea (DPRK) likely deteriorated in 2024 despite the fact that the year was supposed to be the PRC-DPRK "Year of Friendship” according to January 2024 statements. Supreme Leader of North Korea Kim Jong Un and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping declared in January 2024 that 2024 would be a PRC-DPRK “year of friendship” to mark the 75th anniversary of diplomatic ties. Both leaders promised to hold joint celebrations in “all fields” to “inject fresh vitality into the development” of their relationship.[140] Chairman of the PRC National People’s Congress’s Standing Committee Zhao Leji, the PRC’s third-highest ranking official, visited Pyongyang in April to attend the opening ceremony for the friendship year and held high-level talks to discuss promoting bilateral exchange and cooperation.[141] Diplomatic exchanges between the PRC and North Korea, communication between leadership, and bilateral trade all declined in 2024, however, despite earlier commitments to enhance relations in multiple areas.[142]

The 63rd anniversary of the PRC-DPRK Treaty of Friendship on July 11 passed with a minimal ceremony, and neither the North Korean state newspaper Rodong Sinmun nor the PRC state-run press covered the event. The PRC embassy in Pyongyang hosted a reception to mark the anniversary which was attended by lower-level officials than in the previous year.[143] PRC representatives appeared to be absent from North Korea’s July 27th "Victory Day" celebration, which marked the end of the Korean War. The PRC Ambassador to North Korea, Wang Yajun, also did not attend the ceremony, the first time the PRC ambassador has ever skipped the event.[144] The celebration in 2023 included a high-profile visit by a Chinese delegation that had high-level talks with Kim Jong Un, by contrast. Kim and Xi exchanged only three leader-to-leader letters in 2024, down from 10 in 2023.[145] North Korean state media reported on January 1 that Kim Jong Un received New Year's greetings from Xi Jinping, including it in a brief mention alongside messages from other friendly nations, in contrast to the more prominent coverage of greetings to and from Russian President Vladimir Putin.[146] There have been 11 delegation visits between the PRC and DPRK since the DPRK border reopened in July 2023. No visits occurred after April 2024, however.[147] North Korea’s trade with the PRC in November reached nearly $220 million in 2024 but still fell short of the trade levels seen before the pandemic, likely due to the DPRK’s increased trade with Russia.[148]

The decline in DPRK-PRC relations comes as the PRC reaches out to South Korea and seeks to manage its relationship with Japan, while the DPRK dramatically deepens its alliance with Russia. South Korea, Japan, and China held a trilateral summit in May for the first time in five years calling for a “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”[149] Pyongyang protested by stating that “anyone who preaches denuclearization...will be regarded as engaging in the most serious act of sovereignty infringement.”[150] North Korea launched a military reconnaissance satellite on May 28 in protest of the summit. Putin and Kim signed a "comprehensive strategic partnership treaty" in June 2024 that included mutual defense commitments, after which North Korea sent over 10,000 troops to Russia.[151] PRC officials repeatedly declined to comment on the deployment, stating that the PRC "is not involved in the Russia-DPRK development."[152] The PRC historically has been North Korea's strongest ally and economic partner, but this shift in the DPRK's alignment suggests that the PRC may hold less influence over North Korea than it once did.

The DPRK-PRC relationship is likely in decline at least for now. Several factors may contribute to this decline, including the PRC’s reluctance to become deeply entangled in the growing Russia-DPRK alliance for fear of alienating Europe and drawing increased pressure from the United States. The PRC is no longer the DPRK’s sole economic patron, diminishing its diplomatic leverage, although Russia is unlikely to be able fully to replace the PRC in this role. The PRC has a strategic interest in maintaining control over the Kim regime, and the transactional nature of the Russia-DPRK relationship may prove disruptive to PRC objectives in the long term. The PRC is likely to continue maintaining functioning ties with both nations, however, despite the decline in diplomatic exchanges with North Korea over the past year.

Kim may seek to further reduce economic reliance on China to enhance his diplomatic independence. Kim probably hopes to secure international recognition as a nuclear-armed state by strengthening his position against the United States and its allies.[153] This effort includes expanding the DPRK’s weapons portfolio through technology transfers from Russia and increasing North Korea’s global influence, enhancing negotiating power with both the United States and PRC on denuclearization and sanctions. [154] Kim is likely to continue realigning toward stronger ties with Russia at the expense of the PRC.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The PLA carried out combat readiness patrols around Scarborough Shoal on December 29, a final act of coercion in a year of heightened tensions between the Philippines and PRC in the South China Sea. The PRC Ministry of National Defense reported that these exercises, carried out by the PLA Southern Theater Command, were intended to defend PRC national sovereignty and “continuously strengthen maritime and airspace patrols around China’s territorial waters” around Scarborough Shoal.[155] The CCG strengthened its presence around Scarborough Shoal on January 2 by deploying the CCG 5901, the world’s largest coastguard vessel, joining at least three other CCG vessels and seven maritime militia ships already present near Scarborough Shoal.[156] This is the first deployment of the CCG 5901 to Scarborough Shoal since May 2024, another period of high tensions between the PRC and the Philippines.

These patrols and deployments follow a December 19 incident in which the China Coast Guard (CCG) warned and “drove away” a Philippines Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources aircraft flying over Scarborough Shoal.[157] CCG spokesperson Liu Dejun said that the CCG vessel warned the civilian plane that it was “illegally intruding” into PRC territorial airspace, monitored the aircraft, and expelled it from PRC territory.[158]

ISW has reported on multiple CCG patrols around Scarborough Shoal over the past five months, noting that these patrols serve the dual purpose of showcasing PLA military capabilities to the Philippines and reinforcing PRC territorial claims over Scarborough Shoal.[159] The Scarborough Shoal has been under PRC control since a standoff between the Philippines and the PRC in 2012, though the PRC has not built infrastructure on the shoal. Scarborough Shoal is one of the disputed areas of the South China Sea that has been the site of significant tensions and aggressive behavior by the PRC throughout 2024. While there have been periods of relative calm between the PRC and the Philippines, current trends in behavior indicate that tensions in the South China Sea will continue into the new year.

Europe

The PRC did not fully cooperate with a European investigation of a PRC commercial ship that likely severed two subsea cables in the Baltic Sea. The investigation concluded with no arrests. Danish and Swedish ships detained the PRC-flagged cargo ship Yi Peng 3 for a month in the Kattegat Strait, just outside Danish territorial waters, as European authorities investigated whether the ship deliberately severed two undersea communications cables on November 17–18. Investigators determined that the ship dropped its anchor on November 17, severed the first cable, and continued to drag the anchor over 100 miles. They said the ship then turned off its transponder and cut the second cable at 3 a.m. the next day.[160] Sweden, Denmark, Germany, and Finland attempted to carry out an investigation but were unable to board the ship without the PRC’s permission or to make arrests, as the ship was anchored in international waters. The PRC ultimately dispatched its own team to investigate. The PRC team boarded the ship to inspect it on December 19 and allowed European personnel to participate as observers. PRC authorities did not allow Sweden’s chief prosecutor for the case to board, however. The ship was allowed to leave on December 21.[161] Swedish foreign minister Maria Malmer Stenergard criticized the PRC for denying the prosecutor the opportunity to inspect the vessel and question the crew as needed for a criminal investigation.[162] PRC MFA spokesperson Mao Ning portrayed the PRC as cooperative. She said the PRC had invited Germany, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark to participate in the joint investigation, informed them in advance that the ship was leaving “to protect the physical and mental health of the crew,” and is willing to maintain communication to promote the follow-up handling of the incident.[163]

It remains unclear why the ship severed the cables. European investigators and intelligence officials said the PRC government likely wasn’t involved in the incident. The investigation suggested the possibility that Russian agents may have bribed the ship’s crew to carry out the sabotage, however.[164]

Syria

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)’ appointment of Uyghur fighters in Syria to government roles will likely cause friction between the new Syrian government and the PRC. HTS, the ruling coalition that overthrew the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria in December 2024, appointed Uyghur militants of the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) to defense ministry positions as a “token of recognition” for their role in ousting Assad.[165] The coalition appointed the commander of TIP in Syria, Abdulaziz Dawood Khudaberdi, to the position of brigadier general. Two other Uyghurs were given the rank of colonel.[166] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) gave a statement against the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a Uyghur separatist movement the PRC affiliates with TIP, following these appointments. MFA spokeswoman Mao Ning said that the PRC would “resolutely crack down” on ETIM, which she denounced as a “terrorist organization,” in a regular press conference on December 31.[167]

Uyghurs have fled from the PRC to Syria to operate as militants for several years. The Associated Press cited estimates ranging between several hundred and 5,000 Uyghur fighters active in Syria, including via the TIP, since at least the mid-2010s.[168] PRC may interpret HTS’ installation of Uyghur defense officials as tacit approval of the TIP’s cause.[169] TIP has publicly expressed anti-PRC sentiment since HTS came to power in Syria. TIP propaganda released in December 2024 called for a jihad against the PRC, citing PRC government repression of Uyghur Muslims.[170] ISW has assessed that the PRC will likely continue to push for stability and counteract the influence of ETIM and TIP.[171] The PRC has long sought to contain Uyghur militancy in Syria and worked with the Assad regime in order to do so; PRC officials likely view HTS’ rise to power as a disruption to established counterterrorism channels.[172]

High-level PRC officials have called for cooperation with the new Syrian government. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed concern over the turbulence in Syria in a December 13 press conference. Wang urged Syria to “firmly oppose any form of terrorism and extremist forces.” Wang also called for “the lifting of illegal unilateral sanctions” against Syria.[173]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, December 12, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Grant Morgan of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: December 17

Key Takeaways

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses exchanges with Kuomintang (KMT) leaders to legitimize the party while maintaining coercive pressure against President Lai Ching-te’s administration and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). This dual approach is likely intended to cause the Taiwanese public to associate the DPP with military escalation and the KMT with peaceful cross-Strait relations. Former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou led a delegation of nearly 1,000 young Taiwanese people to the PRC and met with TAO Director Song Tao in another high-profile instance of CCP-KMT engagement. A PRC national used a modified drone to photograph the United States Vandenberg Space Force Base on November 30. Frequent infiltrations by PRC nationals into US military installations represent likely PRC efforts to spy on US military facilities, especially missile launch sites.
Guam police apprehended seven PRC nationals attempting to enter the island illegally on December 10 and 11 during a US missile interceptor test off the island.
The European Union (EU) sanctioned six PRC-based companies and one PRC citizen on December 16 for supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses exchanges with Kuomintang (KMT) leaders to legitimize the party while maintaining coercive pressure against President Lai Ching-te’s administration and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). This dual approach is likely intended to cause the Taiwanese public to associate the DPP with military escalation and the KMT with peaceful cross-Strait relations. The PRC staged unannounced large-scale exercises around Taiwan from December 9-11, shortly after Taiwan President Lai Ching-te of the DPP transited through the United States. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) said the exercise was the PRC’s largest maritime operation since the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. PRC officials participated in the Shanghai-Taipei Twin City Forum in Taipei the following week, on December 17. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) granted conditional approval for the forum to take place but threatened to cancel the event if the PRC continued its threatening military exercises against Taiwan.[1] The KMT, which favors closer cooperation and engagement with the PRC, advocated for holding the event despite the PRC’s aggression toward Taiwan amid the military exercises.

The MAC blocked Shanghai Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Director Jin Mei from entering Taiwan to participate in the forum, however. The MAC stated that the Shanghai TAO refused to communicate with the DPP government regarding Jin’s travel to Taiwan.[2] The MAC cited the PRC’s military intimidation and recent threats toward Taiwan, such as a list of legal guidelines that threaten severe punishment for Taiwanese “separatists,” which the PRC released in June.[3] The MAC also denied entry to PRC media personnel due to national security concerns and stated that all PRC media outlets are propaganda units of the CCP.[4] The KMT criticized President Lai Ching-te’s administration for limiting the PRC delegation and framed it as an obstruction of the freedom of press.[5]

The CCP severed official contact with the DPP in 2016 for its alleged “separatist” policies and interacts only with the KMT, on the basis of the KMT’s recognition of the 1992 Consensus. The 1992 Consensus is an alleged verbal agreement between representatives of the CCP and KMT that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China, though the two sides disagree over which government rightfully represents “China.” The CCP conducts direct negotiations with KMT figures to legitimize it as the party that can effectively conduct cross-strait relations, in contrast to the DPP.

The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) uncharacteristic restraint in publicizing the military exercises minimized negative public attention that would have damaged its image amid cross-strait exchanges. The Lai administration’s acquiescence to allow the Twin City Forum to proceed benefits the PRC, which masqueraded a friendly disposition to the Taiwanese public without reducing pressure on the DPP. The PRC did not officially announce or name the military exercises, unlike past drills that aimed to publicly warn the DPP government against policies that support Taiwan’s sovereignty. The deployment began after ROC President Lai Ching-te returned from a tour to visit Taiwan’s Pacific Island allies, which included stopovers in Hawaii and Guam. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of National Defense (MOD) spokespersons did not directly answer whether the PRC was conducting military exercises when asked.[6] TAO Spokesperson Zhu Fenglian stated on December 11 that the PRC must punish “provocations” such as Lai’s transit through the United States in response to a reporter’s question about the military exercises, but did not directly mention them.[7] The PRC’s unusual silence during the exercises insulates it from wider domestic and international scrutiny, which hinders the DPP’s credibility in justifying restrictions. Canceling the event would have exposed the Lai administration to greater criticism by the KMT for being closed off. The PRC's restraint in discussing the exercises thus likely reflects in part the importance to Beijing of increasing KMT-led cross-strait engagement.

Former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou led a delegation of nearly 1,000 Taiwanese young people to the PRC and met with TAO Director Song Tao in another high-profile instance of CCP-KMT engagement. Ma is leading the delegation to the PRC provinces of Heilongjiang and Sichuan from December 18-26 to promote people-to-people exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. The trip began a day after the Taipei-Shanghai Twin City Forum and just over a week after an educational exchange that Ma’s foundation organized to bring PRC visitors to Taiwan.[8] Ma met with Song Tao on December 18 at the Cross-Strait Youth Ice and Snow Festival in Harbin, Heilongjiang. Song said that “compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are all Chinese” and should “put the country's future and national interests first, adhere to the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus, resolutely oppose ‘Taiwan independence’ secession and foreign interference, actively promote cross-strait exchanges and cooperation,” “work together to promote the development of cross-strait relations,” and maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Ma said that people on both sides of the strait “belong to the same Chinese nation” and agreed that they should adhere to the 1992 Consensus, oppose Taiwanese independence, expand exchanges, and promote peaceful cross-strait development.[9] It is unclear whether the meeting led to any agreements, as Ma is no longer an official of the ROC or the KMT.

This trip to the PRC was is Ma’s third trip to the PRC in two years. The PRC TAO announced the trip on December 11, days after Taiwan’s MAC threatened to ban the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation from hosting cross-strait exchanges for six months to five years. An unspecified governhat tment source said the foundation may have illegally permitted political campaigning for “one China” during the exchange, when a PRC student on the trip called Taiwan’s national baseball team the “Taipei, China team.”[10]

The PRC’s repeated hosting of Ma helps to maintain his image as an important figure in cross-Strait relations, as well as within the KMT and ROC politics, and to amplify PRC-aligned messaging within Taiwan. Ma’s faction within the KMT is strongly in favor of cross-strait exchanges and integration but may be losing influence somewhat as the KMT seeks to increase its appeal to younger voters. The CCP has an interest in maintaining Ma’s influence because the model of cross-strait relations he promotes, rooted in the 1992 Consensus, is closely aligned with the PRC’s preferred model. The TAO has explicitly referenced the period of Ma’s presidency from 2008-2016 as the ideal state of cross-strait relations that Taiwan should emulate if it wants peace.[11] Ma’s concept of “one China” refers to the ROC and not the PRC, however.

Ma’s visits to the PRC have added significance because they all occurred during periods of high cross-strait tensions and included meetings with high-level PRC officials. Ma traveled to the PRC in March 2023 for the stated purpose of ancestor worship and met with TAO Director Song Tao while he was there. That trip coincided with then-president Tsai Ing-wen’s transit through the United States, where she met then-House Speaker Kevin McCarthy.[12] Ma met CCP Secretary-General Xi Jinping in April of the following year while leading Taiwanese students on a cultural and historical exchange trip in the PRC. The trip occurred a month before Lai’s presidential inauguration.[13] Ma’s current trip and meeting with Song came soon after President Lai transited through the United States. The PRC responded to all three aforementioned events – the Tsai and Lai transits and Lai’s inauguration – with major military exercises around Taiwan.

Cooperative actions between KMT leaders and the CCP are significant despite the fact that the KMT is not being the ruling party in Taiwan. The DPP has been in control of the executive branch since 2016, but lost its control of the legislature in the 2024 election.[14] The KMT is therefore in a stronger political position than it has been in years. The current Legislative Yuan has no majority party, but the 2024 election resulted in the KMT becoming the largest party in the legislature, with 52 seats to the DPP’s 51.[15] The KMT’s electoral victories in 2024 suggest that it is gaining support with the Taiwanese populace. The CCP may hope that rewarding the KMT with high-profile cross-strait engagements may further raise its popularity and weaken the DPP’s ability to effectively respond to CCP coercion in the future.

The United States delivered its first shipment of M1A2T Abrams tanks to Taiwan on December 16. The Taiwanese military received 38 tanks out of a total of 108 tanks purchased in a 2019 order.[16] The rest of the tanks are scheduled to be delivered in 2025 and 2026.[17]

The new tanks will strengthen coastal defense capabilities and help to further modernize Taiwan’s aging tank fleet.[18] The tanks will also help to expand interoperability with the United States and several partners.[19] The Abrams tanks’ defense capabilities will be particularly effective against China’s emerging Type 05 amphibious fighting vehicles because of their upgraded armor capacities and speed, especially when compared to Taiwan’s aging M60A3 and CM11 tanks.[20] The United States has, in contrast, delivered 31 Abrams tanks to Ukraine since Russia’s invasion in 2022.[21]

The PRC MFA responded to the delivery by denying that Taiwan had its own Ministry of National Defense and urging the United States to abide to the one-China principle, which states that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and the PRC is the sole legitimate government of that China. The United States does not recognize the one-China principle but instead maintains a “one-China policy” of maintaining diplomatic relations only with the PRC and not with Taiwan. MFA Spokesperson Lin Jian highlighted the US-PRC 1982 Joint Communique during the normalization of relations, which the PRC claims precludes the US from selling arms to Taiwan. The US and PRC did not settle the question of arms sales to Taiwan in the course of negotiations regarding the normalization of relations, and the United States’ policy dictates that its arm sales to Taiwan depend on the PRC’s commitment to a peaceful resolution of its differences with Taiwan.[22] The PRC’s response is consistent with its past condemnations of US weapon shipments to Taiwan, such as the approval of a $2 billion weapons agreement in late October.[23] Such statements aim to delegitimize both the ROC government and US support for the ROC.

China

A PRC national used a modified drone to photograph the United States’ Vandenberg Space Force Base on November 30.[24] Frequent infiltrations by PRC nationals into US military installations represent likely PRC efforts to spy on US military facilities, especially missile launch sites. The Department of Justice (DOJ) announced on December 11 that US authorities arrested PRC national Zhou Yinpiao on federal charges after he flew a modified drone over Vandenberg Space Force Base in California and took pictures of the base from above.[25] The base’s security personnel detected the drone flying nearly a mile overhead and apprehended Zhou, who was piloting the drone from a nearby park.[26] US authorities found the drone on Zhou’s person and later discovered the photographs of the military base from an aerial viewpoint on the drone. US authorities arrested Zhou at San Francisco International Airport on December 11 before he boarded a flight to the PRC.[27] The DOJ stated that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is investigating the case.

The criminal complaint affidavit by the Central District Court of California stated that Zhou told a contact on PRC-based messaging app WeChat that he “hacked” the drone so that it could fly higher than its intended range, which he told investigators he achieved by using software that he purchased online.[28] Zhou sent the unnamed person photographs that he took with the drone.[29] The affidavit stated that Zhou told investigators that he previously “got into trouble” for flying an unrestricted drone in the People’s Square in Shanghai, which the PRC designated as a restricted zone.[30]

Frequent attempts by PRC nationals to gain access to US military bases indicate the PRC’s possible interest in gathering intelligence related the United States’ missile launch capabilities. The Wall Street Journal cited unnamed US officials who stated in September 2023 that PRC nationals had accessed US military bases and other sensitive sites up to “100 times in recent years,” including PRC nationals who crossed into a US missile range in New Mexico and scuba divers swimming near a US government rocket-launch site in Florida.[31] Vandenberg Space Force Base frequently launches military and commercial spacecraft, including Starlink satellites.[32] The National Reconnaissance Office, SpaceX and the Space Force launched a Falcon 9 rocket containing satellites bound for orbit on the same day that the base detected Zhou’s drone flying overhead.[33]

Guam police apprehended seven PRC nationals attempting to enter the island illegally on December 10 and 11 during a US missile interceptor test off the island. The PRC nationals arrived by the same boat from Saipan in the Northern Mariana Islands, which have a 90-day visa-exemption policy.[34] The Guam Customs and Quarantine Agency stated in a press release that one of the three detainees arrested on December 10 had a standing warrant for her arrest and was found illegally entering the vicinity of a US military installation.[35] Police also discovered four other detainees on Tanguisson Beach and near a US military installation on December 11.[36] The press release noted that it did not discover any contraband in the detainees’ baggage. The arrests all occurred in northern Guam near Andersen Air Force Base. The US conducted its first Guam-based ballistic missile intercept off the coast of Andersen Air Force Base on December 10.[37] The Guam Customs and Quarantine Agency stated that there were 152 instances of PRC nationals illegally attempting to enter Guam since 2022.[38] The December 10 infiltrations are the latest known instance of suspicious activity by PRC nationals near US missile launch sites. Conducting espionage against US military facilities, especially those with missile launch capabilities, could provide the PRC with potentially valuable intelligence that would benefit it in a conflict with the US. Guam is the closest US territory to the PRC and a significant strategic location for both countries. Guam lies within the second island chain and within the range of PRC DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles nicknamed the “Guam Express.”[39] The PRC’s application of an anti-access aerial denial (A2/AD) strategy to prevent access to Taiwan is dependent on neutralizing threats from the first and second island chains.[40] The US Department of Defense’s 2023 Report on the Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC states that Guam military bases are within PRC ballistic and cruise missile range and added that “in the future, PLA LACMs will also likely be deployable on surface platforms like the RENHAI-class guided-missile cruisers. H-6K bomber flights into the Philippine Sea demonstrate the PRC’s ability to range Guam with air-launched LACMs.”[41] The US Missile Defense Agency said that the December 10 missile interceptor test “marks a pivotal step taken in defense of Guam initiatives and partnerships.”[42]

A UK court accused a PRC businessman close to Prince Andrew on December 12 of being a spy and upheld a decision to bar him from the United Kingdom. The court stated that Christopher Yang Tengbo developed an “unusual degree of trust” with Prince Andrew, who authorized him to act on the prince’s behalf in business meetings with potential Chinese investors. Yang is listed as a director of five companies including the Hampton Group, a business consultancy he founded in 2005 that describes itself as "a bridge between companies in China and the rest of the world.”[43] The UK’s then-Home Secretary Suella Braverman canceled Yang’s UK residency rights in 2023, believing him to be carrying out “covert and deceptive activity for the CCP” on behalf of the United Front Work Department (UFWD). UK authorities said data they found on Yang’s devices when he was stopped in 2021 included documents that indicated a link with the UFWD and other Beijing-linked groups. They argued that the documents showed Yang’s frequent contacts with “officials connected with the Chinese state, that he had "sometimes deliberately obscured" his links to the CCP, and that he may have “proactively engaged in UFWD objectives” even though he hadn’t received direct orders.[44] A court ruling on December 12 upheld the ban.[45]

The PRC MFA called the spy allegations “absurd” without elaborating.[46] Yang denied any wrongdoing, saying that he had never been a CCP member, that contact with the UFWD is inevitable for those doing business in the PRC, and that he was a victim of the “political climate” of rising UK-PRC tensions. He asked the court to disclose his identity to quell speculation. Prince Andrew’s office said that the prince ceased his relationship with Yang after the government advised him to, without specifying when this happened. It said Andrew had only met with Yang through official channels and never discussed sensitive matters with him.[47]

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The Philippines ratified its Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan on December 16 in the latest act of military cooperation between the two states amid increasing pressure from the PRC.[48] The Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) provides the legal framework and official guidance for defense cooperation between the Philippines and Japan. One of the RAA’s provisions enables the Philippines and Japan to deploy troops within the other state, creating the opportunity for larger-scale military exercises and maritime patrols.[49] Philippine military spokesperson Colonel Francel Margareth Padilla stated that “this agreement provides substantial benefits, particularly in enhancing training opportunities, joint exercises, and interoperability” to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).[50] The AFP has been seeking to improve its military capabilities, particularly in the maritime domain, amid ongoing aggression from the PRC in the South China Sea. Both states have identified aggression in the South China Sea and East China Sea as a key reason for their efforts for greater military cooperation in multilateral dialogues between the Philippines, Japan, and their Indo-Pacific partners and allies..[51] Tensions between the Philippines and the PRC have been on the rise following a spate of PRC coercive actions in disputed maritime territory, most recently when China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels employed water cannons and sideswiped a Philippine Coast Guard Vessel (PCG) near Scarborough Shoal on December 4.[52]

Japanese Ambassador to the Philippines Endo Kazuya praised the RAA on December 16 as an important step towards greater cooperation between Indo-Pacific allies.[53] Japan has increasingly sought a greater role in Indo-Pacific security through the establishment of its Official Security Assistance grant program, which will provide $10.6 million in military aid to the Philippines’ capabilities in the South China Sea and Luzon Strait.[54] Japan’s provision of military assistance and signing of defense agreements with the Philippines indicates the importance of South China Sea security and cooperation with alliance members to its overall defense strategy.

PRC officials have not yet commented on the RAA’s ratification but criticized its initial signing in July 2024 and stated that the bilateral cooperation was “targeted” at third parties.[55] In the PRC media outlet Global Times, PRC military experts criticized the deal as an effort by the United States and Japan to reduce Philippine sovereignty and incite further violence in the South China Sea.[56] The PRC often places the blame for South China Sea tensions on United States interference as a way to suggest that conflict with the PRC over maritime territory is not in the best interest of the Philippines and instead serves the United States’ strategic interests.[57]

The PRC announced that it “allowed” a Philippine resupply mission to the Sierra Madre in Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC’s rhetoric likely aims to bolster the credibility of its claims to sovereignty over the territory. The AFP released a statement confirming that a Philippines civilian vessel successfully carried out a resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre in the Second Thomas Shoal on December 12.[58] The PRC and the Philippines negotiated a provisional agreement on July 21 to avoid confrontations during the latter’s resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre, which has resulted in a cessation of PRC harassment up to the present.[59] This marks the fourth resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre since the signing of the provisional agreement between the PRC and the Philippines.[60] The AFP released a statement confirming that a Philippines civilian vessel successfully carried out a resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre in the Second Thomas Shoal on December 12.[61] The PRC has harassed Philippine vessels attempting to access Second Thomas Shoal over a dozen times in the past year in an effort to prevent resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre, often employing violent methods that harm Filipino personnel and damage their ships. The BRP Sierra Madre is a grounded warship that has served as an AFP military outpost in the Second Thomas Shoal since 1999. The CCG released a statement saying that the Philippines' resupply mission to the “illegally grounded” BRP Sierra Madre was carried out “with China’s permission.”[62] The PRC has previously framed its non-interference as “allowing” the Philippines' resupply missions to occur. This framing aims to give the impression that the PRC has legal jurisdiction over the Second Thomas Shoal, which the Philippines rejects.

Europe

Russia

The European Union (EU) sanctioned six PRC-based companies and one PRC citizen on December 16 for supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine.[63] The European Commission (EC) stated the reasons for the sanctions include the PRC national and two entities’ support in facilitating the circumvention of EU sanctions and four entities supplying sensitive drone components and microelectronic components to the Russian military industry that supports its war in Ukraine. The measures are part of the EU’s 15th round of sanctions and mark the first instance of EU sanctions against PRC entities for supporting Russia.[64] The specific measures include a travel ban against the individual and freezing the EU-based assets of the six companies.[65] The EU previously blacklisted PRC firms for supporting Russia’s military in order to prevent them from purchasing sensitive goods from the EU.[66] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Lin Jian stated that China is committed to promoting peace talks and considers the “unilateral sanctions” baseless. Lin claims the PRC has never provided weapons to Russia and strictly controls the export of dual-use materials.[67]

The sanctioned individual is a businesswoman named Sophia Li Xiaocui, whom the EU accused of assisting Russian computer numerical control (CNC) machine manufacturer Unimatik. Li facilitated Unimatik’s acquisition of goods that are subject to restrictions under the EU’s export controls. Li “controls and represents” two other sanctioned firms ARCLM International Trading Co and Shijiazhuang Hanqiang Technology.[68] The EU’s Official Journal stated that Li “facilitated [ARCLM International Trading Co and Shijiazhuang Hanqiang Technology’s] infringements” that “significantly frustrated existing Union restrictive measures provisions.”[69] ARCLM International Trading Co. and Shijiazhuang Hanqiang Technology machinery manufacturers that the EU stated exported “products of European origin to Russian companies in violation of export restrictions.”[70]

The EU sanctioned four other companies for supplying components used for drones: Juhang Aviation Technology Shenzhen Co., Redlepus TSK Vektor Industrial (Shenzhen), Xiamen Limbach Aviation Engine Co, and Asia Pacific Links. Juhang Aviation and Redlepus TSK Vektor are both “involved in a procurement and manufacturing network for the Russian military industrial complex.” [71] Both Juhang Aviation and Redlepus TSK Vektor have sent export-controlled dual-use components to IEMZ Kupol, a subsidiary of Russian arms company Almaz-Antey, through the Russian intermediary OOO TSK Vektor. The United States sanctioned Juhang and Aviation and Redlepus TSK Vektor in May and October, respectively.[72] The companies’ components were used in the Garpiya-3 (G3) drones, which the Russian military uses in Ukraine. Both companies act as intermediaries for Russian companies and Xiamen Limbach, a drone engine producer that the EU sanctioned for selling to IEMZ Kupol.[73] The EU lists Xiamen Limbach as suspected of sharing the L550 drone engine design with drone manufacturers of the Shahed-136 UAV, which the Russian military has used against Ukraine.[74] The EU sanctioned Asia Pacific Links for supplying dual use components. The Official Journal of the EU’s sanctions records stated that Asia Pacific Links is the largest supplier of microelectronic components to Russian companies since the Ukrainian invasion.[75] Asia Pacific Links is Russian-owned and is also sanctioned by the US, Switzerland, UK, and Ukraine.[76]

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping advocated for greater cooperation between the PRC and Russia to shape global governance during a meeting with Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev in Beijing on December 12.[78] Xi urged greater cooperation between the PRC and Russia in multilateral institutions such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).[79] The PRC and Russia are pursuing the expansion of multilateral organizations that they lead to increase international support for alternative institutions and strengthen their influence over global governance. Xi stated that the PRC has repeatedly emphasized three principles regarding the Ukraine crisis: “no expansion of the battlefield, no escalation of fighting and no provocation by any party.” [80] The PRC MFA readout described Russia’s positive reception of the “Friends of Peace” initiative, a PRC and Brazil-led forum that has the stated purpose of expanding dialogue and giving Global South countries a voice to advance a “political settlement of the Ukraine issue.”[81] Medvedev stated in an interview with Russian state media on December 12 that Russia is ready to negotiate “only if Ukraine understands the realities that have developed... on the ground,” and that Xi “set out the Chinese version of the possibility of a settlement.”[82] Russia's terms call for Ukraine to surrender nearly 20% of its territory and its millions of occupants under Russian occupation.[83] The PRC’s lack of reproach for Russian aggression accommodates Russia’s uncompromising demands on Ukrainian sovereignty.

Middle East

The PRC called for counterterrorism cooperation against the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) amid Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) calls for jihad against the PRC in Syria. PRC Embassy to the United States spokesperson Liu Pengyu stated on December 13 that the PRC is prepared to work with international actors to “firmly strike down on” ETIM.[84] TIP is a militant group that is affiliated and allied with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), which overthrew Bashar al-Assad’s regime and seized the capital of Damascus on December 7. TIP Emir Sheikh Abdul Haq al-Turkestani reportedly stated that “With the permission of God, his power and strength, the Chinese infidels will soon taste the same torment that the infidels in the Levant tasted.”[85] TIP released a video featuring footage of armed fighters and overlaid with anti-PRC messaging calling upon a “mujahid” to “liberate [Uyghurs] from the Chinese oppressors” and “save them from the merciless oppression of the Chinese [government].”[86]

Some observers, including the United Nations, have described ETIM and TIP as the same group.[87] Others frame TIP as ETIM’s “successor” or differ on the extent to which ETIM and TIP are connected.[88] The extent to which TIP might hold power in the new Syrian government under HTS remains unclear, but the TIP has been active in Syria for several years. Liu’s statement is consistent with past PRC actions against ETIM and Uyghur separatism more broadly. The PRC attributed over 200 attacks to ETIM as early as 2010 and blamed ETIM and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) for a 2021 suicide attack against PRC citizens in Pakistan.[89] The PRC cites the threat of Uyghur militancy and counterterrorism efforts as the impetus for policy toward Uyghurs in Xinjiang, which the US Department of State stated in 2021 constituted genocide.[90] The United States classified ETIM as a terrorist organization in 2002 but removed this designation in 2020, citing a lack of evidence of the group’s existence.[91] Liu denounced the United States’ removal of the designation in his December 13 statement and accused the United States of having “politicized and weaponized” a counterterrorism issue.[92]

The PRC has relied on the Assad regime to monitor and curtail ETIM’s activities in Syria. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated in 2016 that it was aware of ETIM activity in Syria and that it would maintain transnational efforts to address ETIM’s movements in the Middle East and Central Asia.[93] The MFA expressed a similar interest in transnational cooperation against ETIM in 2017 following reports of ETIM militants crossing from Turkey into Syria.[94] The Associated Press reported in 2017 that the PRC and Syria were engaged in intelligence cooperation to support counterterrorism efforts against Uyghur militants.[95] AP pointed out that the PRC was one of Syria’s major economic backers at the time and had helped protect it against international sanctions.[96] CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping met with Assad in 2023 and upgraded relations between the PRC and Syria to a strategic partnership.[97] The meeting highlighted the two leaders’ focus on counterterrorism cooperation.

The overthrow of the Assad regime and installation of Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) in December 2024 represents a loss of the longstanding counterterrorism cooperation aimed at ETIM. The PRC has pushed for stability in Syria following the rebel takeover of Damascus; PRC Foreign Ministry spokeswoman called for a “political solution” in a regular press conference on December 9, which is consistent with the PRC’s disinclination to take sides in intrastate conflict.[98] The PRC will likely continue to publicly advocate for stability, refrain from supporting potential contributors to the spread of ETIM influence, and shape its new Syria policy around the containment of ETIM and TIP.

Iran

US sanctions on Iranian oil tankers have disrupted Iranian crude exports to the PRC. The US Department of Treasury imposed sanctions on October 11 and December 2 targeting Iran’s “shadow fleet” of tankers used to export Iranian petroleum. Most of the ships in this “shadow fleet” are registered under different countries and frequently change their names and the country of registration to avoid detection.[99] Bloomberg reported that the new US sanctions have disrupted shipments of Iranian oil to the PRC, which purchases around 92% of Iran’s crude oil exports at discounted prices.[100] Bloomberg cited energy market intelligence firm Vortexa, Ltd., which stated that Iran did not deliver some of its oil exports to the PRC in November because PRC buyers require cargo to be delivered on non-sanctioned ships. Vortexa stated that there is a slowdown in Iranian vessels calling at ports in Shandong Province.[101] The sanctions will likely reduce the amount of Iranian oil that the PRC buys and increase the cost of its energy procurement. The PRC imports over 70% of its crude oil, most of it from Russia and Saudi Arabia.[102] Vortexa estimated that the PRC imported an average 1.05 million barrels per day of Iranian oil in the first 10 months of 2023. The PRC usually relabels these imports as originating from Malaysia or a Middle Eastern country to obscure their origin, however.[103] a

Latin America

Vice Chairman of top PRC decision-making body Central Military Commission (CMC) He Weidong met with Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel days after the PRC denied reports of signals intelligence (SIGINT) facilities in Cuba. The two leaders met in Havana on December 11 and affirmed strong bilateral ties. The PRC Ministry of Defense reported that “the two sides will firmly support each other on issues involving each other’s core interests” and that they would “promote the relationship between the two militaries to a new level.” He Weidong also visited former Cuban President Raúl Modesto Castro Ruz and Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces Minister Álvaro López Miera during his trip.[104] The meeting between He and Díaz-Canel aligns with past PRC efforts to maintain a strong PRC-Cuba relationship. PRC President Xi Jinping met with Cuba’s president in both 2022 and 2023 and affirmed strong ties between the two countries.

He’s Cuba trip follows the republication of a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report listing four possible PRC SIGINT facilities in Cuba on December 6. The PRC Embassy in Cuba called these reports “fake news” with “no factual basis” in a December 8 statement.[105] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs echoed this statement on December 11 and responded to a reporters’ question about the report with criticisms of US policy in Latin America and the Caribbean.[106] The US has stated its intent to take action against possible PRC spying efforts in Cuba. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Vice Chair and Secretary of State nominee Marco Rubio released a joint statement with Intelligence Committee Chair Mark R. Warner expressing concern over PRC-Cuba intelligence collaboration in 2023.[107] US Department of Defense spokesman Pat Ryder stated that the US is aware of PRC presence in Cuba and “will continue to keep working to disrupt [it]” when CSIS released its original report of the SIGINT facilities. [108]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, December 5, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and William Pickering of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: December 11, 2024

Key Takeaways

ROC President William Lai completed his tour of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in the Pacific, which included transits through Hawaii and Guam. The PRC strongly condemned the transits and launched a military exercise after Lai returned.
The PRC deployed its largest naval fleet in decades in waters near Taiwan following Lai’s Pacific trip and conducted unannounced air and naval drills. The exercise covered a significantly larger geographic area than previous exercises and simulated blocking foreign intervention throughout the First Island Chain and east of Taiwan. Beijing is very likely escalating its “punishment” of Lai to intimidate his administration and cause the Taiwanese public to associate “separatist” behavior with military escalation.
A PRC educational delegation visited Taiwan on a rare trip organized by the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation. The trip caused controversy and a negative backlash in Taiwan that could hamper future cross-strait exchanges.
Paraguay, one of the ROC’s formal diplomatic allies, expelled the PRC’s envoy to Latin America Xu Wei after he approached its congress and called for Paraguay to cut ties with Taiwan.
The China Coast Guard (CCG) used water cannons and sideswiped a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel sailing near the Scarborough Shoal, the latest action in a period of renewed tensions between the two states.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

ROC President William Lai completed his tour of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in the Pacific, which included transits through Hawaii and Guam. The PRC strongly condemned the transits and launched a military exercise after Lai returned. ROC President William Lai concluded his tour of the Pacific and affirmed ROC ties with its Pacific Island diplomatic allies: the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, and Palau. Lai stopped over in Guam, a US territory, on December 4 after visiting Tuvalu the same day.[1] Lai reported on his X account that he had calls with US House Speaker Mike Johnson, US House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries, and US Senator Roger Wicker while in Guam.[2] Lai stated during his tour that “Taiwan is confident that we can continue to deepen cooperation with the new US government and resist the expansion of authoritarianism.”[3] Lai made the final stop of his tour in Palau on December 5 and stayed for two days before returning to Taiwan.[4]

Lai and Palauan President Surangel Whipps Jr. observed a joint coast guard exercise during Lai’s stay. ISW research has noted recently-reelected president Whipps’ support for both Taiwan and United States military involvement in the region.[5] ISW research has also tracked longstanding tensions between Palau, one of the three Pacific island states that recognize the ROC, and the PRC.[6] The PRC seeks to expand its own influence and access in the Pacific and curtail diplomatic recognition of Taiwan among Pacific islands. Whipps accused the PRC of “weaponizing tourism” over Palau’s support for Taiwan in August 2024 and accused PRC vessels of trespassing in Palau’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in November 2024.[7]

The PRC condemned Lai’s transits through US territory, including Hawaii and Guam, and launched a large-scale military exercise near Taiwan after Lai returned. TAO spokesman Zhu Fenglian denounced Lai’s visit to US territory on December 6 and called on the United States to halt official exchanges with Taiwan in accordance with the one-China principle, which portrays the PRC as the one legitimate Chinese state and Taiwan as part of the PRC. She framed Lai’s transits as an excuse to “rely on the United States to seek independence.”[8] Zhu’s condemnation is consistent with past PRC attempts to delegitimize US interactions with Taiwan, assert control over Taiwan rhetorically, and isolate Taiwan diplomatically. The PRC launched unannounced large-scale maritime exercises near Taiwan after Lai returned, following weeks of speculation by Taiwanese officials that it would do so. Lai called on the PRC to maintain peace on the final day of his tour in Palau. He told reporters, “It is better to open your hands than to clench your fists. Only by doing so can China win respect from the international community.” Lai also stated, “No matter how many military drills China stages and how many ships and aircraft they dispatch to intimidate regional countries, China will not win the respect from any country.”[9]

The PRC deployed its largest naval fleet in decades in waters near Taiwan following Lai’s Pacific trip and conducted unannounced air and naval drills. The exercise covered a significantly larger geographic area than previous exercises and simulated blocking foreign intervention throughout the First Island Chain and east of Taiwan. ROC Ministry of National Defense (MND) spokesperson Sun Li-fang and other officials said on December 10 that the PRC has deployed approximately 90 navy and coast guard vessels near Taiwan and southern Japanese islands in the East and South China Sea. About two-thirds of these vessels were PLA Navy (PLAN) warships. The deployment is the PRC’s largest maritime operation since the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, surpassing the scale of this year’s Joint Sword-2024A and Joint Sword-2024B exercises and the unnamed military exercise around Taiwan in August 2022 launched in response to then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. The deployment covers a much larger geographic area than past PLA exercises near Taiwan.[10] The ROC MND said it is tracking military ship formations from the PLA's Eastern, Northern, and Southern Theater Commands and coast guard vessels, which have entered the Taiwan Strait and the Western Pacific Ocean for long-range offshore operations.[11] It reported 12 PLAN ships, nine “official” (likely coast guard) ships, and 47 PLA aircraft around Taiwan on December 9, then 11 PLAN vessels, 8 “official” ships and 53 PLA aircraft on December 10. None of them entered the waters or airspace of Taiwan’s contiguous zone or territorial waters.[12] The PLA designated seven restricted airspace zones east of the PRC coastal provinces of Zhejiang and Fujian from December 9 to December 11 in preparation for the exercises. The PRC did not announce any PLA exercise during this period, however, and PRC media has not reported on the deployments. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Mao Ning deflected reporters’ questions about the deployment.[13] TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian obliquely addressed a similar question without mentioning the military operations directly, saying “we are highly vigilant against the trend of ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces colluding with external forces to seek ‘independence’ provocations, and we will never let it go.”[14]

Senior Taiwanese MND intelligence officer Hsieh Jih-sheng said on December 10 that the PLA has not carried out any live drills, but did significantly increase activities in the restricted air zones north of Taiwan. An unnamed senior Taiwanese security source told Reuters that the PLA aircraft operating off the PRC coast simulated attacks on foreign naval ships and practiced driving away foreign aircraft as part of a “blockade exercise.” Hsieh further said PLAN ships were forming two “walls” east of Taiwan to practice blocking foreign intervention, one on the eastern periphery of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and another farther out in the Pacific.[15]

The scale, scope, and geographic focal points of the operation are all significantly different from the Joint Sword series of exercises. The Joint Sword exercises and their 2022 precursor all focused on encircling Taiwan, simulating a blockade. Only a minority (up to 21) of the nearly 90 ships involved in the December 2024 operation came close enough to Taiwan each day to be included in the ROC MND’s daily announcement of ADIZ incursions, however. The operation involved three of the PLA’s Theater Commands, while most Taiwan-targeted operations are directed by the Eastern Theater Command. The MND also did not report PLA or China Coast Guard (CCG) activities around outlying Taiwanese islands like Kinmen and Matsu, which was a feature of most previous exercises. The December 2024 operation was similar to previous exercises in that it drilled anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) around Taiwan, but differed in that it focused on blocking foreign entry within a much larger area. An unnamed Taiwanese official said that the PRC appears to be targeting the entire First Island Chain, including Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The official said the operation is intended as "total military intimidation" and an effort to control waters within the “inner part of the island chain.”[16]

The operation also differed from previous Taiwan-targeted operations in that the PRC did not announce it or comment on it. The PRC was very clear during previous large-scale exercises such as the Joint Sword series that the exercises were meant to punish and send a stern message to what it calls Taiwanese “separatists” and their foreign allies. It published maps of most of these exercises and explained their purpose in state media. The lack of announcement for the December operation makes the operation’s intended message and audience less clear, though the timing shortly after Lai’s Pacific tour is very likely a warning to Taiwan. A scholar at the MND-funded Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR), Su Tzu-yun, said the PLA’s decision not to announce its operation was an attempt to play “mind games” to pressure Taiwan.[17]

The CCG played a significant role in the operation, as it has in other recent exercises around Taiwan. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) dispatched patrol vessels on December 9 to shadow CCG ships that had been sailing “unusually” near Taiwan since December 6, the day Lai returned from his trip. Three CCG vessels including the 12,000-ton CCG 2901, one of the CCG’s largest ships, sailed to an area east of Taiwan and 50 to 60 nautical miles east-northeast of Taiwan’s Green Island and loitered there for several days. Four other CCG cutters sailed in a group to an area southwest of Taiwan.[18]

Senior Taiwanese officials speculated in November that the PRC may launch a major military exercise around Taiwan in response to President Lai’s transits through Hawaii and Guam during his state visit to Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in the Pacific. The officials suggested that the PRC may brand this exercise Joint Sword-2024C, making it the third exercise in the Joint Sword series this year.[19] The MND carried out an air defense drill on November 28 in preparation for the anticipated exercise.[20]

The PLA exercise is part of a pattern of increasingly strong PRC reactions to what it considers “provocations” by the Lai administration. Beijing is very likely escalating its “punishment” of Lai to intimidate his administration and cause the Taiwanese public to associate what Beijing calls “separatist” behavior with military escalation. Beijing launched the Joint Sword-2024A exercise days after Lai’s inauguration on May 20 and the 2024B exercise shortly after Lai’s speech on Taiwan’s National Day on October 10. The CCP considers Lai a dangerous separatist. The name “2024A” indicates that the PRC was planning more than one such exercise in 2024 regardless of Lai’s actions. The PRC portrayed Joint Sword 2024B as a deliberate escalation commensurate with Lai’s supposedly “separatist” rhetoric, even though the content of Lai’s National Day speech was notably less critical of the PRC than his inaugural speech. PRC spokespeople and authoritative media commentaries warned at the time that the more Taiwanese “secessionists” “provoke, the faster they will perish.”[21] ISW assessed that the PRC likely planned a strong military response to Lai’s National Day speech in October regardless of the substance of the speech, then retroactively reframed his speech to justify its strong reaction.[22] An unspecified senior Taiwanese official said the PRC’s sea operations in December took almost 70 days to plan and deploy, meaning planning started well before Taiwan announced that Lai would transit through US territory.[23] Beijing is thus not truly reacting to Taiwanese statements and actions but rather implementing a deliberate plan of military escalation that uses “provocations” as a pretext. The PRC is attempting to create a strong correlation between any significant Lai government action it deems a “provocation” and military escalation likely to intimidate the Taiwanese people into politically opposing Lai.

The PRC’s military response to Lai’s Pacific transits is much stronger than its reaction to similar transits by past Taiwanese presidents. The PRC initiated the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995–1996 after the United States allowed Taiwan’s then-President Lee Teng-hui to visit and speak at Cornell University. It launched a major exercise around Taiwan in August 2022 after then-US House speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan and met with Lai’s predecessor Tsai Ing-wen, who is also a member of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). It launched the first Joint Sword-series exercise in April 2023 after Tsai transited through the United States and met then-US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy. Lai’s transits in Hawaii and Guam did not involve meetings with high-level US officials, however, and resemble past “stopovers” by Tsai and other presidents that did not trigger a PRC military response.[24]

A PRC balloon flew directly over Taipei as balloon incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ continued to escalate. Taiwan’s MND reported a PRC balloon in Taiwan’s ADIZ on December 6 and four more on December 7. At least two of the balloons on December 7 entered Taiwan’s territorial airspace, and one flew directly over Taipei.[25] The overflights are part of a pattern of intermittent balloon flights into Taiwan’s ADIZ that began on November 24. The PRC previously sent balloons into Taiwan’s ADIZ and territorial airspace from early December 2023 to April 2024. The balloon overflights gradually escalated in frequency and proximity to Taiwan, hitting a peak immediately before Taiwan’s election on January 13 and gradually tapering off in subsequent weeks. The first balloon that passed directly over Taiwan in that period did so on January 1. Taiwan initially called them weather balloons and later accused the PRC of using the balloons in “cognitive warfare.”[26] The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (PRC TAO) claimed in January 2024 that the balloons were “mostly” meteorological and “mostly” launched by private enterprises.[27] The balloons flew much lower than most meteorological balloons, however, mostly at altitudes near or below the average cruising altitude of commercial aircraft. The balloons’ true purpose and intelligence gathering potential is unclear, but even collecting standard meteorological data over Taiwan can be useful for planning missile strikes.[28] The timing and increasing frequency of balloon overflights in this “round” of incursions resemble the pattern such incursions followed last winter however it is unclear whether the timing is tied to a particular event.

ISW assessed that the balloon overflights last year likely took place as part of a broader effort to wear down Taiwan’s resources and response capabilities, consistent with the effect of normalizing ADIZ incursions more generally.[29] Balloon incursions are yet another possible threat that Taiwan must devote time and resources to track in case they pose a national security threat. Balloons can intrude upon Taiwan’s national airspace without provoking a military crisis because they are not piloted, can drift accidentally, and often float at much higher altitudes than aircraft can fly.

A PRC educational delegation visited Taiwan on a rare trip organized by the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation. The trip caused controversy and a negative backlash in Taiwan that could hamper future cross-strait exchanges. The Ma Ying-jeou Foundation, a Taiwanese non-governmental organization founded by former Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou of the Nationalist Party (KMT), organized an educational exchange that brought 40 PRC teachers and students to Taiwan from November 28 to December 6.[30] The PRC group consisted of professors and students from seven elite PRC universities, including two Olympic gold medalists, nearly all of whom were affiliated with the CCP or Communist Youth League.[31] The students caused a public controversy when congratulating Taiwan’s national baseball team, which had recently won the WBSC Premier12 international championship competing under the name “Chinese Taipei.” The ROC is not allowed to use the name “Taiwan” or “Republic of China” when participating in many international organizations including sports events, so in such settings, it instead uses the name “Chinese Taipei” (中華臺北), which leaves ambiguous whether Taiwan belongs to the PRC or the ROC. One of the PRC students incorrectly referred to the team in Mandarin as the “China Taipei” or “Taipei, China” (中國臺北) team, a similar but more politically charged name that carries connotations of affiliation with the PRC.[32] Taiwanese university students staged protests, waving ROC flags and chanting slogans such as “This is not China Taipei” as the PRC students visited their campuses.[33]

Educational exchanges between the PRC and ROC may get rarer in the aftermath of this trip. The ROC Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) urged the PRC on November 28 to lift its ban on PRC nationals studying in Taiwan, which Beijing implemented at the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic. MAC Spokesperson Liang Wen-chieh noted that the 40-member delegation had been “carefully selected” and urged Beijing to allow free exchanges “free from a United Front agenda.”[34] The “United Front” is a CCP political strategy to unite disparate elements of PRC society in support of CCP rule and to build influence networks abroad in service of CCP goals. The controversy caused by the trip prompted the MAC to threaten punishment against the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation, however, arguing that campaigns for “one China” during cross-strait exchanges in Taiwan may violate Taiwanese law.[35] Unnamed Taiwanese sources said the MAC would likely ban the Foundation from hosting cross-strait exchanges for a period from six months to five years.[36] Ma Ying-jeou Foundation CEO Hsiao Hsu-Tsen argued that such a penalty would have a chilling effect on all cross-strait exchanges, as other organizations would also fear punishment for even relatively innocuous comments made by their PRC guests.[37] MAC Minister Chiu Chui-cheng expressed regret that a cross-strait exchange intended to promote mutual goodwill was marred by political statements that “undermined Taiwan.”[38] The MAC also expressed disappointment that the PRC did not reduce coercive military activities around Taiwan during the academic exchange. It said the CCP’s “exchanges on one hand and intimidation on the other” are a form of “political manipulation” that demonstrates a lack of respect for the Taiwanese interlocutors.[39]

PRC TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian accused Taiwan’s ruling DPP of “cyberbullying” students who participated in the exchange and carrying out a “Green Terror” against the trip’s organizers. She said that the administration “maliciously obstructing” cross-strait exchanges shows that it is afraid of “compatriots on both sides of the strait getting closer.”[40] “Green Terror” is a reference to the DPP’s official color, green, and the 40-year period of martial law in Taiwan called the “White Terror,” which was perpetrated by the then-dictatorial KMT government. The CCP uses the term to suggest that the DPP is tyrannically suppressing proponents of cross-strait engagement and unification.

The PRC sanctioned 13 US defense companies and six senior executives on December 5 in a move consistent with past PRC sanctions policy. The United States announced that it had approved a $385 million sale of spare parts for F-16s and radars on November 29. Reuters reported that the State Department had also approved the possible sale of “improved mobile subscriber equipment and support for an estimated $65 million” and listed the principal contractor for this sale as General Dynamics.[41]

The PRC announced sanctions in response to this arms sale on December 5. The PRC Foreign Ministry listed Trida Brown Engineering, Synix, Rapid Flight, Red Six Systems, Firestorm Labs, BRINC UAV, Cyberlux, Nyros Technologies, Group W, Domo Tactical Communications, Kratos UAV Systems, Catastrophic AI, and Shield AI as the sanctioned firms. Sanctioned individuals included executives of Raytheon, Bayee Land and Weapon Systems, United Technologies Systems Operations, BRINC Drone, and Data Link Solutions. The PRC Foreign Ministry announced that these entities’ assets would be frozen and that “organizations and individuals within the territory of [the PRC] shall be prohibited from engaging in relevant transactions, cooperation and other activities with them.”[42] ISW research has noted that the PRC frequently uses sanctions as a means of punishing and delegitimizing the United States’ relationship with Taiwan. The PRC sanctioned three US defense contractors in May 2024, including General Dynamics, following US arms sales to the ROC.[43] These are also not the PRC’s first sanctions against Raytheon, which the PRC also sanctioned in 2023 over arms sales to Taiwan.[44]

Many of the sanctions announced on December 5 seemingly target US drone production. The sanctions against Raytheon senior executives notably target individuals involved in the company’s Strategic Naval Forces Business Unit. The PRC may perceive US drone firms as a threat to its naval security and may be using these sanctions to block US companies’ access to PRC drone technology. ISW research has noted that drones could play a key role in the defense of Taiwan if drone operators used islands belonging to Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan to pilot swarms of drones with limited ranges.[45]

A new online documentary exposed the extent of the CCP’s United Front efforts to infiltrate and influence Taiwanese celebrities. Internet celebrity Pa Chiung released an online documentary on December 6 in which Taiwanese rapper Chen Po-yuan (Minnan Wolf PYC) recounted his experience with CCP United Front influence over his career to shape Taiwanese public opinion.[46] The United Front is a whole-of-government and society effort to advance the CCP’s ideology and interests by co-opting non-government segments of Chinese society. United Front activities against Taiwan aim to inculcate in the Taiwanese public CCP notions that the PRC is the only legitimate government of China and that Taiwan is a part of that China. [47]

The multi-part documentary focuses on Chen’s cooperation with United Front efforts to advance CCP narratives of cross-strait relations and shared nationality, including asking him to recite scripts that profess a Chinese identity and write songs that are critical of Taiwan’s governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).[48] Chen revealed the nature of the PRC’s United Front influence over his career in live phone conversations and text messages with unwitting CCP officials and other co-opted Taiwanese celebrities on the documentary. Chen stated on December 7 that his Douyin (TikTok) account was shut down following the release of the documentary.[49]

Targeting Taiwanese pop culture figures likely aims to shape the younger generation’s perceptions of Taiwan’s political status and Chinese identity to conform to CCP cross-strait narratives. President of the Taiwan Professors Association Chen Li-fu warned that the focus of the PRC’s United Front work against Taiwan has shifted to young people after the Sunflower Movement in 2014, referring to a primarily student-led wave of political activism that rejected integration policies with the PRC and championed Taiwanese identity. Taiwanese internet celebrities called attention to CCP efforts to recruit them to facilitate United Front work in June.[50] Pa Chiung revealed in June that the CCP sent him a contract that discussed a plan to establish a “Taiwan Support Party,” which artists would join as honorary members to shape the future of PRC-Taiwan relations.[51] The terms stated that the CCP would invest millions of dollars to enable Taiwanese artists to put on shows and events that promoted CCP-aligned narratives of cross-strait relations. The contract encouraged Taiwanese artists with verified accounts to publish open invitations to the Taiwan Support Party. Several other YouTubers and online celebrities subsequently confessed to being contacted by the CCP and published the contract letters that outlined goals to influence Taiwanese politics.

Paraguay, one of the ROC’s formal diplomatic allies, expelled the PRC’s envoy to Latin America, Xu Wei, after he approached its congress and called for Paraguay to cut ties with Taiwan. Xu had been in the Paraguayan capital of Asuncion for an annual UNESCO meeting, but skipped the meeting in favor of making a visit to Paraguay’s seat of government.[52] Xu announced at the Paraguayan Congress the PRC’s interest in establishing diplomatic ties with Paraguay but insisted that Paraguay must cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan as soon as possible.[53] Xu offered the possibility of increased trade and a myriad of other benefits in exchange for a shift in Paraguay’s diplomatic recognition. Some Paraguayan politicians, pointing to the challenges farmers face in exporting soybeans and beef to China have advocated for the switch.[54] Nevertheless, Paraguay’s foreign ministry subsequently accused Xu of meddling in Paraguay’s internal affairs, revoked his visa, and declared him persona non grata—ordering him to leave the country within 24 hours.[55]

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Lin Jian stated that Paraguay’s accusations were unfounded and violated international practices. He reiterated China’s longstanding position that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and invoked UNGA resolution 2758. The resolution, passed in 1971, names the PRC the sole representative of China to the UN. Lin inaccurately claimed that the PRC’s interpretation, which forbids any Taiwanese representation, is the “universal consensus.”[56] Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, praised Paraguay’s decision to evict Xu as a statement upholding Paraguayan sovereignty and safeguarding the Taiwanese-Paraguayan friendship.[57] Taiwan’s embassy in Paraguay criticized China and called Xu an infiltrator.[58]

This incident is part of a broader trend in PRC-Latin American policy. Since 2017, four countries in the region—Honduras, Panama, Dominican Republic, and El Salvador, have flipped their recognition from Taiwan to the PRC. The value of trade between Latin America and the Caribbean with China has also skyrocketed in the last two decades, adding a material incentive for states to align themselves with the PRC.[59]

China

The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) jointly announced that the “Salt Typhoon” breach that infiltrated several telecom providers as well as both the Republican and Democratic presidential campaigns remains unresolved and was greater in scope than officials had previously known. President Biden’s Deputy National Security Adviser for Cyber and Emerging Technology Anne Neuberger said at least eight US telecom providers had been breached, four more than previously known.[60] Moreover, investigators now understand that Salt Typhoon has exploited vulnerabilities and penetrated systems in at least a “couple dozen” countries.[61] The agencies stated that although they had not announced the breach until September this year, Microsoft first detected it in late spring or early summer and likely tipped off the relevant telecom providers.[62] ISW has previously reported that Salt Typhoon could be a campaign by APT40, a highly sophisticated group associated with the Hainan branch of the PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS).[63]

Although officials from the respective agencies have not observed new activity by Salt Typhoon since they last put out an announcement about it on November 13th, they maintained the possibility that the threat group has decided to lie low with the intention to reemerge after the investigation passes.[64] Officials identified three main target types: an unspecified number of victims in the Washington DC area whose call records were taken from telecom companies, a limited group of individuals with political or government connections—each of whom the FBI has notified, and Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement (CALEA) statute program court orders that could contain Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) investigation sources.[65] The official neither confirmed nor denied that Salt Typhoon hackers had uncovered FISA sources, which would pose a dire risk for the latter while helping PRC informants avoid detection.[66] CISA’s Executive Assistant Director Jeff Greene also noted that the extent and method in which each victim was compromised varies significantly, making expulsion of Salt Typhoon all the more complicated.[67] U.S. Senator Mark Warner (D-Virginia) cautioned that eliminating PRC hackers from US networks could necessitate physically replacing thousands of obsolete routers and switches.[68]

CISA and several partnering Five Eyes agencies jointly released an alert warning that PRC threat actors had infiltrated the networks of major telecom providers and a set of guidelines for hardening their infrastructure. Notably, they did not include British agencies, which Greene said operated on “different considerations and timelines.”[69] Greene also recommended that Americans use encrypted messaging apps over SMS to reduce Salt Typhoon’s ability to intercept data in transit.[70]

Telecom providers are among the most valuable targets for a nation state actor interested in espionage to hack. They offer unparalleled visibility into who the providers work with and their customers’ data and metadata, especially where messages are unencrypted.[71] Salt Typhoon has managed to exploit a vast array of outdated network of routers and switches built decades ago by many companies that no longer exist.[72]

The PRC’s export controls on critical minerals will inhibit the United States’ access to materials that are essential to economic and national security. The PRC prohibited exports to the United States of gallium, germanium, antimony, and superhard materials on December 3.[73] The PRC also implemented stricter controls on exports of graphite to the United States.

The US Department of Interior designated antimony, gallium, germanium, and graphite as critical minerals to the economy and national security in 2018.[74] Antimony has a variety of military applications, including night vision goggles, strengthening shielding materials, explosives, flares, nuclear weapons, and infrared sensors.[75] Gallium and germanium have applications in aerospace, military, and telecommunications due to their use in the manufacture of optoelectronic devices and fundamental inputs such as integrated circuits, semiconductors, and transistors.[76] Graphite has extensive industrial and military applications, including the manufacture of missile guidance systems, artillery components, firearms, and military aircraft.[77] Superhard materials, such as diamond, are used for their hardness and durability for precision manufacturing of goods such as semiconductors and electronics.[78]

The PRC is a top producer and source of imports for all of the critical minerals that are subject to new restrictions. The United States has not mined gallium since 1987, antimony since 2001, graphite since the 1950s, and produces minimal germanium.[79] The United States’ annual demand for some of the minerals, such as antimony, exceeds any other single country’s mine production.[80]

The United States’ stockpile of antimony amounted to 1,100 tons in 2023, compared to its consumption of 23,000 tons, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies.[81] A Department of Defense spokesperson stated in July 2023 that the United States has a strategic stockpile of germanium but did not specify the size. The spokesperson stated that the United States does not have a stockpile of gallium.[82] The United States also does not have a stockpile of graphite.[83]

The export restrictions follow a pattern of the PRC’s increasing securitization of critical minerals. The PRC previously implemented export controls for gallium and germanium in August 2023, high-grade graphite in December 2023, and antimony in September 2024.[84] A PRC Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) spokesperson accused the United States on December 3 of “politicizing and weaponizing economic, trade, and technological issues, abusing export control measures, and arbitrarily restricting the export of relevant products to China.”[85] The PRC announced the measures a day after the United States Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) implemented new export control measures to restrict the PRC’s ability to produce semiconductors.[86]

Northeast Asia

Japan

Japan will give $10.6 million, small boats, and radars to the Philippines to strengthen the Philippines’ capabilities in the South China Sea and the Luzon Strait. This is the second instance of Japanese defense aid to the Philippines being provided under the recently created Official Security Assistance grant program, an initiative focused on defense-related cooperation and aid provision from Tokyo to its partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific.[88] In the December 5 agreement Japan promised to increase funding for maritime domain awareness radars from $4 million to $10.6 million and will provide coastal radar systems and rigid-hulled inflatable boats to the Philippine Navy and air defense radars to the Philippine Air Force.[89]

The Philippines has been working to improve its maritime domain awareness capabilities, particularly in the South China Sea.[90] Japan has been one of the primary providers of military assistance and equipment transfers to the Philippines, particularly the Philippines Coast Guard (PCG). The PCG has received 12 Multi-Role Response Vehicles (MRRV) since 2016 and will receive five more by the end of the year.[91] The PCG frequently deploys MMRVs to the South China Sea, and has used them during previous altercations with the PRC.[92] Japan’s recent increases in military assistance to the Philippines suggest the importance of South China Sea security and working with alliance members for Tokyo’s overall national security strategy.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The China Coast Guard (CCG) used water cannons and sideswiped a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel sailing near the Scarborough Shoal, the latest action in a period of renewed tensions between the two states. Vessels from the PCG and the Philippine Bureau of Fisheries were carrying out a routine patrol near Scarborough Shoal on December 4 when CCG and PLA Navy (PLAN) ships approached them.[93] The PCG accused the CCG and PLAN vessels of carrying out “aggressive actions,” specifically using water cannons and sideswiping one of the Philippines’ patrol vessels.[94] The CCG released a statement accusing the Philippines of infringing on its sovereign territory and conducting illegal fishing activities. CCG Spokesperson Liu Dejun released a statement saying that the PRC’s actions were appropriate and necessary to enforce laws surrounding its maritime territory.[95] The CCG also accused the PCG of deliberately ramming into the CCG vessel and distorting the facts in order to manipulate international perceptions of the event.[96]

United States Ambassador to Manila MaryKay Carlson condemned PRC actions that disrupted Philippine maritime operations and “put lives at risk.”[97] The United States, Japan, and the Philippines carried out a joint patrol about 40 nm from Scarborough Shoal on December 6.[98] This joint patrol, one of many held between the Philippines and its allies in recent months, was not in response to the confrontation between the CCG and PCG according to Philippine officials. Symmetrical PRC military responses typically follow joint exercises between the Philippines and its allies, seen most recently on November 28^th, but so far there has been no reaction by the PLA to these joint exercises. [99]

This is the second reported instance of PLA and CCG harassment of the Philippines after three months of relative inactivity. The PCG reported on November 28 that PLAN helicopters harassed two Philippine fishing boats near Iroquois Reef.[100] This second instance of harassment in as many weeks suggests a renewal of tensions between the Philippines and PRC within the South China Sea.

The PRC submitted baselines of territorial waters around Scarborough Shoal to the United Nations (UN) in order to legitimize its claims over the disputed territory. PRC Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN Geng Shuang submitted a statement on the baselines of the Shoal’s territorial waters on December 2.[101] The Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN released a statement saying that the submission’s purpose is to “strengthen maritime administration in accordance with the law,” and added that this action was in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The PRC published the geographic coordinates for its territorial claims around Scarborough Shoal in November 2024 in response to Manila’s approval of the Philippine Maritime Zones Bill.[102] This bill defined the Philippines’ maritime territorial claims and the legal powers that it can exercise within those boundaries.[103] Manila issued a protest following Beijing’s publication, saying that the baselines established by the PRC were an attempt to legitimate the 2012 occupation of Scarborough Shoal, which the Philippines sees as a violation of its territorial sovereignty.

The 2016 Arbitral ruling determined that Scarborough Shoal qualified as a rock, and therefore only entitled to a territorial sea, not an EEZ or continental shelf. A baseline according to UNCLOS is “a line that runs along the coast of a country or an island, from which the extent of the territorial sea and other maritime zones such as the exclusive economic zone and extended continental shelf can be measured.”[104] The PRC’s submission does not reflect a change in UN policy towards PRC’s claims. Article 16 of UNCLOS requests coastal states to publish lists of geographic coordinates for their territorial baselines and submit a copy to the UN.[105] The PRC’s actions do not reflect a change in UN policy, but are rather part of a broader PRC strategy of using lawfare to achieve its national objectives.

Iran

PRC Vice Premier Zhang Guoqing visited Tehran to strengthen Sino-Iranian ties and stressed the importance of implementing the 25-year Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement. The 2021 agreement would have the PRC invest 400 billion USD in Iran’s economy in exchange for discounted Iranian oil. PRC Vice Premier Zhang Guoqing visited Iran on December 3 and 4, his second official visit to Iran this year.[106] Zhang met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on December 4 where the two pledged to expand cooperation with one another and with Moscow to counter American “unilateralism.”[107] Pezeshkian met with PRC President Xi Jinping at the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia; Zhang said that his visit a month and a half later is a follow up on the meeting between the two presidents.[108] Both the PRC and Iran have issued official statements emphasizing their strategic partnership and cooperation.[109]

Zhang and Pezeshkian both expressed their desire to begin implementing the 25-year Sino-Iranian Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement signed in 2021.[110] The final details of this agreement have not been publicly released, but a draft obtained by the New York Times reportedly revealed that China will invest 400 billion USD in Iran’s economy and Iran will provide a reliable and cheap supply of oil in return.[111] Iran currently exports 92% of its oil supply to the PRC at a discounted rate of approximately 30% according to the head of the Research Center at the Iran Chamber of Commerce Hojatollah Mirzaei.[112] The deal was originally proposed in 2016 by PRC President Xi.[113]

Syria

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs has called for Syria's territorial integrity to be “respected” and declined to comment on the Assad regime’s collapse. The PRC has historically maintained good relations with Bashar al-Assad’s regime and provided it support throughout the years.[114] Syria joined the Belt and Road Initiative in January 2022, and, although some analysts view this as the PRC’s long-term commitment to Syria, there have been no significant investments by Chinese firms.[115] Assad also made a visit to China in September 2023, his first since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011.[116] Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning said at the time that the visit would “take bilateral relations to new heights.”[117] The collapse of the pro-Beijing Assad government less than 15 months later sets back the PRC's efforts to expand its influence in the Middle East as it must forge new ties with the Syrian rebel government if it hopes to retain relations with Syria.[118] China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Mao Ning was asked numerous questions about Syria following Assad's exile to Russia in the December 9 press conference. Mao Ning stated that Syria's territorial integrity and sovereignty “should be respected” following Israeli air strikes against the capital city of Damascus. She declined to comment on questions about Assad, such as if the PRC maintained contact with Assad as he entered exile.[119]

exile.

Latin America

The PRC Foreign Ministry and PRC embassy in Cuba spoke out against findings that the PRC is maintaining signals intelligence (SIGINT) facilities in Cuba. The Washington-based think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published a report detailing the locations and function of suspected PRC surveillance stations in Cuba in July 2024.[120] The authors of the report used satellite imagery to assess four sites on the island as possible PRC SIGINT facilities. CSIS republished its findings with new updates on December 6.[121] The report lists Bejucal, El Salao, Wajay, and Calabazar as sites with “observable SIGINT instrumentation, clear physical security infrastructure (guard posts, perimeter fencing, military insignia, etc.), and other characteristics that suggested intelligence collection.” El Salao is located near the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay, while the other three sites are near Havana.[122]

The PRC embassy in Cuba denounced the report as “fake news” with “no factual basis” in a statement on December 8. The embassy’s statement said that “China and Cuba are good friends, good comrades and good brothers. The cooperation between China and Cuba is upright, aboveboard, mutually beneficial and win-win.”[123] PRC Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning gave a similar statement in a regular press conference on December 11. Mao criticized US policy in Latin America and the Caribbean and said that “the cooperation between China and Cuba is aboveboard and is not directed against any third party.”[124]

The PRC’s comments are consistent with past PRC statements on its relationship with Cuba. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla on September 27, 2024. The two foreign ministers discussed the PRC and Cuba’s 64 years of diplomatic relations; the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that Cuba’s foreign minister “thanked China for its assistance to Cuba's economic and social development and for firmly safeguarding Cuba's legitimate rights and interests in international occasions.”[125] PRC President Xi Jinping met with Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermudez in the PRC in 2022 and again on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in 2023; Xi expressed the PRC’s support for Cuba on both occasions.[126] Cuba relies on the PRC as a key trading partner and received a debt relief agreement from the PRC in 2022.[127]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, November 21, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Henry Mann of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: December 2, 2024

Key Takeaways

The People's Republic of China (PRC) warned against Republic of China - Taiwan (ROC) President William Lai’s upcoming transit through United States territory on his trip through the Pacific.
ROC former president Tsai Ing-wen urged US support for Ukraine at the Halifax International Security Forum on November 23.
Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported sighting PRC balloons in Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) for the first time since April 2024.
PRC Defense Minister Dong Jun declined to meet with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on the sidelines of a security forum in Laos in protest against US arms sales to Taiwan. The snub came days after the US-PRC leaders’ meeting in Lima, Peru, highlighted the resumption of bilateral defense talks.
The PRC suspended Director of the Central Military Commission (CMC)’s Political Work Department Admiral Miao Hua on suspicion of corruption. It dismissed allegations from anonymous US officials that Defense Minister Dong Jun is under investigation, however.
The PRC decried the US plans to deploy medium and long-range missile systems to Japan and the Philippines in case of a Taiwan emergency. The US HIMARS and Typhon missile launchers increase the survivability and mobility of missiles based in Japan and the Philippines.
European authorities are investigating a PRC cargo vessel that likely cut two undersea cables in the Baltic Sea on November 17-18.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The People's Republic of China (PRC) warned against Republic of China - Taiwan (ROC) President William Lai’s upcoming transit through United States territory on his trip through the Pacific. Lai transited through Hawaii on November 30 and plans to visit Guam while en route to the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, and Palau, which are Taiwan’s three remaining diplomatic allies in the Pacific.[1] Lai stayed in Hawaii for two nights; Hawaii governor Josh Green presented him with a gift in Honolulu.[2] Lai also had a phone call with US Representative Nancy Pelosi, who expressed well-wishes for Lai’s travels through the Pacific.[3] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Lin Jian warned the United States on November 29 not to permit Lai’s transit and cited the PRC’s one-China principle, which states that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and the PRC is the sole legitimate government of that China.[4] The United States does not recognize the one China principle but instead maintains a “one China policy” of maintaining diplomatic relations only with the PRC and not with Taiwan. The US policy acknowledges the PRC’s position but remains ambiguous about its own stance on the status of Taiwan. The PRC conflates international agreements that recognize the PRC as the government of China with its own one-China principle to falsely claim the existence an international consensus that the PRC is the rightful government of Taiwan and further Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation.[5]

PRC MFA spokeswoman Mao Ning said that the PRC “resolutely opposes any form of official exchanges between the United States and Taiwan.”[6] MFA spokesman Lin Jian gave a statement expressing opposition to Lai’s visit in a regular press conference on December 2 and said that the PRC “firmly opposes the United States’ connivance and support for ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists and their separatist activities in any form.”[7] Such statements are consistent with ongoing PRC efforts to paint Lai as a dangerous separatist and to discredit US support for the ROC.

Reuters cited unnamed Taiwanese officials who speculated that the PRC could hold drills, possibly including another Joint Sword-series exercise, in response to Lai’s transit.[8] Beijing has responded to past US visits by Taiwanese leadership by staging military drills around the ROC. When Lai visited New York and San Francisco as Taiwan’s vice president in August 2023, the PRC responded by holding drills around the island.[9] The PRC also held its inaugural Joint Sword drills around Taiwan in April 2023 after then-ROC President Tsai Ing-wen met with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California.[10] The PRC accused Lai of professing independence sentiments in his inaugural speech in May to justify launching the two-day-long Joint Sword 2024A exercises around the island.[11] The PRC staged its Joint Sword 2024B exercises on October 14 in response to Lai’s National Day speech, which the PRC claimed was escalatory for promoting Taiwanese independence.”[12] The PRC has established a precedent of using harsher rhetoric and bolder military actions against Lai than it used against past DPP presidents. ISW analysis of the October 14 exercises noted that the PRC's response to Lai’s speech did not acknowledge any de-escalation in Lai’s rhetoric; it instead framed the speech as a serious and deliberate provocation of Beijing.[13]

ROC former president Tsai Ing-wen urged US support for Ukraine at the Halifax International Security Forum on November 23. Tsai called upon democracies to continue supporting Ukraine as a means of deterring future authoritarian aggression.[14] Tsai stated, “We still have time to prepare ourselves, with the rest of the world” and that the United States should focus on arming Ukraine.[15] Tsai also thanked for the nations that support freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait, highlighted Taiwan’s resilience, and announced that next year’s Halifax Forum will take place in Taiwan.[16] This year’s Halifax forum featured discussions on European, Middle Eastern, and Asian security topics, including an informal off-the-record session entitled “Taiwan’s Friends: What to Do?”[17] US INDOPACOM commander Admiral Samuel Paparo attended the forum.[18]

PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian said that the PRC opposes “any ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists visiting countries with diplomatic ties to China under any pretext” and called upon Canada to adhere to the one-China principle.[19] Canada’s policy towards the PRC neither endorses nor challenges the one-China principle, like the United States’ policy.[20]

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported six PRC balloons in Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) for the first time since April 2024. Taiwan’s MND observed the first balloon entering Taiwan’s ADIZ at an altitude of 33,000 feet on November 24.[21] PRC Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning declined to comment on the issue.[22] Taiwan’s MND reported sighting two more balloons on November 27, another on November 28, and two more on November 29. MND reported the location of each balloon’s detection or ADIZ crossing relative to Keelung City in Taiwan’s north; all balloons were detected or entered Taiwan’s ADIZ within 104 nautical miles of Keelung.[23]

The balloons did not pass close enough to the ROC for officials to determine their purpose or intelligence-gathering potential. Taiwan accused the PRC of using balloons in “cognitive warfare” in January 2024, when frequent balloon overflights coincided with the Taiwanese elections. Taiwan’s MND first noted the balloons as ADIZ incursions on December 8, 2023. The balloons passed directly over the island of Taiwan for the first time on January 1. ISW has assessed that these balloon overflights likely took place as part of a broader effort to wear down Taiwan’s resources and response capabilities, consistent with the effect of normalizing ADIZ incursions more generally.[24]

Four China Coast Guard (CCG) ships entered restricted waters around Taiwan’s Kinmen islands on November 25th and 26th. Kinmen is a Taiwanese island group located three kilometers (1.9 miles) from the PRC’s coast.[25] Four CCG ships entered Kinmen’s southern restricted waters at four different locations on November 25 for approximately two hours.[26] The same four ships returned the next morning on November 26 to the same locations.[27] CCG ships intrude into Kinmen’s restricted waters in an effort to assert PRC law enforcement control, desensitize Taiwan to incursions in its restricted waters, and expend Taiwanese Coast Guard resources. Regular CCG patrols in Kinmen’s restricted waters began in response to the February 14 capsizing incident this year, and they occur in areas where the PRC may station ships in the event of a quarantine or blockade of Kinmen.[28] Taiwan does not claim any territorial waters around Kinmen partly due to its proximity to the PRC, but it designates “prohibited” and “restricted” waters around Kinmen which it treats as equivalent to territorial waters and a contiguous zone.

The CCG’s intrusions into the waters south of Kinmen resemble a rehearsal for an operation to cut Kinmen off from resupply or intervention by sea, which would require PRC ships to position themselves to the south of the island. The CCG’s tactic of performing simultaneous entries into the restricted waters around Kinmen in different locations by multiple ships provides the CCG with experience in choreographing the initial actions that would be required for a real blockade operation to seal Kinmen off from the Taiwan Strait. Conducting the incursions also enables the PRC to gauge the Taiwanese coast guard’s response and the resources that it can deploy to challenge the stronger CCG. The high frequency of CCG incursions risks desensitizing Taiwan and its partners to them, which could grant the CCG an advantage in solidifying a blockade or quarantine if the PRC feigned the CCG activity as routine harassment of the Kinmen coast guard.

The ROC MND’s lowered threshold for air raid alerts shows how the PLA’s increased air incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ have degraded Taiwan’s threat awareness and response capability. Taiwan’s RW News reported that the ROC Ministry of National Defense issued a confidential document at the end of 2022 that reduced its air raid warning threshold, shortening the warning distance from 70 to 24 nautical miles. This change means Taiwan will only activate air raid alerts if PLA aircraft fly past Taiwan’s contiguous zone boundary, 24 nautical miles from its territorial baseline. The shortened threshold would give some citizens just three minutes to seek shelter in an air raid.[29] ROC Defense Minister Wellington Koo said the change reflected growing threats of PLA activities.[30] The PLA increased its aerial incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ in 2022 to nearly daily frequency. It increased them again in 2024, with aircraft crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait an average of eight times per day in 2024. The old warning threshold thus would have required Taiwan to trigger air alerts several times per day.

The lowering of Taiwan’s air raid warning threshold is a concrete example of how the PLA’s ADIZ incursion campaign has weakened Taiwan’s threat response capability. The PRC’s normalization of a high volume of incursions drains Taiwan’s resources, exhausts its military personnel, and degrades its threat awareness. Taiwan does not scramble aircraft in response to all PRC ADIZ incursions, but it does put military personnel on standby to respond quickly if needed and now has even less time to respond to a real attack.

The PLA’s monthly total air incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ in November dropped below 300 for the first time since April but remained much higher than pre-2024 averages. Taiwan’s MND reported that 264 PLA aircraft crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entered Taiwan’s ADIZ in November, 106 fewer than the 370 incursions in October. The November rate of incursions is comparable to October’s numbers when excluding the Joint Sword-2024B exercise on October 14, however, as the exercise contributed a record 111 incursions in one day. The PRC dramatically escalated incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ following the election of Lai Ching-te in January 2024 and especially after Lai’s inauguration in May, with every month from May to October seeing over 300 incursions. Monthly ADIZ incursions surpassed 300 only once prior to 2024, when the PRC responded to then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022 by launching record-scale military exercises around Taiwan.[31] ADIZ incursion numbers do not include aerial activity around the Taiwanese archipelagos of Kinmen and Matsu, which are west of the median line in the Taiwan Strait.

China

PRC Defense Minister Dong Jun’s refusal to meet with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin at the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ meeting highlights the PRC’s continued willingness to use defense talks as a bargaining chip rather than as a mechanism for managing tensions. Dong and Austin both attended the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus in Vientiane, Laos from November 20-21. Dong declined to meet with Austin on the sidelines of the forum, a refusal Austin called “a setback for the whole region.”[32] PRC Ministry of National Defense (MOD) spokesperson Wu Qian stated that the United States is “fully responsible” for the meeting not happening. Wu said that the United States “cannot damage China's core interests on the Taiwan issue while conducting exchanges with the Chinese military as if nothing had happened,” and urged the United Stated to “create favorable conditions” for high-level exchanges to take place.[33] An unspecified senior US defense official said that the PRC’s refusal to hold the meeting was a response to the proposed US sale to Taiwan of three medium-range National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) and 123 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) (Extended Range).[34]

Dong’s refusal to meet Austin demonstrates the PRC’s use of high-level defense talks as a bargaining chip to shape US policy on Taiwan, despite the fact that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden highlighted the resumption of such talks during their meeting at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders’ summit in Lima, Peru, days earlier.[35] The PRC suspended high-level military exchanges with the United States following then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022. Xi and Biden agreed to resume such talks during their meeting in San Francisco in November 2023. US and PRC military officers met for this year’s second session of the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) on November 6-8, after the United States announced the NASAMS sale to Taiwan.[36] A Pentagon spokesperson said that US-PRC dialogue is continuing despite the PRC’s refusal to hold a bilateral defense ministers’ meeting at the ASEAN event.[37]

The PRC suspended Director of the Central Military Commission (CMC)’s Political Work Department Admiral Miao Hua on suspicion of corruption. It dismissed allegations from anonymous US officials that Defense Minister Dong Jun is under investigation, however. MOD spokesperson Wu Qian confirmed that Miao is “suspected of serious violations of discipline” and has been suspended from his duties.[38] Wu did not specify the allegations against Miao, but the CCP has used “serious violations of discipline” in the past to describe both corruption and perceived political disloyalty to the Party. Admiral Miao’s position as the PLA’s top political commissar, which he had held since 2017, made him the top official in charge of political discipline in the PLA and therefore one of the most powerful members of the PRC military’s leadership. The PLA is officially the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party and has a dual command structure to ensure the military’s political loyalty, with a political commissar in each unit holding authority roughly equal to that of the unit’s commander.[39]

MFA spokesperson Mao Ning denied a Financial Times report citing unspecified US officials that the CCP is investigating Defense Minister Dong Jun for unspecified corruption allegations, however. Mao said the report was “chasing shadows.”[40] Her comment was not included in the transcript of that day’s MFA press conference. Dong’s two immediate predecessors, Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, were both expelled from the CCP following corruption investigations.[41]

The investigation into Admiral Miao is part of a continuing anti-corruption crackdown on the PLA and shows that CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping continues to distrust the political loyalty of the military. Li and Wei were both expelled from the CCP on June 27, 2024, months after being removed from their posts and after largely disappearing from the public eye. Li and Wei were previously the heads of the PLA procurement department and the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), respectively, both of which have borne the brunt of the CCP’s anti-corruption campaign in recent years. [42] Bloomberg reported in January 2024 that US intelligence assessed that graft in the PLA hindered military effectiveness and was a reason behind PLARF purges, including a case in which investigators discovered some missiles that were filled with water instead of fuel.[43] The CCP took measures to strengthen political discipline in the military following the expulsion of Li and Wei. Miao was the top official in charge of this effort to instill political discipline, second to Xi himself.

Dong Jun’s position is relatively weaker than that of his predecessors, which is also a sign of Xi’s lack of trust in the PLA leadership. Dong was not appointed to the Central Military Commission (CMC) and was not made a State Councilor, unlike previous defense ministers. He therefore does not play the same role in PLA decision-making as his predecessors: the CMC is the PLA’s top decision-making body, while the Ministry of Defense is not part of the chain of command and is mainly responsible for military diplomacy.

Northeast Asia

Japan

The PRC criticized the United States' plans to deploy medium- and long-range missile systems to Japan and the Philippines in case of a Taiwan emergency. The US HIMARS and Typhon missile launchers would increase the survivability and mobility of missiles based in Japan and the Philippines. Japan’s Kyodo News cited unspecified sources who said the United States has drawn up plans to deploy a Marine Littoral Regiment equipped with High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) at temporary bases along the Ryukyu Island chain, Japan’s islands closest to Taiwan, in the event of a conflict over Taiwan.[44] The US Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) will also station its long-range fires units in the Philippines, a deployment that would follow the stationing of US Typhon medium-range missile systems in the northernmost part of the country in April 2024.[45] These plans are part of a coordinated effort by the United States to leverage regional allies in the Indo-Pacific to aid the defense of Taiwan. PRC MFA spokesperson Mao Ning said the US-Japan contingency plans are “an excuse to strengthen regional military deployment, provoke tension and confrontation, and undermine regional peace and stability.”[46] The United States also stationed Typhon medium-range missile systems in northern Luzon in the Philippines, separately from the MDTF units it would deploy in the contingency plan. The Typhon systems can launch Tomahawk missiles with a range of over 1000 miles.[47] The MOD also urged the Philippines to withdraw the Typhon missile systems, claiming they are an “offensive weapon” contributing to regional instability.[48]

The United States is legally obligated to defend both Japan and the Philippines. Articles 5 and 6 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan commits the US to defending Japan if attacked by a third party and provides an administrative agreement for the US to base troops in Japan respectively.[49] The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and Philippines requires the two countries to act together in the event of an attack on either.[50] The US missile deployments can improve the security and military preparedness of US allies in the first island chain, deter the PRC, and enable a more effective response to PRC military operations in the region. Major PRC cities such as Shenzhen, Fuzhou, and Shanghai are within the Typhon missile system’s range, although the US is extraordinarily unlikely to use these systems against cities themselves. The deployment of the system between the South China Sea and the Philippine Sea would offer long-range support in many of the anticipated conflict zones in a war over Taiwan. The Ryukyu Islands provide many positions from which HIMARS could help defend Taiwan as well, particularly to protect Taiwan’s eastern coastline, block the PLA’s entry into the Western Pacific, and safeguard crucial routes for Western reinforcements to reach Taiwan. Standard HIMARS Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System rockets have a range of around 45 miles or 72 kilometers.[51] HIMARS can also launch the MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), which has a range of 190 miles or 300 kilometers.[52]

The missile systems deployed to Japan and the Philippines will increase the survivability of missile forces based in those countries. The PLA Rocket Force, a major focus of the PRC’s military modernization, may launch missiles at US military bases in the Pacific during an invasion of Taiwan to reduce the speed and effectiveness of a US-led defense of Taiwan.[53] All US bases in the Pacific are within range of Chinese missiles.[54] The HIMARS and the Typhon missile systems are highly mobile, which allows them to be repositioned quickly to evade destruction by enemy strikes.

Russia also objected to the planned deployment of US missiles to Japan, which demonstrates the growing PRC-Russia military alignment. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said that a deployment of US medium-range missiles to Japan would threaten Russian security.[55] Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov added that Russia may respond with its own deployments of short and intermediate-range missiles in Asia if the US follows through on its plans.[56] Russia and the PRC held joint air exercises near Japan on November 29, part of a trend of growing bilateral military cooperation in the Pacific.[57] Russia and the PRC's military cooperation may indicate the US military deployments will impact geopolitics beyond the immediate Pacific theater.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The United States’ establishment of a military task force to provide ISR support to Philippine operations in the South China Sea is part of a trend of coalition-building among US-aligned nations in the First Island Chain. The US Department of Defense revealed the existence of Task Force Ayungin, a special forward-deployed task force to support Philippine operations in the South China Sea. The task force is named using the Tagalog name for Second Thomas Shoal, a Philippines-occupied shoal in the disputed Spratly Islands, which fall within the PRC’s territorial claims delineated by its in ten-dash line around the South China Sea.[58] Philippine National Security Adviser Eduardo Año said that the task force will provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support to Philippine forces but will not conduct any operations. According to the Pentagon, Task Force Ayungin will assist in planning and training for the Armed Forces of the Philippines Western Command and the integration of four MANTAS T-12 and at least one T-38 Devil Ray unmanned surface vessels recently transferred to the Philippines.[59] PRC MOD Spokesman Wu Qian criticized the task force, together with a US-Philippine intelligence sharing agreement signed earlier in November. Wu said that “defense and security cooperation between countries should be conducive to regional peace and stability,” and called the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty “a product of the Cold War.” Wu accused the United States of undermining China’s territorial sovereignty and accused the Philippines of escalating the South China Sea dispute by violating the PRC’s sovereignty and its own commitments, provoking “trouble at sea,” and trying to pull in external forces. He said the PRC will “take all necessary measures to counter infringement and provocation.”[60]

The revelation of Task Force Ayungin is the latest development in a trend of strengthening defense relationships in the region as the United States and its allies form a counterbalancing coalition against the PRC. The Philippines also signed a reciprocal access agreement with Japan earlier in the year, which Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro Jr. said would allow Japanese forces to participate in joint military exercises within Philippine territory. Teodoro reported that details of military exercises with Japan are still to be determined. He also assured senators that Japanese troops would be on standby to help the Philippines with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) during calamities.[61]

The PLA carried out military exercises the day after a joint United States-Philippines air exercise. This exercise marks the third occurrence of a symmetrical PLA response to joint United States-Philippine military exercises within Philippine maritime territory. On November 26 the United States and Philippine Air Forces carried out a joint exercise over the Western Pacific Ocean.[62] A statement from the US Air Force reported that this exercise was focused on improving force interoperability. The PLA Southern Theater Command carried out air and naval combat readiness patrols over Scarborough Shoal on November 28. The Southern Theater Command stated that this exercise was for the purpose of strengthening control and preserving national sovereignty over PRC territory.[63] This is the third time that the PLA has carried out military exercises in Scarborough Shoal following a joint exercise between the Philippines and its allies in Philippine maritime territory.[64] The PRC has established a precedent for responding in kind to joint military exercises in the South China Sea by the Philippines, which the PRC has repeatedly accused of acting provocatively and escalating tensions over disputed maritime territory. The CCG also conducted a patrol around Scarborough Shoal on November 30.[65]

The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) deployed two patrol vessels in response to the PRC harassment of Philippine fishermen in Iroquois Reef. This event marks the first deployment of PCG vessels against PRC forces since the withdrawal of the BRP Teresa Magbanua from Sabina Shoal in September 2024. On November 28 the PCG reported that Philippine fishing boats were harassed by a PLA Navy Z-9 helicopter near Iroquois Reef.[66] Fishermen also reported the presence of CCG vessels, which shined lasers at the fishermen and stood by as two Philippine boats sank due to severe weather.[67] CCG spokesperson Liu Dejun characterized the incident as a law enforcement measure intended to halt “illegal fishing” activities.[68] The PCG responded by deploying two patrol vessels, the BRP Melchora Aquino and BRP Cape Engaño to Iroquois Reef.[69] PCG Spokesperson Commodore Jay Tarriela stated that the deployment is intended to show the PCG’s commitment to protecting fishing rights in the West Philippine Sea and the commitment of the Philippine government to not “surrender a square inch of our territory to any foreign power.”[70]

Iroquois Reef is located with Reed Bank near the Spratly Islands. The reef falls within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone according to the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling, but the PRC continues to claim the territory and economic rights within it. Reed Bank contains many oil and gas deposits, but the Philippines suspended exploitation of these resources in 2015 due to territorial disputes.[71]

Territorial disputes between the PRC and the Philippines have resulted in multiple instances of harassment and military deployments throughout the South China Sea. The last PCG deployment against PRC forces occurred in September 2024, when the PCG withdrew the BRP Teresa Magbanua from Sabina Shoal following a five-month-long standoff.[72] Tensions between the two states seemingly plateaued since September, but a renewal of military deployments to features within the South China Sea may be on the horizon.

Myanmar

The PRC is trying to protect its interests in Myanmar by brokering peace between the military junta and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and advocating against the ICC prosecution of junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing for crimes against humanity. The ethnic minority Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) announced its willingness to hold talks with the Myanmar military junta on November 25.[73] MFA spokesperson Mao Ning stated that the PRC will continue to actively promote peace and dialogue in the process.[74] The PRC has previously brokered a peace agreement with the TNLA in January 2024, but the deal fell through in June.[75] The International Criminal Court (ICC) accused junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing of crimes against humanity for the treatment of the Muslim Rohingya just two days later on November 27, prompting the PRC Foreign Ministry to say the ICC has no jurisdiction according to the Rome Statute over acts committed by nationals of non-member states on their territories.[76] The PRC has not directly intervened militarily to support the junta or the rebels. It only involves itself when the civil war threatens its interests, particularly with access to natural resources and preventing negative spillover effects from conflict.

The PRC has important interests in Myanmar and has worked to protect its own investments. Myanmar has the highest level of transportation integration with Chinese networks out of all the countries on the PRC’s southwest border.[77] The PRC exported $13.5 billion USD of goods to Myanmar in 2022, while Myanmar exported $9.62 billion USD to the PRC the same year.[78] Myanmar is also critical to the PRC's geopolitical security by providing an alternative shipping route through the Bay of Bengal, thereby reducing reliance on the Strait of Malacca.[79] The PRC has invested $7.3 billion USD into the Kyaukphyu deep-water port in western Myanmar that will provide access to the Indian Ocean.[80] The PRC has also invested heavily in oil and gas pipelines that run from Kyaukphyu into Kunming in mainland China.[81] Precious stones account for 42% of exports from Myanmar to China and other natural resources make up a significant proportion of the rest of the exports.[82] The PRC also claimed to have wiped out all large-scale telecom scam centers in northern Myanmar, arresting 763 Chinese suspects in Tangyan on November 21.[83] Eliminating these scam centers was one of the PRC’s major interests in the Myanmar civil war because many of these scam centers targeted Chinese victims and entrapped Chinese nationals to work for them.

The PRC appears to be trying to minimize political instability, crime, and violence in Myanmar that could threaten its interests. The negative spillover effects from the civil war disrupt Chinese economic activities in the region and jeopardizes the viability of investments.

Europe

European authorities are investigating a PRC cargo vessel that likely cut two undersea cables in the Baltic Sea on November 17-18. [84] The Yi Peng 3 cargo ship departed from Ust-Luga, Russia on November 15, and sailed westward through the Baltic Sea.[85] Investigators determined that the ship dropped its anchor on November 17, severed the first cable, and continued to drag the anchor over 100 miles. The ship then turned off its transponder and cut the second cable at 3 am the next day.[86] It was ultimately forced to stop in the Kattegat Strait between Denmark and Sweden after Danish naval ships intercepted it. Unnamed individuals close to the investigation said that the ship’s hull and anchor showed damage consistent with the cutting of the cables.[87] Sweden launched an investigation on suspicion of possible sabotage, which occurred in Sweden’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).[88] Publicly available ship tracking data from Marine Traffic showed NATO ships from Denmark, Germany, and Sweden surrounding the Yi Peng 3 on December 2 as investigations continue.[89] The PRC MFA said that the PRC is maintaining open channels of communication with Sweden and “other relevant parties.”[90]

European authorities are investigating whether Russian intelligence induced the Yi Peng 3 to cut the cables. The ship had just left a Russian port, whose port records indicate that the ship had a Russian captain. Russia has denied its involvement, however.[91] Russian ships have also been known to turn off their transponders – also known as “going dark” – to evade sanctions.[92] Research from the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration into illegal fishing found that fishing vessels also switch off their transponders to evade competitors or pirates and may go dark “adjacent to Exclusive Economic Zones and the high seas.”[93] The International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) has stated that no “conclusive evidence” has yet proven the PRC’s intentional involvement in the cutting of the Baltic Sea cables.[94]

One of the severed cables ran between Finland and Germany, while the other ran between Sweden and Lithuania. Lithuania expelled three PRC diplomats on November 29, declared them personae non gratae, and ordered them to leave Lithuania within a week.[95] Lithuania accused the expelled parties of violating the Vienna Convention and domestic law; it is unclear whether the cable cutting incident prompted the expulsion. The PRC condemned Lithuania’s decision. PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian called on Lithuania to “adhere to the one-China principle, and push bilateral relations back on track” in a press conference on December 2.[96] The PRC and Lithuania have experienced an ongoing diplomatic spat over Taiwan; the PRC downgraded its ties with Lithuania in 2021 after Vilnius allowed Taiwan to open a representative office there.[97]

This incident was not the first in which PRC ships damaged European undersea infrastructure. Finland launched an investigation into possible sabotage after a PRC-flagged ship called New Polar Bear cut the Balticonnector gas line and a communication cable between Estonia and Finland in 2023.[98] The PRC admitted the ship’s role in causing the damage but claimed that the incident was unintentional.[99] Taiwan also accused the PRC of cutting undersea cables between Taiwan and its outlying Matsu Islands in 2023, which resulted in widespread internet slowdowns across the islands for over a month. The ROC National Communications Commission accused two PRC ships of damaging the cables, but Taiwan’s government refrained from accusing the PRC of orchestrating intentional sabotage.[100]

Russia

The PRC and Russia conducted their ninth joint strategic air patrol on November 29 in the Sea of Japan.[101] The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) stated that the air patrols aim to “test and enhance joint training and operational capabilities of the two air forces.”[102] The PRC and Russia have conducted the joint air patrols since 2019 under what the PRC referred to as an “annual cooperation plan.” This event marks the second such joint air patrol in 2024. The eighth joint air patrol took place over the Bering Sea in July.[103]

The PRC and Russia are conducting increasingly frequent joint military exercises in recent years, especially in the Pacific Ocean, and expanding the scope of their cooperation. The two countries have now held joint exercises in at least five different parts of the world since July, including naval exercises in the South China Sea, Gulf of Finland, Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk, and Northern Pacific.[104]

Recent joint military exercises between the PRC and Russia have encroached on the air and sea space around the United States and its allies. The South Korean military confirmed on November 29 that six Russian and five PRC military aircraft, which included fighters and nuclear-capable bombers, entered South Korea’s ADIZ without prior notice.[105] South Korea responded by scrambling fighter jets in preparation for “contingencies.”[106] PRC and Russian bombers entered the US ADIZ near Alaska for the first time together on July 24 during the two countries’ eighth joint air patrol, prompting the US and Canada to scramble fighter jets to intercept them.[107] PRC and Russian naval vessels sailed together in the United States' EEZ in international waters near Alaska in September 2022 and August 2023.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, November 13, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Will Pickering of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: November 18, 2024

Note: ISW will pause publication of the China-Taiwan Weekly Update during Thanksgiving week. Publication will resume according to the normal schedule following the Thanksgiving holiday.

Key Takeaways

ROC President Lai Ching-te may plan to transit through Hawaii and possibly Guam during a trip to Taiwan’s South Pacific allies in late November or early December.
The PRC released the captain of a Taiwanese fishing vessel whom it had detained since July following a visit by Taiwanese officials from Penghu County.
Xi’s and Biden’s agreement not to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) into nuclear weapons control systems signals Beijing’s willingness to implement guardrails in areas that it has previously been noncommittal about cooperating in.
The PRC debuted its J-35A stealth fighter at Airshow China 2024. The fighter is the PRC's second stealth plane and reportedly greatly expands China's power projection capability into the Pacific.
Xi’s and Biden’s agreement not to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) into nuclear weapons control systems signals Beijing’s willingness to discuss AI safety despite previously withholding nuclear talks to punish the US for supporting Taiwan.
The PRC did not interfere with a Philippine resupply mission to the Sierra Madre in Second Thomas Shoal. It is continuing to abide by a provisional agreement it reached with the Philippines in July 2024 despite continuing tensions over the two countries’ territorial disputes.
The PRC warned the United States and the Philippines against increasing regional tensions following the signing of a US-Philippines intelligence sharing agreement.
Anonymous European Union diplomats said that the EU has “conclusive” and “credible” evidence that a factory in the PRC’s Xinjiang region is producing and exporting drones for Russia.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

Reuters reported, citing anonymous sources, that ROC President Lai Ching-te plans to transit through Hawaii and possibly Guam during a trip to Taiwan’s South Pacific allies in late November or early December.[1] The Taiwanese government did not confirm the report. Such a trip would be Lai’s first visit to the United States as president and would mirror former ROC President Tsai Ing-wen's 2017 South Pacific trip, which also transited Hawaii and Guam.[2] The South Pacific states of Tuvalu, Palau, and the Marshall Islands are among the 12 countries that maintain formal relations with the ROC rather than with the PRC. Guam and Hawaii are both home to major US military bases that are likely to play a role in any US defense of Taiwan. The headquarters of the US Indo-Pacific Command are also in Hawaii. PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian stated that such transits violate the One China principle and will not stop the “inevitable trend” of China’s reunification. He urged the United States not to allow Lai’s transit.[3]

Tsai Ing-wen will embark on a trip to Canada to give a speech at the Halifax International Security Forum from November 22-24.[4] The annual summit, organized by Washington-based institution HFX, brings together leaders in government, defense, academia, and business. The trip would mark Tsai’s second trip abroad since leaving office on May 20, following a trip to Europe last month where she met with politicians and dignitaries in the Czech Republic, France, and Belgium. Tsai received the John McCain Prize for Leadership in Public Service at the 2020 iteration of the summit, honoring her efforts to safeguard Taiwan’s democracy and resist PRC aggression. Lin Jian responded to news of her trip by urging Canada to adhere to the One China principle and warning countries with formal ties to the PRC against hosting Taiwanese “separatists.”[5]

Beijing perceives meetings between high-ranking American and Taiwanese officials as steps toward formal Taiwanese independence and threats to PRC claims over the island. It started the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995 when the ROC’s then-president Lee Teng-hui visited his alma mater, Cornell University, in New York. Following then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022 and Tsai’s meeting with her successor, House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, in Los Angeles in 2023, the PRC held extensive military drills around Taiwan, including the first Joint Sword-series exercise in 2023. It has reacted less strongly to “stopover” transits than to formal public visits, however. The PRC has greatly increased its military and diplomatic pressure on Taiwan to deter further international engagement and assert PRC sovereignty claims since Tsai took office in 2016, and even more since Lai took office in 2024.[6]

The PRC released the captain of a Taiwanese fishing vessel whom it had detained since July following a visit by Taiwanese officials from Penghu County. The PRC detained the Penghu-registered Taiwanese fishing boat Da Jin Man 88 on July 2 for illegally fishing in PRC waters northeast of Kinmen during a PRC fishing moratorium. The CCG escorted the boat to the port of Quanzhou and detained its crew there for over a month. The incident was the first time the PRC had detained a Taiwanese vessel in 17 years.[7] The PRC released four of the boat’s crew members on August 13 but continued to hold the boat’s captain, surnamed Hong, and the boat itself.[8] The PRC released the boat and Captain Hong on November 15 following a visit by former Deputy Speaker of Penghu County Chen Shuang-chuan to Quanzhou the day before. Chen is also Chairman of the Penghu Cross-Strait Exchange Association. Chen arranged to pay 210,000 Chinese yuan (about $29,000 USD) in fines on behalf of Hong to secure his release.[9] Chen and other Penghu officials previously met with PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Director Song Tao on October 24 to negotiate for Hong’s release. The TAO readout framed the visit as being entirely about resuming PRC tourism to Penghu, however, even though that was only a secondary objective of the trip.[10]

The PRC conducts direct negotiations with KMT party officials and local politicians such as Chen Shuang-chuan to legitimize the KMT as negotiating partners on behalf of Taiwan. The PRC released the Da Jin Man 88’s other crew members, as well as another fisherman, following negotiations with Kinmen officials of the KMT.[11] Conducting fruitful negotiations with KMT officials while refusing to publicly meet with DPP officials enables the PRC to help the DPP’s political opponents and reinforces the CCP’s message that acceptance of the 1992 Consensus, which the KMT accepts and the DPP rejects, is the requisite basis for cross-Strait relations. The 1992 Consensus is an alleged verbal agreement between representatives of the CCP and KMT that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China, though the two sides disagree over which government rightfully represents “China.”

The PRC’s four-month detention of Hong may be intended to deter illegal Taiwanese fishing in PRC waters as the PRC strengthens its “law enforcement” against Taiwanese nationals. Illegal fishing in the area is common, but PRC authorities usually warn and drive away offenders rather than detaining them. The PRC may also have used its detention of Hong, his crew, and a Kinmen-based soldier named Hu detained earlier in the year to give it leverage in negotiations with Taiwan at the time. The two sides resumed stalled negotiations about the February 14 capsizing incident, in which two PRC fishermen died while fleeing a Taiwanese Coast Guard boat in Kinmen’s prohibited waters, weeks after the PRC detained the Da Jin Man 88. Local PRC authorities released both Hu and the crew of the Da Jin Man 88 soon after Taiwan agreed to return the boat and bodies of the deceased fishermen.[12] It is unclear what the PRC got in return for releasing Hong, if anything, however, other than payment of his fines. Chen said that Hong’s detention period was so long because unspecified “legal issues” had to be resolved before he could be released.[13]

Four Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ships entered restricted waters around Taiwan’s Kinmen islands in two separate incursions on November 15th. Kinmen is a Taiwanese island group located just three kilometers (1.9 miles) from the PRC’s coast, a distance that has decreased in recent years due to a new PRC land reclamation project for an airport north of the island.[14] The Kinmen Archipelago’s restricted waters extend between 1.5 and 10 kilometers from its shores.[15] The CCG ships simultaneously entered Kinmen’s southern restricted waters at four different points at 8:50 a.m. and left at 11:00 a.m. The same four CCG ships returned to Kinmen’s restricted waters at 2:45 p.m. the same day and left at 5:00 p.m.[16] These two incidents mark the 50^th and 51^st times CCG ships intruded into Kinmen’s restricted waters this year. Taiwan does not claim territorial waters or a contiguous zone around Kinmen due to its proximity to the PRC but does maintain analogous “prohibited” and “restricted” maritime zones around Kinmen, where it claims exclusive rights to carry out law enforcement. The PRC claims Taiwan and all its associated waters to be PRC territory and denies the existence of any restricted or prohibited waters around Taiwanese islands.

The PRC began regular CCG patrols around Kinmen and frequent incursions into Kinmen’s waters since February 2024 in response to the February 14 capsizing incident. The patrols are intended to assert PRC law enforcement control around Kinmen and likely to punish Taiwan for the election victory of President Lai Ching-te in January. Beijing considers Lai to be a dangerous separatist. The PRC has incrementally changed its incursion strategy, especially since Lai’s inauguration in May. The patrols shifted from fixed routes and formations to dispersed, less predictable maneuvers that simultaneously enter Kinmen’s waters from multiple directions.[17] These tactics serve to establish a new status quo, desensitize Taiwan to the threat to Kinmen, and strain Taiwan’s resources as it must be prepared to mobilize at any time. Normalizing these patrols increases the likelihood that Taiwan will be caught unprepared if an apparently routine incursion turns into a full blockade that isolates Kinmen and other outlying islands. It is noteworthy that these incursions are regularly occurring at locations at which the PRC would likely need to station ships to enforce a blockade.

China

US President Joe Biden met with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping on November 16 at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Lima, Peru. This was Biden’s third meeting with Xi since becoming president. Xi’s rhetoric toward Biden was generally placatory while continuing to warn the United States not to escalate tensions. Xi signaled the PRC’s preparation for the US presidential transition and said that the PRC is ready to work with the Trump administration.[18] Xi warned the United States, however, not to challenge what he described as Beijing’s four “red lines:” Taiwan, democracy and human rights, the PRC’s “path and system,” and the PRC’s right to development.[19] Xi expressed the PRC’s resolve to continue asserting its “sovereignty, rights, and interests” in the South China Sea and stated that the United States should not instigate or get involved in bilateral disputes over contested land features. Xi reiterated that the PRC maintains a “fair position” on Russia’s war in Ukraine and portrayed the PRC as a mediator in the conflict, which ignores the PRC’s political and economic support to Russia. Xi also denied claims that the PRC was the perpetrator of cyberattacks, in an apparent reference to an ongoing investigation by US authorities into a PRC state-sponsored cyber operation that compromised several major US telecommunications companies.[20]

Biden expressed the United States’ opposition to “unilateral changes to the status quo” in the Taiwan Strait and called for an end to the PRC’s destabilizing military activity around Taiwan, according to the US readout.[21] Biden also addressed other key issues in the bilateral relationship, including the United States’ disapproval of the PRC’s continued support for Russia’s defense industrial base and US commitment to maintaining stability and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. [22]

Xi and Biden agreed not to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) into nuclear weapons control systems, signaling Beijing’s willingness to implement guardrails in issues about which it has previously been noncommittal. Xi and Biden agreed during their meeting at APEC that the United States and PRC would maintain human control — as opposed to AI control — over their nuclear arsenals.[23] US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan emphasized that the conversation aligned with Biden’s and Xi’s agreement to “work on AI safety and risk together” following last year’s Woodside Summit.[24] Sullivan stated that he did not foresee an “imminent risk” that either power would “hand over the control of nuclear weapons to artificial intelligence” but that the discussion took place as a long-term stabilization measure.[25]

The PRC’s acceptance of the US proposal marks a shift from the PRC’s earlier reluctance to accept limits on its application of AI. US National Security Council Senior Director for Technology and National Security Tarun Chhabra stated in June that the PRC was not in agreement with the US policy that AI should not be involved with nuclear weapons launch systems, following bilateral AI risk and safety talks in Geneva in May.[26] The PRC also refrained from signing an international agreement on the use of AI in the military during the Responsible AI in the Military Domain (REAIM) summit in Seoul on September 10.[27]

The agreement signals rare cooperation from the PRC in two critical areas of competition with the US, AI and nuclear weapons, in both of which the PRC has been disinclined to accept limits that might inhibit the PRC from gaining an edge. The PRC suspended nuclear arms control discussions with the US in July, citing the United States’ arms sales to Taiwan as the primary reason.[28] The PRC has long-maintained disinterest in engaging with the US over limitations on nuclear policy, however, according to Sullivan.[29] The PRC’s unwillingness to sequester issues regarding strategic stability from the rest of the bilateral relationship calls into question the PRC’s commitment to adhere to such agreements should tensions escalate.

The PRC has aimed to portray itself as a responsible nuclear power, deflect criticism of its nuclear arsenal expansion by emphasizing its no-first-use policy, and cast the United States as the destabilizing power in the bilateral relationship.[30] Xi’s agreement to limit the influence of AI over the PRC’s nuclear arsenal is consistent with the PRC’s intent to portray itself as a responsible nuclear power.

The PRC debuted its J-35A stealth fighter at Airshow China 2024. The fighter is the PRC's second stealth plane and reportedly greatly expands China's power projection into the Pacific. The J-35 is a mid-size twin-engine plane intended to be a multirole fighter. There is very little information publicly available about the newly debuted fighter, but many observable features such as the aircraft shape and wing closely resemble Lockheed Martin's F-35 fighter, and this may not be a coincidence, since PRC-based hackers stole data on the F-35 project in 2007 and 2008.[31] The J-35 prototype, FC-31 V2, has smaller dimensions then the other PLA stealth fighter, the J-20, with a length of 17.3 meters, a wingspan of 11.5 meters, and a height of 4.8 meters.[32] The J-35 has two known variants, a carrier-based variant and a land-based variant; the version that made its public debut at Airshow China 2024 is the land-based J-35A.[33] The carrier-based variant has been developed to operate from the PLA’s Fujian aircraft carrier, which has yet to enter service, and other Type-003 carriers the PRC may build in the future. Photographs have shown the carrier-based J-35 to have foldable wings and a launch bar for catapult-assisted takeoff (CATOBAR).[34] The J-20 stealth jet cannot be operated from aircraft carriers, so the J-35 will thus give the PRC the ability to operate stealth combat aircraft far from its shores. The J-35 has a significantly shorter combat range than the J-20, at 750 miles and 1200 miles respectively, but this limited range is partially offset by its ability to operate from an aircraft carrier.[35] Weaponry can be mounted externally on the wings of a J-35, very likely significantly increasing its radar cross-section, or in the internal weapons bay.

The J-35 is designed to be a multirole fighter jet with strong stealth capabilities, but there are some design and logistical challenges that limit the effectiveness of the plane. The J-35 has less observable control surface than the J-20, and this may indicate less maneuverability. The J-35 may have difficulties masking its heat signature due to the double engine design—the F-22 tried to solve this issue with a specially designed trapezoidal engine nozzle, but the J-35 uses a rounded shape with serrated nozzles for heat dispersion.[36]

There are significant limitations to the PRC's technological development in spite of its espionage and intellectual property theft. For example, the PRC’s jet engine technology is outdated compared to Western military jets. The FC-31, the prototype of the J-35, is equipped with WS-13 engines, and the J-35 is supposed to be upgraded to WS-19 engines that are currently still in development.[37] The WS-13 Engines are based on Russian RD-33 engines with a major repair interval of roughly 810 hours and service lifespan of 2200 hours, and these intervals are significantly smaller than many Western engines.[38] The PRC has historically relied on Russian military technology and has made efforts to domestically develop its jet engines, but supply chain issues, reliability and quality control problems, and technological limitations have and will continue to hamper its ability to do so.[39] The PRC has strong manufacturing capabilities, however, and is successfully producing J-20s at scale using pulsating production lines, a capability that will likely expedite J-35 production as well.[40]

The J-35 is one of many new military advancements showcased at Airshow China 2024. The PLA also debuted an upgraded Z-20 helicopter, the Z-20J, designed to provide an effective anti-submarine platform for the Navy, and a variant of the J-15 fighter jet, the J-15T.[41] The airshow also showcased the Jiu Tian reconnaissance and attack drone and the HQ-19 anti-ballistic-missile system.[42] The J-35 and the J-15T are both likely to be fielded on the Fujian aircraft carrier, and the CATOBAR system to launch and land fighter jets allows these aircraft to take off with heavier loads than are possible using the ski jumps on the Liaoning and Shandong.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The PRC conducted military exercises and a law enforcement patrol near the Scarborough Shoal, reinforcing its territorial claims amid its dispute over new Filipino maritime territory laws. On November 13 the PLA Southern Theater Command held naval and air combat drills and a joint patrol near Scarborough Shoal.[43] This is the second PLA joint air and maritime patrol around Scarborough Shoal in four months. On November 14 the China Coast Guard (CCG) carried out a “law enforcement patrol” near Scarborough Shoal.[44] These exercises follow the November 10 announcement by the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) that demarcated the coordinates of the PRC’s territorial sea baseline claims around Scarborough Shoal. The PRC MFA stated that its claims are in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).[45] The PRC’s invocation of international law likely aims to provide legitimacy to their “law enforcement” actions near disputed territory in the South China Sea.

This announcement by the PRC MFA also followed the signing of the Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act and Philippine Maritime Zones Act by Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr on November 8.[46] The Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act established a system allowing foreign vessels and aircraft to exercise the right of passage through Philippine waters. The Philippine Maritime Zones Act defined the Philippines’ internal waters, archipelagic waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. The Philippines’ territorial definitions include the disputed Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal, claims that the PRC criticized as the illegal incorporation of PRC territory. The Philippine government stated that these two laws are intended to align Philippine domestic law with international law according to UNCLOS and the South China Sea Arbitration ruling of 2016. The ruling determined that the PRC‘s expansive South China Sea territorial claims were inconsistent with international law and rejected all PRC territorial or maritime claims determined to be part of the Philippines‘ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf.[47] The PRC protested the Philippines’ “unilateral actions” and stated that the PRC will continue to defend its territorial rights by all means necessary.

The PRC did not interfere with a Philippine resupply mission to the Sierra Madre in Second Thomas Shoal. It is continuing to abide by a provisional agreement it reached with the Philippines in July 2024 despite continuing tensions over the two countries’ territorial disputes.[48] The Philippines successfully completed a rotation and resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre, a grounded warship that acts as a Philippine military outpost in Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC released a statement that the CCG observed this resupply mission and reported that the exercise was completed “with China’s approval.”[49] This marks the third resupply mission since the provisional agreement between the PRC and the Philippines was reached. The PRC claims that it “allows” Philippine resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal to give the impression that it has legal jurisdiction over the Shoal, though the Philippines rejects this framing.

The PRC warned the United States and the Philippines against increasing regional tensions following the signing of a US-Philippines intelligence sharing agreement. On November 18 United States Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA).[50] The text of the agreement has not been released by either government, but according to the US Department of Defense (DoD) the GSOMIA is focused on providing a legal framework for increased sharing of information and defense technology between the two states.[51] The DoD said the agreement was made after two years of bilateral negotiations and will enhance interoperability between United States and Philippine forces. This signing marked Defense Secretary Austin’s fourth visit to Manila, the most of any United States Secretary of Defense, emphasizing Washington’s view of the importance of close relations between Manila and Washington.

PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian commented on the agreement during a press conference, stating that agreements “must not target third parties or harm the interests of third parties” and warning the two states against undermining regional peace and stability.[52] The semi-official state-owned newspaper Global Times cited two PRC-based experts who argued that this agreement could result in additional provocative actions from the Philippines.[53] The PRC has previously stated its concerns over Philippine and United States military cooperation and its implications for PRC maritime security.[54]

Oceania

Palauan President Surangel Whipps Jr.’s reelection reinforces US naval power projection into the Pacific islands. Palauan President Surangel Whipps Jr. won reelection in Palau’s November 2024 election.[55] Taiwan President Lai Ching-te congratulated Whipps Jr. on social media, and Whipps made a deliberate layover in Taiwan on November 13 on his way to Azerbaijan for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC COP29).[56] Palau is one of 12 countries that has diplomatic relations with the ROC rather than the PRC. Whipps has remained extremely vocal in his support for Taiwan’s participation in international bodies, stating that the Taiwanese “deserve to have a voice” at the UN during an interview to Taiwanese media, and also commented on Palau’s efforts to diversify its economy amidst PRC tourism restrictions that Beijing imposed in retribution for Palau’s support of Taiwan.[57]

Whipps also stated that he may ask the United States for a Patriot missile defense system again in light of the recent PLA’s test of an intercontinental ballistic missile in September 2024, which landed in the southern Pacific Ocean. The Palauan Senate previously rejected the proposal in 2023.[58] The US military has been working on a number of large construction projects in Palau, including defense radars in Angaur and Ngaraad state, seaport expansion in Koror, and airstrip expansion of the WWII-era runways on Peleliu.[59] Palau has a Compact of Free Association (COFA) with the United States that grants the US military permission to operate on the island in exchange for economic and military aid.[60] Palau is strategically significant because of its location in the Second Island Chain and because it is the Pacific island closest to the South China Sea that hosts important US military infrastructure. These facts would make it a prime target for the PRC in the event of war in the Pacific, and so the Patriot missile systems would act as deterrence and add a line of defense in the event of an attack.

Whipps also claimed that PRC research vessels and other boats have operated in Palau’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).[61] The PRC's foreign ministry has denied the allegations. These types of incursions have historically been used to normalize PRC presence in foreign waters, especially waters where the PRC has territorial claims. The PRC also named two underwater seamounts within Palau’s EEZ with Chinese names earlier in 2024, which may indicate a preparation to assert claims in the area. [62] The PRC does not currently claim any territory in Palau’s EEZ, however. The PRC will most likely redouble efforts following Whipps’ reelection to pressure the island nation to cease its support of Taiwan and military cooperation with the United States.

Russia

Anonymous European Union diplomats said the EU has “conclusive” and “credible” evidence that a factory in the PRC’s Xinjiang region is producing and exporting drones for Russia. An unspecified senior EU official told South China Morning Post on November 15 that intelligence sources have reported the existence of the drone factory in Xinjiang, but that the EU has yet to confirm this information, whether the drones have already been shipped, and how much PRC authorities knew about the operation.[63] EU foreign ministers met on November 18 to discuss the evidence. Several foreign ministers including Germany’s Annalena Baerbock warned that the PRC would face “consequences” if the EU finds that it is providing drone aid to Russia.[64] PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian denied the allegations, claiming that Beijing has never provided lethal weapons to parties to the conflict and has always “strictly controlled military and dual-use drones.” He claimed that the PRC’s “objective and fair” position on the Ukraine war crisis and promotion of peace talks is in “sharp contrast to the practice of some countries that have adopted double standards and fanned the flames in the Ukrainian crisis.”[65]

The US Department of the Treasury sanctioned two private PRC firms in October for their involvement in producing drones for Russia, the first time the United States has accused PRC entities of sending lethal aid to Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. The Treasury statement said that Russia’s Garpiya-series drone was developed by PRC-based experts and produced in the PRC in collaboration with Russian defense firms. It did not mention the location of the factories, however.[66] Reuters previously reported based on European intelligence sources that one of the companies now sanctioned by the United States, Redlepus Vector Industry Shenzhen Co., collaborated with Russian firms and established a joint drone research center in Xinjiang.[67] It appears likely that this joint drone research center is the same as the Xinjiang factory the EU officials mentioned, or related to it.

The PRC MFA told Reuters at the time that it was unaware of a Russia-PRC drone production project and that the PRC had strict export controls on drones. A US National Security Council spokesperson said that the United States had not seen any evidence that the PRC government was aware of the transactions or had any involvement in providing lethal aid to Russia.[68] PRC firms providing lethal assistance to US-sanctioned Russian firms or jointly collaborating with Russia to produce lethal equipment marks a significant departure from the PRC’s cautious approach to supporting Russia and undermines the PRC’s professed neutrality on the war in Ukraine.

Latin America

PRC President Xi Jinping’s inauguration of Chancay Port before the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum signals the PRC’s growing investment in Latin America. Xi’s visit to Peru featured talks with Peruvian President Dina Hercilia Boruarte Segarra, his third meeting with the Peruvian leader in one year.[69] Xi opened his visit by inaugurating Chancay Port and designating it the beginning of a “21^st century maritime silk road.”[70] PRC shipping company Cosco will exclusively operate the $3.6 billion deepwater port.[71] The port will reduce shipping time to the PRC by 10 days.[72]

Xi aims to link Peru, and Latin America more broadly, to global Belt and Road Initiative efforts. PRC rhetoric around Chancay and activity in Latin America more broadly aligns with the historical and cultural messaging used in other Belt and Road Initiative projects. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Lin Jian spoke of the port as instrumental to the “Inca Trail of the New Era” and emphasized the ancientness of Chinese and Peruvian cultures.[73] Lin also emphasized “mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit, openness and inclusiveness, and win-win cooperation” with regard to PRC activities in Latin America; this rhetoric closely resembles past PRC messaging around its interactions with the “Global South.”[74]

The PRC has used port infrastructure as a means of advancing its economic, and at times military, security around the world.[75] Some observers have expressed concerns that infrastructure projects like Chancay pose a security threat and entrench the PRC’s influence in the region.[76] The PRC has claimed that Chancay Port exists only for commercial purposes; the port could improve the PRC’s naval power projection in the region if used militarily, however.[77]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, November 6, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Frank Mattimoe of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: November 13

Key Takeaways

The ROC government’s November 6 petition to disband the Chinese Unification Promotion Party (CUPP) and indictment of agents acting on behalf of the PRC illustrates the extensiveness of PRC infiltration and political warfare efforts in Taiwan.
The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) released coordinates demarcating its claimed territorial sea baseline around Scarborough Shoal on November 10.[1] The PRC’s announcement of a territorial sea baseline around Scarborough Shoal likely aims to legitimize its territorial claim by fabricating a legal basis using internationally recognized maritime law concepts.
PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu met in Beijing for the 19th round of PRC-Russia strategic security consultations.[2] The PRC's and Russia’s differing emphases signal the partnership’s shared interests with distinct priorities.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The ROC government’s November 6 petition to disband the Chinese Unification Promotion Party (CUPP) and indictment of agents acting on behalf of the PRC illustrates the extensiveness of PRC infiltration and political warfare efforts in Taiwan. Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior (MOI) announced that it would petition for the disbandment of the CUPP for electoral interference on behalf of the PRC.[3] The CUPP is a minor political party established in 2005 whose platform is based on support for unification with the PRC and the One China Principle, which recognizes the PRC as the legitimate representative of China and Taiwan as a part of that China. The MOI stated in its indictment that the CUPP has systemically developed pro-Beijing groups and interests in Taiwan since its founding.[4] Taiwan’s Chiayi District Prosecutor’s Office pressed charges on November 6 against CUPP members Chang Meng-chung and his wife, Hung Wen-ting, for taking NT$74 million (US$2.3 million) from the CCP to produce pro-PRC propaganda.[5] The MOI announced on November 8 that it has investigated and found evidence to pursue eight cases against 11 people for violating national security laws, laws governing cross-strait relations, and election integrity laws.[6] Taiwanese law enforcement also linked 134 CUPP members to serious crimes such as murder, robbery, transnational human trafficking, and gang violence.[7] This is the first time that the MOI has requested that the Constitutional Court dissolve a political party, illustrating the severity of PRC interference in Taiwanese domestic politics.[8]

Taipei prosecutors also indicted the heads of two “hometown associations” on November 5 for organizing a PRC-funded trip for Kuomintang (KMT) officials before Taiwan’s January 2024 presidential elections.[9] Hometown associations are social and cultural organizations of people with common ancestry or ties to a common birthplace. The presidents of the Taiwan and Taipei Anhui Province hometown associations were charged with violating the Anti-Infiltration Act for allegedly recruiting 24 KMT officials at the request of Liao Jian, head of the PRC’s Anhui Province Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), and paying travel expenses to the mainland that totaled approximately NT$33,000 (US$1,000) per person.[10] The PRC hosts urged the attendees during the trip to support KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih in the presidential election over Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate William Lai Ching-te on basis that Hou’s victory would allow for “peaceful cross-strait development.”[11]

Both the CUPP and hometown association influence campaigns fit into the broader PRC strategy of conducting political warfare to “win without fighting.” The PRC strategy in Taiwanese politics broadly has the following components: increasing public support for reunification and weakening local resistance through media and grassroots efforts, gaining political power by bribing politicians and political parties, and accessing confidential information for espionage. These efforts aim to soften internal resistance against eventual Taiwanese reunification with China to make an invasion easier or unnecessary. A key aspect of the “winning without fighting” strategy is the United Front: the CCP strategy to covertly influence and gather intelligence both domestically and abroad.[12] PRC President Xi Jinping has called the United Front “an important magic weapon for uniting all Chinese people at home and abroad to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”[13]

The recent prosecution of the CUPP and the hometown associations illustrates the degree to which the PRC has been undertaking systemic efforts to undermine Taiwan’s political system in line with the United Front strategy. The CUPP has no presence in any of the five branches of the ROC central government, but the party has been able to spread PRC propaganda with the use of radio and digital media as far back as 2011.[14] Taiwanese authorities charged three Taiwanese citizens affiliated with the CUPP in August 2024 with developing a spy network to recruit Taiwanese military personnel on behalf of the PRC[15] The petition to disband the CUPP would dismantle a channel through which the CCP accesses the Taiwanese population.

Hometown associations have a history of co-optation to support CCP interests. The CCP may have recruited hometown associations to rally for pro-CCP electoral reform initiatives during the 2021 Hong Kong elections.[16] Hometown associations have also contributed to PRC transnational repression and monitoring efforts against PRC dissidents living abroad, including the 10,000-member Henan association in New York, which has considerable electoral influence.[17] The Anhui hometown association case was notable because of the PRC’s targeting of Taiwanese public officials — the PRC pushed CCP narratives of cross-strait relations over the multi-day trip. This interaction demonstrates the opportunities hometown associations offer in helping the PRC achieve its political aims through a grassroots approach.

The PRC’s exploitation of Taiwanese political and social organizations reveals the extensiveness of their influence operations.

China

PRC President Xi Jinping congratulated incoming US President Donald Trump on his election victory. Xi called Trump on November 7 and “pointed out that history has shown us that China and the United States will benefit from cooperation and suffer from confrontation.”[18] PRC Vice President Han Zheng gave US Vice President-elect JD Vance a congratulatory call on the same day.[19] The PRC Foreign Ministry reported that it hopes that “the two sides will uphold the principles of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation.”[20] The PRC sent a similar congratulatory message to US President Joe Biden following his election win in 2020. Xi called for both sides to “uphold the spirit of non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation.”[21] Xi also sent a similar message following Trump’s electoral victory in 2016, calling for “greater progress in China–U.S. relations from a new starting point.”[22]

The PRC Foreign Ministry has adhered to standard rhetorical protocol in its responses to Trump’s election. PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said that the PRC is “committed to promoting the stable, healthy and sustainable development of Sino–US relations” during a regular press conference on November 7.[23] Mao avoided addressing specifics and said that “we do not answer hypothetical questions” in response to an inquiry about Trump’s potential tariffs against Chinese goods.[24] She also said that the PRC “firmly opposes any form of official exchanges between the US and Taiwan” in response to a question on Trump’s statement that China will not “invade” Taiwan.[25]

People’s Liberation Army Navy and Air Force representatives participated in the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) Working Group with US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) counterparts from November 6–8.[26] The semi-annual MMCA meetings provide a platform for representatives from both countries’ militaries to “clarify intent and reduce the risk of misperception, miscalculation, or accidents,” according to USINDOPACOM Director of Strategic Planning and Policy Jay Bargeron, who led the US delegation.[27] This MMCA meeting was the third since President Joe Biden and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping agreed to restart the talks during their meeting on November 15, 2023.[28]

The CCP views military-to-military communication as a bargaining chip that it can use to influence US behavior to the party’s benefit, in contrast with the United States’ view of the talks as a means of escalation management to prevent and control crises. The PRC suspended high-level military dialogue in August 2022 in direct response to then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.[29] The PRC declined a US-proposed meeting between US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and then-PRC Defense Minister Li Shangfu in May 2023, which PRC officials have attributed to US sanctions on Li since 2018, before he became Defense Minister.[30] MFA spokesperson Mao Ning stated at the time that “the US should show sincerity and take practical actions to create necessary conditions for military dialogue and communication.”[31] The PRC’s history of withholding high-level military communication to influence US behavior suggests that the PRC could suspend MMCA talks again if bilateral relations deteriorate and the US takes actions that the PRC opposes.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) released coordinates demarcating the PRC's claimed territorial sea baseline around Scarborough Shoal on November 10.[32] The PRC’s announcement of a territorial sea baseline around Scarborough Shoal likely aims to legitimize its territorial claim by fabricating a legal basis using internationally recognized maritime law concepts.

Scarborough Shoal is a contested atoll approximately 140 miles from the Philippine island of Luzon in the South China Sea. The PRC wrested effective control of the shoal from the Philippines in 2012 following a months-long standoff between PRC and Filipino ships and has since maintained a near-constant maritime security presence around the shoal.[33] Scarborough Shoal is still the site of frequent confrontations in which China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia vessels regularly execute dangerous tactics to expel Filipino vessels from the area.[34]

The PRC MFA published a statement on November 10 that claims that its newly announced territorial sea baseline around Scarborough Shoal is in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and is a “natural step by the Chinese government to lawfully strengthen maritime management.”[35] The PRC’s invocation of UNCLOS to justify the territorial sea baseline likely aims to validate its territorial claims on the pretense of adhering to an internationally recognized convention. The PRC frequently appeals to international law to vindicate its “law enforcement” actions, often excessively violent, against the Philippines and other rival claimants in the South China Sea.[36] The PRC’s November 13 air and sea combat drills at Scarborough Shoal, which the PLA southern command said were “a patrol and guard activity carried out by the theater troops in accordance with the law,” are consistent with such appeals.[37]

The PRC’s claimed territorial sea baseline risks escalation with the Philippines should the PRC attempt to detain Filipinos that enter within 12 nautical miles of the shoal on legal grounds. The PRC enacted a law on June 15 that stated that the CCG can arrest and detain foreigners illegally entering or exiting PRC territorial boundaries for up to 30 days without trial and 60 days in “complicated cases.”[38]

The PRC has conducted law enforcement around other disputed features in the South China Sea where it has established a territorial sea baseline, including the entirety of the Paracel Islands, an archipelago that the PRC seized control of from Vietnam in 1974. The Vietnamese MFA called on the PRC on October 31 to release Vietnamese fishermen that the PRC detained for fishing around the Paracel Islands.[39] A PRC-based think tank called the South China Sea Probing Initiative stated that the PRC arrested the Vietnamese fishermen in April and May for “illegal” fishing in the PRC’s territorial waters around the Paracel Islands.[40]

The PRC’s announcement of the territorial sea baseline around Scarborough Shoal follows the Philippines’ enactment of the Maritime Zones Act on November 8, which defines the Philippines’ internal waters, archipelagic waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf. The PRC MFA released a statement on November 8 that condemned the act as a serious infringement on the PRC’s territorial sovereignty.[41] The statement criticized the law for “illegally incorporating” Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands into the Philippines’ territory by using domestic legislation to solidify the “illegal ruling” of the arbitral tribunal.[42] The arbitral tribunal ruling refers to a 2016 decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), which determined that the PRC’s claims to exclusive “historic rights” over resources and jurisdiction within its nine-dash line have no legal basis under UNCLOS.[43] The ruling did not address sovereignty disputes over specific features in the South China Sea. The US Department of State announced its support for the Philippines’ enactment of the Maritime Zones Act, which it stated aligns Philippine domestic laws with UNCLOS and the PCA ruling.[44]

Europe

German police arrested and searched the house of a former US military contractor on November 8 on suspicion that he offered sensitive information from the US military to a PRC intelligence service. The German Federal Prosecutor’s Office stated that the contractor had made contact with Chinese officials and offered to provide the Chinese government with sensitive intelligence and to reconnoiter US military installations in Germany.[45] China’s Ministry of Affairs spokeswoman reported that she was not aware of the situation.[46] The arrest comes amid heightened security concerns in Germany that employees in critical infrastructure industries and government may be passing information to the PRC and Russia. Germany’s Interior Ministry drafted legislation in October to improve security checks for employees in nationally sensitive infrastructure and engineering fields, the country’s Chancellery, government ministries and Office of the Federal President.[47]

This arrest follows a string of PRC-related espionage cases in Germany in the past year. German authorities arrested a PRC national on October 1 for alleged foreign agent activities that include passing on information regarding arms deliveries, which she obtained while working for a logistics company, to a member of a PRC intelligence service.[48] The member of the intelligence agency, identified as Jian G., was arrested on April 22 while working for a German member of European Parliament. The office of the German Federal Prosecutor General accused Jian G. of passing on information about negotiations and decisions in the European Parliament and spying on PRC opposition figures in Germany for PRC intelligence.[49]

Russia

PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu met in Beijing for the 19th round of PRC-Russia strategic security consultations.[50] The PRC's and Russia’s differing emphases signal the partnership’s shared interests with distinct priorities.

The recurring consultations are a platform for the PRC and Russia to coordinate policy and strengthen cooperation on international security issues.[51] The PRC readout highlighted the PRC's and Russia’s strong political trust and pragmatic cooperation, which created a new paradigm for relations between neighboring major countries and contributed to unity and cooperation for Global South countries.[52] Shoigu stated that the most important task is “to counter the policy of dual containment of Russia and China being pursued by the US and its satellites and further strengthen foreign policy coordination, including building a Eurasian architecture of equal and indivisible security.”[53] Russian President Vladimir Putin defined the Eurasian security architecture on June 14 as “a system of bilateral and multilateral guarantees of collective security in Eurasia” to replace what Putin viewed as a collapsing Euro-Atlantic security system.[54] Shoigu’s rhetoric is consistent with past Russian framing of the two countries as victims of the United States’ efforts to maintain hegemony and suppress efforts to create a multipolar world order.[55] Former Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev made similar appeals to exercise collective resistance during past rounds of the strategic security consultation.[56]

The focus of both leaders’ statements speaks to subtle differences in the countries' goals for the PRC-Russia partnership. The PRC’s emphasis on multilateralism and a common Global South identity signifies its regard for the bilateral relationship as an anchor to support the PRC’s cultivation of a community of countries that aligns with its interests and legitimizes PRC leadership on the world stage. Russia’s appeals to form a united front with the PRC indicate its more urgent desire to solidify an alliance that can challenge US hegemony in Europe and Asia.

The PRC and Russia are conducting increasingly frequent joint military exercises in recent years and expanding the scope of their cooperation. The two countries have held joint exercises in at least five different parts of the world since July, including naval exercises in the South China Sea, Gulf of Finland, Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk, and Northern Pacific.[57] PRC–Russia cooperation also extends to political coordination on international security issues in the United Nations (UN). The US Deputy Ambassador to the UN Robert Wood accused the PRC and Russia on November 4 for “shamelessly protecting” North Korea from consequences for its arms buildup, which Woods stated emboldened North Korea to continue developing its ballistic missile, nuclear, and weapons of mass destruction programs.[58]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, October 30, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, and William Pickering of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: November 6, 2024

Key Takeaways

The PRC’s hosting of the 5th Cross-strait Media Summit in Beijing from October 31 to November 1 contributes to its efforts to cultivate a favorable information landscape in Taiwan.
TAO Spokesperson Zhu Fenglian announced new steps to develop Fujian province as a center for cross-strait integration on October 30 that likely aim to foster Taiwan’s economic dependence on the mainland and build political support for cross-strait integration.
The China Coast Guard entered Taiwan’s restricted waters around Kinmen three separate times from October 28–30.[1] Normalizing CCG incursions between Kinmen and the main island of Taiwan enhances the PRC’s preparedness to initiate a future blockade or quarantine of the islands.
PRC hackers directly targeted US presidential candidates and other major political figures in an extensive cyber espionage campaign.
The PLA aircraft carriers Liaoning and Shandong conducted joint military exercises for the first time in the South China Sea.

Cross-Strait Relations

The PRC’s hosting of the 5th Cross-strait Media Summit in Beijing from October 31 to November 1 contributes to its efforts to cultivate a favorable information landscape in Taiwan.[2] Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Song Tao urged media personnel on both sides of the strait to instill a common Chinese national identity in Taiwan, promote Cross-strait media exchanges, and advance the “reunification of the motherland.”[3] Standing Committee member of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee Yang Jinbai stated that members of the media on both sides of the strait should disseminate the concept of “one family across the strait,” a common CCP political platitude meant to reinforce the notion that Taiwan is a part of China.[4] Vice Chairman of the Taiwanese media conglomerate Want Want Group Chou Hsi-wei attended the summit and echoed the view that both sides of the strait are Chinese, and encouraged media personnel in Taiwan and the PRC to reject narratives about the PRC from the United States, Western countries, and “Taiwan independence forces.”[5] Statements from an influential Taiwanese media executive that align with Beijing’s narrative of cross-strait relations and Taiwan’s political status benefit the PRC’s efforts to shape public perceptions.

The Financial Times reported in July 2019 that editorial managers at Want Want Group-owned media outlets receive daily editorial oversight directly from the PRC’s TAO, which dictates content relating to Cross-strait relations and the PRC.[6] Want Want Group later sued the Financial Times reporter who wrote the article for defamation, but withdrew the case in March 2021.[7] The TAO is a primary United Front organization that is responsible for carrying out the PRC’s Cross-strait policy. The United Front is a whole-of-government and society effort to advance the CCP’s ideology and interests by co-opting non-government segments of Chinese society. United Front activities against Taiwan aim to inculcate in the Taiwanese public CCP notions that the PRC is the only legitimate government of China and Taiwan is a part of that China.

The PRC has actively attempted to extend its influence throughout Taiwanese media in recent months. The ROC National Security Bureau (NSB), Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MIJB), and other government agencies launched an investigation in July into claims that a reporter from the PRC’s state-run media outlet Xinhua was illegally working on the production of a Taiwanese political talk show. The investigation was in response to a June 25 Liberty Times report that Xinhua reporter Zhao Bo participated in the program’s discussions to determine topic selection and script production at the request of the Taiwan Affairs Office, citing an anonymous journalist.[8] The source stated that the CCP bargained for Xinhua’s involvement in exchange for supporting the company’s commercial interests in the mainland.[9] The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) stated that the report was well-founded and verified and that the PRC reporter arrived in Taiwan in February 2024 and left in May.[10] MAC stated the investigating agencies would not make the conclusions of the investigation public, but that it would provide the relevant information to prosecutors.[11]

The PRC is also attempting to influence figures outside of the mainstream media. Several Taiwanese YouTubers called attention to CCP efforts to recruit them to facilitate United Front work in June 2024. The celebrities claimed that the CCP is spending considerable resources to lure Taiwanese internet celebrities to influence Taiwanese politics.[12] The CCP also approached several internet celebrities and artists with contracts to join new political parties, which would express support for by holding shows and events that promoted CCP-aligned narratives of cross-strait relations.[13]

TAO Spokesperson Zhu Fenglian announced new steps to develop Fujian province as a center for cross-strait integration on October 30 that likely aim to foster Taiwan’s economic dependence on the mainland and build political support for cross-strait integration.[14] The policy measures include steps to relax Taiwanese businesses’ mainland market access, establish a Fuzhou-Matsu “industrial cooperation park,” and build a Pingtan cross-strait common market pilot zone. Pingtan is a PRC island roughly 20 miles from Taiwan’s Matsu Islands. The measures are part of a sweeping initiative that the PRC announced in September 2023 to transform Fujian into a “demonstration zone” for cross-strait integration, which entails incentives to strengthen people-to-people and economic exchanges, infrastructure to facilitate trade, and policies to enhance cross-strait permeability.[15] The PRC has already released 45 policy measures under the program in three batches.

Earlier policy measures received wide support from target audiences in Taiwan, including the “Fuzhou-Matsu City Pass,” a 300 RMB (approximately 42 USD) benefits card that facilitates the travel and settlement of Matsu residents in Fujian’s capital city of Fuzhou. Many of the PRC’s integration initiatives target Taiwan’s outer islands, which are more inclined to buy in to such projects due to their relatively undiversified economies and politics that favor cooperation with the PRC. The purpose of intertwining the local economies and increased cross-strait interaction is to positively affect the livelihoods of residents in Taiwan’s outer islands and make decoupling a politically unpopular policy.

Xi Jinping urged greater effort to develop Fujian as the driver of cross-strait integration during a tour of the province that began on October 15.[16] Xi visited various institutions and locales during his tour, including free trade pilot zones, schools, rural areas, and cultural sites. Xi’s tour came a day after the PRC staged Joint Sword 2024B military exercises around Taiwan that simulated a blockade. The TAO’s announcement of the new steps was a response to a press conference inquiry about how the government planned to implement Xi’s calls for Fujian’s further cross-strait integration. Xi’s presence in Fujian immediately after military exercises aimed at Taiwan and immediately prior to the announcement of new cross-strait integration measures signals the extent of his control over cross-strait policies, both coercive and persuasive. Xi’s appeals to positively develop cross-strait integration likely aimed to portray the PRC as an advocate for peaceful relations instead of an aggressor in the aftermath of the military exercises. Official readouts of Xi’s tour in Fujian made no mention of Joint Sword 2024B.

An order of US-made drones signals Taiwan’s increasing interest in asymmetric defense as the ROC seeks to upgrade its UAV capabilities. Taiwanese news reported on October 29 that Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense “signed a ‘letter of offer and acceptance’ late last month, the step before signed contracts that specify quantities, dollar values and delivery dates.”[17] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) had confirmed in June it would sell drones to the ROC in an order worth $360 million.[18] Taiwan’s order will include 720 Switchblade missiles and up to 291 Altius 600M loitering munitions.[19]

The ROC’s order from Anduril and Aerovironment is consistent with joint US-ROC efforts to bolster drone capabilities in recent months. Top Indo-Pacific commander Admiral Samuel Paparo announced in June 2024 that he wanted to turn Taiwan into an “unmanned hellscape” of drones should the PRC attack.[20] Since then, ROC efforts to develop its drone warfare capabilities have included hosting a multi-day visit to Taipei by representatives of 26 US drone companies along with Department of Defense and Department of Commerce officials.[21]

An ISW report noted the key role that drones have played in Ukrainian defense and could likewise play in the defense of Taiwan. Drones with limited ranges can operate effectively from Pacific islands belonging to Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan. This range of operations encompasses the Taiwan Strait and could reach the PRC’s coast.[22] Even so, as ISW’s report notes, preemptive drone purchases are not a panacea because of the rapid development of drone and counter-drone technologies: “The requirement to be able to field millions of drones is a requirement to be able to produce millions of drones rapidly, not to have them warehoused in advance.”[23] ROC Defense Minister Wellington Koo has likewise noted that Taiwan will make efforts to acquire drones from multiple sources, as production is currently too low to support the ”hellscape” concept.[24] The latest order of US drone systems will supplement Taiwan’s existing ones, but Taipei will likely maintain efforts to boost its domestic production capacity. Even as Taiwan finalizes drone orders from abroad, it is ramping up efforts to boost production by building a UAV production line in Minxiong.[25]

The China Coast Guard (CCG) entered Taiwan’s restricted waters around Kinmen three separate times from October 28–30.[26] Normalizing CCG incursions between Kinmen and the main island of Taiwan enhances the PRC’s preparedness to initiate a future blockade or quarantine of the islands. Kinmen is a group of Taiwan-controlled islands with a large military garrison roughly 3 kilometers from the coast of the PRC. Each instance over the three days involved four CCG ships in different locations to the south of Kinmen. The incursion on October 30marked the 49th instance of CCG ships entering waters under Taiwan’s jurisdiction around Kinmen this year.[27] The PRC has normalized CCG patrols to erode Taiwan’s control over the waters since February.

The PRC would need to surround the island to cut it off from resupply or intervention by sea in an operation to take control of the island. The location of the CCG ships’ points of entry into restricted waters is conducive to such a course of action. The CCG’s tactic of performing simultaneous entries into the restricted waters around Kinmen in different locations by multiple ships provides the CCG with experience in choreographing the initial actions that a real blockade operation would entail to seal Kinmen off from the Taiwan Strait. Conducting the incursions also enables the PRC to gauge the Taiwanese coast guard’s response and the resources that it can deploy challenge the stronger CCG. The high frequency of CCG incursions risks desensitizing Taiwan and its partners to them, which could grant the CCG an advantage in solidifying a blockade or quarantine if the PRC feigned the CCG activity as routine harassment of the Kinmen coast guard.

The PLA maintained a high number of incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in October, consistent with the new normal it established since ROC President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported that PLA aircraft crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entered Taiwan’s ADIZ 370 times in October.[28] The PRC increased ADIZ incursions significantly after Lai’s inauguration in May, with over 300 incursions in May and every month since. The only time ADIZ incursions exceeded 300 in one month prior to 2024 was the record 446 incursions in August 2022, which coincided with a massive spike in PLA activity around Taiwan following then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. A large portion of the total in October came from the 111 incursions on October 14 as part of the PRC’s Joint Sword 2024B exercise around Taiwan. ADIZ incursion numbers do not include aerial activity around the Taiwanese archipelagos of Kinmen and Matsu, which are west of the median line in the Taiwan Strait.

The PRC has normalized a much higher volume of ADIZ incursions against Taiwan than in previous years as part of an intensified PRC pressure campaign against the new administration of Lai Ching-te, whom the PRC considers a dangerous separatist. The high frequency of ADIZ incursions drains Taiwan’s resources, exhausts military personnel, and degrades Taiwan’s threat awareness. Taiwan does not scramble aircraft in response to all PRC ADIZ incursions, but it does put military personnel on standby to respond quickly if needed.

China

PRC hackers directly targeted US presidential candidates and other major political figures in an extensive cyber espionage campaign. The threat actor targeted the phone numbers belonging to nearly 100 known individuals, including former President Donald Trump, members of his family, his running mate JD Vance, members of the Harris campaign, and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer.[29] Investigators are calling this unprecedented campaign Salt Typhoon, following the Microsoft naming convention for cyber threat actors attributed to the PRC.[30] US investigators have not yet uncovered the extent of data the hackers managed to exfiltrate, but believe the threat actors to have tapped into audio calls and collected unencrypted messages, according to unnamed sources involved in the investigation that spoke to the Washington Post, including a Trump campaign advisor.[31] This kind of data in the hands of PRC officials could provide them invaluable insight on who US officials communicated with and the content of their conversations.[32] PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian denied China’s involvement on October 28, claimed that that the US was deliberately misattributing the operation for politically motivated reasons, and made general counter accusations about American hacking.[33]

The FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) had been investigating Salt Typhoon since at least September 2024 for its infiltration into major US telecommunications infrastructure providers including Verizon, Lumen, and AT&T — which ISW has previously reported on.[34] US investigators did not discover until recently that Salt Typhoon had pursued specific phone numbers of major officials and potentially achieved persistence on their devices, however.[35] US intelligence officials believe the PRC to be relatively indifferent to the outcome of the presidential race compared to other US adversaries but highly interested in shaping the outcome of down-ballot races based on candidates’ stances on specific issues like Taiwan.[36]

The phone tapping operation of presidential campaigns mark a significant escalation in a year where the PRC has already conducted highly intrusive campaigns against infrastructure belonging to the US and its partners. US and foreign partner cybersecurity and intelligence agencies stated on February 7 that Volt Typhoon, another PRC state-sponsored cyber threat actor, infiltrated critical infrastructure organizations in the continental United States and US territories. They assessed with high confidence that Volt Typhoon’s goal was to develop the capability to disrupt key operational technology functions in the event of a conflict with the United States.[37] The Salt Typhoon revelations follow a September 18 cybersecurity advisory from the US and UK that revealed an extensive botnet under the control of PRC state-sponsored cyber threat actor Flax Typhoon. The botnet infected over 260,000 small office/home office (SOHO) routers and internet-linked devices worldwide, almost half of which were in the US.[38] Canada’s Communications Security Establishment (CSE) also released a report on October 30th detailing PRC infiltration into at least 20 government agencies.[39] The PRC may assess that difficulty of symmetrical retaliation for transgressions in cyberspace provide it little incentive to refrain from conducting such espionage operations.

The US Department of State and Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on 398 entities and individuals on October 30 for assisting Russia in circumventing sanctions as it wages war against Ukraine, including 13 PRC companies.[40] ISW detailed in May 2024 Russia’s heavy reliance on PRC-provided machine tools and microelectronics for maintaining its defense industrial production.[41] This is reflected in the types of sanctions on the PRC companies, which sold over US$150 million of products to Russia since January 2023.[42] About $50 million worth of equipment came from the mainland PRC, including $33 million worth of Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machine tools. Other products sold from the PRC include thermal imaging scopes, video surveillance items, and electronic components. About $100 million worth of products sold to Russia were high-performance electronic components from Hong Kong.[43] Among those electronic components are semiconductors, capacitors, circuit boards and sensors.

Hong Kong has emerged as a hub for PRC companies to circumvent sanctions on Iran, Russia, and North Korea since the PRC moved to strengthen political control over the territory in 2019.[44] Five of the thirteen PRC companies that the United States added to its sanctions list were Hong Kong-based companies. Hong Kong-based companies and individuals account for a significant portion of PRC entities that are subject to sanctions for supporting US adversaries’ military activities.[45] Hong Kong’s lenient regulatory environment facilitates relatively easy concealment of corporate ownership and the rapid creation and dissolution of shell companies.

The PLA aircraft carriers Liaoning and Shandong conducted joint military exercises for the first time in the South China Sea. PRC Ministry of Defense (MOD) Spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang stated during a press conference on October 31 that the two-carrier exercise was part of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) annual training plan and aimed at improving the carrier strike groups’ systematic combat strength.[46] Exercise footage released by the PLA Navy shows the following: 3 Type 55 destroyers, 3 Type 52D destroyers, 3 Type 54A frigates, and 2 901 fleet supply ships along with 12 J-15 carrier-borne jets.[47] Zhang did not provide the specific dates on which the exercises occurred. Satellite imagery showed that the Liaoning and Shandong were docked at the same port in Hainan on October 8.[48] The Liaoning participated in Joint Sword 2024B exercises around Taiwan on October 14 and traveled back into the South China Sea before returning northward to its home port in Qingdao on October 22.[49] A PLAN WeChat post stated that the Liaoning’s far-seas combat mission spanned the Mid-Autumn Festival (September 17), PRC National Day (October 1), and other festivals.[50] The post stated that the dual aircraft carrier drills with the Shandong took place in late October, indicating that the exercises occurred after the Joint Sword 2024 exercises.

The dual carrier drills demonstrate the growing role of the PRC’s aircraft carriers in projecting naval power in the Indo-Pacific. Exercises involving two aircraft carriers and their accompanying vessels highlight the PRC’s capability to conduct complicated operations with precise coordination.

Northeast Asia

North Korea
The PRC expressed concern over North Korean nuclear tests on October 31. North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on October 30 into the sea west of Okushiri Island in what Japan announced was its longest-flying missile test yet.[51] PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian responded to a question for comment on the missile test and reports of North Korean soldiers in Russia, by stating that “China is concerned about the development of the situation on the Peninsula.”[52] Lin also said that the PRC “believe(s) that maintaining peace and stability on the Peninsula and promoting the political settlement of the Peninsula issue are in the common interests of all parties.”[53] North Korea fired more a barrage of short-range ICBMs on November 5, which landed in the waters between Japan and the Korean Peninsula.[54] The PRC had not commented on the latest launch at the time of writing.

Lin’s October 31 statement on the North Korean nuclear tests is consistent with previous PRC statements to North Korean military provocations, which advocate for stability while refraining from public condemnation of its only treaty ally. PRC Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador Zhang Jun stated in 2023 that the PRC is “committed to the denuclearization of the peninsula, the peace and stability on the peninsula, and the political settlement of the issue through dialogue.”[55] As a recent ISW report noted, the PRC-North Korea relationship is “fraught with mistrust.” [56]—A rare North Korean official criticism of PRC in 2017 for attempting to rein in its weapons program indicates that the matter is a point of tension in the relationship, even as North Korea remains economically dependent on the PRC.[57]

The PRC may have used a January meeting to warn North Korea against nuclear testing. PRC Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Pak Myong Ho met on January 26 to discuss “issues of mutual interest and concern” in the international space.[58] The meeting took place around the time North Korean leader Kim Jong-un had begun to shift to a more aggressive footing against South Korea, testing a new intermediate-range missile and launching artillery shells into water near South Korean islands in early January.[59] This timing of the meeting supports the possibility that Sun could have pressed Pak for peace on the peninsula. The talks may have made an impact on North Korean thinking; test launches dropped from over 30 in 2023 to 7 in 2024.

Southeast Asia

The Philippines

The Philippine military began two weeks of exercises that will include rehearsing the seizure of an island in the South China Sea.[60] Philippine Army Colonel Michael Logico announced on November 4 that the exercises would include live-fire drills and beach landing drills with artillery and assault rifles.[61] Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief General Romeo Brawner Jr. stated that these exercises are for comprehensively responding to threats against Philippine maritime rights and sovereignty and are not directed at any particular country.[62] The PRC and the Philippines have engaged in periodic confrontations over disputed features in the South China Sea for decades. The frequency and intensity of such confrontations increased in the past year as the CCG and PRC maritime militia vessels take a greater role in thwarting the Philippines’ access to the West Philippine Sea. The Philippines has responded to this increase in tensions by holding several multilateral and unilateral military exercises throughout the South China Sea. The PRC has not yet responded to the announcement of the upcoming exercises but has criticized previous Philippine military exercises in the South China Sea, particularly those involving the United States.[63] When asked, Col. Logico stated that the PRC is likely to monitor the exercises, but unlikely to act against the Philippines. The Philippines military has previously simulated retaking an island with assistance from Australia and the United States.[64] It is unclear whether these forthcoming island seizure exercises will resemble previous joint measures. The exercises signal the Philippines’ defiance of the PRC’s aggressive tactics in the South China Sea and demonstrate its willingness to defend its territorial claims.

Vietnam

The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry issued a protest against the PRC’s illegal detention of its fishermen and vessels in the Paracel Islands and demanded their immediate release. According to a PRC-based think tank, the South China Sea Probing Initiative (SCSPI), the Vietnamese fishermen have been detained for six months for illegal fishing activities.[65] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lin Jian said in a November 1 press briefing that Vietnam was at fault for the situation and urged Vietnamese authorities to “raise the awareness of its fishermen” to ensure that they were not acting illegally in PRC territory.[66] Ownership of the Paracels is disputed, with the PRC, Taiwan, and Vietnam all holding competing claims over the islands. The Paracels are under de facto control of the PRC and are administered as part of Hainan province.[67]

In September 2024 another altercation between Vietnamese fishermen and PRC law enforcement occurred near the Paracel Islands.[68] Vietnamese sources reported that PRC ships chased the fishermen, intercepted the ship, and attacked the fishermen with iron pipes. The PRC MFA released a statement saying that PRC authorities were dispatched to respond to illegal Vietnamese fishing activities.[69] Following this altercation, a series of meetings were held between Vietnamese President To Lam and PRC Premier Li Qiang in Hanoi. The October 12-14 meetings resulted in a series of bilateral agreements expanding cooperation on agriculture, manufacturing, and infrastructure and a joint statement agreeing to increase bilateral military exchanges and patrols.[70] The two also discussed developments in the South China Sea, promising to peacefully manage disagreements and avoid further escalation.[71] It is unknown whether the detained Vietnamese fishermen were discussed during the course of these meetings, but this ongoing point of contention illustrates the unresolved tensions between Vietnam and the PRC.

Oceania

The Palauan election on November 5th will be consequential to US-PRC influence in the Pacific Islands. Palau’s position as the anchor of the second island chain in the Pacific and the closest Freely Associated State with the US to the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea makes it one of the most strategically significant of the United States’ small allies in the Pacific.[72] Palau’s status as a Freely Associated State refers to its Compact of Free Association (COFA) with the United States, which grants the United States military permission to operate in Palau in return for the United States providing financial support and assuming responsibility for national defense. The United States and Palau renewed their COFA in May 2023 for USD$889 million in aid to Palau over the next 20 years, and Congress approved it in March 2024.[73] Palau is one of 12 countries that currently recognize Taiwan.

Roughly 16,000 registered voters are expected to cast ballots for incumbent President Surangel Whipps Jr. and former President Thomas Remengesau Jr.[74] Vote tallies at the time of writing are strongly in favor of Whipps, with 3161 votes to Remensegau's 2262 votes. Absentee ballots will not be tabulated for another seven days, however.[75] Some locals are concerned the US military presence will make Palau a target if war breaks out, which has made US military presence a political issue.[76] The PRC has been applying pressure on Palau to rescind its recognition of Taiwan, according to Whipps.[77]

The extent to which Palau will embrace cooperation with the US military is dependent on the next administration even though neither candidate has signaled a major change in Palau's stance on bilateral relations. Whipps is a fierce critic of PRC interference in the Pacific Islands and has openly welcomed the US military.[78] He has accused the PRC of exerting political pressure on Palau through tourism restrictions, acquiring of Palauan media outlets, bribery of local officials, and hacking government institutions to steal information.[79] Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement that China’s interference in Palau is tantamount to intimidation, inducement, and economic coercion.[80] Whipps wrote in a letter to then-US Defense Secretary Mark Esper in 2020 that “Palau’s request to the US military remains simple – build joint-use facilities, then come and use them regularly.”[81] Whipps has also suggested that the United States should equip Palau with Patriot missiles.[82] Whipps’ family business Surangel & Sons has partnered with the US military in 37 defense contracts, although Whipps himself has not worked for the company since taking office in 2021.[83] By contrast, former President Remengesau has been president for 16 of Palau’s 30 years as an independent state and has aimed to reduce Palau’s reliance on US aid, which accounts for over 10% of the island’s GDP. [84] Remengesau has implemented ambitious environmental policies and has expressed willingness to cooperate with the PRC on environmental and economic matters.[85]

Palau’s election will indicate the strength of its opposition to rising Chinese influence. Several Pacific Island nations have rescinded their recognition of Taiwan in the last 5 years under pressure from the PRC. The Solomon Islands and Kiribati switched recognition to the PRC in 2019 and Nauru in January 2024, immediately after Taiwan’s election.[86] Tuvalu reaffirmed its recognition of Taiwan after the re-election of its incumbent president in February, but faced challenges from an opposition that supported reviewing the country’s diplomatic ties with Taiwan.[87] As ISW noted in the October 30 China-Taiwan Weekly Update, the PRC has been actively increasing outreach to the Pacific Islands through diplomatic and economic exchanges such as the BRI, and its military interest in the region is evident with a PRC warship’s first known port visit to Vanuatu on October 21.[88] While both candidates officially support maintaining ties with Taiwan, the extent to which their administrations would resist PRC influence and accept US military presence is consequential for US-PRC competition in the Asia-Pacific.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, October 23, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, and Grant Morgan of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: October 28, 2024

Key Takeaways

The United States approved a nearly $2 billion US arms sale to Taiwan including three advanced surface-to-air missile systems. The PRC condemned the sale and threatened unspecified countermeasures.
Taiwan’s Constitutional Court struck down most provisions of a set of controversial legislative reforms that would have imposed more checks on the presidency’s executive authority.
CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping used the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia from October 24–26 to promote expanded cooperation between "Global South" countries and burnish the PRC’s reputation as a champion of developing countries’ interests. Growing interest in BRICS participation from the new partner countries signals progress towards that goal for the PRC.
US intelligence officials and threat intelligence researchers are calling attention to assess that PRC information operations are targeting down-ballot candidates and members of Congress to incite divisions in a fraught US political environment. PRC influence efforts likely aim to degrade US policymaking by entangling certain candidates in controversial narratives and detracting from PRC-related issues.
The PRC Type 055 destroyer CNS Xianyang made its first known deployment to the South Pacific and visited Vanuatu.
PRC President Xi Jinping met Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan as the PRC and India work to resolve longstanding border tensions.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The United States approved a nearly $2 billion US arms sale to Taiwan including three advanced surface-to-air missile systems. The PRC condemned the sale and threatened unspecified countermeasures. The United States approved a sale to Taiwan worth a total of $1.988 billion on October 26 that includes three National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) along with AN/TPS-77 and AN/TPS-78 radar turnkey systems It is the 17^th and largest US sale to Taiwan under the Joe Biden administration.[1] An unspecified PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson denounced the sale, saying that it seriously violated the one-China principle, seriously infringed upon the PRC’s sovereignty and security interests, seriously damaged Sino-US relations, endangered peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and sent a seriously wrong signal to “‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces.” The spokesperson urged the United States to immediately stop arming Taiwan and said that the PRC will take “all necessary measures” to defend its sovereignty and national security.[2] Taiwan Affairs Spokesperson Zhu Fenglian made a similar statement and accused Taiwan’s Lai Ching-te administration of trying to rely on the United States and to “use force” to seek independence. She warned Lai that buying weapons would only make Taiwan’s situation more dangerous.[3]

The NASAMS will strengthen Taiwan’s air defense capabilities against hostile aircraft and cruise missiles. They can detect aerial objects at 300 kilometers, engage targets at 40 to 60 kilometers, and include counter jamming capabilities. Retired Taiwanese air force officer Chou Yu-ping said the systems would be deployed in Taipei. Associate research fellow at Taiwan’s state-funded Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) Shu Hsiao-huang said that the NASAMS would replace the HAWK surface-to-air missile system, which covers medium-range and low-to-medium altitude objects in Taiwan’s air defense.[4] The NASAMS has a shorter range than Taiwan’s domestically developed Sky Bow (Tien Kung) I and II SAMS but is significantly more mobile. Tien Kung missiles are launched out of silos, while NASAMS can be deployed on trucks or rail. Taiwan also has nine mobile Patriot missile batteries, which have a range of at least 160 kilometers and have been shown to be effective against ballistic missiles. The Tien Kung system can also reportedly be used against ballistic missiles.[5]

A delegation from Taiwan’s Penghu Islands met with PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Director Song Tao to negotiate the release of a Taiwanese fishing captain detained in the PRC and resuming tourism between the PRC and Penghu. Chairman of the Penghu Cross-Strait Exchange Association Chen Shuang-chuan and his son, Penghu County Speaker Chen Yu-jen, led a delegation to meet with Song in Beijing on October 24. Taiwanese media reported that the delegation was trying to secure the release of a Taiwanese fishing captain surnamed Hong whom the Chinese Coast Guard detained in July for illegally fishing in PRC waters. The PRC released Hong’s vessel, the Da Jin Man 88, and four crew members in August but kept Hong detained for “further investigation.” The Penghu delegation also hoped to discuss relaxations in PRC restrictions on tourism to Penghu.[6] The PRC banned individual travel to Taiwan in 2019, citing poor cross-Strait relations. Local officials from Kinmen and Matsu, Taiwan’s other major outlying islands in the Taiwan Strait, had success earlier in 2024 in securing the release of other Taiwanese fishermen and negotiating the resumption of PRC tourism to their islands.[7]

The TAO readout of the delegation’s meeting with Song Tao did not mention the issue of Captain Hong’s release at all. The readout said that the Chens stated that they came to Beijing to call for the reopening of PRC tourism to Penghu. Song Tao stressed that adhering to the “1992 Consensus” is the key to peaceful cross-Strait relations and criticized Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for promoting “separatism” and severing Taiwan’s historical connection to China. Chen Shuang-chuan said that people “from all walks of life in Penghu agree with the ‘1992 Consensus’” and hope for a return to peaceful cross-Strait relations.[8]

The 1992 Consensus is an alleged verbal agreement between semi-official representatives of the PRC and the then Kuomintang (KMT)-ruled ROC following negotiations in 1992. It states that both sides agree there is only one China, and that Taiwan is part of China. The CCP interprets this “one China” as the People’s Republic of China, while the KMT interprets it as the Republic of China. The DPP does not recognize the 1992 Consensus and considers the ROC and PRC to be mutually non-subordinate. The PRC suspended exchanges with Taiwan’s government in 2016 after the election of DPP president Tsai Ing-wen. It insists that the 1992 Consensus must be the common political basis for all cross-Strait negotiations.

The TAO conducts direct negotiations with KMT party officials and local politicians to legitimize the KMT as negotiating partners on behalf of Taiwan and to benefit KMT-leaning constituencies in Taiwan. Taiwan’s outlying islands of Kinmen and Matsu are solidly pan-Blue (KMT-leaning) regions, while Penghu has a more varied political makeup.[9] Conducting fruitful negotiations with KMT officials while refusing to meet with DPP officials is a way in which the PRC helps the DPP’s political opponents and reinforces the CCP’s message that the 1992 Consensus is the critical basis for cross-Strait relations.

Taiwan’s Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB) charged a Taiwanese criminal gang member and nine military officers with spying for the PRC. The criminal, Lee Huei-hsin, was a member of the “Sun Alliance” criminal organization and managed a temple in a district of New Taipei. The CIB said that she first came into contact with PRC intelligence officials during a temple-related exchange in Macau in June 2023, then used her criminal and religious connections to find recruits for a spy ring. Lee used financial leverage and payments to recruit six active and three retired Taiwanese military officers, whom she paid to collect sensitive travel and work schedules that were then sent to the PRC. The recruits had to take a picture in uniform with a PRC flag and a promise to surrender in case of war.[10]

The AEI-ISW report on PRC short-of-war coercion of Taiwan identified both the recruitment of Taiwanese military personnel and the co-optation of organized crime among the PRC’s lines of effort to weaken Taiwan’s will and capacity to defend itself.[11] Taiwanese authorities have uncovered numerous instances of the CCP bribing ROC military personnel to form spy rings and sign pledges to surrender. A Reuters investigation in 2023 found that at least 21 serving or retired Taiwanese military officers with the rank of captain and above have been convicted of spying for the PRC from 2013 to 2023.[12][13] Besides cases like Lee Huei-hsin’s, the CCP co-opts Taiwan’s criminal underworld to directly promote pro-unification political activity. A notable example is the founder of Taiwan’s China Unification Promotion Party (CUPP), Chang An-lo, who is also an organized crime figure called the “White Wolf.”[14] Chang told PRC state media in 2021 that he was turning Taiwanese youth “from Green to Red.”[15]

The PRC responded to Taiwan Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung’s visit to Guatemala by calling on Guatemala to switch diplomatic recognition to the PRC. Lin visited Guatemala on October 24-25 to mark the 90^th anniversary of diplomatic ties between Guatemala and the ROC. He met with Guatemala President Bernardo Arévalo and invited him to visit Taiwan.[16] PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian responded by reiterating the PRC’s position that Taiwan is PRC territory. He claimed that “more and more people with vision in Guatemala” are leaning in support of establishing relations with the PRC and urged the Guatemalan government to “make the right choice at an early date.”[17]

The PRC is attempting to restrict Taiwan’s independent voice in international politics by “poaching” its diplomatic allies and trying to enforce an international “consensus” on the one China principle. It has increasingly argued that UN Resolution 2758, which expelled the ROC from the United Nations and gave its seat to the PRC in 1971, constitutes a “prevailing consensus” that Taiwan belongs to China and that the PRC is the sole legal government of China.[18] It refuses to have diplomatic relations with countries that recognize Taiwan and has used a variety of methods, including economic incentives and coercion, to persuade countries to recognize the PRC instead. Guatemala is one of 11 remaining countries that maintain diplomatic relations with the ROC after Beijing convinced Nauru to cut ties with Taiwan two days after Taiwan’s 2024 election.[19]

Taiwan’s Constitutional Court struck down most provisions of a set of controversial legislative reforms that would have imposed more checks on the presidency’s executive authority. The KMT and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), which jointly hold a majority in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY), passed the legislation in May despite opposition from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and mass protests. The DPP immediately appealed for a constitutional review. The law would have permitted the LY to call on any public official to testify before an investigative committee, confirm political appointments, and impose fines or criminal charges for “contempt of legislature” against anyone who lies, refuses to answer questions, or talks back while testifying before the legislature. The law also required the president of Taiwan to deliver a State of the Nation address and submit to a question-and-answer session at the discretion of the LY.[20] The Constitutional Court ruled that the “contempt of legislature” law, the LY’s ability to summon and question the President, and new legislative powers to investigate government officials were all unconstitutional. It directed the LY to amend the laws.[21] President Lai offered to deliver a “state of the nation” address anyway, even though he is not required to.[22]

Lai’s political opposition could have used the new reforms to hinder the Lai administration’s policy agenda and will continue to fight for them despite the court ruling. The KMT and TPP have argued that the reforms are necessary checks and balances on the executive branch’s power. KMT majority leader Fu Kun-chi said that the KMT legislators would not cooperate with the court’s request to amend the law. He also stated that the KMT would not welcome Lai to address the LY on his own terms, calling him an “emperor.”[23] The KMT disagrees with the DPP stance on a variety of issues including defense spending and cross-strait relations, so its ability to check Lai’s executive power with investigations and confirmation processes would likely have implications for Lai’s military and civil defense initiatives and other programs.

China

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping used the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia from October 24-26 to promote expanded cooperation between "Global South" countries and burnish the PRC’s reputation as a champion of developing countries’ interests. Growing interest in BRICS participation from new partner countries signals progress towards that goal for the PRC. The PRC is cultivating a common “Global South” identity while pursuing BRICS expansion to strengthen the credibility of its advocacy for alternative mechanisms for world governance to supersede what the PRC frames as hegemonic Western-dominated institutions. This BRICS summit featured newly admitted members Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE.[24] Saudi Arabia was invited to join BRICS but has not yet accepted the invitation.[25] BRICS also invited representatives from 26 other countries and UN Secretary-General António Guterres for the “BRICS+ Leaders Dialogue.”[26] Xi used the platform to advocate for the collective rise of the "Global South" and highlight the PRC’s supposed contributions to solving global security crises such as the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East.[27] Xi welcomed interest from "Global South" members in BRICS cooperation and advocated for further progress toward a multilateral world order by strengthening developing countries’ representation in multilateral forums.[28]

PRC appeals to "Global South" countries during the BRICS summit characterize the organization as an inclusive platform for disenfranchised countries that strives for the realization of a more “equal and orderly multipolar world.”[29]. PRC state media characterized the PRC as the “backbone of BRICS cooperation and a core member of the Global South.”[30] BRICS admitted 13 new “partner” countries in October, including Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.[31] Azerbaijan, Malaysia, and Turkey have already applied to join BRICS as full-fledged members. Growing membership and cooperation from other countries can be interpreted by Xi and the PRC government as an indication of broader acceptance of PRC-led world governance institutions.

The PRC’s attachment of the “Global South” label to its global security initiatives likely aims to legitimize them and attract wider international support. The PRC and Brazil held the inaugural meeting of the “Friends of Peace” platform on September 27, which has the stated purpose of expanding dialogue and giving Global South countries a voice to advance a “political settlement of the Ukraine issue.”[32] 13 of the 17 participating countries signed a joint communiqué that expresses support for the PRC' and Brazil’s six-point peace plan for the Russia-Ukraine war—India notably did not sign the communique. The PRC has been trying to attract international support for the plan since Ukrainian leaders called for greater participation from the "Global South" in de-escalating the war in June while advancing Ukraine's own peace platform.[33] The United States, EU, NATO, and Ukraine have all criticized the PRC-Brazil plan due to aspects of the plan that favor Russia, such as its omission of a demand for Russia to withdraw from Ukrainian territory. Several of the non-BRICS countries that attended in summit were also signatories to the communiqué, including Indonesia and Turkey, a NATO member.[34] The PRC’s persistent framing of its world governance initiatives as "Global South"-oriented contributes to the PRC information operation claiming that PRC policies represent the interest of countries that identify with the "Global South" label.

US intelligence officials and threat intelligence researchers assess that PRC information operations are targeting down-ballot candidates and members of Congress to incite divisions in a fraught US political environment. PRC influence efforts likely aim to degrade US policymaking by entangling certain candidates in controversial narratives and detracting from PRC-related issues. The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) called out PRC, Russian, and Iranian efforts to spread divisive narratives online before the US election in an October 21 election security report.[35] ODNI officials stated in an October 7 Department of State press briefing that the PRC was attempting to influence down-ballot races and candidates, regardless of party affiliation.[36] ODNI officials stated that the PRC’s efforts focused on candidates whom Beijing perceives to threaten its core interests, especially regarding Taiwan.

The Microsoft Threat Analysis Center released an election security update on October 23 that highlighted the focus of PRC influence operations on down-ballot candidates and members of Congress.[37] Microsoft highlighted antisemitic narratives, accusations of corruption, and promotion of opposition candidates as dominating the substance of PRC operators’ content.

The Washington Post attributed the recent activity to the PRC state-sponsored information operation Spamouflage, based on its analysis of more than 19,000 posts on X/Twitter from accounts that it identified using data from the US Justice Department and other threat intelligence organizations.[38] The politicians whom the Washington Post and Microsoft investigations identified as the targets of PRC influence efforts are outspoken critics of the PRC. The account operators’ focus on spreading antisemitic rhetoric represents an attempt to seize on politically sensitive issues after the start of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023 to mire US politicians in controversy.

The Washington Post’s findings are consistent with findings from investigations by network analysis and social media intelligence firm Graphika, which assessed in September that Spamouflage operators posed as Americans on social media to foment political division ahead of US elections.[39] The findings also align with research from UK-based research nonprofit the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, which reported in February that suspected Spamouflage accounts focused on creating a sense of dismay in the United States by portraying the election as a high-stakes showdown and symbol of a divided United States. Themes at this time also included sowing doubt about election integrity, highlighting social problems, and featuring direct criticisms of President Biden.[40] The shifting themes of information operations reveals the opportunistic nature of PRC influence efforts, as well as their evolution to focus on sowing political division and undermining faith in the US electoral process.

Southeast Asia

Indonesia

Indonesian patrol ships drove a Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessel away from an Indonesian vessel during three separate incidents in the North Natuna Sea. The Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (IMSA) reported that a CCG vessel had approached the Norwegian-flagged MV Geo Coral on October 21st, 23rd, and 25^th, and three times interrupted the ship’s ongoing seismic surveillance operations north of Indonesia’s Natuna Islands, which it was conducting for the state-owned Indonesian firm PT Pertamina. The area is part of Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) but overlaps with the PRC’s claims in the South China Sea based on the PRC's Nine-Dash Line.[41] PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian claimed that the CCG’s movements were routine patrols in waters under PRC jurisdiction. Lin added that “China is ready to enhance communication and consultation with Indonesia through diplomatic channels and properly handle maritime differences between the two countries”. [42]The IMSA announced that it would continue to conduct intensive patrols within the waters of North Natuna to ensure ” its sovereign right to explore” its natural resources[43] The CCG vessel first entered the waters on October 17. Jakarta shadowed it with coastguard ships backed by maritime surveillance aircraft and a naval vessel. There was no indication of violence in the confrontations.

This incident follows similar standoffs that have occurred between the two countries over the past decade. Despite acknowledging Indonesian sovereignty over the Natuna Islands in 2015, China has continuously challenged Jakarta’s rights to patrol and extract resources in the nearby waters. In 2016, a CCG operation forcibly intervened and recovered a Chinese vessel from an Indonesian coastguard ship after Indonesia had seized the boat for illegal fishing activities.[44] In 2020 and 2021, the PRC sent a series of law enforcement and maritime survey vessels into waters under Indonesian and Malaysian jurisdiction. Similar incidents occurred in 2023 as well. One incident in 2020 involved the Indonesian government sending multiple naval vessels, military jets, and over 600 troops in response to PRC incursions over Indonesia’s fishing rights.[45]

The PRC has gradually normalized patrols in the exclusive economic zones of Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines, which all claim different parts of the South China Sea. Its actions against Indonesia have been at a much lower intensity than those against the Philippines and Vietnam but are consistent with the PRC’s efforts to enforce its maritime claims in the South China Sea and prevent other countries from resource exploitation there.

The PRC will likely attempt to avoid escalating its confrontations with Indonesia given its recent attempts to strengthen defense ties with Jakarta.[46] The CCG patrols may be meant to put regional countries into difficult situations where they must attempt to balance protecting their own interests with maintaining their vital economic relations with the PRC.[47]

Oceania

The PRC Type 055 destroyer CNS Xianyang made its first known deployment to the South Pacific and visited Vanuatu.[48] The Xianyang and Type 052 destroyer CNS Nanning – both part of the Southern Theater Command navy – arrived at Vanuatu’s capital, Port Vila.[49] The PRC embassy in Vanuatu described the visit as a “technical stop” for resupply.[50]

The Xianyang’s visit is consistent with concerted and public PRC efforts to cultivate ties with Vanuatu and with Pacific island nations more broadly. The PRC Foreign Ministry said on October 18 that the “foundation of China-Vanuatu friendship is accelerating” and that “Chinese elements can be seen everywhere on the island.”[51] It described Vanuatu’s “development potential,” highlighting Vanuatu’s deepwater port at Luganville that “can accommodate two 10,000-ton cruise ships at the same time with the help of China.”[52] The Type 055 destroyer displaces roughly 12,000-13,000 tons;[53] the Type 052 is smaller. Director of the CCP International Department Liu Jianchao met with Vanuatu’s Minister of Finance Johnny Koanapo on October 16 and discussed “deepening exchanges of experience in state governance and promoting the construction of a China-Vanuatu community with a shared future in the new era.”[54] PRC President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang met with Vanuatu Prime Minister Charlot Salwai in July 2024 during Salwai’s visit to Beijing.[55]The PRC also donated a presidential building complex to Vanuatu in July 2024.[56] A PRC naval hospital ship, the Peace Ark, visited Vanuatu in 2014 and 2018.[57] Vanuatu is a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) country, as are a number of other Pacific Island nations: Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Federated States of Micronesia, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Timor-Leste, and Tonga.[58] PRC military diplomacy and outreach efforts to Vanuatu will likely continue as the PRC seeks to expand its influence and power projection in Oceania. FDI, security cooperation, and military diplomacy – including port visits and police cooperation, which the PRC has used across Oceania to varying extents[59] – offer the PRC a means of power projection. Vanuatu could offer the PRC an especially critical foothold due to its location near Australia. Access to Vanuatu could also enhance the PRC’s access to the Solomon Islands, which maintains a security agreement with the PRC.[60] PRC former representative to New Zealand Jie Wenji said that the PRC has rapidly improved its power projection capabilities and that the PRC navy “can be used all over the world”[61] in reference to the Xianyang port visit.

The PRC Commerce Ministry expressed its opposition to United States sanctions placed on PRC companies involved with the production and export of attack drones to Russia. PRC Commerce Ministry spokesperson He Yadong criticized the sanctions for being unilateral and without basis in international law and norms in an October 24 press conference.[62] He reiterated that the PRC has strict rules regarding the export of dual-use items and stated that since the beginning of the war in Ukraine the PRC has issued several notices on drone exports and forbids the export of civilian drones to be used for military purposes.[63] The provision and use of PRC dual-use goods for military purposes by the Russian Armed Forces has been widely documented.[64]

The United States Treasury Department announced on October 17 that it would be targeting two PRC firms for working with previously sanctioned Russian firms in the development of the Garpiya-series attack drone.[65] This was the first time that the United States sanctioned PRC entities for sending lethal aid to Russia for the war effort in Ukraine. Following the announcement of sanctions, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning denied that the PRC provided lethal weapons to Russia and characterized the Treasury Department’s statement as an attempt to pressure the PRC.[66]

Reports of Putin’s alleged request to Elon Musk to limit Starlink access in Taiwan could signify a shift in Russian policy towards Taiwan. Russian President Vladimir Putin asked Elon Musk to avoid activating Starlink satellite internet service over Taiwan as a favor to Xi Jinping, according to an October 25 Wall Street Journal report.[67] Representatives from the PRC embassy in Washington have stated that they are unaware of the specifics of this situation, and thus unable to comment on it.[68] Musk has denied the allegations. National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby declined to comment on the report and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that the only communication the Kremlin had with Musk concerned space and future technologies.[69] Overt efforts by Putin and the Russian government to aid in PRC efforts regarding Taiwan are very uncommon and typically limited to rhetorical statements echoing the PRC’s stance on Taiwan’s political status. A direct request such as the one Putin allegedly made to Musk would be a significant departure from previous Russian actions towards Taiwan and would signify further alignment between the PRC and Russia.

Starlink does not provide internet service in Taiwan, in part due to Taiwanese government restrictions on non-domestic satellite operations. The Taiwanese government has been working to develop a domestically produced version of Starlink as part of its Beyond 5G project.[70] This project, part of a collaboration between the Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry of Economic Affairs, is working to develop a low-earth orbit satellite by 2027. Taiwanese government officials have placed an emphasis on protecting and improving communications infrastructure amid constant PRC attacks that risk interrupting Taiwanese access to the internet and isolating the island.

South Asia

PRC President Xi Jinping met Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan as the PRC and India work to resolve longstanding border tensions. The last formal bilateral meeting between the two leaders took place in 2019, prior to the May 2020 border skirmish that killed four Chinese and 20 Indian troops.[71] PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian commented that “China is willing to work with India to adhere to the strategic height and long-term perspective to view and handle China-India relations, strengthen communication and cooperation, enhance strategic mutual trust, properly handle differences, and promote the return of bilateral relations to the track of stable development as soon as possible.”[72] PRC and Indian forces have already begun withdrawing from the contested border stand-off points and dismantling structures constructed along the border following a pre-BRICS agreement to disengage.[73]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, October 18, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, and Henry Mann of the Institute for the Study of War;

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: October 22, 2024

Key Takeaways

The ROC Mainland Affairs Council criticized the PRC for interfering in Taiwan’s arts and entertainment industry after Taiwanese artists and performers reposted the PRC’s announcement of military drills around Taiwan on October 14.
The PRC accused a joint US-Canadian transit of the Taiwan Strait of undermining peace and threatening the PRC’s sovereignty.
PRC President Xi Jinping traveled to Kazan, Russia for the 16th BRICS summit from October 22 to 24. The summit will cover BRICS expansion and deepening financial cooperation among member states.
The United States sanctioned two PRC firms involved in producing drones for Russia. This is the first time the United States has accused PRC entities of sending lethal aid to Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The ROC Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) criticized the PRC for interfering in Taiwan’s arts and entertainment industry after Taiwanese artists and performers reposted PRC announcements of military drills around Taiwan on October 14.[1] The MAC stated that the CCP uses political ideology to intervene in performing arts activities and has even required artists to make political statements when performing in mainland China due to strict regulations against “endangering national unity sovereignty, and territorial integrity.” Several artists reposted specific CCP unification slogans during the PRC’s Joint Sword 2024B exercises last week, such as “reunification with the motherland is inevitable.”[2] The PRC state broadcaster CCTV subsequently published screenshots of Taiwanese artists’ expressions of support for unification and encouraged them to follow up and clarify their stances.[3]

The MAC emphasized the CCP’s inculcation of political ideology in the art and entertainment industry in a statement on October 1. It called out the CCP for mobilizing Taiwanese celebrities to express pro-unification stances to their audiences after dozens of Taiwanese artists, actors, and celebrities publicly supported unification.

The PRC pressures Taiwan’s arts and entertainment industry in a variety of ways, ranging from threats of banning and ostracization to direct co-optation. Some of the banned performers and bands have expressed support for Taiwanese statehood, whereas others have simply performed at concerts dedicated to causes such as anti-annexation and support for Hong Kong protesters in 2019. The PRC pressured the popular Taiwanese band Mayday to support the PRC’s claim that Taiwan is a part of China in December 2023.[4] Reuters cited an anonymous source who provided access to an internal security note that details the PRC’s threats to fine the band for lip-syncing, a fraudulent offense in the PRC. Several Taiwanese YouTubers also called attention to CCP efforts to recruit them to facilitate United Front work in June 2024. The United Front is a whole-of-government and society effort to advance the CCP’s ideology and interests by co-opting non-government segments of Chinese society. United Front activities against Taiwan aim to inculcate in the Taiwanese public CCP notions that the PRC is the only legitimate government of China and Taiwan is a part of that China. The celebrities claimed that the CCP is spending considerable resources to lure Taiwanese internet celebrities to influence Taiwanese politics.[5] YouTuber Ba Jiong revealed that a draft contract he received discussed a plan to establish a “Taiwan Support Party” that artists would join as honorary members to shape the future of PRC-Taiwan relations.[6] The terms stated that the CCP would invest millions of dollars to enable Taiwanese artists to put on shows and events that promoted CCP-aligned narratives of cross-strait relations.

The PRC likely aims to shape the younger generation’s perceptions of Taiwan’s political status and Chinese identity to conform to CCP cross-strait policies through such pressure on Taiwan’s arts and entertainment industry. Young people make up most of celebrities’ fans and therefore are the audience for their political expressions, both at in-person events and on social media.

The PRC thanked South Africa for demanding that Taiwan relocate its representative office out of Pretoria. South Africa first asked Taiwan’s representative office to relocate from Pretoria, its administrative capital, verbally in December 2023.[7] It also requested that Taiwan relocate the office in April 2024 and then issued an “ultimatum” to Taipei on October 7, 2024, stating that it would close the office if it did not relocate.[8] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning approved of South Africa’s demand and stated that the one-China principle is “a recognized norm of international relations and the will of the international community and the general trend.” She also said that “‘Taiwan independence’ is unpopular and will fail.”[9]

Taipei responded by declaring it will not relocate the office. Taiwanese officials have stated that Taipei “retains the right to determine its location and status,” because the office is Taiwanese property.[10] ROC Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung said that the office “is still in operation and will stay in the capital” and that South Africa is violating a 1997 agreement stating that Taiwan could maintain an office in South Africa’s capital despite South Africa’s formal relations with the PRC (established in 1996, before South Africa broke off ties with Taiwan in 1998).[11] Taiwan may also consider requesting South Africa to move its representative office out of Taipei in response.[12]

Taiwan faced a similar issue in 2017 when Nigeria ordered Taiwan’s liaison office to relocate from the administrative capital. In this case, Taiwan complied.[13] The Washington Post reported that it “remains unclear whether South Africa would follow through on its threat to shut down the office’s operations if Taipei sticks with its insistence on not moving.”[14]

China

The PLA conducted live-fire drills near an island in the Taiwan Strait a week after it carried out the Joint Sword 2024B exercise around Taiwan. The Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) announced that the drills would take place in the waters near Niushan Island on October 22, eight days after the Joint Sword exercise and two days after a US and Canadian warship jointly transited the Taiwan Strait. Niushan Island, part of Fujian Province, is 165 kilometers from Taipei and 80 kilometers south of Taiwan’s Matsu islands. It is the closest point in the PRC to the main island of Taiwan.[15] Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense said the PLA drill is part of an annual routine military exercise. It said the PLA is using the drill to exert deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.[16]

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping visited an island county opposite Taiwan days after the PLA’s Joint Sword 2024B exercise around Taiwan. Xi visited Dongshan County on October 16 as part of an inspection tour of Fujian Province. Dongshan County was the site of a battle in 1953 in which the ROC unsuccessfully tried to retake the island from the PLA, four years after the CCP established the PRC and expelled the KMT from the mainland. It was the last battle of its kind between PRC and ROC forces. Dongshan has also been the site of PLA drills, including landing exercises. PRC media and government readouts did not specify whether Xi inspected military facilities in Dongshan and did not mention any connection with the Joint Sword exercise.[17] Xi visited the memorial hall of former Dongshan CCP Party Secretary Gu Wenchang. CCTV and other state media noted that Xi has mentioned Gu in speeches many times and that Gu played an important role in defending Dongshan from KMT forces.[18] This is Xi’s first inspection tour of Fujian since 2021.

The PRC accused a joint US-Canadian transit of the Taiwan Strait of undermining peace and threatening the PRC’s sovereignty. The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Higgins and Royal Canadian Navy Halifax-class frigate HMCS Vancouver jointly conducted a transit of the Taiwan Strait on October 20. A statement from US INDOPACOM said the ships transited through a “high seas corridor in the Strait that is beyond the territorial sea of any coastal state.”[19] PLA Eastern Theater Command (ETC) spokesperson Li Xi said the ETC mobilized naval and air forces to monitor the transit. Li claimed the transit “disturbed the situation and undermined the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait.”[20] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Lin Jian claimed that “the Taiwan issue is not an issue of freedom of navigation, but an issue concerning China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.” He said the PRC “firmly opposes any country provoking or threatening China's sovereignty and security in the name of freedom of navigation.”[21] The rhetoric reflects frequently stated PRC positions and is similar to its response to the Canadian transit on August 1 and the German transit on September 14.[22] It is harsher than the response to the previous US-Canada joint transit in November 2023, however, when the ETC did not accuse the United States and Canada of undermining peace.[23]

PRC President Xi Jinping traveled to Kazan, Russia for the 16th BRICS summit from October 22 to 24. The BRICS summit will be the first to include new members Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. Its original members are Brazil, Russia, India, the PRC, and South Africa.[24] Russian foreign affairs advisor Yuri Ushakov called the summit “the largest foreign policy event ever held by Russia,” with high-level representatives from 36 countries attending including 20 heads of state.[25] Xi arrived in Kazan, along with CCP Secretary of the Secretariat Cai Qi and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, on October 22.[26] MFA spokesperson Lin Jian said that the PRC is "willing to work with all parties to promote the steady and long-term development of the 'Greater BRICS Cooperation.'"[27]

BRICS expansion will be an agenda item for discussion in Kazan. Lin Jian noted that the Kazan summit will constitute the first meeting since BRICS’ expansion.[28] Four new members joined in 2024. Saudi Arabia was also invited to join but has not yet accepted the invitation.[29] Belarusian Foreign Minister Maxim Ryzhenkov claimed in September that the next wave of membership expansion will be announced at the Kazan summit, though BRICS officials have not confirmed this claim.[30] Russian President Vladimir Putin said at least 34 countries have expressed interest in joining BRICS, including Turkey, a NATO member.[31] PRC ambassador to Russia Zhang Hanhui said in an interview with state-owned Global Times that the summit will outline a “development blueprint for the BRICS mechanism” and that the PRC welcomed further expansion of BRICS and “BRICS Plus” cooperation.[32]

Financial cooperation among BRICS countries will also be a major topic and priority for the PRC. Global Times cited Institute of Developing Countries at the China Institute of International Studies Director Wang Youming, reporting that economic and financial cooperation is expected to be among key topics.”[33] Ambassador Zhang said the summit aimed to achieve “new landmark results” in areas such as finance, artificial intelligence, and energy and minerals. He particularly stressed financial cooperation, saying that countries should “strive to promote breakthroughs in domestic currency settlement and cross-border payment cooperation.” Zhang commented on the prospects of promoting a common BRICS currency by noting that the PRC has advanced the internationalization of its currency, the renminbi. BRICS adopting the renminbi, or another common currency, would reduce reliance on the US dollar among Global South countries.[34]

Northeast Asia

Japan

The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) claimed that it “expelled” a Japanese fishing boat from the territorial waters of the Japan-controlled Senkaku Islands. CCG Spokesman Liu Dejun claimed the vessel was illegally fishing in Chinese waters on October 15 and 16.[35] The PRC and ROC both claim sovereignty over the uninhabited Senkaku Islands, which they call the Diaoyu Islands. Japan’s Coast Guard reported that CCG ships entered the territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands two days in a row, marking the 39th such incursion in 2024, but did not confirm whether the CCG expelled a Japanese boat.[36] There have been between four and twenty CCG incursions into the Senkaku Islands’ territorial waters within 12 nautical miles of the islands in months since April 2019. The CCG’s claimed expulsion of Japanese boats from the waters around the Senkaku Islands serves to legitimize the PRC’s law enforcement jurisdiction there and demonstrate the PRC’s de facto control of the islands, even though Japan administers the islands.

The CCG began near-daily incursions into the Senkaku Islands’ contiguous zone, and occasionally territorial waters, in 2012. It significantly increased the frequency of these incursions in 2019. It has made 90–110 incursions in most months since April 2019 into the Senkaku Islands’ contiguous zone. There have been only 9 days since October 20, 2023, without CCG incursions into the Senkaku contiguous waters. This behavior appears to be part of a long-term PRC strategy to gradually erode Japanese control and assert Chinese sovereignty over the islands.[37]

Russia

The United States sanctioned two PRC firms involved in producing drones for Russia. This is the first time that the United States has accused PRC entities of sending lethal aid to Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. A US Department of Treasury statement said that the two PRC firms worked with US-sanctioned Russian firms to develop and manufacture the Garpiya-series drone in PRC-based factories and ship them to Russia.[38] Russia has deployed Garpiya drones against Ukraine.[39] The Treasury statement said that the PRC-based Xiamen Limbach Aircraft Engine Co. produced the L550E engine for the Garpiya in the PRC in collaboration with Russian company Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant Kupol (IEMZ Kupol), a subsidiary of Russian state-owned weapons company Almaz-Antey.

The statement also stated that the PRC company Redlepus Vector Industry Shenzhen Co. works with the Russian firm TSK Vektor to ship the UAVs to Russia. TSK Vektor is an intermediary between IEMZ Kupol and its PRC suppliers. TSK Vektor and IEMZ Kupol are both under US sanctions. The statement said that Redlepus has used Vektor to export components with UAV applications since the beginning of 2024, including aircraft engines, parts of automatic data processing machines, and electrical components. It further said Redlepus worked with IEMZ Kupol and TSK Vektor to establish a joint drone research and production center. [40] Reuters previously reported on the collaboration between Redlepus and the Russian firms to produce drones, including establishing a joint drone research center in the PRC’s Xinjiang region.[41]

The PRC MFA told Reuters it was unaware of a Russia-PRC drone production project and that the PRC had strict export controls on drones. A US National Security Council spokesperson said that the United States had not seen any evidence that the PRC government was aware of the transactions or had any involvement in providing lethal aid to Russia.[42] Xiamen Limbach and Redlepus Viktor are private firms. PRC firms providing lethal assistance to US-sanctioned Russian firms or jointly collaborating with Russia to produce lethal equipment nevertheless marks a significant departure from the PRC’s cautious approach to supporting Russia and undermines the PRC’s professed neutrality on the war in Ukraine.

South Asia

The PRC and India reached an agreement on border issues contested since 2020.[43] Weeks-long disengagement talks between the two sides concluded with an agreement that both sides would resume border patrols along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between Aksai Chin and Ladakh.[44] The two sides have held rounds of talks while maintaining military assets stationed at the border since Indian and PRC forces attacked each other with sticks and stones in May 2020. Indian PM Narendra Modi and PRC President Xi Jinping agreed to “intensify” de-escalation efforts at the 2023 BRICS Summit in Johannesburg.[45]

Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar stated that “the disengagement process with China has been completed.” Reuters reported that “the two militaries will patrol contested points along the border according to an agreed schedule.”[46] The two sides have not released a joint statement.[47] PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated in a press conference that “at present, the two sides have reached a solution to the relevant issues, which China has positively evaluated. In the next step, China will work with India to implement the above solution.”[48]

The PRC affirmed that it seeks to expand PRC-Pakistan cooperation at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Islamabad. In his first visit to Pakistan as PRC Premier, Li Qiang met with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting. Li stated that “China is willing to work with Pakistan, focusing on establishing an upgraded version of the CPEC.”[49] Li said that the new China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will “aim to accelerate the construction of major projects in areas such as railways, roads, and ports” and increase “practical cooperation in agriculture, mining, information technology, and energy.”[50] PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning stated in an October 14 regular press conference that “China and Pakistan are iron-clad friends and all-weather strategic partners.”[51]

Expanded PRC-Pakistan cooperation could take the form of counterterrorism and security efforts. The South China Morning Post reported that Li Qiang met with Pakistani military officials during his visit and told them that the PRC hopes to improve counterterrorism cooperation. Li told Sharif that “China firmly supports Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts and is willing to actively promote counterterrorism cooperation, helping Pakistan to strengthen its counterterrorism capacity building.”[52] The SCO summit took place following a militant attack that killed two Chinese nationals in Karachi on October 6. This attack prompted PRC calls for Pakistan to improve its security situation and raised questions about Pakistan’s ability to protect PRC assets. Islamabad’s inability to control its security situation has long frustrated Beijing.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, October 11, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, and Alison O’Neil of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: October 15, 2024

Key Takeaways

The PRC launched a large-scale military exercise around Taiwan in response to Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s National Day speech. It framed Lai’s speech as a new level of “provocation” even though the speech was more restrained than Lai’s inaugural address. The PRC was likely planning a strong military reaction regardless of the content of Lai’s speech.
The Joint Sword 2024B exercise was an escalation from previous Joint Sword-series exercises and featured a significantly expanded role for the Chinese Coast Guard in blockade operations.
The PRC announced sanctions against Taiwanese DPP legislator Puma Shen, United Microelectronics Corporation founder Robert Tsao, and Shen’s Kuma Academy civil defense organization. It added Shen and Tsao to its list of “‘Taiwan independence’ diehards.”
The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced sanctions on October 10 against three US defense firms and ten senior executives over military aid to Taiwan that the United States approved on September 29.
Russia and the PRC concluded joint naval drills and patrols in the Pacific.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The PRC launched a large-scale military exercise around Taiwan in response to Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s National Day speech. It framed Lai’s speech as a new level of “provocation” even though the speech was more restrained than Lai’s inaugural address. Lai gave his first National Day speech as Taiwan’s president on October 10. The speech was notably less critical of the PRC than his inauguration speech on May 20 and did not feature any changes to Lai’s well-established position on cross-strait relations. He stated that the Republic of China “put down roots in Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu” and repeated a line from his inauguration speech that “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other,” adding that “the People’s Republic of China has no right to represent Taiwan.” He stressed his commitment to “resist annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty.” The speech did not directly reference the PRC’s military actions, gray-zone coercion, infiltration, or other actions against Taiwan that Lai discussed in his inauguration speech, however.[1] It focused heavily on domestic issues and emphasized building Taiwan’s resilience against climate change, infectious disease, and security threats, implicitly framing the PRC as merely the third of three main challenges that Taiwan faces. Lai expressed willingness to work with the PRC on climate change, infectious disease, and regional security, the same three core challenges he identified. Lai ended his speech by signaling continuity in Taiwan’s cross-Strait policy: the Taiwanese people’s determination to defend national sovereignty, their efforts to maintain the status quo of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, their hope for parity and dignity in cross-strait dialogue and exchanges, and their determination to protect their free and democratic way of life all remain “unchanged.”[2]

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) highlighted Lai’s emphasis on continuity in Taipei’s cross-strait policy and his expression of goodwill toward the PRC, including efforts to promote cross-strait exchanges and collaborate on shared concerns. It also reiterated Lai’s statement that the ROC and PRC are mutually non-subordinate, however, and said the PRC’s “one China principle” has no room for the survival of the Republic of China.[3]

The PRC's response to Lai’s speech did not acknowledge any de-escalation in Lai’s rhetoric and instead framed the speech as a serious and deliberate provocation of Beijing. The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua said on the day of the speech that Lai advocated a "‘new two-state theory’ of ‘mutual non-subordination,’ fabricated the fallacy of ‘Taiwan independence,’ promoted separatist ideas, and incited hostile confrontation between the two sides of the strait.” Chen rejected the notion that the division between the PRC and ROC is about “democracy vs authoritarianism,” a motif of many Lai speeches, saying that different political systems “are not an obstacle to reunification, nor are they an excuse for division.” He stressed that the PRC has “the confidence and ability to achieve the complete reunification of the motherland” and is “closer than ever to achieving national rejuvenation.”[4] Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Mao Ning made similar comments that day and repeated standard PRC rhetoric about Taiwan. It is relatively rare for the MFA to comment at length about developments in Taiwan because the PRC does not consider Taiwan a foreign affairs issue.[5]

The PLA Eastern Theater Command (ETC) and Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) carried out a large-scale one-day exercise called Joint Sword-2024B that simulated a blockade of Taiwan. The exercise occurred on October 14, four days after Lai’s speech. This is the second such exercise in 2024, after the two-day Joint Sword-2024A that followed Lai’s inauguration in May.

PRC government bodies and state media released a collection of statements and commentaries about Lai’s speech on and around October 14 that were significantly harsher than the initial PRC reactions on October 10. Ministry of National Defense (MOD) Spokesperson Wu Qian accused “Lai Ching-te and his ilk” of forgetting their ancestors, deliberately severing historical ties to China, and inciting hostility and confrontation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. He said the purpose of the PLA exercise is to communicate to “Taiwan independence elements” that “the sword is hanging over their heads and that seeking ‘independence’ is a dead end.” He said that Joint Sword 2024B is not a repeat of 2024A but an increase in pressure triggered by pro-independence “provocations.”[6] TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua said the drills were a “resolute punishment” for Lai’s “separatist claims” and warned that Lai would “push the Taiwanese people into the abyss of disaster” if he continued his “delusions” and pro-independence “provocations.”[7] Chen, who gave the initial TAO response to Lai’s speech, gave another statement on October 15 that claimed Lai’s National Day speech was an “even more harmful and destructive ‘Taiwan independence’ statement” than before. Chen picked apart lines in Lai’s speech to argue that Lai was trying to sever the historical ties between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and to mobilize all of Taiwan’s society to pursue “secession.” He denied that there was any “goodwill” in Lai’s speech, possibly in rebuttal to the MAC statement on October 10, and called Lai a “peace destroyer.”[8] Authoritative commentaries in state media called Lai an “outright secessionist” and warned Taiwanese “secessionists” that “the more they provoke, the faster they will perish.”[9]

The PRC was likely planning a strong military reaction regardless of the content of Lai’s speech. Media on both sides of the Taiwan Strait speculated after the Joint Sword 2024A exercises in May that the PLA would hold a second exercise in the series later in the year, as the naming convention implied there would be a Joint Sword 2024B.[10] The PRC also launched a rocket that flew through Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) on Taiwan’s National Day and announced the launch in advance.[11] The PRC considers Lai and his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) dangerous separatists and was deeply displeased when Lai’s election victory in January gave the DPP an unprecedented third consecutive presidential term. CCP media and officials often label Lai in particular a “Taiwan independence worker,” a term he once used to describe himself, despite Lai’s efforts to moderate his position later in his political career.[12]

The PRC framed Lai’s speech as an “escalation” likely to justify increased military coercion against Taiwan. The MOD framed the October 14 drills as an escalation in response to “provocation” by Lai even though Lai’s National Day speech was milder on the issue of cross-strait relations than his inauguration speech and did not reveal any shifts in his administration’s position. The TAO also issued harsher rhetoric about Lai’s speech on October 15 to retroactively justify the scope of Joint Sword 2024B.

The Joint Sword 2024B exercise was an escalation from previous Joint Sword-series exercises and featured a significantly expanded role for the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) in blockade operations. The PLA Eastern Theater Command (ETC) published a map of the approximate exercise areas, which included six zones to the north, northwest, southwest, and east of Taiwan. It showed three additional zones near Taiwan’s outlying islands of Matsu, Dongyin, and Wuqiu.[13] ETC Spokesperson Li Xi stated that the Liaoning aircraft carrier group operated jointly with PLA Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force troops to train ship-aircraft cooperation, joint air control, and strike on maritime and ground targets. Li stated that the purpose of the drills was to test the joint combat capabilities of all services and arms, blockade key ports and areas, and send a strong warning against “separatist acts.”[14] This is the first time the Liaoning participated in a Joint Sword exercise, though the Shandong aircraft carrier participated in the first exercise of the series in 2023. The ROC Ministry of National Defense (MND) stated that 125 PLA aircraft flew sorties around Taiwan on October 14, of which 111 crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entered Taiwan’s ADIZ. This is nearly double the previous all-time high of 56 ADIZ incursions in one day.[15]

All the six claimed areas of operation around Taiwan in Joint Sword 2024B overlapped with the ROC’s contiguous zone, the area of water between 12 and 24 nautical miles from Taiwan’s shores. This is an escalation compared to the 2024A exercise in May when all the exercise areas pressed up against the ROC’s contiguous zone but did not cross into it. The PLA exercises around Taiwan in August 2022, an unnamed precursor to Joint Sword that the PRC launched in response to then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, went even further by overlapping in some areas with Taiwan’s sovereign territorial waters. The areas of the major PLA exercises between 2022 and October 2024 collectively include nearly all the waters surrounding Taiwan. The PLA is developing its capacity to operate anywhere around Taiwan and establish sea and air control wherever it may need to.

The Liaoning aircraft carrier group operated in Joint Sword 2024B to the southeast of Taiwan, past the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines. Approximately 90 J-15 fighter jets and 40 carrier-based helicopters took off from the Liaoning in one day, compared to 80 fighter jets and 40 helicopters from the Shandong in three days during the inaugural Joint Sword exercise in April 2023.[16] ETC spokesperson Li Xi said the Liaoning’s involvement helped to “test the combat capabilities of integrated operations inside and outside the island chain by troops of multiple services.” PLA National Defense University Professor Zhang Chi said the Liaoning’s position east of the Bashi Channel allowed it to control a key chokepoint, form a “solid maritime barrier” and establish “external blockade and internal pressure.”[17] Placing an aircraft carrier group east of the Bashi Channel could be the PLA’s means of blocking the passage of foreign militaries seeking to support Taiwan in a blockade or invasion scenario.

The October 14 exercise was the shortest of the PRC’s major joint exercises around Taiwan, lasting only 13 hours. Joint Sword-2024A in May lasted two days, Joint Sword-2023 lasted three days, and the August 2022 drills lasted over ten days. It is unclear whether the reduced length of the drills is a sign of restraint by the PRC or intended to demonstrate the PLA’s ability to mobilize and execute missions quickly.

The CCG played a much more prominent role in the exercise than it did in previous exercises around Taiwan, which indicates that the PRC plans for it to play a critical role in a potential blockade of Taiwan. 17 CCG ships participated in the exercise around Taiwan, the same as the number of PLA ships. CCG formations 2901, 1305, 1303, and 2102 completed a patrol that fully encircled Taiwan for the first time and coordinated with PLAN ships drilling in the same areas. CCG ship 2901, one of the Coast Guard’s largest ships, participated for the first time.[18] The CCG released a rough map of the patrol that depicted the route in the shape of a heart around Taiwan, with the message “the patrol is in the shape of loving you.”[19] A similar number (16) of CCG ships participated in the 2024A exercise in May, but the majority of them patrolled around Taiwan’s outlying islands.[20] Four CCG ships operated east of Taiwan during the 2024A exercise but in a much more limited geographic scope. CCG ships also patrolled around Taiwan’s outlying islands in the Taiwan Strait on October 14. Four of them entered restricted waters around the islands, which also happened during the 2024A drills.[21]

The expanded role of the CCG in the blockade drills is consistent with the PRC increasingly relying on the CCG over other maritime forces to assert the legitimacy of its law enforcement authority in waters that it claims. The PRC has normalized CCG patrols in the restricted waters of Taiwan’s Kinmen islands since February to erode Taiwan’s control over the waters and assert PRC jurisdiction there. The CCTV-affiliated state-run social media Yuyuan Tantian suggested that the “Kinmen model” can be applied around other Taiwan-controlled territories and ultimately around Taiwan itself.[22] The state-owned tabloid Global Times cited an anonymous PRC expert who speculated that the CCG will intensify and increase the frequency of its activities around Taiwan to “restrict the operational space of ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces.” The same expert said the CCG 2901 ship in particular could be used to prevent “separatists” from fleeing through Taiwan’s eastern waters, as the large ship can operate at sea for an extended period.[23] The PRC may plan to use the CCG to patrol in and around Taiwan-controlled waters during a real blockade operation, intercept Taiwanese ships attempting to pass, and arrest “separatists” under the guise of legitimate law enforcement. It will likely use PLA Navy ships and other military assets to prevent entry by US or other Taiwan-friendly foreign forces into the region.

Four CCG ships entered the restricted waters of Taiwan’s Matsu Islands during the PRC’s Joint Sword 2024B drills around Taiwan. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) detected two CCG ships that entered the restricted waters west of Nangan (Matsu) Island and another two that simultaneously entered restricted waters north of Dongyin Island at 8 am on October 14. The ships circled the islands continuously until 6 pm, with the former two ships sailing around both Nangan and Beigan islands.[24] The CGA said the PRC has intruded into Taiwan-controlled waters near Taiwan’s outlying islands 44 times this year, including the October 14 incursions. One CCG ship also carried out patrols near the Taiwanese island of Wuqiu, though Taiwan did not report an incursion into restricted waters there.[25] The CCG said it practiced boarding and inspection drills during these patrols.[26]

Joint Sword 2024B did not include patrols around Kinmen, even though Kinmen was included in the 2024A exercises in May and has been the most frequent site of CCG incursions into Taiwan-controlled waters this year. Nearly all the 44 PRC incursions into Taiwan’s restricted or prohibited waters in 2024 were around Kinmen, the closest of Taiwan’s territories to the PRC. The only CCG incursions into Matsu’s restricted waters occurred during the Joint Sword 2024A exercise in May 2024.

The PRC is considering unspecified “further measures” in retaliation for Taiwan’s trade restrictions on the PRC. The measures are very likely part of the CCP’s economic coercion against the Lai administration. The PRC Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) claimed on October 12—two days after Lai’s National Day speech—that the DPP has not taken any measures to lift trade restrictions that MOFCOM designated as “illegal trade barriers” in December 2023.[27] MOFCOM stated in December 2023 that it concluded an investigation and found Taiwan’s bans on 2,509 imports from the PRC to be in violation of the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), a 2010 agreement in which the PRC and Taiwan committed to reducing trade barriers. ISW assessed that the December 2023 announcement was timed to influence Taiwan’s 2024 elections, as it came less than a month before Taiwan’s presidential elections on January 13, 2024.[28]

MOFCOM’s threat of unspecified economic measures against Taiwan is part of its multifaceted coercion campaign against Lai’s administration. MOFCOM has used the pretext of trade disputes to implement economic coercion against Taiwan on several occasions in the past year. It suspended ECFA tariff exemptions on 12 Taiwanese hydrocarbon and petrochemical products on December 21, before the Taiwanese election, and on 134 Taiwanese products of various kinds after Lai took office in May 2024.[29] The lack of specificity in MOFCOM’s October 12 announcement suggests that the PRC wanted to make the announcement shortly after Lai’s speech but is still deciding what specific measures it will impose.

The PRC announced sanctions against Taiwanese DPP legislator Puma Shen, United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) founder Robert Tsao, and Shen’s Kuma Academy civil defense organization. It added Shen and Tsao to its list of “‘Taiwan independence’ diehards.” TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua claimed that the TAO decided to punish Shen, Tsao, and Kuma Academy after “carefully verifying” tips that it received from “people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.” The TAO received the tips in an email mailbox it set up on August 7 to encourage reporting on Taiwanese “separatism.” [30] Kuma Academy is a Taiwanese nonprofit organization that trains Taiwanese civilians in civil defense skills such as first aid, self-defense, evacuation procedures, and countering disinformation.[31] Chen claimed that Kuma Academy cultivates “violent Taiwan independence elements” with support from DPP authorities and is an “out-and-out ‘Taiwan independence’ base.” He accused Puma Shen, as the head of the organization, of “maliciously” selling secessionist and “anti-China” ideas to Taiwanese people and widely spreading “the seeds of violent conflict in the Taiwan Strait. He said Tsao “provided huge financial support" for Kuma Academy to “engage in secessionist criminal activities” and funded pro-independence films and TV dramas.[32] Tsao pledged one billion Taiwan dollars (about US$32 million) to Kuma Academy in 2022.[33]

Chen said the TAO’s sanctions against Shen and Tsao will prohibit both men and their families from entering the PRC, restrict the cooperation of their “affiliated institutions” including Kuma Academy with PRC-based individuals and organizations, and “never allow” their affiliated companies and financiers to make profits in the PRC. He did not specify how this would affect UMC’s business in the PRC. The TAO also added Shen and Tsao to its list of “‘Taiwan independence’ diehards,” a list that it originally published in 2021 and now includes twelve people, including Shen and Tsao. This is the first time the TAO has added people to the list since 2022. Chen said Shen and Tsao will be “held accountable for life” and subjected to “other necessary punishment measures” under the PRC’s “Opinions on Punishing Taiwan Independence Diehards for Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism.”[34] The “Opinions” are a set of authoritative legal guidelines that the PRC issued on June 21 to clarify the definitions and punishments for what it considers criminal Taiwanese “separatist activities” under its 2005 Anti-Secession Law. The Opinions called for severe criminal penalties up to life imprisonment or death for separatist “diehards,” which likely refers to the people on the list.[35] The PRC has not attempted to detain or charge any of the people on the list, even though its law permits trials in absentia.

The PRC’s sanctions against Shen and Tsao are very likely part of Beijing’s multifaceted “punishment” of the Lai administration following his National Day speech. Shen and Tsao are not officials in Lai’s administration and the TAO has not added Lai himself to its list of “diehard” separatists. The timing and stated reasons for the sanctions both point to a connection with Lai, however. The TAO announced the sanctions on October 14, the same day the PRC launched its Joint Sword 2024B exercises to “punish” Lai.

Targeting the sanctions at major proponents of Taiwan’s civil defense is likely meant to send a threatening message against Lai’s civil defense initiatives, which Lai mentioned in his speech. Lai inaugurated the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee in September to engage members of government, industry, academia, and civil society in improving Taiwan’s civil defense capabilities. Kuma Academy chair Liu Wen is a committee member and Robert Tsao is an advisor to the committee.[36] The committee aims to mobilize around 400,000 volunteers for Taiwan’s civil defense. It will organize a tabletop exercise in December, a small unscripted civil defense drill in March 2025, and a nationwide drill in June 2025 that will coincide with Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang military drills. [37]

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced sanctions on October 10 against three US defense firms and ten senior executives over military aid to Taiwan that the United States approved on September 29. The PRC will freeze the assets of Edge Autonomy Operations LLC, Skydio Inc., and Huntingdon Ingalls Industries Inc.[38] PRC Ministry of Defense (MOD) spokesman Wu Qian called the United States “treacherous” over the $567 million aid package, originally announced on September 29. The military aid package is the largest the United States has ever sent to Taiwan. Wu accused the United States of “double-dealing,” and called it to “stop using ‘two faces’ to deal with China.”[39] Wu made this statement outside the MOD’s regularly scheduled press conferences and more than ten days after the Ministry of Defense had already commented on it, marking a rhetorical escalation from past MOD statements against US military aid and arms sales to Taiwan. MOD spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang called on the United States to “stop military collusion” with Taiwan but did not call it “treacherous” in a regularly scheduled September press conference.[40]

Tsai Ing-wen visited Prague and addressed EU countries at the 28th Forum 2000 meeting. Former Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen discussed the threat that authoritarianism poses to democratic societies and emphasized Taiwan’s support for Ukraine. Tsai highlighted Taiwan’s resilience and efforts to build ties with the United States and European Union. [41][42]

The Czech Republic, which hosts the Forum 2000, has a history of bilateral cooperation with Taiwan. In 2023 the Czech Republic and Taiwan negotiated an arms sale of Czechian howitzers and missile transport trucks and agreed to collaborate on drone research.[43] In 2022 the Taiwanese drone firm Geosat signed an MOU with Czech firm Primoco.[44]

China

A PRC state-sponsored cyber threat actor’s apparent espionage campaign that targeted US telecommunications companies affected major internet service providers. Two anonymous people involved in the ongoing investigation stated that AT&T, Verizon, and Lumen were among the 10-12 companies that were affected.[45] Gaining access to the digital infrastructure of ISP and telecom companies would position PRC-based threat actors to steal sensitive data and potentially affect the flow of internet traffic. The Washington Post cited an unnamed US official who stated that the operation may have targeted systems that track federal wiretap requests to telecommunications providers, though it is not certain that the systems were compromised. Such a vulnerability would represent a significant risk for US intelligence efforts should the PRC plant false information or inform targets to hamper US surveillance.

Investigators are calling the campaign Salt Typhoon, following the Microsoft naming convention for cyber threat actors attributed to the PRC.[46] The ongoing investigation by the US government is still determining the scope and the nature of the compromise. The Biden administration established an interagency team to coordinate investigation and response efforts across the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Information Security Agency (CISA).[47] Former CISA Director Chris Krebs suggested that the threat actor could be Advanced Persistent Threat 40 (APT40), another cyber threat actor that the Five Eyes, Germany, South Korea, and Japan have attributed to the PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS) Hainan branch.[48]

Salt Typhoon is also known as GhostEmperor and Famous Sparrow, according to Microsoft’s cybersecurity division. Estonian cybersecurity research firm ESET discovered the threat actor, which it named FamousSparrow, in 2021 after observing activity that targeted hotels, engineering companies, and international and government organizations in 12 countries worldwide, including Taiwan.[49] Russian cybersecurity research firm Kaspersky publicized other malicious activity from a Chinese-speaking threat actor that it called GhostEmperor a week later.[50] Kaspersky linked GhostEmperor to FamousSparrow based on a common IP address across the activity in both companies’ investigations. Kaspersky reported that the threat actor infiltrated government entities and telecommunications companies in Southeast Asia and suggested geopolitically motivated espionage as a possible purpose, based on the targets.

The PRC’s National Computer Virus Emergency Response Center, its cyber defense agency, released a report that accuses the United States and Five Eyes countries of cyber espionage against other countries amid the Salt Typhoon investigation.[51] The PRC consistently times its accusations of malicious foreign cyber activity to coincide with revelations of its hacking operations. The CVERC report, which has versions in English and several other languages, also claims there is “ironclad evidence” that the United States conducts false flag operations and uses stealth tools to mislead attribution analysis. The report also claimed that the United States inserts strings of other languages, such as Chinese characters, in digital footprints to frame China and other countries. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Mao Ning claimed that some US tech companies, likely referring to Microsoft, are accomplices in US government cyber attacks against the global supply chain because they allow the US to exploit backdoors in their products and participate in US narratives that demonize the PRC.[52] The CVERC released reports in April and July that characterized another PRC state-sponsored cyber threat actor, dubbed Volt Typhoon, as a disinformation campaign that US intelligence agencies conducted to exaggerate threats from the PRC and expand their budgets.[53]

Southeast Asia

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states pressured the PRC to respect international law and push for a code of conduct for the South China Sea. The biannual ASEAN summit took place in Laos from October 6-October 11, with representatives from the ten member states and observing states in attendance.[54] During the summit, leaders discuss several issues including economic development, regional security, and diplomatic engagement. Several speeches and bilateral engagements discussed matters related to the South China Sea, where increased tensions between the PRC and ASEAN states have resulted in multiple maritime incidents. In a meeting between ASEAN leaders and the PRC, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. expressed concern at the PRC’s “disregard of international law and standards” as evident in its actions in the South China Sea.[55] Marcos cited some recent incidents between the PRC and the Philippines, which he described as examples of harassment and aggression from the CCG. Li Qiang denied that the recent spike in tensions was the fault of the PRC, placing the blame on “external forces” interfering in the region.[56] Li stated that the PRC has a right to defend its sovereignty, and its actions follow international law. Leaders from several ASEAN states called for increased urgency in negotiations with the PRC to create a code of conduct governing behavior in the South China Sea. This code of conduct has been under negotiation since the early 2000s but has made little progress despite the increase in regional tension.

Philippines

Philippine and PRC vessels collided near Thitu Island on October 15. The Philippines Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) accused the PRC ship, which it stated was part of the Chinese Maritime Militia (CMM), of conducting dangerous maneuvers and threatening the safety of BFAR’s BRP Datu Cabaylo.[57] The CMM vessel reportedly sideswiped and collided with the BRP Datu Cabaylo, resulting in minor damages. The BRP Datu Cabaylo and another BFAR vessel were patrolling near Thitu Island, a Philippine-occupied island with a Coast Guard base and military infrastructure. Thitu Island is near Subi Reef, a South China Sea feature, and the location of a PRC military base. The PRC has previously stated its concern that the Philippines will continue to expand its military infrastructure on the island, threatening PRC territorial sovereignty.[58]

In response to the October 15 incident, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning accused the Philippines of inciting violence and placing PRC fishermen in danger.[59] Mao stated that the Philippines had collided with the PRC, in direct opposition to Philippine official reports. This collision is the latest incident in a series of confrontations between the Philippines and PRC over disputed features in the South China Sea.

Vietnam

Vietnamese President To Lam and PRC Premier Li Qiang released a joint statement reiterating their earlier promise to manage maritime disputes peacefully. Premier Li traveled to Hanoi from October 12-14 for discussions on economic, diplomatic, and security issues.[60] During these meetings, the PRC and Vietnam signed ten agreements expanding bilateral cooperation on agriculture, manufacturing, and infrastructure.[61] They also released a joint statement that included an agreement to increase bilateral military exchanges and patrols and reiterated the importance of cooperation in the fields of security, intelligence, counter-terrorism, and transnational criminal activity.[62] Li and Lam also discussed developments in the South China Sea, promising to peacefully manage disagreements and preserve regional stability.[63] In addition to agreeing to avoid escalatory behavior in disputed waters, both sides agreed to effectively implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and move towards the creation of a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea per international law. The two states previously agreed to manage disputes in the South China Sea peacefully during a meeting between Xi Jinping and To Lam in August 2024.[64]

The meeting between Li and Lam follows the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry’s October 4 accusations against the PRC, blaming them for attacks perpetrated against Vietnamese fishermen fishing near the Paracel Islands.[65] The fishermen reported that 40 assailants attacked them with metal pipes on September 29, resulting in three broken bones.[66] The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry blamed PRC law enforcement for the attacks, saying that their actions violated Vietnamese sovereignty, international law, and their earlier agreement to manage conflict peacefully.[67] The PRC MFA responded to these accusations, saying that while they did carry out law enforcement measures against “illegal” Vietnamese fishing, PRC law enforcement acted professionally throughout the encounter.

Russia

Russia and the PRC concluded joint naval drills and patrols in the Pacific. The PLA Navy WeChat reported that guided-missile destroyers Xining and Wuxi, supply ship Taihu, and missile frigate Linyi “completed troop assembly with Russia” in the Sea of Japan on September 9.[68] The same source described live-fire exercises between PRC and Russian ships from September 11-27 as part of the Beibu-2024 exercise, after which PRC and Russian naval fleets traveled to “relevant waters in the Pacific” and “conducted the fifth joint cruise.”[69]

Newsweek reported that a joint patrol began following the close of the Beibu-2024 exercises on September 27. It said that “Russian destroyers Admiral Panteleyev and Admiral Tributs, as well as Chinese destroyers CNS Xining and CNS Wuxi, frigate CNS Linyi, and replenishment ship CNS Taihu, took part in the patrol” but that it “was not clear whether they had sailed near the US coast off Alaska.” Newsweek also reported that the joint naval detachment “searched for a mock enemy submarine and used rocket-bomb launchers to destroy the target” and “practiced using air defense missile and jamming systems to repel an enemy air missile attack,” citing the Russian Pacific Fleet.[70] Newsweek reported that the Russian and PRC forces separated on October 14, with Russian warships entering the Miyako Strait and the PRC ships heading west toward Taiwan. [71] The PRC contingent approached southeast Taiwan during Joint Sword 2024-B exercises, according to Japan’s MOD.[72] Taiwanese defense researcher Chieh Chung said that these four ships “should have rendezvoused” with the PLA aircraft carrier Liaoning and Type 055 destroyer Anshan as they remained near Taiwan for the Joint Sword exercise.[73]

The PLA Navy WeChat reported that the Beibu exercises formally concluded in Qingdao with the arrival of Russian and PRC fleets on October 17.[74] Joint PRC-Russia coast guard drills incorporating the CGC’s Meishan and Xiushan ships also concluded on October 17. PRC and Russian ships “formed a formation for the first time to enter the North Pacific high seas joint patrol, conduct inspections and supervision of operating vessels in accordance with the law, and actively maintain the production order of fisheries in the North Pacific high seas.”[75]

Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov met PRC CMC Vice-Chair Zhang Youxia and PLA Admiral Dong Jun to discuss deepening PRC-Russia defense cooperation. Both sides affirmed strong PRC-Russia ties.[76] Belousov said that Russia will work with the PRC to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the Soviet Great Patriotic War and the PRC’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression.[77]

Iran

The PRC condemned the Israeli Defense Forces for attacking UN peacekeeper outposts in southern Lebanon on positions and sentry towers, which resulted in injuries to some peacekeepers. MFA Spokesperson Mao Ning and Ministry of Defense (MOD) Spokesperson Wu Qian stated that the PRC demands an investigation, accountability for those responsible personnel, and measures to prevent it from happening again. The PRC had 419 UN peacekeepers in the UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon as of April.[78] The PRC peacekeeping contingent includes a multi-functional engineer detachment, a construction engineer detachment, and a medical detachment.[79] Wu stated that the PRC contingent was safe and that the PRC would take measures to enhance its security.[80]

PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi held separate phone calls with the Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on October 14.[81] Wang praised Iran’s recent diplomacy with Middle Eastern countries to mitigate potential Israeli retaliation for an Iranian missile barrage on October 1.[82] Wang stated that the PRC would “demonstrate its responsibility as a major country… and play a constructive role in promoting the cooling of conflicts.”

During a UN Security Council meeting on the Middle East on September 30, Wang advocated for a ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon, a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, a Palestinian-led government of post-war Gaza, and increasing international humanitarian assistance to the Middle East.[83] Wang claimed that the PRC is a “builder of peace, promoter of stability, and a contributor to the development of the Middle East… that never interferes in the internal affairs of Middle Eastern countries, never carves out spheres of influence in the region, and never seeks geopolitical interests by exploiting hot issues.”

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, October 4, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, and Alison O’Neil of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: October 10, 2024

Key Takeaways

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) accused Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) president Lai Ching-te on October 10 of promoting separatism and inciting cross-strait confrontation in his National Day speech.
The PRC urged Czechia and other “relevant countries” on October 8 not to interact with Taiwanese “separatist forces” in response to former ROC President Tsai Ing-wen’s plans to visit Czechia.
The FBI announced charges against five PRC nationals who were caught near a US military base in August 2023 during annual exercises.
The China Coast Guard (CCG) fired water cannons at Philippine civilian vessels completing a resupply mission at Scarborough Shoal.
Vietnam accused PRC law enforcement of attacking ten Vietnamese fishermen near the Paracel Islands. The PRC aims to defend its control over the maritime features it administers and deny other states the ability to extract resources in areas it claims.
The PRC supported a Russian draft proposal at the United Nations that calls for a UN investigation into the destruction of the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline in September 2022.
The militant group Baloch Liberation Army killed two Chinese nationals in an IED attack in Karachi on October 6.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) accused Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) president Lai Ching-te on October 10 of promoting separatism and inciting cross-strait confrontation in his National Day speech. The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua rejected that the division between the PRC and ROC is about “democracy vs. authoritarianism” and accused Lai of forcing notions of independence onto Taiwan.[1] Taiwan is already an independent and sovereign polity under the name of the Republic of China (ROC). Chen emphasized the PRC’s claim as the only legitimate government of China, including Taiwan, and the shared history and identity of the Chinese nation.[2] Chen claimed that the PRC was closer to achieving “national rejuvenation” than ever before.

National Rejuvenation is a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mantra that describes the Chinese nation’s attainment of lasting greatness by the centennial of the PRC in 2049.[3] It acts as the PRC’s overarching strategic goal and compass for all policymaking, especially economic and foreign policy that aim to make the PRC a leading economic and political power in the world. The annexation of Taiwan and the political assimilation of other territories that the PRC regards as wayward or lost is a necessary step to achieve national rejuvenation.[4]

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Mao Ning accused Lai of intentionally severing the historical ties between the people of mainland China and Taiwan in his speech.[5] Mao stressed the international consensus on the “One-China Principle,” which states that there is only one China, Taiwan is part of that China, and the PRC is its legitimate representative. This claim ignores the different “One China” policies of many countries around the world, which acknowledge the PRC as the government of China but in many cases do not take an explicit stance on Taiwan’s sovereignty.[6]

Lai emphasized in his speech on October 10 Taiwan’s determination to defend its national sovereignty and its commitment to living in a free and democratic society.[7] He cast the people of Taiwan as peace-loving and eager to engage with the rest of the world. Lai noted the shared nature of the challenges that the world and Taiwan are both facing, namely the expansion of authoritarianism that threatens the rules-based order and Taiwan’s free and democratic society. He denied that the PRC has the right to represent Taiwan and urged the PRC to meet its responsibility together with Taiwan to contribute to regional and global peace.

Lai’s speech on October 10 was his highest-profile public address since taking office on May 20. The PRC responded to Lai’s inauguration speech by launching two days of large-scale military exercises that closely surrounded Taiwan from May 23-24.[8] Chen Binhua called the exercises a “resolute punishment” for Lai’s inauguration speech, which the PRC claimed was provocative and promoting Taiwanese independence. Reuters cited an anonymous Taiwanese national security official on October 7 who assessed that the PRC would likely use Lai’s speech as a pretext to launch another round of premeditated military exercises in a show of coercion against Taiwan.[9] Reuters reported that it reviewed an internal security memo that outlines the Taiwanese government’s assessment of impending PRC military activities after National Day.

The PRC urged Czechia and other “relevant countries” on October 8 not to interact with Taiwanese “separatist forces” in response to former ROC President Tsai Ing-wen’s plans to visit Czechia. The ROC Presidential Office announced on October 7 Tsai’s plans to travel to Czechia and “other European countries” this weekend.[10] The announcement stated that Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Security Council are responsible for planning the trip. Tsai will attend the Forum 2000 conference in Prague, which is focused on spreading democratic values and supporting human rights.[11] Reuters reported that Tsai will also visit France and Belgium.[12]

PRC MFA Spokesperson Mao Ning urged Czechia and the “relevant countries” to abide by the “One-China Principle” and not do anything to harm bilateral relations.[13] TAO Spokesperson Zhu Fenglian warned Czechia and the other countries not to send the wrong signal to “Taiwan independence separatist forces” and refrain from giving them a platform to spread “separatist fallacies.”[14] Zhu accused the Democratic Progressive Party, Taiwan’s incumbent party, of engaging in separatist activities and deceiving the international community.

The PRC often lobbies foreign officials not to meet with Taiwanese officials. Mao accused Czech President Petr Pavel in January 2023 of violating Czechia’s political commitment to uphold the “One-China Principle” after he shared a phone call with Tsai, making him the first EU head of state to speak directly with a Taiwanese president.[15] Mao stated that Pavel ignored the PRC’s repeated attempts to dissuade Pavel from engaging with Tsai. US Congresswoman Young Kim stated in September that PRC officials contacted members of Congress and their staff to dissuade them from participating in a May delegation to Taiwan.[16] Legislators from six countries who attended an international summit in Taiwan in July claimed that PRC diplomatic officials contacted them before they departed to prevent them from attending.[17]

Pavel’s succession from his PRC-friendly predecessor Miloš Zeman was a setback for PRC influence in Central Europe. Czechia and Taiwan have strengthened relations under Czech President Petr Pavel despite PRC pressure to diplomatically isolate Taiwan. Within the past two years, Taiwan and Czechia have developed bilateral technology investment initiatives, direct flights, security partnerships, and cooperative plans to jointly provide aid to Ukraine.[18] Czech parliamentarians led delegations to Taiwan in March 2023 and June 2024, with the former consisting of over 150 businesspeople, scientists, and officials.[19]

China

The FBI announced charges against five PRC nationals who were caught near a US military base in August 2023 during annual exercises. A US National Guard officer discovered the five people taking photos of US military equipment at a campground near Camp Grayling, a US military base that was hosting the US National Guard’s annual Northern Strike exercise. The live-fire drills had around 7,000 participants, including some Taiwanese soldiers. The five people were students at the University of Michigan at the time. They claimed that they were “media” trying to take pictures of a meteor shower. The FBI and customs authorities questioned the students at the airport months later but did not arrest them. An affidavit that the FBI publicized on October 1 charged the five with conspiracy, tampering with evidence, and making false statements to federal officers. The FBI discovered pictures of US military vehicles on an external hard drive, which was seized from one of the people, and found that some of the people texted about deleting photos and messages to throw off suspicion. The suspects are not in custody because they returned to the PRC after graduating from the university, however.[20]

Two other University of Michigan students from the PRC were caught photographing military and naval infrastructure at Naval Air Station Key West in Florida in 2020. They were convicted and sentenced to prison.[21]

The PRC frequently denies that it carries out espionage activities in other countries. It has not commented on the FBI charges in this case but often accuses the United States of unfairly targeting students and academics from the PRC on illegitimate grounds. The PRC Ministry of State Security claimed on October 8 that the US Department of Justice’s (DOJ) “China Initiative,” which the DOJ initiated in 2018, aimed to “fabricate so-called ‘Chinese espionage cases.’" It said the DOJ has been “recklessly arresting Chinese-origin experts and scholars through malicious tactics, conducting indiscriminate investigations and harassment, continuously hyping the ‘Chinese espionage threat.’”[22]

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The China Coast Guard (CCG) fired water cannons at Philippine civilian vessels completing a resupply mission at Scarborough Shoal. On October 8 two vessels from the Philippines Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) conducted a resupply mission for Philippine fishermen near Scarborough Shoal.[23] During the resupply mission, three CCG ships shadowed and fired water cannons at the BFAR vessels. Despite this interference, BFAR was able to carry out its mission successfully. Philippine Rear Admiral Roy Vincent Trinidad released a statement on the incident, saying that while it was a matter of concern it would not prevent the Philippines from continuing to patrol the West Philippine Sea and supporting its military and civilian vessels in the area. CCG spokesperson Liu Dejun accused the BFAR vessels of sailing in PRC waters without permission and stated that the CCG law enforcement measures were legitimate means to protect PRC territorial sovereignty.[24]

Confrontations between PRC vessels and Philippine civilian ships conducting resupply missions have occurred before. Most recently, on September 27 a PRC missile ship shadowed two BFAR vessels, BRP Datu Romapenet and BRP Taradipit, during a resupply mission to Half-Moon Shoal.[25] A BFAR aircraft monitoring the mission reported that the PRC vessel aimed a high-intensity laser at the pilots, an action which the Philippine authorities said constituted a threat to pilot safety.[26] A separate September 27 Philippine resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre in Second Thomas Shoal was not interrupted by the PRC due to a previous agreement made between the two countries. The difference in PRC behavior indicates that they are more likely to respond when the Philippines takes an action that the PRC sees as provocative or otherwise against PRC interests in the South China Sea.

Naval exercises between the Philippines, the United States, and allies began on October 7 near Subic Bay. The Sama Sama 2024 exercise also included participants from Canada, France, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Japan.[27] The exercises will take place over the next two weeks and will reportedly include drills focusing on anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, anti-air warfare, and maritime domain awareness. Participating assets from the United States include the USS Howard, personnel from the U.S. 7^th Fleet, three Command Task Forces, Destroyer Squadron Seven, and the Marine Corps’ Marine Rotational Force for Southeast Asia. Philippine assets included the BRP Jose Risal, BRP Waray, BRP Nestor Reinoso, special operations units, and supporting units.[28] This is the seventh iteration of the Sama Sama exercises, which has evolved from a bilateral exercise between the United States and the Philippines to a multilateral and multiplatform exercise.

The Philippines and the Republic of Korea (ROK) signed six bilateral agreements and elevated their ties to a “strategic partnership.” One of these six agreements will increase maritime cooperation between the Philippines and ROK navies.[29] Seoul’s ambassador to Manila, Lee Sang-hwa said that the October 7 agreements represented a “pivotal moment” in relations between the two states.[30] The two states have been steadily increasing their military ties through joint exercises and weapons sales over the past year. Modernizing the Philippine military and improving relations with regional partners are key elements of Marco’s foreign policy.[31] The establishment of close military relations with the United States, Japan, the ROK, and others may be intended to send a message to the PRC and warn against escalation within Philippine maritime territory. While there has been no official response to these agreements from the PRC, the Hong Kong-based media outlet South China Morning Post characterizes this agreement as an indication of the desire to counter the PRC within Manila and Seoul.[32]

Vietnam

Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry accused PRC law enforcement of perpetrating an attack on ten Vietnamese fishermen fishing near the disputed Paracel Islands. The fishermen initially reported that around 40 foreign assailants on boats assaulted them at sea with metal pipes on September 29, causing three of the fishermen to suffer broken bones. They did not identify the assailants. The Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused PRC law enforcement on October 4 of perpetrating the attack and claimed the PRC’s actions “seriously violated Vietnam’s sovereignty in the Paracel Islands,” international law, and an agreement by the leaders of the two countries to better manage their territorial disputes.[33] Vietnam said that PRC Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) vessels 101 and 301, assigned to Sansha City, surrounded the Vietnamese boat and deployed rubber-hulled inflatable boats to board it. Sansha is a small PRC settlement in the Paracel Islands that Beijing has designated a “prefecture level city” to administer all the PRC’s claims in the South China Sea.[34] The PRC MFA confirmed on October 1 that law enforcement authorities took measures to stop Vietnamese fishermen who it claimed were “illegally” fishing in waters near the Paracel Islands. The MFA did not mention the attack but claimed the PRC actions were “professional and restrained” and that it did not note any injuries.[35] It did not respond to Vietnam’s specific allegations.

A PRC think tank released an edited video of the incident and falsely claimed the fishermen used weapons to “initiate attack.” The PRC think tank South China Sea Probing Initiative (SCSPI) exclusively released a video of the incident that showed boats deployed from the Sansha Law Enforcement 101 ship surrounding the Vietnamese fishing boat. The fishermen tried and failed to prevent the MSA personnel from boarding. The think tank claimed the Vietnamese fishermen were “obviously trained, using long bamboo poles, harpoons and machetes to initiate attack.” It further claimed that three “Chinese auxiliary law enforcement officers were also injured to varying degrees” under attack by the Vietnamese fishermen. The video was edited and did not show anyone being injured.[36] SCSPI is a Beijing-based think tank affiliated with Peking University.

PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times claimed that the Vietnamese fisherman broke the helmets of two law enforcement personnel while using bamboo poles to prevent the personnel from boarding their fishing boat. The Global Times mischaracterized the ships as “China Coast Guard law enforcement vessels.” [37] The ships “Sansha Law Enforcement 101” and “Sansha Law Enforcement 301” are operated by local civilian law enforcement based in Sansha, rather than the paramilitary CCG.[38]

The PRC, Vietnam, and Taiwan all claim the Paracel Islands. The PRC seized control of the archipelago from Vietnam in 1974 and has since constructed military facilities on several islands, as well as the “city” of Sansha on Woody Island.[39] The PRC claims a straight territorial baseline around the archipelago, which means it claims full sovereignty over all waters between the islands as internal waters. It asserts the right to restrict unauthorized access to foreign nationals. International law does not recognize the PRC’s straight-baseline claim, however. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) allows states to claim territorial waters extending 12 nautical miles seaward from their coast but not to draw straight-line boundaries around entire island groups (except for a few designated “archipelagic states,” which the PRC is not). The United States military has conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations through the relevant waters to contest this PRC claim. Coordinates released by SCSPI show that the confrontation with the Vietnamese fishing boat occurred within the PRC’s illegally claimed “internal waters” but outside the UNCLOS-designated territorial waters.[40] International law has not determined which country has rightful sovereignty over the islands themselves.

Source: Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative[41]

The PRC’s confrontations with Vietnam are aimed at defending PRC control over the features it already administers, especially the Paracel Islands, and at preventing Vietnam from extracting resources in places the PRC claims. The PRC has used CCG, maritime militia, and research vessels to block Vietnamese energy exploration in Vanguard Bank and other energy-rich areas of Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone. It used ramming and water cannons against Vietnamese ships trying to block PRC energy exploration and against Vietnamese fishermen fishing in waters near the Paracel Islands.[42] On the other hand, the PRC has done very little in the past few decades to challenge Vietnam’s presence in the Spratly Islands, where Vietnam occupies by far the largest number of features of any country. It has not publicly objected to Vietnam’s rapid island-building and militarization of the Spratly archipelago likely because it does not fear that those military facilities would be used against the PRC.

Russia

The PRC and Russia conducted another joint naval drill in the Pacific. Russian news reported joint PRC-Russia anti-submarine drills, following the joint Beibu/Northern Interaction 2024 exercises.[43] Two Russian anti-submarine destroyers, the Admiral Tributs, and the Admiral Panteleyev, participated in the exercise. The PRC sent the Type 055 destroyer Wuxi, the Type 054 frigate Linyi, and the Type 052 destroyer Xining.[44] This joint exercise follows joint PRC-Russia coast guard patrols in the North Pacific in September and points toward a pattern of growing Russia-PRC military cooperation in the Pacific.[45]

The PRC supported a Russian draft proposal at the United Nations that calls for a UN investigation into the destruction of the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline in September 2022. Russia’s UN representative Vassily Nebenzia convened a UN Security Council meeting on October 4 and called for an independent UN investigation into the destruction of the natural gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea. He criticized independent investigations by Denmark, Sweden, and Germany as inconclusive and accused the United States, Germany, and other Western countries of deliberately hindering or sabotaging investigations and even of confessing “complicity” in the “terrorist attack.”[46] PRC UN Representative Geng Shuang announced the PRC’s support for Russia’s proposal and likewise criticized the Danish, Swedish, and German investigations for lacking detailed conclusions. He did not speculate about the perpetrators of the pipeline explosion but questioned whether there was a “hidden agenda to the initial opposition to an international investigation” and whether “evidence [has] been covered up and destroyed over the past two years or so.”[47] The PRC has supported past Russian calls for a UN investigation into the pipeline’s destruction, but the UN Security Council rejected the past proposals.[48]

The PRC has sought to portray itself as a fair and neutral arbiter in the Russia-Ukraine war but aligns with Russia’s framing of the war. It is critical of NATO, portrays the Western security order and arms sales to Ukraine as fueling the war, opposes sanctions on Russia, calls the war a “crisis” rather than a “war,” and calls for respect for Russia’s “legitimate security concerns.” It has lent credence to Russia's narratives of US culpability in the war, including amplifying Russian allegations that the United States operated secret bio-labs in Ukraine and uncorroborated self-published reporting by US journalist Seymour Hersh that a US operation deliberately destroyed the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.[49] The PRC has not explicitly defended Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or provided lethal military aid to Russia, however.

South Asia

The militant group Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) killed two Chinese nationals in an IED attack in Karachi on October 6. The BLA opposes both the Pakistani government and Chinese investment in Pakistan and has a precedent of attacking Chinese projects and nationals there. The October 6 attack took place shortly before the upcoming Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in Islamabad, which will bring together regional leaders including PRC Premier Li Qiang.[50] The BLA has previously attacked Chinese workers and interests in Pakistan. Recent examples include a 2023 attack on a military convoy carrying Chinese workers in Balochistan[51] and a 2022 suicide bombing near a Confucius Institute in Karachi.[52] The BLA operates primarily in Balochistan province and rarely conducts high-profile attacks in Karachi.[53] Nikkei reported that the BLA is transitioning from a rural organization to a terrorist group capable of operating in urban environments.[54]

The Chinese embassy in Karachi responded by condemning the attack, urging Chinese citizens not to travel to Balochistan or Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,[55] and asking Pakistan to investigate. It also asked Chinese citizens and projects in Pakistan to remain vigilant and improve their security.[56] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs member Liu Jinsong met with Pakistani Ambassador to China Hashmi on October 8 and “asked Pakistan to earnestly fulfill its commitments, do its best to do a good job in rescue and aftermath, thoroughly investigate the case, and severely punish the murderer.”[57] The Ministry of State Security (MSS), the PRC’s intelligence service, has declared that it will improve intelligence-sharing mechanisms to prevent future attacks.[58] Pakistani news sources reported that the Pakistani government is approving a security plan to ensure that the summit takes place safely following the Karachi attack.[59] Pakistani authorities recently declared that they will restrict the movement of PRC nationals visiting for the SCO meeting, although PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning denied knowledge of this plan.[60] Mao said that “China will work with Pakistan to effectively ensure the safety of Chinese personnel, projects, and institutions in Pakistan,” but did not specify the form this cooperation might take, in a press conference on October 10.[61

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, September 27, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, and Alison O’Neil of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: October 1, 2024

Key Takeaways

Chinese Coast Guard ships entered the restricted waters of Taiwan’s Kinmen islands twice on September 26. The PRC has normalized such incursions since February to erode Taiwan’s control of the waters and assert the PRC’s right to enforce its laws there.
The PRC has normalized a much higher volume of ADIZ incursions against Taiwan than in previous years as part of an intensified PRC pressure campaign against the new administration of Lai Ching-te.
The PRC did not interfere with the Philippines’ resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC likely intends to send a message to the Philippines that the PRC will not escalate further if the Philippines cooperates with PRC demands.
The PRC, Brazil, and 11 other countries issued a joint communique that expresses support for the PRC-Brazil plan to end Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Reuters reported that a Russian defense firm established a program in the PRC to manufacture long-range attack drones for the Russian war in Ukraine. The PRC has provided dual-use components and other nonlethal equipment to support Russia’s defense industrial base. There are no corroborated reports of the PRC providing lethal aid to Russia.

The PLA conducted military exercises and operations likely in response to a joint training exercise by the United States, Philippines, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The PLA’s behavior indicates that it will maintain current levels of coercion and military presence within contested waters.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ships entered the restricted waters of Taiwan’s Kinmen islands twice on September 26. The PRC has normalized such CCG incursions since February to erode Taiwan’s control of the waters and assert the PRC’s right to enforce its laws there. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) reported that four CCG ships simultaneously entered Kinmen’s southern restricted waters at four separate points at 8:50 am and left at 11:00 am. They entered again at the same locations at 2:20 pm and left at 4:20 pm. The CGA said these were the 41^st and 42^nd such incursions in 2024.[1] The Fujian CCG announced the patrols and said their purpose is to “continuously strengthen law enforcement patrols in the waters near Kinmen, further strengthen control of relevant waters, and effectively safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese fishermen, including those in Taiwan.”[2]

The PRC began CCG patrols around Kinmen in response to the deaths of two PRC fishermen whose boat capsized while fleeing a CGA pursuit in Kinmen’s prohibited waters on February 14. The CCG carried out incursions into Kinmen’s restricted and prohibited waters an average of five times per month between February and September. The CCG has normalized its incursions into Kinmen’s waters despite the PRC and the ROC resolving most of the disputes related to the February 14 capsizing incident. The PRC remains committed to its long-term campaign of using law enforcement to establish the PRC’s legal jurisdiction around Taiwan’s outlying islands.

The PLA has normalized very high numbers of incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) each month since Lai Ching-te took office as president of Taiwan. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported that PLA aircraft crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entered Taiwan’s ADIZ 322 times in September. This is less than the totals for the previous three months, but still much higher than almost all the monthly totals between January 2022 and Lai’s inauguration in May 2024. PLA incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ climbed rapidly after Lai won Taiwan’s presidential election in January 2024 and hit a near-record high of 439 in July. The highest number of ADIZ incursions in one month was 446 in August 2022, which coincided with a massive spike in PLA activity around Taiwan following then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. ADIZ incursion numbers do not include aerial activity around the Taiwanese archipelagos of Kinmen and Matsu, which are west of the median line.

The PRC spoke out against a new US arms sale package to Taiwan as arms deliveries to the island continue. The White House announced a Presidential Drawdown Authority arms sale worth $567 million to Taiwan on September 29. The arms sale package will include “defense items, services, and military training."[3] CNA further reported that the new arms package will include UAVs.[4] The PRC spoke out against the sale, with PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian admonishing the US for supporting the “Taiwan independence attempt” and “emboldening Lai Ching-te and the DPP authorities.”[5] Taiwan News reported that its first shipment of Harpoon land-based anti-ship missiles arrived in Kaohsiung Port on September 27.[6] The United States approved the sale of these missiles in 2020 and will aim to conclude deliveries in 2028.[7]

The PRC could respond to ongoing approval and delivery of arms sale packages with sanctions, asset freezes, or bans on visits by senior executives, limiting the ability of US businesses—especially those connected to the US military—to access assets or operate in mainland China. The PRC has a range of policy options to choose from but has followed a precedent of sanctions as a response to US-Taiwan arms sales. In May and September of 2024, the PRC responded to announcements of US arms sales by freezing the assets of US-military-linked firms.[8] The PRC froze the assets of nine US firms in September and twelve US firms in May, also barring senior executives from visiting the PRC.[9] The sales that prompted these responses cost less than the sale announced on September 29, worth $567 million.

China

The Wall Street Journal reported that US investigators are investigating a hacking campaign by PRC state-sponsored threat actors that infiltrated US-based internet service providers (ISP) to conduct espionage.[10] Investigators are calling the campaign Salt Typhoon, following the Microsoft naming convention for cyber threat actors attributed to the PRC. Salt Typhoon is also known as GhostEmperor and Famous Sparrow, according to Microsoft’s cybersecurity division.[11] PRC-based threat actors’ access to US ISPs and telecommunications companies. Gaining access to the digital infrastructure of ISP and telecom companies would position PRC-based threat actors to steal sensitive data and potentially affect the flow of internet traffic.

Estonian cybersecurity research firm ESET discovered the threat actor, which it named FamousSparrow, in 2021 after observing activity that targeted hotels, engineering companies, and international and government organizations in 12 countries worldwide, including Taiwan.[12] Russian cybersecurity research firm Kaspersky publicized other malicious activity from a Chinese-speaking threat actor that it called GhostEmperor a week later.[13] Kaspersky linked GhostEmperor to FamousSparrow based on a common IP address across the activity in both companies’ investigations. Kaspersky reported that the threat actor infiltrated government entities and telecommunications companies in Southeast Asia and suggested geopolitically motivated espionage as a possible purpose, based on the targets.

The Salt Typhoon revelations follow a September 18 cybersecurity advisory from the US and UK that revealed an extensive botnet under the control of PRC state-sponsored cyber threat actor Flax Typhoon. The botnet infected over 260,000 small office/home office (SOHO) routers and internet-linked devices worldwide, almost half of which were in the US.[14]

Former US Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) suggested that the threat actor could be Advanced Persistent Threat 40 (APT40), another cyber threat actor that the Five Eyes, Germany, South Korea, and Japan have attributed to the PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS) Hainan branch.[15] The Wall Street Journal reported that Salt Typhoon’s focus on intelligence collection is notably different from other assessed PRC state-sponsored threat actors such as Volt Typhoon. The Five Eyes countries issued a joint advisory on February 7 that exposed Volt Typhoon’s targeting of critical infrastructure in the United States.[16] The Five Eyes countries assessed that the purpose of this campaign was to develop the capability to disrupt key operational technology functions in the event of a conflict with the United States by leveraging its access to informational technology environments.

PRC President Xi Jinping delivered a speech on PRC National Day that possibly aimed to rally popular support amid the PRC’s ongoing economic challenges. The PRC celebrated its National Day and the 75^th anniversary of its founding on October 1. PRC President Xi Jinping delivered a speech calling upon the nation to “resolutely oppose Taiwan independence,” notably not a part of last year’s National Day speech.[17][18] Xi’s speech emphasized the changes that China has experienced. He said that “China’s modernization has unfolded a magnificent picture,” but that “the road ahead will not be smooth” and that the PRC “must be prepared for danger in times of peace.”[19]

Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Chairman Wang Huning likewise gave a National Day speech at a September 28 reception with high-level PRC leaders and 2000 members of the Chinese diaspora, including those from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau, in attendance.[20] Wang and Xi’s National Day rhetoric reflected the PRC’s broader efforts to unite all parties around the CCP and common national goals: “Chinese-style modernization” and unity within China.[21] The intertwining notions of modernization, national unity, and strength amid economic hardship reflect the interrelatedness of these goals.

Northeast Asia

Japan

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Lin Jian criticized Japan for a joint naval transit through the Taiwan Strait with New Zealand and Australia on September 25.[22] Lin stated that the PRC was aware of the “political intentions” of Japan’s actions and reminded Japan not to interfere in Taiwan per its commitments to the PRC after normalizing relations in 1972.

The PRC has reversed its earlier held position that the Taiwan Strait is an international waterway since 2022 and claims “sole sovereignty and jurisdiction” over the strait.[23] The PRC does not deny other countries freedom to navigate through the strait, however, despite protesting the actions as provocations that support Taiwanese independence. Lin’s comments did not mention New Zealand or Australia, which sent naval ships through the strait on the same day.[24] New Zealand Defense Minister Judith Collins called it “a routine activity, consistent with international law, including the right of freedom of navigation as guaranteed under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” The transit was the first for New Zealand since 2017.[25]

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The PRC did not interfere with the Philippines’ resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal on September 27. The Philippines sent a civilian ship to Second Thomas Shoal on September 27 to deliver supplies to the BRP Sierra Madre.[26] The PRC did not interfere with this resupply mission, with official CCG statements saying that the PCG’s actions were in accordance with a July provisional agreement between the two states.[27] Friction arose following the initial announcement of the deal, due to a disagreement over whether the Philippines needed to provide prior notification to the PRC when conducting resupply missions.[28] Despite this point of contention and the fact that the PRC has repeatedly called for the PCG to remove the BRP Sierra Madre from what it sees as its sovereign territory, the CCG deployed to Second Thomas Shoal only monitored PCG actions throughout the resupply mission. The PLA’s actions are likely intended to send a message to the Philippines that the PRC will not escalate further if the Philippines cooperates with PRC demands.

The PLA conducted military exercises and operations likely in response to a joint training exercise by the United States, Philippines, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The PLA’s behavior indicates that it will maintain current levels of coercion and military presence within contested waters. On September 28 the Philippines, Japan, United States, Australia, and New Zealand held a multilateral maritime cooperative activity (MMCA) in the Philippines EEZ intended to improve interoperability.[29] On the same day, the PLA Southern Theater Command reported that it held exercises near Scarborough Shoal focused on reconnaissance and surveillance, patrol and combat readiness, and joint strike capabilities.[30] Philippine defense authorities responded to PRC claims by rejecting the idea that PLA drills took place near Scarborough Shoal, saying that Philippine troops did not observe the activity[31] This is the second time that the PLA has held military exercises in Scarborough Shoal at the same time as joint Philippine and allied military exercises in the Philippines EEZ. This is the second time that the PLA has held military exercises in Scarborough Shoal at the same time as joint Philippine and allied military exercises in the Philippines EEZ.

Vietnam

The PRC MFA denied claims by Vietnamese state media that PRC authorities brutally beat and injured Vietnamese fishermen fishing near the disputed Paracel Islands. Vietnam’s Thanh Nien and Tien Phong newspapers reported that around 40 people aboard foreign vessels attacked 10 Vietnamese fishermen fishing near the islands on September 29. The assailants beat the Vietnamese fishermen with iron pipes and confiscated their fishing equipment. Three Vietnamese fishermen suffered broken arms or legs. [32] A Vietnamese local official said that a Chinese ship chased the fishing boat and that the armed assailants used canoes to intercept and attack the fishermen.[33] The PRC MFA said in response to a Reuters request for comment that Vietnamese fishing boats illegally fished in the waters of the Paracel Islands without the permission of the Beijing government and that relevant Chinese authorities took measures to stop them. The MFA did not mention the attack but claimed the PRC actions were “professional and restrained” and that it did not note any injuries.[34]

The Paracel Islands archipelago in the South China Sea is contested between the PRC, Taiwan, and Vietnam, but is entirely under PRC control. The PRC seized control of the archipelago from Vietnam in 1974 and has since constructed military facilities on several islands, as well as a small town on Woody Island.[35] The PRC claims a straight territorial baseline around the archipelago, which means it claims full sovereignty over all waters between the islands as internal waters rather than the standard territorial waters extending 12 nautical miles seaward from each island. It asserts the right to restrict unauthorized access to foreign nationals. International law does not recognize the PRC’s straight-baseline claim, however. The United States military has routinely conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations through the relevant waters to contest this PRC claim.

Russia

Reuters reported that a Russian defense firm established a program in the PRC to manufacture long-range attack drones for the Russian war in Ukraine. The PRC has provided dual-use components and other nonlethal equipment to support Russia’s defense industrial base. There are no corroborated reports of the PRC providing lethal aid to Russia. Reuters cited two anonymous European intelligence sources and documents it obtained which indicated that IEMZ Kupol, a subsidiary of Russian state-owned arms company Almaz-Antey, developed a long-range drone with help from PRC specialists and was manufacturing it on PRC soil. The US government levied sanctions on IEMZ Kupol in December 2023. Reuters said documents sent by IEMZ Kupol to the Russian defense ministry said the company developed the new Garpiya-3 (G3) drone with PRC assistance and could manufacture it “at scale” in the PRC for use in Russia’s war in Ukraine. Invoices reviewed by Reuters from a Russian firm that serves as an intermediary between IEMZ Kupol and PRC suppliers showed that unidentified PRC suppliers delivered seven drones, including two G3s, to IEMZ Kupol’s Izhevsk headquarters on unspecified dates. Another Reuters report from September 13 reported that Kupol used PRC engines and parts of its Garpiya-A1 drones in 2023. Reuters said the G3 drone model is an upgraded version of the G-A1 drone that was modified with help from PRC engineers. Other documents showed that IEMZ Kupol was working with the Russian defense firm TSK Vektor as an intermediary and the Shenzhen-based PRC firm Redlepus TSK Vector Industrial. One showed plans by IEMZ Kupol, TSK Vektor, and Redlepus to establish a joint Russian-PRC “Advanced UAV Research and Manufacturing Base” in the Kashgar special economic zone of the PRC’s Xinjiang province.[36] ISW cannot independently corroborate the Reuters reports at this time.

The PRC MFA told Reuters it was unaware of a Russia-PRC drone production project and that the PRC had strict export controls on drones. A US National Security Council spokesperson said that the United States had not seen any evidence that the PRC government was aware of the transactions or had any involvement in providing lethal aid to Russia.[37] The United States, Ukraine, and other countries have accused the PRC of supplying dual-use components such as semiconductors to Russia that are used in Russian military equipment. They have not publicized any cases of the PRC providing lethal equipment, however. Corroborated evidence of PRC firms providing lethal assistance to US-sanctioned Russian firms or jointly collaborating with Russia to produce lethal equipment would show a significant departure from the PRC’s cautious approach to supporting Russia and undermine the PRC’s professed neutrality on the war in Ukraine.

The PRC, Brazil, and 11 other countries issued a joint communique that expresses support for the PRC-Brazil plan to end Russia’s war in Ukraine. The PRC-Brazil plan is a “six-point consensus on the political resolution to the Ukraine crisis” on May 23 to set conditions for a political settlement based on the UN charter through inclusive diplomacy.[38] It outlines a series of vague steps to de-escalate the war and does not meet Ukraine’s base condition of Russia’s withdrawal from occupied territory.[39] Ukraine, the United States, and the European Union have dismissed the plan, despite PRC claims of widespread support from the international community.[40] The plan demands equal participation by both Ukraine and Russia at international peace summits.

Algeria, Bolivia, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey, and Zambia expressed support for the plan through the joint communique. The PRC called Brazil, Indonesia, and South Africa “important members of the Global South” on July 26 before PRC Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs Li Hui conducted a round of shuttle diplomacy in the three countries to generate support for the PRC’s role as a mediator.[41]

The communique is a product of the PRC and Brazil-led “Friends of Peace” forum, which is devoted to expanding dialogue and giving Global South countries a voice to advance a “political settlement of the Ukraine issue.”[42] PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira, and Brazilian Chief Presidential Advisor Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim co-chaired the opening meeting of the forum at the UN headquarters in New York on September 27. [43] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated that representatives from 17 Global South countries attended.

Ukraine’s interest in involving the Global South in the peace process explains the PRC’s emphasis on winning approval from Global South countries for its role as a mediator. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba and Deputy Head of the Office of the President Igor Zhovkva stated in June that Ukraine is interested in having a Global South country host a second peace summit, which Ukraine aims to hold before the end of the year.[44]

Zelenskyy called the PRC-Brazil plan “destructive” on September 12, however, and warned during the UNGA on September 25 that attempts to win over other countries to the plan conceal interests that are different from achieving a “full and just peace.”^[45] Then-NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg criticized Turkey on September 30 for endorsing the plan and stated that NATO countries should fully support Ukraine’s conditions for peace.[46]

The PRC will likely use the Friends of Peace forum to promote conditions for peace that are favorable to Russia. Attaching the label of Global South to the forum and associating the group’s joint communique with the PRC-Brazil peace plan enables the PRC to claim that its plan for reaching a “political solution” represents the collective Global South’s position. The PRC can use the PRC-Brazil plan to shape the course of the war by advocating for Russia’s representation at peace summits and calling for a ceasefire without demanding Russia’s evacuation from occupied territory.

The PRC and Russian militaries began their fifth joint naval patrol in the Northwest Pacific. The PRC and Russia held the first four joint maritime patrols in October 2021, September 2022, July 2023, and July 2024, making 2024 the first year that the PRC and Russia conducted the exercise twice in one year.[47]

The PRC and Russia concluded the 18-day PRC-led Northern/Interaction exercise on September 27. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) announced that PRC and Russian naval vessels that participated in the Northern/Interaction exercises replenished supplies in the Sea of Okhotsk and initiated their joint exercise in the Northwest Pacific.[48] PRC military aircraft and naval vessels also participated in the Russian-led Okean-2024 exercises between two phases of Northern/Interaction.

The PRC and Russia also initiated joint coast guard patrols in the Northwest Pacific on September 13.[49] PRC state media claimed that the joint patrols aim to improve coordination and organization between the two countries and enhance their ability to “jointly respond to various maritime security threats.”[50] The China Coast Guard (CCG) and Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) first announced a memorandum of understanding regarding coast guard cooperation in April 2023 to strengthen maritime law enforcement.[51] The US Coast Guard (USCG) located four Russian Border Guard and CCG vessels conducting a joint patrol in the Bering Sea on September 28, marking the northernmost location where the USCG has observed CCG vessels.[52] The USCG stated that the vessels remained five miles within Russia’s Exclusive Economic Zone.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, September 20, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, and Alison O’Neil of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: September 27, 2024

Key Takeaways

The PRC Ministry of State Security claimed that a hacker group called Anonymous 64 is a “cyber army” affiliated with the Taiwanese military's Information, Communications, and Electronic Force Command. Taiwan rejected the accusation.
The PRC canceled tariff exemptions for 34 Taiwanese agricultural products on September 25. The PRC likely intends to undermine popular Taiwanese support for the DPP through fear of economic repercussions as a result of its cross-strait policy.
The PRC condemned the latest US arms sale to Taiwan as support for Taiwan’s independence and froze the assets of nine companies in response to the sale.
The PRC test-launched an intercontinental ballistic missile into the Pacific Ocean for the first time since 1980.
PLA Southern Theater Commander General Wu Yanan attended the Chiefs of Defense conference in Hawaii and met with US Indo-Pacific Command chief Admiral Samuel Paparo. The PRC is increasing its emphasis on military diplomacy likely to stabilize bilateral relations in anticipation of the US administration change in 2025 and amid escalation in the South China Sea.
A PLA aircraft carrier sailed through Japan’s contiguous zone for the first time. The transit may be part of a pattern of the PRC testing Japan’s military response.
The Philippine Coast Guard has resumed its patrol of Sabina Shoal, fulfilling its promises to return to the disputed territory and ensure that the Shoal does not fall under PRC control. The CCG may deny Philippine resupply missions access to Sabina Shoal to compel the PCG to withdraw from the shoal.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS) claimed in a WeChat post that a hacker group called Anonymous 64 is a “cyber army” affiliated with Taiwan's Information, Communications, and Electronic Force Command (ICEFCOM) under the Ministry of National Defense.[1] The post claimed that the command is responsible for carrying out cyber operations, information operations, cognitive warfare, electronic warfare, and public opinion warfare against the PRC. The MSS doxxed three members of the ROC military in its post and claimed that they are active-duty personnel of ICEFCOM. The MSS accused ICEFCOM of malicious cyber operations against the PRC that target the aerospace, defense, and energy industries to steal data and collect intelligence for the ROC government. The MSS also accused ICEFCOM of manipulating public opinion and hiring trolls to undermine the PRC’s political system. ICEFCOM rejected the accusations in a statement and stated that it is responsible for information and network security for national defense.[2]

The PRC’s accusations against Taiwan are possibly a response to recent revelations about its own hacking operations. The US Department of Justice announced on September 18 a law enforcement operation that disabled botnet malware that PRC state-sponsored cyber threat actor Flax Typhoon controlled.[3] Flax Typhoon gained notoriety for its extensive penetration of Taiwanese networks, including government agencies, educational institutions, critical manufacturing industries, and information technology companies. PRC claims that aggressors are targeting it in cyberspace usually come soon after revelations of hacking operations by PRC state-sponsored cyber threat actors.[4] The PRC has deflected accusations of hacking with claims counter accusations against other countries, which portray it as a victim of foreign transgressions in cyberspace.[5]

Cybersecurity researchers at Microsoft and Recorded Future’s Insikt Group published threat intelligence reports in August 2023 and June that analyze Flax Typhoon’s (also known as RedJuliett) cyber activity and operations.[6] Both reports assessed that Flax Typhoon is a PRC nation-state actor that targeted Taiwanese entities for espionage purposes.[7] Insikt Group identified threat actor IP addresses that geolocated to Fuzhou in the PRC’s Fujian province across the Taiwan Strait, which is home to the PRC’s Taiwan-focused non-kinetic operations center Base 311. Base 311 is responsible for the same categories of operations that the MSS accused ICEFCOM of conducting against the PRC, including cyber, electronic, and informational warfare.[8] A cybersecurity advisory from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on September 18 stated that Flax Typhoon is the publicly traded PRC-based company Integrity Technology Group, which the FBI claimed had links to the PRC government.[9] The FBI stated that Integrity Technology Group has operated its botnet since 2021 and it controlled and infected more than 260,000 devices worldwide, almost half of which were in the United States.[10]

The PRC canceled tariff exemptions for 34 Taiwanese agricultural products on September 25.[11] The PRC likely intends for the reinstatement of tariffs to undermine popular Taiwanese support for the DPP through fear of economic repercussions for its cross-strait policy. Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Chen Binhua framed the measures as a necessary response to combat the separatist policies of Lai Ching-te’s administration.[12] Chen accused the Lai administration of escalating cross-strait hostility with independence policies and “unilaterally restrict[ing] the import of more than 1,000 agricultural products from the mainland.” Chen claimed that the PRC is committed to cross-strait economic integration and cares about Taiwanese farmers and fishermen. Chen urged Taiwanese farmers and fishermen to recognize the harm that the DPP government inflicts on cross-strait relations by pursuing independence.

Reinstating tariffs across a wide range of Taiwanese agricultural exports aims to generate concern among Taiwanese farmers and fishermen for their livelihoods. Explicitly blaming the measures on the Lai administration aims to direct their frustration to the DPP government and reduce political support for the party by associating its incumbency with turbulence in cross-strait relations. The PRC’s justification for reinstating the tariffs is consistent with that of past coercive economic measures.[13] On the other hand, the PRC attributes reconciliation over economic disputes to successful negotiation with the Kuomintang (KMT), which the CCP favors due to its willingness to pursue closer cross-strait relations.[14]

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) criticized the PRC for weaponizing trade as a tool of coercion for political purposes and highlighted how fickle the PRC’s self-proclaimed “goodwill” towards Taiwan is.[15] The PRC is the largest export market for many of the affected goods. Taiwan’s Ministry of Agriculture stated that if paid, the tariffs will only raise costs by approximately USD 1 million across all 34 affected goods, however.[16]

The PRC has previously imposed trade restrictions on Taiwanese exports that disproportionately affect certain constituencies, likely to exert targeted economic pressure against certain stakeholders that collectively hold political influence.[17] The variety in the affected products, which includes a range of fruits, vegetables, and seafood, does not suggest that the measures are geographically focused. The PRC has also previously targeted broad swaths of Taiwanese goods, including reinstating tariffs on 134 different industrial goods in June after Lai’s inauguration.[18] The TAO’s appeal to Taiwanese farmers and fishermen at large, however, indicates a broader target to sway political opinion.

The PRC condemned the latest US arms sale to Taiwan as support for Taiwan’s independence and froze the assets of nine companies in response to the sale. The United States approved a $228 million arms sale for Taiwan last week. The sale is mostly for spare parts and repair packages.[19] Taipei Times reported on September 22 that Biden is close to approving another arms sale package worth $567 million that the Pentagon has already approved.[20] The pending sale would be the largest to Taiwan to date and would support training and multidomain awareness, in addition to drone warfare. The PRC admonished the US not to support “Taiwan independence” and to adhere to the one-China principle.[21] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already given an official statement condemning the sales, and the PRC will implement property freezes against nine US firms following last week’s announcement of the $228 million arms sale.[22] These military-linked companies — S3 Aerospace, Exovera, and others — will have their assets frozen in China. Further PRC responses, including but not limited to sanctions and asset freezes, could follow the reported $567 million arms sale announcement as well.

China

The PRC test-launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) into the Pacific Ocean for the first time since 1980. The People’s Liberation Army launched an ICBM into the Pacific Ocean on September 25 The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that the launch was part of routine training.[23] The PRC Ministry of National Defense (MOD) also stated that the training took place in accordance with international law and was not directed at any specific country.[24] PRC Ministry of National Defense spokesman Zhang Xiaogang reiterated this stance on September 26, claiming that the test launch was routine and reiterating the PRC’s no-first-use policy.[25] The PRC claimed that it “informed the relevant countries” and warned the United States before the launch.[26] It also warned the Japan Coast Guard of “space debris.”[27] The PRC did not disclose the launch site or landing location, but Newsweek placed the likely launch site in the southern province of Hainan. The dummy warhead reportedly landed in the ocean north of Tahiti, 7400 miles away.[28]

The circumstances of the ICBM test set it apart from other routine military exercises. The PRC has not launched an ICBM into the Pacific since 1980 and usually conducts missile tests in Xinjiang or the Bohai Sea.[29][30] The PRC did not elaborate on the rationale for conducting the recent test in the Pacific or for the timing of the launch. The timing of the ICBM test aligns with the expansion of the PRC’s nuclear arsenal, however. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that the PRC’s nuclear warhead arsenal grew from 410 to 500 between 2023 and 2024, making it the world’s fastest-growing nuclear arsenal.[31] SIPRI’s estimate of the PRC’s nuclear arsenal aligns with estimates presented in the US Department of Defense’s China Military Power Report in 2023. The Department of Defense assessed that the PRC could reach 1,000 warheads by 2030 and 1,500 warheads by 2035.[32] The PRC has continuously restated its no-first-use nuclear policy and attempted to cast itself as a responsible nuclear power as it expands its nuclear arsenal.[33]

PLA Southern Theater Commander General Wu Yanan attended the Chiefs of Defense (CHODs) conference in Hawaii and met with US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) chief Admiral Samuel Paparo. The PRC is increasing its emphasis on military diplomacy likely to stabilize bilateral relations in anticipation of the US administration change in 2025 and amid escalation in the South China Sea. US INDOPACOM hosted the conference from September 18–20 with participation from 28 countries and multinational organizations and a stated aim “to enhance mutual understanding, cooperation, and a consistent operational framework while underscoring international commitment to protecting shared interests across the region.”[34] PLA Southern Theater Command chief General Wu Yanan led the PRC delegation to the conference and met with Paparo two weeks after their video call on September 10.[35] The PRC readout noted that Wu attended the conference at the invitation of the United States and said the two sides “exchanged views candidly and in-depth on issues of common concern,” without mentioning any specific issues. The readout from the Wu-Paparo video call used similarly vague language. Both readouts also said the two sides were implementing the consensus reached by the leaders of both countries, referring to the US-PRC agreement in November 2023 to resume high-level military-to-military talks.[36]

Official PRC government statements and state media coverage about the Paparo-Wu refrained from criticizing the United States or mentioning PRC grievances. PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times quoted PLA expert Zhang Junshe as saying that General Wu’s participation in CHODs “is conducive to reducing misunderstandings and misjudgments of the frontline forces at sea and in the air in the South China Sea as well as risks of maritime and aerial accident.” It cited an unspecified PRC military expert who said Wu’s visit to Hawaii “showed China's sincerity in managing and controlling differences through talks,” and that the United States' invitation “showed that the US does not want to have unintended military frictions with China either.” The Global Times reporting struck a positive tone and refrained from criticizing the United States even though the outlet is well-known for its jingoistic views.[37]

The tone of the PRC readouts differs from many previous high-level bilateral engagements, including US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan’s meetings with PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Central Military Commission Vice Chair Zhang Youxia in late August. Wang raised a range of grievances on Taiwan, the Philippines, trade, and sanctions, while Zhang warned that the United States must not cross the PRC’s “red line” on Taiwan.[38] A similar tone shift was evident from the readouts of the 18th US-PRC Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCT) in Beijing on September 15. The PRC readout simply said the two sides “exchanged in-depth views on the relationship between the Chinese and U.S. militaries, the next stage of exchanges between the two militaries, and issues of common concern,” while the US readout mentioned US concerns about several topics including PRC behavior in the South China Sea and its support for Russia’s defense industrial base.[39] The tone and level of detail in the readout sharply contrasted with the equivalent from the 17th DPCT in January 2024, which stressed that the US side needs to take PRC concerns seriously, “demanded” the United States abide by the One China Principle and stop arming Taiwan, urged the United States to “reduce military presence and provocation in the South China Sea” and “strictly discipline troops on the ground,” and other strongly-worded grievances.[40]

The different tone of the Wu-Paparo meetings and DPCT also reflects a change in how the PRC views military-to-military communication with the United States. PRC has previously used military-to-military talks as a bargaining chip to influence US behavior, most notably when it suspended such talks in August 2022 in response to then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. By contrast, PLA Lieutenant General He Lei told Global Times before the Beijing Xiangshan Forum on September 13 that the relationship between the PRC and US militaries is “the stabilizer and the ballast stone of bilateral ties” and that “any communication is better than no communication.” He said that defense talks are “constructive for strengthening strategic communication, avoiding miscalculations, and managing divergences and risks.”[41] MOD spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang said on September 26 that US-PRC military relations are “stabilizing,” though he urged the United States to “correct its strategic perception of China.”[42]

The high frequency of high-level defense talks in September and the PRC rhetoric surrounding them shows that the PRC likely is worried about unintentional conflict escalation with the United States, especially in the South China Sea, and wishes to prevent such escalation. The PLA Southern Theater Command is responsible for the South China Sea.

The PRC may also fear major US policy changes after the upcoming US presidential election. PRC authorities have consistently declined to comment on US elections and do not appear to have a clear preference between the two current presidential candidates, having strongly criticized the policies of both the Trump and Biden administrations toward the PRC.[43] The PRC showed anxiety about sudden US policy shifts late in the 2020 election, however. Global Times speculated in October 2020 that the Trump administration might try to “play the Taiwan card” as part of an “October Surprise” to boost its reelection chances.[44] Former Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley revealed that PRC military leaders were “worried about an attack” from the United States shortly before and after the US election. Milley made two phone calls to PLA General Li Zuochang, then chief of the Central Military Commission’s Joint Staff Department, in the last months of the Trump administration to reassure the PRC that the United States had no plans for a surprise attack.[45]

The recent change in the PRC’s engagement with US defense officials and how it frames military-to-military meetings suggests that the PRC seeks to mitigate the risks of a change in US policy. Building strong relationships with US military leaders who will remain in their current positions through the transition and into the next US administration could ensure that the PRC maintains lines of communication with the United States.

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) called the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue a tool for the United States to “contain China and maintain US hegemony.” US President Joe Biden hosted Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in Wilmington, Delaware, for a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) leaders’ summit. Biden told the other leaders in comments unintentionally overheard by the press that the PRC is behaving aggressively in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and other places to “test” the United States and its partners.[46] MFA spokesperson Lin Jian dismissed US claims that the Quad does not target the PRC as a “lie with open eyes,” saying that the PRC was the “first topic of the summit.” Lin urged the United States to “let go of its obsession with maintaining hegemony and containing China, stop using regional countries as tools, [and] stop whitewashing the strategic intentions of various ‘small circles,’” rather than “seeking selfish interests at the expense of the strategic security interests of other countries and the well-being of the people in the Asia-Pacific region.” Lin criticized the Quad’s announcement that it would begin coast guard cooperation including a joint coast guard mission involving all four countries in 2025. He said cooperation between countries should be “conducive to promoting regional peace, stability and prosperity, rather than forming closed and exclusive ‘small circles’ that undermine mutual trust and cooperation among regional countries.” Lin also described the situations in the South and East China Seas as “generally stable” in response to concerns raised by Quad leaders at the summit.[47] The South China Sea has been the site of dramatic confrontations between the PRC and the Philippines over disputed territories like Sabina Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal throughout 2024, with the PRC employing aggressive means like ramming to block Philippine supply missions and force the Philippines out of disputed areas. MOD spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang defended the PRC’s actions as legitimate, accused the Quad of “smearing” the PRC in its joint statement, and claimed the United States was the one guilty of “coercion and bullying” in the region due to its deployments of “offensive weapons” and joint exercises with allies in the region.[48]

PRC state media likewise portrayed the Quad as a destabilizing and hegemonic force in the region that is targeting the PRC.[49] Editorials in English-language state media Global Times and China Daily portrayed the partnership as ineffective, however. They claimed that the Quad has made little concrete progress to address “global challenges” in the last three years due to a lack of unity among the four member countries, which all have their own national interests and major trade relationships with the PRC.[50]

Northeast Asia

Japan

A PLA aircraft carrier sailed through Japan’s contiguous zone for the first time. The transit may be part of a pattern of the PRC testing Japan’s military response. The PLA Navy (PLAN) aircraft carrier Liaoning sailed through a passage between Japan’s Yonaguni and Iriomote islands on the way to carry out drills in the Western Pacific Ocean on September 18.[51] The ship and two destroyers that accompanied it passed through Japan’s contiguous zone during its transit.

Japan's Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroshi Moriya said the incident was “totally unacceptable from the perspective of the security environment of Japan and the region.”[52] PRC Ministry of National Defense (MOD) Spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang said the carrier was on its way to conduct “routine training” and that there is no need to “over-interpret” its transit.[53]

The Liaoning’s transit was the first time a PLA aircraft carrier sailed through the narrow passage but part of a pattern of PLAN ships increasingly sailing to the Pacific Ocean through waterways other than the Miyako Strait. The Miyako Strait is the widest waterway through Japan’s Ryukyu Islands, between the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. Statistics from Japan’s Joint Staff show that a majority of PLA ships passed through the Miyako Strait when traveling to the Western Pacific Ocean from 2018 to 2023, but only 43 percent of them used that route in 2024. The PLAN began using the Yonaguni Channel, which is between Yonaguni and Taiwan, in 2021. The route accounted for over 26 percent of total PLAN transits from the East China Sea to the Western Pacific between January and August 2024.[54] PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times cited PLA expert Fu Qianshao who said the transit demonstrated that the PLAN can break through the First Island Chain through multiple routes besides the Miyako Strait.[55] Yonaguni and Iriomote are Japan’s southwesternmost islands and the closest Japanese islands to Taiwan. The capability to sail through multiple waterways in the Ryukyu island chain could be important to the PLA’s ability to land on Taiwan’s east coast and disrupt Western supply lines in a potential war.

The Liaoning’s passage through Japan’s contiguous zone may be part of a pattern of the PRC testing Japan’s military response. A PLA reconnaissance aircraft briefly flew into Japan’s territorial airspace on August 26 for the first time since World War II. The PRC claimed the airspace violation was a “regrettable” accident.[56] A PLAN survey ship sailed through Japan’s territorial waters off Kagoshima Prefecture on August 31 in an incident that the PRC justified as a “completely legitimate” transit under the UNCLOS provision for “innocent passage.” The transit was the tenth time in the past year that a PLAN survey ship entered Japan’s territorial waters, or the 13th if including submarines and other intelligence-gathering ships.[57] A Russian reconnaissance plane also breached Japan’s territorial airspace near Hokkaido three times on September 23, a day after Russia and the PRC conducted joint naval exercises in the Sea of Japan.[58]

A contiguous zone is a region of water between 12 and 24 nautical miles from a country’s coast in which the country can conduct some law enforcement actions. A contiguous zone is not part of a country’s sovereign territory under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), however, and countries cannot block the passage of foreign ships through their contiguous zone. The PRC itself has often protested the passage of foreign military vessels through waters in which it claims jurisdiction but does not have internationally recognized sovereignty, however, including the middle of the Taiwan Strait and waters between the disputed Paracel Islands. Beijing also protested an intrusion by a Japanese destroyer on July 4 that sailed into PRC territorial waters within 12 nautical miles of Zhejiang Province. Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force said on September 22 that the intrusion was a “serious error” and that it fired the naval officer responsible, but maintains that even military vessels have a right of “innocent passage” through territorial waters of other countries.[59]

The PRC warned the United States and Japan not to proceed with a tentative US plan to deploy intermediate-range missiles to Japan for the first time. US Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth stated on September 4 that the United States is interested in seeing the Multi-Domain Task Force operate in Japan through exercises. The Multi-Domain Task Force is a new US Army unit that hosts the mid-range Typhon missile system. Wormuth said the United States is especially interested in being able to move equipment and soldiers to Japan’s southwest Ryukyu Islands, which are located very close to Taiwan.[60] MFA spokesperson Lin Jian said on September 18 that the United States is promoting the deployment of weapons including intermediate-range missiles in the Asia-Pacific region to seek “absolute military superiority.” He claimed the deployment would intensify regional arms races and tensions and threaten regional peace. He urged the United States to abandon the deployment plan and advised Japan to “be aware of the real intentions of the United States.”[61] MOD spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang made similar comments and warned Japan “not to invite wolves into the house or cater to the United States, otherwise it will only push itself into danger.”[62]

The PRC is likely worried that a US deployment of missiles near PRC territory through exercises will become a permanent deployment. The PRC repeatedly protested the deployment of the Typhon missile system to the Philippines for training exercises, using similar rhetoric. Philippine officials initially said the missiles were part of a temporary training program and would be removed in September, but later said on September 20 that there is no timeline to remove the missiles.[63] Wormuth said the missile system’s monthslong deployment to the Philippines would be a model for future deployments. The Typhon system can launch the Tomahawk cruise missile, which can strike targets more than 1,600 km away, and the Standard Missile-6 multipurpose interceptor, which has a range of up to 370 km.[64] Tomahawk missiles deployed on Japan’s southwest islands east of Taiwan could strike deep into PRC territory, while the short-range SM-6 missiles could hit targets throughout most of the Taiwan Strait.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) has resumed its patrol of Sabina Shoal, fulfilling its promises to return to the disputed territory and ensure that the shoal does not fall under PRC control. The CCG may deny Philippine resupply missions access to Sabina Shoal to compel the PCG to withdraw from the shoal. On September 22 the PCG deployed an unnamed vessel to Sabina Shoal to replace the recently withdrawn BRP Teresa Magbanua.[65] The PCG withdrew the BRP Teresa Magbanua from Sabina Shoal on September 15, citing medical concerns, a lack of essential supplies, and incoming bad weather.[66] The BRP Teresa Magbanua had been deployed to Sabina Shoal for five months, during which the CCG harassed the PCG vessel and blocked resupply missions from delivering supplies to Coast Guard personnel aboard. While some media outlets interpreted the PCG’s withdrawal from Sabina Shoal as a sign of their acquiescence to PRC demands, the PCG maintained that their decision to withdraw was neither a sign of them ceding territory to the PRC nor an indication of a diplomatic agreement being signed between the two states.[67] PRC MOD spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang addressed the situation in Sabina Shoal in a September 26 press conference, saying that the withdrawal of PCG vessels from the Shoal is the only way to restore peace and stability to the disputed waters.[68] The PRC asserted its sovereignty over Sabina Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal and emphasized that the PRC will counter any infringement into PRC territory to protect its maritime rights.

The PRC has maintained a significant and sustained presence at Sabina Shoal.[69] These ships included CCG ships, PLA Navy warships, and Chinese maritime militia vessels. The highest number of PRC vessels were reported in Sabina Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal, where the grounded BRP Sierra Madre is located.

Russia

The PRC and Russia launched the second phase of the PRC-led joint naval exercises “Northern Interaction 2024” in Vladivostok on September 21.[70] The exercises will take place in the Sea of Japan and will involve air defense and anti-submarine drills, according to the Russian state-owned news outlet RIA Novosti.[71] The second phase of Northern Interaction 2024 was the latest in a spate of PRC-Russia joint exercises that started on September 10. The PRC and Russia completed the first phase of the joint military exercises on September 15, before initiating other drills as part of the large-scale Russian-led Ocean 2024 military exercises in the Pacific and Arctic Oceans on September 16.[72]

The PRC and Russia are conducting increasingly frequent joint military exercises in recent years and expanding the scope of their cooperation. The two countries have now held joint exercises in at least five different parts of the world since July, including naval exercises in the South China Sea, Gulf of Finland, Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk, and Northern Pacific.[73] PRC and Russian bombers entered the US air defense identification zone near Alaska for the first time together on July 24.[74] PRC and Russian naval vessels sailed together in the United States’ EEZ in international waters near Alaska in September 2022 and August 2023.[75] PRC naval ships and Russian naval ships sailed separately into the United States’ EEZ near Alaska on July 10 and September 16, respectively.[76]

The PRC and Russia are also increasing coast guard cooperation. The PRC announced on September 13 that PRC and Russian coast guard fleets will conduct joint patrols in the Northern Pacific, which lasted from September 16–20.[77] PRC state media claimed that the joint patrols aim to improve coordination and organization between the two countries and enhance their ability to “jointly respond to various maritime security threats.”[78] The China Coast Guard (CCG) and Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) first announced a memorandum of understanding regarding coast guard cooperation in April 2023 to strengthen maritime law enforcement.[79]

Middle East

The PRC voiced concerns about Lebanon’s sovereignty in response to the escalation of the war in the Middle East. PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian said the PRC is “highly concerned” about the detonation of Hezbollah communication equipment and said the PRC opposes any infringements on Lebanon’s sovereignty and security. He expressed concern that the incidents may escalate regional tensions and called on “all parties concerned” to maintain peace and stability in the Middle East.[80] The MFA avoids making similar statements on sovereignty when attacks occur in Israel, typically urging general de-escalation and advocating for a two-state solution.[81]

Taiwanese news reported PRC “cognitive warfare” and a “smear campaign” against Taiwan in connection with the pager explosions that occurred in Lebanon last week. US media reported that the Taiwanese firm Gold Apollo produced the pagers.[82] Gold Apollo denied producing the pagers and said that the firm that manufactured these pagers, the Budapest-based company BAC Consulting KFT, had been licensing its brand.[83] Gold Apollo released a statement saying that the company only provided brand trademark authorization for BAC to sell the products in certain regions. Gold Apollo stated that it was involved neither in the design nor the production of the pagers. Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs also gave a statement on the event, saying that Gold Apollo had no records of exporting directly to Lebanon in recent years and that Taiwanese-made products would not explode. The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs also gave a statement on the pagers, saying that “from 2022 to August 2024, the company exported 260,000 sets of pagers, mainly to European and American countries, and there were no explosions in related products reported by the media.”[84]

Taiwan’s Central News Agency (CNA) cited unnamed officials who reported that national security investigations blamed Beijing for cognitive operations attempting to pin the blame for the pager explosions on Taiwan. CNA cited rumors on Chinese social media networks that Israel and Taiwan had colluded and that “although no Chinese official media has yet directly intervened, these accounts participating in the smear campaign have long been publishing posts to cooperate with the Chinese government’s anti-Western and anti-democracy and touting China’s characteristics.”[85] The PRC declined to comment on accusations of Taiwanese involvement.[86]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, September 13, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, and Alison O’Neil of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: September 17, 2024

Key Takeaways

The CCP framed the corruption case against Taiwan People’s Party founder Ko Wen-je as part of a “Green Terror” campaign by Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party to persecute “dissidents.”
Four Chinese Coast Guard ships intruded into Taiwan’s “restricted waters” around Kinmen on two consecutive days in a continuing effort to assert PRC jurisdiction over the waters.
The 2024 Beijing Xiangshan Forum points toward an increase in the PRC’s international security cooperation, most notably with Russia.
The PRC used the BRICS high-level meeting of representatives for security affairs in St. Petersburg to promote the forum as the voice of the Global South.
The Philippines withdrew the BRP Theresa Magbanua from Sabina Shoal following four weeks of the CCG blocking Philippine resupply missions to the Shoal. The CCG could replicate this strategy against other PCG ships, such as the BRP Sierra Madre in the Second Thomas Shoal.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The CCP framed the corruption case against Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) founder Ko Wen-je as part of a “Green Terror” campaign by Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to persecute “dissidents.” Taipei authorities detained Ko Wen-je incommunicado on September 5 in connection with a corruption case from his time as mayor of Taipei in 2014–2022. Prosecutors allege that Ko and members of his mayoral administration accepted bribes to approve the expansion of a shopping mall, which dramatically increased the property’s value.[1] Ko is the founder of the TPP, Taiwan’s third-largest political party, and was the party chair until August 29 when he announced a three-month leave over an unrelated campaign finance scandal from his 2024 presidential run.[2] CCP Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua responded to a question about Ko’s arrest by claiming that Taiwanese public opinion believes President Lai Ching-te has been perpetrating a “Green Terror” and “using judicial means to suppress dissidents for his political interests.” “Green Terror” is a reference to the DPP’s color, green, and the “White Terror” period of martial law in Taiwan from 1947–1987.[3] The CCP is connecting the two to undermine popular support for the DPP administration by portraying the DPP as corrupt and tyrannical.

The CCP is framing the Ko case as part of the “Green Terror” likely to capitalize on sentiments among a minority of Taiwan’s population that the case against Ko Wen-je is political persecution. Support for Ko is far more mainstream in Taiwan than support for the pro-reunification activities that the CCP typically claims are being “persecuted.” The TPP accused the DPP government of politically persecuting Ko and framed the case against him as a crisis of judicial integrity. It maintains that Ko is innocent.[4] A recent poll by the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF) found that 28.6% of respondents agreed with the statement that the case against Ko is political persecution by the ruling party, while 54.6% disagreed.[5]

Chen also used the “Green Terror” allegation in the context of two other cases. Taiwan’s Pingtung District Court sentenced two local leaders of the fringe Reunification Alliance Party to four and a half years in prison for colluding with the CCP to interfere in Taiwan’s 2024 elections. The two men recruited people to go on “free” trips to the PRC with funding from the TAO, took the trip participants to meet with PRC officials, and urged them to vote for certain candidates outside their party.[6] Taiwan is also investigating retired general Tsang You-hsia for standing for the PRC national anthem while attending a pro-reunification event in Hong Kong. Tsang is a former chairman of the now-defunct Huang Fuh-hsing department of the Kuomintang (KMT), Taiwan’s main opposition party.[7] Chen condemned both cases as evidence of the DPP’s “Green Terror” and abuse of power. He claimed that “anyone may be the next victim” of the DPP’s “plot” to persecute supporters of “cross-strait exchanges.”[8]

The CCP reiterated that its measures against Taiwanese “separatism” target only a very small minority of “‘Taiwan independence’ diehards” and will not affect the vast majority of the Taiwanese people who live, work, or travel in the PRC. The PRC issued new legal guidelines on the punishment of Taiwanese “separatists” on June 21 which recommended severe punishments up to the death penalty for activities that promote Taiwan’s independence.[9] It established an email mailbox for reporting such “separatist” activities on August 7.[10] TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua said on September 11 that PRC authorities would carefully verify and identify any tips it receives through the mailbox and crack down on the “very small number of ‘Taiwan independence’ diehards and their separatist activities.” Chen denied Taiwanese media reports that some Taiwanese businessmen in the PRC were reported through the mailbox and harassed and that many of them left the PRC. He claimed the media reports had “ulterior motives” to deceptively conflate the vast majority of Taiwanese people with separatist “diehards” and “muddy the waters.” He encouraged more Taiwanese people to visit the PRC and claimed that the 2.6 million Taiwanese who visited the PRC from January to August of 2024 were a repudiation of the “lies and rumors” of the DPP.[11]

Four Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ships intruded into Taiwan’s “restricted waters” around Kinmen on two consecutive days in a continuing effort to assert PRC jurisdiction over the waters. Four CCG ships simultaneously entered four different locations in the restricted waters around Taiwan’s Kinmen island group on September 13 and again on September 14. They entered at 8:50 am and left at 11 am on both days. The CCG did not announce the incursions. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) accused the PRC of deliberately carrying out these incursions on the eve of the Mid-Autumn Festival, a major holiday on both sides of the Taiwan Strait that occurs on September 17. The CGA said the incursions were the first in September and the 39th and 40th of 2024.[12]

Kinmen is located less than two miles from the PRC mainland city of Xiamen. Taiwan does not claim any territorial waters around Kinmen but maintains concentric “prohibited” and “restricted” zones around the islands that are functionally equivalent to territorial waters and a contiguous zone. This means that Taiwan reserves the exclusive right to conduct law enforcement activities there. The PRC largely respected these maritime boundaries before 2024 even if it did not officially acknowledge them.

The CCG has normalized incursions into the restricted waters around Kinmen since February 2024 to erode Taiwan’s control over the waters and establish the PRC’s legitimate right to enforce its laws there. The CCG has conducted incursions into the waters an average of five times per month. Some of the patrols ventured into Kinmen’s prohibited waters as well. The PRC began these efforts in response to an incident in February in which two PRC fishermen died in a boat collision while fleeing a CGA pursuit in Kinmen’s prohibited waters. The number of monthly incursions peaked in May around Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration, and the PRC has gradually increased the duration of each incursion from around one hour to over two hours. The PRC has also expanded the patrol scope from fixed-line patrols in formation to a broad patrol area where individual CCG ships can patrol freely. PRC officials have repeatedly denied the existence of restricted or prohibited waters around Kinmen since February, most recently during a TAO press conference on September 11.[13] PRC state-affiliated social media account Yuyuan Tantian suggested that the “Kinmen model” of normalizing “law enforcement” patrols can be applied to other Taiwanese outlying islands in the future, such as Matsu and Penghu.[14]

The PRC objected to the transit of German warships through the Taiwan Strait on September 13. The PRC claims jurisdiction over the entire Strait and denies the existence of “international waters” in the Strait. The German naval frigate Baden-Wuerttemberg and the supply ship Frankfurt am Main transited the Taiwan Strait en route from South Korea to Indonesia. This was the first time German warships transited the Taiwan Strait in 22 years. German Minister of Defense Boris Pistorius said the Taiwan Strait is an international waterway and was the shortest and safest way to the ships’ destination.[15] The PLA Eastern Theater Command (ETC) organized air and naval forces to monitor the ships’ transit. PRC officials framed the transit as a provocation. PRC Ministry of National Defense (MOD) Spokesperson Col. Wu Qian said that “freedom of navigation does not mean freedom to run rampant and it cannot be used to provoke and endanger [the PRC’s] sovereignty and security.”[16] Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Mao Ning said that the Taiwan issue is not about freedom of navigation but about the PRC’s “sovereignty and territorial integrity.” She said that the PRC respects “the navigation rights enjoyed by all countries in relevant waters in accordance with Chinese law and international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” (UNCLOS), but firmly opposes “provocation and endangerment of China's sovereignty and security under the banner of freedom of navigation.”[17]

The PRC claims varying levels of jurisdiction over the entire Taiwan Strait and denies the existence of “international waters” in the Strait. It frequently protests foreign military transits through the Taiwan Strait but has not physically impeded them. The MFA claimed on September 9 that the Taiwan Strait is “China's internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone in that order" when moving from either shore toward the middle.[18] This characterization includes Taiwan and its maritime jurisdictions as part of the PRC.

PRC officials have denied that the Taiwan Strait constitutes “international waters” and stressed the PRC’s jurisdiction over the entire strait, which may be intended to imply that foreign military ships should not sail there without Beijing’s permission.[19] States, including the PRC, do not have sovereign rights to deny passage to foreign ships within their contiguous zone or Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), however. Such regions therefore are informally called “international waters” because any ship has a right to navigate freely in those waters. States can only restrict passage in their internal or territorial waters, which extend up to the country’s territorial baseline and 12 nautical miles beyond it, respectively.

Pro-Russian hackers targeted many Taiwanese government and financial websites with DDoS attacks in retaliation for ROC President Lai’s comment about the PRC taking back parts of the Russian Far East. Lai argued in an interview on September 1 that the PRC’s intention to annex Taiwan is not truly about territorial integrity, otherwise “why not reclaim the land ceded to Russia in the Treaty of Aigun during the Qing Dynasty?”[20] The pro-Russia hacker group NoName057(16) framed Lai’s comments as a suggestion that the PRC should “take away Russia’s land in the Far East” and retaliated by launching large-scale Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks on Taiwanese government and financial websites beginning on September 9.[21] The group took down at least 45 websites by September 14. It continued to claim attacks through September 17. The group’s targets included the websites of Taiwan’s Supreme Court, the Ministry of Justice, government departments of many cities and counties, the Taoyuan city metro, Taipei International Airport, several major banks, the Taiwan Stock Exchange, and various local financial firms.[22]

NoName057(16) is a pro-Russian cyber collective that emerged in March 2022 and initially targeted Ukrainian government and media sites but has since expanded to target Western government, economic, and logistical entities, including in NATO member states.”[23] NoName057(16) relies on volunteers to conduct its cyberattacks and previously published its own crowdsourced botnet, "DDoSia," along with Russian and English language instructions for using DDoSia to conduct DDoS attacks.[24]

China

The PRC used the BRICS high-level meeting of representatives for security affairs in St. Petersburg to promote the forum as the voice of the Global South. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated during the meeting that the Global South has gained momentum in the 21st century and that it “should bravely stand at the forefront, take the initiative, and contribute positive forces to building a world of lasting peace and universal security.” Wang stressed that the PRC has always been a “natural member” of the Global South and pointed to last week’s Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which the readout stated sent out a loud call for the Global South to forge ahead. Beyond the original and new members of BRICS, the meeting also featured representatives from Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Laos, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Serbia, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Vietnam.[25]

The PRC has long styled itself as an ally of the developing world and since 2023, frequently refers to itself as a member of the Global South.[26] The PRC’s frequent use of the phrase in official rhetoric portrays the PRC as a champion of the Global South that takes the lead in advocating for and advancing cooperation.[27] The PRC framed the expansion of BRICS in 2023 as making progress in strengthening the representation of the Global South and rebuking a hegemonic world order in favor of multilateralism.[28] The expanding membership of BRICS and attendance from non-BRICS members at the PRC’s encouragement signals interest from countries that possibly view the forum as a way to increase their own participation in matters of international importance.

Wang called for advancing a multipolar world and enhancing the representation and voice of the Global South in a proposal for BRICS countries to cooperate to solve security threats.[29] Wang linked the PRC’s advocacy for political solutions to highlight the PRC-Brazil six-point consensus to resolve the war in Ukraine, which it claimed received a “wide range of positive responses.” Wang welcomed more BRICS partners to participate in the international conversation to form a consensus on how to reach a political solution for the war.

The PRC seeks for Global South countries to align with it on international security issues. PRC Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs Li Hui traveled to Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia, countries that the PRC referred to as “important members of the Global South,” to generate support for its six-point consensus with Brazil, which the two countries released in May. The plan, which stipulates that Russia must participate in peace talks, has failed to gain traction with Ukraine, the United States, and most European countries, despite claims from the PRC to the contrary.[30] The PRC skipped a June peace summit in Switzerland in protest because Russia was not invited.[31]

Li’s trip came after statements on June 21 from then-Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba and Deputy Head of the Office of the President Igor Zhovkva that Ukraine is interested in having a “Global South” country host a second peace summit, which Ukraine aims to hold before the end of the year.[32] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy repeated Ukraine’s interest in hosting the next peace summit in a Global South country during an interview on August 25.[33] The PRC’s interest in generating support for its mediation of the war in Global South countries is possibly aimed at gaining recognition as a qualifying member of the Global South that is capable of hosting the summit. Alternatively, hosting the summit in a Global South country that the PRC has won favor with would extend the PRC’s influence over the next peace summit.

The 2024 Beijing Xiangshan Forum points toward an increase in the PRC’s international security cooperation, most notably with Russia. The Xiangshan Forum is a multilateral summit focused on security cooperation that began on September 13 and brought together Chinese defense leaders and their international counterparts. Over 1,800 guests from over 100 countries attended.[34] According to Xinhua, the number of participants at this year’s Xiangshan Forum has reached a new high, drawing representatives from NATO, the EU, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Approximately one-third of the participants hailed from the United States or Europe, reflecting the PRC’s global reach in matters of security cooperation.[35] The sessions of the forum followed the themes of “Security Cooperation and Prosperity and Stability in the Asia-Pacific Region," "Multipolarization and the Direction of International Order," "'Global South' and World Peace and Development," and "International Mechanisms and Global Security Governance.”[36]

The meeting between PRC Defense Minister Dong Jun and Russian Deputy Defense Minister Fomin highlighted trends in PRC-Russia defense messaging — namely the growing alignment between their messaging on the Pacific. According to the South China Morning Post (SCMP), Fomin used his platform at the Xiangshan Forum to accuse the United States of fomenting instability in the Taiwan Strait. He lauded the PRC-Russia partnership but accused the US of militarization in East Asia. Russian news site TASS’ Telegram reported that “The plan for military cooperation between Russia and China includes more than 100 events this year, and their number will grow,” according to Fomin.[37] Moreover, Fomin's statements linked Russia and the PRC’s shared grievances against the West and legitimized overt collaboration. Fomin reportedly said that the Ukraine war has "reinvented modern warfare” and that Russia is "ready to share its unique experience of Western weapons with partners."[38]

Joint military exercises are one way Russia could share such information with China. Russia and China are comprehensive strategic partners and have participated in an increasing number of joint exercises during the last several years.[39] The number of PRC-Russia joint exercises has increased from 2 in 2018 to 10 in 2024. Most of the joint exercises are naval and occurred in places including the East China Sea and South China Sea.[40]

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The Philippines withdrew the BRP Theresa Magbanua from Sabina Shoal following four weeks of the CCG blocking Philippine resupply missions to the Shoal. The CCG could replicate this strategy against other Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) ships, such as the BRP Sierra Madre in the Second Thomas Shoal. The PCG withdrew the BRP Theresa Magbanua from Sabina Shoal on September 15.[41] PCG spokesperson Jay Tarriela stated that the ship left Sabina Shoal to evacuate personnel in need of medical care and concerns over bad weather and a lack of essential supplies.[42] The BRP Theresa Magbanua maintained a presence in the Shoal for five months due to concerns over the CCG presence in the area. Constant PCG presence has allowed it to monitor PRC land reclamation and island-building attempts. The PRC has repeatedly called for the PCG to withdraw its ships from Sabina Shoal. The PRC has accused the Philippines of violating PRC sovereign rights and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, an agreement signed by the PRC and ASEAN member states in 2002. Despite the withdrawal of the BRP Theresa Magbanua, the PCG says that it will continue to deploy vessels to Sabina Shoal and assert its territorial claims.[43]

The PCG has clearly stated that its withdrawal from Sabina Shoal is not an indication that it is abandoning territory or ceding the shoal to the PRC.[44] There is no indication that the Philippines’ actions were a result of discussions with the PRC.[45] The PRC MFA and CCG have not responded to the PCG's claims that it will deploy additional vessels to the Sabina Shoal. Various PRC media outlets have published articles advocating for continued vigilance by the CCG in case of future “provocations” by the PCG, however.[46] The CCG has maintained its presence in Sabina Shoal following the PCG’s withdrawal.[47] Maintaining a presence in Sabina Shoal is advantageous for the PRC, as the Shoal’s location allows the PRC to assert its claim over the nearby Second Thomas Shoal and more easily intercept Philippine vessels attempting to access or establish a presence around other features in the South China Sea. Blocking resupply missions to PCG vessels in the South China Sea has resulted in the CCG forcing the withdrawal of foreign vessels. They could replicate this strategy against other PCG ships, including the BRP Sierra Madre in the Second Thomas Shoal, who attempt to maintain a more permanent presence in the South China Sea.

Russia

The PRC participated in joint naval and air exercises with Russia from September 10–16. The PRC Ministry of National Defense (MOD) announced on September 9 that Russia would send naval and air forces to participate in the PRC-led Northern Joint 2024 exercises in the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk.[48] Two PRC guided missile destroyers, a PRC guided missile frigate, a supply ship, and three ship-borne helicopters participated in the exercises. MOD stated that the PRC forces will also participate in its fifth joint maritime cruise with Russia as part of the Russian-led Ocean-2024 exercises, which will take place throughout the Pacific and Arctic Oceans.[49] Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that representatives from 15 “friendly” nations would observe its wide-ranging exercises during Ocean-2024, which the Russian government claims is the largest of its naval exercises in 30 years.[50]

The PRC and Russia are also increasing coast guard cooperation. The CCG announced that it signed a memorandum of understanding with Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) in April 2023 to strengthen maritime law enforcement.[51] The PRC announced on September 13 that PRC and Russian coast guard fleets will conduct joint patrols in the Northern Pacific, which aim to improve coordination and organization between the two countries and enhance their ability to “jointly respond to various maritime security threats.”[52]

The PRC and Russia are conducting increasingly frequent joint exercises in recent years and expanding the geographical scope of their cooperation. The two countries have now held joint exercises in at least five different parts of the world since July, including naval exercises in the South China Sea, Gulf of Finland, Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk, and Northern Pacific.[53] PRC and Russian bombers entered the US air defense identification zone near Alaska for the first time together on July 24.[54] PRC and Russian naval vessels sailed together in the United States’ EEZ in international waters near Alaska in September 2022 and August 2023.[55] PRC naval ships and Russian naval ships sailed separately into the United States’ EEZ near Alaska on July 10 and September 16, respectively.[56]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, September 6, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, and Alison O’Neil of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek and Liam Karr of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: September 11, 2024

Key Takeaways

The People's Republic of China (PRC) convicted Taiwanese political activist Yang Chih-yuan of secessionism on August 24 and sentenced him to nine years in prison. Yang’s conviction is a threat from the PRC to Taiwanese people not to advocate for policies that promote Taiwanese sovereignty or statehood.
The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested the anticipated passage through the Taiwan Strait of two German naval ships.
PLA Southern Theater Commander General Wu Ya’nan had a call with US Indo-Pacific Command Commander Admiral Samuel Paparo as part of a trend of restoring US-PRC high-level military communication.
The PLA and Russian military will participate in two military exercises and a joint Pacific patrol in close succession in September.
The PRC is trying to forcibly expel the Philippine presence from Sabina shoal to degrade the Philippines’ military and coast guard operations in the South China Sea.
The PRC elevated ties with Africa during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. The PRC's bilateral relationships with African countries now take the form of strategic partnerships or comprehensive strategic partnerships, signifying China's interest in cooperating with African nations across a variety of economic and security sectors.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The People's Republic of China (PRC) convicted Taiwanese political activist Yang Chih-yuan of secessionism on August 24 and sentenced him to nine years in prison. Yang’s conviction is a threat from the PRC to the Taiwanese people not to advocate for Taiwan’s statehood or policies that support Taiwanese sovereignty. The PRC arrested Yang in August 2022 during his trip to the mainland to visit family and held him in detention until April 2023, when PRC authorities “approved” Yang’s arrest on suspicion of secessionism.[1] Yang helped found the Taiwanese National Party in 2011, which advocated for an independence referendum.[2] Yang also was a legislative candidate for the Taiwan Action Party Alliance, a short-lived political party that promoted Taiwanese statehood and participation in the United Nations.[3] Yang’s conviction marks the first instance of the PRC prosecuting an ROC national for secessionism.

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) called for Yang’s immediate release on September 5 and Yang’s conviction proved that the PRC’s 22 guidelines on punishing “separatism” endangers all Taiwanese people who travel to the PRC, not just “a very small number of Taiwan independence die-hards,” as the PRC claims.[4] Spokesperson for the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Chen Binhua accused Taiwan’s governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of attempting to intimidate people from Taiwan and prevent them from participating in normal cross-strait exchanges by distorting the nature of the legal guidelines.[5]

Yang’s punishment is an example of the type of behavior that the PRC aims to deter under the new legal guidelines that it released in June, which outline punishment for “Taiwan independence diehards.” The PRC regards expressions of support for policies that promote Taiwan’s sovereignty as separatist, such as Taiwan’s accession to international organizations and adopting a Taiwanese identity over a Chinese one. These policies are core objectives of the DPP, which the PRC accuses of separatism, despite the fact that the DPP does not advocate for declaring Taiwanese statehood. Imprisoning Yang, who shares similar positions on Taiwan’s sovereignty, discourages Taiwanese people from supporting policies that are associated with the DPP.

The PRC has repeatedly attempted to assuage concerns about the heightened risk of arbitrary detention for ordinary Taiwanese people who are in the PRC while simultaneously taking greater steps to root out separatists, such as sharing contact information on the TAO website to report people for separatist activities.[6] The TAO also advertised a list of 10 mostly DPP politicians, including Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim and Defense Minister Wellington Koo, who the PRC deemed “Taiwan independence diehards.”[7] The MAC has maintained that going to the mainland is dangerous for all Taiwanese people and to reconsider travel there unless absolutely necessary.

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) protested the anticipated passage through the Taiwan Strait of two German naval ships.[8] German media outlet Der Spiegel reported on September 7 that the German frigate Baden-Württemberg and the supply ship Frankfurt am Main will sail through the Taiwan Strait on their route from South Korea to Jakarta in mid-September.[9] Der Spiegel stated that the German government would not notify the PRC to demonstrate that it views transit through the strait as a matter of freedom of navigation. Germany deployed the Baden-Württemberg and the Frankfurt am Main in May on a so-called “foreign training cruise,” which can entail training with partner navies in the Indo-Pacific. Their voyage is not a formal military operation or a freedom of navigation operation.[10] The transit will be the first passage through the Taiwan Strait by German naval ships in over 20 years.[11]

PRC MFA spokesperson Mao Ning called the would-be transit a provocation against the PRC on September 9. Mao stated that both sides of the Taiwan Strait were the PRC’s territory, but did not clarify whether the Taiwan Strait is a space that countries can freely navigate.[12] Chairman of the Bundestag’s Committee on Foreign Affairs Michael Roth expressed on Twitter his support for the transit, which he stated was in accordance with international law. Roth denied that the transit is a provocation simply because it does not suit the CCP.[13] Roth stated his support for Canada and the Netherlands, whose naval ships traversed the strait in July and June, respectively.[14]

The PRC’s claim to sovereignty over the Taiwan Strait conflicts with the international consensus on the Taiwan Strait and attempts to revise its legal status. The PRC MFA first claimed in June 2022 that the PRC has full sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Taiwan Strait and denied that the Taiwan Strait qualified as international waters.[15] Bloomberg cited an anonymous source who stated that PRC officials began privately asserting this claim in meetings with US counterparts in 2022.[16] TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua repeated in March that the PRC held sole sovereignty over the strait and denied the existence of international waters.[17] The claims contradict the PRC’s long-held position that the Taiwan Strait is an “international waterway.”[18] Convincing other countries of the PRC’s sovereignty over the Taiwan Strait effectively turns the waterway into an inland sea that the PRC can deny access to, which would enable the PRC to conduct military operations or a blockade against Taiwan without the threat of obstruction from other navies.

Taiwan’s National Security Bureau (NSB) warned in a written report to the Legislative Yuan that the CCP uses pop culture and cross-strait exchanges to promote cross-strait integration with and unification under the CCP-led PRC.[19] The NSB stated that the CCP’s United Front work against Taiwan is diverse and targets Taiwanese religious communities, artists, media professionals, students, and more. The report mentioned that the CCP attempts to attract Taiwanese youth to the mainland and engage in cultural and creative activities, such as art and film, to promote the PRC’s soft power and strengthen a common Chinese identity. The United Front is a whole-of-government and society effort to advance the CCP’s ideology and interests by co-opting non-government segments of Chinese society. United Front activities against Taiwan aim to inculcate in the Taiwanese public CCP notions that the PRC is the only legitimate government of China and Taiwan is a part of that China.

Spokesperson for Taiwan’s Executive Yuan Julia Hsieh stated on September 5 that the government was aware of a campaign by the PRC to recruit Taiwanese influencers to visit Xinjiang Province and promote a more positive narrative about Beijing's rule there.[20] MAC Deputy Minister Liang Wen-chieh stated on September 5 that Taiwanese people should exercise caution and beware not to violate the Anti-Infiltration Law, which bans the spread of false information by hostile foreign forces. Liang stated that the wave of “Beautiful Xinjiang” propaganda aims to dispel notions of human rights there.[21]

Taiwanese internet celebrities called attention to CCP efforts to recruit them to facilitate United Front work in June. YouTuber Potter King claimed that the CCP is spending considerable resources to lure Taiwanese internet celebrities to the PRC under the pretense of traveling to film content.[22] Several other YouTubers and online celebrities subsequently confessed to being contacted by the CCP and published the contract letters that outlined goals to influence Taiwanese politics. YouTuber Ba Jiong revealed that the contract he received discussed a plan to establish a “Taiwan Support Party” that artists would join as honorary members to shape the future of PRC-Taiwan relations.[23] The terms stated that the CCP would invest millions of dollars to enable Taiwanese artists to put on shows and events that promoted CCP-aligned narratives of cross-strait relations. The contract encouraged Taiwanese artists with verified accounts to publish open invitations to the Taiwan Support Party. Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior issued an announcement that urged individuals not to break the law by accepting instructions and funding from foreign forces that would compromise Taiwan’s national security.[24]

The CCP’s influence within creative industries is extensive. PRC-based gaming company Hero Games provided popular overseas streamers with a list of topics not to speak of while playing the new popular Chinese game Black Myth: Wukong, which Hero Games manages the marketing for.[25] The topics included issues of sensitivity to the CCP that it enforces censorship of, such as COVID-19, quarantines, “feminist propaganda,” and “other content that instigates negative discourse.”

China

PLA Southern Theater Commander General Wu Ya’nan had a call with US Indo-Pacific Command Commander Admiral Samuel Paparo as part of a trend of restoring US-PRC high-level military communication. A US readout of the call said that Paparo urged the PLA to “reconsider its use of dangerous, coercive and potentially escalatory tactics in the South China Sea and beyond.” He also stressed the importance of maintaining lines of communication between the two militaries to reduce the risk of misperception and miscalculation. Paparo said he hoped his conversation with General Wu would be the first of many, both with Wu and with other PLA theater commanders. The Southern Theater Command is responsible for the South China Sea.[26] The PRC readout of the call offered no detail except that the two sides had an “in-depth exchange of views on issues of common concern.”[27]

The Paparo-Wu call is the first US-PRC theater commander-level conversation since US President Joe Biden and CCP Secretary-General Xi Jinping agreed to resume high-level military talks in November 2023. The PRC cut off military talks with the United States after then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022.[28] The US and PRC militaries will have several other interactions in September. Both militaries are participating in Brazil’s Formosa-2024 Exercise.[29] The United States will send Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for China Michael Chase to the Beijing-hosted Xiangshan Forum on September 12-14.[30] General Wu Ya’nan will attend the Chiefs of Defense Conference that the US Indo-Pacific Command will host in Hawaii and will meet Paparo in person.[31]

The US House of Representatives passed two bills that restrict the access of PLA-affiliated tech companies to US markets and supply chains as part of a broader legislative effort to limit CCP influence within the American economy. The US House of Representatives has begun voting on a series of National security legislation to reduce CCP influence in several domains as part of “China Week.” The bills discussed have focused on identifying and reducing military, ideological, economic, and technological threats posed by the CCP to the American people.

One of the bills passed was the Countering CCP Drones Act, which would prohibit new drones from the PRC company DJI from operating in the United States and accessing its communication infrastructure.[32] DJI was placed on the United States Treasury Department’s investment blacklist in 2021,its role in biometric surveillance, tracking of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang, and ties to the PLA.[33] DJI has denied any involvement in human violations or surveillance operations. Following the passage of this bill, DJI released a statement saying that Congress’s actions would undermine American interests and have negative impacts on federal agencies, law enforcement, emergency responders, and small businesses that utilize their technology.[34]

The House of Representatives also passed the Biosecure Act, a bill that would restrict the federal government from contracting with PRC biotechnology firms with ties to the CCP and PLA.[35] The legislation would target five companies, BGI Group, Complete Genomics, MGI, WuXi AppTec, and WuXi Biologics, and establish an inter-agency process for identifying additional companies that pose a threat to national security. BGI is a PRC genomics company with reported ties to the PLA that was placed on the Bureau of Industry and Security’s entity list in 2020.[36] MGI and Complete Genomics are BGI subsidiaries in the PRC and California, respectively. WuXi AppTec and WuXi Biologics are PRC-based pharmaceutical companies that have been targeted by the US Government for their connections with PLA under the military-civilian fusion strategy.[37] All of these companies have denied having ties to the PLA or posing any threat to US National Security.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

An authoritative People’s Daily commentary accused the Philippines of violating PRC sovereignty at Sabina Shoal and infringing on the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. The PRC is trying to forcibly expel the Philippine presence from the disputed shoal to degrade the Philippines’ military and coast guard operations in the South China Sea. The article in the CCP official newspaper People’s Daily was published under the pseudonym “Zhong Sheng,” a homophone for “voice of China” in Mandarin that People’s Daily uses to denote authoritative commentary articles on foreign affairs. The article claimed that the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) deliberately “stranded” its flagship Teresa Magbanua at Sabina Shoal to justify “humanitarian” resupply missions to the area, portraying itself as a victim while aiming to establish a long-term presence at the shoal. It claimed the Philippines “violated the law and provoked first” by intruding into what the PRC claims is its territory, while the PRC “defended its rights in accordance with the law. The article also claimed that the Philippines violated Article 5 of the 2002 PRC-ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which stipulated that all parties would refrain from occupying any presently uninhabited maritime features. It said all parties should keep Sabina Shoal uninhabited and without facilities. It also insinuated that the Philippines was “provoking” the PRC at the behest of “some non-regional countries” that wish to “sow discord” in the region. The article concluded that PRC-Philippines relations were at a “crossroads” and the Philippines had to choose dialogue and consultation over conflict and confrontation.[38]

The PRC claims nearly all land features in the South China Sea within its “Nine Dash Line” territorial boundary, including Sabina Shoal. Sabina Shoal is an uninhabited low-tide elevation located within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone. The Philippines uses Sabina Shoal as a staging ground for resupply missions to the nearby Second Thomas Shoal, where the Philippines maintains a military garrison aboard a grounded warship. The PCG deployed the Teresa Magbanua to the shoal in April to monitor PRC activity there, in response to Philippine reports that crushed coral found at the shoal was evidence the PRC was preparing to build infrastructure there.

The PRC has deployed dozens of Chinese Coast Guard (CCG), PLA Navy (PLAN), and Chinese Maritime Military (CMM) vessels to block Philippine resupply missions and prevent it from establishing a permanent presence at Sabina Shoal. A CCG ship rammed the Teresa Magbanua three times on August 31, causing damage to the hull, while up to 71 CMM, CCG, and PLAN vessels swarmed around Sabina Shoal. The PRC has accused the Philippines of ramming its ships in confrontations despite video footage showing otherwise. PRC state media has accused the Philippines of preparing to build infrastructure on the shoal and likened the anchored Teresa Magbanua to the grounded Sierra Madre on Second Thomas Shoal. CCG vessels have also engaged in aggressive maneuvers against Philippine vessels resupplying the Sierra Madre, including a violent confrontation on June 17 in which the PRC rammed, boarded, towed Philippine boats to thwart a resupply mission.

The PRC is framing the Philippines as an aggressor and a violator of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea as a form of legal and public opinion warfare to justify its own aggression against Philippine vessels in the region. It is framing its actions to force out the Philippine presence as enforcing the Declaration’s stipulation against occupying currently unoccupied features, even though the Philippines has not constructed any facilities on Sabina Shoal and “occupies” it with coastguard vessels in the nearby waters, the same manner in which the PRC “occupies” the disputed Scarborough Shoal..

The PRC is sending CCG and CMM vessels to the disputed Reed Bank in the Spratly Islands, likely to assert its control over oil and gas reserves in the area. A CCG vessel conducted 24-hour “intrusive patrols” of Reed Bank on August 29 and September 2. Reed Bank is a large undersea tablemount in the Spratly Islands between 90 and 170 miles from the Philippine province of Palawan. It is part of the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone.[39] The Philippine Navy also reported 58 CMM vessels and one PLAN ship in the vicinity of Iroquois Reef from September 3-9, which has steadily climbed from 36 CMM vessels in the previous week and 17 the week before.[40] Iroquois Reef is an uninhabited reef at the southwestern end of Reed Bank.

The PRC is likely using Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels to assert control over Reed Bank and its copious energy resources. A 2013 report from the US Energy Information Administration estimated that untapped underwater reserves at Reed Bank may contain as many as 5.4 billion barrels of oil and 55.1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The Philippines began oil and gas exploration in Reed Bank in the 1970s but ceased drilling in 2015 because the PRC contested its claim. A decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016 ruled that Reed Bank is part of the seabed within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which means that the Philippines has the exclusive right to exploit the resources there. The PRC rejects the 2016 decision, however, and claims Reed Bank along with most of the South China Sea. The Philippines did not resume energy extraction there despite the Court of Arbitration ruling in its favor.[41]

The Philippine Navy also reported CMM or PRC fishing vessels “swarming” Iroquois Reef in July 2023 and December 2022. It said the vessels were loitering in the area and not fishing.[42] The PRC often uses CMM vessels to maintain a presence in disputed parts of the South China Sea. Maritime militia vessels are often repurposed fishing boats. The PRC uses them because their connection to the PRC government is difficult to prove, their presence is less likely to trigger conflict escalation than CCG or naval vessels, and they can be deployed quickly in far greater numbers than official ships.

Russia

The PLA and Russian military will participate in two military exercises and a joint Pacific patrol in close succession in September. The PRC Ministry of National Defense (MOD) announced on September 9 that Russian air and naval forces will join PLA forces in the Northern/Interaction-2024 exercise in the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk. It did not specify the exact dates of the exercise but said participating Russian and PRC forces assembled in the Sea of Japan on September 9. The exercise will last until late September.[43] The participating PRC and Russian air forces include more than 20 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, including the PRC’s KJ-500, J-16, J-10, and Z-20, and Russia's Il-38, Su-30, and MiG-31. The participating PLA naval forces include the guided missile destroyers Xining and Wuxi, the guided missile frigate Linyi, the comprehensive supply ship Taihu, and three ship-borne helicopters. The Russian naval forces include the frigate Marshal Shaposhnikov, destroyer Admiral Panteleyev, four corvettes, and Ka-27 anti-submarine helicopters. The MOD also announced that the PRC and Russian navies would carry out their fifth joint maritime patrol in the Pacific Ocean on an unspecified date and that the PRC would participate in Russia’s Ocean-2024 military exercise, which is ongoing from September 10-16.[44] The Ocean-2024 is a massive Russian exercise involving 400 ships, 120 aircraft, and 90,000 personnel conducting drills in the Pacific Ocean, Arctic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, Baltic Sea, and Caspian Sea. Neither country’s defense ministry specified the nature, location, or dates of the PRC’s participation in the exercise.[45]

The PRC and Russia have increased joint naval and aerial exercises and patrols in the Pacific region in recent years, in a sign of their growing geopolitical alignment against the collective West and its Asian allies such as Japan.[46] The two countries held at least seventeen joint patrols or exercises in parts of the Western Pacific Ocean including the East China Sea, Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea, Bering Sea, and South China Sea between 2022 and the present, averaging five to six per year. They had one or no joint military activities in this region each year prior to 2021.[47] The two countries held the Joint Sea 2024 exercise and their fourth joint Pacific patrol in the South China Sea in July. They deployed four bombers in a joint patrol near Alaska’s Aleutian islands the same month. The PRC organized several previous “Interaction”-series exercises with Russia in recent years, including the Northern/Interaction-2023 in the Sea of Japan in July 2023.[48]

Africa

The PRC elevated ties with Africa during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which reflects the greater strategic importance the PRC is giving to the continent. African leaders met with high-ranking Chinese officials from September 4-6 to discuss bilateral ties, development goals, and economic cooperation. The summit resulted in a spate of new PRC-Africa agreements – with the PRC offering almost $50.7 billion in investment – as well as the elevation of PRC-Africa ties to an “all-weather China-Africa community with a shared future in the new era.”[49] The PRC's bilateral relationships with African countries now take the form of strategic partnerships or comprehensive strategic partnerships, signifying China's interest in cooperating with African nations across a variety of economic and security sectors.

For more information on specific cooperation agreements between the PRC and African nations, see the Africa File from the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute.

The PRC’s rhetoric affirmed high-level support for Africa in the context of the broader "Global South” and framed China-Africa relations as an equitable partnership, possibly to hedge against accusations of exploitation, neocolonialism, or “debt trap” diplomacy. PRC press releases cast the PRC as Africa's equal partner and emphasized "mutual respect" in PRC-Africa relations. Xi contrasted Western “modernization,” associated with “immense sufferings,” and Chinese modernization, based on inclusivity and equity.[50] PRC spokesperson Mao Ning stated in a press conference that China seeks “equal” cooperation with Africa and does not promulgate debt traps.[51] As a further sign of its commitment to Africa, the PRC upgraded bilateral ties with African nations.

US officials are concerned that the PRC’s new initiatives in Africa will facilitate the PRC’s military power projection. Bloomberg reported that the PRC may intend to build a base in Gabon following FOCAC security agreements.[52] According to WSJ, rumors around a proposed Chinese base in Gabon have swirled since former Gabonese President Ali Bongo reportedly promised Xi in August 2023 that the PRC could station troops there.[53] US officials reportedly tried to persuade Bongo to retract this statement, but their efforts proved moot after Bongo’s security forces ultimately overthrew him.[54] Interim president Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema took power in September 2023 and has not indicated his stance on the proposed Chinese base.[55] Nguema seems to hold positive views of the PRC, his country’s top trading partner and the provider of loans that backed three vocational training centers in Gabon.[56]

African leaders also declared their support for the one-China principle across high-level meetings during the forum. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning referenced Africa’s broad adherence to the one-China principle and issued a statement on Swaziland, the one African country noticeably absent from FOCAC. She said that Swaziland's diplomatic support for Taiwan was not in its best interests and that China believes Swaziland will soon switch its allegiance to the PRC.[57] By “naming and shaming” Swaziland, while publicly elevating the status of nations that adhere to the one-China principle, the PRC signaled that development assistance and economic cooperation may be linked to diplomatic consensus on the PRC’s Taiwan policy.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, August 30, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, and Alison O’Neil of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: September 4, 2024

Key Takeaways

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced that it will lift restrictions on PRC tourism to Kinmen and Taiwanese pomelo imports, likely to economically reward Kuomintang-leaning regions and legitimize the Kuomintang as a negotiating partner on behalf of Taiwan.
The PRC maintained a high number of air incursions of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone in August.
Network analysis firm Graphika identified PRC state-operated accounts on Twitter and TikTok that posed as Americans to undermine US political institutions and stability ahead of the 2024 US presidential elections. PRC information operation narratives have evolved to focus on sowing political division and undermining faith in the US electoral process.
PRC state broadcaster CCTV ran a segment on August 27 that publicized a People’s Liberation Army air defense exercise to counter enemy drone swarms. The PLA’s focus on countering drone swarms is likely a reaction to Taiwan’s evolving defense strategy that emphasizes asymmetric defense.
The China Coast Guard rammed a Philippine Coast Guard vessel near Sabina Shoal as part of its broader intimidation efforts to decrease the Philippine presence in the South China Sea. This is the third time that the CCG rammed a PCG ship near the Shoal during the last two weeks.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The PRC announced that it will lift restrictions on PRC tourism to Kinmen and Taiwanese pomelo imports, likely to economically reward Kuomintang (KMT)-leaning regions and legitimize the KMT as a negotiating partner on behalf of Taiwan. The PRC Ministry of Culture and Tourism announced on August 30 that it would allow residents of Fujian Province to resume travel to Kinmen “in the near future.” The ministry said it was lifting the ban at the request of a visiting delegation from Kinmen.[1] A Kinmen delegation led by KMT legislator Jessica Chen Yu-jen met with PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Director Song Tao in Beijing on August 22 and requested that the PRC lift the travel ban for Kinmen. Kinmen is a Taiwanese island group located two miles from the coast of Fujian. The PRC suspended independent travel to Taiwan in August 2019, citing poor cross-strait relations, and banned group travel to Taiwan in 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic.[2] Chen said 800,000 tourists from the PRC visited Kinmen annually prior to the ban, bringing in US$199.9 million each year.[3]

TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua announced on September 2 that the PRC would lift its ban on imports of Taiwanese Wendan pomelos that come from orchards and packaging plants registered with the PRC. He made the announcement two weeks before the Mid-Autumn Festival, a Chinese cultural holiday during which pomelo is traditionally eaten.[4] The PRC banned Taiwanese pomelo imports in August 2022 following then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan but claimed that the ban was motivated by biosecurity concerns. Chen directly credited Taiwan’s KMT legislative caucus leader Fu Kun-chi and his district, Hualien County, for expressing their “strong desire” to resume pomelo imports and organizing the industry to “make rectifications.” Hualien is a major producer of pomelo in Taiwan and contains most of Taiwan’s pomelo plants that are registered with the PRC.[5] Fu led a KMT delegation to the PRC in late April, meeting with high-level PRC TAO, United Front, customs, and travel officials. The meetings resulted in announcements that the PRC would lift bans on imports of Taiwanese food products including pomelos and resume Fujian tourism to Taiwan’s outlying Matsu Islands.[6] The first PRC tour group arrived in Matsu on August 9.[7]

The PRC likely lifted these import and travel bans to legitimize KMT officials as negotiating partners on behalf of Taiwan and to economically benefit KMT-leaning constituencies. Hualien, Kinmen, and Matsu are all solidly pan-Blue (KMT-leaning) regions. TAO spokesperson Chen commented when announcing the lifting of the pomelo import ban that “as long as we adhere to the ‘1992 Consensus’ and oppose ‘Taiwan independence,’ the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family, and family matters can be discussed and resolved easily.”[8]

TAO Director Song Tao met with KMT Vice Chair Andrew Hsia on August 28 and stated that the CCP was willing to work with the KMT on the common political basis of the 1992 Consensus and opposing Taiwanese independence. Hsia stated that the KMT was also willing to cooperate on the same political basis and that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to the “Chinese nation.”[9] Hsia was in Lushan, PRC for the 19th Jiangxi-Taiwan Economic, Trade and Cultural Cooperation and Exchange Conference.[10] It is unclear whether Hsia’s visit resulted in any concrete agreements.

The 1992 Consensus is an alleged verbal agreement between semi-official representatives of the PRC and the then KMT-ruled ROC following negotiations in 1992. It states that both sides agree there is only one China, and that Taiwan is part of China. The CCP interprets this “one China” as the People’s Republic of China, while the KMT interprets it as the Republic of China. Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) does not recognize the 1992 Consensus and considers the ROC and PRC to be mutually non-subordinate. The PRC suspended exchanges with Taiwan’s government in 2016 after the election of DPP president Tsai Ing-wen. It insists that the 1992 Consensus must be the common political basis for all cross-Strait negotiations.

The PLA carried out amphibious landing drills with dual-use roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) ships off the coast of Fujian Province. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) said it detected PLA combat aircraft, helicopters, drones, amphibious ships, and ro-ro freighters loaded with ground troops carrying out "joint landing exercises" around Dacheng Bay in the PRC’s Fujian Province, which is directly across the Taiwan Strait from Taiwan.[11] The PRC did not announce the drills. The PLA has conducted amphibious landing drills in the same area in 2023 and in previous years, often around September.[12] The PRC has also previously conducted training with ro-ro boats to carry troops and vehicles.[13] Ro-ro boats are cargo vessels with ramps that can be used to drive vehicles onto and off the ship instead of loading them with cranes. The PLA currently lacks sufficient sealift capability to execute a full-scale invasion of Taiwan and is working to integrate commercial ro-ro ships into its operations to fill this gap.[14]

The PRC maintained a high number of air incursions of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in August. Taiwan’s MND reported that PLA aircraft crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entered Taiwan’s ADIZ a total of 399 times in August, including at least one incursion every day of the month. This is the third highest monthly total on record, surpassed only by 446 incursions in August 2022 and 439 incursions in July 2024. The high number of incursions in August 2022 coincided with a massive spike in PLA activity around Taiwan following then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. The PLA incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ in 2024 did not spike but instead rapidly climbed month-on-month from January to July, following Lai Ching-te’s victory in Taiwan’s January 2024 presidential election. Lai took office in May.[15] The ADIZ incursion numbers do not include aerial activity around Kinmen and Matsu, which are west of the median line.

The PRC has normalized a much higher volume of ADIZ incursions against Taiwan than in previous years as part of an intensified PRC pressure campaign against the new administration of Lai Ching-te, whom the PRC considers a dangerous separatist. The high frequency of ADIZ violations drains Taiwan’s resources, exhausts military personnel, and degrades Taiwan’s threat awareness. Taiwan does not scramble aircraft in response to all PRC ADIZ violations, but it does put military personnel on standby to respond quickly if needed.

Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB) accused eight PRC companies of “illegally poaching” talent and trade secrets from Taiwan’s computer chip industry. A joint investigation by the prosecutors’ offices of Hsinchu, Taipei, and New Taipei found that the PRC companies hid their backgrounds to poach Taiwanese semiconductor engineers and other high-tech personnel to acquire high-end technologies. The MJIB also suspects that companies stole trade secrets. It said that these illegal practices “seriously affect the competitiveness of Taiwan’s high-tech industry.” The accused companies are iCommsemi, Shanghai New Vision Microelectronics Co, NJAVC, Emotibot Technologies Ltd, Tongfang Co, ACTT, Naura Technology Group Co. and Hestia Power Inc.[16]

Tongfang is a large technology company that makes civilian electronics and supplies military end-use products to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The products that it provides to the PLA include wireless communications, satellite navigation equipment, information security software, and electronic countermeasure equipment. Tongfang is a subsidiary of China National Nuclear Corp (CNNC), a state-run enterprise that oversees military nuclear programs, information technology, and energy and environmental projects.[17] MJIB found that Tongfang set up a Taiwanese company to recruit nearly 100 people while hiding its source of funding. Naura is a supplier for the PRC’s biggest chipmaker, the partially state-owned Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp (SMIC). MJIB found that Naura illegally recruited engineers who worked on chip-related equipment. It found that Hestia Power set up shell companies to move capital to Taiwan with funding from the PRC Ministry of Finance’s China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund and the Small and Medium Enterprise Development Fund. MJIB found that ACTT, a supplier of integrated circuit patents and product design, tried to cover up its illegal business in Taiwan by telling staff to register their health insurance at other places.[18]

Taiwan is a high-tech power that produces around 90% of the world’s most advanced semiconductors, microchips that are used in computers, cell phones, cars, and many other commercial and military technologies. Taiwan’s globally dominant semiconductor industry is sometimes referred to as its “Silicon Shield” because the world’s reliance on Taiwanese semiconductors incentivizes other countries to defend Taiwan.[19] The PRC has invested billions of dollars to build its own semiconductor industry. It set up the third phase of the China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund in May with a registered capital of 344 billion yuan (US$47.5 billion). The PRC seeks to reduce Taiwan’s competitive advantage and make the PRC more self-sufficient in advanced technologies.[20] Taiwan previously accused PRC companies of illegally poaching to acquire semiconductors and other advanced technology from Taiwan in May 2024, 2022, and other years.[21]

China

Network analysis and social media intelligence firm Graphika identified PRC state-operated accounts on Twitter and TikTok that posed as Americans to undermine US political institutions and stability ahead of the 2024 US presidential elections.[22] Spamouflage is a PRC state-sponsored information operation that operates on over 50 social media platforms.[23] Graphika reported that Spamouflage has become more aggressive in its efforts to spread divisive narratives and is seeding content to denigrate both Democratic and Republican candidates, including President Joe Biden, Vice President Kamala Harris, and former President Donald Trump. The 15 Twitter accounts and 1 TikTok account identified in the report use a range of personas to impersonate US voters and AI-generated audio, video, and images are increasingly present in Spamouflage content.

Spamouflage narratives have evolved over time to focus on sowing political division and undermining faith in the US electoral process. Analysis from Graphika and ASPI in 2020 showed that criticism of US policies and response to crises were dominant themes in Spamouflage content, including the United States’ response to the Covid-19 pandemic compared to the PRC’s, police brutality and the government’s handling of protests, and US foreign policy.[24] Research from the Microsoft Threat Analysis Center that identified and analyzed over 2,000 assessed Spamouflage Twitter and YouTube accounts over 11 months in 2021 showed that most of the accounts were created during the six-month period from September 2020 to March 2021, peaking in November.[25] The surge in accounts created during the US election season indicates that Spamouflage operators were directing content at the US public.

Graphika reported that Spamouflage began to explicitly engage with election-related topics before the 2022 US midterm elections. In 2023, Spamouflage content started directly criticizing US election candidates, sowing doubt in the legitimacy of the US electoral process, and propagating divisive narratives about polarizing political and social issues. Spamouflage’s evolving focus is consistent with findings from the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), a UK-based research nonprofit. ISD reported in February that suspected Spamouflage accounts focused on creating a sense of dismay in the United States by portraying the election as a high-stakes showdown and symbol of a divided United States. Themes at this time also included doubt over election integrity, social problems, and direct criticisms of President Biden.[26] ISD and Graphika, both identified inauthentic accounts posing as American conservatives and Trump supporters.[27] Graphika noted, however, that the content is more representative of efforts to exacerbate social divisions and portray the United States as a country in decline.[28]

A Washington Post investigation revealed that PRC diplomats and pro-PRC diaspora groups in the United States coordinated and participated in violent actions against anti-Xi Jinping protesters during his visit in November. Pro-CCP rival protesters violently assaulted Chinese anti-CCP protesters during demonstrations from November 15-17 as CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping visited San Francisco to participate in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. The pro-CCP protesters instigated violence against anti-Xi protesters, including attacks with flagpoles, chemical sprays, and physical assaults, as documented in verified videos. PRC diplomats from the Los Angeles and San Francisco consulates were present among the pro-CCP protesters.

The Washington Post obtained WeChat messages that show that the Los Angeles PRC Consulate paid for the hotels and meals of counter-protesters as an incentive to participate in the demonstrations. The Washington Post reported that PRC diplomats hired at least 60 private security guards to “protect” the pro-CCP diaspora groups that gathered to welcome Xi Jinping, according to seven individuals involved in the arrangement. At least 35 pro-CCP diaspora groups from various states—including New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington—mobilized for the protests. Washington Post stated that a number of the participating pro-CCP diaspora groups have links to the PRC’s United Front Work Department, which aims to co-opt civilian Chinese groups to align with CCP interests.

This is not the first instance of PRC officials’ involvement in the violent suppression of dissident protesters. The PRC Manchester Consul General Zheng Xiyuan and consulate staff were recorded in October 2022 dragging a Hong Kong pro-democracy protester inside the consulate grounds and beating him.[29] Six PRC diplomats, including Zheng, left the UK after they were wanted for questioning by the police for their involvement in the incident.[30]

The PRC is involved in a range of unauthorized transnational repression activities throughout the world. The Spain-based human rights NGO Safeguard Defenders investigated in 2022 over a hundred alleged overseas police stations in countries across the world, which operate under the guise of providing consular services such as renewing passports and driver’s licenses.[31] The stations intimidate and coerce dissidents to return to the PRC as part of a Ministry of Public Security (MPS)-run repatriation campaign. One of the organizers of the pro-CCP demonstrations in San Francisco is the self-described “backbone” of an overseas consular assistance volunteers program that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established in 2013.[32]

The US Department of Justice (DOJ) indicted two PRC nationals in April 2023 on charges of acting as agents of the PRC for operating a “secret police station” on behalf of the PRC Ministry of Public Security (MPS) that conducted monitoring and intimidation of Chinese dissidents living in the United States.[33] The DOJ also indicted 40 MPS officers for using inauthentic social media accounts to harass PRC dissidents living in the US.[34] DOJ also charged the officers with attempting to recruit US nationals who were sympathetic to CCP narratives as “unwitting” agents of the PRC.

New York authorities arrested former New York Governor Kathy Hochul's aide Linda Sun and her husband Chris Su on federal charges of acting as unregistered foreign agents for the PRC. The DOJ-issued indictment alleges that Sun “used her position of influence among executives to covertly promote PRC and CCP agendas.” Sun’s activities extended to preventing meetings with Taiwanese government representatives; changing high-level New York State officers’ messaging regarding issues of importance to the PRC and the CCP, including eliminating references to Taiwan and Uyghurs from state communications; and obtaining official New York State proclamations for PRC government representatives without proper authorization.[35] The indictment states that Sun actively concealed that she took actions at the direction of the PRC. Sun and Su also allegedly laundered millions of dollars for the PRC and used the monetary benefits of this scheme to buy luxury vehicles and property in New York, according to the IRS.

Governor Hochul stated that her office fired Sun as soon as it had discovered her misconduct.[36] Sun served for 15 months in Hochul’s administration as her deputy chief of staff and had worked for the NY governor’s office for years prior under Governor Andrew Cuomo as a liaison to the Asian-American community and deputy chief diversity officer.[37] The New York Times cited anonymous NY lawmakers who stated that Cuomo’s office was sensitive to Taiwan issues during Sun’s time there, including expressing resistance to pro-Taiwan resolutions in the State Legislature.[38]

Hochul called for the expulsion of the New York PRC consul general in response to Sun’s alleged activities.[39] US Department of State spokesperson Matthew Miller stated on September 4 that the consul general had already “rotated out” of his position at the end of August.[40]

The PRC Ministry of Defense (MOD) accused the United States of threatening global nuclear stability by expanding its arsenal and signing nuclear submarine deals with the UK and Australia. The PRC aims to weaken US credibility on nuclear and non-proliferation issues. US President Joe Biden approved a nuclear weapons strategy in March that reoriented the focus of US nuclear deterrence to the PRC’s expansion of its nuclear arsenal and ordered US forces to prepare for coordinated nuclear confrontations with the PRC, Russia, and North Korea. A US official further said that the United States may expand its nuclear arsenal after the US-Russia New START arms control treaty expires in 2026.[41] MOD spokesperson Wu Qian responded to these developments by criticizing the United States for “using the non-existent ‘China nuclear threat theory’ as an excuse to expand its nuclear arsenal and shirk its nuclear disarmament responsibilities.” He claimed that the PRC “firmly pursues a nuclear strategy of self-defense” and maintains its nuclear forces at the “minimum level required for national security.” He urged the United States to “substantially reduce its nuclear arsenal” and to stop engaging in “nuclear sharing,” “extended deterrence,” and “nuclear alliances.”[42]

Wu also claimed that an Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) deal to sell nuclear-powered submarines to Australia “seriously undermined the international nuclear non-proliferation system, seriously stimulated the nuclear arms race, and seriously endangered regional peace and stability.” He said the agreement allowed the nuclear-armed United States and United Kingdom to transfer nuclear reactors and highly enriched uranium to a non-nuclear state, Australia.[43] The PRC made the same criticisms of the AUKUS deal before and raised them at the International Atomic Energy Agency in May.[44]

PRC state broadcaster CCTV ran a segment on August 27 that publicized a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) air defense exercise to counter enemy drone swarms.[45] The PLA’s focus on countering drone swarms is likely a reaction to Taiwan and the United States’ defense strategies that emphasizes asymmetric defense. The CCTV report stated that the group’s first round of anti-aircraft artillery only achieved 40 percent damage against a drone swarm. A representative from the PLA Ground Force’s 77^th Group Army Duan Xiaolong stated that hitting the drones was challenging due to their small size, speed, and ability to change flight trajectories, which made it easy for gunners to lose the targets.[46] Another representative, Cui Yang, acknowledged the problems and stated that the unit would focus on practicing and improving air defense capabilities.[47]

The PRC recognizes the challenges that drone swarms would pose in the event of an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. A 2023 article from a PRC military periodical explored the lessons that military strategists gleaned from observing both Russia and Ukraine’s successful use of kamikaze drones.[48] The analysis highlights the effectiveness of low-cost drones in destroying high-value targets. The article points out that the PRC must be wary of these drones entering Taiwan, which it can employ against a potential PRC landing force.

Taiwan’s asymmetric defense strategy, formally known as the Overall Defense Concept (ODC), aims to maximize the military’s lethality under resource constraints to compensate for the disparity in military power with the PRC. The ODC focuses in part on exploiting “a large number of small things,” according to former ROC Chief of General Staff and ODC architect Lee His-min.[49] The PLA air defense training follows a June announcement by the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense to procure 1,000 AI-enabled drones and the development of a US Department of Defense initiative that aims to field large drone swarms.[50]

The PRC is taking note of the United States’ development of its own asymmetric capabilities. TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian warned the United States on June 26 against sending “dangerous signals” that expose its intention to “destroy Taiwan to safeguard its own interests.”[51] Zhu’s comments were a response to Indo-Pacific Commander Admiral Samuel Paparo’s statements in a June interview that spoke of a defense concept called “Hellscape,” which would deploy a high volume of unmanned systems to the Taiwan Strait and disrupt an amphibious invasion.[52] Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks announced in August 2023 the Replicator Initiative, which aims to develop the United States’ capability to field large drone swarms to counter the PRC’s numerical advantage in military assets.[53] Hicks called for the United States to leverage platforms that are “small, smart, cheap, and many” against the PRC’s overwhelming mass. The program will likely be a keystone of the Hellscape defense strategy.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The China Coast Guard (CCG) rammed a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel near Sabina Shoal as part of its broader intimidation efforts to decrease the Philippine presence in the South China Sea. This is the third time that the CCG rammed a PCG ship near the Shoal during the last two weeks. A CCG ship rammed the PCG BRP Theresa Magbanua near Sabina Shoal on August 31.[54] Commodore Jay Tarriela accused the CCG of deliberately colliding with the anchored PCG ship and emphasized that there was no provocation from the PCG.[55] CCG spokesperson Liu Dejun accused the PCG of intentionally ramming the CCG vessel and accused the Philippines of illegally anchoring in PRC territory.[56] This incident follows the previous deliberate CCG ramming of a PCG vessel near Sabina Shoal on August 19 and 25.[57] The PRC deployed 40 vessels on August 26 to block PCG vessels from delivering necessary supplies to PCG personnel aboard the BRP Theresa Magbanua, which has been anchored in Sabina Shoal since April.[58] The Philippine military has reported a significant increase in the number of PRC ships around Sabina Shoal. Philippine Navy spokesperson Admiral Roy Vincent Trinidad reported that from August 27 to September 2 the Philippine Navy saw 203 PRC vessels in the West Philippine Sea, a 24% increase over the past two weeks.[59] 71 of the PRC vessels were monitored at Sabina Shoal. The PRC vessels were comprised of 53 maritime militia boats, nine PLAN ships, and nine CCG ships.[60]

Sabina Shoal is about 110 nautical miles north of the Philippine island of Palawan. It serves as the main staging ground for supply missions to Second Thomas Shoal, where the BRP Sierra Madre has been intentionally grounded since 1999. The PRC and the Philippines have both accused one another of attempting to assert control over Sabina Shoal. The PCG has committed to maintaining a presence at the Shoal to monitor PRC land reclamation and artificial island building attempts.[61] A PRC-controlled Sabina Shoal would improve the PRC’s ability to assert its claim over the Second Thomas Shoal. Controlling the Shoal would also enable the PRC to more easily intercept Philippine vessels attempting to access or establish a presence around other disputed features in the South China Sea.

The PRC’s presence near Sabina Shoal could continue to make Philippine resupply missions dangerous, making it more difficult for the Philippines to maintain a permanent presence in the Sabina and Second Thomas Shoals. CCG ramming has thus far not coerced the PCG into leaving the Shoals, despite the damages inflicted on PCG ships. The PRC could continue to normalize these ramming incidents around the Sabina Shoal and other disputed features and escalate matters further if they believe it is necessary to protect their territorial claims. Continued CCG escalation could result in the PCG asking for help from the United States.

US Indo-Pacific Command chief Admiral Samual Paparo has suggested providing escorts to Philippine ships completing resupply missions and stated that the United States would come to the aid of its ally if the Philippines invoked the Mutual Defense Treaty.[62] Armed Forces of the Philippines chief General Romero Brawner Jr. told Paparo that the Philippines could still defend itself against the PRC, but would ask for assistance from the United States if it decided that United States assistance was necessary. The PRC has condemned previous joint US-Philippine activities in the South China Sea, and a more significant United States presence in the South China Sea could elicit a stronger response from the PRC.

Cambodia

The PRC will gift Cambodia two Type 056A missile corvettes possibly/likely in exchange for access to the Ream naval base in Sihanoukville. The PRC has trained Cambodia in the operation of the ships and will soon give the Cambodian Navy two new warships, the Type 056A missile corvettes 630 and 631.[63] This comes as the PRC has outfitted the naval base with a new pier. Around 100 Chinese workers have been preparing the base for transfer to Cambodian control likely in September, according to Radio Free Asia.[64] Cambodian personnel have been barred from accessing the new part of the base.[65] Cambodia's constitution forbids the construction of foreign military bases on its soil, but Cambodia can circumvent this by merely giving the PLA preferred or exclusive access to the base. Only PLAN vessels have been able to use the port's new pier. Cambodia rerouted two Japanese destroyers to Sihanoukville’s other port in February; more recently, it rerouted an Australian frigate to the same place. PRC corvettes, on the other hand, docked at the pier in December and have been there "on and off."[66] These corvettes are the same type that the PRC will transfer to Cambodia.

The PRC’s military diplomacy in Cambodia supports its efforts to grow PRC economic and diplomatic influence in Southeast Asia, as well as its efforts to expand its naval power projection. The PRC likely deems a naval port in Cambodia a strategic interest because it could provide a more forward position near the Malacca Strait, a critical energy chokepoint through which most of the PRC’s overseas oil imports must pass.[67] Cambodia is also one of the PRC’s major economic partners. The PRC has constructed airports, roads, hotels, and other properties in the country. The PRC’s interests in Cambodia reflect its interests in Southeast Asia more broadly: expansion of economic interests tied to geopolitical goals.

Oceania

The Pacific Islands Forum removed an affirmation of Taiwan’s “development partner” status in its joint communique following backlash from the PRC. It did not bar Taiwan’s participation in the forum despite PRC pressure, however. The annual Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) took place in Nuku’alofa, Tonga from August 26-30. The PIF released a joint statement on its website after the forum that “reaffirmed the 1992 Leaders decision on relations with Taiwan/Republic of China," which gave Taiwan “development partner” status in the forum. The development partner status is equivalent to a limited observer role in other organizations. Taiwan is the only country that holds development partner status with the forum. Nikkei Asia reported that PRC special envoy to the Pacific Qian Bo was visibly angry about the communique and confronted PIF Secretary-General Baron Waqa, calling the statement “unacceptable.” Qian then told reporters that "Taiwan is part of China. Taiwan is not a dialogue partner of PIF, so China has the representation on behalf of the whole of China, including Taiwan and the mainland.” He claimed that the statement “must be a mistake," as 15 of the 18 PIF members "have categorically stated they abide by the 'One-China' principle."[68] PIF members Palau, Tuvalu, and the Marshall Islands maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The PIF removed the communique from its website the same evening and posted a new version on August 31 that omitted the reference to Taiwan. A forum spokesperson denied that the forum had bowed to PRC pressure and said the draft that mentioned Taiwan was uploaded by mistake. The spokesperson said “PIF would never have taken down the document if the leaders had agreed to it,” suggesting that some PIF members did not agree to the language about Taiwan.[69]

The PIF did not remove Taiwan’s participation in the forum, however, despite Australian media reporting that the PRC pressured the Solomon Islands to put forth a motion to strip Taiwan of its “development partner” status. The Solomon Islands has been one of the PRC’s closest partners among the Pacific Islands since it broke ties with Taiwan in 2019 and recognized the PRC. It will host the next PIF in 2025.[70] The PRC often pressures countries to bar or restrict Taiwan’s participation in international organizations to reduce Taiwan’s international status and voice. Taiwan signed a three-year financial cooperation agreement with the PIF Secretariat after the forum ended, indicating its continued involvement.[71]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, August 23, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War; Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Key Takeaways

The People's Republic of China (PRC) flew 32 military aircraft over the Taiwan Strait median line while ROC President Lai Ching-te was in Kinmen County to commemorate the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. The PRC possibly used the flights to signal its opposition to Lai attending the commemoration ceremony.
The PRC signaled its interest in permitting Fujian residents to resume tourism to Kinmen County while meeting with KMT officials. Restoring tourism to Kinmen after negotiation with the KMT would advance the PRC’s goals of economic integration and engendering support in Taiwan for KMT policies.
PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan for a round of strategic talks in Beijing to help stabilize the bilateral relationship. The PRC did not signal any policy change on issues of US concern but agreed to future military talks and a call between heads of state Xi Jinping and Joe Biden.
The PRC deployed Chinese Coast Guard, PLA Navy, and Maritime Militia vessels to Sabina Shoal as part of an effort to block resupply missions and dislodge the Philippine Coast Guard’s long-term presence at the shoal.
A PLA reconnaissance plane breached Japanese airspace for the first time on August 26. The PRC released a statement calling the violation accidental and “extremely regrettable.”
The PRC conducted military drills along the PRC-Myanmar border likely to deter further escalation of fighting between the military junta and rebels along the border and spillover into its southwestern territory.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The People's Republic of China (PRC) flew 32 military aircraft over the Taiwan Strait median line while ROC President Lai Ching-te was in Kinmen County to commemorate the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. The PRC possibly used the flights to signal its opposition to Lai attending the commemoration ceremony. Kinmen is a group of Taiwan-controlled islands with a large military garrison roughly 3 kilometers from the coast of the PRC. Lai gave a speech in Kinmen County on August 23 during a commemoration ceremony on the 66th anniversary of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958, when the PRC unleashed a heavy artillery barrage against Kinmen. The PRC flew 32 aircraft across the median line for two consecutive days from August 22-23, marking the largest number of PLA aircraft median line crossings in August.[1] The PRC also flew two military drones around Taiwan on August 23. The PRC has used similar flights to signal its disapproval of political developments that express or support Taiwan’s sovereignty, including PLA sorties into Taiwan’s de facto Air Defense Identification Zone.

Four China Coast Guard (CCG) ships also sailed into Kinmen’s restricted waters on August 21, marking the second incursion into Kinmen’s waters that week.[2] Kinmen has been a focus of cross-strait tension since February when the China Coast Guard (CCG) and other official vessels began aggressively asserting their presence in waters under Taiwan’s jurisdiction. The timing of the incursions suggests a connection between the CCG activities and Lai’s visit.

The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) criticized ROC President Lai Ching-te on August 23 for highlighting the growing threat that the PRC poses to Taiwan. TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian called Lai’s separatist policies the biggest threat to peace in the Taiwan Strait and ridiculed the Lai administration’s portrayal of the PRC as a threat as an exaggeration.[3] Zhu accused Lai of militarism and wasting the money of Taiwanese citizens with weapons purchases. Zhu stated that “Taiwan independence” and peace in the Strait are incompatible. The PRC’s criticism aims to portray the Lai administration’s policies as responsible for escalating cross-strait tensions and shift blame to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for the PRC’s aggression.

The PRC signaled its interest in permitting Fujian residents to resume tourism to Kinmen County while meeting with KMT officials. Restoring tourism to Kinmen after negotiation with the KMT would advance the PRC’s goals of economic integration and engendering support in Taiwan for KMT policies. Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office Song Tao met with Kinmen County Council Chairman Hung Yun-tien and Kinmen’s representative in the LY Jessica Chen Yu-jen on August 22 in Beijing to discuss strengthening exchanges between the mainland and Kinmen County. The discussions focused on the possibility of resuming tourism to Kinmen by Fujian residents, which Chen has outspokenly advocated for.[4] The PRC suspended individual tourism to Taiwan in 2019, citing poor cross-strait relations.[5] It then suspended group tours to Taiwan in 2020 during the pandemic and maintained the restrictions on Taiwan despite resuming group travel to more than 70 countries in August 2023.[6] The PRC recently resumed tourism to the Matsu Islands, another Taiwan-controlled territory close to the mainland, indicating a willingness to meet the demand for economic engagement in Taiwan’s economically vulnerable outlying islands. The TAO noted in the readout from Song’s meeting with Chen that Kinmen’s tourism sector and the wider economy have suffered from the suspension of tourism.[7] The readout stated that Kinmen would benefit from “integrated development” that restoring tourism would bring.

The engagement with Kinmen KMT officials is consistent with the CCP’s efforts to legitimize the KMT as a good-faith partner that is capable of stabilizing cross-strait relations to the benefit of the citizens of Taiwan. The PRC has a track record of making conciliatory gestures in cross-strait relations after meetings with KMT officials. The PRC announced its decision to resume tourism for Fujian residents to Matsu while receiving a KMT Caucus Whip Fu Kun-chi’s delegation in April.[8] The PRC severed contact with the governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2016 for its alleged separatist policies.

Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB) is investigating former PC manufacturing executive Chen Yu for potentially poaching IT workers to work for a joint venture with a PRC state-owned enterprise (SOE). MJIB has evidence that Chen offered high salaries to more than 100 computer engineers, designers, and technicians from his former employer Shuttle Inc. to work for Uniwill, a gaming laptop company that Chen co-owns and operates with PRC SOE Tsinghua Tongfang Co.[9] Tsinghua Tongfang is a large technology company involved in the production of goods whose applications span security, military industry, internet applications, digital TV operations, LED, and system integration.[10] Tsinghua Tongfang is also a supplier of military end-use products to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), including wireless communications, satellite navigation equipment, information security software, and electronic countermeasure equipment.[11]

China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) became the controlling shareholder of Tsinghua Tongfang Co. in 2019.[12] CNNC is a state-owned and managed enterprise that oversees the PRC’s civilian and military nuclear programs.[13] CNNC is “a leading element of national strategic nuclear forces and nuclear energy development” and “undertakes missions to ensure national security and facilitate domestic economic development,” according to its mission statement.[14]

The Taipei District Prosecutor’s Office stated that Chen circumvented the law that requires PRC investments and companies to apply for approval with the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Poaching Taiwanese talent to help PRC SOEs research and develop products from Tsinghua Tongfang undermines Taiwan’s security, according to the prosecutors. If found guilty, Chen’s activities would constitute a violation of the Cross-strait Act, which regulates exchanges between the PRC and ROC to uphold national security.

The Taiwan High Prosecutor’s Office Kaohsiung Division charged three members of Taiwan’s Chinese Unification Promotion Party for acting as agents of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).[15] The Prosecutor’s Office found evidence that Taiwanese businessman Wen Long acted on behalf of the United Front Work Department to recruit two retired ROC military officers to provide the CCP with intelligence on Taiwan’s military and advance United Front causes in Taiwan.[16] Prosecutors claim that Wen persuaded the retired military officers to develop networks to recruit other military personnel and join the Chinese Unification Promotion Party. The Chinese Unification Promotion Party is a minor far-right that does not have any representation in the government or legislature.

The United Front is a whole-of-government and society effort to advance the CCP’s ideology and interests. United Front work is pervasive throughout the CCP’s political strategy. Overt United Front work entails public alliance building and soft power initiatives to win the hearts and minds of Chinese-ethnic people and encourage ideological alignment between the CCP and the rest of society.[17] United Front work can also support covert and clandestine activities, such as infiltration, manipulation, co-optation, and intelligence gathering on target groups.[18] In June, a series of Taiwanese YouTubers and online celebrities confessed that the CCP contacted them and published contract letters that outlined goals to influence Taiwanese politics[19]. YouTuber Ba Jiong revealed that the contract he received discussed a plan to establish a “Taiwan Support Party” that artists and celebrities would join as honorary members to shape the future of PRC-Taiwan relations.[20] The terms stated that the CCP would invest millions of dollars to enable Taiwanese artists to put on shows and events that promoted CCP-aligned narratives of cross-strait relations. The contract encouraged Taiwanese artists with verified accounts to publish open invitations to the Taiwan Support Party.

China

PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan for a round of strategic talks in Beijing to help stabilize the bilateral relationship. The PRC did not signal any policy change on issues of US concern but agreed to future military talks and a call between heads of state Xi Jinping and Joe Biden. This was Sullivan and Wang’s fifth meeting and Sullivan’s first trip to the PRC under the Joe Biden administration. The two sides agreed to plan a leader-level call “in the coming weeks,” a theater commander telephone call “in the near future,” and a second round of US-PRC talks on artificial intelligence “in due course.” A US readout said the two discussed a wide range of issues including the implementation of commitments on counternarcotics, military-to-military-communications, and AI safety that US President Joe Biden and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping agreed to during their meeting in San Francisco in November 2023. Sullivan raised continued concerns about the PRC’s unfair trade policies and “non-market economic practices.” He also raised US concerns about tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the PRC’s support for Russia’s defense industrial base, and the PRC’s “destabilizing actions” against lawful Philippine maritime operations in the South China Sea.[21]

According to a PRC readout of the meeting, Wang Yi said that peaceful and smooth US-PRC relations required mutual respect, abiding by the three US-PRC joint communiques, and establishing a “correct understanding” of the PRC’s development priorities. Wang claimed that Taiwan belongs to China and urged the United States not to support “Taiwan independence,” which he called the biggest threat to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Wang also said the United States should stop “suppressing China” in trade, science, and technology, and stop using "overcapacity" as an excuse to engage in protectionism. He said the United States must not use bilateral treaties to undermine the PRC’s “sovereignty and territorial integrity” in the South China Sea and must not condone the Philippines' “infringing actions." He claimed the PRC has always been committed to promoting peace, dialogue, and a political solution to the “Ukrainian crisis” and said the United States should not “abuse illegal unilateral sanctions.”[22] The two also discussed shared concerns about North Korea, Myanmar, and the Middle East.

This is the first time since 2016 that a US National Security Advisor has visited the PRC. Wang and Sullivan have met before on several occasions, however, including three “secret” meetings in Vienna, Malta, and Bangkok since May 2023. Financial Times reported that the low-profile meetings were part of a “strategic channel” that US President Joe Biden and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping agreed to establish when they met in Bali, Indonesia for the G20 summit in November 2022. The strategic channel held its first meeting in Vienna months after the US military shot down a PRC spy balloon that flew over the United States in February 2024.[23]

Sullivan met with CMC Vice Chair Zhang Youxia, the PRC’s highest-ranked uniformed officer, on August 29. Sullivan and Zhang agreed to continue military-to-military communication.[24] A PRC readout said Zhang stressed that the “Taiwan issue” is an “insurmountable red line” in US-PRC relations. He said the PLA has a mission to oppose “independence” and promote “reunification.” He demanded that the United States stop “military collusion” with Taiwan, stop arming Taiwan, and stop “spreading false narratives” involving Taiwan.[25]

Sullivan also had a surprise meeting with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping on August 29. A US readout said the two discussed many of the same issues as in the Sullivan-Wang meeting but did not offer much detail.[26] A PRC readout largely focused on Xi’s comments about the US-PRC relationship in general and struck a conciliatory tone, with little mention of specific issues. Xi said the United States and PRC must clearly answer the question of whether they are rivals or partners, presenting this as a binary choice. He said he hoped the United States would “work in the same direction as China” and view the PRC’s development in a “positive and rational light.”[27]

The United States placed sanctions and trade restrictions on hundreds of PRC companies for ties to the Russian military. The United States State Department imposed sanctions on August 23 on more than 400 PRC entities and individuals for their support for Russia’s defense industrial base and war efforts in Ukraine.[28] PRC companies shipping microelectronics and machine tools were of particular concern in this round of sanctions. The State Department previously warned Beijing against supporting the Russian military and taking actions that could assist Russia in averting Western sanctions. That same day the United States Treasury Department reported that it has been targeting transnational networks assisting with the procurement of ammunition and other essential equipment for the Russian military.[29] Additionally, 42 PRC entities were added to the United States Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security Entity List on August 23.[30] The Entity List compiles individuals, companies, and organizations that pose a national security risk to the United States. Entities on this list are subject to trade restrictions for certain technologies and goods.[31]

The PRC Ministry of Commerce released a statement on August 25 opposing US sanctions. The Ministry accused the United States of disrupting international trade and preventing normal economic exchanges.[32] The PRC stated that it would take steps to safeguard the rights of its companies operating internationally. PRC special envoy for Eurasian affairs Li Hui also commented on the sanctions saying that “a particular country” was attempting to place blame on countries with economic ties to Russia for extending the war in Ukraine.[33] Li’s statement drew a clear distinction between PRC efforts promoting peace in Ukraine and the United States’s efforts to sow division in the international community.

Northeast Asia

Japan

A PLA reconnaissance plane breached Japanese airspace for the first time on August 26. The PRC released a statement calling the violation accidental and “extremely regrettable.” The Y-9 reconnaissance plane flew over Japan’s Danjo Islands west of Kyushu.[34] The Japanese defense ministry scrambled jets in response and issued a strong protest against Beijing. Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Masataka Okano summoned a senior Chinese official from the embassy in Tokyo to lodge a complaint against the violation and prevent this action from occurring again. The Japanese Defense Ministry released a map of the Y-9’s flight path and reported that the aircraft remained in Japanese territorial airspace for about two minutes.[35] This is the first confirmed instance of a PLA military aircraft entering Japanese territorial airspace. The Japanese Self-Defense Force scrambled jets 479 times in response to sightings of Chinese aircraft in international airspace around Japan last year.[36] Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian stated in a regular press conference that the event was “extremely regrettable” and that the PLA had not intended to intrude into Japanese airspace.[37] Apologies for PLA actions are relatively uncommon. This indicates that the violation is likely a genuine mistake or miscalculation by the PLA, and not indicative of a shift in PLA behavior towards Japan.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The PRC deployed Chinese Coast Guard, PLA Navy, and Maritime Militia vessels to Sabina Shoal as part of an effort to block resupply missions and dislodge the Philippine Coast Guard’s (PCG) long-term presence at the shoal. Philippines NTF-WPS spokesperson Jay Tarriela said that eight PRC vessels engaged in “aggressive and dangerous maneuvers” around the Philippine BFAR vessel BRP Datu Sanday as it traveled between Half-Moon Shoal and Sabina Shoal to resupply Philippine fishermen with fuel, food, and medical supplies on August 25. Tarriela said that CCG vessels encircled and rammed the Datu Sanday, blasted horns, and deployed water cannons against the BFAR ship until the ship’s engine failed and it was forced to end the resupply mission.[38] The CCG and PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) accused the Philippine ship of intruding into PRC waters near Sabina Shoal and deliberately colliding with a CCG vessel.[39] PRC state media Global Times cited Ding Duo, the deputy director of the Institute of Maritime Law and Policy at the PRC’s state-funded National Institute for South China Sea Studies, who claimed that the Philippine ship was trying to supply the BRP Teresa Magbanua, the Philippine Coast Guard’s (PCG’s) largest vessel, which has been anchored at Sabina Shoal since April.[40] The CCG also claimed to have rescued Philippine personnel who fell overboard during the confrontation, a claim that Tarriela denied as “groundless” misinformation.[41

Tarriela said that the PRC deployed 40 vessels on August 26, the following day, to block the PCG vessels BRP Cabra and BRP Cape Engaño from delivering food and supplies to Philippine personnel aboard the Teresa Magbanua at Sabina Shoal. The PRC vessels included six CCG ships, three PLAN ships, and 31 maritime militia vessels that swarmed waters near the shoal and successfully obstructed the resupply mission.[42] The Philippines originally dispatched the Teresa Magbanua on a long-term deployment at Sabina Shoal in response to what it claimed was evidence of early-stage PRC island reclamation activities at the shoal.[43] CCG ships also rammed and damaged the BRP Cape Engaño and another PCG ship, the BRP Bagacay, near Sabina Shoal on August 19.[44]

Sabina Shoal is about 110 nautical miles north of the Philippine island of Palawan and serves as the main staging ground for Philippine supply missions to nearby Second Thomas Shoal, which is 35 nautical miles to its west, and other places in the South China Sea. Half-Moon Shoal is located approximately 60 nautical miles north of Palawan.[45] The Philippines has de facto control of Sabina, Half-Moon, and Second Thomas Shoals including a grounded warship on Second Thomas Shoal that serves as a Philippine military outpost. All three features are within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone. The PRC also claims these features, however, as it does with the rest of the Spratly Islands archipelago.

The PRC is drawing parallels between the PCG presence at Sabina Shoal and the “illegally grounded” Philippine warship at Second Thomas Shoal to justify its aggressive actions against the Philippines. The Philippines deliberately grounded its warship BRP Sierra Madre on Second Thomas Shoal in 1999 and has used the ship as a military outpost on the shoal since then. MFA spokesperson Lin Jian said on August 26 that the Philippines’ long-term stationing of the Teresa Magbanua at Sabina Shoal and its resupply missions to the ship “seriously violated” PRC sovereignty and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.[46] PRC state-owned media Global Times repeatedly referred to the Teresa Magbanua as a “quasi-grounded” ship. It cited the South China Sea expert Ding Duo who speculated that the Philippines may try to air-drop supplies to the ship as it has done at Second Thomas Shoal, now that the PRC blocked three subsequent resupply missions on August 19, 25, and 26.[47] The Philippines successfully used a helicopter to resupply its ship on August 29.[48]

Philippine and PRC officials negotiated a provisional agreement on July 21 to allow for resupply missions to the Sierra Madre. The current status of this agreement is unclear. The Philippines carried out a resupply mission of the Sierra Madre on July 27. Nearby PRC vessels did not interfere.[49] Philippine Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Maria Theresa Lazaro said Manila would review the agreement after PRC aircraft fired flares near a Philippine military plane over Scarborough Shoal on August 8.[50] The PRC has repeatedly objected to Philippine supply missions to the Sierra Madre, especially shipments of construction equipment that the Philippines could use to reinforce the dilapidated warship.

The PRC fired flares at a Philippine government plane that flew over Subi Reef and Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. Subi Reef is a disputed territory in the Spratly Islands that the PRC has occupied since 1988 but the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan also claim. The PRC artificially expanded Subi Reef through island reclamation and built a military base there beginning in 2014.[51] The Philippines released a video showing that the PRC fired flares from the island as a Philippines Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) plane flew in the island’s airspace on August 22. Spokesperson for the Philippines National Task Force on the West Philippine Sea Jay Tarriela said that the BFAR plane was conducting a patrol jointly with the Philippine Coast Guard to monitor and intercept poachers encroaching on the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Tarriela said that PLA aircraft fired flares in the path of the same BFAR plane on August 19 when the plane flew over PRC-occupied Scarborough Shoal.[52] PLA aircraft also fired flares in the path of a Philippine Air Force light transport plane over Scarborough Shoal on August 8, the first aerial confrontation between the two countries since bilateral tensions started rising in the South China Sea in 2023.[53]

Myanmar

The PRC conducted military drills along the PRC-Myanmar border likely to deter further escalation of fighting between the military junta and rebels along the border and spillover into its southwestern territory. Myanmar’s northern Shan state, which borders the PRC, has seen an increase in fighting since last October. Earlier this month rebel armies captured the towns of Lashio and Mogok, which were home to a major junta military headquarters and the center of Myanmar’s gem-mining industry, respectively.[54] The PLA Southern Theater Command announced 3-day live-fire military drills near the PRC-Myanmar border in the vicinity of the cities of Ruili and Zhenkang in the PRC’s southwestern Yunnan province. [55] The PLA statement said the drills included armed patrols along the border and air-to-ground joint patrols. The Southern Theater Command said that these drills are focused on maintaining stability within the border areas.

The PRC has allied itself with Myanmar’s State Administration Council (SAC) since it took power in a 2021 coup. The SAC has encouraged continued PRC investment in several economic projects including maintaining natural gas pipelines, constructing ports, and mining rare earth minerals. The PRC’s economic investments in Myanmar and worries about its border security have resulted in a number of PRC-led peace efforts between the SAC and rebel armies. Previous peace efforts have been ineffective, resulting in continued fighting along the PRC border. Shelling from across the Myanmar border since the start of the fighting wounded five PRC citizens in January.[56] The PRC recently opened fire into Myanmar following SAC airstrikes as a warning to military forces along their border.[57] The PRC has made it clear that regardless of its alignment with the SAC, any fighting that threatens to extend into its territory will be met with a response.

Russia

The PRC is trying to generate support in the Global South for its Ukraine war peace plan, likely to ensure Russia’s participation in the next round of peace talks. The PRC Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs Li Hui promoted the PRC-Brazil “Six-point Consensus” to deescalate the war in Ukraine on August 27 after a round of shuttle diplomacy to Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia. Li has traveled to the “important members of the Global South” since July 28 to generate support for the PRC’s efforts to mediate the war and promote peace talks. Li stated during a briefing that all three countries agree to the PRC’s conditions for a peace summit, which includes Russia’s participation.[58] He implied that Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia would support Russia’s participation by emphasizing that all three “have maintained communication with both Russia and Ukraine and stay committed to a political settlement to the crisis through dialogue and negotiation.”[59]

Li also criticized Western countries’ continuous loosening of conditions for providing weapons to Ukraine for intensifying the conflict.[60]

Readouts from Li’s meetings in all three countries stated that the host country appreciated the PRC’s role in mediating the crisis.[61] The PRC’s peace plans, including its joint statement with Brazil and a 12-point plan from February 2023, have failed to gain traction with Ukraine, the United States, and most European countries, despite claims from the PRC to the contrary.

Li’s trip came after statements on June 21 from Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba and Deputy Head of the Office of the President Igor Zhovkva that Ukraine is interested in having a “Global South” country host a second peace summit, which Ukraine aims to hold before the end of the year.[62] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy repeated Ukraine’s interest in hosting the next peace summit in a Global South country during an interview on August 25.[63] Zelenskyy also stated on July 15 that Russian representatives should be present at the next peace summit.[64] The PRC did not attend the first peace summit that took place in Switzerland from June 15-16 in protest of Russia’s exclusion.[65]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, August 16, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: August 21, 2024

Key Takeaways

The PRC carried out a 30-hour patrol of the Taiwan Strait after its summer fishing moratorium ended. The increase in maritime traffic in the Taiwan Strait risks accidents and other incidents involving PRC and ROC vessels, which the PRC may use as a pretext to expand the scope of its law enforcement activities against Taiwan.
CCG ships intruded into Taiwan’s restricted waters around Kinmen twice on August 16, the day the PRC’s fishing moratorium ended, and twice on August 21.
The PRC announced that it will implement export controls for antimony on September 15. The US Department of Interior designated antimony as a critical mineral in 2018.
The PRC is taking steps to secure its supply of critical minerals as it closes off access to other countries.
A Chinese Coast Guard ship rammed a Philippine Coast Guard ship twice near Sabina Shoal on August 19.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The PRC carried out a 30-hour patrol of the Taiwan Strait after its summer fishing moratorium ended. The increase in maritime traffic in the Taiwan Strait risks accidents and other incidents involving PRC and ROC vessels, which the PRC may use as a pretext to expand the scope of its law enforcement activities against Taiwan. The PRC annually bans fishing along its coastlines and in the South China Sea from early May to mid-August. Its 2024 fishing moratorium ended on August 16. 55,000 PRC fishing vessels entered the East and South China Sea at the start of the fishing season. The PRC Ministry of Transport (MOT) organized a 30.5-hour patrol of the Taiwan Strait on August 17 and 18 “to enhance maritime traffic control and emergency rescue capabilities in the Taiwan Strait, and effectively protect the safety of life and property of ships, facilities and personnel sailing and operating in the Taiwan Strait.” Two boats from the Fujian Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) and one from the East China Sea Rescue Bureau jointly carried out the patrol. One of the MSA ships was the Haixun 06, the largest PRC patrol vessel deployed to the Taiwan Strait. The patrol covered 413 nautical miles (475 miles). The MOT noted that the large number of vessels in the Taiwan Strait increased the risk of collision between fishing and commercial vessels. It listed a wide range of maritime law enforcement activities as the “main tasks” of the patrol, including “patrolling waterways in the central waters of the Taiwan Strait,” inspecting high-risk waterways, implementing traffic control, and checking passing ships.[1] Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) reported that the three PRC vessels briefly crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and then sailed back toward the PRC without entering Taiwan-controlled waters.[2] A portion of the PRC’s contiguous zone crosses over the median line. The PRC claims Taiwan and the entire Taiwan Strait as its territory and denies that any “median line” boundary exists.

The PRC patrol may expand the PRC’s claimed legal jurisdiction in the Taiwan Strait to incorporate international waters near Taiwan’s Penghu Islands. The PRC state social media account Yuyuan Tantian reported in a post titled “The ability to control the Taiwan Strait is changing” that the patrol covered a wider area than in previous years, reaching two nautical miles east of the median line in the Taiwan Strait and as far south as Taiwan Shoal. Taiwan Shoal is an undersea feature southwest of Taiwan’s Penghu islands.[3] Director of the Division of Defense Strategy and Resources at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research Su Tzu-yun said that this is the first time the PRC’s patrol route has included Taiwan Shoal. He commented that this indicates the PRC intends to expand its control to the median line and turn the Taiwan Strait into a “quasi-inland sea.”[4]

The increase in maritime traffic in the Taiwan Strait risks a greater number of accidents and other incidents involving PRC and ROC vessels. The PRC may use such incidents as a further excuse to intensify its “law enforcement” operations against Taiwanese nationals or extend the geographic scope of such operations. Taiwanese fishermen and law enforcement authorities have reported occasional CCG operations in waters east of the median line, including attempts to expel Taiwanese fishermen from international waters near Penghu that are within Taiwan’s claimed Exclusive Economic Zone.[5]

CCG ships intruded into Taiwan’s restricted waters around Kinmen twice on August 16, the day the PRC’s fishing moratorium ended, and twice on August 21. Taiwan’s CGA reported that four CCG ships entered Taiwan’s restricted waters around Kinmen at 9:00 am and again at 3:00 pm on August 16, three hours before and after the PRC fishing moratorium ended at noon, respectively. The ships stayed in Kinmen’s restricted waters for two hours each time. The CCG did not announce the incursions.[6] The CCG conducted a very similar pair of incursions on August 21. Four ships simultaneously entered Kinmen’s southern restricted waters at four separate points at 8:50 am and left at 11:00 am. They entered again at 2:50 pm and left at 5:00 pm. The incursions were ten minutes longer on August 21 than on August 16 but were otherwise nearly identical.[7] The Fujian CCG announced the August 21 patrols. It said that it had organized a fleet to “continuously strengthen law enforcement patrols in the waters near Kinmen” in August, especially after the fishing season started. The CCG said that it will further strengthen the control of the waters, “safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese fishermen, including those in Taiwan,” and “effectively ensure the normal navigation and operation order in the Xiamen-Kinmen waters.”[8]

The PRC normalized Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) patrols around Kinmen in response to the deaths of two PRC fishermen whose boat capsized while fleeing a CGA pursuit in Kinmen’s prohibited waters on February 14. The CCG carried out incursions into Kinmen’s restricted and prohibited waters an average of five times per month between February and July. The CCG has continued its incursions into Kinmen’s waters despite the PRC and ROC recently resolving some disputes related to the February 14 capsizing incident. This indicates that the PRC remains committed to its long-term campaign of using law enforcement to establish the PRC’s legal jurisdiction around Taiwan’s outlying islands.

The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) rejected and condemned the findings of a Taiwanese investigation that exonerated Taiwan’s Coast Guard in the February 14 capsizing incident. Two PRC fishermen died on February 14 while fleeing a Taiwanese CGA pursuit in prohibited waters around Kinmen, a Taiwanese island group two miles from the PRC. The CGA boat and PRC fishing boat collided during the chase, after which the fishing boat sank. The Kinmen Prosecutor’s Office released the results of an investigation into the incident on August 16 and announced it would not prosecute the CGA personnel. It determined that the CGA personnel were not at fault in the collision and acted legally during the pursuit.[9] TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian rejected the investigation’s findings, claiming they “disregard facts and deliberately shirk responsibilities.” She called on Taiwan to disclose the truth about the incident, “severely punish” those responsible, and prevent similar incidents in the future.[10]

The Taiwanese prosecutors released their findings weeks after PRC and ROC authorities concluded negotiations on June 30 over the capsizing incident. The ROC released the bodies of the deceased fishermen and their boat to the PRC and apologized for not recording the incident. The details of the agreement are not public. The PRC subsequently released two of the three Taiwanese fishermen it had detained, including a former soldier it had held since March.[11]

The TAO’s reaction to the investigation’s findings is consistent with PRC demands during earlier rounds of negotiations in March, in which the PRC demanded that Taiwan reveal the truth and apologize for the incident, in addition to returning the boat and bodies. The PRC may seize on Taiwan’s decision not to prosecute anyone for the incident as an outstanding grievance that demands retribution, such as further “law enforcement” actions against Taiwan around Kinmen’s waters.

PRC researchers at Xiamen University released and quickly deleted a report advocating for the establishment of a “shadow government” that would be prepared to take control of Taiwan after “reunification.” Xiamen University’s Cross Strait Urban Planning Institute posted the short article on August 5 on the PRC social media platform WeChat. The article called for the immediate establishment of a Central Taiwan Work Committee that would be primed to enter Taiwan as a “shadow government” as soon as the PRC “reunifies” Taiwan. The committee would deeply study Taiwan’s existing system to figure out a way to “digest” the system, determine which institutions to preserve and which to change, and incorporate Taiwanese elites into the design of the new government to smooth the regime change process. The committee would also unite “anti-independence” forces in Taiwan. The post argued that the Kuomintang (KMT), the relatively PRC-friendly political party in Taiwan, is softening its “anti-independence” stance and moving toward “implicit Taiwan independence,” while “pro-unification” forces are generally disorganized and vilified in Taiwanese society. It said the establishment of the Central Taiwan Work Committee could systematize and institutionalize forces against Taiwan's independence, support them as the Communist International supported the Chinese Communist Party in its early days, and make Taiwanese people feel a greater sense of urgency with regard to unification.

The post also advocated for the establishment of a “Taiwan governance pilot zone” to conduct policy experiments, train cadres, and demonstrate what post-unification governance might look like. It proposed to situate the pilot zone in the districts of the cities of Xiamen and Quanzhou nearest to Taiwan’s Kinmen islands and to incorporate retired Taiwanese military, government, and education personnel as consultants for the pilot zone. Xiamen and Quanzhou are in Fujian Province, which is already the center of many cross-strait integration initiatives due to its location directly across the Taiwan Strait from Taiwan. The paper argued that the One Country, Two Systems model of governance that the PRC applied to Hong Kong may not be suitable for Taiwan and that the PRC should aim to fully integrate Taiwan right away.[12]

It is unclear the extent to which the post reflects the views of CCP officials. The names of the authors were not listed on the article and the post was deleted soon after posting without explanation. Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post reported that the Xiamen research institute said it would republish the article later. The research institute has not done so as of August 21.[13] Mainland PRC media did not report on the article. Xiamen University is one of at least 75 public universities subordinate to the PRC Ministry of Education.[14] The Cross-Strait Urban Planning Institute is part of its architecture and civil engineering school.

China

The PRC announced that it will implement export controls for antimony on September 15.[15] The US Department of Interior designated antimony as a critical mineral to the economy and national security in 2018.[16] Antimony has a variety of military applications, including night vision goggles, strengthening shielding materials, explosives, flares, nuclear weapons, and infrared sensors.[17] The export controls on antimony follow a pattern of the PRC’s increasing securitization of critical minerals. The PRC implemented export restrictions on gallium and germanium in August 2023 and high-grade graphite in December 2023.[18] All three minerals are US-designated critical minerals. Gallium and germanium have applications in aerospace, military, and telecommunications due to their use in the manufacture of optoelectronic devices and fundamental inputs such as integrated circuits, semiconductors, and transistors.[19] Graphite has extensive industrial and military applications, including the manufacture of missile guidance systems, artillery components, firearms, and military aircraft.[20]

The PRC’s export controls will complicate the United States’ access to antimony. The PRC is the world’s leading producer of antimony, accounting for 48% of global production in 2023. The PRC accounted for 63% of US antimony imports from 2019–2022.[21] The United States has not mined its antimony since 2001.[22] The United States’ annual demand for antimony is greater than any other single country’s mine production.[23]

The PRC is also taking steps to secure its supply of critical minerals as it closes off access to other countries. PRC Minister of Natural Resources Wang Guanghua publicly urged the PRC to increase production of strategic minerals to guard against “unexpected domestic or external emergencies that could bring negative impacts.”[24] Improving access to strategic minerals for national security purposes was among the policy measures that the PRC outlined in a resolution following the Third Plenum in July.[25] PRC Premier Li Qiang toured Australian lithium processing plants on June 17, following an agreement to repair ties after several years of trade tensions.[26] The PRC Ministry of Natural Resources designated lithium as a strategic mineral in 2016.[27]

The PRC encountered a recent setback regarding its access to rare earth minerals in Australia, however. Australian Treasurer Jim Chalmers ordered the PRC national-owned Yuxiao Fund from an Australian rare earth mining company on June 3 after using apparent proxy companies to increase its stake, despite denial by the government’s Foreign Investment Review Board.[28] A corporate filing from 2023 reveals the head of the Yuxiao Fund, Wu Tao, as a mining magnate with connections to the PRC government.[29]

Southeast Asia

Philippines

A Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ship rammed a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) ship twice near Sabina Shoal on August 19. The collisions caused significant damage to the hull of the PCG ship. The PCG ship continued its mission to supply personnel at other Philippine-occupied islands in the South China Sea, however.[30] The Sabina Shoal is 75 nautical miles from the Philippine island of Palawan and is within the Philippines’ United Nations-recognized Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Sabina Shoal belongs to the Spratly Islands, which is a semi-submerged archipelago that the PRC and Philippines both claim in its entirety. CCG and Chinese Maritime Militia (CMM) boats frequently resort to ramming against rival claimants in the South China Sea to deter their presence in PRC-claimed waters without escalating to outright violence.[31]

The CCG and PRC MFA stated that the Philippines was responsible for the incident and that the PCG ship deliberately caused the collision.[32] PCG spokesperson Jay Tarriela denied the PRC’s version of events and blamed the CCG for the collision.[33] The US Department of State issued a press statement that condemned the PRC for deliberately colliding with the PCG ship and reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to defending the Philippines in the South China Sea under the two countries’ mutual defense treaty.[34]

The PRC and the Philippines both accuse each other of attempting to establish footing at Sabina Shoal to assert control over the feature. PCG spokesperson Jay Tarriela stated on May 11 that the PCG was committed to maintaining a presence at Sabina Shoal to monitor PRC attempts at land reclamation, which he claimed aimed to build an artificial island on the shoal.[35] The PRC MFA stated that the accusation was an attempt to mislead the international community.[36] The CCG anchored its largest ship near Sabina Shoal on July 3 and remained there for 38 days.[37] The PRC communicated its intent to stop the Philippines from adding to its presence there days before the incident. State-owned tabloid Global Times reported on August 14 that the PRC would not allow the Philippines to “expand its occupation” of the shoal.[38]

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson stated on August 16 and 19 that the Philippines’ presence at Sabina Shoal violates the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC).[39] The DOC is a non-binding document between ASEAN countries and the PRC that affirms the signatories’ commitment not to act in an escalatory manner or resort to violence in territorial disputes.[40] The PRC’s accusation possibly refers to a provision of the DOC that states that members will refrain from inhabiting previously uninhabited features in the South China Sea. The PRC’s ramming of the PCG ship represents its own violation of the DOC’s provision not to use violence in territorial disputes. The parties have failed to solidify a binding code during the last two decades amid the PRC’s aggressive militarization of the South China Sea. The PRC denied the validity of alternative regional security frameworks in response to the Philippines’ calls in November to establish an ASEAN-led South China Sea code of conduct.[41]

A PRC-controlled Sabina Shoal would improve the PRC’s ability to assert its claim over the Second Thomas Shoal and other nearby features in the South China Sea. The PRC has built military infrastructure on the features of the Spratly Islands that it occupies to counter the Philippines’ claims in the South China Sea. For example, the PRC’s two most militarized features in the Spratly Islands are Subi Reef and Mischief Reef, both of which are directly adjacent to the two most militarized Philippine-controlled features, Thitu Island and Second Thomas Shoal, respectively. The infrastructure on both of the PRC-controlled features enables the PRC to sustain deployments of naval ships and aircraft in the South China Sea.[42]

Controlling the shoal, which is near the Philippines as one of the easternmost features in the Spratly Islands, likely would enable the PRC to more easily intercept Philippine vessels sailing from Palawan to prevent them from accessing or establishing a presence around other disputed features. PRC infrastructure on the shoal, especially facilities that accommodate CCG or naval vessels, would better position CCG ships to frustrate Philippine resupply missions to the Sierra Madre military outpost on Second Thomas Shoal, which is 35 nautical miles to the west.

Vietnam

The PRC and Vietnam signed fourteen economic deals and pledged to increase diplomatic efforts pertaining to the South China Sea. These agreements reflect Vietnam’s desire to avoid picking sides in South China Sea disputes. Vietnamese President To Lam met with Xi Jinping on August 14, during which they signed fourteen bilateral agreements, mostly focusing on infrastructure and trade regulations. The PRC and Vietnam also issued a joint declaration on August 20 that reiterated their desire to diplomatically resolve issues in the South China Sea and cooperate to build a “China-Vietnam community of shared destiny with strategic significance.”[43] The two countries agreed that they would implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and push for the negotiation of the South China Sea Code of Conduct (COC). The COC is an agreement between the PRC and ASEAN member states that has been under negotiation for over a decade. The COC will provide guidelines for state behavior in disputed waters to reduce maritime tensions in the region.[44] The PRC and ASEAN have had difficulty completing negotiations due to disagreements on the proposed geographic scope of the COC and the binding nature of such an agreement.[45] This led to the completion of the non-binding DOC in 2002, with sporadic negotiation attempts taking place up to the present day.[46] Defense ministers and public security officials from the PRC and Vietnam also met and promised to continue bilateral engagement on security issues.[47]

These high-level meetings occurred only a few weeks after the announcement of joint coast guard exercises between Vietnam and the Philippines and the corresponding agreement to expand coast guard cooperation between the two countries. Both the Philippines and Vietnam have experienced PRC incursions into their territorial waters, but the two countries have pursued very different courses of action regarding the PRC. Vietnam’s engagement with CCP leadership indicates that they see positive relations with the PRC as a key component of their national security and economic development.

Myanmar

The PRC promised to support the Myanmar junta’s upcoming elections and plans for government transition. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Myanmar from August 14–15.[48] Wang met with top leaders from Myanmar’s State Administration Council (SAC), who took control of the country in a military coup in 2021. During this meeting, Wang reiterated the PRC’s support for the SAC and expressed his desire for the SAC to bring about an end to the conflict. The PRC has supported the SAC since the coup occurred, and the two governments have been working together on a number of cooperative efforts including building the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, maintaining existing oil and gas pipelines, and reducing transnational crime.[49] The PRC brokered a short-lived ceasefire between the SAC and a group of militias known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance after the militias conducted the massive Operation 1027 joint offensive along the PRC border last October.[50] Since the resumption of fighting this June, resistance forces have taken even more territory within the border areas.[51]

The PRC has promised additional support for the SAC’s upcoming census and elections. Wang Yi reiterated the PRC’s support for democratic transition in Myanmar during an August 16 meeting with leaders from Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia.[52] During this meeting Wang also stated the PRC’s support for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ “Five-Point Consensus,” the organization’s peace plan for Myanmar. Pro-democracy forces in Myanmar widely criticized the Five Point Consensus and claimed that it was a way to legitimize the junta’s control. The junta’s proposed elections have been widely criticized, as the junta has forcibly dissolved almost 40 political parties in Myanmar and banned several others from participating in the upcoming election.[53] The dissolved parties include the National League for Democracy (NLD), whose overwhelming electoral victory in 2021 sparked the military coup.

The United States met with representatives from Myanmar’s opposition movement after Wang’s statements. US State Department Counselor Tom Sullivan and USAID Assistant Administrator Michael Schiffer met with leading members of Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG), the National Unity Consultative Council, and representatives for key Ethnic Resistance Organizations.[54] During this meeting, the US representatives voiced their support for the opposition and stated that they would continue to expand direct support to pro-democracy actors and improve their ability to provide humanitarian aid and public services to those in need. While the US representatives also called for an end to the crisis, analysts believe that recent rebel victories will embolden opposition groups to move towards areas in central Myanmar.[55]

Indonesia

Indonesia and the PRC agreed to organize joint military training as part of their first “2+2” diplomatic and military dialogue. Indonesia will host a US-led regional military exercise next week. Senior PRC and Indonesian foreign ministry and defense officials met in the two countries’ first “2+2” dialogue in Jakarta on August 12 to discuss strengthening diplomatic and defense ties. A statement that the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released on August 13 announced cooperation on various issues including joint military training.[56] It did not provide any details on the arrangement. Indonesia will host the US-led Super Garuda Shield exercises from August 26 to September 5. The exercises will include dozens of other countries including Japan, Australia, South Korea, Germany, Singapore, and Malaysia.[57]

Indonesia has participated in separate joint military exercises with the PRC and the United States as part of a policy of engaging with both major powers to avoid being drawn into one side of the geopolitical rivalry.[58] Indonesia’s push for military modernization, spearheaded by Defense Minister and incoming president Prabowo Subianto, may lead to closer defense cooperation and new arms deals with other countries including the PRC. The South China Morning Post cited analysts who said Indonesia has been “lukewarm” about developing a defense partnership with the PRC, however. Indonesia procures most of its military equipment from European and other Western-aligned countries.[59]

Europe

Germany

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) criticized the scheduled transit of two German warships through the Taiwan Strait in September. The German frigate Baden-Wuerttemberg and replenishment ship Frankfurt am Main are visiting ports in East Asia and awaiting orders to transit the Taiwan Strait in September. The United States and other nations have sent warships through the Taiwan Strait several times in 2024, including a Canadian transit on July 31. The upcoming German transit will be Germany’s first since 2002, however.[60] MFA spokesperson Mao Ning responded to the news and said that “China has always opposed undermining China's territorial sovereignty and security under the guise of ‘freedom of navigation.’”[61] The PRC perceives itself as surrounded by a coalition of US-aligned nations that seek to contain it. It has repeatedly criticized “external interference” in the region and especially in the “Taiwan question,” which it considers to be its internal affair.

Russia

PRC Premier Li Qiang traveled to Russia to meet with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin for the 29th meeting between PRC and Russian prime ministers on August 21. The PRC readout called for the PRC and Russia to strengthen coordination in international affairs, better safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Russia and China, and promote the continuous development of the comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership between the two countries in the new era.[62] The two prime ministers signed an updated version of the PRC-Russia investment cooperation planning outline as well as cooperation agreements spanning education, science and technology, chemicals, green construction, maritime search and rescue, cross-border cargo transportation, and facilitation of citizen exchanges.

Mishustin stated that the two countries should jointly defend their interests and the principles of the multipolar world order in the face of pressure from Western sanctions. Mishustin claimed that Western countries wanted to contain the PRC and Russia’s economic and technological potential to maintain their global dominance.[63]

Li met with Russian President Vladimir Putin after meeting with Mishustin. Li expressed the PRC’s interest in expanding cooperation with Russia outside of traditional areas to include scientific and technological innovation in emerging sectors.[64] Li signaled the PRC’s willingness to strengthen multilateral coordination with Russia and promote multi-polarization.

Iran

Iran is seeking security partnerships with two Chinese satellite companies specializing in low-cost satellites capable of capturing high-resolution imagery.[65] This capability could enable Iran to enhance its intelligence-gathering capabilities to improve the effectiveness of its strikes. The Washington Post, citing unspecified Western security officials, reported on August 16 that Iran is seeking a partnership with two Chinese satellite companies specializing in manufacturing and operating small, low-cost satellites with optical equipment capable of producing high-resolution images. The Washington Post reported that the optical equipment of the Chinese satellites is “at least twice as sensitive” as the most advanced satellites currently operated by Iran. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Chinese companies have exchanged multiple delegations over the past few months in an attempt to secure these partnerships.

Higher resolution satellite imagery could allow Iranian military services to improve their targeting practices for future operations targeting US, Israeli, and Arab military bases. Iran would also almost certainly share this targeting information with its proxies and partners to enable their attacks. Iranian state media previously reported in July 2020 that the IRGC used its satellites to collect intelligence on US military positions in the region.[66] The United States previously sanctioned one of the companies Iran is pursuing a partnership with, Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., due to its support for Russia’s Wagner Group.[67]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, August 9, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, and Alexander Richter of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: August 12, 2024 at 5pm ET

Key Takeaways

The PRC released four members of a Taiwanese fishing boat on August 13, whom it detained near Kinmen on July 2. The crew’s release does not indicate a change in the PRC’s long-term coercion campaign against Taiwan, however.
The PRC exempted Fujian residents from a travel ban covering Taiwan’s Matsu islands, possibly to make decoupling from the PRC a politically unpopular policy among Matsu residents.
ROC officials warned that PRC outreach to religious groups in Taiwan is a national security risk.
The PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the National Endowment for Democracy of carrying out subversive activities against the PRC under the guise of democracy promotion.
The PLA Air Force conducted unsafe and unprofessional maneuvers while intercepting a Philippine military transport plane over Scarborough Shoal. This was the first time that the Philippine–PRC disputes in the South China Sea led to an aerial confrontation.
The PRC reiterated its support for Iran and called for Israel to end the war in Gaza following the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The PRC released four members of a Taiwanese fishing boat on August 13, whom it detained near Kinmen on July 2.[1] The crew’s release does not indicate a change in the PRC’s long-term coercion campaign against Taiwan, however. The PRC continues to hold the Taiwanese captain of the crew and the boat, with no confirmed date for their release. The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) detained the crew and boat for fishing in PRC waters during a seasonal fishing moratorium. The crew’s release comes after the PRC and ROC made progress in resolving the handling of the February 14 capsizing incident, in which two PRC fishermen died while fleeing from a Taiwanese Coast Guard pursuit near Kinmen. Kinmen is a group of Taiwan-controlled islands with a large military garrison roughly 3 kilometers from the coast of the PRC. The July 30 deal concludes lengthy backchannel negotiations that stalled in early March, resulting in the ROC returning the bodies of the deceased and paying restitution to their families. The PRC released a Taiwanese former soldier that it held for nearly five months on August 7 after the deal.[2]

Since the February 14 capsizing incident, the CCG has conducted frequent violations of Taiwan’s maritime jurisdiction in the waters around Kinmen, which peaked in May around President Lai’s inauguration. Several commercial PRC drones have also flown over Kinmen in recent months.[3] This phenomenon has previously occurred during periods of high cross-strait tensions, which suggests that it is a PRC-directed gray zone warfare activity.[4]

The capsizing incident triggered the PRC’s aggression around Kinmen, but its coercive actions are part of a broader campaign to exert pressure on Taiwan after the election of President Lai Ching-te. Since Lai’s election, the PRC has conducted large-scale military exercises that encircled Taiwan, nearly brought Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) incursions to an all-time high, and announced legal guidelines that threaten severe punishment for Taiwanese “separatists.”

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) lodged diplomatic objections to Japan’s detention of two ROC-registered fishing vessels on behalf of Taiwan and denied the ROC government’s legitimacy. The Japanese Fisheries Agency vessel detained an ROC fishing vessel on July 5 for illegally fishing 1.5 nautical miles past a “designated enforcement line” near Amami Oshima.[5] The Japanese Coast Guard detained a second ROC fishing vessel on July 28 for illegally fishing inside Japan’s territorial waters near Yonaguni.[6] Japanese authorities subsequently fined and released both vessels within two days of detention.[7]

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated on August 9 that “Japan has no right to take law enforcement measures against “Chinese fishing vessels,” citing the China-Japan Fisheries Agreement.[8] The PRC and Japan signed the agreement in 1975, which outlines procedures for dispute settlements and fishing regulations in agreed-upon waters.[9] The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) rebuked the PRC’s interference and said that this case is a maritime matter between Taiwan and Japan. MOFA stated that the matter has been resolved in accordance with international maritime regulations and bilateral mechanisms. [10]

The PRC uses international dialogue to act as a voice for Taiwan and deny the legitimacy of the ROC government.[11] The PRC Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN Geng Shuang thanked the international community for its “sympathy and concern” on April 3 after Taiwan experienced a damaging earthquake.[12] The ROC MOFA condemned “China’s shameless behavior” and stated that “only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent Taiwan’s 23.5 million people internationally.”[13]

The PRC exempted Fujian residents from a travel ban covering Taiwan’s Matsu islands, possibly to make decoupling from the PRC a politically unpopular policy among Matsu residents. Matsu (officially Lienchiang County) is a Taiwan-controlled group of islands 10 kilometers off the mainland coast at their closest point and home to roughly 13,000 people. The first mainland tour group since 2019 arrived in Matsu on August 9. The PRC suspended individual tourism to Taiwan in 2019, citing poor cross-strait relations.[14] It then suspended group tours to Taiwan in 2020 during the pandemic and maintained the restrictions on Taiwan despite resuming group travel to more than 70 countries in August 2023.[15]

Matsu is the target of a series of PRC economic integration programs that likely aim to foster the islands’ economic dependence on the mainland and build political support for cross-strait integration. The Fujian provincial government in the PRC announced on April 28 the “Fuzhou-Matsu City Pass,” a 300 RMB (approximately 42 USD) benefits card that facilitates the travel and settlement of Matsu residents in Fuzhou, the capital of Fujian province.[16] The card offers Matsu residents discounted rides on transportation and hotels in Fuzhou, free tours of Fuzhou's major cultural attractions, housing benefits, and dedicated hotline consultation for children's education, employment, and entrepreneurship. The Fujian government also announced that it will promote the construction of transportation and industrial infrastructure, such as airports, high-speed rails, highways, and ports, to increase connectivity between Fuzhou and Matsu. The PRC announced another batch of policies on May 16 that aim to strengthen economic integration with trade, investment, and employment incentives.[17]

Tourism is an important source of revenue for Matsu to offset lesser military presence after significant force reductions in the past two decades, which shrunk the county’s military garrison to just 2,000 people from 20,000.[18] Lienchiang County Director of Transportation and Tourism Liu Hsing-chien stated Matsu received approximately 22,000 tourists from the PRC in 2019, representing approximately 10% of total tourist arrivals.[19] Professor Huang Cheng-tsung of Providence University’s Department of Tourism in Taiwan estimated that the potential daily tourism revenue would be 260,000 USD if the islands’ hotels reached full capacity.[20]

ROC officials warned that PRC outreach to religious groups in Taiwan is a national security risk. President Lai Ching-te spoke at a Buddhist temple in Taichung on August 9 and warned that the PRC is using religious pretenses to lure Taiwanese people to the mainland.[21] Lai stated that the exchanges are a risk to national security and urged people not to let the PRC swindle them. Taiwan’s Ministry of Interior (MOI) warned on August 10 that an account on the popular messaging platform LINE may be a CCP front carrying out United Front activities.[22] The United Front is a whole-of-government and society effort to advance the CCP’s ideology and win the hearts and minds of Chinese-ethnic people by forming a thorough alliance between the CCP and the rest of society. The MOI stated that it contacted the Taiwan Taoist Provincial Church, the supposed parent organization, which denied that it had established a cross-strait youth league. Former Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Minister Chiu Tai-san stated in October 2023 that religious exchanges enable the CCP to collect information on Taiwanese people and learn which people hold influence in certain communities.[23]

The PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS) claimed it destroyed Taiwanese espionage networks in the PRC. The MSS posted on the social media WeChat on August 13 that it discovered over 1,000 instances of Taiwanese espionage during major operations in recent years. It said that it severely punished “spies who carried out intelligence theft, infiltration, and sabotage activities.” It specifically mentioned Taiwanese political activist Yang Chih-yuan, who was detained in August 2022 in Wenzhou, Zhejiang province, and charged with secessionism in 2023. The MSS accused Yang of being a “Taiwan independence” leader and claimed his arrest was a “heavy blow [and] a strong deterrent” to Taiwanese pro-independence “separatists.”[24] The MSS post is part of a trend of PRC crackdowns on Taiwanese “separatism” following Lai Ching-te’s presidential election victory in January and inauguration in May. The PRC released an authoritative “legal opinion” in June that threatened “Taiwan independence diehards” with penalties up to life imprisonment and death. The Taiwan Affairs Office and Ministry of Public Security added website sections on August 7 with information about Taiwanese “separatism” and how to report it to authorities. They included the names of ten Taiwanese political figures that the PRC designated “Taiwan independence diehards” in 2021 and 2022.

China

The PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) accused the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) of carrying out subversive activities against the PRC under the guise of democracy promotion. The MFA released a report on August 9 entitled “The National Endowment for Democracy: What it is and what it does,” accusing the NED of implementing US government-supported infiltration, subversion, and sabotage operations around the world.[25] The NED is a US non-governmental organization focused on promoting democracy around the world that receives a portion of its funding from the US Congress. In 2019 the MFA released a report accusing the NED of being a front for US intelligence operations and funding anti-PRC groups in Hong Kong.[26] The NED was one of several US NGOs to be sanctioned by the PRC for “instigating extremely violent criminal activities” in Hong Kong.

The most recent MFA report accuses the NED of instigating “color revolutions,” cultivating pro-US forces in foreign countries, interfering in foreign elections, and working to undermine stability in foreign states. The MFA accuses the NED of working to “incite division” within the PRC by supporting Taiwan independence forces, colluding with anti-China forces in Hong Kong, providing support to a number of Uyghur activists and organizations, and meeting with the Tibetan government-in-exile. The MFA accuses the NED of engaging in subversion utilizing a number of capabilities in the information, economic, diplomatic, and political domains for the purpose of inciting change in unfriendly regimes. Representatives from the NED have not released a statement responding to the MFA’s accusations.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) conducted unsafe and unprofessional maneuvers while intercepting a Philippine military transport plane over Scarborough Shoal. This was the first time that Philippine–PRC disputes in the South China Sea led to an aerial confrontation. Philippine military officials stated that two PLAAF aircraft flew very close to a Philippine Air Force (PAF) light transport plane that was on patrol near Scarborough Shoal on August 8 and launched at least eight flares in the flight path of the PAF plane, putting the plane at risk.[27] The Philippines’ National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea condemned the PLA’s “irresponsible, unprofessional, illegal and dangerous acts” and called on the PRC to cease “all forms of provocative and hazardous acts that could undermine the safety of Filipino military and civilian personnel in the waters or in the skies, destabilize regional peace, and erode the trust and confidence of the international community in the PRC.”[28] The Philippines filed a diplomatic protest against Beijing on August 13 over the incident.[29]

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Lin Jian claimed the Philippines intruded into the “adjacent airspace of Huangyan Dao” (Scarborough Shoal) on August 7 and August 8, which infringed on PRC sovereignty and international law. He claimed the PLA took “necessary and lawful measures in response” and called the PLAAF maneuvers “professional” and “consistent with Chinese and international law.” Lin accused the Philippines of sending its aircraft into Scarborough Shoal’s airspace as a “deliberate provocation” during a joint patrol with US, Australian, and Canadian forces in the South China Sea.[30] A statement from the PLA’s Southern Theater Command, which is responsible for the South China Sea, likewise accused the Philippines of illegally intruding into PRC airspace and said that the incursion disrupted a PLA training exercise.[31]

The PRC and the Philippines both claim Scarborough Shoal as their territory. The PRC has maintained de facto control of the shoal since 2012 but has not built any infrastructure on it. The PRC conducted a joint air and sea combat patrol around Scarborough Shoal on August 7 on the same day as the Philippines, United States, Canada, and Australia held joint drills in the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).[32] The Philippine government said the PLA Navy sent three ships to tail its joint exercises with its partners.[33]

The aerial confrontation is the first since PRC–Philippine hostilities in the South China Sea began to heat up in 2023.[34] Some Philippine and other Southeast Asian analysts assess that the PRC may begin to employ military harassment and gray-zone tactics against the Philippines in the aerial domain, in the latest escalation of the two countries’ territorial disputes.[35] Philippine Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Maria Theresa Lazaro said the Philippines will review a provisional agreement the two sides reached on July 22 regarding resupply missions in the South China Sea. The provisional agreement, which Lazaro helped negotiate, was aimed at de-escalating tensions in the South China Sea after a series of violent confrontations surrounding Philippine missions to resupply soldiers at Second Thomas Shoal, another South China Sea maritime feature that both countries claim.[36] The PRC observed but did not impede a Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal on July 27.[37]

Indonesia

The PRC is taking steps to deepen diplomatic and defense ties with Indonesia, likely to counter Western influence with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The PRC held its first “2+2” diplomatic and military dialogue with Indonesia in Jakarta on August 12. PRC Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Sun Weidong and Deputy Director of the Office for International Military Cooperation of the Central Military Commission Zhang Baoqun met with their Indonesian counterparts Abdul Kadir Jailani, Director General of Asia-Pacific and African Affairs at the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Brigadier General Oktaheroe Ramsi, Secretary of the Directorate General for Defense Strategy at the Indonesian Ministry of Defense. Sun also met with Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi and Deputy Foreign Minister Pahala Mansury on the same day. A PRC readout said the two sides discussed diplomatic and defense strategic cooperation and reached a series of “common understandings.” They also discussed issues of common concern including management of differences in the South China Sea through peaceful negotiations. The readout also said this inaugural 2+2 dialogue marks a new level of strategic mutual trust between the two countries.[38]

The PRC also has proposed naval sales to Indonesia in recent months. Representatives from the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) have traveled to Indonesia to propose discounted offers on PRC S26T diesel-electric submarines (SSK) and guided-missile destroyers. The South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that the offer is in the “proposal” stage but would be Indonesia’s largest purchase of PRC defense equipment if it goes through. Indonesia has procured anti-ship missiles, drones, and self-propelled air defense systems from the PRC. It has procured most of its military equipment from France, Italy, Sweden, Belgium, the United States, and South Korea, however. PRC-produced equipment has made up less than 0.1% of Indonesia’s defense acquisitions since 2014. The SCMP cited analysts who said Indonesia has been “lukewarm” about developing a defense partnership with the PRC, even as its defense minister and president-elect Prabowo Subianto has pushed for military modernization.[39]

Some PRC media and analysts are presenting PRC–Indonesia cooperation as a model of PRC–ASEAN relations in contrast to the hostile PRC–Philippines relationship. PRC state-owned media Global Times cited Chen Xiangmiao, director of the World Navy Research Center at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCSS), who said the PRC and Indonesia were likely to discuss negotiations on the South China Sea Code of Conduct. NISCSS is a government-affiliated think tank. Chen said Indonesia was concerned that tensions in the South China Sea, particularly between the PRC and the US-aligned Philippines, may force members of ASEAN to choose sides in the US–PRC geopolitical contest. He said Indonesia may wish to play a mediating role in the South China Sea.[40] Indonesia is a minor player in the multinational South China Sea dispute, as its EEZ extending from the Natuna Islands overlaps with the PRC’s Nine Dash Line claims that cover most of the South China Sea.[41]

Russia

The PRC and Russia may begin barter trade to evade payment issues related to Western sanctions on Russia. 98 percent of PRC banks are rejecting payments in Chinese yuan from Russia. Reuters cited three unspecified Russian sources who are closely involved in Russia–PRC trade and payments, who claimed that the PRC and Russia expect to reach deals involving barter trade as soon as this autumn. The sources said that Russia is developing regulations for barter trading and assumed the PRC is doing the same. One source said Russia is discussing ways to export food products to the PRC using a barter system. Another source said companies were discussing trading metal from Russia for machines from the PRC. Barter trade circumvents the use of payment systems that Western regulators monitor, allowing traders from the two countries to do business without fear of stopped payments or secondary sanctions. Unspecified Russian sources said that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Beijing in May helped to facilitate alternative payment means between the two countries to some extent, but major difficulties and political problems remain.[42]

The PRC and Russia’s attempts to implement barter trade show both the effectiveness and the limits of Western-led sanctions on Russia over Russia’s war in Ukraine. The PRC is Russia’s largest trading partner and faces criticism for its support of Russia’s defense industrial base. However, PRC banks have increased restrictions on trade with Russia since at least December 2023, after the European Union imposed its 12th sanctions package against Russia and the United States authorized secondary sanctions on financial institutions that help Russia evade sanctions. Three of the PRC’s “Big Four” state banks and many smaller PRC banks began rejecting payments from sanctioned Russian financial institutions since the start of 2024. Russian newspaper Izvestia reported on August 12 that 98% of PRC banks are now rejecting yuan payments from Russia.[43] Russian business newspaper Kommersant reported on July 29 that around 80 percent of payments in Chinese yuan are being returned to Russia.[44] Besides bartering, Russian companies are being forced to use "trading houses” as intermediaries or to make use of small local banks or PRC-based subsidiaries of Russian banks that are not significantly involved in trade with the United States. These workarounds enable some trade but increase the cost and difficulty of trade compared to normal transactions without sanctions.[45]

Iran

The PRC reiterated its support for Iran and called for Israel to end the war in Gaza following the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. Israel killed Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 30. The PRC condemned the assassination and expressed concern that it would result in further regional upheaval.[46] PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi called acting Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani on August 11 to reiterate the PRC’s support for Iran’s defense of its sovereignty.[47] Wang condemned the assassination, blaming those responsible for undermining ceasefire negotiations and increasing tensions. Bagheri Kani stated that he hoped the PRC would play a bigger role in de-escalating tensions in Gaza.

Wang’s comments are part of a broader PRC effort to more closely align itself with Iran. The PRC’s rhetoric has remained consistent since the start of the war, centering on calls for a ceasefire in Gaza and blaming Israel for the increase in regional tensions.[48] PRC responses to attacks on Israel have thus far been muted. Following Iran’s April 13 strike on Israeli territory, the PRC MFA did not condemn Iran’s strike, instead calling for Israel to bring an end to the conflict in Gaza and avoid further spillover of conflict.[49]

The PRC has used the Israel–Hamas war to build better relations with the Arab States, likely to cement the PRC as a key player in the Middle East and present itself as a potential economic and diplomatic partner for states seeking to distance themselves from the US due to its alliance with Israel. The PRC has been working to foster negotiations and peace deals since the outbreak of conflict, with the most recent instance being the July 23 signing of the Beijing Declaration between Hamas and Fatah.[50] The Arab League (AL) expressed support for the Beijing Declaration and the PRC’s peace efforts. The AL stated that the PRC’s support for Palestine was commendable and showed the strength of relations between the Arab States and the PRC.[51] Wang also had similar conversations with leaders in Egypt and Jordan, calling for joint efforts to pursue de-escalation and ceasefire in Gaza.[52]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, August 2, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: August 7, 2024 at 5pm ET

Key Takeaways

The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and Ministry of Public Security (MPS) listed the names of ten Taiwanese political figures in new website sections devoted to punishing “Taiwan independence diehards.” The postings are part of a pressure campaign targeted at Taiwan’s new administration of Lai Ching-te and the ruling DPP.
PRC state-sponsored hacker group APT41 likely stole passwords and documents from a Taiwanese government-affiliated research center in July 2023.
The PRC released a Taiwanese former soldier it held for nearly five months — a week after Taiwan returned the bodies of two PRC fishermen who died in the February 14 capsizing incident in Kinmen’s waters. This small breakthrough in tense cross-strait relations is unlikely to change the PRC’s long-term coercion campaign against Taiwan.
The People’s Liberation Army Eastern Theater Command released a video on the PLA’s 97th anniversary that depicts an assault on Taiwan.
The United States imposed sanctions on five individuals and seven entities in Iran and the PRC for facilitating the procurement of components for Iran’s ballistic missile and UAV programs
PRC Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs Li Hui traveled to Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia to generate support for the PRC’s efforts to mediate the war and promote peace talks.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and Ministry of Public Security (MPS) listed the names of ten Taiwanese political figures in new website sections devoted to punishing “Taiwan independence diehards.” The postings are part of a pressure campaign targeted at Taiwan’s new administration of Lai Ching-te and the ruling DPP. The TAO and MPS posted the names on their websites with other information, such as the text of the 2005 Anti-Secession law, legal guidelines about the punishment of Taiwanese “separatists,” relevant statements from PRC officials, and contact information for reporting separatist activities.[1] The names include the following Taiwanese political figures:

Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim
Minister of Defense Wellington Koo
National Security Council Secretary-General Joseph Wu
National Security Council Deputy Secretary-General Lin Fei-fan
Senior Advisor to the President and Former Premier and DPP Chair Su Tseng-chang
DPP Legislative Caucus Whip Ker Chien-ming
Former Premier, Speaker of the Legislative Yuan (LY), and DPP Chair You Si-kun
Legislator and former LY Deputy Speaker Tsai Chi-chang
Legislator Wang Ting-yu
Former Legislator and New Power Party (NPP) Chair Chen Jiau-hua

The TAO originally published a list of “Taiwan independence diehards” in 2021 and included Su, You, and Wu, who at the time were Taiwan’s Premier, Speaker of the LY, and Foreign Minister. It added the other seven names in 2022.[2] Nine of the ten people are prominent members of the DPP, including Su and You who are considered founding members of the party. Chen Jiau-hua was a legislator and chairwoman of the pan-Green (DPP-aligned) New Power Party, a minor party that no longer holds any legislative seats. All members of the list held government offices at the time they were included, except Lin Fei-fan who was a founding member of the 2014 Sunflower Movement and held no political office. Taiwan President Lai Ching-te and former president Tsai Ing-wen are not on the list even though the PRC has repeatedly called them separatists.

The TAO and MPS prominently published this list weeks after the PRC Supreme People’s Court and other institutions issued an authoritative legal opinion that threatened “diehard” advocates of Taiwanese independence with criminal penalties up to life imprisonment and death. The opinion is an authoritative legal interpretation of Article 103 of the PRC’s criminal code, which delineates the crime of “splitting the State and undermining the unity of the country” but does not specifically reference Taiwan.[3] The opinion clarifies how Article 103 should be applied to issues of Taiwanese “separatism” and defines the types of actions that would be subject to criminal prosecution under the criminal code.[4] The PRC could use the policy to arrest pan-Green political figures and activists who travel to the PRC. It can also try and convict suspects in absentia, issue international arrest warrants, and pressure other countries to extradite wanted Taiwanese “separatists” who travel to those countries.

The PRC may add other prominent DPP officials that it considers to be major “separatist” figures in the coming months. It has strongly criticized new president Lai Ching-te as a separatist and intensified its coercion against Taiwan since he took office on May 20, including issuing the “legal opinion,” launching a massive military exercise around Taiwan days after Lai’s inauguration, and rapidly escalating incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone. TAO Spokesperson Zhu Fenglian clarified on June 28 that the new guidelines only target a “very small number of ‘Taiwan independence’ diehards” and do not target the “vast majority” of Taiwanese people, however.[5] Zhu likely intended to reassure Taiwanese nationals who wish to work, invest, and travel in the PRC that the “legal opinion” does not put them in danger. Zhu made the comment after Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council raised the severity of its travel warning for Taiwanese people traveling to the PRC in response to the new legal opinion.[6] Publishing the names of ten “diehard separatists” likely serves the same purpose of reassuring Taiwanese people that the PRC’s “anti-separatist” measures are targeted only at a very small number of specific people.

The PRC state-sponsored hacker group APT41 likely stole passwords and documents from a Taiwanese government-affiliated research center in July 2023. Cisco Systems’ Talos Threat Intelligence Group released a report on August 1 that found a malicious hacking campaign compromised an unspecified Taiwanese government-affiliated research institute on computing. Talos said that the nature of the institute’s work makes it a valuable target for threat actors wishing to obtain proprietary and sensitive technologies. The breach happened in July 2023 and lasted 11 days. Talos assessed with “moderate confidence” that the hackers were part of APT41, also known as Double Dragon, a PRC state-sponsored hacker group that US officials have linked to the PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS).[7] Talos researchers did not assess how much data the cyberattacks stole. APT41 is connected to PRC state-sponsored espionage and financially motivated hacking activities.[8] A spokesperson for the PRC embassy in Washington accused the United States of spreading disinformation and “groundless smears” against the PRC. The spokesperson claimed that the PRC “does not encourage, support or condone attacks launched by hackers.”[9]

The US government and other authorities have designated other cyber threat actors besides APT41, including Volt Typhoon, APT31, and APT40, as affiliated with the MSS.[10] US and foreign partner cybersecurity and intelligence agencies stated on February 7 that Volt Typhoon infiltrated critical infrastructure organizations in the continental United States and US territories. They assessed with high confidence that Volt Typhoon’s goal was to develop the capability to disrupt key operational technology functions in the event of a conflict with the United States.[11] The US Department of Justice accused APT31 of targeting Chinese dissidents in the United States at the behest of the MSS.[12]

The PRC released a Taiwanese former soldier it held for nearly five months a week after Taiwan returned the bodies of two PRC fishermen who died in the February 14 capsizing incident in Kinmen’s waters. This small breakthrough in tense cross-strait relations is unlikely to change the PRC’s long-term coercion campaign against Taiwan, however. The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) rescued the soldier, surnamed Hu, and another man near Taiwan’s Kinmen islands on March 18 after their boat ran out of fuel and drifted into PRC waters. Kinmen is located just 3 kilometers from the PRC city of Xiamen. The CCG promptly released the second man but continued to detain Hu after discovering he was a non-commissioned officer of the Kinmen Defense Command. PRC officials claimed Hu tried to conceal his identity as a soldier.[13] The ROC Army discharged Hu at his family’s request while he was in custody.[14] The PRC allowed him to return home on August 7 following lengthy backchannel negotiations.[15]

Hu’s release was precipitated by successful ROC-PRC negotiations on July 30 on Kinmen that largely resolved a standoff related to the February 14 capsizing incident in Kinmen’s waters. The incident centered on a PRC speedboat that capsized following a collision with a Taiwan Coast Guard Administration (CGA) vessel, killing two PRC fishermen. The speedboat was fleeing a legal CGA pursuit within Taiwan’s prohibited waters around Kinmen. The PRC demanded during many rounds of negotiation that Taiwan return the boat and bodies of the PRC fishermen, pay compensation to the families, provide a full explanation of the incident, and apologize for wrongdoing. Negotiations broke down in early March but resumed and concluded on July 30, when Taiwan handed over the boat, bodies, and monetary compensation as part of an undisclosed agreement with the PRC.[16] Taiwan did not admit wrongdoing and has not concluded its investigation into the incident. Taiwanese legislator Jessica Chen Yu-jen, who represents Kinmen County, said the deadlock over the February 14 incident had hampered negotiations to secure Hu’s release. Chen was a key figure in Taiwan’s efforts to free Hu.[17] PRC state media Xinhua claimed Hu was allowed to return after PRC authorities completed their investigations. It did not reference any negotiations.[18]

The July 30 agreement and Hu’s release from PRC custody may open the path for further negotiations on specific issues, such as securing the release of a Taiwanese fishing crew that the PRC detained on July 2 for illegal fishing in PRC waters. PRC and ROC government officials had a rare face-to-face meeting during the negotiations on Kinmen, apparently a quiet exception to a PRC policy since 2016 of not meeting with ROC officials while the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is in power.[19] The PRC considers the DPP a separatist party. The PRC did not announce the participation of any PRC officials in the talks, however. PRC state media described the head of the PRC delegation, Li Zhaohui, as a “senior consultant” with a local branch of the Red Cross Society of China. It did not mention his role as the deputy director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the city of Quanzhou.[20]

This breakthrough in negotiations likely will not change the trajectory of PRC coercion toward Taiwan and Kinmen, however. The PRC responded to the February 14 capsizing incident by beginning regular CCG patrols around Kinmen, including several incursions each month into Kinmen’s restricted and prohibited waters to assert PRC authority there. The change in CCG activity around Kinmen represents a long-term PRC effort to assert sovereignty over the island and to erode Taiwan’s control of the surrounding waters.

The Kuomintang (KMT) denied a Taiwanese media report it did not send representatives to the July Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) conference in Taipei because of CCP lobbying efforts and threats. IPAC is an international group of legislators that lawmakers from the United States, Canada, UK, Japan, and other allied democracies established in 2020. The organization aims to coordinate an international response to what it perceives as the threats to global trade, security, and human rights posed by the PRC’s rise.[21] The organization now has 250 members from 40 countries including Taiwan. Taiwan joined IPAC during the conference on July 30–31 with co-chairs from the ruling DPP and the smaller Taiwan People’s Party (TPP).[22] No representatives from the KMT attended the IPAC conference. The PRC opposes Taiwan’s participation in most international organizations and considers IPAC to be an “extreme anti-China” group.[23]

Taiwan’s Up Media reported on August 1 based on unspecified sources that the PRC pressured the KMT to skip the conference. It said the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and United Front Work Department jointly lobbied individual KMT legislators and even threatened to suspend KMT-CCP exchanges at all levels if the KMT attended the IPAC conference.[24] Secretary-general of the KMT legislative caucus Hung Mong-kai denied the report as a malicious smear.[25] KMT officials cited a preexisting policy of not sending an official delegation to IPAC meetings but said the party would not prevent members from going if they wished.[26]

A report by Taiwan’s National Audit Office (NAO) showed that foreign vessels including the PRC damaged submarine cables between Taiwan and its outlying islands 36 times from 2019 to 2023. 12 incidents occurred in 2023, the highest number ever in one year. In the most serious case, a PRC fishing boat and a PRC cargo ship damaged both of the submarine cables connecting Taiwan and the Matsu islands on February 2 and February 8, 2023. The damage caused an Internet outage that affected Matsu’s 13,000 residents for 50 days, seriously disrupting communications as well as government services, financial transactions, medical services, and transportation.[27] Taiwan’s government did not claim the cables were severed intentionally or at the direction of the PRC, though some local officials speculated that may be the case.[28] It is unclear which other countries’ vessels have damaged Taiwan’s submarine cables.

Submarine cables are a critical infrastructure that ensure Taiwan’s communications with its outlying islands. Taiwan has ten submarine cables, including two that connect Taiwan to the archipelagos of Kinmen and Matsu. Damage to these submarine cables, whether intentional or accidental, can impair Taiwan’s ability to effectively govern its outlying island territories by cutting off communications and government services. It could also seriously disrupt economic activity in the affected areas. Taiwan is exploring ways to safeguard its connectivity by protecting its cables, laying additional redundant cables, shortening repair times, and setting up satellite communications networks.[29]

China

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command (ETC) released a video on the PLA’s 97th anniversary that depicts an assault on Taiwan.[30] The video, set to rock and roll music, depicts a simulated sequence in which PLA ships and aircraft surround Taiwan as a barrage of missiles strike the island’s major cities. The words that accompanied the video included themes that allude to unification with Taiwan, including “prosperity and unity are linked by the blood of compatriots” and “steadfastly protect national unity and territorial integrity.”

The PLA’s use of imagery of violence against Taiwan is an example of cognitive warfare designed to threaten and intimidate the ROC to deter it from practicing policies that support Taiwanese sovereignty. The ETC released footage in May from large-scale military exercises that encircled Taiwan after President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration, which the PRC claimed was punishment for Lai’s “independence provocations.”[31] The ETC released similar content on the PLA’s anniversary in 2023 that included footage from earlier military exercises around Taiwan that the PLA conducted after then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in 2022.

The PRC is presenting itself as a responsible nuclear power to deflect criticism for its expanding nuclear arsenal. The PRC submitted a working paper to the United Nations that calls on states with nuclear weapons to follow the PRC in adopting a “no first use” policy.[32] The document highlighted the PRC’s commitment and consistent adherence to this policy and stated the PRC’s willingness to engage in discussions with states on the issue.

The PRC’s self-portrayal as a responsible nuclear state and framing of its no first use policy as an example for others to follow aims to counter criticism of unwillingness to meaningfully engage in nuclear arms control talks with the US while it forges ahead with building its nuclear weapons arsenal. The PRC submitted the document on July 12 before suspending arms control and non-proliferation talks with the United States on July 17, citing US arms sales to Taiwan.[33] PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian highlighted the PRC’s no first use policy in response to a joint statement from the US and Japan that expressed concern over the PRC’s lack of transparency and rapid expansion of its nuclear weapons arsenal.[34] Lin stated that the PRC maintains its nuclear arsenal at a minimum level for its own national security and does not engage in arms competition with other countries.[35]

US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan commented on the PRC’s disinterest in “substantive dialogue” on arms control and nuclear non-proliferation prior to the two countries holding rare, semi-official talks in June.[36] Sullivan stated that the PRC had little willingness to “compartmentalize strategic stability from broader issues in the relationship.”[37] The United States and the PRC last held official arms control negotiations in Washington in November 2023 after a five-year hiatus.[38] The meeting occurred a week before President Joe Biden and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping held a summit in San Francisco to stabilize bilateral relations. An unnamed US official familiar with the talks described the PRC’s level of engagement during that meeting as not substantive.[39] The US Under Secretary for Arms Control Bonnie Jenkins stated in Congressional testimony in May that the PRC declined a follow-on meeting and did not provide a substantive response to the risk reduction suggestions that the US side put forth during that meeting.[40] The PRC MFA rejected the notion that the PRC was dragging its feet and stated that the PRC is willing to uphold communication with the US on arms control on the condition that the US respects its “core interests.”[41]

The PRC imposed export controls on a range of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technologies that will take effect on September 1.[42] The restrictions apply to radio communication equipment to control drones, infrared imaging equipment for target indication, civilian anti-drone jamming equipment greater than 5 kilometers, high-powered anti-drone lasers, and more. The announcement added that exporters of drone technology shall not export any items that are not included in the list if they know that the technology will be used for the proliferation of weapons, terrorism, or military purposes. Some commercial drones are also subject to the export controls.[43] The PRC also canceled a temporary ban on the exports of consumer drones that it imposed last year.[44] The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the General Administration of Customs (GAC), and the Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission jointly issued the new controls.

MOFCOM stated in a press release that the controls reflect the PRC’s principle of coordinating economic development with national security, which is conducive to better safeguarding the PRC’s safety and interests.[45] This suggests that the PRC aims to tighten oversight over the sales of its domestically developed drone technology.

The PRC is simultaneously taking steps to promote sales of its military drones. A PRC aviation and aerospace exhibition scheduled for November in Guangdong province will feature a dedicated area for unmanned systems for the first time, including a demonstration area for UAVs and unmanned surface vessels, according to the state-owned tabloid Global Times.[46] The PRC’s spotlight on its drone technology signals its interest in promoting its domestic drone industry to foreign consumers, who will attend the expo.

Voice of America reported that the PRC lifted sanctions on US telecommunications company Viasat because the company’s services are irreplaceable for distant-water communications. The PRC imposed sanctions on Viasat in January 2024 in response to the United States announcing a $300 million sale of equipment to Taiwan to help maintain Taiwan’s tactical information systems.[47] The PRC lifted the sanctions on Viasat on July 22, claiming that “the circumstances based on which the countermeasures were issued have changed.”[48] This is the first time the PRC publicly announced the lifting of sanctions on a firm that has sold military equipment to Taiwan.[49] Voice of America cited Taiwanese and US experts who said that PRC vessels operating far from the PRC, including fishing boats and research vessels, rely on services from the Viasat subsidiary Inmarsat. The PRC has communications satellites that cover the entirety of PRC territory and offshore areas, but it cannot replace Inmarsat’s services in the short term for distant-water communications.[50] There is no evidence that the PRC sanctions on Viasat forced the company to change its behavior, such as canceling contracts with Taiwan.

The PRC criticized Canada on July 31 for “undermining peace and stability” in the Taiwan Strait after a Canadian warship transited the strait.[51] Canadian Defense Minister Bill Blair stated that Canada was increasing the presence of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Indo-Pacific region, in line with its Info-Pacific Strategy, which it released in 2022.[52] PRC Ministry of Defense spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang accused Canada of sending “wrong signals to ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces” and making excuses to justify its wrongful presence in the strait.[53] The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command (ETC) spokesperson Li Xi stated that the ETC organized naval and air forces to monitor Canada’s HCMS Montreal during its transit.[54]

The PRC has used confrontational intimidation tactics to deter foreign military presence in waters it deems to be its neighborhood, which has resulted in several tense encounters with the Canadian military. The Canadian Ministry of Defense claimed that a PRC fighter jet launched flares in front of one of its military helicopters near the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea on October 29, forcing the helicopter to take evasive maneuvers.[55] The PLA Navy destroyer Luyang III came within 150 yards of the USS Chung-Hoon destroyer and Canadian HMCS Montreal frigate as they transited through the Taiwan Strait in June 2023.[56] The PRC’s aggression towards foreign militaries in the region has also instigated dangerous encounters with US and Australian military craft in recent months.[57]

The United States imposed sanctions on five individuals and seven entities in Iran and the PRC for facilitating the procurement of components for Iran’s ballistic missile and UAV programs.[58] The PRC-based entities included Hong Kong resident Thomas Ho Ming Tong and his four companies, which procure components for a subsidiary of Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) that produces Shahed-series UAVs for Russian use against Ukraine. The sanctions also include a Shenzhen-based supplier for a MODAFL front company in Beijing.

Hong Kong has emerged as a hub for PRC companies to circumvent sanctions on Iran, Russia, and North Korea. Hong Kong’s lenient regulatory environment facilitates relatively easy concealment of corporate ownership and the rapid creation and dissolution of shell companies. Iran relies on Hong Kong companies as transshipment intermediaries to obtain Western parts for its UAVs.[59]

Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee stated in October 2022 that the territory would not implement unilateral sanctions on Russia after the US warned that Hong Kong’s status as a financial center could be affected if it acted as a haven for sanctions evasion.[60] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba appealed to the Hong Kong government in July not to allow Russian companies to use Hong Kong companies to evade sanctions.[61] The US sanctioned approximately 20 PRC and Hong Kong entities on May 1 for supporting Russia’s military-industrial base.[62]

Southeast Asia

Vietnam

The PRC flew two UAVs near the Vietnamese coast after Vietnam and the Philippines announced joint coast guard exercises in Manila Bay. The South China Sea Chronicle Initiative (SCSCI), a Vietnamese research group, tracked a WZ-10 UAV that flew from the PRC’s Hainan island to roughly 100 km (62 miles) from Vietnam’s coastline to the city of Nha Trang before returning to Hainan on August 2.[63] The UAV’s tracker was on throughout the course of the journey. Aircraft tracking data showed that a second WZ-10 flight along a similar path occurred on August 7.[64] The SCSCI and other South China Sea researchers confirmed that this was the first time that the PRC had made such a voyage visible to the Vietnamese. Neither Vietnam’s nor the PRC’s foreign and defense ministries have released comments on the flights.

The flights occurred after Vietnam and the Philippines announced joint Coast Guard exercises, which are scheduled to begin on August 9 in Manila Bay.[65] Vietnam and the Philippines signed two agreements in January that expanded cooperation between their coast guards to prevent incidents in the South China Sea.[66] Vietnamese Coast Guard ships arrived in Manila on August 5 and are scheduled to remain there until August 10. The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) reported that these exercises will focus on search and rescue and fire and explosion prevention operations.

The flights also took place after Vietnam filed a claim at the United Nations to extend its continental shelf in the South China Sea in July.[67] While the Philippines and Vietnam still hold competing territorial claims in the South China Sea, these types of joint efforts are likely to be interpreted by the PRC as a cooperative effort to challenge the PRC within what it sees as its sovereign territory.

Philippines

The Philippines and Germany committed to sign a defense agreement this year. On August 4 the Philippines and Germany committed to sign a defense cooperation agreement this year during a meeting between German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius and Philippine Defense Minister Gilberto Teodoro.[68] The two Ministers agreed to expand training, bilateral exchanges, bilateral armaments cooperation, and other joint projects. Both sides agreed to uphold the international rules-based order. Pistorius specifically reaffirmed the validity of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration decision denying the legal basis of China’s claims in the South China Sea and stressed the importance of strengthening these maritime borders.[69]

This meeting marks the first visit of a German Defense Minister to the Philippines, marking 70 years of diplomatic relations between the two states and following several violent clashes between Philippine and Chinese coast guard vessels in Philippine territory in the South China Sea. Pistorius stated that Germany’s commitments were not directed at any particular country but rather to protect trading routes and ensure freedom of navigation. Teodoro stated that its agreements with Germany were not intended to provoke the PRC and blamed the PRC for increasing tensions. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Mao Ning denied that the PRC was responsible for recent disputes, stating that PRC behavior was all in accordance with international law.[70] The MFA did not comment on Germany’s actions, but did accuse the Philippines of “stirring up trouble” in the South China Sea.

The United States, Australia, Canada, and the Philippines conducted joint maritime activity within the Philippines’ EEZ while the PRC held a joint combat patrol near Scarborough Shoal on August 7.[71] US Indo-Pacific Command stated that the joint activities focused on enhancing interoperability among the four armed forces. It also reiterated the US and allied commitment to upholding international law regarding freedom of navigation and the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal Award that rejected PRC territorial claims in the South China Sea. The PRC’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) simultaneously conducted combat patrols over the sea and airspace near the Scarborough Shoal.[72] The Scarborough Shoal is a disputed territory within the South China Sea, located about 120 nautical miles from the Philippine Island of Luzon.[73] Information released by the PRC Ministry of National Defense stated that the joint patrol was carried out by the PLA’s Southern Theater Command and focused on training early warning, rapid mobility, and joint strike capabilities.[74] The Philippine government released a statement in response, accusing the PLA of sending three of its ships to tail their joint exercises instead of conducting Shoal.[75]

Oceania

The PRC MFA criticized the United States and Australia for cooperating to upgrade the latter’s military facilities on the Cocos Islands in the Indian Ocean. PRC MFA spokesperson Mao Ning stated the PRC’s conviction that defense cooperation should be conducive to regional stability and not be targeted at or harm the interests of “third parties,” which references PRC interests.[76] Mao urged the “relevant countries,” meaning the United States and US allies, to do more to maintain peace in the Indo-Pacific.

The planned upgrades are funded under the US Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which directs investments to enhance US military infrastructure, presence, and readiness, as well as that of regional allies, to counter the PRC’s expanding military presence in the Indo-Pacific.[77] Former Australian Assistant Secretary for Force Development Ross Babbage stated that the upgrades would allow reconnaissance planes, early warning aircraft, and aerial refuelers to operate from the islands, which would extend the range and operability of US and Australian aircraft in the Indo-Pacific.[78]

Europe

Germany accused PRC state-sponsored cyber threat actors of infiltrating the Federal Agency for Cartography and Geodesy to conduct espionage in 2021.[79] Germany accused the PRC actors of exploiting individuals and companies to obfuscate its own presence in federal networks. The PRC embassy in Germany dismissed the accusation and accused the German government of misusing cybersecurity issues to defame the PRC, which undermines the international community’s efforts to jointly combat such challenges.[80] The embassy urged Germany to stop “political smearing” and highlighted the PRC’s responsible approach to preventing malign cyber activities.

The PRC has consistently denied accusations of state-sponsored hacking amid Western countries’ vocal condemnation and coordination to expose the PRC’s malign cyber activities. The United States, United Kingdom, and New Zealand accused PRC-state-sponsored cyber threat actors of conducting malicious cyber operations against democratic institutions in March.[81] Palau, one of Taiwan’s twelve remaining diplomatic allies, announced in March that the PRC was the culprit behind a major cyber incident in which threat actors stole over 20,000 government documents.[82] The PRC conducted the operation as Palau finalized a deal with the US to renew the latter’s military access to the archipelago in exchange for financial aid.

The extensive accusations against the PRC’s violation of other countries’ cyber sovereignty highlight that the PRC exploits cyber tools to advance national interests that it cannot achieve through legitimate and transparent statecraft.

Russia

PRC Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs Li Hui traveled to Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia to generate support for the PRC’s efforts to mediate the war and promote peace talks. PRC MFA spokesperson Mao Ning announced the new round of shuttle diplomacy last week and stated that Li would confer with “important members of the Global South.” Li’s trip comes after a June 21 announcement from the Ukrainian Deputy Head of the Office of the President that a “Global South” country would likely host a second peace summit, which Ukraine aimed to hold before the end of the year.[83] The PRC did not participate in the first peace summit in Switzerland on June 15–16 because the summit excluded Russia.[84] Mao Ning stated that the summit did not meet the PRC’s three conditions for a peace conference, which include “recognition by both Russia and Ukraine, equal participation by all parties, and fair discussion of all peace plans.”[85] 90 countries and organizations attended the summit.

The PRC MFA readout of Li’s meeting with Brazilian diplomats stated that the PRC-Brazil joint statement on reaching a political solution to the crisis received a positive response from more than 110 countries.[86] The PRC and Brazil released a joint statement outlining a series of vague steps to deescalate the war in May. The joint statement does not meet Ukraine’s base condition of Russia’s withdrawal from occupied territory.[87] Readouts from Li’s meetings in all three countries stated that the host country appreciated the PRC’s role in mediating the crisis.[88] PRC readouts made similar claims from high-level meetings with other countries’ officials, including Hungary and Ukraine.[89]

The PRC’s efforts to ingratiate itself with leading Global South countries aim to curry early support for its peace efforts before the next peace summit, which European countries and other stakeholders will likely attend. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated on July 15 that Russian representatives should be present at the next peace summit.[90] The PRC’s previous peace plans, including its joint statement with Brazil and a 12-point plan from February 2023, failed to gain traction with Ukraine, the US, and most European countries.[91] An EU readout from a July 26 meeting between EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell and PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that Borrell asked the PRC to use its influence with Russia to contribute to ending the war, but that “the joint statement with Brazil of May 2024 does not go in that direction.”[92] This statement contradicted the PRC readout from the meeting, which claimed that Borrell stated that the EU “attaches importance to the PRC-Brazil peace initiative.”[93]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, July 25, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, and Alexandros Tsipouras of the Institute for the Study of War

Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: July 31, 2024

Key Takeaways

The PRC attempted to prevent legislators from at least six countries from attending an international parliamentary forum that works to counter the CCP’s actions to subvert the international order and democratic principles.
The PRC and ROC made progress in resolving the handling of the February 14 capsizing incident. The deal is unlikely to result in the PRC decreasing coercive actions against Kinmen.
The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the United States and Japan of inciting a “new Cold War” and exaggerating the threat from the PRC following a US-Japan 2+2 dialogue on July 28.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi met on the sidelines of the annual Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum on July 27. Wang called on ASEAN to resist US- and NATO-led “external interference” in the region.
The CCG claimed to monitor a Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal. The Philippines confirmed that the CCG was present but disputed that it inspected the Philippines ships.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The PRC attempted to prevent legislators from at least six countries from attending an international parliamentary forum that works to counter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) actions to subvert the international order and democratic principles. The Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) was established in 2020 by a group of legislators from the Five Eyes, Germany, Japan, Norway, and Sweden to form a coordinated response between democracies to challenges that the PRC’s expanding global influence poses to the free, open, and rules-based international order.[1] IPAC holds an annual summit, which Taiwan hosted this year. IPAC members at this year’s summit in Taiwan launched the 2758 Initiative, which pledges to advocate for resolutions in members’ home parliaments that counter the PRC’s efforts to suppress Taiwan’s status and representation in the international community.[2] The 2758 Initiative also serves as a joint statement that addresses the PRC’s distortion of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, which established the PRC as the sole representative of China in the UN in 1971, replacing Taiwan. The initiative highlights that the PRC misrepresents UNGA 2758 as an international legal decision against Taiwan’s participation in international organizations.

Eight member legislators from Bolivia, Bosnia, Colombia, North Macedonia, Slovakia, and an unspecified Asian country claimed that PRC diplomatic officials contacted them before they traveled to Taipei and in some cases attempted to prevent them from attending.[3] Some lawmakers received inquiries about their plans to attend while others received requests for meetings that would interfere with their travel plans. One PRC diplomat contacted the head of the Bosnian Naša Stranka party to prevent lawmaker Sanela Klarić from attending the IPAC summit.[4] These actions are part of the PRC’s efforts to diplomatically isolate Taiwan, degrade Taiwan’s legitimacy on the world stage, and facilitate unification with Taiwan without resistance from the international community.

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lin Jian responded to the reports of interference by condemning IPAC for “maliciously hyping up issues and spring rumors about China.”[5] Lin urged the attending parliamentarians to “abandon their ideological prejudices” and expressed the PRC’s opposition to interference in its internal affairs by conducting official exchanges with Taiwan.

IPAC has been the target of PRC subversion in the past. The United States indicted six PRC nationals affiliated with a Ministry of State Security (MSS)-backed cyber threat actor Advanced Persistent Threat 31 (APT31) for malign hacking activities that included inundating IPAC members from European Parliament and the UK with emails that transmitted data back to the PRC when opened.[6] The PRC has also sanctioned some members of IPAC.[7]

2024 marks was first year that Taiwan was able to formally join the organization, as a legislature’s representation requires two co-chairs from “ideologically diverse political parties.” Taiwan joined with co-chairs from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the smaller Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). No legislators from the Kuomintang (KMT), the main opposition party, have sought membership. IPAC welcomed members from six other new countries this year, bringing the total membership to 250 lawmakers from 40 parliaments.[8]

The PRC and ROC made progress in resolving the handling of the February 14 capsizing incident. The deal is unlikely to result in the PRC decreasing coercive actions against Kinmen. A PRC fishing boat capsized in Taiwanese waters near Kinmen while fleeing from a legal Taiwan Coast Guard pursuit, resulting in the death of two PRC fishermen. Kinmen is a group of Taiwan-controlled islands with a large military garrison roughly 3 kilometers from the coast of the PRC.[9] The PRC pledged after the incident to strengthen law enforcement activities around Kinmen and has since conducted repeated violations of Kinmen’s maritime boundaries to normalize the presence of Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ships. The PRC’s violations have become more frequent over time and have expanded to include other maritime agency-affiliated vessels and even naval ships.[10]

The ROC agreed to return the bodies of the deceased and pay restitution to their families. The details of the accident will be handed over to a third party for investigation. CGA Deputy Director-General Hsieh Ching-chin stated that the details of the deal were not public out of respect for the victims’ families.[11]

Taiwan has a stake in negotiations, including several ROC nationals detained in the PRC. The Chairman of the MAC Chiu Chui-cheng stated that the SEF is lobbying the PRC for the immediate release of the Taiwanese fishing boat and its two Taiwanese crew members after the PRC detained them for fishing in PRC waters on July 2.[12] The PRC has also kept an ROC soldier from Kinmen in detainment since March after his boat ran out of fuel and drifted into PRC waters.

Representatives from the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), Coast Guard Administration (CGA), and Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) led Taiwan’s negotiating party. The Deputy Director of the Quanzhou Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau Affairs Office Li Zhaohui led the PRC side. PRC readouts referred to Li only as a member of the Red Cross Society, however, as the PRC halted official contact with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government in Taiwan in 2016. The PRC alleges that the DPP is a separatist party.

The resolution to the capsizing dispute is unlikely to result in a de-escalation of the PRC’s erosion of ROC sovereignty around Kinmen. The PRC’s activities around Kinmen foreshadow efforts to gradually wrest control of Taiwan’s sea and air space. The capsizing incident triggered the PRC’s aggression around Kinmen, but its coercive actions are part of a broader campaign to exert pressure on Taiwan after the election of President Lai Ching-te. Since Lai’s election, the PRC has conducted large-scale military exercises that encircled Taiwan, near all-time high Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) incursions, and announced legal guidelines that threaten severe punishment for Taiwanese “separatists.”

The PRC conducted at least 439 military incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone in July 2024, surpassing all previous months except August 2022. PLA aircraft entered Taiwan’s ADIZ every day of July except the four days of July 24-27, when Typhoon Gaemi disrupted military operations.[13] 280 of the incursions (roughly 64 percent) occurred during the first two weeks of the month. The ADIZ incursion numbers, which are reported by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, do not include activities around outlying islands such as Kinmen and Matsu.

July is the third consecutive month of significantly higher and rising numbers of ADIZ incursions and is part of a trend of increased ADIZ violations after Lai Ching-te took office as president of Taiwan on May 20.[14] The PRC considers Lai a dangerous separatist. The heightened number of incursions reflects an intensified PRC pressure campaign against Taiwan under the new administration. The high frequency of incursions drains Taiwan’s resources, exhausts military personnel, and degrades Taiwan’s threat awareness. Taiwan does not scramble aircraft in response to all PRC ADIZ incursions, but it does put military personnel on standby to respond quickly if needed.

August 2022 is the only month in which the PRC conducted more ADIZ incursions. Most of the 446 incursions at that time were part of massive military exercises in response to then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.

China |

US federal prosecutors charged three people in two separate cases for operating as unregistered PRC agents to harass Chinese dissidents and fugitives in the United States. US federal prosecutors alleged on July 29 that Wang Shujun, a naturalized US citizen and academic who emigrated from the PRC in 1994, pretended to be a pro-democracy advocate against the PRC government while spying on Chinese dissidents in New York. Wang was arrested in March 2022 and pleaded not guilty to four charges that include acting as an unregistered foreign agent and lying to US authorities. The prosecutors said that Wang targeted Uyghur and Tibetan activists, Hong Kong democracy activists, and advocates of Taiwan independence from 2005 to 2022 at the direction of the Ministry of State Security (MSS). Wang’s defense lawyer said Wang communicated with the MSS agents to win their support for democratic movements, not to work for the MSS.[15] The US Department of Justice also accused PRC nationals and Los Angeles residents John Chen and Lin Feng of acting as unregistered agents of the PRC and bribing an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent in a plot to target practitioners of Falun Gong, a spiritual practice banned in the PRC. Chen and Feng pleaded guilty on July 25.[16]

The PRC has been using agents in New York and other cities around the world to spy on overseas Chinese and extend the reach of the PRC’s law enforcement. The US Department of Justice charged two Chinese nationals in April 2023 for setting up an illegal overseas police station in New York on behalf of the Fuzhou branch of the PRC’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) in 2022.[17] A former NYPD officer was convicted in June 2023 for working as a PRC agent to intimidate a PRC fugitive in New York into returning home to face charges.[18] The 2022 report by the Spanish human rights group Safeguard Defenders found that local branches of the MPS had set up at least 102 overseas police stations in at least 53 countries to harass, threaten, intimidate, and force targets to return to the PRC to face charges.[19]

Northeast Asia

Japan

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the United States and Japan of inciting a “new Cold War” and exaggerating the threat from the PRC following a US-Japan 2+2 dialogue on July 28. US Secretary of State Blinken, US Secretary of Defense Austin, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Kamikawa, and Japanese Minister of Defense Kihara met in Tokyo for the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on July 28. Following the 2+2 meeting a joint statement was released reiterating their shared stances on Indo-Pacific security issues.[20] This statement made clear that the PRC’s recent actions in the East China Sea and South China Sea were contributing to regional instability, and decried PRC attempts to alter the status quo and “reshape the international order for its own benefit.

Subsequent US Department of Defense (DOD) press releases also built upon the April 10 official visit of Japanese Prime Minister Kishida to the United States and earlier statements on upgrading the US-Japan alliance.[21] These alliance upgrades include facilitating greater US and Japan force interoperability as part of the establishment of the Japanese Self Defense Forces Joint Operations Command (JJOC), increasing the production of key military technology, and expanding bilateral cooperative efforts to include other partners and allies in and beyond the Indo-Pacific region.

PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian responded to the US-Japan Joint Statement in a press conference on July 29.[22] Lin denounced the US-Japan joint statement, seeing it as an attack on PRC foreign policy and an exaggeration of regional tensions and the “threat” posed by the PRC. Lin reiterated that the PRC is a force for peace in the Indo-Pacific region, and instead blamed the US and Japan for inciting a “new Cold War” and undermining regional peace and stability.

North Korea

The United States Department of Treasury announced sanctions on July 24 targeting five Chinese companies and six Chinese nationals accused of supporting North Korean ballistic missile programs. The US Department of Treasury stated that these individuals and companies participate in a large overseas network of missile component suppliers to North Korea.[23] The US has identified Chinese national Shi Qianpei as organizing efforts to transfer restricted missile technology to North Korea.[24]

South Korean Defense Minister Shin Wok-sik stated the day after the United States announced its sanctions that North Korea is in the final stages of developing a tactical nuclear weapon. It is unclear whether the ballistic missile program procurement targeted by the sanctions is connected to North Korea's nuclear program. Short-range ballistic missiles can be used to deliver tactical nuclear warheads.[25] While tactical nuclear weapons have a lower yield, the South Korean Ministry of Defense stated that this tactical nuclear weapon has the range to strike US bases in Japan.[26]

Southeast Asia

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi met on the sidelines of the annual Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum on July 27. Wang called on ASEAN to resist US- and NATO-led “external interference” in the region. A US readout said Blinken and Wang had “open and productive discussions on key bilateral, regional, and global issues” at the event in Laos. The readout said Blinken acknowledged recent steps by the PRC to advance counternarcotics cooperation and to enhance military-to-military communication. He raised concerns about the PRC’s “destabilizing actions” in the South China Sea, including at Second Thomas Shoal, the PRC support for Russia’s defense industrial base, and North Korea’s “provocative actions.”[27] An unspecified senior US State Department official said Blinken also expressed concern about the PRC’s “provocative actions” around Taiwan, including a simulated blockade of Taiwan during the Joint Sword-2024A exercise after Lai Ching-te’s presidential inauguration in May.[28] A PRC readout said Wang criticized the United States for intensifying its “containment and suppression of China” and called on the United States to “return to a rational and pragmatic policy toward China.” Wang claimed the United States persists in a “wrong perception of China” that “reflects China with its own hegemonic logic.” He claimed the PRC does not seek hegemony or power and is the “major country with the best record in the world on peace and security issues.” Wang also called on the United States to stop “fanning the flames” of the PRC-Philippines disputes and to stop “smearing” the PRC and “abusing unilateral sanctions” on the issue of the war in Ukraine.[29]

Wang Yi attended the ASEAN Regional Forum’s Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and a series of other regional forums on the same day and urged ASEAN states to reject “external interference.” Wang said the US-led Indo-Pacific Strategy “exacerbates the security dilemma and runs counter to the vision of long-term peace and prosperity in the region” and that “NATO's intervention in the Asia-Pacific region is bound to trigger confrontation and intensify tensions. All parties must be highly vigilant and resolutely oppose it.” He urged continued dialogue and consultation and stressed that “external interference cannot solve problems.”[30] Wang also stressed on several occasions that the “Taiwan issue” is a matter of China’s internal affairs and that external forces have no right to intervene. He highlighted the temporary agreement between the PRC and the Philippines to allow the delivery of “humanitarian supplies” to Philippine personnel on Second Thomas Shoal and called on the Philippines to stop “going back on its words” and “causing unnecessary trouble.”[31]

Philippines

The CCG claimed to monitor a Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal. The Philippines confirmed that the CCG was present but disputed that it inspected the Philippines ships. The Philippine Coast Guard conducted its first resupply mission since the “provisional agreement” with the PRC on July 22. The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel MV Lapu-Lapu delivered supplies and new troops to the grounded warship BRP Sierra Madre on July 27 in the disputed Second Thomas Shoal while PRC forces observed nearby.[32] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed the CCG conducted an “on-site” inspection of the Philippine vessel and allowed the vessel to complete its mission.[33] Philippine officials denied that they sought the PRC’s permission or that the PRC boarded any Philippine vessels in the supply mission.[34] The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stated that the PRC “mischaracterized” the South China Sea agreement and requested that the PRC stick to the agreed provisions.[35] Neither side has released the text of the agreement. Video evidence provided by the Philippines Coast Guard confirmed that PRC Coast Guard vessels were present nearby during the resupply mission but did not show PRC personnel boarding the Philippine vessels.[36]

The Sierra Madre is a derelict warship that acts as a Philippine military outpost on the Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged reef within the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The PRC claims nearly all islands and maritime features within the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, as part of its “Nine Dash Line” territorial claims. The PRC has deployed coast guard, maritime militia, and naval vessels using a variety of “gray zone” tactics including physically surrounding, ramming, and firing water cannons at Philippine vessels to contest Philippine control over several PRC-claimed features including Second Thomas Shoal. It uses such tactics to gain control of the territories without provoking US intervention or outright war. The PRC claims to “allow” Philippine supply missions to Second Thomas Shoal to give the impression that it has legal jurisdiction over the shoal while pursuing de-escalation and humanitarian aims. The PRC opposes the delivery of any construction materials to reinforce the Sierra Madre, however, in hopes that the ship will eventually become incapable of supporting the Philippine presence.

The PRC MFA criticized the deployment of US intermediate-range missiles in the Philippines and a $500 million US military aid package to the Philippines. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned the Philippines during an ASEAN summit in Laos on July 27 that allowing the United States to deploy intermediate-range missiles to Philippine territory would “create tension and confrontation in the region and trigger an arms race,” against the interest of the Filipino people.[37] The United States deployed its intermediate-range Typhon missile system to Luzon in April for annual bilateral exercises. The Philippines announced that the missiles would return to the United States in September, however.[38] Philippine Foreign Minister Enrique Manalo denied the missile deployment would lead to an arms race and said the deployment was purely for defensive purposes.[39] MFA spokesperson Lin Jian claimed on July 30 that the Philippines allowing the deployment of the missiles is a “perverse act of cooperating with extra-regional forces to fuel regional tensions and confrontations, provoke geopolitical confrontation and arms races.” He urged the withdrawal of the missiles as soon as possible.[40]

Lin also criticized a $500 million military aid package that the United States announced during the 2+2 ministerial dialogues with the Philippines.[41] Lin said the United States is not a party to the South China Sea issue and has no right to intervene in the maritime issues between the PRC and the Philippines. He warned the Philippines that “wooing countries outside the region to provoke confrontation in the South China Sea” will only undermine regional stability, aggravate tensions, and make the Philippines into a “pawn.”[42]

Russia

The PRC is appealing to the “Global South” to legitimize its position as a mediator of Russia’s war in Ukraine. PRC MFA spokesperson Mao Ning announced a new round of “shuttle diplomacy” by Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs Li Hui on July 28, who will visit Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia to confer with “important members of the Global South” on how to work toward establishing peace talks.[43] Mao claimed that the PRC and Brazil’s six-point “consensus” received widespread support from the international community, referring to a joint document that outlines vague steps toward peace, but fails to meet Ukraine’s base condition of Russia’s withdrawal from occupied territory.[44]

The PRC’s focus on ingratiating itself with non-European countries offers an alternative path to gaining recognition for its role as a conflict mediator despite failing to make headway with Ukraine-aligned countries. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell at the ASEAN regional forum on July 26. The PRC readout of the meeting claimed that Borrell stated that the EU attaches importance to the PRC-Brazil peace initiative.[45] The EU readout of the meeting negated the PRC’s claim, stating that Borrell asked the PRC to use its influence on Russia to contribute to ending the war, but that “the joint statement with Brazil of May 2024 does not go in that direction.”[46] The PRC made a similar claim after Wang met with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmitry Kuleba on July 24.[47]

The PRC did not attend a peace summit in Switzerland on June 15-16 due to Russia’s exclusion from the event.[48] Mao Ning stated that the summit does not meet the PRC’s three conditions for a peace conference, which include “recognition by both Russia and Ukraine, equal participation by all parties, and fair discussion of all peace plans.”[49] Mao stated that the PRC would continue to promote dialogue and lasting peace in “its own way.”

PRC banks have tightened restrictions on payments from Russia in response to Western sanctions. Russian business newspaper Kommersant reported on July 29 that around 80 percent of payments in Chinese yuan are being returned to Russia. PRC banks have increased restrictions on trade with Russia since at least December 2023, after the European Union imposed its 12th sanctions package against Russia and the United States authorized secondary sanctions on financial institutions that helped Russia evade sanctions. Three of the PRC’s “Big Four” state banks and many smaller PRC banks began rejecting payments from sanctioned Russian financial institutions since the start of 2024.[50]

The PRC’s tightening of restrictions on transactions with Russia shows the effectiveness of Western sanctions even as the PRC faces criticism for its support of Russia’s defense industrial base. PRC officials have repeatedly denounced unilateral sanctions as “illegal,” but PRC businesses and financial institutions are nonetheless deterred by the potential consequences of violating the sanctions on Russia. The restrictions by PRC banks in response to Western sanctions do entirely block transactions with Russia but can make them more difficult and expensive. Kommersant reported that Russian companies are being forced to use "trading houses” as intermediaries, which increases transactional costs by up to 10 percent. Cross-border trade can also make use of small local banks that are not involved in trade with the United States, or use PRC-based subsidiaries of Russian banks such as VTB Bank.[51]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, July 19, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, and Matthew Egger of the Institute for the Study of War; Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: July 24, 2024

Key Takeaways

The CCG continued to expand its “law enforcement activities” to assert the PRC’s claim over the Taiwan Strait. The CCG intruded into Taiwan’s restricted waters around Kinmen and tried to expel Taiwanese fishing vessels near the middle of the Strait.
Taiwan and the PRC agreed to resume negotiations about the February 14 capsizing incident that killed two PRC fishermen fleeing the Taiwanese Coast Guard near Kinmen.
PRC officials and media slammed Taiwan’s Han Kuang military exercises as a futile attempt to “resist reunification.”
The PRC held the Third Plenum of the 20th Party Congress, which focused on promoting economic development in alignment with national strategic goals.
The PRC and Philippines reached a “provisional arrangement” for rotation and resupply missions to the Second Thomas Shoal, though significant points of disagreement remain.
The PRC hosted a “reconciliation dialogue” for Palestinian factions in which Hamas and Fatah signed a joint declaration that stated their intention to form a temporary post-war unity government in Gaza and the West Bank.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The CCG continued to expand its “law enforcement activities” to assert the PRC’s claim over the Taiwan Strait. Four CCG ships entered restricted waters in four different locations around Taiwan’s Kinmen island group on July 19. Kinmen is a Taiwanese island chain located just 10 kilometers (6 miles) from the PRC’s coast. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) said this was the 32nd such incursion into Kinmen’s restricted waters in 2024.[1] On the same day, the CGA also discovered a CCG ship trying to expel Taiwanese fishing boats near the middle of the Taiwan Strait, around 48 miles west of Huayu Island of Taiwan’s Penghu archipelago.[2] The PRC claims Taiwan and all its associated waters to be Chinese territory and denies the existence of any restricted or prohibited waters around Taiwanese islands such as Kinmen. It claims the entire Taiwan Strait to be part of its Exclusive Economic Zone. TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian accused Taiwanese media that reported on CCG harassment of Taiwanese fishing boats of trying to “intimidate” Taiwanese fishermen and provoke cross-strait hostility by “distorting and smearing” normal law enforcement activities to enforce a summer fishing moratorium.[3]

The PRC began regular CCG patrols around Kinmen and incursions into Kinmen’s restricted and prohibited since February 2024 to assert its sovereignty over those waters and to punish Taiwan for electing President Lai Ching-te, whom the PRC considers a dangerous separatist. It substantially increased the frequency of incursions in May, around the time of Lai’s inauguration, and shifted from fixed-line patrols into Kinmen waters to designating “patrol areas” within which individual CCG ships can patrol in a less predictable pattern. Taiwanese media has also reported occasional instances of CCG ships harassing Taiwanese fishermen near the Penghu Islands, including one incident on July 5 that occurred 3.5 miles east of the Taiwan Strait median line.[4] The expansion of CCG “law enforcement” activities into Taiwan-controlled waters around Kinmen and eastward into international waters near Taiwan shows an intensifying PRC campaign to assert control over the waters near and around Taiwan.

Taiwan and the PRC agreed to resume negotiations about the February 14 capsizing incident that killed two PRC fishermen fleeing the Taiwanese Coast Guard (CGA) near Kinmen. The ROC Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) announced on July 23 that it will meet with PRC authorities at a hotel in Kinmen to further discuss a speedboat crash that killed two PRC fishers on February 14. Typhoon Gaemi's landfall in Taiwan and the PRC on July 23-24, however, halted ferry service between Xiamen and Kinmen, delaying negotiations as relatives of the deceased fishermen and other members of the PRC delegation were unable to travel to Kinmen on the day of negotiations. An MAC press release stated negotiations will continue once the PRC and ROC agree on a suitable date.[5] PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Zhu Fenglian said on July 24 that the PRC hoped to “resolve the relevant issues through proper negotiation” but did not provide further details about the talks.[6]

The focus of the negotiation surrounds an incident on February 14, 2024, when a PRC fishing boat in Taiwanese waters near Kinmen, a Taiwanese island around ten kilometers away from the PRC city of Xiamen, capsized while fleeing from a legal Taiwan Coast Guard pursuit. The incident resulted in the deaths of two of the fishing boat’s four crewmembers. The ROC took custody of the boat and the bodies. ROC and PRC representatives have held 15 rounds of negotiations to resolve disputes caused by the incident. Unresolved PRC demands from previous negotiations include the ROC revealing the truth behind the incident, returning the dead fishermen’s bodies and their boat to the PRC, and apologizing for the incident. According to Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA), however, negotiations failed because the PRC demanded to interrogate CGA personnel and did not respect Taiwan’s maritime boundaries and law enforcement rights.[7] The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) began patrolling the waters around Kinmen and making occasional incursions into Kinmen’s restricted or prohibited waters in the months after the incident, claiming it has the jurisdiction and responsibility to do so to protect the rights and safety of fishermen from both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

The PRC seeks to secure through negotiations the deceased fishermen’s bodies and boat, an apology from the ROC, and the release of detailed information about the February 14 incident and its causes.[8][9] The PRC blames Taiwan for the deaths and claimed in March that the negotiations would be postponed until after the conclusion of Taiwan’s judicial investigation into the incident concludes.[10]

The new round of negotiations may be an attempted quid pro quo by the ROC to free Taiwanese nationals detained by the PRC. Kinmen Kuomintang (KMT) Legislator Jessica Chen Yu-jen expressed hopes that the new round of negotiations could lead to an ROC fisherman surnamed Hu’s release from PRC detainment or PRC authorities allowing PRC tourists to visit Kinmen.[11] The CCG detained Hu in March after his boat ran out of fuel and drifted into PRC waters near Kinmen. Chen has negotiated with PRC officials to allow Hu’s family to visit him in Quanzhou, a PRC city near Kinmen, though there is no indication she will participate in the new round of negotiations.[12] The delayed negotiations were also scheduled to occur roughly three weeks after the CCG detained a Taiwanese fishing boat and its five-man crew in PRC territorial waters near Weitou, Fujian Province. The crew, three of which are ROC nationals, is still in detainment in Fujian despite ROC efforts to secure their release.[13]

PRC officials and media slammed Taiwan’s Han Kuang military exercises as a futile attempt to “resist reunification.” The ROC began its annual Han Kuang military exercises on July 22 and will hold them until July 26. The 2024 exercises are “unscripted” and will test Taiwan’s ability to protect critical infrastructure and conduct supply-delivery missions amid a PRC blockade.[14] The exercises also feature live-fire drills on Taiwan’s outlying islands of Kinmen, Matsu, and Penghu.[15] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Mao Ning blamed tension in the Taiwan Strait on the DPP “provocation” and “seeking independence” with help from foreign forces. She stressed that any attempt to “seek independence by force” or “resist reunification by force” will inevitably fail.[16] An article in PRC state media Xinhua claimed that changes to make the exercises unscripted and decentralized, to make them better simulate the unpredictable conditions of real combat, were superficial changes that further “hijack” the lives and safety of Taiwanese people. MND spokesperson Senior Col. Wu Qian said on June 27 that the annual Han Kuang exercises were simply a “show” that cannot change the outcome of a war.[17] TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian accused the DPP on July 24 of exaggerating the threat from the PRC, squandering Taiwanese people’s money to buy weapons from the United States, tying Taiwan to the “‘Taiwan independence’ chariot” and using the Taiwanese people as “cannon fodder for Taiwan independence.”[18] State media Global Times cited PRC military expert Zhang Junshe who called the exercises a “show” and claimed the drills actually aim to ensure the survival of the DPP authorities, use the Taiwanese “general public” as shields, and await foreign reinforcements.[19]

Taiwan’s Constitutional Court issued an injunction on July 19 to temporarily suspend the implementation of most provisions of a controversial legislative reform law. The Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), which hold a combined majority in the Legislative Yuan (LY), passed the set of reforms on May 28 despite opposition from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). President Lai Ching-te of the DPP signed the bill into law on June 24 after the LY overrode his request for “reconsideration,” but the DPP filed for a “constitutional interpretation” of the law in hopes of preventing its implementation. The new law grants the LY enhanced oversight powers over the government. The law permits the LY to call on any public official to testify before an investigative committee, confirm political appointments, and impose fines or criminal charges for “contempt of legislature” against anyone who lies, refuses to answer questions, or talks back while testifying before the legislature. The law also requires the president of Taiwan to deliver a State of the Nation address and submit to a question-and-answer session by the LY.[20] The Constitutional Court ruled 13-2 to issue injunctions on the implementation of almost all these provisions while it completes a review of their constitutionality. There is no set date for the final decision. The Constitutional Court expressed concern that provisions in the new law could infringe upon the separation of powers between the LY and other branches of government, force people to express opinions or provide documents against their will, and grant the LY investigative powers that the Constitution does not stipulate.[21]

The court’s injunction order and the reasoning behind it suggest that it will find some or all of the suspended provisions unconstitutional in the final ruling. The KMT legislative caucus described the injunction ruling as “the death of judicial independence” and said it did not believe the justices who ruled to issue the injunction would be able to rule impartially on the law’s constitutionality.[22] TPP Chair Ko Wen-je called the injunction a “declaration of war” on the parliamentary system.[23] If the reforms pass constitutional review, they will increase the KMT and TPP opposition’s ability to check, investigate, and hinder the agenda and operation of President Lai’s DPP administration. The KMT and TPP together hold a majority of seats in the LY.

China

The PRC held the Third Plenum of the 20th Party Congress, which focused on promoting economic development in alignment with national strategic goals. The Third Plenum is one of seven meetings that the Central Committee of the CCP holds once every five years to chart a path for the PRC’s major economic and social policies. The unifying theme of the plenum was deepening comprehensive reform, ranging from fiscal policy, urban development, industrial policy, and more. The purpose of the reforms is to advance the PRC’s goal of achieving “socialist modernization” by 2035, which is a CCP-designated milestone that entails strengthening the PRC’s national power through the advancement of economic, military, and political influence.

The focus of the reforms reflects the PRC’s prioritization of calibrating the economy’s trajectory to support national security objectives. The PRC released a resolution on July 21 that summarized the plenum’s goals and planned reforms.[24] The resolution made frequent references to “high-quality development,” which is an emerging slogan that entails investment in innovation to drive growth, climbing the value chain in technology and manufacturing, and deepening market reforms for a more balanced economy. The PRC’s modernization drive is rooted in the construction of the so-called “integrated national strategy system,” which seeks to coordinate and harmonize economic development with national defense. This concept is a product of CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping’s pervasive “Overall National Security Outlook,” in which national security concerns permeate all facets of society.

The resolution stressed numerous priorities that reflect the PRC’s urgent drive to securitize economic growth to support national defense capabilities. The resolution highlighted scientific and technological frontiers as the “main battlefield” of the economy and called for concentrating state capital in important industries related to national security. These “strategic industries” include AI, aerospace, new energy and resources, advanced technology, and quantum computing. The resolution also called for hastening the progression of independent supply chains to enhance security in integrated circuits, industrial equipment, and other advanced technology. One of the measures to achieve supply chain security included transferring critical industries within the PRC and building a “national strategic hinterland.” The resolution also highlighted the need to improve access and production of “strategic minerals,” which are inputs in various technologies important to national and economic security.

These priorities are consistent with the PRC’s focus on insulating areas of strategic importance from what it sees as escalating efforts from hostile countries to suppress the PRC. The resolution acknowledged a “complex domestic and international situation,” and called for reforms to coordinate the two. In an explainer of the resolution released alongside it, Xi Jinping urged the PRC to adapt to the challenging global environment that is characterized by growing “external attempts to suppress and contain China.”[25] Xi claimed that deepening reform will help the PRC win the strategic initiative as challenges arise. The PRC began a drive to foster technology industries domestically in 2020 after the United States took measures to limit the PRC’s access to dual-use technologies that are critical for achieving the PRC’s ongoing militarization. Dual-use technologies are a cornerstone of the PRC’s military-civil fusion strategy, which aims to ensure that economic development supports military development.

The PRC removed sanctions from US satellite communications firm Viasat, which it had sanctioned for aiding Taiwan’s military. PRC MFA spokesperson Mao Ning announced on July 22 that the PRC has lifted its sanctions against the US communications company Viasat “since the circumstances based on which the countermeasures were issued have changed.” She did not comment on media reports that Viasat is seeking cooperation with PRC firms.[26] The PRC originally imposed sanctions on Viasat in January 2024 along with four other defense firms in response to the United States announcing a $300 million sale of equipment to Taiwan to help maintain Taiwan’s tactical information systems.[27] The sanctions froze the companies’ assets in the PRC and prohibited PRC organizations and individuals from doing business with them.[28] Taiwan’s Central News Agency (CNA) reported that this is the first time the PRC publicly announced the lifting of sanctions on a firm that sold military equipment to Taiwan.[29] Viasat’s PRC business has included a 2019 partnership with China Satellite Communications Co. to provide inflight wi-fi to PRC airlines and a sale of equipment to Sichuan Airlines in 2022. Viasat also acquired the British satellite communications company Inmarsat in 2023, which provided satellite services to China Central Television (CCTV).[30] It is unclear what “circumstances” changed to trigger the lifting of sanctions. Viasat has not commented on the removal of the sanctions as of July 24.

The PRC suspended arms control and non-proliferation talks with the United States, citing US arms sales to Taiwan. PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian cited repeated US arms sales to Taiwan as the reason for suspending negotiations.[31] The PRC has long been uninterested in the talks, however. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan commented on the PRC’s disinterest in “substantive dialogue” on arms control and nuclear non-proliferation in June 2023. Sullivan stated that the PRC had little willingness to “compartmentalize strategic stability from broader issues in the relationship.”[32] Sullivan stated that the PRC has not shown interest in discussions regarding the changes it is making to its nuclear forces.[33]

The United States and the PRC held the last instance of arms control negotiations in Washington in November 2023 after a five-year hiatus.[34] The meeting occurred a week before President Joe Biden and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping held a summit in San Francisco to stabilize bilateral relations. An unnamed US official familiar with the talks described the PRC’s level of engagement during that meeting as not substantive.[35] The US Under Secretary for Arms Control Bonnie Jenkins stated in Congressional testimony in May that the PRC declined a follow-on meeting and did not provide a substantive response to the risk reduction suggestions that the US side put forth during that meeting.[36] Lin rejected the notion that the PRC was dragging its feet and stated that the PRC is willing to uphold communication with the US on arms control on the condition that the US respects its “core interests.”[37]

The PRC frequently uses security dialogue as a bargaining chip to influence US behavior, rather than viewing it as a necessary aspect of bilateral relations. The PRC cut off high-level military talks with the United States after US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022. The PRC agreed to resume them at the presidential summit between US President Joe Biden and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping in San Francisco in November 2023.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The PRC and Philippines reached a “provisional arrangement” for rotation and resupply missions to the Second Thomas Shoal, though significant points of disagreement remain. The Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) released a statement on July 21, saying that this agreement was part of an effort to de-escalate the situation with China around the Second Thomas Shoal.[38] Tensions have been high since a territorial dispute occurred in June of this year when a Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessel collided with a Philippine supply ship during a routine transport mission to the grounded Sierra Madre.[39] Subsequent statements from both sides indicate that significant points of disagreement remain, however.

Neither the PRC nor the Philippines have released the details of the agreement, which has enabled the PRC to begin shaping the information environment to blame the Philippines for any failure to implement the agreement. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Mao Ning remarked at a July 22 press conference that the Philippines and China had just completed a series of consultations on managing the situation at the Second Thomas Shoal, and had reached an agreement with the Philippines on humanitarian resupply activities based on three points guiding the PRC’s “principled position” on this issue.[40] First, China reiterates that the grounding of the Sierra Madre is a violation of PRC sovereign rights, and again calls for it to be removed from its current location. Second, China will allow humanitarian supply missions to the Sierra Madre if the Philippines informs China in advance and allows Chinese monitoring throughout the process. Third, China will not allow the Philippines to send construction materials to the Sierra Madre and/or attempt to build a permanent outpost in contested waters.

The DFA stated on July 22 that the MFA inaccurately characterized the agreement. The DFA contested that the Philippines must provide prior notification to the PRC and receive on-site confirmation before humanitarian supply missions can occur.[41] The DFA stated that the Philippines will continue to assert its rights within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), including in the Second Thomas Shoal. However, the DFA made it clear that it is still ready to implement the agreement on rotation and resupply efforts.

Vietnam

Vietnam filed a claim at the United Nations to extend its continental shelf in the South China Sea. The claim aims to extend the continental shelf beyond the current 200 nautical miles, but not exceeding 350 nautical miles, from baselines in its territorial waters.[42] Vietnam also seeks through the submission to reaffirm its sovereignty over the disputed Paracel and Spratly archipelagos one month after the Philippines filed a similar claim. The DFA released a statement reaffirming the Philippines’ claims on its extended continental shelf but acknowledged that Vietnam has a right to submit claims establishing the limits of the continental shelf in accordance with UNCLOS.[43] The Philippines stated its desire to engage with Vietnam on possible ways to achieve a mutually beneficial solution to issues in the South China Sea.

The PRC MFA stated that it “firmly opposes” Vietnam’s filing.[44] MFA spokesperson Lin Jian stated that such actions by Vietnam and the Philippines infringe on China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests and will only serve to intensify existing conflicts.[45]

Russia

PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmitry Kuleba from July 23-25. Wang stated that “both Ukraine and Russia have sent signals of willingness to negotiate to varying degrees,” but that the “timing is not yet ripe.”[46] The PRC readout stated that Ukraine appreciated the “positive and constructive role played by China in promoting peace and maintaining international order.” The Ukrainian readout of the meeting did not mirror the sentiments from the PRC readout, however. The Ukrainian readout stated only that Kuleba expressed conviction that peace in Ukraine corresponds to the PRC’s strategic interests and called the PRC’s role as a global force for peace important.[47]

The PRC’s readout aims to assert the narrative that Ukraine has confidence in the PRC to help negotiate an end to the war. The PRC released a vague 12-point peace plan in February 2023 that advocated for a political settlement to the war in Ukraine. Ukraine and Western allies regarded it as a non-starter due to its failure to demand Russia’s withdrawal from occupied territory. The PRC readout highlighted Ukraine’s regard for the PRC’s six-point “consensus” to reach a political solution that it jointly issued with Brazil on May 23, which lacks the same precondition for starting negotiations as the 12-point plan.[48] The PRC skipped a Ukraine peace summit in June in protest of Russia’s exclusion.[49]

The PRC’s efforts to showcase international support for its role as a mediator aim to rebuke NATO's accusations that the PRC is supporting Russia in the war against Ukraine. The PRC also seeks to promote its peace plan as an alternative outcome to the war than the resolution that NATO and Ukraine advocate for, which is Russia’s full withdrawal from Ukrainian territory.

PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian expressed support to Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó on July 17 for Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s peace efforts, referring to the latter’s recent shuttle diplomacy between Ukraine and Russia.[50] The PRC highlighted alignment on the issue of Ukraine between the PRC and Hungary, an EU and NATO member, during a meeting between Xi Jinping and Orbán on July 8.[51] Lin used Orban’s appeal to European Council President Charles Michel to include the PRC in future EU peace negotiations by advocating for Russia’s involvement.

The PRC is taking parallel actions to undermine NATO on the world stage alongside its diplomatic efforts to influence the Ukraine crisis. The PRC conducted joint military exercises with Belarus near the Polish and Ukrainian border that simulated the seizure of an airport, which the two countries called “anti-terrorism operations.”[52] The exercises began on July 8, during the week of the NATO summit in Washington in which NATO heads of state labeled the PRC a “decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine.”[53] Lin Jian criticized NATO for reports that member states are considering nationalizing PRC-owned infrastructure and accused it of trying to expand its influence.[54] The PRC Ambassador to the UN Fu Cong also accused NATO of expansionism during a speech at a UN sustainability forum and stated that “history has amply proved that wherever NATO hands extend, turmoil and chaos will ensue.”[55]

Israel-Palestine

The PRC hosted a “reconciliation dialogue” for Palestinian factions in which Hamas and Fatah signed a joint declaration that stated their intention to form a temporary post-war unity government in Gaza and the West Bank.[56] Fatah is the dominant party in the Palestinian Authority (PA), which governs the West Bank. The eight-point declaration stipulates that a government involving Hamas would rule the Gaza Strip and West Bank until elections could be held at an unspecified future date.[57] The declaration reportedly does not address how or when the government will be formed, nor which party will maintain security in the Gaza Strip. Hamas has been adamant that it will keep its military wing.[58] The declaration stands in contrast to the position of the United States and other Western countries, which oppose Hamas’ involvement in the Palestinian government unless it recognizes Israel.[59] Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz accused Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas of embracing terrorism by engaging with Hamas and denied that the government will form because Israel would crush Hamas.[60] The full text of the agreement has not been released at the time of writing.

PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi lauded the declaration as a “historic moment for the cause of Palestinian liberation.[61] Wang stated that the PRC has never had any selfish interests in the Palestinian issue and has contributed “Chinese wisdom and solutions” through various proposals under Xi Jinping. Wang outlined a three-step process for resolving the current conflict, which entailed an immediate ceasefire, the international community’s acceptance of a post-war Palestinian government in Gaza, and Palestine’s full membership in the United Nations to begin working toward a two-state solution. PRC state media highlighted congratulations from the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres and EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process Sven Koopmans.[62]

The PRC’s early portrayal of the deal as a success is not easily reconcilable with the historic obstacles to the unification of the Palestinian factions. Past deals have failed to bring about substantive cooperation between Fatah and Hamas.[63] PRC MFA spokesperson Mao Ning responded to public skepticism over the declaration’s role in facilitating reconciliation and stated that “peace will not be achieved overnight.”[64]

The PRC is using engagement with Palestinian factions to portray itself as a successful global mediator that can resolve conflicts where the United States has failed. Hosting the intra-Palestinian talks is a relatively low-cost, low-risk way for the PRC to bolster its diplomatic reputation. A failure to bring about Fatah-Hamas reconciliation would amount to maintenance of the status quo and would not draw significant criticism of the PRC. Even without a material improvement in relations between Fatah and Hamas, the negotiations provide the PRC with an opportunity to tout its diplomatic credentials in a similar way to the Beijing-mediated Saudi Arabia-Iran rapprochement in March 2023.

The PRC’s diplomatic engagement could facilitate greater PRC economic and political influence in the Levant. The PRC first hosted intra-Palestinian reconciliation talks between Fatah and Hamas in Beijing on April 26.[65] MFA spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated on April 26 that the PRC supports strengthening the authority of the PA, which signals its intent to establish relations with the Palestinian factions that have roles in governing Gaza after the war. [66] Post-war reconstruction offers a path for the PRC to grow its economic influence. The PRC pledged $83 million to reconstruction efforts and humanitarian aid as of May.[67] Senior Hamas official Hassam Badran stated that a Palestinian unity government would oversee reconstruction efforts under the joint agreement that the PRC facilitated.[68]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, July 12, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, and Jackson Karas of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: July 16, 2024

Key Takeaways

Taiwan Affairs Office Spokesperson Chen Binhua accused the DPP of intentionally distorting information about the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) recent legal guidelines for punishing Taiwanese separatism and generating undeserved fear among the Taiwanese public.
Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) spokesperson Sun Li-fang warned about the PRC’s weaponization of AI and deepfakes to conduct cognitive warfare operations.
PRC state media promoted “high-quality development,” self-reliance, and overcoming “obstacles” to economic reform ahead of the CCP Central Committee’s Third Plenum. The CCP is trying to shore up perceptions of a weak economy and lay the groundwork for upcoming economic reforms because its domestic legitimacy increasingly rests on its ability to deliver economic prosperity.
A PRC-Philippine agreement signed after the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on July 2 set up a direct presidential-level line of communication for bilateral crisis management. The hotline may provide a mechanism for escalation management but does not indicate a change in the PRC’s aggressive posture in the South China Sea.
The PRC and Russia conducted joint naval exercises in the South China Sea concurrently with a joint naval patrol in the North Pacific.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Spokesperson Chen Binhua accused the DPP of intentionally distorting information about the PRC’s recent legal guidelines for punishing Taiwanese separatism and generating undeserved fear among the Taiwanese public.[1] Chen stated that the recent regulations outlining severe punishment for “Taiwan independence forces” are not targeted at the vast majority of Taiwanese people but only against specific “die-hard elements.” Chen cited recent cross-strait exchanges as proof that the general public does not identify with the DPP’s alleged separatist policies.

The TAO announcement aims to assuage concerns with the legal guidelines that caused alarm in Taiwan over the prospect of arbitrary incarceration and prosecution for those who travel to the mainland. Chen’s specification regarding the focus of the legal guidelines aims to clarify the target of the PRC’s recent ire following intensifying coercion towards Taiwan after the inauguration of President Lai Ching-te, a DPP member whom the PRC regards as a separatist advancing Taiwanese sovereignty.

The guidelines follow a series of actions by the PRC to escalate pressure on Taiwan since the new administration, including large-scale military exercises around Taiwan in May, increasing encroachment on Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) by military aircraft, and the erosion of Taiwanese jurisdiction in waters around its outer islands. The PRC’s messaging toward the DPP directly links the aggressive PRC behavior to the DPP. The PRC justified its most recent military exercises, which took place three days after Lai’s inauguration, as a “strong punishment for the separatist acts of ‘Taiwan independence’ forces.”[2]

There were at least 325 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) violations of Taiwan’s ADIZ in June and 289 in May, the second and third-highest monthly totals on record, respectively. The June total is the highest for any month without a large-scale PLA exercise. The heightened number of ADIZ violations reflects an intensified PRC pressure campaign against Taiwan under Lai’s administration. The high frequency of ADIZ violations drains Taiwan’s resources, exhausts military personnel, and degrades Taiwan’s threat awareness. Taiwan does not scramble aircraft in response to all PRC ADIZ violations, but it does put military personnel on standby to respond quickly if needed.

Four Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ships entered Taiwan’s restricted waters around Kinmen on July 11.[3] The four ships approached the outer limits of Kinmen’s restricted waters in four different locations and simultaneously sailed across the boundary an hour later. This is the second instance that CCG ships have sailed simultaneously in multiple locations since a state media-affiliated social media account Yuyuan Tantian stated that the CCG was pursuing a “new model” of law enforcement patrols around Kinmen in June.[4] The social media account claimed that CCG patrols since June have moved away from fixed routes and to new formations consisting of single ships and pairs, which will increase the number of patrol areas. Yuyuan Tantian also stated that the CCG has increased the intensity of patrols and is conducting them around the clock. Violating Taiwan’s jurisdiction in multiple areas at once with individual CCG ships stretches Taiwanese Coast Guard resources and reduces its ability to respond to incursions, similar to ADIZ incursions.

Yuyuan Tantian stated that the original purpose of the CCG patrols was to defy Taiwan’s control over its restricted and prohibited waters. This contradicts the CCG’s stated purpose of their patrols in Kinmen’s waters, which is to “safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese fishermen, including Taiwan… and ensure normal navigation and operation in Kinmen-Xiamen waters.”[5] Taiwan does not formally claim any territorial waters around Kinmen partly due to its proximity to the PRC, but it designates “prohibited” and “restricted” waters around Kinmen, which it treats as equivalent to "territorial waters" and a "contiguous zone," respectively. The PRC does not officially recognize the existence of any restricted or prohibited waters around Taiwan’s outlying islands and claims the right to conduct law enforcement activities there, however.

The Taiwan Affairs Office of Shanghai is holding an annual summer program that provides Taiwanese college students with internships at prestigious companies in Shanghai’s central business district.[6] The program is one of countless sociocultural exchanges under the coordination of the PRC’s United Front agencies that aim to strengthen young Taiwanese people’s connection to the mainland and promote Chinese identity. The United Front is a whole-of-government and society effort to advance the CCP’s ideology and win the hearts and minds of the Chinese people by forming a thorough alliance between the CCP and the rest of society.

The program’s name, the “Stars Project,” mimics a well-respected Taiwanese program by the same name that helps promising high school students apply to universities in Taiwan.[7] The name is designed to leverage Taiwanese students’ association of the term with a prestigious program and encourage participation.

President of the Taiwan Professors Association Chen Li-fu stated that the PRC’s United Front activities directed at Taiwan’s youth aim to influence their national identity.[8] Chen warned that the focus of the PRC’s United Front work against Taiwan has shifted to young people after the Sunflower Movement in 2014. The Sunflower Movement was a primarily student-led wave of political activism in 2014 that rejected integration policies with the PRC and championed Taiwanese identity.

China-Taiwan Net, a news outlet that the TAO runs, features a constant stream of youth-focused cross-straits exchanges, demonstrating the emphasis of the PRC’s United Front work on reaching young Taiwanese people.[9] The PRC held the Cross-Strait Youth Summit in Beijing on July 3 and the Cross-Strait Youth Development Forum in Hangzhou and other cities on July 6.[10] The forums are annual events that the TAO and other United Front agencies host to promote cross-strait youth exchanges while pressuring attendees to adopt PRC-aligned political narratives, such as opposition to Taiwan's independence and acceptance of a shared national identity.

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) spokesperson Sun Li-fang warned about the PRC’s weaponization of AI and deepfakes to conduct cognitive warfare operations. Sun stated that the PRC’s cognitive warfare strategy is not limited to disseminating disinformation, but is closely integrated with the military operations of the PLA. The MND invited Academia Sinica Director of the Institute of Information and Communications Technology Huang Chin-i to advise on the PLA’s use of AI and disinformation to degrade the situational awareness and morale of its targets. Sun cited past examples of PRC disinformation targeted at Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang military exercise, including that the purpose of the exercises was for the commander-in-chief to plan an escape route, officers and soldiers defected due to the pressure of the exercises, and the equipment malfunctions casualties.[11]

Huang also detailed the PLA’s goal to use AI-enabled disinformation to create political polarization among the public and incite divisions. The PRC’s political warfare against Taiwan features constant information operations that aim to degrade support for the DPP and suppress Taiwanese sovereignty and identity. Governments and threat intelligence organizations have called repeated attention to sprawling PRC disinformation operations in coordinated campaigns such as Spamouflage.[12] A report from DoubleThink Labs, a Taiwanese firm that researches PRC influence operations, released a report in January that detailed the wide range of narratives that PRC threat actors propagate to negatively influence Taiwanese people’s perception of the DPP. The narratives opportunistically seize on topical controversies in Taiwanese politics to amplify criticism of the DPP government, including egg and pork import scandals, fraud cases related to Taiwan’s domestic submarine production, compulsory military service extensions, Indian migrant worker inflows, and false rumors about President Lai Ching-te’s supposed illegitimate child.[13]

China

PRC state media promoted “high-quality development,” self-reliance, and overcoming “obstacles” to economic reform ahead of the CCP Central Committee’s Third Plenum. The CCP’s 20th Central Committee held its Third Plenary Session from July 15-18. The Third Plenum for each CCP Central Committee, convened roughly every five years, sets the top economic policy agenda for the CCP’s next economic Five-Year Plan.[14] PRC state media including Xinhua and the CCP Central Party School journal Study Times called for the country to open itself to deeper economic reforms and to overcome “ideological rigidity” as well as “institutional and mechanistic” obstacles to reform.[15] A Study Times article on July 15, the first day of the Third Plenum, called for the party to push back on “misinterpretations” including the idea that reforms have stagnated.[16] An issue of the CCP theoretical magazine Qiushi released on the same day featured a series of excerpts from speeches by Xi Jinping that championed self-reliance and self-confidence.[17]

CCP leaders at the Third Plenum are likely trying to address of major economic challenges the PRC is facing, including a spiraling housing market, high local government debt, low consumer demand, weakening investor confidence, and slowing economic growth.[18] The PRC’s National Bureau of Statistics released new economic numbers on July 15 that showed that the economy grew 5.3% in the first quarter and 4.7% in the second quarter, underperforming expectations. A spokesperson for the bureau framed the economy’s performance as “relatively good” and stable. The spokesperson blamed the second-quarter slowdown in growth on recent floods as well as insufficient domestic demand and “lack of smoothness in domestic circulation.”[19] A spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) called the semi-annual economic report “remarkable” and said it showed that the PRC withstood the pressures of global instability and continued its “steady and positive” trend of “high-quality development” and “high-level opening-up.”[20]

The CCP is trying to shore up perceptions of a weak economy and lay the groundwork for upcoming economic reforms because its legitimacy as the PRC’s one-party government increasingly rests on its ability to deliver economic prosperity. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a report on July 9 based on surveys of PRC citizens that showed that the PRC populace increasingly blames unequal opportunity and an unfair economic system for poverty, while citing “connections” and generational wealth as the top two reasons for a person to be rich. The results show a dramatic change since 2014, when surveyed people cited talent and hard work as the top two reasons for wealth, while lack of ability and effort were the top two reasons given for poverty.[21]

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced new sanctions on six US defense firms over arms sales to Taiwan. The MFA announced on July 12 that it was imposing “countermeasures” on six US defense firms and five senior executives for arms sales to Taiwan. The sanctions freeze the PRC-based assets of Anduril Industries, Maritime Tactical Systems, Pacific Rim Defense, AEVEX Aerospace, LKD Aerospace, and Summit Technologies Inc. They also bar three Anduril executives and two executives of the drone manufacturer AeroVironment from entering the PRC and freeze any PRC-based assets they hold The MFA announcement said that US arms sales to Taiwan “seriously violated the one-China principle,” interfered in China’s domestic affairs, and damaged China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.[22] The PRC has imposed sanctions on at least nine other US firms and their executives for the same reason in 2024, including Boeing, Lockheed Martin, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, and General Dynamics Land Systems.[23] A 2023 report by the German think tank Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) found that the PRC has significantly increased its use of unilateral sanctions since 2018 against US individuals, groups, or companies it perceives to be interfering in its internal affairs.[24] The PRC has repeatedly expressed opposition to unilateral sanctions in general, however, including US sanctions against it and other countries such as Russia and Iran.[25]

Southeast Asia

Philippines

A PRC-Philippine agreement signed after the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) on July 2 set up a direct presidential-level line of communication for bilateral crisis management. Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Undersecretary Maria Theresa Lazaro and PRC Vice Foreign Minister Chen Xiaodong met in Manila on July 2 for talks about the PRC-Philippine disputes in the South China Sea as part of the ninth round of BCM talks. The two countries signed the Arrangement on Improving Philippines-China Maritime Communication Mechanisms.[26] The Associated Press reported on July 16 that the agreement included the opening of a direct line of communication between the presidential offices of both countries to better manage disputes in the South China Sea.[27] The PRC and the Philippines have had a series of tense confrontations over the past several months over control of disputed islands and maritime features in the South China Sea. The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) has used increasingly aggressive tactics including ramming and water cannons to prevent Philippine government ships from reaching Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC has controlled Scarborough Shoal since 2012 but has not built any facilities there. The Philippines controls the Second Thomas Shoal using a beached derelict warship as an outpost. Both sides have avoided directly attacking each other’s personnel with weapons to prevent the dispute from escalating into a violent conflict, which could trigger the US-Philippine mutual defense treaty.

The establishment of a presidential-level hotline with the Philippines may provide a mechanism for escalation management but does not indicate a change in the PRC’s aggressive posture in the South China Sea. The PRC has continued its rhetoric regarding the Philippines’ “provocations” around PRC-claimed territories in the South China Sea since the July 2 agreement. It anchored its largest CCG vessel, CCG-5901, less than 800 yards from the Philippine Coast Guard ship at the Philippine-controlled Sabina Shoal on July 3, released a report on July 8 blaming the Philippine warship on Second Thomas Shoal for environmental damage, and deployed CCG vessels to assert PRC claims to Second Thomas Shoal while “allowing” the Philippines to perform a medical evacuation on July 9.[28] Additionally, it is unclear how or whether the PRC will use the new hotline to defuse crises. The Philippines said that it was unable to reach PRC officials through a preexisting “maritime communication mechanism” during a confrontation at Second Thomas Shoal in August 2023.[29] An unspecified “highly placed” Philippine source told the South China Morning Post that the pre-existing hotline has never been used during Philippine resupply missions, a common flashpoint for conflict with the PRC, but has been used to coordinate with the PRC for search-and-rescue missions.[30]

North America

Canada

The PRC denied Canada’s accusations that the PRC set up clandestine overseas police stations in Toronto to harass Chinese expatriates. A July 13 Bloomberg article cited two anonymous sources within Canada’s government who stated that Canada has mapped out the locations of clandestine PRC police stations in its territory including in three majority-Chinese areas of Toronto.[31] The anonymous sources stated that Canada intends to coordinate its response to covert overseas PRC police stations with other members of the G7. Among the G7, the United States, Germany, Italy, and the UK have each expressed concern about overseas PRC police presence in their territory in the previous two years.[32] The United States and Canada released a joint communique on July 12 that highlighted common concerns of foreign interference including “transnational repression-related cases” such as the 2022 indictment of 5 US persons accused of working for the PRC government to silence expatriate criticism of the PRC.[33]

Spain-based human rights organization Safeguard Defenders claimed in a 2022 report that the PRC operates 54 overseas police stations on 5 continents.[34] The report further stated that these covert police stations formed a part of a PRC campaign to establish extraterritorial control over Chinese expatriates while circumventing formal legal structures that would provide protection to the expatriates. Safeguard Defenders additionally noted that the PRC instead uses these covert police stations to threaten and harass expatriates to pressure them to return to the PRC. The location of the alleged PRC police bases in Chinese-majority areas of Toronto indicates that the PRC police presence in Canada is likely a component of the PRC’s wider effort to monitor and influence its expatriate community both extraterritorially and extralegally.

PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian denied the existence of overseas PRC police stations and urged Canada to stop “smearing” the PRC in his daily remarks on July 15.[35] The PRC Embassy in Ottawa likewise claimed that the PRC offices in Toronto are staffed by volunteers and aid Chinese people with documentation and stated that the PRC respects the “judicial sovereignty” of all nations.[36] These statements mirror recent PRC criticisms of the United States and its allies of overselling the “China threat theory” as an excuse to heighten cooperation targeted at the PRC’s influence abroad. The PRC also has painted itself as the victim of a growing “anti-China” coalition in the West.[37] The PRC response reflects growing concern over what the PRC views as increasing Western cooperation to "contain” the PRC, particularly if a joint-G7 effort to combat clandestine PRC police action abroad materializes.

Russia

The PRC and Russia conducted joint naval exercises in the South China Sea concurrently with a joint naval patrol in the North Pacific. The “Joint-Sea 2024” exercises began on July 14 at a port in Zhanjiang, Guangdong, the headquarters of the PLAN South Sea Fleet.[38] The joint exercises included air defense drills, anti-submarine drills, live-fire drills, and rescue training.[39] The Russian Navy corvettes Gromkiy and Rezkiy, Russian fleet oiler Irkut, PLAN destroyer Nanning, PLAN frigates Xianning and Dali, and PLAN supply ship Weishanhu, participated in the exercises.[40]

Joint patrols began in the East China Sea, near South Korea’s Jeju Islands, and transited through Japan’s Osumi Strait before sailing to the South China Sea. The joint China-Russia Naval Patrol entered the South China Sea through the Balintang Channel located near the Luzon Strait.[41] The Chinese Ministry of Defense (MOD) reported that the joint patrol was carried out by the PLAN destroyer Yinchuan, PLAN frigate Hengshui, Russian frigate Sovershennyi, and PLAN supply ship Weishanhu.[42] The participating vessels also participated in “search and arrest” and supply replenishment exercises.[43]

The PRC MOD denied that these exercises were in response to the recent NATO summit and stated that they were not intended to target any third party.[44] Instead, the PRC characterized them as a normal instance of cooperation between two militaries.

Annual “Joint-Sea” exercises have been an element of China-Russia military cooperation since 2012 and have focused on enhancing joint maritime operations and responding to security threats facing the two countries.[45] To date, 10 of the 13 ”Joint-Sea” exercises have transited through the Indo-Pacific, most commonly the Sea of Japan and East China Seas, strategically important locations for China and Russia.[46] “Joint-Sea 2016” was the only exercise before “Joint-Sea 2024” to occur in the South China Sea, taking place a few months after the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea were invalid.[47] “Joint-Sea 2024” occurred after the end of the United States, Japan, and South Korean trilateral “Freedom Edge” exercise in the East China Sea near Jeju Island and amid escalating tensions between the PRC and the Philippines.

A Meeting between PRC National People’s Congress Standing Committee Chairman Zhao Leji and Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized Sino-Russian strategic consensus. On July 13 Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) Zhao Leji met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg.[48] The two discussed the strategic partnership between China and Russia, and the benefits that it has brought to both countries. Putin and Xi Jinping met earlier this month at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in Astana and reportedly reached several consensuses, which Putin reiterated in his meeting with Zhao.[49] Given Zhao’s leadership position within the NPC, his affirmation of these points of consensus suggests continued Sino-Russian bilateral cooperation at the legislative level.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, July 3, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War; Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Key Takeaways

The PLA significantly increased its daily incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone in July to expand the PRC’s coercive pressure on the ROC as “punishment” for the election of ROC President Lai Ching-te.
The PRC is using cross-strait events such as the Cross-Strait Youth Summit to legitimize the Kuomintang as a negotiating partner on behalf of Taiwan and promote its pro-unification message.
The PRC framed collaboration between NATO and Indo-Pacific states as a threat to regional security.
CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping welcomed Belarus to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and advocated for Turkey to join the organization. Xi seeks to use the SCO to legitimize PRC-led institutions and undermine Western-led security frameworks.
The PRC’s cyber defense agency issued disinformation about the US Intelligence Community and denied that the Volt Typhoon cyber threat actor is a PRC state-sponsored group.
The CCG anchored its largest ship in the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone as an intimidation tactic following reports of Philippine Coast Guard base construction in Sabina Shoal.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The PLA significantly increased its daily incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in July to expand the PRC’s coercive pressure on the ROC as “punishment” for the election of ROC President Lai Ching-te. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported 232 ADIZ violations by PLA aircraft in the first ten days of July, more than the totals for most months on record. This included 56 violations on July 10, which is tied with October 4, 2021, as the highest daily total on record.[1] 36 of the aircraft involved in the July 10 incursions flew through the southern and southeastern part of the ADIZ on their way to the Western Pacific for air-sea joint training exercises with the Shandong aircraft carrier and other PLA Navy vessels.[2]

The high number of ADIZ violations in July is part of a trend of increased ADIZ violations after Lai Ching-te took office as president of Taiwan on May 20. There were at least 325 PLA violations of Taiwan’s ADIZ in June and 289 in May, the second and third-highest monthly totals on record, respectively. The June total is the highest for any month without a large-scale PLA exercise. The record for most ADIZ violations in one month was 446 in August 2022, when the PRC responded to then-US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan with record-scale military exercises around Taiwan.[3] The number of ADIZ violations that Taiwan’s MND reports does not include PRC vessels and aircraft around Taiwan’s outlying islands such as the Kinmen and Matsu archipelagos.

The heightened number of violations reflects an intensified PRC pressure campaign against Taiwan under the new administration of Lai Ching-te, whom the PRC considers a dangerous separatist. The high frequency of ADIZ violations drains Taiwan’s resources, exhausts military personnel, and degrades Taiwan’s threat awareness. Taiwan does not scramble aircraft in response to all PRC ADIZ violations, but it does put military personnel on standby to respond quickly if needed.

A PLA drone flew near an airport on Taiwan’s Matsu Islands and disrupted two flights. The ROC Army Matsu Defense Command detected a PRC military drone hovering 5 nautical miles from Matsu’s Nangan Airport on July 2. The command notified the airport control tower, which alerted nearby aircraft and had two flights to delay their landing at the airport. The drone remained in the area for 20 minutes before leaving.[4] It did not enter the airspace above Matsu’s restricted or prohibited waters.[5] This is the first reported instance of a PLA drone approaching Taiwan’s outlying islands outside of a military exercise.

A Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ship tried to expel Taiwanese fishing boats fishing near the Penghu Islands and east of the median line of the Taiwan Strait. A Taiwanese Coast Guard Administration (CGA) ship patrolling the median line of the Taiwan Strait on July 5 discovered a CCG ship 3.5 miles east of the median line trying to expel Taiwanese fishing boats there. The CCG ship was 30 miles northwest of Mudou Island, part of Taiwan’s Penghu archipelago, and within Taiwan’s claimed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). It was not in the PRC’s territorial waters or contiguous zone. Taiwan’s CGA ship cut between the CCG and fishing boats and broadcast for the CCG to leave and stop interfering with Taiwanese boats.[6] The PRC claims Taiwan as its territory and considers the entire Taiwan Strait to be part of the PRC’s EEZ.

The PRC is increasing the frequency, scope, and aggressiveness of its “law enforcement” patrols around Taiwan as part of a pressure campaign against ROC President Lai and his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration.[7] The CCG began conducting patrols around Taiwan’s outlying Kinmen archipelago, including into Kinmen’s restricted and prohibited waters, after two PRC fishermen died while fleeing a CGA pursuit in Kinmen waters in February 2024. It boarded and detained a Taiwanese fishing boat for illegally fishing in PRC waters near Kinmen on July 2, the first such detainment in 17 years, and continues to hold the crew as of July 9.[8] The PRC has detained since March an ROC soldier of the Kinmen Defense Command whose fishing boat drifted into PRC waters.[9] CCG operations in Taiwan-controlled waters and EEZ serve to enhance the PRC’s claims and erode Taiwan’s control over those waters and territories.

The ROC CGA expelled a PRC research vessel that entered “restricted or prohibited waters” off Taiwan’s east coast. The PRC scientific research vessel Tan Kah Kee, also known as the Jia Geng, sailed in waters near Taiwan’s Yilan County on July 7. At one point the vessel came within 20 nautical miles of Taiwan’s coast, which is within Taiwan’s contiguous zone. A CGA vessel expelled it from the area. Tan Kah Kee is a 3,600-ton research vessel owned by the PRC’s Xiamen University’s Marine Operations. It is equipped with acoustic sensors, weather radars, and submarine drones it can launch to map the ocean floor.[10] Taiwan’s National Security Bureau Director Tsai Ming-yen said the vessel did not cast any underwater equipment and was mainly there to collect hydrological data.[11] A Financial Times report from February 2024 noted that some such research vessels have ties to the PLA, however, and that the data they collect including meteorological data have military applications.[12] Taiwan will conduct its annual Han Kuang military exercises in July, including sensitive weapons tests and drills in Yilan County.[13]

The February 2024 Financial Times report found that PRC research vessels sailed into or along Taiwan’s eastern contiguous zone nine times between September 2023 and February 2024, an increase from previous years.[14] The incursion by the Tan Kah Kee into Taiwan’s contiguous waters is the first such incursion that ISW has noted since February. In addition to collecting data, the PRC may use ostensibly non-military and scientific vessels around Taiwan in tandem with near-daily air and naval violations of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and increasing CCG patrols near Taiwan’s outlying islands to wear down Taiwan’s threat awareness and resources, forcing it to be selective in which perceived incursions it chooses to respond to. Blurring the lines between military and civilian activities also has the effect of making it more difficult for Taiwan to determine which activities are potential threats.

A Taiwanese government investigation found that three Taiwanese military facilities had installed banned PRC-made devices including routers. Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) Legislative Caucus Chair Huang Kuo-chang is leading an investigation into the Taiwanese military’s use of PRC technologies. The Ministry of National Defense's (MND) Armaments Bureau confirmed on July 4 that it had found two Huawei routers and a PRC-manufactured Advantech data reader installed at the army’s Hungchailin Camp. It also found 128 PRC-made inverters at solar installations at the Hungchailin base, the Pinghai Navy Base, and Tri-Service General Hospital’s Songshan Branch. Taiwan had banned the installation of these PRC-made devices at military facilities due to security concerns. The MND Armaments Bureau said it ordered the Taiwanese contractors who illegally installed these devices to remove the devices and would investigate them for breach of contract. Huang claimed in a press conference that the DPP administration had allowed its green energy initiative in the military to become a “fifth column for Beijing,” alluding to fears that the PRC could use the banned telecommunications devices to spy on Taiwanese bases.[15] Huang also accused Taiwan’s National Defense University of using PRC-made routers and computers and concealing this fact from the MND, which did not find PRC-made devices at the university. The MND also said on July 10 that it was investigating the military’s use of PRC-made dashcams and had already removed over 800 such dashcams from military vehicles. KMT legislator Hsu Chiao-hsin said Taiwan had blacklisted the vendor who won the army contract for the dashcams in 2021, on the same day the military placed its order.[16]

The PRC is using cross-strait events such as the Cross-Strait Youth Summit to legitimize the Kuomintang (KMT) as a negotiating partner on behalf of Taiwan and promote its pro-unification message. The CCP kicked off the Cross-Strait Youth Summit in Beijing on July 3 and the Cross-Strait Youth Development Forum in Hangzhou and other cities on July 6. The forums are annual events that the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and other agencies host to promote youth exchanges between the PRC and Taiwan and promote a message of cross-strait unity. KMT Vice Chairman Sean Lien Sheng-wen attended the Cross Strait Youth Summit and gave a speech in which he encouraged young people on both sides to connect in person and said the KMT hopes both sides of the strait can shelve their disputes and seek common ground.[17] Lien also told cross-strait media that any action that does not contribute to cross-strait exchanges and a friendly atmosphere is unnecessary. His comment referred to Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council’s (MAC) decision to upgrade its travel warning to the PRC after the PRC issued legal guidelines promising harsh punishments for “Taiwan independence diehards.”[18] Former KMT Chair and Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou also spoke at the summit via video conference and urged young people to work together to “create a bright future for the Chinese nation.” About 600 people attended the forum including TAO Director Song Tao, who gave the opening speech.[19]

Song Tao also attended the opening of the Cross-Strait Youth Development Forum on July 6 together with former KMT Chair and current chair of the China Cyan Geese Peace Education Foundation Hung Hsiu-chu. Around 800 people attended in total.[20] Song met with Hung on July 8 in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province. According to a PRC readout, Song and Hung both expressed the need to jointly oppose Taiwan's independence and promote national reunification and rejuvenation.[21]

The CCP invites KMT figures such as Lien, Hung, and Ma to participate in cross-strait events and negotiations as part of an effort to legitimize the KMT as an interlocutor on behalf of Taiwan in contrast to the DPP. The PRC cut off official exchanges with Taiwan after Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP became president of Taiwan in 2016. CCP officials have repeatedly met with KMT officials and invited them to PRC-hosted events during this time. Sean Lien and fellow KMT vice chairman Andrew Hsia are frequent participants in such meetings. The CCP insists that all cross-strait negotiations must be on the mutual basis of the “1992 consensus,” which Ma and the KMT recognize but Tsai and the DPP do not. The 1992 Consensus is an alleged verbal agreement between semi-official representatives of the PRC and the then KMT-ruled ROC following negotiations in 1992. It states that both sides agree there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The CCP interprets this “one China” to be the People’s Republic of China, however, while the KMT interprets it to be the Republic of China.

China

The PRC framed collaboration between NATO and Indo-Pacific states as a threat to regional security. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Lin Jian criticized NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg’s pledge on July 9 to expand NATO cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. Most of the leaders of these Indo-Pacific states are attending the NATO summit from July 9-11. The exception is Australia, which sent Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles.[22] Lin accused NATO of “expanding its power across its boundaries, provoking confrontation, and engaging in hegemony and bullying.”[23] Lin stated that NATO’s strengthening of security ties with countries surrounding the PRC amounted to implementing the US “Indo-Pacific Strategy” and has undermined peace in the region.

Lin condemned the NATO summit declaration that held the PRC responsible for enabling Russia’s war against Ukraine.[24] Lin blamed the US for using NATO to spread false information and undermine PRC-EU relations. Lin claimed that the PRC’s “constructive role on the Ukrainian issue is widely recognized by the international community.” The PRC began military exercises with Belarus near the Polish border during the NATO summit.[25]

The PRC is also frustrated with the strengthening of defense cooperation between US allies in the Indo-Pacific. Lin criticized the signing of a Reciprocal Access Agreement between the Philippines and Japan that permits the temporary stationing of troops in each other’s territory for exercises and patrols. Lin stated that such cooperation instigated a “new Cold War” and highlighted Japan’s militaristic history.[26] Japan finalized a Reciprocal Access Agreement with Australia in August 2023.[27] The PRC’s dissatisfaction with security cooperation is based on the perception that collaboration between liberal democracies in the region has the potential to mount stronger resistance to PRC efforts to advance certain interests which it relies on maintaining a dominant military presence for, such as enforcing territorial claims over Taiwan and the South China Sea.

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping welcomed Belarus to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Xi seeks to use the SCO to legitimize PRC-led institutions and undermine Western-led security frameworks. The SCO is a Eurasia-focused multilateral security forum established by the PRC and Russia in 2001. Belarus joined the SCO at the organization’s 2024 regional security forum on July 4 and is the first new member state since the SCO admitted Iran in 2023.[28] Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that Turkey sought full membership in the SCO after a meeting with Xi on the sidelines of the summit. Erdoğan first expressed interest in Turkey joining the SCO in 2022.[29] Turkey would be the first NATO member to join the organization.

Xi called on member states to pursue change in an increasingly unstable world and strengthen ties with each other, especially security cooperation and exchanges that enhance mutual trust.[30] Xi’s appeal reflects the PRC’s goal to present the SCO as a viable alternative to the Western-led security architecture and highlight the need to pursue other security arrangements as the existing one fails to prevent instability. Xi’s comments reflect the PRC’s goal to build solid ties between the member states and bolster the SCO as a long-lasting alternative to the Western-led security architecture. Strong participation in PRC-led institutions is beneficial to the PRC’s ability to pursue its interests freely. Xi has used his platform at past SCO summits to advance PRC goals, including playing up the threat of terrorism in Xinjiang, advocating for Central Asian states’ participation in the Belt and Road Initiative, and “opposing interference in the internal affairs of other countries,” a phrase which PRC officials usually use in reference to Taiwan.[31]

Xi met separately with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during the week of the SCO summit. PRC readouts of the meetings highlighted alignment between Xi and the leaders of both countries on the war in Ukraine.[32] Orban later praised the PRC as a “key power” in promoting peace in Ukraine and stated that “China has a peace plan. America has a war policy.” The PRC released a vague 12-point peace plan in February 2023 that advocated for a political settlement to the war in Ukraine.[33] Ukraine and Western allies regarded it as a non-starter due to its failure to demand Russia’s withdrawal from occupied territory. The PRC’s publicization of meetings with the two leaders seeks to play up divisions among NATO members and show that there is no uniform policy on Ukraine. Praise from Orban also helps the PRC to rebuke NATO's accusations of the PRC’s responsibility for the crisis as Russia’s enabler.

The PRC’s cyber defense agency issued disinformation about the US Intelligence Community and denied that the Volt Typhoon cyber threat actor is a PRC state-sponsored group. The PRC’s National Computer Virus Emergency Response Center (CVERC) published a report on July 8 that responds to US and Five Eyes accusations of PRC state-sponsored hacking. The report alleges that the cyber threat actor Volt Typhoon is not a PRC state-sponsored group. It also claims that the US and FVEY assessments are sensationalist lies that US intelligence agencies fabricated to demonize the PRC and earn more funding from Congress. State media outlet Xinhua highlighted the US intelligence community’s motivation to enhance its surveillance powers.[34]

CVERC published the report in both Chinese and English, which is unusual for the agency’s announcements. CVERC’s release of an English version suggests the target audience includes the international community, as the PRC attempts to rebuff US and Five Eyes allegations of PRC misconduct in cyberspace. The PRC issued the report on the same day that the United States, Five Eyes partners, Germany, South Korea, and Japan published a joint advisory about malicious cyber operations of Advanced Persistent Threat 40 (APT40). The joint advisory includes the assessment that APT40 is affiliated with the PRC’s Ministry of State Security (MSS), marking the first such attribution by Australia, Japan, and South Korea.[35]

The CVERC report is the second part of a series first published on April 15 that followed US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) advisories about Volt Typhoon in February and March.[36] The PRC’s accusation that the US advisories are disinformation is consistent with previous instances of flipping the narrative when its state-sponsored malign cyber activities become public. For example, MFA spokesperson Lin Jian responded to US and Five Eyes partner accusations about the PRC’s election-related hacking by citing PRC threat intelligence reports that supposedly exposed US-based APTs including several US intelligence agencies.[37] The PRC uses blame shifting to divert public attention from PRC malicious cyber activities and crowd the information space with narratives that target the United States and US allies.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The China Coast Guard (CCG) anchored its largest ship in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) near Sabina Shoal. The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) reported that the CCG’s largest vessel, the CCG-5901, entered the Philippines’ EEZ on July 2. The CCG-5901 traveled through the Second Thomas Shoal and Panganiban Reef to its destination in the Sabina Shoal, where it has been anchored since July 3.[38] The PCG released a statement on July 6 accusing the PRC of attempted intimidation.[39] PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian responded that the CCG was operating within PRC sovereign territory per international law.[40] Lin did not comment on whether the CCG’s actions were in response to territorial disputes in Sabina Shoal.

Yang Xiao of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), an arm of the Ministry of State Security, previously accused the PCG of attempting to build a permanent maritime base in Sabina Shoal. Yang stated that such behaviors would lead the PRC to increase its law enforcement presence around Sabina Shoal.[41] The anchoring of the CCG-5901 in Sabina Shoal serves the dual purpose of intimidating the PCG and acting on earlier CCG threats of increasing their law enforcement presence in the disputed territory. With the CCG-5901 anchored in Sabina Shoal, the PCG is unlikely to continue building a maritime base. Preventing the construction of a base in Sabina Shoal is in the best interest of the PRC, as a PCG base will allow the Philippines to enhance resupply capabilities to the Second Thomas Shoal and Sierra Madre.

The PRC released a report accusing the Philippines of causing environmental harm to coral reefs in Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC Ministry of Natural Resources released a report accusing the Philippines of causing “serious damage” to the coral reef ecosystem around Second Thomas Shoal.[42] The Ministry states that this damage is caused by the “illegal” beaching of the Philippine warships, including the BRP Sierra Madre. The Sierra Madre was grounded by Manila in 1999 to defend and enhance its territorial claims.[43] The report calls on the Philippines to remove its warships and halt further damage to underwater ecosystems. The Philippine task force on the South China Sea rejected the PRC’s accusation, instead placing the blame for any ecological damage on PRC actions. The task force called for an independent, third-party investigation into ecological damage in the South China Sea and its causes. PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian responded to the Philippines’ accusation on July 10.[44] Lin rejected the idea that the PRC caused any damage to coral reefs in the Second Thomas Shoal, and contrasted the damaged Second Thomas Shoal with the well-maintained and PRC-held Scarborough Shoal, reiterating the threat to coral reef ecosystems posed by the Philippines’ military activities.[45]

The PRC and Philippines have competing claims over the Second Thomas Shoal along with other regions of the South China Sea. If the Philippines were to remove the Sierra Madre it would improve the PRC’s ability to assert its claim over the Second Thomas Shoal. Preventing damage to marine environments is a stated component of CCG responsibilities and could serve as a justification for increased CCG presence in the Second Thomas Shoal and surrounding areas.[46]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, June 27, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Key Takeaways

The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office downplayed the risk that the PRC will prosecute ordinary Taiwanese citizens after the PRC released legal guidelines that threaten advocates of Taiwanese independence with criminal penalties up to the death penalty.
Chinese Coast Guard ships boarded a Taiwanese fishing boat for illegally fishing in PRC waters and escorted it to a naval port in Fujian province on July 2.
PRC officials and media framed the ongoing RIMPAC exercises as provoking “bloc confrontation” in the Asia-Pacific and attempting to intimidate the PRC in support of Taiwan.
The Philippines stated that the PRC interfered in the rescue of Philippine fishermen whose boat exploded near Scarborough Shoal. The PRC framed the role of the CCG positively to portray itself as the legitimate authority in the waters near the shoal.
The PRC accused the Philippines of “undermining peace and stability” by resupplying a Philippine Coast Guard vessel “illegally stationed” on Sabina Shoal.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) downplayed the risk that the PRC will prosecute ordinary Taiwanese citizens after the PRC released legal guidelines that threaten advocates of Taiwanese independence with criminal penalties up to the death penalty. TAO Spokesperson Zhu Fenglian claimed that the guidelines only target “Taiwanese independence diehards” who engage in “separatist activities.” The guidelines outline the actions subject to criminal prosecution under the criminal code. They state that “Taiwan independence”-related activities punishable under Article 103 include:

Forming a “Taiwan independence” organization or program;
Directing people to carry out activities that “split the country or undermine national unity;”
Attempting to change the “legal status of Taiwan as a part of China” by law;
Attempting to create “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” in the international community by promoting Taiwan’s membership in international organizations that require statehood or by engaging in official exchanges or military contacts with other countries; and
Using one’s official position to “wantonly distort or falsify the fact that Taiwan is a part of China” in education, culture, history, media, etc., or to “suppress” political parties, groups, or individuals that support peaceful cross-strait relations and “national reunification.”[1]

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) raised the travel warning severity for the PRC on June 27 in response to the legal guidelines, citing increased detention and interrogation of Taiwanese citizens under the PRC’s progressively strict national security laws in recent years. The MAC urged Taiwanese citizens to avoid travel to the mainland unless necessary.[2]

Zhu accused the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government of “political manipulation” in response to the travel warning and claimed that the DPP was inciting confrontation to obstruct cross-strait exchanges.[3] Zhu encouraged Taiwanese people to participate in cross-strait exchanges and stated that there was no reason to worry when traveling to the mainland. The PRC’s accusations against the DPP serve to portray it as the instigator of cross-strait tensions while minimizing the severity of the legal guidelines, which threaten punishment up to the death penalty.

DPP spokesperson Justin Wu Cheng claimed on July 1 that there is a real risk for Taiwanese citizens to travel to the PRC because of the PRC’s history of weaponizing the law and arbitrarily detaining Taiwanese nationals. He cited the examples of Lee Meng-chu and Yang Chi-yuan, two Taiwanese citizens who were arrested “without reason” in the PRC on political grounds.[4]

PRC authorities arrested Lee in Shenzhen in August 2019 for taking pictures of police officers and withheld information about his detainment for weeks. The PRC labeled Lee an “independence activist” for his position as chairman of the Taiwan-United Nations Alliance (TAIUNA) and forced him to publicly confess his support for Hong Kong “thugs,” referring to pro-democracy protesters.[5] The PRC imprisoned him for one year and ten months for alleged spying for foreign countries on behalf of Taiwan. The PRC allowed him to return to Taiwan in July 2023.

PRC authorities detained Yang in August 2022, during then-Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, and held him without trial for eight months. The PRC charged Yang with “promoting Taiwan’s independence and accession to the United Nations” and convicted him of secessionism, marking the first case of the PRC prosecution for such an offense.[6] Yang remains imprisoned in the PRC.

PLA aircraft violated Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) at least 325 times in June, the highest monthly total since August 2022. The June total is the second-highest monthly total on record and the highest for any month without a large-scale PLA exercise. The record for most ADIZ violations in one month was 446 in August 2022, when the PRC responded to then-US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan with record-scale military exercises around Taiwan. There were 289 violations in May, of which 82 (28 percent) occurred on May 23 and 24 during the PRC’s Joint Sword 2024A exercise around Taiwan.[7] The number of ADIZ violations that Taiwan’s MND reports does not include PRC vessels and aircraft around Taiwan’s outlying islands such as the Kinmen and Matsu archipelagos.

Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ships boarded a Taiwanese fishing boat for illegally fishing in PRC waters and escorted it to a naval port in Fujian province on July 2.[8] The Taiwanese fishing boat was within PRC territorial waters 11.5 nautical miles from the PRC coast when the CCG ships confronted it. It was also near the Taiwanese island of Kinmen, though not within Taiwan-controlled waters.[9] CCG spokesperson Liu Dejun said the fishing boat was suspected of illegally fishing in a prohibited area in violation of a summer fishing moratorium and was using equipment that did not comply with regulations.[10]

Two Taiwanese Coast Guard Administration (CGA) ships deployed to the scene of the arrest to rescue the fishermen and engaged in a standoff with four CCG ships who intercepted the pursuit and broadcast warnings not to interfere.[11] The Taiwanese Coast Guard stated that it halted the pursuit to avoid escalation of the situation. A CGA spokesperson called on the PRC to release the fishing boat and to avoid politicizing the issue.[12] Taiwanese media claimed that the site of the confrontation was an established location for Taiwanese fishermen to catch squid and the incident represented the violation of a years-long tacit understanding.[13] Taiwanese media stated that there were other Taiwanese fishing vessels in the vicinity, which other CCG ships monitored during the confrontation.[14]

The PRC and Taiwan have detained or expelled each other’s fishing boats for illegal fishing in their respective waters in the past.[15] The PRC has increased its patrols and law enforcement since February 2024 around Kinmen and some of Taiwan’s other outlying islands, however, in response to an incident in which two PRC fishermen died in a boat accident while fleeing a CGA pursuit in Kinmen’s prohibited waters. The PRC has made increasingly frequent incursions into Taiwan-controlled waters around Taiwan’s outer islands since February, primarily with CCG patrols but also including at least two PLA naval vessels.[16] The CCG boarded a Taiwanese sightseeing ship sailing around Kinmen on February 19 when it briefly strayed off course into PRC waters.[17] The PRC has detained one Taiwanese fisherman for over three months since March 18 after his boat ran out of fuel and drifted into PRC waters and the PRC discovered he was a soldier in the Kinmen Defense Command.[18]

China

PRC state media publicized a message of countering corruption and ensuring the military’s political loyalty to the CCP days after the CCP expelled two former defense ministers for corruption. The PRC announced corruption investigations against former Ministers of Defense Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu and expelled both men from the CCP on June 27. The state news agency Xinhua announced that both men had “seriously violated political discipline,” failed in their political responsibilities, used their positions to benefit themselves, and accepted gifts and large amounts of money for favors. It also said that Wei had “seriously polluted the political ecology of the troops” and Li had “seriously polluted the political ecology of the equipment field.”[19] The PLA’s official newspaper PLA Daily published an editorial on July 1, three days after the announcements about the former defense ministers, that called for the PLA to “adhere to the Party’s absolute leadership over the military” under Chairman Xi Jinping, continue to deepen political training, and eradicate the “soil and conditions for the breeding of corruption.”[20]

Xi has pursued an extensive anti-corruption campaign in the military and government since he took power in 2013. Anti-corruption purges in the PLA in recent years have particularly focused on the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and equipment procurement. Many of the nine senior generals the PRC purged during the past year were also from the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). Wei and Li are the latest purges in this trend.

Before becoming Ministers of Defense, Wei was the first commander of the PLARF, created in 2016 from the former Second Artillery Corps, while Li was the head of the PLA procurement department. Bloomberg reported in January 2024 that US intelligence assessments that graft in the PLA hindered military effectiveness and was a reason behind the PLARF purges, including a case in which investigators discovered some missiles that were filled with water instead of fuel.[21]

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping portrayed the PRC as a force for global peace and justice on the 70th anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are a set of principles dating back to the 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement that Xi said have since formed the “bedrock” of the PRC’s international relations. They are:

Mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity;
Mutual non-aggression;
Non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit; and
Peaceful coexistence.[22]

Xi delivered a speech to an audience including representatives and former leaders from over 100 countries in which he pledged that “China's door to opening up will only open wider and wider” and that the PRC’s “determination to pursue a path of peaceful development will not change.” Xi framed the PRC’s vision to build a “community with a shared future for mankind” as the most effective way to “sustain, promote, and upgrade” the Five Principles in the “new circumstances.” He called on the Global South to work together and take the lead in building the “community with a shared future for mankind.”[23] Attendees of the event jointly issued a Beijing Declaration that said the Global South is a “key force in advocating and practicing the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.” The declaration said the Five Principles are a “correction to imperialist, colonialist, and hegemonic systems” built on protecting the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries.[24]

The PRC is using the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to persuade countries of the Global South to unite behind a Beijing-led international order. It contrasts these principles of non-interference and mutual respect for sovereignty with the colonialist past and what it calls the “hegemonic” policies of countries in the Western-led international order.

PRC officials and media framed the ongoing RIMPAC exercises as provoking “bloc confrontation” in the Asia-Pacific and attempting to intimidate the PRC in support of Taiwan. The biennial Ring of the Pacific (RIMPAC) multinational maritime exercise began on June 27 near Hawaii. Over 25,000 personnel from approximately 29 countries will participate in the exercise until August 1. The exercise will feature “experimentation” with new capabilities to sink the USS Tarawa, an 820-foot-long, 40,000-ton decommissioned amphibious assault ship.[25] PRC Ministry of National Defense (MOD) spokesperson Senior Colonel Wu Qian responded to media reports that the sinking of the Tarawa is preparation for an attack on PLA amphibious assault ships in case of war in the Taiwan Strait by accusing the United States of using the exercise to “frighten” the PLA, which Wu said was an “impossible task.” Wu stressed that solving the “Taiwan issue” is an internal matter for the PRC that will not allow external interference.[26]

State media outlet Global Times cited PRC military expert Fu Qianshao who said that there were “obvious” signs that RIMPAC exercise targets the PRC because there are few countries in the Asia-Pacific region that operate amphibious assault ships and are not US allies. Fu said using the USS Tarawa as a target can also be practice for sinking an aircraft carrier.[27] State media Xinhua published commentary by another military expert named Zhang Junshe who wrote that the true purpose of the exercise is for the United States to “coerce” other countries into joining its “small circle” and provoke “camp confrontation” against the PRC. He claimed that aside from a handful of countries such as Japan, Australia, and Canada that are willing to act as “thugs” of the United States, most participating countries do not want to be involved in a US-PRC confrontation and are participating because they do not wish to offend the United States.[28]

RIMPAC is the world’s largest naval exercise. It began in 1971 with participation from the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand and has since grown to include 29 participating nations in 2024. The United States invited the PRC to participate in RIMPAC in 2014 and 2016 but stopped inviting it ever since due to Beijing’s construction of military bases on disputed territory in the South China Sea.[29] The PRC views RIMPAC as part of a broader US-led effort to build a multinational coalition to “contain” the PRC in the Asia-Pacific region.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

PRC and Philippine officials held their ninth round of talks under the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) on the South China Sea. Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Undersecretary Maria Theresa Lazaro and PRC Vice Foreign Minister Chen Xiaodong met in Manila on July 2 for talks about the PRC-Philippine disputes in the South China Sea. Both sides described the talks as “frank and constructive.” The Philippine readout said both sides saw the need to rebuild trust and confidence and affirmed their commitment to de-escalate tensions. Lazaro told Chen that the Philippines will be “relentless in protecting its interests and upholding its sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the West Philippine Sea.”[30] The PRC readout said the PRC reiterated its sovereignty over the Spratly Islands including the Second Thomas Shoal and urged the Philippines to stop its “maritime infringement and provocative acts.”[31] The Philippines and PRC also signed the Arrangement on Improving Philippines-China Maritime Communication Mechanisms and agreed to discuss how to operationalize this mechanism.[32]

The Philippines stated that the PRC interfered in the rescue of Philippine fishermen whose boat exploded near Scarborough Shoal. Two Philippine fishermen were severely injured on June 29 when the engine on their fishing boat exploded and nearly sank the boat around 17 nautical miles southwest of Scarborough Shoal. Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) spokesperson Rear Admiral Armando Balilo said CCG and PLA Navy vessels shadowed a PCG ship that sailed to respond but ceased their “harassment” when the Filipino crew informed them of the explosion. Balilo said the CCG ship launched two rigid-hull inflatable boats (RHIBs) and offered help to the half-submerged fishing boat.[33] PCG spokesperson for the West Philippine Sea Jay Tarriela claimed on June 30 that the CCG deployed its RHIBs to “hinder and obstruct” the PCG’s rescue operation, however. He claimed the PCG managed to outmaneuver the CCG boats to rescue the Filipino fishermen and tow their damaged boat.[34]

The PRC framed the role of the CCG positively to portray itself as the legitimate authority in the waters near the shoal. PRC state media Global Times later released a video showing personnel in the CCG boats tossing life jackets and lifebuoys to a person in the water. The video included an audio clip it claimed was the PCG thanking the CCG for its cooperation.[35] Some of the rescued fishermen told Philippine media that the CCG did nothing to help except to throw life vests at them, which was not useful because the fishermen were already transferring to the PCG ship at the time.[36]

Scarborough Shoal is a disputed territory in the South China Sea that the PRC and Philippines both claim. The PRC seized control of the shoal from the Philippines in 2012 and maintains a Coast Guard presence in the nearby waters, though it has not built infrastructure on the shoal itself.

The PRC accused the Philippines of “undermining peace and stability” by resupplying a PCG vessel “illegally stationed” on Sabina Shoal. CCG spokesperson Liu Dejun claimed the CCG “followed and monitored” three PCG ships that the Philippines sent to Sabina Shoal to transfer personnel and materials to a PCG ship stationed at Sabina Shoal.[37] The PCG ship at Sabina Shoal is the BRP Teresa Magbanua, the PCG’s largest and most advanced ship.[38] PRC state media Global Times published an article on July 2 with photos that appear to show the Philippines transporting cement to the Teresa Magbanua in addition to fuel and living supplies. It cited Yang Xiao, deputy director of the Institute of Maritime Strategy Studies under the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), who claimed the Philippines’ actions around Sabina Shoal indicate that Manila is planning to build a permanent maritime base there for operations in other parts of the South China Sea including resupply missions to the nearby Second Thomas Shoal. CICIR is an arm of the PRC’s Ministry of State Security. Yang accused the Philippines of trying to replicate the 1999 grounding of the Philippine warship BRP Sierra Madre, which the Philippines now uses as its outpost on Second Thomas Shoal. He claimed the Philippines’ actions are a “strategic blunder” that will trigger the PRC to increase its maritime law enforcement presence near the shoal.[39] Philippine Navy spokesperson for the West Philippine Sea Rear Admiral Roy Vincent Trinidad did not confirm or deny the Global Times’ allegations during a July 2 press conference and said that “these are actions the Philippines will pursue if and when necessary.”[40]

The Philippines accused the PRC in May of preparing for island reclamation at Sabina Shoal by dumping crushed coral there. It deployed the Teresa Magbanua to the shoal on May 12 to monitor PRC activity there.[41] The Philippines and the PRC both claim Sabina Shoal as their territory, although the shoal is located well within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone and the Philippines has de facto control of it. Sabina Shoal is roughly 37 miles east of Second Thomas Shoal and is the staging point for Philippine resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal. A PRC-controlled Sabina Shoal would extend the PRC’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, improve the PRC’s ability to assert its claim over the Second Thomas Shoal, and enhance the difficulty of Philippine resupply missions to the Sierra Madre.

Europe

The PRC denounced the inclusion of PRC companies in the EU’s Russia-targeted sanctions as “having no basis in international law.” The European Union issued its 14th round of sanctions on Russia on June 24. The list of sanctioned entities included 19 PRC-based companies that the EU accused of supporting Russia’s military-industrial complex in the war in Ukraine.[42] The PRC Ministry of Commerce claimed on June 26 that these “unilateral sanctions” and application of “long-arm jurisdiction” had no international legal basis, were not authorized by the UN Security Council, and go against agreements reached by PRC and EU leaders.[43] The PRC has repeatedly denied that it provides material support to Russia’s war effort and has accused Western countries of unfairly targeting its “normal trade relations” with Russia. The PRC has also frequently expressed opposition to unilateral sanctions in general, claiming they are illegal.[44]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, June 21, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: June 27 at 9am EST

Key Takeaways

The PRC has increased its violations of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone since President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration on May 20.
Four Chinese Coast Guard vessels entered restricted waters around Kinmen on June 25.
A likely state-sponsored PRC cyber threat actor is conducting persistent network infiltration operations against various Taiwanese organizations.
The PRC Supreme People’s Court and other institutions issued an authoritative legal opinion that threatens advocates of Taiwanese independence with criminal penalties up to the death penalty.
Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan passed a controversial legislative reform bill unchanged after a government-mandated second review. President Lai Ching-te signed the bill into law but pledged to file for a constitutional interpretation.
CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping convened a Military Commission Political Work Conference to emphasize the need to maintain strict military discipline and uphold Party governance.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The PRC has carried out violations of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) more frequently since President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration on May 20. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported 305 ADIZ violations by PLA aircraft between June 1 and June 27. The June total to date is the second-highest monthly total on record and the highest for any month without a large-scale PLA exercise. The record for most ADIZ violations in one month was 446 in August 2022, when the PRC responded to then-US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan with record-scale military exercises around Taiwan.[1] There were 289 violations in May, of which 82 (28 percent) occurred on May 23 and 24 during the PRC’s Joint Sword 2024A exercise around Taiwan. The number of ADIZ violations that Taiwan’s MND reports does not include PRC vessels and aircraft around Taiwan’s outlying islands such as the Kinmen and Matsu archipelagos.

Four Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels entered restricted waters around Kinmen on June 25.

The ships sailed simultaneously in two groups of two into different areas of restricted waters. One group approached east of Beiding Island in the eastern part of the Kinmen archipelago, while the other approached south of Fuxing Islet in the southwest of the archipelago. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) claimed that it chased the CCG ships out after about two hours.[2] The CCG announced a “regular law enforcement patrol in the waters near Kinmen” but did not provide more detail about where the patrol sailed.[3] PRC state media claimed the CCG was carrying out a “new model” of law enforcement by splitting ships on patrol into separate formations and by expanding patrols from fixed linear tracks to “extensive patrol zones.”[4]

Taiwan does not formally claim any territorial waters around Kinmen partly due to its proximity to the PRC, but it designates “prohibited” and “restricted” waters around Kinmen, which it treats as equivalent to "territorial waters" and a "contiguous zone," respectively. The PRC does not officially recognize the existence of any restricted or prohibited waters around Taiwan’s outlying islands and claims the right to conduct law enforcement activities there, however. The CCG began patrols in Kinmen’s restricted and prohibited waters in February after two PRC fishermen drowned while fleeing from a Taiwanese Coast Guard pursuit on February 14. The PRC pledged after the incident to strengthen law enforcement activities around Kinmen. The PRC has increased the frequency of CCG patrols in Kinmen’s waters and the volume of ships per event since it began routine violations in late February. The most recent publicly reported incursion was two PLA Navy landing craft that entered Kinmen’s restricted waters on May 29.[5] CCG and PLA incursions into Kinmen’s restricted waters assert PRC control over those waters while eroding Taiwan’s sovereignty.

A likely state-sponsored PRC cyber threat actor is conducting persistent network infiltration operations against various Taiwanese organizations. Recorded Future’s threat research division Insikt Group published a threat intelligence report on June 24 that detailed the threat actor’s targeting of mainly Taiwanese tech companies, educational institutions, and government entities over six months from November to April.[6] Insikt Group identified threat actor IP addresses that geolocated to Fuzhou in the PRC’s Fujian province across the Taiwan Strait, which is known to house the PRC’s Taiwan-focused non-kinetic operations centers such as the notorious Base 311.[7]

Microsoft first issued a report on the threat actor and its targeting of Taiwanese organizations in August 2023. That report noted that the threat actor, which it refers to as Flax Typhoon, has been active since 2021 and targets Taiwanese organizations in sectors spanning education, critical manufacturing, and information technology. The report also stated that Flax Typhoon has targeted Taiwanese government agencies.[8] Insikt Group noted the threat actor’s focus on the technology industry and pointed to attempted exploitation against a semiconductor company and two aerospace companies that have contracts with the Taiwanese military.

Microsoft and Insikt Group both assessed that the purpose of the threat actor’s operations is espionage, based on the observed behavior of gaining and maintaining access to networks for as long as possible. The threat actor’s emergence in 2021 and focus on conducting espionage against organizations involved in critical technology is a plausible reaction to US efforts to limit the PRC’s access to certain technologies, which gained momentum in 2020 as Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturers complied with US export controls to PRC companies.[9] Conducting espionage against Taiwanese research institutions and critical tech companies serves the dual purpose of hastening the development of the PRC’s domestic tech industry while undermining Taiwan’s established position in the market.

Insikt Group’s report also noted the threat actor’s interest in Taiwan’s trade policy and international affairs, having targeted three de facto embassies from South and Southeast Asian countries, two government departments focused on economic policy, two think tanks researching Taiwanese economic policy, and a trade promotion organization. Spying on these organizations can provide intelligence to inform PRC policies that target pressure points in Taiwan’s economy and further its isolation from the global economy.

The PRC Supreme People’s Court and other institutions issued an authoritative legal opinion that threatens advocates of Taiwanese independence with criminal penalties up to the death penalty. The PRC Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry of Justice jointly issued the opinion on June 21 and ordered it to be implemented immediately. The opinion is an authoritative legal interpretation of Article 103 of the PRC’s criminal code, which delineates the crime of “splitting the State and undermining the unity of the country” but does not specifically reference Taiwan.[10] The opinion clarifies how Article 103 crime should be applied to issues of Taiwanese “separatism” and defines what types of actions in pursuit of Taiwanese independence would be subject to criminal prosecution under the criminal code. It states that “Taiwan independence”-related activities punishable under Article 103 include:

Forming a “Taiwan independence” organization or program;
Directing people to carry out activities that “split the country or undermine national unity;”
Attempting to change the “legal status of Taiwan as a part of China” by law;
Attempting to create “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” in the international community by promoting Taiwan’s membership in international organizations that require statehood or by engaging in official exchanges or military contacts with other countries; and
Using one’s official position to “wantonly distort or falsify the fact that Taiwan is a part of China” in education, culture, history, media, etc., or to “suppress” political parties, groups, or individuals that support peaceful cross-strait relations and “national reunification.”

The opinion calls for criminal penalties up to life imprisonment or death for these crimes, depending on the seriousness of the case. The penalties increase if the crime involves collusion with foreign individuals. The opinion allows the PRC to try and convict suspects in absentia if they fail to show up to court in the PRC. It also allows for the case to be withdrawn if suspects “abandon their separatist stance,” however.[11]

The PRC’s new legal guidelines for punishing Taiwanese “separatists” are part of a pressure campaign against Taiwan’s new administration of Lai Ching-te and the ruling DPP. The opinion stresses the need to severely punish “‘Taiwan independence’ diehards,” a term the PRC has used to describe Lai, Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim, and other DPP officials. Multiple activities delineated in the opinion appear to target DPP policies, including the DPP’s fight for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, reform of educational curriculum to emphasize Taiwan’s independent identity, and military cooperation with the United States and other countries. The opinion also references the use of official authority to “suppress” groups and individuals who support cross-strait peace and reunification, indicating that the PRC may interpret Taiwan’s application of its Anti-Infiltration Law and other counter-PRC legislation as a crime in the PRC.

The new legal standards will primarily affect DPP-affiliated Taiwanese nationals who travel to the PRC since the PRC cannot enforce its laws in Taiwan. Director of the Taiwan think tank’s China Research Center Wu Se-chih said that the PRC could try to further extend its jurisdiction over Taiwan by convicting Taiwanese nationals in absentia, issuing international arrest warrants, and pressuring other countries to extradite wanted Taiwanese “separatists” who travel to those countries. The PRC has extradition treaties with 39 countries including South Korea, Vietnam, and Thailand, which are popular destinations for Taiwanese tourists.[12] Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) condemned the new PRC legal guidelines and stressed that “the Beijing authorities have no jurisdiction over Taiwan.”[13] The MAC issued an upgraded travel warning on June 27 advising Taiwanese nationals to avoid unnecessary travel to the PRC, including Hong Kong and Macao.[14]

The new legal guidelines are a form of “lawfare” against Taiwan and part of a broader multifaceted pressure campaign against Taiwan that has intensified since Lai Ching-te’s election victory on January 15 and even further after his presidential inauguration on May 20. The campaign has also included military exercises around Taiwan, increased intrusions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone, heightened Chinese Coast Guard “law enforcement” activities around Taiwan’s outlying islands, tariffs on certain Taiwanese goods, “poaching” of one of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, and other measures to punish the DPP and bolster opposition to the Lai administration.

Taiwan’s National Communications Commission (NCC) is investigating a media report that a Taiwanese political talk show took directions from a PRC state media reporter. Taiwan’s Liberty Times newspaper reported on June 24 based on an anonymous journalistic source that the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) reached out to Taiwanese news channels to request PRC involvement in the production of news shows in exchange for commercial interests in the PRC. The source said one Taiwanese channel agreed and aired a series at the PRC’s behest in praise of former Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou’s cross-strait policy. The series’ production team involved Zhao Bo, a reporter from the PRC state news agency Xinhua, who gave direction on the program’s topic selection and scripts. The NCC said it was investigating whether the news program had violated a code of ethics under the Satellite Broadcasting Act. Taiwan’s MAC Director Chiu Chui-cheng said that Taiwan would launch a multi-agency investigation into the case. He said the reporter Zhao had already been recalled to the PRC, however.[15] The TAO said on June 26 that Liberty Times’ report was “completely fake.” It accused the DPP of using the Green-leaning Liberty Times to deceive the people of Taiwan and incite cross-strait hostility.[16]

Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) passed a controversial legislative reform bill unchanged after a government-mandated second review. President Lai Ching-te signed the bill into law but pledged to file for a constitutional interpretation. The new law grants the LY enhanced oversight powers over the government. The law permits the LY to call on any public official to testify before an investigative committee, confirm political appointments, and impose fines or criminal charges for “contempt of legislature” against anyone who lies, refuses to answer questions, or talks back while testifying before the legislature. The law also requires the president of Taiwan to deliver a State of the Nation address and submit to a question-and-answer session by the LY.[17] The opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) could use the new reforms and their collective majority in the LY to hinder the Lai Ching-te administration’s policy agenda.

The KMT and TPP originally pushed the bill through on May 28 despite opposition from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Premier Cho Jung-tai, who heads the Executive Yuan (EY), received the bill and returned it to the LY for reconsideration. He claimed elements of the bill were unconstitutional or difficult to implement.[18] The LY voted on the bill and passed it again unchanged on June 21 with a vote of 51-62 along party lines, which obligated the president to sign the bill into law.[19] President Lai Ching-te signed the bill on June 24. He said he would apply for Taiwan’s Constitutional Court to perform a constitutional interpretation of the law, however, and to impose a preliminary injunction on the implementation of the law while the court reviews it. Lai said he supports legislative reform in general but characterized the new law as an unconstitutional expansion of legislative power that could threaten the separation of powers, violate the rights to privacy of people the LY calls to testify, or force companies to divulge company secrets to the LY.[20] The Constitutional Court finding the law unconstitutional is the DPP’s last chance to stop the law from taking effect.

China

The PRC announced additional sanctions against some subsidiaries and executives of Lockheed Martin for arms sales to Taiwan. The sanctions will freeze properties of Lockheed Martin Missile System Integration Laboratory, Lockheed Martin Advanced Technology Laboratory, and Lockheed Martin Venture Capital Company within the PRC. They will also bar Lockheed Martin President and CEO James Taiclet, COO Frank St. John, CFO Jesus Malave, and other senior executives from entering the PRC and freeze any assets they hold in the PRC.[21] The PRC previously placed sanctions on at least eight other US defense firms earlier in 2024.[22] A 2023 report by the German think tank Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) found that the PRC has significantly increased its use of unilateral sanctions since 2018 against US individuals, groups, or companies it perceives to be interfering in its internal affairs.[23] The PRC has repeatedly expressed opposition to unilateral sanctions in general, however, including US sanctions against it and other countries such as Russia and Iran.[24]

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping convened a Military Commission Political Work Conference to emphasize the need to maintain strict military discipline and Party governance.[25] Xi urged cadres to own up to shortcomings at risk of losing face and called for the military leadership to scrupulously root out hotbeds of corruption. By instilling an absolute commitment to the CCP in the PLA, Xi aims to ideologically fortify the ranks of the military to prevent the interests of individual members of the military from conflicting with Party interests, which prioritizes achieving the highest possible level of the PLA’s military effectiveness. Xi’s comments reaffirm similar sentiments from a whole-of-military Political Work Conference in 2014 that took place amid a sweeping corruption purge and military modernization drive to eliminate inefficiencies that could hinder the military’s effectiveness during wartime.

Xi’s messaging at the conference signals the continuation and possible widening of purges to remove corrupt military officials. Military purges during the past year included nine senior generals, many of whom were from the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF).[26] Former Defense Minister Li Shangfu was abruptly removed from his post in October after a prolonged disappearance. The CCP formally expelled Li and his predecessor Wei Fenghe for corruption and bribery on June 27.[27] Bloomberg cited unnamed US intelligence officials in January that spoke to Xi’s concerns about the PLA’s ability to fight a war following the discovery of extensive graft and mismanagement throughout the military and defense industrial base.[28] Bloomberg reported that US intelligence assessments raised examples of graft that hindered military effectiveness and were a reason behind the PLARF purges, including the discovery of missiles that were filled with water instead of fuel.

Xi’s calls to reinforce the “political construction” of the PLA and “uphold the Party’s absolute leadership” refer to the restoration of organizational integrity and the subordination of personal interests to those of the CCP. Xi is pursuing ideological reinvigoration as the solution to correct the loss of discipline after the abandonment of communist ideology-driven policymaking. Xi perceived corruption as the greatest threat to the CCP’s rule when he took power in 2013 and embarked on comprehensive efforts to recenter ideology in governance and revive the party-state. Ideological doctrines that strive to strengthen the CCP’s leadership over society permeate all facets of PRC governance under Xi, from the broad dogma of Xi Jinping Thought to tailored concepts such as the Fengqiao Experience, which urges Party advocacy at the grassroots level.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Mao Ning accused the Philippines of being the provocateur after a dramatic confrontation on June 17. PRC Coast Guard vessels resorted to a series of violent actions to board and disarm a Philippine navy supply boat, resulting in injuries for eight of the Philippine crew members. Mao urged the Philippines to stop misleading the international community in response to the Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s defiance of the PRC’s violent actions.[29]

PRC state media has repeatedly circulated statements from US foreign policy critic and former Marine intelligence officer Scott Ritter that the United States was only using the Philippines as a tool to create conflict with the PRC and would abandon the Philippines if war ensued.[30] The news articles featured direct quotes stating "China is not your enemy. China is your neighbor. China is your friend. China doesn't want war."[31]

The PRC’s portrayal of the US as a destabilizing force in the region is consistent with PRC efforts to detract from its own escalatory actions. PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times framed US intentions to deploy a Marine Littoral Regiment to Guam as evidence of the US’s aggressive intentions in the Indo-Pacific region. The Global Times further stated that the US intends to create instability in East Asia while using the Philippines and Japan as “cannon fodder.”[32]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, June 13, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: June 20 at 12pm ET

Key Takeaways

The PRC hosted the 16th annual Straits Forum to promote stronger cross-strait linkages with the Taiwanese business community, civil society, and opposition political parties.
Taiwanese internet celebrities are calling attention to CCP efforts to recruit them to facilitate United Front work.
The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs used revelations about a US information operation against the PRC’s COVID-19 vaccine to discredit other negative US narratives about the PRC.
The PRC forcefully blocked a Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal two days after the implementation of a new CCG regulation that permits more aggressive “law enforcement” in the South China Sea. A CCG and Philippine boat collided, and the CCG boarded, towed, emptied, and damaged two Philippine supply boats.
The PRC and Australia agreed on June 17 to improve military-to-military communication to avoid future standoffs

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The PRC hosted the 16th annual Straits Forum to promote stronger cross-strait linkages with the Taiwanese business community, civil society, and opposition political parties. Deputy Director of the Straits Forum Organizing Committee Office Chen Zhiyong stated that the forum was focused on realizing the PRC’s goals for social and economic cross-strait integration. The goals are supported by the various initiatives in the PRC’s ambitious plan to increase Taiwan’s connectivity with the mainland’s Fujian province with infrastructure linkages and preferential economic programs for Taiwan residents.[1]

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Deputy Minister Liang Wen-chieh stated that the Straits Forum is a United Front platform for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). He reminded the public that the law forbids anyone from participating in any activities that involve the PRC’s “One Country, Two System” political vision for integrating Taiwan.[2] The United Front is a whole-of-government and society effort to advance the CCP’s ideology and win the hearts and minds of the Chinese people by forming a thorough alliance between the CCP and the rest of society.

The Straits Forum is an informational tool for the PRC to portray itself as the purveyor of peaceful and prosperous cross-strait relations, as well as highlight Taiwanese attendants’ conformity to CCP platitudes about cross-strait relations and national identity. The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) claimed that more than 7,000 people from Taiwan attended, including representatives from political parties, various industries, and community leaders, in defiance of what it called the DPP’s “green terror” restrictions.[3] The forum did not result in any official policy outcomes for advancing cross-strait relations.

Kuomintang (KMT) Vice Chairman Sean Lien attended the forum, where he met with CCP Politburo member Wang Huning. PRC state media highlighted Lien’s alignment with CCP cross-strait narratives and opposition to formal Taiwanese independence. Wang stated in his speech that the PRC maintains the capability and will to “crush separatist plots for Taiwan’s independence.”[4] Past Straits Forums have featured similar meetings between CCP and KMT officials.[5] The CCP and KMT maintain regular political exchanges, which sometimes result in the CCP granting concessions that are beneficial to Taiwan’s economy. Such meetings serve to legitimize the KMT as the political party that is capable of managing a healthy cross-strait relationship, in contrast to the ruling DPP, with which the PRC severed contact in 2016 for its alleged “separatist” policies.

Wang is Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the foremost United Front work organization, as well as deputy leader of the Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs, making him one of the top CCP officials responsible for overseeing the PRC’s policy toward Taiwan.

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping highlighted KMT-CCP cooperation, expressed opposition to Taiwanese independence, and promoted cross-strait unification in his congratulatory letter to the Whampoa Military Academy centennial celebration on June 17.[6] The Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, a non-ROC, CCP-controlled entity that holds the designation of “political party,” emphasized the shared ideals between the KMT and the CCP to achieve national rejuvenation.[7] The PRC’s portrayal of the CCP-KMT relationship as one of cooperation and shared values is consistent with the PRC’s efforts to showcase the KMT’s legitimacy as the representative of Taiwan rather than the democratically-elected DPP government. The CCP’s emphasis on shared values and history between the two parties presents the CCP-KMT relationship as the hopeful path to cross-strait unification.

Minister of the ROC’s Veteran Affairs Retired and retired General Yen Teh-fa stated that few retirees of the ROC military went to the mainland to participate in the PRC’s anniversary event. Yen warned against accepting media interviews for those who did travel to the PRC and highlighted the risk of falling for tricks of the CCP’s cognitive warfare and united front tactics.[8] Former chairman of the disbanded Huang Fu-hsing wing of the KMT Chi Lin-lien was among the attendees.[9] The Chairperson of the KMT Cultural Communication Association distanced the KMT from Chi’s participation by stating that he held no party position.[10]

Taiwanese internet celebrities are calling attention to CCP efforts to recruit them to facilitate United Front work. YouTuber Potter King first claimed that the CCP is spending considerable resources to lure Taiwanese internet celebrities to the PRC under the pretense of traveling to film content.[11] Several other YouTubers and online celebrities subsequently confessed to being contacted by the CCP and published the contract letters that outlined goals to influence Taiwanese politics. YouTuber Ba Jiong revealed that the contract he received discussed a plan to establish a “Taiwan Support Party” that artists would join as honorary members to shape the future of PRC-Taiwan relations.[12] The terms stated that the CCP would invest millions of dollars to enable Taiwanese artists to put on shows and events that promoted CCP-aligned narratives of cross-strait relations. The contract encouraged Taiwanese artists with verified accounts to publish open invitations to the Taiwan Support Party. Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior issued an announcement that urged individuals not to break the law by accepting instructions and funding from foreign forces that would compromise Taiwan’s national security.[13]

The PRC has targeted pop culture icons as an avenue to influence Taiwanese politics in the past. Reuters reported on December 28 that the PRC pressured the popular Taiwanese band Mayday to support the PRC’s claim that Taiwan is a part of China.[14] Reuters cited an anonymous source who provided access to an internal security note that details the PRC’s threats to fine the band for lip-syncing, a fraudulent offense in the PRC. A Taiwanese security official involved in the leak asserted that the PRC’s intimidation of Mayday was to influence Taiwan’s youth vote in the presidential elections.

China

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) used revelations about a US information operation against the PRC’s Covid-19 vaccine to discredit other negative US narratives about the PRC. A Reuters report on June 14 revealed that the US Department of Defense carried out clandestine psychological operations on Twitter from 2020 to 2021 to discredit the PRC’s Sinovac vaccine in the Philippines. The operation was intended to counter growing PRC influence in the Philippines.[15] MFA spokesperson Lin Jian said the operation was part of a “consistent practice” of the United States “manipulating social media to spread false information, poison public opinion, and smear the image of other countries.” Lin said the United States uses such tactics to discredit countries it wishes to “contain and suppress.” He claimed this approach applied not only to narratives about the Sinovac vaccine but also to US criticism of the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative and that the PRC has “overcapacity” in its electric vehicle industry.[16]

The MFA deflected concerns about the PRC’s expanding nuclear arsenal by claiming the United States is the real threat to nuclear strategic stability. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) released a report that estimated that the PRC’s nuclear warhead arsenal grew from 410 to 500 between 2023 and 2024, making it the world’s fastest-growing nuclear arsenal.[17] MFA spokesperson Lin Jian declined to comment on the PRC’s nuclear expansion except to say the PRC’s nuclear strategy is defensive and “maintains a high degree of stability, continuity, and predictability.” He claimed instead that the US investment in upgrading its nuclear triad, increase in “nuclear sharing,” and extended deterrence deserve more attention as the “major issues that truly concern global strategic stability.”[18] “Nuclear sharing” likely refers to the US-UK-Australia cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines, which the PRC has framed as a threat to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.[19]

SIPRI’s estimate of the PRC’s nuclear arsenal aligns with estimates presented in the US Department of Defense’s China Military Power Report in 2023. The Department of Defense assessed that the PRC could reach 1,000 warheads by 2030 and 1,500 warheads by 2035.[20]

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The PRC forcefully blocked a Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal two days after the implementation of a new CCG regulation that permits more aggressive “law enforcement” in the South China Sea. A CCG and Philippine boat collided, and the CCG boarded, towed, emptied, and damaged two Philippine supply boats. CCG, PLA Navy (PLAN), and Chinese Maritime Militia (CMM) vessels disrupted a joint Philippine Coast Guard and Navy resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal on June 17. The Philippines controls Second Thomas Shoal and has troops stationed aboard the grounded warship Sierra Madre, but the PRC also claims the shoal as its territory. The Philippine supply ship and a PRC vessel collided during the confrontation. The PRC and the Philippines blamed each other for the collision.[21] The CCG also boarded, inspected, and towed away two Philippine inflatable boats carrying supplies and confiscated some of the supplies, including rifles. CCG personnel damaged the hulls of the boats with bladed weapons and abandoned them. At least eight Philippine personnel were injured during the clash, including one who lost a thumb.[22]

The Philippines accused the PRC of using “physical attacks and violence” against Philippine soldiers to prevent the resupply mission. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) released videos of the incident which showed the CCG deploying tear gas, blaring sirens, flashing strobe lights, and ramming the Philippines navy supply boats.[23] This is the first time the PRC has used bladed weapons or boarded a Philippine government vessel during its confrontations with the Philippines in the South China Sea.[24] It is the second time the Philippine military reported that the CCG had seized its supplies. The first time was on May 19, when the Philippine military said the CCG seized food and medicine it had airdropped to Second Thomas Shoal.[25]

The CCG claimed that the Philippines sent ships to “illegally” enter PRC waters around Second Thomas Shoal, which the PRC calls Ren’ai Reef and the Philippines calls Ayungin Shoal, and that the CCG acted in a “reasonable, legal, professional, and standard” way to warn, intercept, board and inspect, and forcibly expel the Philippine vessels.[26] The PRC MFA claimed the Philippine supply delivery included construction materials, which would be used to reinforce the Sierra Madre.[27] The PRC aims to prevent the delivery of construction materials to Second Thomas Shoal because the Philippines’ ability to maintain a presence on the shoal depends on the structural integrity of the Sierra Madre, a World War II-era ship that is severely dilapidated. The PRC most likely believes that preventing the delivery of supplies to the Sierra Madre will eventually force the Philippines to abandon the shoal as the Sierra Madre becomes uninhabitable.

The confrontation happened two days after the CCG officially implemented new procedures first announced on May 15 that authorize it to detain for up to 60 days any foreign national that illegally intrudes into the PRC’s claimed territory and to board and inspect the cargo of foreign vessels traveling to the PRC’s claimed waters. ISW previously assessed that the procedures were intended to enhance PRC efforts to assert its sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.[28] Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief Romeo Brawner urged Filipino fishermen to ignore the CCG’s restrictions and continue fishing operations as normal.[29] It is unclear whether the CCG attempted to arrest any of the Philippine personnel involved in the June 17 supply mission.

The PRC claims all the islands and maritime features within its delineated “nine-dash line” as PRC territory, including the Spratly Islands and nearly all other land features in the South China Sea. Other countries including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan dispute some or all of the PRC’s claims in the region. A 2016 decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration declared the PRC’s maritime claims within the nine-dash line to be legally invalid, but the PRC rejects this ruling. The PRC has deployed coast guard, maritime militia, and naval vessels using a variety of “gray zone” tactics including physically surrounding, ramming, and firing water cannons at Philippine vessels to contest Philippine control over several PRC-claimed features including Second Thomas Shoal. It uses such tactics to gain control of the territories without provoking US intervention or outright war.

The CCG claimed that it took “restrictive measures” against Philippine boats that landed on Sabina Shoal in the South China Sea. PRC state media Global Times reported on June 14 that the CCG confronted a Philippine ship that “intruded” into waters near Sabina Shoal and released small boats to “illegally” land on sandbars there. The CCG warned the Philippine ships of the PRC’s claimed sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, of which Sabina Shoal is a part, and took unspecified “restrictive measures.” Global Times did not specify when this incident occurred.[30] Philippine Coast Guard spokesperson Jay Tarriela asserted Philippine sovereignty over Sabina Shoal and denied that the CCG took any “regulatory actions” against the Philippine ship there, which he identified as the BRP Teresa Magbanua.[31] The Philippine Coast Guard deployed the Teresa Magbanua to Sabina Shoal on May 12 to monitor PRC activity in the area.[32] The Philippines has accused the PRC of dumping crushed coral at Sabina Shoal as a preparatory step to begin reclamation and build facilities there.[33]

Sabina Shoal is roughly 37 miles east of Second Thomas Shoal and is the staging point for Philippine resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal. The Philippines and the PRC both claim it as their territory, although the shoal is located well within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone and the Philippines has de facto control of it. A PRC-controlled Sabina Shoal would extend the PRC’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and improve the PRC’s ability to assert its claim over the Second Thomas Shoal. A PRC-controlled Sabina Shoal would also provide the PRC with the opportunity to build a military facility to the east of the Second Thomas Shoal. This would surround the Second Thomas Shoal with PRC military facilities, which would enhance the difficulty of Philippine resupply missions to the Sierra Madre.

The PLA Navy (PLAN) deployed an amphibious assault ship to the Spratly Islands for the first time as part of an intensifying PRC effort to assert control over disputed South China Sea territories. Manila Times and PRC state media Global Times reported that a Type 075 helicopter landing dock, which is a type of PLA amphibious assault ship, was spotted for the first time near Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands. Subi Reef is a disputed territory and hosts one of the PRC’s main military bases in the South China Sea. Global Times cited unspecified “experts” who claimed the deployment was preparation for “emergency response” amid “repeated provocations” from the Philippines. The ship made its maiden voyage to the Spratly Islands shortly after another PLA amphibious assault ship held hovercraft drills around Sabina Shoal on June 4.[34] Philippines Coast Guard spokesperson Jay Tarriela said the deployment on June 4 was to disrupt the activities of Philippine scientists surveying Sabina Shoal.[35]

The PRC MFA claimed that the Philippines' application to delimit an extended continental shelf (ECS) in the South China Sea violated PRC sovereignty. The Philippines submitted a delimitation case for an ECS with the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on June 15. An ECS would grant the Philippines exclusive rights to resource exploration and exploitation within the extended boundaries. The Philippines Maritime and Ocean Affairs Department said it was entitled under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to delimit the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles but less than 350 nautical miles from its shores. It did not specify how far out it seeks to delineate the extended shelf.[36] PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian called the Philippines’ “unilateral” submission of an ECS case a violation of “China’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction” and claimed the UN Commission would not review the case if it involved delimitation of disputed waters.[37] The PRC previously ignored and rejected a 2016 decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration that its territorial claims within the Nine Dash Line have no legal basis. It would likely reject a UN Commission decision that grants the Philippines an extended continental shelf if the ECS overlaps with PRC territorial claims.

Oceania

The PRC and Australia agreed on June 17 to improve military-to-military communication to avoid future standoffs. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced the agreement after a state visit from PRC Premier Li Qiang.[38] This marks the second high-level visit from a PRC official to Australia during the last three months and since Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Albanese in March.[39]

The PRC has used confrontational intimidation tactics to deter Australian military presence in waters it deems to be its neighborhood, resulting in several tense encounters. Australia’s Department of Defence revealed a Chinese warship sent out a sonar pulse in proximity to an Australian naval vessel in the East China Sea on November 14, injuring a diver.[40] A PRC fighter jet released flares in the path of an Australian naval helicopter on May 4 during an Australian mission to ensure sanctions enforcement against the DPRK. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Lin Jian claimed that the Australian helicopter deliberately flew close to the PRC’s airspace in a provocative manner.[41] The PRC has used this tactic to instigate confrontations with other foreign militaries in the past. The Canadian Ministry of Defence claimed that a PRC fighter jet launched flares in front of one of its military helicopters in the South China Sea on October 29.[42]

Both Li and Albanese signaled the meeting represented a stabilization of the relationship, following a period of turmoil in which the PRC imposed a series of economic trade restrictions against Australian goods, which were in response to tensions involving COVID-19 and PRC influence in domestic Australian politics. The two countries also signed a pact to improve cooperation in various areas, including visa exemptions, education, and climate change.[43] Li toured lithium processing plants in the province of Western Australia following his meeting with Albanese, highlighting the PRC’s interest in maintaining access to Australia’s critical minerals sector that supplies key inputs for the PRC’s electric vehicle production.[44]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, June 6, 2024

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, and Joseph Su of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: June 12 at Noon ET

Key Takeaways:

Taiwan’s Executive Yuan returned a bill that would expand legislative oversight over the government to the Legislative Yuan for a second vote. The reform bill is very likely to pass the second review and become law.
A PRC civilian drone dropped flyers and broadcast a video in the airspace over the Taiwanese outlying island of Kinmen
Taiwanese officials said the PRC could use ROC military veterans who attend the Whampoa Military Academy centennial celebration in the PRC to facilitate espionage and promote pro-unification narratives.
The United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom published a joint bulletin detailing how the People’s Republic of China’s People’s Liberation Army is recruiting current and former Western-trained fighter pilots and associated personnel to train its respective counterparts.
The PRC blamed a Philippine medical evacuation for a Chinese Coast Guard coercive operation at the Second Thomas Shoal.
The PRC denied Palau President Surangel Whipps Jr’s assertion that it would interfere with Palau’s general election in November 2024.
PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi met separately with acting Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov at the BRICS foreign ministers meeting in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia on June 10.
The PRC and Russia are using the BRICS platform to advance alternative financial architecture that aims to insulate their trade from US sanctions.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

Taiwan’s Executive Yuan (EY) returned a bill that would expand legislative oversight over the government to the Legislative Yuan (LY) for a second vote. The Legislative Yuan passed the reform bill on May 28. The bill would grant the LY the ability to confirm political appointments, call any official to testify before the LY, and impose fines or criminal charges on anyone it deems to be in “contempt of legislature” for talking back or lying during testimony. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which holds a minority in the LY, opposed the bill. [1] EY President (Premier) Cho Jung-tai with the approval of ROC President Lai Ching-te officially requested on June 11 that the LY conduct a second review of the bill and vote on it again.[2] The EY said elements of the bill were too broad, unconstitutional, or difficult to implement.[3] The LY has 15 days to vote on the bill again. If a majority in the LY votes for the bill, it will become law with no option for the EY or the president to veto it. If they vote against the bill or fail to vote within 15 days, the bill will not become law.

The reform bill is very likely to pass the second review and become law. The Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) have stated they will support the reform bill on the second review despite opposition from the DPP. The KMT and TPP jointly hold a majority in the LY and were the parties that advanced and passed the reforms the first time.[4] DPP leaders including LY caucus whip Ker Chien-ming and President Lai Ching-te have stated that they will request a constitutional interpretation of the bill if it becomes law. The Constitutional Court finding the law unconstitutional would prevent its implementation.[5]

A PRC civilian drone dropped flyers and broadcast a video in the airspace over the Taiwanese outlying island of Kinmen. The Fujian-based PRC firm Zhongli Technology flew a drone into the airspace of the main island of Kinmen on June 8 and filmed a video that it broadcast on its Douyin account.[6] Douyin is the PRC’s domestic version of TikTok. The drone flew near the Mashan Observation Post in northeastern Kinmen and dropped leaflets urging Taiwan to “come back” and conveying holiday wishes for the Dragon Boat Festival.[7] Mashan Observation Post is a historic ROC military site that the ROC once used to broadcast propaganda encouraging PRC soldiers to surrender and join the ROC.[8] The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) said the incident was the “spontaneous action by mainland netizens to express their hope for reunification and opposition to ‘Taiwan independence.’”[9] There have been several past instances of ostensibly civilian drones from the PRC violating Kinmen’s airspace and filming videos or dropping flyers over military facilities. The ROC military claimed that some of these past instances were part of the PRC’s “cognitive operations” against Taiwan.[10]

Taiwanese officials said the PRC could use ROC military veterans who attend the Whampoa Military Academy centennial celebration in the PRC to facilitate espionage and promote pro-unification narratives. The PRC and ROC are holding rival centennial celebrations for the Whampoa Military Academy on and around June 16. The PRC’s Whampoa Military Academy Alumni Association said that it invited 3,000 alumni from Taiwan to attend the celebration in the PRC.[11] ROC Veterans Affairs Council minister Yen Teh-fa said he expects fewer than 100 retired Taiwanese military officers to attend, however, while around 10,000 retired ROC officers will attend the celebration in Taiwan.[12] Defense Minister Wellington Koo urged Taiwanese retired officers not to attend the PRC event due to the risks of leaking personal information.[13] An unnamed ROC official told Taiwanese media that the retired Taiwanese officers who attend the PRC events will be required to get PRC residency documents, driver’s licenses, and bank accounts and would be given cellphones with pre-downloaded applications to allow them to access transportation and other services in the PRC. The unnamed official said these measures could enable PRC espionage when the retired officers return to Taiwan, as Taiwan cannot monitor PRC financial institutions or telecommunications. Another unnamed source said the CCP’s United Front Work Department arranged the retired officers’ itinerary in the PRC to feature World War II memorials, a memorial for the Nanjing Massacre, as well as the Whampoa Academy’s former site in Guangzhou to build a narrative that the Taiwan and PRC militaries are one entity and Japan is their common enemy.[14]

The PRC TAO publicized comments by retired Taiwanese general Chi Lin-lien, who spoke in favor of “expelling Taiwan independence and reviving China.” Chi will attend the Whampoa Military Academy centennial events in the PRC. Chi is the former chairman of the KMT’s veteran-dominated Huang Fu-hsing faction, which the KMT disbanded earlier in 2024. The TAO spokesperson claimed that Chi’s comments aroused “deep patriotism” and praise from people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and proved that the DPP’s efforts to “de-Sinicize” Taiwan cannot “weaken the Chinese feelings of compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.” [15]

The Whampoa Military Academy has historic importance to both the ROC and PRC. The ROC founded the academy in 1924 in Guangzhou, which is now part of the PRC, and included both KMT and Communist Party members among its faculty and student body. Many Whampoa faculty and alumni became members of the ROC and CCP militaries who fought in the Chinese Civil War and World War II. The school’s first superintendent was Chiang Kai-shek, who later became the president of the ROC. The academy relocated to Kaohsiung, Taiwan after the Chinese Civil War but remains an important historical site in the PRC.[16]

PRC officials “firmly opposed” the US sale of F-16 parts to Taiwan. The US Department of State approved two potential sales of $300,000 of F-16 parts and related equipment to Taiwan on June 6.[17] Spokesperson for the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of National Defense (MOD) both said the PRC is “strongly dissatisfied and firmly opposed to” the sales. They claimed the sale violated the one-China principle, harmed the PRC’s sovereignty, and undermined peace in the Taiwan Strait.[18]

China

The United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom published a joint bulletin detailing how the People’s Republic of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is recruiting current and former Western-trained fighter pilots and associated personnel to train its respective counterparts.[19] The bulletin warned that the PLA is continuing its efforts to recruit current and former personnel from NATO and Western countries to enhance its air operations while also gaining insight into Western aerial tactics, techniques, and procedures. It noted that while the most sought-after personnel were fighter pilots, the PLA has also targeted flight engineers, air operations center staff, and technical experts for recruitment. The bulletin warned the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLA Navy (PLAN) are actively recruiting Western personnel through private companies across the globe in Africa, the Middle East, and China. It also warned that providing unauthorized training or expertise can face civil or criminal penalties under the US Arms Export Act.

The five countries that published the bulletin have reported cases of PLA efforts to recruit their military aviation personnel during the last two years. In October 2022, the UK Ministry of Defense announced up to 30 former Royal Air Force pilots had trained PLA aviators with compensation reported as high as USD 270,000.[20] In October 2022, New Zealand’s Ministry of Defense told the Financial Times that four former pilots were employed by a now US-sanctioned South African flight school that reportedly has trained PLA pilots.[21] The Australian Ministry of Defense also launched an investigation in 2022 into reports that Australian pilots had accepted training roles for the PLA.[22] An unspecified PRC Embassy spokesperson in the United States declined to comment on the bulletin, but stated that “some US officials have been quick to accuse China and smear the normal exchanges and cooperation between China and the US.”[23]

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The PRC blamed a Philippine medical evacuation for a Chinese Coast Guard coercive operation at the Second Thomas Shoal. Two Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ships, two smaller ships, and two rubber vessels harassed a Philippine medical evacuation operation from the grounded Sierra Madre on May 19. One CCG ship fired a water cannon and rammed a Philippine rubber boat.[24] The incident did not become public knowledge until Philippine media reported on it during the first week of June.[25] PRC MFA Spokeswoman Mao Ning stated on June 7 that the Philippines did not notify the PRC in advance, which the PRC claims is a necessary prerequisite due to its territorial claim over the Second Thomas Shoal.[26] Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Spokesman Jay Tarriela stated on June 6 that the PCG informed the CCG via radio and public address system about the “humanitarian nature of our mission for medical evacuation.”[27] Philippine National Security Adviser Secretary Eduardo M. Año stated on June 8 that the CCG actions on May 19 were “barbaric and inhumane.”[28]

The PRC is conducting a campaign to enforce its territorial claims over disputed maritime features in the South China Sea. The PRC deployed research vessels and divers to the Sabina Shoal in early May, potentially as part of a campaign to prevent the Philippines from defending its claim to the Second Thomas Shoal. This is a change from April when the PRC deployed the Chinese Coast Guard to block Philippine ships from reaching Second Thomas Shoal and did not conduct efforts to reclaim Sabina Shoal.[29] The PRC also conducted its largest-ever blockade at Scarborough in an attempt to block a fleet of Philippine civilian ships from resupplying fishermen near Scarborough Shoal.[30] The Chinese Coast Guard also released new law enforcement procedures on May 15, which it could use to justify the arrest and detainment of non-PRC nationals and vessels, such as Philippine resupply ships or Filipino fishermen, within the boundaries of PRC territorial claims.[31]

Oceania

The PRC denied Palau President Surangel Whipps Jr’s assertion that it would interfere with Palau’s general election in November 2024. Whipps said in a Reuters interview that his recognition of Taiwanese sovereignty makes him an enemy of the PRC in the PRC’s view.[32] Palau is one of 12 countries that maintain diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan).[33] PRC MFA Spokeswoman Mao Ning denied on June 6 that the PRC would interfere in Palau’s general election and urged Palau to abandon diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[34]

Palau is part of a sea line of communication (SLOC) that provides a security route connecting American allies and partners, such as the Philippines and Taiwan, to the US territory of Guam and the state of Hawaii. The United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) defines SLOCs as “the principal maritime routes between ports, as used for trade, military, or other purposes.”[35] Palau’s relationship with the United States is governed by a Compact of Free Association (COFA). The COFA grants the United States extensive military access throughout Palau’s territories.[36]

Russia and Iran

PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi met separately with acting Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov at the BRICS foreign ministers meeting in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia on June 10. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Chinese MFA both stated that Lavrov and Wang discussed diplomatic coordination in international organizations such as the United Nations Security Council.[37] Wang stated China is willing to work with Russia to “maintain strategic focus” and “promote the steady and long-term development of bilateral relations.”[38] Wang and Bagheri Kani both emphasized a willingness to build a multilateral world order and enhance the voice of the Global South in international affairs.[39] Wang viewed the purpose of the meeting as strengthening BRICS multilateralism in international affairs, “safeguard[ing] peace and security,” as well as enhancing BRICS economic, technological, and cultural exchanges.[40]

The PRC and Russia are using the BRICS platform to advance alternative financial architecture that aims to insulate their trade from US sanctions. Kremlin aide Yury Ushakov announced on March 5 that BRICS will work to create an independent payment system based on digital currencies and blockchain.[41] PRC efforts to de-dollarize international trade have made little progress to date. The PRC created the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) in 2015 as a settlement and payment clearing system for international transactions that use the yuan. Approximately 30 Russian banks are direct participants in CIPS.[42] Average daily transactions on CIPS increased roughly 50 percent in the 12 months following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, albeit from a small base.[43] Despite the increased volume of cross-border payments under CIPS, the system has not gained sufficient traction to make up for Russia’s lost access to the international financial system after Western sanctions limited Russian banks’ participation in the dominant infrastructure.

The PRC and Russia are branding the new payment system as a BRICS-wide initiative to establish the legitimacy of the system and make their criticisms of US dollar dominance in global trade appear as a shared concern across the international community. Foreign Minister Wang Yi made concerns about economic security a focus during the BRICS summit. Wang criticized the “securitization” of economic issues and increasing unilateral sanctions and urged the world to support BRICS efforts to promote multipolarity and fight anti-globalist and unipolar hegemony.[44] White House National Security Communications Adviser John Kirby told reporters on June 11 that the Group of Seven (G7) summit in Italy would “address the PRC’s support for the Russian defense industrial base.”[45]

Click here to read the full report with maps

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Joseph Su, and Nils Peterson of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: June 5 at Noon ET

Key Takeaways

The PRC is exerting greater pressure on Taiwan across domains following the inauguration of President Lai Ching-te in May
Two People’s Liberation Army naval ships entered Taiwan’s restricted waters near Kinmen Island on May 29, a move that signals escalating PRC efforts to assert control over the waters
The PRC suspended tariff exemptions on 134 Taiwanese goods included in the Cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement.
PRC Defense Minister Dong Jun and a Ministry of National Defense (MoD) spokesperson expressed opposition to “rampant” US freedom of navigation activities and criticized them as illegitimate.
The PRC MFA condemned the trilateral United States-Japan-South Korea defense ministers meeting as provocatively targeting the PRC.
The PRC framed the Philippines as provoking regional instability at the Shangri-La Dialogue as part of an effort to justify PRC coercion targeting the Philippines in the South China Sea.
PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokeswoman Mao Ning announced China will not attend the upcoming Russia-Ukraine War peace summit in Switzerland from June 15-16.
The People's Republic of China seeks to diversify its energy supply chains through negotiations with Russia on the proposed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline and diplomatic outreach to Middle Eastern states.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The PRC is exerting greater pressure on Taiwan across domains following the inauguration of President Lai Ching-te in May. PRC officials signaled after Taiwan’s presidential election in January that it views the incoming DPP administration as hostile separatists who instigate cross-strait tensions. The PRC escalated its military and economic lines of coercion against Taiwan after Lai’s inauguration on May 20. PRC officials have maintained fierce rhetoric accusing Lai and the DPP of antagonism to justify the PRC’s actions since the inauguration.

Two People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ships entered Taiwan’s restricted waters near Kinmen Island on May 29, a move that signals escalating PRC efforts to assert control over the waters.[1] Kinmen is a Taiwan-controlled island with a large military garrison roughly 3 kilometers from the coast of the PRC. The incursion follows months of Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ships violating Taiwan’s restricted and prohibited waters around its outer islands, which is aimed at eroding Taiwan’s sovereignty over waters where it holds jurisdiction. Taiwan does not formally claim any territorial waters around Kinmen partly due to its proximity to the PRC, but it designates “prohibited” and “restricted” waters around Kinmen, which it treats as equivalent to “territorial waters” and a “contiguous zone,” respectively. The PRC has normalized the presence of CCG ships in Kinmen’s restricted and prohibited waters since February, increasing both the frequency of incursions and the number of ships. PRC presence in Taiwan-controlled waters around Kinmen peaked in May before President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration, when five CCG ships conducted drills with seven official PRC ships near the island.[2]

Taiwanese security analysts such as Institute for National Defense and Security Research Director Szu Tzu-yan noted the structure of the ships indicated that they were landing craft.[3] Taiwanese media outlet China Times cited unnamed military officials who stated that this was the first time in ten years that a PLA ship entered Kinmen’s restricted waters.[4] One retired general noted the significance of the event as a gray zone operation and distinguished it from occasional instances in which PRC ships cut corners through Kinmen’s restricted waters to save time.[5] The PRC’s deployment of PLA ships in Taiwan-controlled waters represents a tangible manifestation of recent PRC pressure against Taiwan. The incident follows large-scale PLA exercises that encircled Taiwan from May 23–24 after Lai’s inauguration on May 20. Ministry of Defense spokesperson Wu Qian stated that the exercises were aimed at combating the arrogance of "Taiwan independence" and deterring external interference and intervention. Wu stated that the exercises were “completely reasonable, legal, justified, and necessary.”[6] CCG ships concurrently entered Taiwan-controlled waters around two islands in the Matsu archipelago.

The PRC suspended tariff exemptions on 134 Taiwanese goods included in the Cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA).[7] The goods are primarily chemical products, industrial metals, machinery, rubbers, and plastics. Taiwanese exports to the PRC constitute a large share of the total in these categories.[8] This is the PRC’s second suspension of ECFA tariff exemptions on similar products since December 21, just weeks before Taiwan’s presidential elections. At that time, the PRC targeted 12 hydrocarbon and petrochemical products.[9]

The PRC implements trade restrictions in a coercive or punitive manner to weaken political support for the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which it regards as a threat due to the DPP’s proactive resistance to PRC efforts to undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty. The PRC adopted bans on Taiwanese fish and pomelo imports as a form of economic punishment after then-US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi arrived in Taiwan in August 2022.[10] The PRC also makes economic concessions to increase political support for the opposition Kuomintang (KMT), which it favors due to the KMT’s willingness to pursue closer cross-strait relations. The PRC Deputy Director of the General Administration of Customs Zhao Zenglian announced on April 28 during a meeting with KMT Caucus Whip Fu Kun-chi that the PRC would lift its ban on Taiwanese pomelos and fish imports.[11] PRC state media highlighted Fu’s acceptance of the 1992 Consensus in his meeting with Zhao. The PRC established the 1992 Consensus as a pre-condition for cross-strait cooperation. It states that both sides agree there is only one China, and that Taiwan is part of the only China.

Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua framed the measures as necessary retaliation in response to Taiwan’s alleged “unilateral adoption of discriminatory trade restrictions” on more than 2,500 products from the PRC.[12] The CCP’s blaming Taiwan for the deterioration of trade relations is consistent with its efforts to style itself as the party pursuing economic cooperation that is beneficial for both sides of the strait. Chen highlighted a series of cross-strait economic initiatives that the PRC is pursuing during a TAO press conference on May 29. Chen framed the initiatives as successful modes to attract people from Taiwan to the mainland despite recent cross-strait tensions, which it claims are a product of the DPP government’s destructive cross-strait policies.[13]

The PRC also uses economic coercion to achieve Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation. The PRC rejected imports of Guatemalan coffee and macadamia nuts in May to punish Guatemala for maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[14] Guatemala is one of twelve states that have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesman Wang Wenbin criticized Guatemalan Foreign Minister Carlos Martínez for attending ROC President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration on May 20.

PRC Defense Minister Dong Jun threatened Taiwanese “separatists” and their foreign supporters in his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. Dong gave a speech on “China’s Approach to Global Security” at the dialogue on June 2 in which he claimed Taiwan’s DPP administration was “pursuing separation in an incremental way” and had recently made “fanatical statements that show their betrayal of the Chinese nation and their ancestors.” Dong also accused “some external interfering forces” of using a “salami-slicing strategy” to hollow out the One China Principle through arms sales and Taiwan-related legislation. He was most likely referring to the United States. He said these forces’ attempts to “embolden Taiwan independence separatists” are “dragging Taiwan into a dangerous situation.” Dong said that the PRC is still committed to peaceful reunification, but that this prospect is being eroded by “separatists” and foreign forces. He stressed that “whoever dares to split Taiwan from China will be crushed to pieces and invite their own destruction.”[16] Dong’s rhetoric regarding Taiwan mirrors persistent and aggressive diatribes against the DPP and “Taiwan separatists” from PRC officials since Lai’s inauguration.[17] PRC messaging seeks to justify the PRC’s actions amid increasing pressure to shape the narrative of cross-strait relations.

The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Mainland Affairs Council condemned Dong’s comments on Taiwan. They accused the PRC of violating the UN Charter’s provision against the use or threats of force and of increasing risks to Asia-Pacific peace and security.[18]

China

PRC Defense Minister Dong Jun and a Ministry of National Defense (MoD) spokesperson expressed opposition to “rampant” US freedom of navigation activities and criticized them as illegitimate. MND spokesperson Col. Wu Qian said on May 30 that the PRC the US notion of “freedom of navigation” is a “false proposition.” Wu claimed the South China Sea is one of the freest and safest waterways in the world and that the PRC has always respected freedom of navigation and overflight under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He said that “navigation cannot be ‘rampant’ and freedom cannot be ‘reckless,’” however. He said the PRC opposes “rampant freedom” and accused the United States of using freedom of navigation as an excuse to interfere in regional affairs, maintain US hegemony, and undermine other countries’ sovereignty.[19]

Defense Minister Dong Jun claimed in the question-and-answer session following his June 2 speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue that “some countries” that have not signed UNCLOS are using freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOPs) to enter the territorial sea of other countries. He was referring to the United States conducting FONOPs through waters around the Paracel Islands and other PRC-claimed islands which the PRC considers to be its territorial waters. Dong compared this practice to “driving through others’ houses” instead of driving on the main road. He claimed that “we [countries of the Asia-Pacific region] are all victims of these kinds of operations” and denied that they should be considered “freedom of navigation.”[20]

The PRC most recently accused the United States of illegally intruding into its territorial waters during a US FONOP in waters around the Paracel Islands on May 10. The PRC claims straight archipelagic baselines around the Paracel Islands, which means it considers all the water between the islands as its territorial waters. The PRC also requires foreign ships to get permission or provide advance notification when they sail through its territorial waters. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not permit countries to restrict “innocent passage” through their territorial waters, however. “Innocent passage” is uninterrupted transit through the waters without other activities such as fishing, research, intelligence collection, or military activities. UNCLOS also only permits designated archipelagic states to draw straight-baseline claims around their islands. Non-archipelagic states, such as the PRC, can only claim waters up to 12 nautical miles from their shores as their territorial sea.[21]

PRC Defense Minister Dong Jun met with US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin on May 31 on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. This was the first in-person meeting between US and PRC defense ministers since 2022. MoD spokesperson Wu Qian described the meeting as “positive, practical, and constructive.”[22] A US readout said that Austin emphasized the importance of maintaining open lines of military-to-military communication, expressed concern about recent PLA activity around Taiwan, discussed the PRC’s support for Russia’s defense industrial base, and expressed concerns about recent provocations from North Korea including direct contributions to Russia’s war in Ukraine.[23] Dong said the purpose of military-to-military communication is to enhance understanding, eliminate misunderstandings, and accumulate mutual trust. He expressed hope that the United States will be “consistent in words and deeds” and explore a “correct way” for the two sides to get along in line with common interests. Dong emphasized the PRC’s bottom line on Taiwan and Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC readout did not mention the other issues that Austin brought up.[24] PRC media reported that Dong also expressed strong opposition to the US deployment of intermediate-range missiles to the Philippines during an exercise, though the official readout did not mention this issue.[25] MoD spokesperson Wu said on May 30 that the missile deployment “brought huge risks of war to the region.”[26]

PRC Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu met US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell in Washington, DC on May 30. Ma expressed a range of PRC grievances with the United States on Taiwan, the South China Sea, economic issues, and Ukraine. The US readout said the “candid and constructive” meeting was part of an effort to maintain open lines of communication to manage bilateral competition. Campbell raised US concerns about the PRC’s “destabilizing actions” in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, and South China Sea, as well as PRC support for Russia’s defense industrial base.[27] Ma agreed to maintain high-level exchanges but said "the practice of the United States seeking dialogue and cooperation while undermining China's interests is not feasible and cannot be done.” He said the PRC will never agree to contain, suppress, and deprive the PRC of its legitimate right to development. Ma called Taiwan the “insurmountable red line” in US-PRC relations and urged the United States to abide by the one-China principle if it wanted to maintain cross-strait peace. Ma also urged the United States to stop “politicizing” economic issues, stop “instigating and supporting infringement and provocation” in the South China Sea, and stop “smearing and pressuring China” on the Ukraine war.[28]

The Ma-Campbell meeting came one day after Campbell briefed NATO partners and framed China’s material assistance to Russia as “already having chosen a side.” Campbell said that PRC economic support for Russia is a “sustained, comprehensive effort that is backed up by the leadership in China” to support Russia “to the hilt” and allow Russia to “reconstitute elements of their military force,” including long-range missiles, artillery, UAVs, battlefield awareness, and other capabilities.[29] The United States has accused the PRC of supplying Russia with dual-use components including machine tools and nitrocellulose, which is used in propellants.[30] The PRC has officially presented itself as neutral on the war in Ukraine and framed its economic support of Russia as “normal trade relations.” It has largely adopted Russian framing of the war including portraying US aid to Ukraine as “adding fuel to the fire,” however.[31]

Northeast Asia

Japan and South Korea

The PRC MFA condemned the trilateral United States-Japan-South Korea defense ministers meeting as provocatively targeting the PRC. The United States, Japanese, and South Korean ministers committed to trilateral cooperation to create a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. They also condemned North Korean missile launches and regional provocations.[32] PRC MFA Spokeswoman Mao Ning accused the United States of instigating confrontation in the region. She stated the PRC aimed for the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula but declined to condemn North Korean provocations.[33]

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The PRC framed the Philippines as provoking regional instability at the Shangri-La Dialogue as part of an effort to justify PRC coercion targeting the Philippines in the South China Sea. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr stated during his May 31 keynote address that the Philippines was on the front line to assert the integrity of UNCLOS against “assertive actors who aim to propagate excessive and baseless claims through force, intimidation, and deception.”[34] The PRC MFA stated in response that the Philippines was fully responsible for the escalation in the South China Sea. The PRC MFA also rejected the 2016 UNCLOS Arbitration Tribunal ruling that rejected the legitimacy of PRC claims to territory inside of the nine-dash line and land reclamation activities.[35] PRC Minister of National Defense Dong Jun claimed in his June 2 speech that “a certain country [Philippines], emboldened by outside powers [United States], has broken bilateral agreements and its own promises, made premeditated provocations and created false scenarios to mislead the public.”[36]

The PRC is conducting a campaign to enforce its territorial claims over disputed maritime features in the South China Sea. The PRC deployed research vessels and divers to the Sabina Shoal in early May, potentially as part of a campaign to prevent the Philippines from defending its claim to the Second Thomas Shoal. This is a change from April when the PRC deployed the Chinese Coast Guard to block Philippine ships from reaching Second Thomas Shoal and did not conduct efforts to reclaim Sabina Shoal.[37] The PRC also conducted its largest-ever blockade at Scarborough in an attempt to block a fleet of Philippine civilian ships from resupplying fishermen near Scarborough Shoal.[38] The Chinese Coast Guard also released new law enforcement procedures on May 15, which it could use to justify the arrest and detainment of non-PRC nationals and vessels, such as Philippine resupply ships or Filipino fishermen, within the boundaries of PRC territorial claims.[39]

Oceania

Palau President Surangel Whipps Jr. accused the PRC of conducting a cyberattack that stole 20,000 government documents, including military information related to the United States and Japan. The documents appeared on the dark web in early April. These documents included the location of a U.S. radar installation in Palau, crew lists of Japanese Navy ships that visited Palau, and unspecified details about Palau’s diplomatic relationship with Taiwan.[40] President Whipps emphasized the strength of Palau’s relationship with Taiwan in response to the hack.[41] The Republic of China condemned the cyberattack and began working with Palau to strengthen cybersecurity against “authoritarian infiltration.”[42] The PRC MFA denied responsibility for the attack and accused Palau of lacking evidence for their conclusion.[43]

Europe

The PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS) claimed to have uncovered two spies working for the British intelligence agency MI6. The MSS said one of the spies surnamed Wang studied abroad in the UK in 2015, where MI6 bribed him. He induced his wife, Zhou, to become a spy as well, according to the MSS.[44] The MSS accusation comes as two employees of the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office will go to trial on espionage charges in the United Kingdom.[45]

The PRC United Front Work Department provided financial support to the Dutch political party NL Plan, which is participating in the European Parliamentary elections from June 6–9. The United Front Work Department is a CCP organization that blends influence activities and intelligence operations to shape a target’s political environment and policies to the CCP’s benefit.[46] NL Plan received 42,000 euros (45,643 USD) from organizations affiliated with the United Front, such as the Chinese Council for Peaceful National Reunification in the Netherlands.[47]

United Front-supported parties, such as NL Plan, sitting in the European Parliament could aid the PRC in blocking EU actions, such as sanctions against the PRC. Prominent NL Plan member Dong Lili stated that “whether you are inside or outside of China, we should all put our energy into making our motherland stronger.”[48] The European Parliament endorses the EU’s annual budget as well as international agreements.[49]

Russia-Ukraine War

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokeswoman Mao Ning announced China will not attend the upcoming Russia-Ukraine War peace summit in Switzerland from June 15–16 due to the absence of Russia.[50] PRC MFA Spokeswoman Mao Ning stated that China does not believe the summit will meet China’s three proposals.[51] China’s stated requirements for an international peace summit are recognition by both Russia and Ukraine, equal participation by all parties, and fair discussion of all peace plans.[52] Mao instead said China would continue to promote dialogue and lasting peace in “its own way” and that China’s position of non-attendance is “fair and just, not directed at any party, and certainly not at this summit.” [53]

PRC President Xi Jinping met with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, French President Emmanuel Macron, and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen in April and May. All three European leaders urged Xi to pressure Russia to end its war against Ukraine.[54] The PRC's decision not to attend the upcoming peace summit signifies the failure of these efforts so far to convince Xi to use his leverage over Russia to this end.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) seeks to diversify its energy supply chains through negotiations with Russia on the proposed Power of Siberia 2 (PS-2) pipeline and diplomatic outreach to Middle Eastern states. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 2 that three unspecified sources familiar with the matter stated that the PRC and Russia are in stalled negotiations regarding the PS-2 gas pipeline. The PRC wants to pay prices near Russia's subsidized domestic gas prices and to commit only to buying a small part of the pipeline's planned capacity.[55] Russia seeks higher prices to make up for lost LNG exports to the EU following a unified EU drive to move away from Russian energy products. The EU is on track to import roughly 82 percent less LNG from Russia in 2024 than in pre-war 2021.[56] The PRC is simultaneously pursuing greater access to oil and natural gas resources in the Middle East, such as through the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) on May 30. PRC diplomatic efforts with the UAE and Iraq at the CASCF included discussions about expanding cooperation and Chinese investment in the oil and natural gas industries.[57]

The PRC seeks to diversify its energy supply chains to meet increasing domestic demand beyond 2030. Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy stated that the PRC will mostly or entirely be able to meet its projected increased demand for imported gas with existing supply contracts until 2030, but that the PRC's demand for imported gas will exceed the capacity of its existing contracts by roughly 150 billion cubic meters, 50% of China’s predicted imports of 300 billion cubic meters by 2040.[58] The PRC’s state-owned China National Petroleum Company projected China’s total natural gas demand would sit at roughly 605.9 billion cubic meters with domestic Chinese production fulfilling the additional 300 billion cubic meters required.[59

The European Union is finalizing a sanctions package against Russia, which may grant leverage to the PRC in its negotiations over the PS-2 pipeline. European Commissioner for Energy Kadri Simson stated on June 3 that the EU aims to finalize its 14^th sanctions package against Russia in June. This will be the first sanctions package to target the Russian liquid natural gas (LNG) trade.[60] This would provide the PRC with greater economic leverage over the Russian energy market as Russia would have fewer avenues to sell over 18 billion cubic meters of LNG to the EU, as it did in 2023, after the sanctions.[61]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, May 30, 2024

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, May 24, 2024

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: May 30 at 9am ET

Key Takeaways

Taiwan’s opposition-led Legislative Yuan passed legislative reforms to strengthen the legislature’s oversight powers over the government.
At least 45 Taiwanese musicians, actors, and other celebrities shared a post by PRC state media CCTV on the social media platform Weibo in support of “reunification.”
The CCP rejected opportunities that the ROC government has offered to restart cross-strait exchanges and cool down tensions.
The PRC Ministry of Defense and state media selectively publicized comments from the UN Secretary-General’s spokesperson to bolster its stance that Taiwan is a part of the PRC under international law.
A PRC delegation led by Minister of National Defense Dong Jun attended the Shangri-La Dialogue.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) passed legislative reforms to strengthen the legislature’s oversight powers over the government. The bill that the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) proposed included amendments to the Law Governing the Legislature's Power. The reforms permit the LY to call on any public official to testify before an investigative committee and confirm political appointments. They also mandate that the president give an annual national address on the state of the nation followed by a question-and-answer session with legislators. The reforms impose fines of up to NT$200,000 ($6,206) for “contempt of legislature.” The LY can impose these fines on anyone who fails to appear at a legislative hearing, refuses to answer questions, asks questions back to legislators, fails to provide requested documents, or lies.[1] The LY also passed an amendment to Taiwan’s Criminal Code to make lying to the LY a criminal offense punishable by a fine of up to NT$200,000 ($6,206) and up to one year in prison.[2] The new reforms that strengthen the legislature’s oversight powers will increase the KMT and TPP opposition’s ability to check, investigate, and hinder the agenda and operation of President Lai’s DPP administration. The KMT and TPP together hold a majority of seats in the LY.

The LY approved the bill amid large-scale protests. Around 70,000 protesters in Taipei and thousands more in other cities gathered to protest the legislative reforms on May 28. A crowd of 100,000 previously gathered around the LY during the bill’s second readings on May 24. Some of the protesters used slogans such as “I am in contempt of legislature” and “no discussion, no democracy” to signal their opposition to the contents of the reforms and their view that there was not enough discussion before the vote.[3] A Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation poll found that 57.5% of Taiwanese respondents supported criminalizing “contempt of legislature,” however.[4]

The LY will send the bill to the Executive Yuan (EY) and ultimately the president to sign the bill into law. The EY has ten days to pass the bill or to send it back to the LY for reconsideration with approval from the president. “Reconsideration” means that the LY will vote on the bill again or revise it. If a majority of the LY votes to pass the bill unchanged at this second review, the president and EY must sign it into law.[5]

EY President (Premier) Cho Jung-tai said he may ask the LY to conduct a second review of the bill, which would likely delay but not stop the bill's passage to law. Cho expressed concern that the bill does not clearly define “contempt of legislature” and could be used to unreasonably persecute officials the LY summons or even prevent them from fully clarifying policies. Cho also said the provisions allowing the LY to confirm political appointments and summon the president to address the LY could lead to excessive LY interference in executive power.[6] The KMT-TPP coalition in the LY has the majority needed to pass the bill again if required to do a second review, however.

The DPP is considering a constitutional challenge to the reforms, which could block the bill. DPP legislative caucus whip Ker Chien-ming said on May 27 that the DPP would request a constitutional interpretation of both the content of the reforms and the procedures through which they advanced. Ker and other DPP politicians argued that the new reforms give the LY an unconstitutional amount of power over the government. They also argued that the KMT and TPP forced their reforms through without allowing sufficient discussion or transparency about the content of the bill.[7] A constitutional review that results in Taiwan’s Constitutional Court finding the reforms unconstitutional is likely the DPP’s last hope to stop the reforms from passing into law, since an EY-mandated “reconsideration” would still allow the KMT and TPP to pass it again with a simple majority. President Lai Ching-te said he supports both the EY’s recommendation to send the bill back for a second review and the DPP caucus’s request for a constitutional review.[8]

The KMT and TPP countered that the reforms will strengthen Taiwan’s democracy. KMT Chair Eric Chu said the bill’s passage was a “milestone” for Taiwan’s democracy and would give full play to the legislature’s constitutional role in imposing checks and balances on the government, in line with the public’s expectations.[9] KMT legislative caucus whip Fu Kun-chi said the KMT and TPP will form a joint investigative team to use the LY’s new investigative powers to crack down on corruption.[10] TPP Chair Ko Wen-je said the new reforms would strengthen Taiwan’s democracy and that he “never imagined” the DPP would try to block them, as the DPP had supported some similar reforms when it was in the opposition.[11] Ko said he opposed Fu Kun-chi’s proposal for a joint KMT–TPP anti-corruption investigative team, however.[12] The TPP holds a decisive 8 seats in the LY, which were essential to passing these reforms. No party holds a majority of seats.

At least 45 Taiwanese musicians, actors, and other celebrities shared a post by PRC state media CCTV on the social media platform Weibo in support of “reunification.” The post from May 22, two days after Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration, read: “Taiwan has never been a country and will never be a country. ‘Taiwan independence’ is a dead end and the motherland’s reunification cannot be resisted. China will eventually achieve complete reunification.”[13] Some of the celebrities added their own pro-reunification slogans or reposted a post from the official CCP newspaper People’s Daily with a similar message. CCTV highlighted these reposts on its account on May 25.[14]

The ROC Ministry of Culture said these Taiwanese artists “had no choice” because the PRC was pressuring them to publicly express a political stance in favor of Taiwan “returning” to China. Many of the Taiwanese artists make their living performing in the PRC or have large PRC fanbases.[15] The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson claimed on May 29 that nearly 100 Taiwanese celebrities shared the CCTV post and that these reposts were “natural expressions of true feelings.” The spokesperson accused President Lai and the DPP of deliberately creating cross-strait tensions by claiming that the celebrities were “forced” to share the posts.[16]

The PRC has previously pressured Taiwanese celebrities to make statements favorable to the CCP’s political stance on Taiwan. The agent of Taiwanese actress Wu Mu-hsuen told Taiwanese media in early May that the film crew on a PRC drama Wu had finished filming told her she must sign an agreement that “Taiwan is part of China” or the show would not be aired. Wu signed the agreement and the show aired in 2023. The agent said forcing Taiwanese actors working in the PRC to sign such agreements has become common practice. The agent said PRC officials review the identity and political commitments of Taiwanese artists before allowing them to perform in the PRC.[17] Reuters reported on December 28, 2023, that the PRC’s National Radio and Television Administration pressured the Taiwanese band Mayday to publicly support the PRC stance on Taiwan. The TAO denied the allegation.[18] The case of Mayday in December and the large number of celebrities sharing Weibo posts on May 22 occurred at politically sensitive times. The first was right before Taiwan’s January 2024 election and the second was right after Lai Ching-te’s inauguration as Taiwan’s president.

Recent polls show that the CCP’s stance is not popular in Taiwan. A Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF) poll found that 74.3% of Taiwanese respondents agreed with President Lai Ching-te’s statement that “the ROC and PRC are not subordinate to one another.” 47.2% supported “Taiwan independence” compared to only 12.4% who supported reunification and 28.5% who supported the “status quo.”[19]

The CCP rejected opportunities that the ROC government has offered to restart cross-strait exchanges and cool down tensions. President Lai Ching-te said in his inauguration speech on May 20 that the PRC should cooperate with Taiwan to resume cross-strait tourism based on reciprocity and allow PRC university students to study in Taiwan. Lai said on May 27 that he hoped to promote mutual understanding, reconciliation, and forgiveness through cross-strait exchanges and cooperation.[20] Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) issued a statement on May 24 calling for the PRC to resume allowing its degree students to study at Taiwanese universities.[21] ROC Transport Minister Li Men-yen said on May 24 that the Ministry of Transportation would discuss resuming cross-strait group tourism on a reciprocal basis.[22] The PRC has rejected these overtures, however. TAO Spokesperson Zhu Fenglian claimed that Lai’s calls for cross-strait dialogue and exchange lack sincerity.[23] Zhu responded to Lai’s call for understanding, reconciliation, and forgiveness on May 29 by saying that Lai must immediately abandon his “Taiwan independence” stance, cease “separatist provocations,” and return to the 1992 Consensus.[24] The 1992 Consensus is an alleged verbal agreement between semi-official representatives of the PRC and the then KMT-ruled ROC following negotiations in 1992. It states that both sides agree there is only one China, and that Taiwan is part of China. The CCP interprets this “one China” to be the People’s Republic of China, while the KMT interprets it to be the Republic of China.

The PRC Ministry of Education suspended all programs that sent PRC students to study in Taiwan in 2020, citing the COVID-19 pandemic and bad cross-strait relations.[25] The PRC and ROC both halted group tourism during the pandemic.[26] Taiwan’s Tourism Administration initially planned to resume Taiwanese group tours to the PRC on March 1 but canceled this policy in February after the PRC unilaterally adjusted a flight route in the Taiwan Strait to fly closer to Taiwan.[27]

The ROC Kinmen Defense Command said a PRC civilian drone that dropped pro-unification fliers on an ROC military base on Erdan Island was a “cognitive warfare trick.” A drone dropped a box containing pro-unification fliers on a pier of an ROC military base on the island of Erdan. The fliers said both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to “one China,” and urged the readers not to use force to resist unification or sacrifice their lives for “Taiwan independence.” Erdan is a small island with a military garrison that is part of Taiwan’s Kinmen County, a series of islands located a few miles from the mainland of the PRC. A PRC netizen posted a video of himself on YouTube packaging the fliers into a box and using an aerial drone to drop them on Erdan from the PRC.[28] The Kinmen Defense Command said the flier drop from a drone “beyond visual range” was a “typical cognitive warfare trick” with the intent to attract attention, stir debate, and increase social media traffic.[29]

PRC civilian drones have flown over and filmed ROC facilities on Erdan and other nearby islands on previous occasions including on March 30 and April 8. ROC Army Chief of Staff Chen Chien-yi said on April 3 that such drones constituted “gray zone intrusions” and “cognitive operations” by the PRC to undermine Taiwanese and international confidence in Taiwan’s military. Chen at the time dismissed the possibility that “mainland civilian bloggers trying to gain popularity on the Internet” were responsible for the drone incursions.[30]

The PRC expressed firm opposition to US Congressional delegations that visited Taiwan after President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration. A US House of Representative delegation led by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Michael McCaul arrived in Taiwan on May 26 for a week of talks on US-Taiwan relations with the new administration. A US Senate delegation led by Senator Tammy Duckworth arrived in Taiwan on May 29 for a two-day visit. Both groups met President Lai and other government officials.[31] McCaul said Congress would work to speed up US weapons shipments to Taiwan.[32] Duckworth said she and other senators would introduce a bill to require US sanctions on the PRC if it invades Taiwan.[33] These were the first two delegations of US officials to Taiwan since President Lai’s inauguration on May 20. No sitting US officials attended the inauguration itself. A PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson said on May 27 that the PRC strongly opposed McCaul’s delegation’s visit and made “serious protests” to the United States. She said the Congresspeople who visited Taiwan violated the one-China principle and the US government’s commitment to maintain only unofficial relations with Taiwan and sent a “severely wrong signal” to “Taiwan independence forces.”[34]

China

The PRC Ministry of Defense and state media selectively publicized comments from the UN Secretary-General’s spokesperson to bolster its stance that Taiwan is a part of the PRC under international law. Spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General Stéphane Dujarric said at a press briefing on May 23 that “on the issue of China, [the UN is] guided by the General Assembly resolution of 1971.” He clarified in response to a journalist’s question that the UN Resolution in question is relevant “in terms of our standing on Taiwan as a province of China” but denied that this means that “China can take over Taiwan anytime.” Dujarric responded to the PRC’s military exercises around Taiwan on May 23 by urging “relevant parties to refrain from acts that could escalate tensions in the region.”[35] UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 admitted the PRC as the sole representative of “China” and expelled the ROC from this seat in 1971. The resolution did not mention Taiwan. PRC state media Xinhua and other state media outlets reported that Dujarric had reiterated the UN stance that Taiwan is a province of China but did not report any further context of his comments, including his call to avoid escalation in the region and his rejection of the stance that “China can take over Taiwan anytime.”[36] Ministry of National Defense (MOD) spokesperson Col. Wu Qian cited Dujarric’s comment along with UN Resolution 2758 on May 30 to refute Lai Ching-te’s line in his inaugural speech that the ROC and PRC are “not subordinate to each other.”[37] The PRC has repeatedly argued that UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 is equivalent to an international legal consensus that Taiwan is part of the PRC.[38]

Broader international acceptance of PRC arguments that Taiwan is part of the PRC under international law would serve to further undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty. It would hamper Taiwan’s international participation, lend legitimacy to PRC coercive actions against Taiwan as a “domestic issue,” and lend credence to PRC arguments that the United States and other countries’ engagement with Taiwan without PRC consent is illegal.

A PRC delegation led by Minister of National Defense Dong Jun attended the Shangri-La Dialogue. The Shangri-La Dialogue is a defense summit that the International Institute for Strategic Studies organizes and holds annually in Singapore. This year’s conference will take place from May 31 – June 2.[39] Minister of National Defense Dong Jun will represent the PRC and deliver a speech on the PRC’s Global Security Outlook and meet with foreign counterparts, including United States Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.[40]

Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s keynote speech on May 31 called out “illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive actions” that violate the Philippines’ sovereignty, and vowed to defend the Philippines’ sovereignty “to the last square inch.” PLA Major General Xu Hui publicly responded to Marcos’ speech during the Q&A session. Xu emphasized the importance for Southeast Asian states to maintain a policy of centrality and suggested that the Philippines’ behavior was a threat to regional peace.[41]

The CCP is also signaling its intent to stabilize relations with the United States by agreeing to resume communication between PLA and US theater commanders. This agreement is the latest in a trend since November 2023, when Biden and Xi agreed at their San Francisco summit to restore bilateral military meetings. The PLA has participated in the required meetings since that agreement. The PLA participated in the US–China Defense Policy Coordination talks in early January.[42] The PLA then participated in the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement in early April. [43] The US Department of Defense announced that Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin reaffirmed with Dong that the two sides’ respective theater commanders would resume communication by phone “in the coming months.” The PRC frames the core of the “San Francisco Vision” as stabilizing PRC–US relations while engaging in governmental exchange groups and consultations on regional hotspots.[44] The PRC has continued to drive regional tensions in the South China Sea and Taiwan since this summit.

The United States views military-to-military talks as a means of escalation management to prevent and control crises. The CCP views these talks, at least in part, as a bargaining chip that it can use to influence US behavior to the party’s benefit, however. A US action that the CCP deems unfavorable would be grounds to cut off military-to-military dialogue, in the party’s view. The party previously did this by cutting off high-level military dialogue in the aftermath of then-Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022.[45] This precedent indicates the possibility that the CCP will continue to use military-to-military dialogue opportunities to shape United States behavior.

Northeast Asia

Japan and South Korea

PRC Premier Li Qiang focused on reducing trade barriers during a trilateral summit with leaders from Japan and South Korea on May 27. The summit, which included Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, was the first trilateral meeting in four years. Li maintained a distinct focus on economic matters and proposed deepening trade connectivity to maintain stability in supply chains.[46] Li also proposed strengthening scientific and technological cooperation and resuming negotiations on a three-way free trade agreement. Li’s representation at the summit instead of Xi Jinping reinforces the PRC’s emphasis on trade over security, as the premier is traditionally responsible for overseeing economic affairs.

Li advocated for upholding “strategic autonomy,” promoting multipolarity, and opposing “camp politics” during a joint press conference after the summit, referencing Japan and South Korea’s cooperation with the US.[47] Li expressed his opposition to “turning economic matters into political games and security issues,” rejecting protectionism, and preventing the decoupling of supply chains.[48] The PRC views the alignment of technology industry leaders from countries such as Japan and South Korea with US measures to limit the PRC’s access to critical technologies as a national security risk.

The United States, Japan, and South Korea agreed in August 2023 at the trilateral Camp David summit to cooperate on the regulation of sensitive technologies to ensure their safe application, including by coordinating export controls.[49] Japan announced earlier in March 2023 a raft of export restrictions on semiconductor manufacturing equipment with the stated objective of preventing its application for military use.[50] Japan’s former Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) Yasutoshi Nishimura denied speculation that the measures were aimed at the PRC specifically and downplayed the notion that Japan’s actions followed the United States’ lead.[51] Japan expanded export restrictions on semiconductor technology on April 26, which METI again stated was to better regulate the export of components with potential military applications.[52] The Biden administration announced further restrictions on technology imports from the PRC on May 15, including semiconductor and electric vehicles.[53]

Kishida separately raised concerns with Li in a bilateral meeting a day earlier over the PRC's “intensifying military activity” in the South China Sea and East China Sea, noting the PRC’s military cooperation with Russia in the region. Kishida also stated that Japan was closely monitoring the PRC’s military activities around Taiwan and stressed the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.[54] Kishida asked Li for the PRC to immediately lift a ban on the import of Japanese seafood products, which the PRC banned on health grounds after Japan released treated wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear plant into the Pacific Ocean.[55] The PRC’s withholding of certain trade concessions acts as a lever to discourage Japan from taking further steps that the PRC regards as harmful to its national security.

Southeast Asia

Cambodia

The PRC and Cambodia held annual joint “Golden Dragon” naval exercises in the Gulf of Thailand from May 16-30. The PRC and Cambodia have held the exercises annually six times since 2016. PRC state media stated that the exercises focused on joint counterterrorism and humanitarian rescue.[56] 16 ships participated in the exercises, including 5 People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships, marking a record number of PRC military ships operating in Cambodian waters.[57] The joint naval exercises follow recent high-level meetings between PRC and Cambodian officials. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet on April 24, where the two agreed to strengthen bilateral defense cooperation and continue conducting joint military exercises.[58]

The PLAN has maintained a near-uninterrupted presence at Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base since December.[59] Cambodian Ministry of Defense spokesperson Chhum Socheat stated on May 8 that two corvettes were stationed in Ream during the last six months and were there to participate in the Golden Dragon exercises.[60] The Wall Street Journal reported in 2019 that the PRC and Cambodia signed an agreement that granted the PRC access to the base for thirty years, citing US officials who had seen a draft of the document.[61] Cambodian officials have consistently denied that the PRC has privileged access to Ream Naval Base, which would violate Cambodia’s constitution.[62] The PRC MFA previously denied the PRC’s involvement with the base and used the opportunity to criticize the US for its large overseas military presence.[63]

The PRC funded an expansion of Ream Naval Base in 2022 that accommodates larger ships to dock there.[64] The PRC has also funded a series of other big-ticket infrastructure projects in Cambodia, including two airports, and accounts for 40% of Cambodia’s external debt.[65]

Europe

Two employees of the Hong Kong Economic and Trade office will go to trial on espionage charges in the United Kingdom. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesman Wang Wenbin accused the United Kingdom on May 24 of fabricating charges under the guise of national security in response.[66] Chung Biu Yuen and Chi Leung Peter Wai are charged with undertaking information gathering and surveillance to assist a foreign intelligence service in the period of December 2023–May 2024.[67] Thames Valley Police found the third man charged in the case, former Royal Marine Matthew Trickett, dead in Grenfell Park, Maidenhead, on May 21. A police investigation into his death is ongoing.[68]

Russia-Ukraine War

The PRC and Brazil announced six points of consensus to de-escalate the Russia-Ukraine War that are similar to the PRC’s 2023 proposal. The PRC’s 2023 plan called for the cessation of hostilities, protection of civilians and nuclear power plants, avoiding using chemical or biological or nuclear weapons, stopping sanctions, vague calls to respect national sovereignty, and “prevent[ing] bloc confrontation.”[69] The Sino-Brazilian 2024 plan called for the cessation of hostilities at a peace conference recognized by both Russia and Ukraine, protection of civilians and nuclear power plants, avoiding using chemical or biological or nuclear weapons, and opposition to dividing the world into “close political or economic groups.”[70]

Middle East

The PRC held the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) in Beijing on May 30.[71] The heads of state from Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates attended the forum.[72] PRC Vice Foreign Minister Deng Li stated on May 27 that the objectives of the CASCF included promoting cooperation in “various fields” via the Belt and Road Initiative.[73] The $2 billion sale of bonds by the Beijing-based Lenovo Group to the Saudi Arabian sovereign wealth fund on May 28 combined with the PRC-based FAW Group aiming to manufacture electric vehicles in Egypt demonstrates that economic cooperation will be a central component of the CASCF.[74] The states adopted the Beijing Declaration and China-Arab States Cooperation Forum 2024–2026 Implementation Action Plan at the forum, which aims to deepen cooperation in areas such as finance, aerospace, and artificial intelligence.[75]

PRC Vice Foreign Minister Deng Li and PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated the PRC’s position on May 27 and May 30, respectively, on the Israel–Hamas War calling for an immediate ceasefire and creation of an independent Palestinian state.[76] The joint Sino-Arab statement on Palestine issued at the forum echoes this view.[77] The PRC has repeatedly criticized Israel’s military operations in Gaza and US support for Israel while calling for an internationally mediated ceasefire.[78] The PRC’s Palestine policy position combined with the hosting of talks between Fatah and Hamas in late April reflects the PRC’s intent to play an active diplomatic role in the resolution of the Israel–Hamas War and the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[79]

Guatemala

The PRC rejected imports of Guatemalan coffee and macadamia nuts to punish Guatemala for maintaining diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan). The Guatemalan Exporters Association reported on May 23 that seven containers of macadamia nuts could not enter the PRC. Reuters stated unspecified Guatemalan traders had been told macadamia and coffee would be denied entry to the PRC.[80] Guatemalan President Bernardo Arévalo stated on May 24 that this trade issue could be related to Guatemala holding diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[81] PRC MFA Spokesman Wang Wenbin criticized Guatemalan Foreign Minister Carlos Martínez for attending ROC President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration on May 20. Wang also criticized Guatemalan President Bernardo Arévalo for holding a videoconference with President Lai on May 21.[82]

Guatemala sought to engage in trade with the PRC while also maintaining formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan).[83] Guatemalan President Bernardo Arévalo stated on February 8 that he does not intend to switch diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC.[84] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Wang Wenbin’s February 6 statement that Guatemala would need to recognize the one-China principle to “conduct cooperation” between the two countries underscores the difficulty Arévalo will face holding that position.[85] The one-China principle is the People’s Republic of China’s position that it is the sole legitimate representative of China and that Taiwan is a part of China. Guatemala accepting the PRC’s one-China principle would mean breaking its diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

The PRC accounts for 2.66 percent of total Guatemalan exports, which suggests that the PRC rejecting coffee and macadamia nuts will not have a substantial impact on the Guatemalan economy.[86] The PRC policy to deny imports of Guatemalan coffee and macadamia nuts is a signal to President Arévalo of the costs to continued diplomatic relations with the ROC, however. The PRC is aiming to make it difficult for Arévalo to pursue both trade with the PRC and maintain diplomatic relations with the ROC.

The PRC’s long-term objective is for Guatemala to switch diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC. Guatemala and Belize are the only countries in Central America that recognize the Republic of China. The other five Central American countries broke relations with the Republic of China between 2007 and 2023. Guatemala and Belize are also 2 of the 12 countries, including Vatican City, that recognize the ROC.

The CCP’s efforts to diplomatically isolate the ROC are part of a campaign to degrade the ROC’s legitimacy on the international stage. The loss of full diplomatic relations for the ROC supports the CCP’s attempts to increase pressure on Taiwan to unify with the PRC without prompting an international backlash. Undermining international recognition of the ROC buttresses the CCP’s argument that the ROC is not a state, but rather a province of the PRC.

Click here to read the full report with maps

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: May 24 at Noon ET

Key Takeaways

Tens of thousands of demonstrators gathered outside the Legislative Yuan on May 21 and May 24 to protest the advancement of a controversial legislative reform bill in the Legislative Yuan.
The PRC launched two days of joint military exercises around Taiwan to “punish” Taiwan for the election of President Lai Ching-te and what the PRC deemed separatist “provocations” in Lai’s inauguration speech. PRC and ROC media cited analysts who said that the exercise’s name, Joint Sword 2024A, suggests that there may be additional exercises in the series later this year.
The Fujian branch of the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) conducted “law enforcement” drills that entered restricted waters around the Taiwanese Wuqiu and Dongyin islands. The CCG coordinated the drills with PLA joint exercises on May 23 and May 24. The CCG also carried out drills east of Taiwan on May 24.
The PRC announced new sanctions on three US defense firms over arms sales to Taiwan.
The PRC referenced UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to block Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organization’s 2024 annual assembly.
The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) released new law enforcement procedures on May 15 likely as part of PRC efforts to assert territorial claims in the South China Sea.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

Tens of thousands of demonstrators gathered outside the Legislative Yuan on May 21 and May 24 to protest the advancement of a controversial legislative reform bill in the Legislative Yuan. The Legislative Yuan (LY) began voting on the joint Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) reform bill on May 17, which would grant the LY the ability to call on anyone to testify before an investigative committee, establish penalties for perceived non-compliance or dishonesty in responses, confirm political appointments, and mandate the president to give an annual national address on the state of the union.[1] The “Contempt of Congress” aspect of the bill is a focal point of the controversy, as it entails punishment such as fines and jail time for individuals whose compliance with LY investigators’ inquiries is deemed unsatisfactory, including government officials. Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislators opposed the reform bill in the LY on May 17, which climaxed in a physical confrontation between members of the legislature. Mass demonstrations took place outside the LY on May 21 and 24 as the general assembly continued voting on the bill’s provisions.[2] The LY is set to continue voting on the bill on May 28.

DPP legislators have criticized the bill as unconstitutional and labeled it a political tool that the KMT and TPP will abuse to expand their power. DPP Caucus Whip Ker Chien-ming articulated the threat that the bill poses to the executive branch, calling it a “limitless expansion of powers” and a “constitutional monster” whose purpose was to weaponize the legislature.[3] KMT Caucus Deputy Secretary-General Lin Szu-ming, one of the main authors of the reform bills, earlier highlighted the LY’s need to possess “strong weapons” to supervise the government.[4] DPP Caucus Secretary-General Rosalia Wu stated on April 1 that the DPP will fight against the law with all its strength, and would request action from the justices of the Constitutional Court if the bill passed the LY.[5]

The DPP China Affairs Department highlighted the Contempt of Congress aspect of the bill among a series of KMT actions that benefitted CCP interests.[6] DPP legislator Puma Shen criticized the Contempt of Congress law during LY proceedings on May 24 for granting legislators excessive penal authority and claimed that the law could be used arbitrarily to punish those with opposing views, including individuals that the CCP might accuse of separatism.[7] Ker claimed that the bill amounted to Taiwan’s “Hong Kong-ization,” referring to the territory’s democratic backsliding and political assimilation with the PRC.[8] The DPP argues that the law carries national security risks, as military or government officials could be compelled to disclose confidential information during questioning from an LY investigative committee or face indictment under the law.[9] The bill includes a stipulation that exempts sensitive national security information from disclosure.[10]

The DPP and protestors are also condemning the KMT and TPP for using opaque and undemocratic methods to advance the reforms in the legislature. The DPP accused the KMT of automatically advancing the bill to the general assembly without proper review in the relevant committee on April 15.[11] The KMT and TPP introduced an amended version of the bill on the morning of May 17, which the parties did not make available to the public or disseminate to the general assembly before initiating voting.[12] TPP Caucus Whip Huang Kuo-chang stated in an interview on May 17 that the amended version was “top secret.”[13] Huang later pushed back against the DPP and protesters’ accusations of opacity and circumvention of legislative procedures and criticized the DPP for using violence to obstruct the bill’s advancement.[14]

KMT Chairman Eric Chu expressed the party’s strong resolve to achieve its political objectives in defiance of what it views as an uncooperative DPP. Chu stated on May 19 that the KMT would no longer be “restrained and courteous” in its fight to achieve reform and invoked the KMT’s mandate to carry out the public’s expectations for reform, which is based on the party’s dominant presence in the LY.[15] Chu criticized the DPP on May 22 for staging the protests to obstruct democracy and the will of the majority.[16] KMT Caucus Whip Fu Kun-chi, who spearheaded the bill’s sponsorship, vowed on May 24 to finalize its passage next week after the LY proceedings continued into the night.[17]

The PRC framed ROC President Lai Ching-te’s inaugural address as hostile and provocative for cross-strait relations. Lai took office on May 20, marking the start of the DPP’s third consecutive term in power. Lai’s inaugural address emphasized the importance of upholding Taiwan’s sovereignty and democracy.[18] PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua rejected Lai’s assertions of Taiwan’s sovereignty and self-determination as “separatist fallacies” that made clear his desire to realize Taiwan’s formal independence.[19] Chen described Lai as a separatist zealot who poses a danger to cross-strait peace and does not represent mainstream public opinion in Taiwan. Chen criticized countries that sent representatives to attend Lai’s inauguration and warned against foreign interference in Taiwan that violates the recognition of the PRC as the sole government of China.[20] Chen specifically called out the United States for having diplomatic relations and “official exchanges” with Taiwan. There were no official government representatives in the US delegation and the United States does not have official diplomatic relations with Taiwan. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi, speaking at a foreign ministers’ summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, stated that nothing can stop the PRC from reunifying with Taiwan, and that “separatists will be nailed to a pillar of shame.”[21]

PRC state broadcaster CCTV claimed widespread disapproval of Lai’s alleged independence-minded rhetoric in Taiwan.[22] The segment featured spokesperson Yu Chih-pin of Taiwan’s New Party, a pro-unification party that grew out of the KMT, who framed the DPP as the antagonist in cross-strait relations and criticized Lai for stating that “neither side of the strait was subordinate to the other.” The piece highlighted a Taiwanese poll released on May 20 that showed more than half of respondents did not have confidence in Lai’s ability to manage cross-strait relations.[23]

China

The PRC launched two days of joint military exercises around Taiwan to “punish” Taiwan for the election of President Lai Ching-te and what the PRC deemed separatist “provocations” in Lai’s inauguration speech. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command (ETC) carried out two days of joint military exercises around Taiwan on May 23-24. The exercises, titled “Joint Sword 2024A,” took place in nine distinct locations in the waters to the north, south, and east of the main island of Taiwan and around the Taiwanese islands of Kinmen, Matsu, Wuqiu, and Dongyin. ETC spokesperson Senior Colonel Li Xi said that the ETC was organizing services including the army, navy, air force, and rocket force for the joint drills. Li said the drills would focus on joint sea-air combat-readiness patrol, joint seizure of comprehensive battlefield control, and joint precision strikes on key targets. He also said the exercises would involve the patrol of vessels and planes closing in on areas around Taiwan and “integrated operations” inside and outside the island chain to test the joint combat capabilities of the ETC’s forces.[24] The ETC also released a map of the exercises on May 23 that showed PLA Navy (PLAN) warship formations approaching Taiwan from five directions on all sides of the main island.[25]

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported 49 PLA aircraft around Taiwan on May 23, the first day of the joint exercises. 35 of the aircraft crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entered the north, central, and southwest parts of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).[26] It did not report on the number of ships that day. The MND again reported 49 PLA aircraft along with 19 PLAN vessels and 7 Chinese Coast Guard vessels around Taiwan on May 24, the second day. 35 of the aircraft crossed the median line and entered Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ that day.[27]

ETC spokesperson Li said the second day of the exercise on May 24 drilled vessel-aircraft coordination, sea assault, and land attack, and tested the forces' combat capabilities including multi-domain coordination and joint strike. PLA Rocket Force units conducted mock fire strikes with modularized long-range rocket systems in eastern Fujian Province, which faces the Taiwan Strait. PLAN warships around Taiwan conducted mock strikes on maritime targets. PLA bombers and fighter jets took off carrying live missiles.[28] The ETC also released a video showing a 3D simulation of strikes on the Taiwanese cities of Taipei, Hualien, and Kaohsiung by PLA air, naval, and rocket forces.[29]

The political purpose of this exercise is to punish Taiwan for its election of Lai as president and what the PRC deemed “provocations” in Lai’s inauguration speech. The exercises began three days after Lai’s inauguration as president of Taiwan. ETC spokesperson Li said that the drills serve as a “strong punishment for the separatist acts of ‘Taiwan independence’ forces” and a “stern warning against the interference and provocation by external forces.”[30] TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua elaborated in stating that the exercise was a punishment for “provocations seeking independence” in Lai’s inauguration speech on May 20.[31] Ministry of National Defense (MOD) spokesperson Senior Colonel Wu Qian claimed that Lai “seriously challenged the one-China principle, blatantly sold the ‘two-state theory,’ and attempted to ‘seek independence through force’ and ‘seek independence through foreign forces’” as soon as he took office. Wu warned that “every time ‘Taiwan independence’ provokes, our countermeasures will be pushed forward until the complete reunification of the motherland is achieved.”[32]

The exercises also signal a message of deterrence both to Taiwan’s DPP administration and to “external forces” that support Taiwan to not make further moves toward Taiwan’s independence. The military purpose of the exercise is to improve the joint interoperability of various services under the ETC, including joint sea-air patrols, joint battlefield control operations, and joint precision strikes.[33] These capabilities are integral to executing several of the PLA’s joint operational war plans as identified in PLA military texts, including Joint Firepower Strike Operations against Taiwan, Joint Blockade Operations against Taiwan, and Joint Attack Operations against Taiwan.[34]

PRC state media, including Xinhua and Global Times, cited PLA Academy of Military Science (AMS) expert Tong Zhen who said that the exercise demonstrated the PLA’s ability to “strike all directions of the island without any blind spots,” pinning down Taiwan from all sides.[35] PLA National Defense University (NDU) Professor Major General Meng Xiangqing noted in an article in the English-language state newspaper China Daily that the Joint Sword 2024A exercises were larger in scale, number of troops, and area covered than previous exercises and made several “breakthroughs.” First, PLA ships reached the Taiwanese outlying islands of Wuqiu and Dongyin for the first time. Second, PLA ships and planes came “as close as ever” to the main island of Taiwan in their combat-readiness patrols. Third, the drill showed joint and integrated operations to seize “comprehensive control of the sea, land, and air,” including cooperation with the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and “many new forces” including “network forces, information support forces, and information systems.”[36] Lieutenant Colonel Zhang Chi of the NDU’s Centre of Strategic Studies wrote in the same article that the drills to the north, south, and east of Taiwan have specific meanings. The drills to the north send warning signals to “important political and military targets,” including the ruling DPP, based in Taiwan’s capital Taipei in northern Taiwan. The exercise to the south is a “political attack” and an “economic blockade” of the city of Kaohsiung, which is a DPP stronghold and Taiwan’s largest port as well as an important garrison for Taiwan’s maritime forces. The exercise to the east is aimed at blocking the “lifeline for Taiwan’s energy imports,” a possible escape route for Taiwan’s “independence forces,” and support lines for the United States and allies to aid Taiwan. All these lines rely mainly on the eastern Taiwanese port of Hualien.[37]

The exercises are comparable to the PLA’s large-scale exercises around Taiwan in August 2022 in response to then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and the Joint Sword exercises in April 2023 after then-Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen met then-US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California. The 2022 exercises featured a larger number of military assets and involved the firing of ballistic missiles over Taiwan. Those exercises initially lasted five days from August 4-7, with additional drills until August 10.[38] The 2023 exercises lasted three days, compared to the two days of Joint Sword 2024A. The Joint Sword 2024A exercise expanded the area of operation compared to previous joint exercises, however, operating in nine distinct areas including around Taiwan’s outlying islands compared to six areas not including outlying islands during 2022. Joint Sword 2024A also came closer to Taiwan’s east coast than previous exercises.[39]

The MND condemned the exercises and called them an “irrational provocation” that would destabilize regional peace and security.[40] Taiwan President Lai and representatives of the DPP, KMT, and TPP all condemned the PLA drills.[41]

PRC and ROC media cited analysts who said that the exercise’s name, Joint Sword 2024A, suggests that there may be additional exercises in the series later this year. Follow-on exercises would be named Joint Sword 2024B, Joint Sword 2024C, and so on.[42] The PLA held only one Joint Sword exercise in 2023, the first in the series.[43]

The Fujian branch of the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) conducted “law enforcement” drills that entered restricted waters around the Taiwanese Wuqiu and Dongyin islands. The CCG coordinated the drills with the PLA Joint Sword exercises on May 23 and May 24. The CCG also carried out drills east of Taiwan on May 24. CCG spokesperson Gan Yu announced the drills on May 23 and said they were intended to test the Fujian CCG’s joint patrol, rapid response, and emergency handling capabilities. The CCG released maps that showed its patrol routes around the islands. The maps showed a route that passed within 2.8 nautical miles north of Wuqiu and another route that passed within 3.1 nautical miles east and south of Dongyin.[44] The routes entered the “restricted waters” around the islands but not the “prohibited waters.”[45] The CCG also conducted patrols in restricted waters around Wuqiu and Dongyin on May 24 but did not release a map that day.[46] Taiwan does not claim territorial waters around Wuqiu and Dongyin partly due to their proximity to the PRC. It instead designates “prohibited” and “restricted” waters around the islands, which it treats as equivalent to "territorial waters" and a "contiguous zone," respectively. The Fujian CCG has conducted similar patrols that intruded into prohibited and restricted waters around the Taiwanese island of Kinmen on multiple occasions since February 2024.[47] The PRC does not recognize any “restricted” or “prohibited” waters around Taiwan’s outlying islands.

The CCG also carried out law enforcement exercises in waters east of Taiwan on May 24. The exercises focused on training in verification, identification, warning, and expulsion and testing joint patrol and emergency response capabilities. It released photos of the exercises but no map.[48] It is not clear how close the CCG vessels came to Taiwan’s coast.

The PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times cited an unnamed “source close to the matter” who said this was the first time CCG vessels had entered the “restricted waters” around Dongyin and Wuqiu. The source said the exercise and the published maps sent a message of deterrence to Taiwan. The source said the PRC might replicate the “Kinmen model” if the Taiwan government remains “obstinate,” which could include entering the prohibited waters around the Wuqiu and Dongyin islands or boarding and inspecting Taiwanese vessels in the waters around the islands. The source said Wuqiu and Dongyin are of “high strategic importance” and military value because they are close to the mainland PRC, oversee key transportation routes in the Taiwan Strait, and are the front line for Taiwan’s defense operations. The same source also said the CCG patrols showed heightened coastguard-military coordination, as PLA forces concurrently carried out exercises around the islands.[49] PRC authorities did not release maps showing the precise movements of the PLA forces. NDU Professor Major General Meng Xiangqing noted in his China Daily article that PLA forces also approached the islands of Dongyin and Wuqiu for the first time during the Joint Sword 2024A exercises. He said the exercises near those islands sent a warning that if “‘Taiwan independence’ forces escalate their provocation, the PLA may enter the ‘prohibited waters to carry out inspections of Taiwan ships in the area and conduct combat-readiness patrols.”[50] There are no known instances of the PRC using military forces to inspect Taiwanese ships in this way.

Wuqiu and Dongyin are administratively part of Taiwan’s Kinmen and Matsu regions, respectively. The CCG’s patrols around Wuqiu and Dongyin mark the seventh and eighth CCG intrusions into the restricted waters of Kinmen or Matsu in May 2024.[51] The CCG has normalized patrols in restricted waters around the main islands of Kinmen since an incident on February 14 in which two PRC fishermen drowned while fleeing from a Taiwan Coast Guard pursuit.[52] These CCG patrols serve to erode Taiwan’s control over waters around its territory.

The PRC announced new sanctions on three US defense firms over arms sales to Taiwan. The PRC Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) announced that it was adding General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, General Dynamics Land Systems, and Boeing’s Defense, Space & Security unit to an “Unreliable Entity List” for selling arms to Taiwan. MOFCOM made the announcement on May 20, the same day Lai Ching-te was inaugurated as President of Taiwan. The PRC forbids entities on the Unreliable Entity List from conducting export and import business with the PRC and from making new investments in the PRC. The sanctions also ban senior managers of the companies from entering or staying in the PRC. Lockheed Martin and Raytheon’s Missile and Defense division have been on the Unreliable Entity List since February 2023.[53] The PRC previously froze the assets of General Atomics Aeronautical Systems and General Dynamics Land Systems held in the PRC in April 2024. It imposed sanctions on Boeing Defense, Space, and Security President and CEO Ted Colbert in September 2022 over Boeing’s sale of Harpoon missiles to Taiwan.[54]

The PRC opened an anti-dumping investigation against polyoxymethylene (POM) copolymers from the United States, European Union, Japan, and Taiwan. The PRC Ministry of Commerce launched the investigation on May 19 after six major PRC POM copolymer producers applied for the investigation on April 22.[55] POM copolymer, also known as polyformaldehyde copolymer or acetal copolymer, is a thermoplastic resin widely used in various industries ranging from auto parts to electronics.[56] Imports supplied nearly 45 percent of the PRC’s POM copolymer demand in 2022. The EU, Taiwan, Japan, and the United States were the third through sixth largest sources of the material, respectively, in the first quarter of 2024.[57]

PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times denied Western media speculation that the “regular and normal anti-dumping investigation” was retaliatory. It said the application to begin the investigation predated US President Joe Biden’s new tariffs on the PRC and that the broader anti-dumping investigation in this industry actually began in 2016, leading to duties on POM copolymer imports from South Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia in 2017.[58] The article claimed that US media speculation that the investigation was retaliatory shows that the United States fears PRC countermeasures to the new tariffs.[59]

The PRC referenced statements from the UN Special Rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures to bolster its opposition to unilateral Western sanctions. The special rapporteur on the negative impact of the unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights, Alena Douhan, visited the PRC from May 6 to May 17. She met with government departments, enterprises, civil groups, and other entities in Beijing, Shenzhen, and Xinjiang to study the negative impact of unilateral sanctions on the PRC. Douhan concluded that unilateral sanctions against the PRC as well as the “over-compliance” of foreign businesses with those sanctions have harmed the human rights of “vulnerable groups” by increasing unemployment and causing other economic disruptions in affected regions like Xinjiang. She claimed that any “unilateral sanctions” that are not retaliatory and implemented without authorization of the UN Security Council are illegal. She further said that all secondary sanctions imposed on individuals and entities as punishment for circumventing sanctions regimes on third countries are illegal. She said that unilateral sanctions should not be used as a foreign policy tool and a means of economic coercion.[60]

The PRC is using Douhan’s credentials as a UN expert to strengthen its rhetoric against Western sanctions and human rights narratives. PRC Assistant Foreign Minister Miao Deyu, MFA spokesperson Wang Wenbin, and state media such as Xinhua and Global Times publicized and echoed Douhan’s views that “unilateral coercive measures” against the PRC violate international law and human rights.[61] Wang urged “relevant countries” to immediately lift their “illegal unilateral sanctions.”[62]The claim that unilateral sanctions are illegal and the conflation of economic development with human rights, which are core premises in the special rapporteur’s mandate and reports, parallel longtime CCP rhetoric.[63]

The Special Rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures is not an impartial expert or authority, however, and the PRC may have shaped the outcome of her study to support PRC narratives. The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) created the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures in 2014 to study the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights and to work with UNHRC and other bodies to minimize the negative effects of unilateral coercive measures.[64] Iran introduced the mandate for the special rapporteur on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.[65] The United States and most of its allies opposed the mandate.[66] A Special Rapporteur is an unpaid independent expert that the UN Human Rights Council appoints to produce reports on a specific theme. Douhan is a professor of international law at Belarus State University who took up the post of Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights in 2020.[67] She has previously urged the lifting of unilateral sanctions on Qatar, Iran, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and Syria.[68] A 2022 report by the nonprofit UN Watch found that Douhan received a $200,000 donation from the PRC government in 2021.[69]

The PRC used UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, which admitted the PRC to the UN as the sole representative of China and expelled the ROC from the UN in 1971, to block Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organization’s 2024 annual assembly. PRC officials including the PRC ambassador to the United Nations and spokespeople for the MFA and TAO have claimed that the resolution confirms the “one China principle” in international law by definitively establishing the PRC as the only legal government of all of China, of which Taiwan is a part.[70] The MFA cited the resolution on May 13 and May 24 when explaining the PRC’s decision to block Taiwan from participating in the World Health Organization’s 2024 World Health Assembly (WHA), which begins on May 27. It argued that because Taiwan is part of China and the PRC is the sole legal representative of China, Taiwan cannot participate in international organizations without permission from the PRC's central government. It claimed that Taiwan’s DPP government has “stubbornly adhered to the separatist stance of ‘Taiwan independence’” since it took power in 2016 and thus invalidated the political basis for Taiwan’s participation in the WHO. [71] The PRC has repeatedly cited Resolution 2758 in its reasoning for blocking Taiwan’s participation in the WHO since 2017.[72] Taiwan participated as an observer in the WHA under the name “Chinese Taipei” during the presidency of Ma Ying-jeou from 2009-2016, however.[73]

PRC officials strongly criticized statements by US officials such as State Department China Coordinator Mark Lambert and various US senators which refuted the PRC’s interpretation of UNGA 2758.[74] An MFA spokesperson claimed on May 20 that “some people in the United States maliciously spread fallacies” in arguing that the UN resolution did not resolve Taiwan’s status and does not prevent Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. The spokesperson said such “absurd and dangerous” arguments “not only challenge China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also challenge “international justice and conscience” and the post-war international order.”[75] The same spokesperson claimed on May 15 that the US “distorting and slandering” of UNGA Resolution 2758 showed that the United States uses international law inconsistently to maintain its “hegemony.”[76]

Broader international acceptance of PRC arguments that interpret UNGA Resolution 2758 as an international legal consensus that Taiwan is part of the PRC would serve to further undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty. It would hamper Taiwan’s international participation, lend legitimacy to PRC coercive actions against Taiwan as a “domestic issue,” and lend credence to PRC arguments that the United States and other countries’ engagement with Taiwan without PRC consent is illegal.

The PRC’s use of UNGA 2758 in tandem with the 1992 Consensus to block Taiwan from participating in international organizations could also support its legal argument for its broader effort to legitimize the KMT over the DPP as a negotiating partner on behalf of Taiwan. It did not block Taiwan’s participation in the WHO during the KMT administration of Ma Ying-jeou because Ma and his party officially accept the “1992 Consensus” that Taiwan and mainland China are part of “one China.” The PRC may return to this more permissive policy under the next KMT administration in Taiwan, with the argument that the KMT recognizes the supposed “international legal consensus” of the One China principle and the DPP does not.

PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Foreign Minister’s Summit in Astana, Kazakhstan. The SCO is a Eurasian regional cooperation organization that the PRC and Russia established in 2001 with several central Asian countries. It now also includes India, Pakistan, and Iran.[77] The Foreign Minister’s meeting was primarily in preparation for a full SCO summit in July. Wang called on the SCO the bolster security cooperation, information sharing, joint operations, and personnel training. He accused “a few countries” of pursuing hegemony, forming “small circles,” interfering with and suppressing other countries, “decoupling,” and even fueling the “three forces” in the region with the aim of suppressing the strategic autonomy of the Global South.[78] The “three forces” is a reference to terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. Wang did not specify which countries he was talking about, but most of his rhetoric echoed criticisms the PRC commonly directs at the United States. Wang met individually with many other foreign ministers at the summit including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.[79] Lavrov confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping would meet again at the SCO meeting in Astana on July 3-4.[80]

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) released new law enforcement procedures on May 15 likely as part of PRC efforts to assert territorial claims in the South China Sea. The CCG released the Coast Guard Administrative Law Enforcement Procedures (CGALEP), which states that the CCG can arrest and detain foreigners illegally entering or exiting PRC territorial boundaries for up to 30 days without trial. The CCG has the option to extend detentions up to 60 days in “complicated cases.”[81] The procedures will come into force on June 15.[82] The CCG announced the new procedures as the PRC is increasingly asserting its claims over disputed maritime features in the South China Sea, such as Scarborough and Second Thomas Shoal, amid heightened tensions with the Philippines. The PRC deployed research vessels and divers to the Sabina Shoal in May, potentially as part of a campaign to prevent the Philippines from defending its claim to the Second Thomas Shoal. This is a change from last month when the PRC deployed the Chinese Coast Guard to block Philippine ships from reaching Second Thomas Shoal and did not conduct efforts to reclaim Sabina Shoal.[83] The PRC also conducted its largest-ever blockade at Scarborough Shoal in May in an attempt to block a fleet of Philippine civilian ships from resupplying fishermen near Scarborough Shoal.[84]

The CCG could use the new law enforcement procedures to justify the arrest and detainment of non-PRC nationals and vessels, such as Philippine resupply ships or Filipino fishermen, within the boundaries of PRC territorial claims. The Philippine civilian group Atin Ito sent a convoy to resupply Filipino fishermen near Scarborough Shoal from May 14 to May 16. An advance party of the Atin Ito convoy delivered 1,000 liters of fuel and 200 food packs near Scarborough Shoal on May 16.[85] The convoy leaders declared the mission accomplished on May 16 in light of this news and decided not to sail closer to Scarborough Shoal.[86] The CCG also fired water cannons and collided with Philippine ships in March while attempting to block a Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal.[87] These confrontations show the situations in the South China Sea under which the CCG could detain Philippine nationals under the CGALEP. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. condemned the CGALEP and called it “completely unacceptable to the Philippines” and pledged “to always protect our citizens.”[88]

The map below depicts the PRC's claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea islands within the “nine-dash line” maritime boundary with the 12-nautical mile territory boundary depicted around each of the maritime features that the PRC claims. The map does not depict contiguous zones, economic zones, and continental shelves that the PRC also claims because these do not constitute territorial waters.[89] These island groups include the Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands), Paracel Islands (Xisha Islands), Pratas Island (Dongsha Islands), as well as Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal (Zhongsha Islands).[90] In addition to territorial waters within 12 nautical miles of each maritime feature, the PRC claims straight baselines around the Paracel Islands as a group, which means it considers waters between these islands to be its internal waters even when they are more than 12 nautical miles from any individual island. The Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in 2016 that there is no legal basis for the PRC’s nine-dash line claims and that the PRC’s actions had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights.[91] The PRC rejected the ruling.[92]

Europe

The PRC threatened to impose retaliatory tariff controls on European agricultural goods in response to EU subsidy investigations into PRC firms. This threat is part of a PRC campaign to dissuade the European leaders from implementing more hawkish economic policies that run counter to the PRC’s interests. The China Chamber of Commerce to the EU stated on May 18 that it “was informed… if the EU continues its actions [subsidy investigations into PRC firms in the electronic vehicle, wind turbine, and security equipment sectors], the Chinese side will have no choice but to implement a series of retaliatory measures.” It also stated that “European wine and dairy products may find themselves caught in the crossfire.”[93] The PRC wine and dairy imports are less than three percent of all of the PRC’s imports from the EU.[94] EU Agriculture Commissioner Janusz Wojciechowski’s visit to the PRC in late April aimed to increase food exports to the PRC.[95] The PRC threat of agricultural tariffs is one means to oppose this EU policy goal and coerce it into eliminating investigations into PRC companies at minimal cost to the PRC. The PRC is the EU’s third largest export market for agricultural products, at six-point-four percent, however.[96]

Russia

United Kingdom Defense Minister Grant Shapps stated on May 22 that US and UK intelligence have evidence that the PRC “is now or will be” providing lethal military assistance to Russia, a statement that US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan questioned.[97] Shapps stated that this evidence is a “significant development” as the PRC has previously presented itself as a “moderating influence” but did not provide further information about the supposed intelligence. Sullivan stated during a press conference that he has previously warned that the PRC may supply Russia with lethal military assistance but that the US has “not seen that to date.”[98] Sullivan stated that he will speak with his British counterparts to ensure that the US and UK have a “common operating picture” and to clarify Shapps' comment.

The PRC has provided non-lethal assistance to Russia to support its defense industrial base since at least 2023. Over 90 percent of Russian microelectronics imports came from the PRC in 2023, for example. These dual-use materials are key for manufacturing weapons.[99] The CCP also provided Russia with military assistance such as rifles and smokeless powder at varying points in 2023.[100] United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated in April and May 2024 that the PRC provided dual-use components, such as machine tools, to the PRC as part of “invaluable support to Russia’s defense industrial base.”[101]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, May 17, 2024

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, May 10, 2024

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: May 16 at Noon ET

Key Takeaways:

The Fujian provincial government in the PRC launched a series of economic initiatives that aim to build political support in Taiwan for cross-strait integration. Promoting economic ties between Fujian and Taiwan’s outer islands furthers the PRC’s efforts to establish greater political influence over ROC municipalities.
The United States and PRC held their first bilateral government negotiations on artificial intelligence risks and governance in Geneva, Switzerland on May 14.
The PRC may make an upcoming PRC-South Korea summit conditional on South Korea not sending a delegation to Taiwan President-elect Lai Ching-te’s inauguration on May 20.
The PRC is increasingly asserting its claims over disputed maritime features in three areas of the South China Sea to signal its resolve amid heightened tensions with the Philippines.
CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping held a series of meetings with European and Russian leaders in April and May, after which he likely concluded that the PRC could maintain and deepen economic ties with Europe while continuing to support Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The Fujian provincial government in the PRC launched a series of initiatives aimed at building political support in Taiwan for cross-strait integration.[1] Among the services that the Fujan provincial government announced on April 28 is the “Fuzhou-Matsu City Pass,” a 300 RMB benefits card that facilitates the travel and settlement of Matsu residents in Fuzhou. The card offers Matsu residents discounted rides on transportation and hotels in Fuzhou, free tours of Fuzhou's major cultural attractions, housing benefits, and dedicated hotline consultation for children's education, employment, and entrepreneurship.[2] The Fujian government also announced that it will promote the construction of transportation and industrial infrastructure, such as airports, high-speed rails, highways, and ports, to increase connectivity between Fuzhou and Matsu.

The Fujian government announced the new programs on the same day that Kuomintang (KMT) Caucus Whip Fu Kun-chi met with Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Director Song Tao. The PRC’s announcement during Fu’s visit follows a pattern of showcasing cooperative policies to portray the KMT as a good faith partner that produces favorable outcomes for cross-strait relations.

Municipal offices in the Matsu Islands facilitated residents’ participation in the PRC initiatives. Municipal offices in Matsu (officially Lienchiang County) began assisting in the collection of the card applicants’ information in March after county Magistrate Wang Chung-ming met with Fuzhou Municipal Party Committee Secretary Lin Baojin.[3] The county Transportation and Tourism Bureau processed the information and forwarded it to the PRC for card printing.[4] Deputy Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chan Chih-hung stated at a press conference on May 9 that the MAC initially warned the Lienchiang County government about the possible illegality of cooperating with the PRC in processing applications and highlighted the danger of transferring citizens’ personal information.[5]

Promoting economic ties between Fujian and Taiwan’s outer islands furthers the PRC’s efforts to establish greater political influence over ROC municipalities. The purpose of intertwining the local economies and increased cross-strait interaction is to positively affect the livelihoods of residents in Taiwan’s outer islands and make decoupling a politically unpopular policy. Targeting Taiwan’s economically vulnerable and isolated outer islands enables the PRC to establish its influence at a local level without having to engage with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) central government, with which the PRC severed official communication in 2016.

The PRC has already made political inroads by promoting cross-strait travel links. The PRC and ROC islands of Kinmen and Matsu expanded links in transportation, trade, and postal services in 2008 after decades of lobbying by the PRC. The PRC refers to these services between the PRC and Taiwan's outer islands as the "Three Little Links."[6] The PRC’s promotion of cross-strait travel has resonated with Kinmen residents, especially with whom political support for a bridge to connect the island to the mainland is strong.[7] The PRC has capitalized on that political support to promote the development of the Fujian “demonstration zone for integrated cross-strait development.”[8]

The measures are part of a broader PRC program unveiled in September 2023 that seeks to cultivate Fujian province as a “demonstration zone” for cross-strait integration by promoting infrastructure linkages and economic incentives with Taiwan.[9] The sweeping initiative aims to make Fujian, a region that shares a cultural and linguistic heritage with Taiwan, into a hub for “merged development” by attracting Taiwanese people and businesses.[10] Other measures include establishing a service center to accommodate Taiwanese firms transitioning to Fujian, offering preferential loans to Taiwanese businesses, and providing professional training programs to increase employment and entrepreneurship opportunities for Taiwanese people in Fujian.[11] The initiative entails creating a “joint living circle” between Fuzhou and Matsu, which the PRC is promoting by popularizing programs such as the Fuzhou-Matsu City Pass. The Fuzhou city government announced an additional ten policies on May 16 at the Cross-Strait Economic and Trade Fair that aim to draw in Matsu residents and enterprises.[12]

The dominant parties in Taiwan—the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Kuomintang (KMT)—voiced opposing stances on the PRC initiatives. Democratic Progressive Party Secretary-General Rosalia Wu labeled the program a tool of the PRC’s United Front political strategy to assimilate Taiwan and called on the Lienchiang County government to stop acting as an agent of the PRC’s political influence.[13] DPP legislator Lin Chu-yin questioned National Security Bureau (NSB) Deputy Director Hsu Hsi-hsiang on May 13 whether the Matsu government’s cooperation in submitting the applications constituted a violation of the Cross-Strait Act and enabled the PRC to spread its influence.[14] Hsu replied that the NSB would work with the MAC to determine whether the Matsu government’s cooperation with the program broke the law. Hsu mentioned that the program received approximately 3,000 applicants, almost a quarter of Lienchiang County’s population of 13,000. The Lienchiang County government suspended assistance in applying for the card in April.

Kuomintang (KMT) Secretary-General Hung Mong-kai stated at the same press conference that cross-strait tourism was an “olive branch” that could bring the two sides of the strait closer together. Fu announced that the KMT will propose a resolution in the Legislative Yuan to lift restrictions on cross-strait tourism and prioritize facilitating mainland tourists’ travel to Taiwan’s outer islands.[15]

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned the United States for participating in joint naval exercises with Taiwan in the Pacific in April. Reuters reported on May 14 that Taiwan and the United States conducted unpublicized drills in the Western Pacific, according to unnamed sources. ROC Ministry of National Defense spokesperson Sun Li-fang responded to the claim on May 14, stating that the Taiwanese navy carried out routine exercises with the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, referring to a non-binding code that aims to prevent confrontations between different navies at sea.[16] The United States is a signatory to the agreement. Taiwan abides by the code even though it is not a signatory. MFA spokesperson Wang Wenbin criticized the United States in a press conference the same day, urging the US to “earnestly abide by the one-China principle and the provisions of the three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués, and stop the erroneous act of military collusion.”[17]

China

The United States and PRC held their first bilateral government negotiations on artificial intelligence (AI) risks and governance in Geneva, Switzerland on May 14. The meeting was the first under an intragovernmental dialogue on AI that US President Joe Biden and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping agreed to launch during their meeting in San Francisco in November 2023.[18] The US delegation included officials from the White House, the State Department, and the Department of Commerce. The PRC delegation included officials from the MFA, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, and the CCP Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission. An unnamed US official told the South China Morning Post that the first round of talks was not intended to focus on deliverables but instead was an initial exchange of views about the technical risks of AI.[19]

A US readout said that the two sides “exchanged perspectives on their respective approaches to AI safety and risk management” in a “candid and constructive” discussion. The United States also raised concerns over the misuse of AI, including by the PRC.[20] The United States has made a declaration that only humans, and never AI, would make decisions about deploying nuclear weapons. It has urged the PRC to make a similar commitment.[21] The PRC has not responded to this US demand, however, and readouts from both sides of the May 14 talks did not mention military applications of AI.

A PRC readout said that the PRC supports strengthening the global governance of artificial intelligence with the United Nations as the main channel. It said it is willing to strengthen communication and coordination with the international community, including the United States, to form a global AI governance framework and standards with broad consensus. The PRC also expressed its “solemn stance” on the US restrictions and “suppression of China” in the field of AI.[22] An MFA spokesperson objected to a proposed US AI export control bill on May 10. He urged the United States not to “politicize” trade, science, and technology. He also called on the United States to stop protectionist practices, restrictions on PRC science and technology, and disruptions to the international economic order.[23]

The PRC condemned the US imposition of new tariffs on PRC goods. The US government announced on May 14 that it would further increase tariffs on PRC goods including electric vehicles, batteries, solar cells, minerals, semiconductors, steel and aluminum, cranes, and medical equipment.[24] A PRC Ministry of Commerce spokesperson claimed the United States was abusing the Section 301 tariff review process out of “domestic political considerations.” It said the tariffs violate WTO rules and US President Joe Biden’s commitment to not “seek to suppress and contain China’s development” and not to decouple from the PRC.[25] An MFA spokesperson said the United States was “compounding” its mistakes and that the tariffs would primarily hurt US consumers. Both spokespeople said the PRC would take unspecified measures to protect its interests.[26]

The PLA claimed it “expelled” the USS Halsey after the ship “illegally broke into” waters around the Paracel Islands. PLA Southern Theater Command spokesperson Colonel Tian Junli claimed PLA air and naval forces “monitored, warned, and expelled” the Halsey destroyer ship on May 10 after it “illegally” entered the “territorial waters” around the Paracel Islands without PRC permission. Tian claimed the US transit violated PRC sovereignty and security. He also claimed it was “ironclad evidence” that the United States is pursuing “navigational hegemony,” is militarizing the South China Sea, and is a “security risk creator.”[27] The US 7th Fleet said that the Halsey carried out a Freedom of Navigation Operation to challenge restrictions on innocent passage around the Paracel Islands by the PRC, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and to challenge the PRC’s claim to straight baselines around the islands. It did not mention any confrontation with PLA forces.[28] The PRC administers the Paracel Islands and calls them the “Xisha Islands.” Taiwan and Vietnam also claim the islands.

The PRC claims straight archipelagic baselines around the Paracel Islands, which means it considers all the water between the islands as its territorial waters. The PRC also requires foreign ships to get permission or provide advance notification when they sail through its territorial waters. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not permit countries to restrict “innocent passage” through their territorial waters. “Innocent passage” is uninterrupted transit through the waters without other activities such as fishing, research, intelligence collection, or military activities. UNCLOS also only permits designated archipelagic states to draw straight-baseline claims around their islands. Non-archipelagic states, such as the PRC, can only claim waters up to 12 nautical miles from their shores as their territorial sea.[29]

The PRC framed US-UK-Australia nuclear submarine cooperation as a threat to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime at a seminar in Vienna. The PRC permanent mission in Vienna hosted a seminar on May 10 entitled “AUKUS: A Case Study about the Development of IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards.” An MFA spokesperson claimed over 100 attendees from the missions of nearly 50 countries, think tanks, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) engaged in “heated discussions” about IAEA supervision of AUKUS, the US-UK-Australia security partnership. The spokesperson claimed that the nuclear submarine cooperation within AUKUS undermines regional security, provokes arms races and “confrontation between camps,” and has triggered “widespread concerns” about nuclear proliferation. He further claimed the trilateral cooperation undermines the effectiveness of the IAEA and Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) because existing institutional safeguards and oversight mechanisms cannot effectively supervise the transfer of nuclear reactors and large amounts of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium involved in the AUKUS submarine deal. He urged the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia to stop promoting nuclear submarine cooperation.[30]

The PRC reference to “nuclear submarine cooperation” refers to the AUKUS plan to build a nuclear-powered submarine fleet for Australia, which includes at least three submarines from the United States and nuclear reactors constructed in the United Kingdom.[31] The NPT bans the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons states, such as Australia, but permits the transfer of fissile material to non-nuclear states without IAEA inspection if the material is not for use in explosive devices.[32] The PRC has accused the United States and the United Kingdom of violating the “object and purpose” of the NPT by transferring fissile material to Australia, however.[33] The PRC seminar in Vienna came less than two weeks before an upcoming IAEA conference in Vienna from May 20-24.[34] The PRC may raise the issue of the AUKUS nuclear submarine deals at the conference or seek to include language about the issue in a joint ministerial declaration produced by ministers attending the conference.

Northeast Asia

South Korea

PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi acknowledged “difficulties and challenges” in the PRC-ROK relationship during talks with South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul. The talks in Beijing on May 13 were the first bilateral foreign minister talks between the two countries since 2022. The two countries’ relations have been strained over South Korea’s increasingly close security and economic relationship with the United States.[35] The PRC readout of the meeting said Wang acknowledged the PRC-ROK relationship has faced “difficulties and challenges” lately but hoped the two countries could enhance mutual trust and deepen mutually beneficial cooperation on trade and development. Wang also urged South Korea to “abide by the one-China principle [and] properly and prudently handle Taiwan-related issues.”[36] The readout did not elaborate on the “difficulties and challenges” Wang referred to. The ROK readout of the meeting said Cho also agreed the two countries should enhance mutual trust and strengthen economic cooperation. Cho also raised concerns about North Korea’s recent “provocations” and illicit military cooperation with Russia. He called on the PRC to strengthen its constructive role for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and the denuclearization of North Korea and urged the PRC not to repatriate North Korean defectors against their will.[37] The PRC readout did not mention these issues.

The PRC may condition the holding of a future PRC-ROK summit on whether South Korea sends a delegation to Taiwan President-elect Lai Ching-te’s inauguration on May 20. President of the Seoul-based Korea-China Global Association Woo Su-yuen, whom Korean media described as a “longtime adviser to Chinese policymakers,” said PRC Premier Li Qiang would attend a PRC-South Korea-Japan trilateral summit at the end of May. The three countries have not announced an exact date for the summit, but media reports say it will likely take place on May 26-27. Woo also claimed top PRC State Council and CCP officials privately said during his visit to the PRC in April that Beijing would only agree to a separate bilateral PRC-ROK summit if South Korea honors its commitment not to send a delegation to the presidential inauguration of Lai Ching-te in Taiwan on May 20.[38]

Making bilateral talks contingent on South Korea's decision not to send a delegation to Lai’s inauguration is consistent with the PRC’s willingness to suspend dialogue to punish other countries for engaging with Taiwan. The PRC suspended military dialogue with the United States after then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022 and did not resume the dialogue until after the Biden-Xi meeting in November 2023.[39]

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The PRC is increasingly asserting its claims over disputed maritime features in three areas of the South China Sea to signal its resolve amid heightened tensions with the Philippines. The PRC is deploying research vessels and divers to the Sabina Shoal, potentially as part of a campaign to prevent the Philippines from defending its claim to the Second Thomas Shoal. This is a change from last month when the PRC deployed the Chinese Coast Guard to block Philippine ships from reaching Second Thomas Shoal and did not conduct efforts to reclaim Sabina Shoal. The PRC also conducted its largest-ever blockade at Scarborough in an attempt to block a fleet of Philippine civilian ships from resupplying fishermen near Scarborough Shoal. The PRC asserts that the United States and the Philippines are driving tensions in the region, however, through joint exercises and by forming a coalition against the PRC.

The PRC deployed research vessels and divers to the Sabina Shoal, which may be part of a campaign to reclaim the island and prevent the Philippines from defending its claim to Second Thomas Shoal. Sabina Shoal is roughly 37 miles east of the Second Thomas Shoal and is the staging point for Philippine resupply missions to the Second Thomas Shoal. The resupply missions enabled the Philippines to maintain the Sierra Madre, a dilapidated World War II-era naval ship that the Philippines ran aground at Second Thomas Shoal in 1999 to serve as a military detachment.[40]

The PRC has sent an unspecified number of research vessels and divers to Sabina Shoal since early May, which prompted the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) to deploy a ship near Sabina Shoal on May 11 in response.[41] PCG Spokesman Jay Tarriela expressed concern on May 11 about the PRC dumping crushed corals at Sabina Shoal, which he warned was a preparatory step to allow the PRC the option to build structures upon the shoal as part of a reclamation effort.[42] He also stated on May 13 that the PCG’s mission is to prevent the PRC from “carrying out a successful reclamation in Sabina Shoal.”[43] PRC MFA Spokesman Wang Wenbin denied Tarriela’s assertion and accused the Philippines of misleading the international community.[44]

A PRC-controlled Sabina Shoal would extend the PRC’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and improve the PRC’s ability to assert its claim over the Second Thomas Shoal. A PRC-controlled Sabina Shoal would also provide the PRC with the opportunity to build a military facility to the east of the Second Thomas Shoal. This would surround the Second Thomas Shoal with PRC military facilities, which would enhance the difficulty of Philippine resupply missions. The Filipino troops stationed on the Sierra Madre as well as the ship’s structural integrity depend on Philippine resupply missions.

The malign PRC activities at the Sabina Shoal come as the PRC alleges that the Philippines has violated a series of secret and informal agreements about the Second Thomas Shoal since 2016. The PRC claims are part of a malign influence campaign to secure PRC control over the Second Thomas Shoal and frame the Philippines as the belligerent in the South China Sea. The PRC Embassy to the Philippines claimed on May 2, 2024, that Xi Jinping and then-Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte reached an unwritten “temporary special arrangement” in 2016 about the Philippines’ access to the waters near Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC alleged that they concluded the arrangement as a gentleman's agreement with two stipulations. First, Philippine fishing vessels would have access to the waters near Second Thomas Shoal. Philippine military and police ships needed to stay at least twelve nautical miles away from the shoal, however.[45] Second, the Philippines would not transport construction materials to repair the Sierra Madre, a dilapidated World War II-era naval ship on Second Thomas Shoal that the Philippines deliberately ran aground in 1999 to serve as a military detachment.[46] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning clarified that if the Philippines needed to replenish the Sierra Madre with necessities for the personnel there, it must notify the PRC in advance, which will approve and supervise the process.[47]

PRC MFA Spokesman Lin Jian claimed on May 6, 2024, that the PRC reached another unspecified “gentleman’s agreement” in 2021 with the Philippine government under then-President Rodrigo Duterte. Lin claimed the Philippines violated this agreement in February 2023 without specifying the contents of the agreement or how the Philippines had failed to comply with it. Lin also claimed that the PRC negotiated a “new model” at “the beginning of this year [2024]” that received the approval of “all key officials in the Philippine chain of command, including the Secretary of National Defense and the National Security Advisor.”[48] Lin then stated that the Philippines carried out a resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal on February 2 before abandoning this “new model.” [49]

Philippine political leadership denies the existence of these alleged agreements. Duterte denied ever making a “gentleman’s agreement” with Xi, however, and claimed that the 2016 meeting helped keep the status quo of peace in the South China Sea. Duterte also claimed that Xi threatened to go to war if the Philippines exercised its economic rights in the South China Sea.[50] Current Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. deems the alleged agreement illegitimate since it was a “secret agreement” hidden from the public.[51] Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro and National Security Advisor Eduardo Año denied agreeing to the PRC-alleged “new model” on May 5.[52] The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs also stated on May 5 that “no cabinet-level official of the administration has agreed to any Chinese proposal pertaining to Ayungin Shoal [Second Thomas Shoal].”[53]

Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and Chinese Maritime Militia (CMM) vessels surrounding Scarborough Shoal failed to prevent a successful resupply mission to Filipino fishermen by the civilian group Atin Ito. At least 4 CCG and 26 CMM vessels are at Scarborough Shoal awaiting the Atin Ito convoy as of May 14.[54] 1 PLA Navy, 8 CCG, and 34 CMM vessels sailed to the east of Scarborough Shoal to prevent the Atin Ito convoy from reaching the shoal on May 15.[55] SeaLight Director Ray Powell noted this is the largest-ever blockade at Scarborough.[56] The Atin Ito convoy comprises 5 commercial fishing vessels and 100 small fishing boats that aim to deliver supplies such as food and fuel to the fisherman.[57] The Atin Ito convoy is independent of the Philippine government even though the BRP Bacagay is escorting the convoy.[58] An advance party of the Atin Ito convoy delivered 1,000 liters of fuel and 200 food packs near Scarborough Shoal on May 16.[59] The convoy leaders declared the mission accomplished on May 16 in light of this news and decided to not sail closer to Scarborough Shoal.[60]

The CCP English language propaganda outlet Global Times released articles and a video maligning the Philippines to portray the Philippines as irresponsible to the Atin Ito convoy. It claimed on May 13 that Atin Ito is using the fishermen as “human shields” and that the organization is a “hired gun” of the United States that has “continuously stirred up troubles” in the South China Sea.[61] Global Times also released an edited video showing Philippine fishermen polluting the environment by spitting, urinating, and dumping garbage at sea.[62]

A PLA Navy (PLAN) destroyer division carried out anti-missile and anti-submarine drills in the South China Sea. The PLA Southern Theater Command (STC) posted a video of the drill on May 10, the day the US-Philippine annual Balikatan military exercise in the South China Sea concluded.[63] The drill included the powerful Type 055 guided-missile destroyer Zunyi and other ships including the destroyer Haikou, destroyer Kunming, and frigate Xianning. The STC said the ships were deployed in “sea-strike tactical formation” for training that focused on sea warfare, air defense and anti-missile warfare, and submarine warfare. The drill also included simulated nighttime strikes on onshore targets and exercises involving buoys.[64] PRC state-owned media Global Times reported that PLAN task forces led by Type 055 destroyers conducted multiple exercises around the South China Sea over the past month, including four PLAN ships that traversed the Sibutu Strait near the southern Philippines on May 2.[65]

Europe

Xi held a series of meetings with European and Russian leaders in April and May, after which he likely concluded that the PRC could maintain and deepen economic ties with Europe while continuing to support Russia’s war against Ukraine. Xi emphasized the benefits of cooperation between Europe and the PRC and rejected concerns about Sino-Russian ties and support that the PRC is providing to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Xi said during his April meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on April 16 that PRC and German industrial and supply chains are “deeply embedded” in one another and claimed this is not a “risk” but a guarantee of future relations – a possible reference to the European Union’s “de-risking” policies toward the PRC. He stressed that the two countries have “huge potential” for “win-win cooperation,” including in green development, and said both sides should be wary of protectionism. He said that the PRC hopes for a “fair, open, and non-discriminatory German market.”[66] Xi also stressed cooperation during his May 5 meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron. He said he hopes that “EU institutions… [will] formulate a positive policy towards China” and build “an industrial and supply chain partnership that is stable and mutually trustworthy.”[67] Xi’s statements aligned with a PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on April 27 in the leadup to Xi’s trip that emphasized the necessity of avoiding “confrontation between camps” and the desire for France to push the EU to “pursue a positive and pragmatic policy towards China.”[68]

Xi’s approach during these meetings aimed to dissuade the European Union from implementing more hawkish economic policies against the PRC’s interests. The European Commission and its president Ursula von der Leyen have called EU-PRC trade “critically unbalanced,” criticized the PRC’s preferential treatment of its domestic companies and overcapacity in its production, and called for “de-risking” policies to reduce Europe’s economic dependence on the PRC.[69] The European Commission’s Economic Security Strategy released in 2023 said “de-risking” policies are meant to mitigate risks to supply chain resilience, risks to critical infrastructure, risks related to leakage of sensitive technology, and risks of economic coercion by diversifying supply chains and restricting European companies’ ability to produce sensitive technologies overseas.[70] Scholz, Macron, and von der Leyen all urged Xi to pressure Russia to end its war against Ukraine.[71]

Xi focused on shared Sino-Russian geopolitical goals during his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on May 16, however. Putin framed Russia and the PRC as both not willing to “accept Western attempts to impose an order based on lies, hypocrisy, and invented rules” in a written interview with CCP media outlet Xinhua on May 15.[72] Xi’s view in the aftermath of this meeting that the PRC and Russia should deepen their cooperation to produce a multi-polar world aligns with Putin’s view in the Xinhua interview.[73] PRC MFA Spokesman Wang Wenbin’s May 16 statements further demonstrate Xi’s view that the PRC can continue supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine with minimal consequences. He framed the US accusations of PRC support for Russia as an attempt to shift blame for the Russia-Ukraine War onto the PRC. Wang then reiterated the PRC claim that US accusations “against China’s normal trade with Russia” are unjustified. [74]

The PRC strongly denied and condemned the United Kingdom’s espionage charges against alleged agents from Hong Kong. UK police charged three men under the National Security Act for allegedly assisting Hong Kong’s intelligence service in spying on UK-based dissidents. The charges include aiding a hostile state and forcing entry into a UK address. One of the men is the office manager at the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office (HKETO) in London and an alleged former classmate of Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee. The other two are a UK Border Force official and a former Royal Marines commando.[75] The UK summoned PRC ambassador Zheng Zeguang to lodge complaints about the spying.[76] Lee, the PRC Embassy in the UK, and the MFA all strongly denied the charges. An MFA spokesperson called the allegations “malicious slander” and “political manipulation” and expressed “serious concern” about the prosecution of PRC citizens.[77] PRC Ambassador Zheng also claimed the case was a fabrication to “smear and attack” the Hong Kong government. He accused the UK of wantonly harassing and detaining PRC citizens in the UK and warned it not to meddle in Hong Kong affairs. He said the PRC is “firmly resolved in fighting anti-China elements seeking to disrupt Hong Kong” and accused the UK of “harboring wanted criminals.”[78] The UK government previously charged two British nationals with spying for the PRC in April.[79]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, May 3, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel and Nils Peterson of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: May 9 at Noon ET

Key Takeaways

The Chinese Coast Guard has normalized patrols around Kinmen, a Taiwan-controlled island with a large military garrison roughly 3 km from the coast of the PRC.
Kuomintang and Taiwan People’s Party legislators in the Legislative Yuan rejected a Democratic Progressive Party draft amendment that would reduce the CCP’s ability to engage with the opposition.
CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping met with French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on May 5 as part of a charm offensive to block the formation of a stricter EU policy on China.
The PRC alleges that the Philippines has violated a series of secret and informal agreements about the Second Thomas Shoal since 2016. The PRC claims are part of a malign influence campaign to secure PRC control over the shoal and frame the Philippines as the belligerent in the South China Sea.
The PRC announced that it will release an audio recording that it claims will prove that the Philippines had agreed to the terms of the secret deals.
The election of Jeremiah Manele as prime minister provides the PRC with an opportunity to continue expanding economic and infrastructure cooperation with the Solomon Islands.
The United States Intelligence Community warned of Sino-Russian military cooperation in East Asia.
Russia is starting the development of a joint Sino-Russian lunar nuclear power plant. The PRC and Russia are also collaborating on the development of surveillance space capabilities that threaten US access to space and space-based capabilities.

Cross-Strait Relations

The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) has normalized patrols around Kinmen, a Taiwan-controlled island with a large military garrison roughly 3 kilometers from the coast of the PRC. The CCG began patrols in Kinmen’s prohibited waters in February after two PRC fishermen drowned while fleeing from a Taiwanese Coast Guard pursuit on February 14. The PRC pledged after the incident to strengthen law enforcement activities around Kinmen. The PRC has increased the frequency of CCG patrols in Kinmen’s waters and the volume of ships per event since it began routine violations in late February.

The CCG announced on April 29 that it carried out law enforcement patrols in waters near Kinmen. The announcement stated that the CCG strengthened its law enforcement activities around Kinmen in April to “safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese fishermen, including Taiwan… and safeguard normal navigation in Kinmen-Xiamen waters.”[1] The CCG violated Taiwan’s maritime borders around Kinmen four times since the beginning of May under the pretense of legitimate law enforcement operations.[2] Five CCG ships and seven PRC fishery and maritime agency-affiliated official ships took part in the operations on May 9, marking the first time CCG ships and other official ships have sailed together in Taiwan’s waters.[3] The Taiwanese Coast Guard Administration (CGA) stated that three other PRC fishing vessels joined the formation, which CGA suspects conducted drills with the official ships in Taiwan’s contiguous zone around Kinmen.[4]

The CCG frequently announced its activities in the past week and illustrated its May 6 voyage through Taiwan’s prohibited waters with a publicly released map.[5] PRC state media has actively covered CCG patrols and highlighted their proximity to Kinmen.[6] The CCG and PRC state media’s publicization of CCG patrols in Kinmen waters serves as a public challenge to ROC sovereignty that surpasses the PRC’s rhetorical denial. Taiwan’s CGA has responded to each instance by deploying ships to and broadcasting warnings to the PRC vessels until they leave Taiwanese waters.[7]

Taiwan

Opposition parties in Taiwan’s legislature rejected a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) draft amendment that would reduce the CCP’s ability to engage with the opposition. DPP legislator Puma Shen spearheaded a proposal to amend the Cross-Strait Act, which regulates cross-strait travel for public officials. The Act, passed in 1992, currently prohibits central government officials, city mayors, county magistrates, and personnel of national security-related agencies, from traveling to the PRC without permission from the Ministry of Interior.[8] Shen’s amendment, if passed, would extend the scope of that law to include legislators and other elected officials such as city councilors. DPP legislator Puma Shen spearheaded an amendment proposal that would extend the scope of the law to include legislators and other elected officials.[9] Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) legislators voted down the proposal on May 6.[10] The proposal follows a high-level KMT delegation of lawmakers led by Caucus Whip Fu Kun-chi to the mainland last week. Fu met with Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Director Song Tao and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Chairman Wang Huning on April 27.[11] Wang is the PRC’s top Taiwan policy setter after Xi Jinping.

Blocking DPP efforts to regulate cross-strait engagement is beneficial to the CCP. The CCP uses cross-strait engagement with legislators and lower-level officials to advance its political objectives in Taiwan. The CCP strategy rewards aims to legitimize the KMT as a good-faith steward of cross-strait relations that benefit Taiwan. For example, the CCP announced during a meeting with KMT Caucus Whip Fu Kun-chi on April 26 that the PRC would lift its ban on the imports of Wendan pomelos and two types of fish from Taiwan.[12] The change in CCP policy signaled to Taiwan’s farmers and fishermen that they stand to benefit from the KMT’s cross-strait engagements and lose from the DPP’s. The PRC implemented the bans as a form of economic punishment after then-US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi arrived in Taiwan in August 2022.[13]

The PRC’s ability to conduct cyber-enabled information operations against Taiwan at scale is increasing with the popularization of social media and artificial intelligence. Days before the presidential election in January, unnamed Taiwanese national security personnel told the media that hundreds of videos denigrating President Tsai Ing-wen appeared on YouTube. The videos were being spread by over 200 accounts and used AI generative technology.[14] The national security sources attributed the videos and other related content to an information operation by the PRC’s Ministry of State Security. The Taiwan Information Environment Research Center (IORG), a civil society organization that researches disinformation, found that about 23% of Taiwanese people use YouTube as their main source for intaking news.[15] The same study found that TikTok users were more agreeable to political narratives that aligned with CCP interests than non-users. Tsai acknowledged TikTok as a possible avenue for CCP information manipulation in 2023, noting Taiwan’s vulnerability due to lack of restrictions.[16]

The PRC is already inundating Taiwan with disinformation. Taiwan’s National Security Bureau (NSB) Director-General Tsai Ming-yen revealed on May 1 that the NSB identifies as many as 30,000 instances of online misinformation each week.[17] Tsai stated that the NSB reports around 6,000 of those posts to the Executive Yuan to decide how to respond. Although Tsai did not explicitly mention the PRC by name in his address to the Legislative Yuan, the PRC’s domination of Taiwan’s information threat landscape is known. The PRC’s political warfare against Taiwan features constant information operations that aim to degrade support for the DPP and suppress Taiwanese sovereignty and identity. Governments and threat intelligence organizations have called repeated attention to sprawling PRC disinformation operations in coordinated campaigns such as Spamouflage.[18]

A report from DoubleThink Labs, a Taiwanese firm that researches PRC influence operations, released a report in January that detailed the wide range of narratives that PRC threat actors propagate to negatively influence Taiwanese people’s perception of the DPP. The narratives opportunistically seize on topical controversies in Taiwanese politics to amplify criticism of the DPP government, including egg and pork import scandals, fraud cases related to Taiwan’s domestic submarine production, compulsory military service extensions, Indian migrant worker inflows, and false rumors about President-elect Lai Ching-te’s supposed illegitimate child.[19]

China

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping met with French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on May 5 as part of a charm offensive to block the formation of a stricter EU policy on China. Macron emphasized trade disputes and urged the PRC to pressure Russia to end its invasion of Ukraine.[20] Von der Leyen also focused on trade by stating that the EU “cannot absorb massive over-production of Chinese industrial goods flooding its market” and said that Europe would protect its own market.[21] Xi stated his hope that “EU institutions… [will] formulate a positive policy towards China” and build “an industrial and supply chain partnership that is stable and mutually trustworthy.”[22] Xi rejected the assertion that the PRC has an “overcapacity problem.”[23] He inaccurately framed the PRC as not a party to the “Ukraine crisis,” while avoiding mentioning PRC support for Russia’s industrial base.

Xi’s statements align with a PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on April 27 in the leadup to Xi’s trip that emphasized the necessity of avoiding “confrontation between camps” and the desire for France to push the EU to “pursue a positive and pragmatic policy towards China.”[24] Bloomberg also reported on April 29 that the EU is considering additional restrictions on PRC companies for supporting Russia.[25] The PRC MFA readout of the meeting between Xi, Macron, and von der Leyen emphasizing the economy and only addressing the Ukraine War in the second to last paragraph indicates that CCP leadership is attempting to maintain access to Europe as an export market while simultaneously supporting Putin’s war of aggression in Ukraine.

Xi visited and met with Serbian and Hungarian political leadership to conclude his European trip. His trip to Serbia resulted in the lifting of trade restrictions and the announcement that the China-Serbia Free Trade Agreement would come into effect on July 1.[26] Xi emphasized implementing the Belt and Road Initiative during his time in Hungary.[27] This will take the form of a 2.1 billion USD project to construct a Budapest-Belgrade railway.[28] Xi’s trip solidifies Serbia and Hungary as avenues for the party to exert influence in Europe, particularly Hungary due to its membership in the European Union.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The PRC alleges that the Philippines has violated a series of secret and informal agreements about the Second Thomas Shoal since 2016. The PRC claims are part of a malign influence campaign to secure PRC control over the shoal and frame the Philippines as the belligerent in the South China Sea. The PRC Embassy to the Philippines claimed on May 2, 2024, that Xi Jinping and then-Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte reached an unwritten “temporary special arrangement” in 2016 about the Philippines’ access to the waters near Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC alleged that they concluded the arrangement as a gentleman's agreement with two stipulations. First, Philippine fishing vessels would have access to the waters near Second Thomas Shoal. Philippine military and police ships needed to stay at least twelve nautical miles away from the shoal, however.[29] Second, the Philippines would not transport construction materials to repair the Sierra Madre, a dilapidated World War II-era naval ship on Second Thomas Shoal that the Philippines deliberately ran aground in 1999 to serve as a military detachment.[30] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning clarified that if the Philippines needed to replenish the Sierra Madre with necessities for the personnel there, it must notify the PRC in advance, which will approve and supervise the process.[31]

PRC MFA Spokesman Lin Jian claimed on May 6, 2024, that the PRC reached another unspecified “gentleman’s agreement” in 2021 with the Philippine government under then-President Rodrigo Duterte. Lin claimed the Philippines violated this agreement in February 2023 without specifying the contents of the agreement or how the Philippines had failed to comply with it. Lin also claimed that the PRC negotiated a “new model” at “the beginning of this year [2024]” that received the approval of “all key officials in the Philippine chain of command, including the Secretary of National Defense and the National Security Advisor.”[32] Lin then stated that the Philippines carried out a resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal on February 2 before abandoning this “new model.” [33]

Philippine political leadership denies the existence of these alleged agreements. Duterte denied ever making a “gentleman’s agreement” with Xi, however, and claimed that the 2016 meeting helped keep the status quo of peace in the South China Sea. Duterte also claimed that Xi threatened to go to war if the Philippines exercised its economic rights in the South China Sea.[34] Current Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. deems the alleged agreement illegitimate since it was a “secret agreement” hidden from the public.[35] Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro and National Security Advisor Eduardo Año denied agreeing to the PRC-alleged “new model” on May 5.[36] The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs also stated on May 5 that “no cabinet-level official of the administration has agreed to any Chinese proposal pertaining to Ayungin Shoal [Second Thomas Shoal].”[37]

The PRC announced that it will release an audio recording that it claims will prove that the Philippines had agreed to the terms of the secret deals. Bloomberg reported on May 7 that unspecified PRC officials are threatening to release audio of a purported call on January 3 with Philippine Western Command Vice Admiral Alberto Carlos to substantiate their allegations.[38] The PRC MFA declined to state on May 8 when the PRC would release the recording.[39] Philippines Armed Forces Chief of Staff Romeo Brawner denied that the recording is legitimate, noting that “transcripts can be easily fabricated, and audio recordings can be manufactured by using deep fakes.”[40]

The Manila Times reported the transcript of the alleged audio recording on May 8. Per the transcript, the PRC and Philippines agreed to each deploy “one plus one vessel,” which “most likely” would be a coast guard and civilian vessel. The Philippines would also notify the PRC of any resupply mission to the Second Thomas Shoal two days in advance, and those missions would “only transport food and water or humanitarian subsistence.” It also claims that Philippine Western Command Vice Admiral Alberto Carlos, Philippines Armed Forces Chief of Staff Romeo Brawner, Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro, and National Security Advisor Eduardo Año all approved the agreement.[41]

Oceania

Solomon Islands

The election of Jeremiah Manele as prime minister provides the PRC with an opportunity to continue expanding economic and infrastructure cooperation with the Solomon Islands. Manele was the foreign minister in the prior Sogavare administration and traveled to the PRC in 2019 in that role to formalize the Solomon Island’s switch of diplomatic relations from Taiwan to the PRC.[42] PRC Premier Li Qiang congratulated Manele and said he looked forward to “strengthening mutually beneficial cooperation.”[43]

Manele called for a “more focused and aggressive approach” to address economic difficulties in the Solomon Islands during his victory speech and may look to the PRC for additional investment.[44] The Solomon Islands awarded Huawei a contract for an underwater telecommunication cable project that Australia jointly funded and secured a $66 million loan from the PRC for Huawei to build telecommunications towers that began in 2022.[45] Huawei’s ties to the CCP and PLA provide potential avenues for espionage.[46] The Solomon Islands and PRC also engaged in talks in April 2024 to negotiate a standard cooperation agreement before implementing further Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure projects.[47]

Russia

The United States Intelligence Community warned of Sino-Russian military cooperation in East Asia. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines testified on May 2, 2024, that "We see China and Russia for the first time exercising together in relation to Taiwan and recognizing that this is a place where China definitely wants Russia working with them and we see no reason why they wouldn't." She did not specify the forces, timing, or location of these exercises, however.[48] Haines’ comment responded to a question about the increasingly robust cooperation between the PRC and Russia and whether one initiating hostility with the United States and US allies would prompt the other to follow suit.

Sino-Russian military cooperation in East Asia supports Putin’s objective to portray Russia as an equal defense partner to the PRC in the Pacific. Putin portrayed Russia to the PRC as an equal defense partner in the Pacific since 2023.[49]

Russia is starting the development of a joint Sino-Russian lunar nuclear power plant. Russian space agency, Roscosmos, General Director Yuri Borisov stated on May 8 that the development of a nuclear power plant for the joint Russia-China lunar station project is underway.[50] Borisov previously stated on March 5 that the PRC and Russia were considering cooperation to build a nuclear power plant on the moon in the early 2030s.[51] This is a competing initiative to an ongoing NASA project to design a nuclear fission reactor on the moon.[52]

The PRC and Russia are also collaborating on the development of surveillance space capabilities that threaten US access to space and space-based capabilities. The China National Space Administration (CNSA) stated in late February that the PRC plans to construct a surveillance system around the in-progress International Lunar Research Station (ILRS). The surveillance system will use the Skynet mass surveillance system as a model.[53] Skynet is the PRC’s nationwide camera surveillance system that includes over 600 million cameras.[54] The ILRS is a multinational space station initiative that Russia and the PRC founded in 2021 that is scheduled for competition by the 2030s. CNSA did not specify how it would prioritize surveillance efforts in space. Borisov stated on May 8 that the ILRS will be launched in two stages between 2025 and 2035.[55]

Commander of United States Space Command General Stephen N. Whiting stated that these types of space-based systems compete with US interests during his February 29 testimony to the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services. He warned that the PRC “and the Russian Federation continued to field systems and engage in behavior that threaten US, Allied, and Partner access to space and space-based capabilities.”[56]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, April 26, 2024

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: April 30 at 5pm ET

Key Takeaways

The PRC eased cross-strait trade and travel restrictions after hosting a Kuomintang delegation. The PRC ended the trade bans after hosting the KMT delegation as a form of economic coercion that aims to reduce domestic support for the Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan.
President-elect Lai Ching-te announced his national security cabinet picks on April 25. The reshuffling of cabinet posts is telling of Lai’s intent to stay the course in cross-strait policy.
The CCP signaled during US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to the PRC the potential for cooperation in US-PRC relations while asserting that US actions—including economic measures against the PRC and support for Taiwan–risk competition and instability.
The Chinese Coast Guard and Chinese Maritime Militia failed to block a Philippine Coast Guard resupply mission near Scarborough Shoal on April 30. This is the latest PRC effort to enforce the CCP’s territorial claims in the South China Sea.
CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping will visit France, Serbia, and Hungary from May 5 to 10 as part of a charm offensive to build ties with the European states and block the formation of a stricter EU policy on China.
The PRC hosted “reconciliation” talks between Fatah and Hamas in Beijing and endorsed the strengthening of the Palestinian Authority. Hosting the intra-Palestinian talks is a relatively low-cost, low-risk way for the PRC to bolster its diplomatic reputation and signal its intent to play an active diplomatic role in the Middle East.

Cross-Strait Relations

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) eased cross-strait trade and travel restrictions after hosting a Kuomintang (KMT) delegation. The PRC ended the trade bans after hosting the KMT delegation as a form of economic coercion that aims to reduce domestic support for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan. KMT Caucus Whip Fu Kun-chi traveled to the PRC on April 26, where he met with CCP officials throughout the weekend. Fu met with General Administration of Customs Deputy Director Zhao Zenglian on April 28. Zhao announced during the meeting that the PRC would lift its ban on imports of Wendan pomelos and two types of fish from Taiwan.[1] The PRC implemented the bans as a form of economic punishment after then-US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi arrived in Taiwan in August 2022.[2] The PRC’s import bans significantly reduced income for Taiwanese exporters, as the PRC is an important export market for the banned goods, especially Wendan pomelos. The PRC accounted for over two-thirds of Taiwan’s pomelo exports before the ban.[3] Director General of the Ruisui Township Farmers’ Association Huang Sheng-huang claimed that the PRC accounted for 90% of Wendan pomelo exports from Hualien County, Fu Kun- Chi’s district. [4]The change in CCP policy signals to farmers and fishermen in Taiwan that they stand to benefit from the KMT’s cross-strait engagements and lose from the DPP’s.

Fu also met with Ministry of Culture and Tourism Vice Minister Rao Quan the same day, during which Rao announced the PRC would allow Fujian residents to travel to Taiwan’s Matsu islands again.[5] The Matsu Islands make up an archipelago close to the PRC coast. Representatives from the agriculture and travel industries have called for the ROC government to reciprocate the PRC’s loosening. Chairman of the Travel Agent Association of Taiwan Hsiao Bo-ren urged Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) to respond in kind.[6] A program on the PRC state-run China Central Radio and Television posted on its WeChat on April 30, calling on the DPP to lift restrictions to allow tourism to return to normal and stop obstructing cross-strait exchanges.[7]

The PRC’s use of economic bargaining chips to influence Taiwan’s politics is not new. The PRC ended its suspension of Taiwanese grouper imports in December 2023, two weeks before the presidential election, citing action from the KMT to address quality concerns.[8] KMT Vice Chairman Andrew Hsia, who has held numerous meetings with CCP officials since assuming his role in 2021, travelled to the mainland earlier that year to lobby for an end to the import suspension.[9] TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian accredited the successful negotiations to the CCP and KMT’s mutual recognition of the 1992 Consensus, which the DPP does not recognize. The 1992 Consensus states that both sides agree there is only one China, and that Taiwan is part of the only China. The CCP claims that China is the PRC, while the KMT simply acknowledges the differences in interpretations of “one China.”

Fu met with Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Director Song Tao and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Chairman Wang Huning on April 27. Wang stated that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to the Chinese nation and expressed hope for greater cross-strait exchanges.[10] Fu echoed Wang’s sentiments and advocated for greater cooperation between the CCP and KMT on their “common political basis.”[11] Wang’s role as CPPCC chairman, which is a leading United Front organization, and as deputy leader of the Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs make him one of the top CCP officials responsible for overseeing the PRC’s policy toward Taiwan. TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian also stated on April 27 that the PRC is willing to donate prefabricated houses to Hualien County, where a recent earthquake wrought extensive damage.[12]

Taiwan

President-elect Lai Ching-te announced his national security cabinet picks on April 25. Old hands from President Tsai Ing-wen’s cabinet comprise the picks, although they will serve in different capacities. National Security Council (NSC) Secretary-General Wellington Koo will head Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) and current Foreign Minister Joseph Wu will replace Koo at the NSC. Lin Chia-lung, the current Secretary General to the President and former ambassador-at-large for Taiwan's digital New Southbound Policy initiatives, will head the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). Former deputy minister of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and current vice chairman of the Straits Exchange Foundation Chiu Chui-cheng will become minister of the MAC. National Security Bureau (NSC) Director General Tsai Ming-yen will remain in his post.

The reshuffling of cabinet posts is telling of Lai’s intent to stay the course in cross-strait policy. During a presidential candidate debate in December, Lai praised Tsai In-wen’s diplomatic line and touted his qualifications to continue her policy, being her vice president.[13] The PRC regards the DPP as a separatist party that wants to pursue formal Taiwanese statehood (as opposed to the Republic of China) and suspended diplomatic communication with the DPP government in 2016. TAO Spokesperson Zhu Fenglian described Taiwan independence workers as “war makers” during the election season, referring to Lai.[14] The TAO responded to Lai’s victory in the January presidential election by condemning the DPP’s “separatist plots” and vowing to resist the DPP’s “independence provocations.”[15] Lai previously described himself as a “pragmatic worker for Taiwan independence” during his premiership in 2017, but later stated that there was no need to formally declare Taiwan’s independence from the ROC.[16]

China

The CCP signaled during US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to the PRC the potential for cooperation in US-PRC relations while asserting that US actions—including economic measures against the PRC and support for Taiwan–risk competition and instability. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping and PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi in separate meetings during his trip to the PRC on April 26. Xi’s comments in the PRC readout largely took a positive tone about US-PRC relations. Xi said the two countries should be partners, not rivals, and that they should engage in win-win cooperation and implement the “San Francisco Vision” of his and US President Joe Biden’s meeting in November 2023. Xi said the PRC is willing to cooperate, but cooperation must go both ways; that the PRC is not afraid of competition, but competition should be about common progress and not a zero-sum game; and that the PRC does not form alliances and the United States likewise should not form “small circles” – a reference to US-led multilateral regional partnerships that exclude and target the PRC.[17] Wang Yi also praised the San Francisco meeting and said that US-PRC relations have “generally stopped declining and stabilized.” His remarks focused far more than Xi’s on accumulating “negative factors” in the relationship, however. Wang urged the United States to stop arming Taiwan, refrain from sending “wrong signals” to Taiwan “separatists,” and not use Taiwan as a tool to contain China. Wang also criticized the United States for “endless measures to suppress China’s economy, trade, science and technology.” He said it should stop promoting the “false narrative” of PRC “overcapacity” and lift “illegal sanctions” and tariffs. Wang finally stressed that the Asia-Pacific should “not become a battleground for major powers.” He urged the United States to stop “forming small circles,” stop “coercing” countries in the region to choose sides and stop deploying intermediate-range missiles to the region.[18]

A PRC readout claimed that Wang and Blinken’s meeting produced a five-point consensus. The consensus included agreements to 1. Stabilize and develop US-PRC relations in accordance with the San Francisco “consensus;” 2. Maintain exchanges at all levels and in newly established consultation mechanisms in various fields, including military, drugs, climate change, and AI; 3. Hold a variety of dialogues including the first China-US Intragovernmental Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence, dialogues on Asia-Pacific Affairs, US-PRC military affairs, and consular consultations; 4. Embrace people-to-people and cultural exchanges; 5. Continue consultations on international and regional hotspot issues.[19] The US readout about the meeting did not reference any five-point consensus, however. It said Blinken and Wang discussed the next steps for advancing cooperation on counternarcotics, military-to-military communication, talks on artificial intelligence risks and safety, and facilitating people-to-people exchanges.[20]

The PRC responded to Blinken’s accusations that the PRC provided dual-use goods to Russia by accusing the United States of denigrating its “normal trade with Russia” and “aggravating the crisis” through aid to Ukraine. Blinken raised the issue of PRC provision to Russia of dual-use components and machine tools during his meetings with top PRC officials.[21] He said in an interview after his trip that the PRC is providing “invaluable support to Russia’s defense industrial base” which is helping Russia overcome the effects of sanctions and export controls.[22] An MFA spokesperson claimed the PRC has “never done anything to fan the flames or seek profit from the crisis.” He said the PRC’s “right to normal trade and economic exchanges” with countries including Russia should not be interfered with. He also noted US military aid to Ukraine and remarked that it is clear “who exactly is fueling the flame and aggravating the crisis.”[23] The PRC readouts of Blinken’s meetings with Xi Jinping and Wang Yi did not mention the issue of PRC support for Russia’s defense industry.[24]

The PRC expressed muted opposition following the passage of a US law to force the sale or ban of TikTok in the United States. US President Joe Biden signed a bill on April 24 to force TikTok’s PRC parent company ByteDance to fully divest from TikTok within 270 days or face a ban in the United States.[25] An MFA spokesperson responded to the ban on the day it passed by saying the MFA had already expressed its “principled position” on the issue.[26] The MFA previously expressed its strong opposition to a TikTok “divest or ban” bill on March 14. It accused the United States of overstretching the concept of “national security” to hinder foreign competition, said the attempt to force the sale of TikTok was based on “sheer robbers’ logic,” warned that the US moves would eventually backfire, and claimed the US government has never found evidence that TikTok poses a national security threat.[27] TikTok called the law unconstitutional and said it would fight the legislation in US courts.[28]

Northeast Asia

Japan

The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) confronted a delegation of Japanese officials en route to inspect the Senkaku Islands on April 27. The PRC Embassy in Japan said on April 28 that the CCG carried out unspecified “law enforcement measures” and that the PRC lodged “stern representations” with the Japanese government.[29] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Linjian reiterated PRC claims on April 27 that the Japanese-administered Senkakus, what the PRC refers to as Diaoyu Dao, are PRC territory.[30] The delegation of Japanese officials included Defense Minister Tomomi Inada and a member of the Japanese Diet.[31]

The PRC did not increase the number of CCG vessels operating in the vicinity of the Senkakus to confront the Japanese delegation. Four CCG vessels operated in the Senkaku Islands on April 27.[32] This is consistent with the trend of CCG incursions of between two and four vessels occurring daily in Senkaku Island waters since April 2023. Up to eight CCG vessels routinely intrude into the Senkaku Island waters on the first of every month.[33] The intent of these incursions is to exert the PRC’s claims of sovereignty over the Senkakus.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and Chinese Maritime Militia (CMM) failed to block a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) resupply mission near Scarborough Shoal on April 30. This is the latest PRC effort to enforce the CCP’s territorial claims in the South China Sea.[34] The CCG deployed four ships, the CMM deployed six ships, and the PCG and BFAR deployed two ships.[35] The CCG and CMM vessels hit the PCG and BFAR vessels eight times with high-pressure water cannons and rammed the vessel three times. The PCG ship suffered damage to its superstructure while the BFAR suffered minimal hull and electrical damage.[36] The Philippines' resupply mission was successful, nonetheless.[37] The CCG also reinstalled a floating barrier covering the entrance of Scarborough Shoal on April 30 to prevent Philippine ships from accessing the shoal.[38] The CCG previously placed this barrier at Scarborough Shoal on September 20, 2023, and February 22, 2024, which the PCG then removed.[39]

The harassment is consistent with ongoing CCG actions to enforce PRC territorial claims inside the nine-dash line. The PRC rejected a 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that declared the nine-dash line territorial claims unlawful.[40] The PRC has normalized CCG harassment of the PCG and supply ships near the Second Thomas Shoal, also a prominent feature inside the nine-dash line, since December 2023 to render the Philippines unable and unwilling to defend its claim to the Second Thomas Shoal. The CCG harassed the PCG and associated supply ships six times at the Second Thomas Shoal between November 2021 and November 2023.[41] The number of such incidents at the Second Thomas Shoal has nearly doubled since December 1, 2023. The methods of harassment that the CCG employs have remained constant during the past three years. The CCG shines military-grade lasers to blind the PCG crews, sprays water cannons to immobilize supply ships and injure Filipino sailors, and rams PCG ships.[42]

The CCP used a similar strategy in 2012 that resulted in the Philippines withdrawing from the Scarborough Shoal, indicating the party’s intent with CCG activity around disputed shoals is to gain and enforce control of that territory. The CCP engaged in negotiations with the Philippines in 2012 to end a standoff at the Scarborough Shoal, which Manilla administered at the time, while steadily increasing the number of Chinese Coast Guard ships near the shoal.[43] This resulted in the Philippines withdrawing its ships from the shoal in mid-June 2012 under a now-disputed agreement that the PRC would do the same.[44] The CCP subsequently kept its ships near the shoal and achieved its political objective of gaining de facto control of the Scarborough Shoal by July 2012.[45]

CCP-controlled media outlets portrayed the United States-Philippines Exercise Balikatan 2024 as a threat to regional stability. The exercise runs from April 22 to May 10 and will include test missions across all domains, including a Philippine-US-French trilateral naval exercise in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ).[46] The naval exercises will occur in the Philippines’ EEZ rather than territorial waters because France and the Philippines have not yet completed a visiting forces agreement.[47] The party-controlled Xinhua and People’s Daily media outlets framed the exercise as a bellicose provocation that destabilizes the region.[48]

Europe

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping will visit France, Serbia, and Hungary from May 5 to 10 as part of a charm offensive to build ties with the European states and block the formation of a stricter EU policy on China. The Xi-Macron meetings will include discussions of Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas War and Sino-French trade and scientific cooperation.[49] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement emphasized the necessity of avoiding “confrontation between camps” and the desire for France to push the EU to “pursue a positive and pragmatic policy towards China.”[50] Bloomberg also reported that the EU is considering additional restrictions on PRC companies for supporting Russia.[51]

The PRC claimed that European governments are manufacturing fears of a “China spy threat” after Germany and the United Kingdom arrested several individuals for spying for the PRC.[52] Germany arrested three German nationals on April 22 who prosecutors said are “strongly suspected of having worked for a Chinese secret service since an unspecified date before June 2022.” The prosecutors said that the individuals supplied the PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS) with information about military technology, including machine parts for the operation of powerful ship engines and a “special laser.”[53] Germany arrested an aide to far-right PRC-friendly German MEP Maximilian Krah on April 23 on suspicion of being an “employee of a Chinese secret service” and spying on “Chinese opposition figures” in Germany.[54] A PRC spokesperson on April 26 claimed Germany’s espionage cases were “completely fabricated.” The PRC summoned the German ambassador to lodge protests.[55] The UK also arrested two people it accused of spying for the PRC on April 26.[56] The PRC embassy in the UK called the UK spy cases “malicious slander” and “anti-China political manipulation.[57]

The PRC has used spies in Europe to monitor and influence European policy toward the PRC. An investigation by European media Der Spiegel, Financial Times, and Le Monde published in December 2023 found that an MSS agent named Daniel Woo directed former far-right Belgian MP Frank Creyelman from 2019 to 2022 to report on confidential meetings in the European Parliament, attack the reputations of “anti-China” politicians and activists, and spread pro-PRC narratives on issues such as Covid-19, the PRC repression of Uighurs, and pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. European intelligence services also identified Woo as the PRC contact of other far-right and pro-Russia European politicians as well as a recruiter of spies in countries including Germany and Poland. [58]

Russia and Iran

PRC Defense Minister Dong Jun’s speech at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on April 26 called on member states to be a model for “unity and cooperation” amidst current instability in global governance. He emphasized the necessity of security so that member states may effectively develop in a stable environment.[59] Dong also engaged in a flurry of meetings at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting on April 26 in Astana, Kazakhstan. He met with defense ministers of Pakistan, Russia, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan to discuss the international security situation and unspecified “issues of common concern.”[60] Dong’s April 26 meeting with Iranian Defense Minister Mohammad Ashtiani occurred after PRC Special Envoy for Middle Eastern Affairs Zhai Jun met with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri on April 25 in Moscow to discuss “the situation in the Middle East.”[61]

Israel-Hamas War

The PRC hosted “reconciliation” talks between Fatah and Hamas in Beijing and endorsed the strengthening of the Palestinian Authority. The PRC invited representatives of Fatah and Hamas to Beijing on April 26 to negotiate “intra-Palestinian reconciliation” between the two major factions.[62] A PRC MFA spokesperson said on April 30 that the two sides “expressed their political will to achieve reconciliation through dialogue and consultation, discussed many specific issues and made positive progress, and unanimously agreed to continue this dialogue process and strive for the early realization of Palestinian unity and reunification.”[63] Another MFA spokesperson said on April 26 that the PRC supports strengthening the authority of the Palestinian Authority (PA).[64] PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi laid out the PRC position in an interview published the same day as the talks. Wang said the PRC supports an immediate ceasefire, unimpeded humanitarian assistance to Gaza, preventing regional escalation, and correcting “historical injustice” to the Palestinian people by promoting reconciliation between Palestinian factions and establishing an independent State of Palestine with UN membership.[65] The April 26 talks followed PRC MFA envoy Wang Kejian’s trip around the Middle East from March 10-17, which included meetings with PA and Israeli officials and the PRC’s first publicly acknowledged meeting with Hamas since its terror attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023.[66] The PRC has never directly criticized Hamas.

The PRC’s hosting of and statements about intra-Palestinian negotiations reflect its intent to play an active diplomatic role in the resolution of the Gaza war and the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The talks also serve the propaganda purpose of portraying the PRC as an important and responsible mediator in the conflict in contrast to the United States. The PRC has repeatedly criticized Israel’s military operations in Gaza and US support for Israel while calling for an internationally mediated ceasefire.[67]

Hosting the intra-Palestinian talks is a relatively low-cost, low-risk way for the PRC to bolster its diplomatic reputation. A failure to bring about Fatah-Hamas reconciliation would amount to maintenance of the status quo and would not draw significant criticism of the PRC. A success in the negotiations, which is very unlikely, would present an opportunity for the PRC to embellish its reputation in a similar way to the Beijing-mediated Saudi Arabia-Iran rapprochement in March 2023. The PRC said after the Saudi-Iran negotiations that “China has no selfish interests in the Middle East, respects the status of the Middle East countries as its masters, and opposes geopolitical competition in the Middle East... China will continue to contribute Chinese wisdom and put forward Chinese suggestions to achieve peace and tranquility in the Middle East, and play its role as a responsible great power.”[68]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, April 18, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Nils Peterson, and Mathilde Lemerle of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: April 25 at Noon ET

Key Takeaways

The PRC unilaterally opened two eastbound connecting flight routes near Taiwanese airspace over the Kinmen and Matsu islands. The move is likely part of a CCP effort to strain Taiwan’s situational awareness around its airspace and put pressure on Taiwan’s incoming Lai Ching-te administration.
PRC tariffs on Taiwan’s polycarbonate exports may be part of a pressure campaign ahead of Lai Ching-te’s presidential inauguration on May 20.
Former ROC President Ma Ying-jeou met with Kuomintang Chairman Eric Chu on April 16 and discussed amending a law that counters PRC interference in Tawan’s politics.
The People’s Liberation Army dissolved the Strategic Support Force into three distinct arms to achieve “information dominance” and operational superiority through force integration.
The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs highlighted the importance of addressing United States sanctions on PRC companies during Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to the PRC. The PRC framing of the visit indicates that the CCP aims to alleviate economic tension with the United States while maintaining commercial and defense industrial base assistance to Russia.
The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Lin Jian framed the United States Army deploying the Typhon ground-based cruise missile and air-defense missile launcher to the Philippine island of Luzon as part of the US-Philippine Salaknib 2024 military exercise as “provoking conflict.”

Cross-Strait Relations

The PRC unilaterally opened two eastbound connecting flight routes near Taiwanese airspace over the Kinmen and Matsu islands. The move is likely part of a CCP effort to strain Taiwan’s situational awareness around its airspace and put pressure on Taiwan’s incoming Lai Ching-te administration. The flight routes, W122 and W123, have been operational in the westbound direction since 2018 and connect the PRC cities of Fuzhou and Xiamen to the M503 north-south flight route, which goes down the middle of the Taiwan Strait. The W122 route flies close to the Matsu islands and the W123 route flies near the Kinmen Islands, two island groups near the PRC that Taiwan controls. The PRC Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) unilaterally canceled a 6 nautical mile “offset” of the M503 route in January 2024, which moved the route to within 4.2 nautical miles (5 miles or 7.8 kilometers) of the median line of the Taiwan Strait. It announced on the same day that it would permit eastbound flights along the W122 and W123 routes.[1] The CAAC finally launched the new eastbound flight routes on April 19. It claimed the new airspace “optimization” and the adjustment of the M503 route were needed to meet the “development needs” of air transportation between the Yangtze River Delta and the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Bay Area and to ensure flight safety.[2]

Taiwan’s Civil Aviation Administration said both the establishment of the new flight routes and the “unilateral” adjustment of the M503 were a danger to air traffic in the area. It said it will request that aircraft turn around if they approach Taiwanese airspace without permission.[3] ROC Premier Chen Chien-jen condemned the new routes, called for them to be retracted, and directed the CAA to study possible response measures.[4] The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) denied that there were any security concerns about the new flight routes and also denied the existence of a median line in the Taiwan Strait.[5]

An unnamed “senior Taiwan official” told Reuters the PRC’s flight adjustments were part of a pattern of pressure on Taiwan ahead of ROC Vice President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration as President on May 20. The official said the CCP wants Taiwan to “cave in, make compromises, and change [its] behavior.”[6] The CCP considers Lai and his political party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), to be separatists. The timing of the air route changes is consistent with political motives. The CAAC originally announced the routes and the shifting of the M503 route on January 30, not long after Taiwan’s January 13 election. It activated the new routes on April 19, almost one month before Lai’s inauguration. Increasing the volume of flights in the sensitive airspace near Kinmen, Matsu, and the Taiwan Strait median line serves to strain Taiwanese resources as Taiwan must monitor, assess, and prepare to respond to each flight as a potential airspace incursion.

PRC tariffs on Taiwan’s polycarbonate exports may be part of a pressure campaign ahead of Lai Ching-te’s presidential inauguration on May 20. The PRC Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) announced on April 19 that it would levy tariffs of up to 22.4% on Taiwan’s polycarbonate exports to the PRC. Polycarbonate is a material used in many fields such as electronic appliances, sheets and films, automobiles, optics, packaging, medical devices, and safety equipment.[7] The tariffs resulted from MOFCOM concluding an anti-dumping investigation into Taiwanese polycarbonate products. MOFCOM first announced the investigation in November 2022 and released preliminary findings announced in August 2023 which claimed Taiwanese “dumping” of polycarbonate products had “substantially” damaged the PRC’s polycarbonate industry. The findings released on April 19 confirmed the conclusions from August.

ROC Executive Yuan spokesperson Lin Tze-luen accused the PRC of using “political manipulation” to interfere with normal cross-strait trade relations.[8] The TAO spokesperson claimed on April 24 that the anti-dumping investigation reached its conclusion “fairly and impartially” and fully complied with relevant laws and World Trade Organization regulations. The spokesperson threatened further economic measures against Taiwan “if the DPP authorities continue to stubbornly adhere to the ‘Taiwan independence’ stance,” however.[9]

The TAO statement and the timing of the tariff announcement are consistent with a politically motivated pressure campaign against Taiwan and the incoming administration of Lai Ching-te. The tariffs took effect on April 20, exactly one month before Lai’s presidential inauguration. MOFCOM’s announcement of the tariffs on April 19 also coincided with the CAAC announcing its new flight routes near Kinmen and Matsu. The PRC previously imposed punitive economic measures against Taiwanese chemical and fishery products before Taiwan’s January 13 election. It also claimed Taiwan’s trade restrictions on the PRC violated the 2011 Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). ISW has assessed that these punitive economic measures may have been meant to influence Taiwan’s election.[10]

Taiwan

Former ROC President Ma Ying-jeou met with Kuomintang (KMT) Chairman Eric Chu on April 16 and discussed amending a law that counters PRC interference in Tawan’s political system. Ma, who is a member of the KMT, and the KMT leadership advocated amending some provisions of the law to prevent it from becoming a tool for DPP “manipulation” and to avoid “stifling the rights of Taiwanese people to exchange with the mainland.” They did not publicly specify what amendments they sought to make.[11] The Anti-Infiltration Act is a 2020 law that the DPP government passed to counter PRC interference in Taiwan’s elections and political system. It imposes criminal penalties for accepting funds from “hostile foreign forces” to make political donations and lobby the government. It also increases penalties for other election law violations if those violations are committed with funding from foreign forces.[12]

Ma and the KMT’s plans to propose amendments are consistent with their opposition to the law when originally passed. Ma at the time compared the law’s passage to a return to “martial law” in Taiwan, referring to the period of KMT authoritarian rule from 1949-1987 known as the “White Terror.”[13] The KMT boycotted the final vote on the law and criticized it as a ploy for the DPP to win votes shortly before the 2020 election. Some of the law’s critics said it was too broad and could be used to repress legitimate political activity and cross-strait exchanges.[14]

The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson on April 24 claimed the Anti-Infiltration Act is an “evil law” meant to suppress dissidents, create “Green Terror,” and seek the “selfish interests” of one party.[15] “Green Terror” is a term the CCP and other opponents of the DPP use to compare DPP policies with the repressive policies of the “White Terror.” Green is the DPP’s official color. The CCP’s rhetoric about the Anti-Infiltration Law is similar to that of Ma and some hardline KMT officials. The CCP prefers for the law to be abolished rather than amended, however.

The DPP said it would oppose former president Ma Ying-jeou and the Kuomintang’s proposed amendments to Taiwan’s Anti-Infiltration Act. ROC Vice President and President-elect Lai Ching-te said on April 17 that the KMT’s proposal appears to be harmful to Taiwan and regional stability. He said the Anti-Infiltration Act is designed to prevent malicious infiltration by foreign forces and does not hinder cross-strait exchanges.[16] DPP spokesperson Justin Wu said on April 23 that the DPP would oppose any loosening of the law. He raised suspicions about the timing of Ma and the KMT’s announcement, noting that it came shortly after Ma returned from his trip to the PRC on April 1-11. Wu also warned KMT legislative caucus whip Fu Kun-chi not to discuss domestic Taiwanese legislation during his planned trip to the PRC.[17] Fu will lead a KMT delegation to the PRC on April 25.[18]

The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs is investigating the leak of government documents and whether the documents were altered overseas before their public disclosure. The leaked documents dating from March 15 included reportedly official communications between the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Keelung Customs Service, and the ROC National Treasury Administration approving a Hsiao Bi-khim request for the wine she imported for her personal consumption to be exempted from inspection. The documents were part of 4GB of data acquired by hackers.[19] The ROC MOFA did not confirm the authenticity of the leaked documents. It suspected the documents involved may have undergone “malicious overseas alteration” after being “sold on the dark web.”[20] The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance stated that the transfer of Hsiao Bi Khim’s personal belongings back to Taiwan occurred legally. [21] ROC Premier Chen Chien-jen stated that the accusations against Hsiao Bi-khim were an act of cognitive warfare and called on the public to maintain vigilance. [22]

China

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) dissolved the Strategic Support Force (SSF) into three distinct arms to pursue “information dominance” and operational superiority through force integration. Xi created the SSF in 2015 during comprehensive military reforms, tasking it with integrating military operations across the cyber, electronic, and aerospace domains.[23] Former PLA Navy Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo stated in 2016 that SSF responsibilities included target detection and reconnaissance, relaying target information, management of BeiDou [navigation] satellites and space reconnaissance means, and conducting operations in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum.[24] CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping announced the dissolution of the SSF and the inauguration of the Information Support Force (ISF) on April 19.[25] Ministry of National Defense (MND) spokesperson Wu Qian stated that an Aerospace Force and Cyberspace Force also came into existence alongside the ISF as a part of the restructuring.[26]

The three new arms are organized in the same support capacity as the preexisting Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF), whose task is to unify logistics to support the five theater commands. The four auxiliary arms are distinct from the PLA’s four armed services, which are the Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force.

Xi described the new ISF as a key support for coordinating the development and application of “network information systems,” referring to mechanisms to facilitate information sharing and strengthen information infrastructure across the military.[27] Xi’s introduction indicates that the ISF will assume one of the SSF’s primary responsibilities, which includes what former SSF Commander Gao Jin referred to as acting as an “information umbrella” for the military to integrate operational capabilities.[28] This entails forming a data link to enable information transmission, processing, and distribution that is critical to the cohesion of joint operations.[29] This is consistent with PRC military doctrine, which emphasizes the importance of network-centric “informatized” warfare that exploits information sharing to achieve synergy across warfighting domains.[30] The PLA defines information dominance as gaining “superiority over an adversary in terms of information acquisition, transmission, processing, utilization, and confrontation capabilities.”[31] Information offense and defense are inherent to information dominance in the PLA’s view, requiring a blend of kinetic and non-kinetic means to influence, interfere with, degrade, and destroy the enemy’s information systems.[32]

The Aerospace Force and Cyberspace Force will likely take on the responsibilities of the SSF’s two functional units, the Aerospace and Network Systems Departments.[33] PRC officials have not indicated where responsibilities under the SSF’s broad remit would be reallocated, such as collecting intelligence, technical reconnaissance, electronic countermeasures, and psychological warfare.

The SSF’s division into three distinct organizations demonstrates the CCP leadership’s aim to streamline its various missions into separate individual arms to improve efficacy. The creation of a standalone ISF suggests that the SSF was inadequate to meet Xi’s standards for centralizing informatization in PLA operations. Xi appointed SSF Deputy Commander Bi Yi as ISF Commander and SSF Political Commissar Li Wei ISF Political Commissar.[34] Retaining top leadership roles such as Bi and Li suggests that the reason for the SSF’s dissolution was primarily functional and not due to endemic performance or trust issues throughout the command. The ISF’s placement under the direct command of the Central Military Commission affirms the centrality of information in military operations and maintains CCP leadership’s close supervision over the information chain.

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs highlighted the importance of addressing United States sanctions on PRC companies during Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to the PRC. The PRC framing of the visit indicates that the CCP aims to alleviate economic tension with the United States while maintaining commercial and defense industrial base assistance to Russia. Blinken met with party officials in Shanghai on April 24 before traveling to Beijing to meet with PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi on April 26.[35] The head of the MFA’s North America and Oceania Division Yang Tao announced the PRC’s main goals for Blinken’s visit during a briefing on April 23 are: 1) establishing the right perception; 2) strengthening dialogue; 3) effectively managing disagreements; 4) promoting mutually beneficial cooperation; and 5) jointly assume responsibilities as major countries. The establishment of right perception refers to making the United States not contest fundamental economic and political disagreements with the PRC over sensitive issues like CCP regime stability and Taiwan. Yang claimed that the United States has intensified measures to suppress the PRC’s economy, trade, science, and technology with sanctions. Yang denied the PRC’s responsibility for the crisis in Ukraine and urged the United States to immediately stop “indiscriminately imposing unilateral sanctions on Chinese companies and individuals.” Yang also noted “negative developments” regarding the United States’ security cooperation with the Philippines, Australia, and Japan. [36]

A senior unnamed State Department official outlined the issues that Blinken will focus on during a briefing on April 19, which included US concerns about PRC businesses’ transfers of dual-use materials and weapons components to Russia that Russia is using to advance its military production. The State Department official stated the United States’ concern that through Chinese support, Russia has reconstituted its defense industrial base and is therefore reinforcing the threat to Ukraine on the battlefield and European security writ large. Blinken called the PRC the primary contributor to Russia’s defense industrial base on April 19 during the Group of Seven (G7) summit in Italy.[37]

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Lin Jian framed the United States Army deploying the Typhon ground-based cruise missile and air-defense missile launcher to the Philippine island of Luzon as part of the US-Philippine Salaknib 2024 military exercise as “provoking conflict.” The United States Army stated this is the first time it deployed the Typhoon to the Philippines.[38] Lin claimed that the deployment “aggravated regional tensions” and urged the Philippines to be aware of the unspecified “serious consequences of catering to the US.”[39]

Russia

The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) began implementing expanded cooperation with the Border Guard Bureau Service of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). The CCG held working-level talks with the FSB in Vladivostok from April 16 to 18 for the first time since the signing of the April 2023 memorandum of understanding between the two services. The meetings involved tabletop exercises and seminars.[40] The April 2023 memorandum stated that the CCG and FSB would strengthen maritime law enforcement.[41]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, April 12, 2024

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, and Kaylin Nolan of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: April 16 at 5 pm ET

Key Takeaways

ROC opposition parties advanced a bill in the Legislative Yuan (LY) that aims to strengthen the LY’s oversight of the government. Passing the bill could hamper the DPP-led government’s ability to implement its policies. Political feuding that impedes the DPP’s ability to govern is favorable to CCP interests.
PRC Minister of National Defense Dong Jun and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin held the first US-PRC defense minister’s talk since November 2022. Dong dismissed US concerns about South China Sea tensions and claimed the situation was “generally stable.”
CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping promoted economic integration during a meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Beijing.
The PRC claims that the Philippines is not upholding a 2016 “gentleman’s agreement” and driving tensions at Second Thomas Shoal.
Unnamed senior US officials said that the PRC is supplying Russia with equipment that Russia is using to rapidly increase military production for use in its war against Ukraine.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

ROC opposition parties advanced a bill in the Legislative Yuan (LY) that aims to strengthen the LY’s oversight of the government. Passing the bill could hamper the DPP-led government’s ability to implement its policies. Political feuding that impedes the DPP’s ability to govern is favorable to CCP interests. The reforms would grant the LY the ability to conduct inquiries and call on officials to testify before the LY, establish penalties for perceived non-compliance or dishonesty in responses, and confirm political appointments.[1] The bill would also impose penalties on members of the Executive Yuan, including up to a year of imprisonment for concealing information or providing false or misleading information.[2] The maximum sentence is three years for all other individuals. DPP Caucus Whip Ker Chien-ming articulated the threat that the bill poses to the executive branch, calling it a “limitless expansion of powers” and the “constitutional monster” whose purpose was to weaponize the legislature. Ker claimed that if the law is passed, the president will be immediately summoned on May 20 to answer inquiries from the Legislative Yuan and can even be imprisoned if found to be in contempt of the legislature.[3] The Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) were able to advance the proposed bill through the LY Judiciary and Organic Laws Statutes Committee despite objections from the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) because they have a majority on the committee.

The bill entered a month-long “consultation period” after passing the Judiciary and Organic Laws and Statutes Committee. The KMT and TPP plan to bring the reform bill to the LY for a vote as early as May 17, before the change of government on May 20. KMT Caucus Whip stated the KMT’s intent to formally vote on the bill before President-elect Lai Ching-te’s inauguration on May 20.[4] TPP Caucus Whip Huang Kuo-chang declared the opposition’s goal to clear the bill from the committee on the day of the meeting.[5]

Collaboration between the KMT and the TPP on the proposals suggests that the reforms will pass with a majority in the LY, as the two opposition parties outnumber the DPP in the LY. The TPP and KMT have consistently stated that establishing a legislative investigative task force to strengthen oversight of the executive branch is at the top of their agenda.[6] KMT Caucus Deputy Secretary-General Lin Szu-ming, one of the main authors of the reform bills, earlier referred to the proposed reforms as a “great weapon” that the LY must use to supervise the government.[7]

The DPP will continue to oppose the legislative oversight bill. DPP Caucus Secretary-General Rosalia Wu stated on April 1 that the DPP will fight against the law with all its strength, and would request action from the justices of the Constitutional Court if the bill passed the LY.[8] Stopping the bill would require more than a quarter of legislators petitioning the Constitutional Court to issue a judgment declaring the bill unconstitutional.[9] The DPP holds 51 seats in the Legislative Yuan, exceeding the threshold to initiate a lawsuit.

The KMT approved of former President Ma Ying-jeou’s meeting with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping. The party issued a press release that praised Ma’s articulation of the 1992 Consensus.[10] Ma described the 1992 Consensus as both sides agreeing to a "one China principle," with each side free to determine what "China" means.[11] The 1992 Consensus is an alleged verbal agreement between semi-official representatives of the PRC and the then KMT-ruled ROC following negotiations in 1992. It states that both sides agree there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The CCP interprets this “one China” to be the People’s Republic of China, while the KMT interprets it to be the Republic of China. The PRC has never publicly recognized the part of the “consensus” that acknowledges differing interpretations of “China” and did not include this part of Ma’s comments in its official readout of the meeting. KMT Chairman Eric Chu separately announced after Ma’s return that he had given Ma his “blessing” for his trip to the mainland.[12]

The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), chaired by DPP members, issued a press release expressing disappointment that Ma failed to convey to Xi the Taiwanese people’s insistence on safeguarding the sovereignty of the Republic of China (ROC) and its democratic system.[13] The MAC called the 1992 Consensus an attempt to undermine Taiwan’s sovereign status that left no room for the ROC’s survival.

China

PRC Minister of National Defense Dong Jun and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin held the first US-PRC defense minister’s talk since November 2022. Dong dismissed US concerns about South China Sea tensions and claimed the situation was “generally stable.” The US readout of the virtual meeting on April 16 said Austin and Dong discussed US-PRC defense relations as well as regional and global security issues, including the South China Sea, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and North Korea. Austin underscored freedom of navigation, especially in the South China Sea, and re-iterated the US commitment to the One China Policy. He also stressed the importance of maintaining open lines of communication.[14] The PRC readout said Dong emphasized that Taiwan is at the core of the PRC’s core interests and that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will never let “‘Taiwan independence’ separatist activities” and “external connivance and support” go unchecked. Dong also claimed the situation in the South China Sea is “generally stable” and that regional countries have the “willingness, wisdom, and capacity” to resolve issues. He urged the United States to respect the PRC’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the sea.[15]

This call was Austin’s first conversation with Dong since Dong became the PRC defense minister in December 2023. It was the first formal top-level military communication between the United States and PRC since November 2022.[16] The PRC cut off military talks with the United States after US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022. It agreed to resume them at the presidential summit between US President Joe Biden and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping in San Francisco in November 2023. The CCP views military exchanges, at least in part, as a bargaining chip that it can use to influence US behavior to the party’s benefit.

Senior US and PRC diplomats met for three days to discuss various bilateral and regional issues. The PRC readout stressed PRC criticism of US-Japan-Philippines collaboration “against China” on South China Sea issues, US interference in PRC “internal affairs,” and US “suppression” of PRC companies. US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink and National Security Council Senior Director Sarah Beran led a delegation to the PRC from April 14-16 to meet PRC officials including Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu. US Ambassador to the PRC Nicholas Burns also joined a meeting on April 15. A US State Department readout said the two sides had “candid” and “constructive” discussions on a range of bilateral, regional, and global issues, including the Middle East, PRC support for Russia’s defense industrial base, cross-Strait issues, the South China Sea, and North Korea.[17] A PRC readout said the PRC expressed its “solemn position” on the US promotion of its Indo-Pacific Strategy “against China” and about the United States trying to “cobble together a small circle” with Japan and the Philippines to “disrupt the situation in the South China Sea.” It urged the United States to not engage in “camp confrontation, “stop interfering in China’s internal affairs, stop obstructing China’s development, stop unreasonable sanctions on Chinese companies, and stop suppressing China’s economy, trade, science and technology.”[18] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken is expected to visit the PRC in the coming weeks.[19]

The PRC imposed sanctions on US defense firms General Atomics and General Dynamics for arms sales to Taiwan. The sanctions froze all assets of the two companies within the PRC and barred senior management employees from obtaining a visa to enter the country.[20] General Dynamics operates half a dozen Gulfstream and jet aviation services in the PRC and manufactures the Abrams tanks that Taiwan agreed to purchase in 2019. General Atomics is a drone manufacturer that signed a contract with Taiwan in 2020 to deliver MQ-9B drones.[21] The PRC previously sanctioned five other US defense companies in January 2024 in response to US arms sales to Taiwan and US sanctions on PRC companies and individuals.[22] A 2023 report by the German think tank Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) found that the PRC has significantly increased its use of unilateral sanctions since 2018 against US individuals, groups, or companies it perceives to be interfering in its internal affairs.[23] The PRC has repeatedly expressed opposition to unilateral sanctions in general, however, including US sanctions against it and other countries such as Russia and Iran.[24]

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The PRC claims that the Philippines is not upholding a 2016 “gentleman’s agreement” and driving tensions at Second Thomas Shoal. Xi Jinping and then-Phillipines President Rodrigo Duterte met in 2016 to discuss the South China Sea territorial disputes.[25] The PRC alleges that Duterte and Xi made a gentleman’s agreement to not transport construction materials to repair the Sierra Madre, which is a dilapidated World War II-era naval ship on Second Thomas Shoal that the Philippines deliberately ran aground in 1999 to serve as a military detachment.[26] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning clarified that if the Philippines needed to replenish the Sierra Madre with necessities for the personnel there, it must notify the PRC in advance, which will approve and supervise the process.[27] Duterte denied ever making a “gentleman’s agreement” with Xi, however, and claimed that the meeting helped keep the status quo of peace in the South China Sea. Duterte also claimed that Xi threatened to go to war if the Philippines exercised its economic rights in the South China Sea.[28] Current Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. views the alleged agreement as illegitimate since it was a “secret agreement” hidden from the public.[29] The spokesperson for the PRC Embassy in the Philippines responded that the agreement was not a secret, and the two sides operated in accordance with the agreement for a short time before the Philippines reneged.[30]

A Chinese Coast Guard vessel tailed two Philippine vessels conducting a hydrographic survey near Scarborough Shoal on April 15. The Philippine National Security Council refuted initial reports that the CCG vessel had blocked the Philippine ships for over eight hours as they crossed the “nine dash line” 35 nautical miles from the Philippine coast.[31] The CCG vessel in question, CCG 5303, was also present in a “swarm” of PRC ships around Scarborough Shoal on April 13, including two preexisting CCG ships and 25 militia vessels.[32] Philippine Coast Guard spokesman Jay Tarriela rejected the PRC narrative that the Philippines is deliberately provoking the PRC in the South China Sea.[33]

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokeswoman Mao Ning portrayed the United States, Japan, and the Philippines as stoking “bloc confrontation” tensions in the region in response to the trilateral meeting on April 11. The United States, Japan, and the Philippines issued a trilateral statement on April 12 that condemned the PRC’s coercive use of their coast guard and maritime militia in the South China Sea.[34] She accused the trilateral meeting of targeting the PRC and introducing “camp confrontation” into the region. Mao inaccurately claimed that PRC coercion in the South China Sea was “lawful [and] justified” while blaming “certain countries [an implicit reference to the United States] outside the region” for “fanning the flames and provoking confrontation.”[35]

Northeast Asia

North Korea

CCP Politburo Standing Committee member Zhao Leji led a delegation to visit North Korea from April 11-13. Zhao emphasized the PRC’s willingness to “intensify high-level exchanges [and] deepen mutually beneficial cooperation” with the DPRK throughout this year, which the CCP calls the “China-DPRK Friendship Year” in celebration of the 75th anniversary of ties between the two countries. [36]

Europe

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping promoted economic integration during a meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Beijing. Xi said that PRC and German industrial and supply chains are “deeply embedded” in one another and claimed this is not a “risk” but a guarantee of future relations – a possible reference to the European Union’s “de-risking” policies toward the PRC. He stressed that the two countries have “huge potential” for “win-win cooperation,” including in green development, and said both sides should be wary of protectionism. He said that the PRC hopes for a “fair, open, and non-discriminatory German market.”[37] The two countries launched cooperation mechanisms on climate change and green transition, science and technology, and agriculture.[38] The PRC also lifted some restrictions on German agricultural imports after the meeting.[39] The PRC’s positive messaging on PRC-German free trade and economic cooperation comes as the European Union has taken a harsher stance on PRC trade practices, particularly focused on countering their damaging impact on European electric vehicles and green energy technology.[40] The PRC has repeatedly criticized “baseless” investigations into PRC firms and warned against “de-coupling” and “de-risking” policies.[41]

The PRC’s bilateral engagement with Germany is consistent with CCP efforts to undermine moves in the EU toward more hawkish policies against the PRC. The European Commission and its president Ursula von der Leyen have called EU-PRC trade “critically unbalanced,” criticized the PRC’s preferential treatment of its domestic companies and overcapacity in its production, and called for “de-risking” policies to reduce Europe’s economic dependence on the PRC.[42] The European Commission’s Economic Security Strategy released in 2023 said “de-risking” policies are meant to mitigate risks to supply chain resilience, risks to critical infrastructure, risks related to leakage of sensitive technology, and risks of economic coercion by diversifying supply chains and restricting European companies’ ability to produce sensitive technologies overseas.[43]

The PRC has promoted the strength of the PRC-Germany trade relationship to counter the broader European “de-risking” strategy.[44] PRC Ambassador to Germany Wu Ken claimed on March 26 that the resilience of PRC-Germany trade relations shows the “unpopularity” of the EU’s de-risking policy.[45] The overseas edition of the CCP’s official newspaper People’s Daily claimed after Scholz’s visit that Scholz signaled to other countries Germany’s opposition to “decoupling and breaking links” with the PRC despite the pressure of the EU’s de-risking strategy.[46]

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping presented four “principles” to peacefully end the Russia-Ukraine war during his meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Xi proposed “four dos and four don’ts” to “restore peace” in Ukraine — prioritize peace and stability and not “seek selfish gain,” cool down the situation and not “add fuel to the fire,” create the conditions for restoring peace and not aggravate the situation, and reduce the negative impact on the global economy and not undermine the stability of global industrial supply chains.[47] Xi’s vague and seemingly neutral language is consistent with the PRC’s portrayal of itself as an unbiased and fair “stabilizing force” in the war and its reticence to make the Sino-Russian partnership as deep as Russia desires, partially to maintain access to Western markets.[48] The PRC rhetorically aligns with the Russian framing of the war, however. It is critical of NATO, portrays the Western security order and arms sales to Ukraine as fueling the war, opposes sanctions on Russia, does not call the war a war, and calls for respect for Russia’s “legitimate security concerns. Xi’s four principles may therefore be read in this context as veiled criticisms of US and Western actions.

PRC state media has claimed Western military aid to Ukraine “adds fuel to the fire” in pursuit of profit for defense firms, for instance.[49] NATO and US officials have warned that China is helping to “prop up” the Russian defense industrial base and support Russia via microelectronics, optics, machine tools, and missile propellant deliveries.[50] Xi’s generally vague signaling to Scholz vis-a-vis Ukraine over the backdrop of reportedly intensifying Chinese support for Russia is therefore likely an attempt to secure PRC economic interests in Europe by garnering goodwill with Germany rather than a show of genuine interest in facilitating an end to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Russia

Unnamed senior US officials said that the PRC is supplying Russia with equipment that Russia is using to rapidly increase military production for use in its war against Ukraine. The officials said on April 12 that the PRC is selling Russia large quantities of machine tools, drone and turbojet engines, technology for cruise missiles, microelectronics, and nitrocellulose used in ammunition. They also said that PRC and Russian entities have been jointly developing drones in Russia and that the PRC has provided Russia with satellite imagery that aided its war effort. The officials said the PRC provided Russia with more than 70% of its nearly $900 million in machine tools imports in the last quarter of 2023, which Russia has likely used to build ballistic missiles. In 2023 the PRC also provided 90% of Russia’s microelectronics imports, which are essential for producing missiles, tanks, and aircraft. One official said PRC materials are filling critical gaps in Russia’s defense production cycle and claimed that Russia would “struggle to sustain its war effort without PRC input.” [51] The PRC embassy in the United States denied that the PRC provided weaponry to any party in the Ukraine war.[52] The PRC’s role as a lifeline for the Russian economy and military-industrial complex undermines its repeated claims to be a neutral and impartial promoter of peace between Russia and Ukraine. The PRC has rhetorically aligned with Russia’s narrative about the war, which it does not call a “war,” and refused to pressure Russia to end the war.

Iran

The PRC condemned Israel’s April 1 strike on the Iranian embassy complex in Syria but did not condemn Iran’s missile attack on Israel on April 13. Israel killed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force commander Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi on April 1 while he was at the Iranian embassy complex in Damascus.[53] On April 14, Chargé d'Affaires of the PRC Permanent Mission to the UN Dai Bing condemned “Israel’s aggression against its [Iran’s] diplomatic premises” in Syria.[54] The PRC MFA expressed “deep concern” on April 14 but did not condemn the Iranian missile attack on Israel.[55] On April 15, PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi condemned the attack on the Iranian embassy in Syria and stated that “China appreciates Iran’s emphasis on not targeting [other] regional countries.”[56]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, April 5, 2024

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Key Takeaways

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping met with former ROC President Ma Ying-jeou on April 10 for the first time since 2015. The Xi-Ma meeting is consistent with a CCP effort to legitimize the KMT as its negotiating partner in Taiwan and to promote the Ma administration’s cross-strait policies as its preferred vision of cross-strait relations.
PRC civilian drones repeatedly approached islands of Taiwan’s Kinmen archipelago to film military facilities on the islands.
The PLA participated in the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) Working Group with their American counterparts in early April for the first time since December 2021.
The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) criticized the United States and Japan for expanding security relations to counter the PRC. The PRC perceives a deterioration in the threat environment from Japan’s deepening integration into the US-led regional security framework.
The PRC has normalized Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) harassment of Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and supply ships near the Second Thomas Shoal since December 2023 to render the Philippines unable and unwilling to defend its claim to the Second Thomas Shoal.

Cross-Strait Relations

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping met with former ROC President Ma Ying-jeou on April 10 for the first time since 2015. The Xi-Ma meeting is consistent with a CCP effort to legitimize the KMT as its negotiating partner in Taiwan and to promote the Ma administration’s cross-strait policies as its preferred vision of cross-strait relations. The two leaders met in Beijing near the end of Ma’s trip to the PRC, which spanned from April 1-11. Xi Jinping praised “Mr. Ma” for upholding the “1992 Consensus,” opposing Taiwanese independence, and promoting the peaceful development of cross-strait relations and exchanges.[1] He claimed that “compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are all Chinese” and that “there is no grudge that cannot be resolved, no issue that cannot be discussed, and no force that can separate us.” Xi stressed that people on both sides must “protect the common home of the Chinese nation” by opposing Taiwanese “separatism” and external interference, work together for their long-term well-being, build a sense of community for the Chinese nation, and “realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” He also said that “we have realized the blueprint drawn by Dr. Sun Yat-sen” and “created many achievements that far exceed Dr. Sun Yat-sen's imagination.”[2] Sun Yat-sen was the founder of the Republic of China and the Kuomintang, Ma’s political party.

Ma said that Chinese people on both sides of the strait have “made steps together toward Chinese revitalization” over the past 30 years. He acknowledged recent tensions but said that a cross-strait war would have "unbearably heavy" consequences. He urged both sides to adhere to the 1992 consensus, oppose Taiwan's independence, look for common ground while setting aside disputes, seek out "win-win" solutions, and pursue peaceful development. Ma described the 1992 consensus as both sides agreeing to a "one China principle," with each side free to determine what "China" means.[3] The 1992 Consensus is an alleged verbal agreement between semi-official representatives of the PRC and the then KMT-ruled ROC following negotiations in 1992. It states that both sides agree there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The CCP interprets this “one China” to be the People’s Republic of China, while the KMT interprets it to be the Republic of China. The PRC has never publicly recognized the part of the “consensus” that acknowledges differing interpretations of “China” and did not include this part of Ma’s comments in its official readout of the meeting.

Radio Free Asia and Taiwanese media reported that Ma’s meeting with Xi, which neither Ma nor the CCP confirmed in advance, was originally scheduled for April 8 but was postponed to April 10.[4] The April 10 date coincides with a meeting between US President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida as well as the 45th anniversary of the signing of the Taiwan Relations Act in the United States.[5] Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislative caucus speculated that in moving the meeting to April 10, the CCP has made Ma into a “pawn” in its confrontational “game” with the United States.[6]

Ma did not meet Xi in an official capacity, as he is no longer an official in Taiwan’s government or his party, the Kuomintang (KMT). The stated purpose of Ma’s trip, which he called a “journey of peace and friendship,” was to lead a delegation of Taiwanese students to participate in exchanges with mainland youth, visit cultural and historical sites, and promote cross-strait stability.[7] Ma claimed throughout his trip that Taiwanese people have a strong belief in Chinese culture and national identity. He stressed that disputes must be resolved peacefully.[8] Ma visited the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War Memorial Hall and Marco Polo Bridge in Beijing on April 9, important sites representing the KMT and CCP’s joint resistance against Imperial Japan during World War II. Ma also visited the Forbidden City with TAO Director Song, where he stressed that “de-Sinicization” will not succeed.[9]

Ma last met Xi in Singapore in 2015, when Ma was the president of Taiwan. This was the first meeting between the leaders of the PRC and Taiwan. In March 2023, Ma became the first former Taiwanese president to visit the PRC, in a visit that overlapped with sitting president Tsai Ing-wen’s trip to the United States. Ma did not meet Xi on that visit, however.

TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua said on March 14 that Taiwan would be able to alleviate tensions and “sleep soundly” if it could relive the “peaceful development period across the Taiwan Strait from 2008-2016.” Chen’s statement refers to the years of Ma’s presidency.[10] The PRC cut off official exchanges with Taiwan after Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP became president of Taiwan in 2016. CCP officials have repeatedly met with KMT officials during this time. The CCP insists that all cross-strait negotiations must be on the mutual basis of the “1992 consensus,” which Ma and the KMT recognize but Tsai and the DPP do not.

Taiwan’s political parties were split in their reaction to Ma’s meeting with Xi. The incumbent DPP administration’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) said it “deeply regrets” that Ma “failed to publicly convey to China the Taiwanese people's insistence on safeguarding the sovereignty of the Republic of China and its democratic and free system.” The MAC also urged the PRC to engage in dialogue without political preconditions, noting a poll that found nearly 80% of Taiwanese people did not agree with the CCP’s insistence that accepting the “1992 Consensus” is a precondition to cross-strait dialogue.[11] Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) said that Taiwanese people are concerned about the PRC’s escalating military intimidation, diplomatic pressure, and economic coercion against Taiwan, rather than any “discussions that do not represent mainstream Taiwanese public opinion.”[12] The KMT legislative caucus, however, praised the Ma-Xi meeting as a break in the deadlock and antagonism between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. It said the meeting showed the PRC and the international community that Taiwan does not only have “anti-China” voices. It said opposition to Taiwanese independence is the international consensus, including among Taiwan-friendly countries like the United States and Japan. It also praised Ma for bringing up to Xi that the “1992 Consensus” includes differing interpretations of “China.”[13]

The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office said on the 45th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) that the TRA and the United States’ “Six Assurances” to Taiwan are “completely wrong, illegal, and invalid.” TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian claimed the TRA and Six Assurances “seriously violate the one-China principle and the three communiques, violate the norms of international relations, and grossly interfere in China’s internal affairs.”[14] The TRA and the Six Assurances to Taiwan form the basis of the modern US relationship with Taiwan. US President Jimmy Carter signed the TRA in 1979 to define the basis of US-Taiwan relations after the United States ended its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan to form relations with the PRC. The law authorized the United States to maintain de facto relations with Taiwan through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). It also committed the United States to sell military equipment to Taiwan as necessary to allow Taiwan to maintain “sufficient self-defense capacity” and to allow the United States to “resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”[15] The Six Assurances are a series of clarifying statements that the United States released in 1982 to reassure Taiwan of its continued commitments after the United States switched diplomatic recognition to the PRC and issued three joint communiques with the PRC. The last joint communique said that the United States does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan and intends gradually to reduce them. The Six Assurances stated that the United States: 1) did not agree to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan; 2) did not agree to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan; 3) will not mediate between Taipei and Beijing; 4) did not agree to revise the Taiwan Relations Act; 5) has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and 6) will not pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC.[16]

The PRC deputy representative to the United Nations accepted condolences for the casualties of the earthquake in Taiwan on behalf of Taiwan. A 7.4 magnitude earthquake struck the east coast of Taiwan on April 3, killing at least 9 people and injuring at least 1,000. This was the strongest earthquake to hit Taiwan since 1999.[17] PRC Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN Geng Shuang told the UN Security Council that day that the PRC expressed its condolences to “Taiwan compatriots” for the earthquake that occurred in “Taiwan, China,” was willing to provide disaster assistance, and was “grateful to the international community for their expressions of sympathy and concern.”[18] Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the PRC’s “shameless behavior of using the Taiwan earthquake to carry out cognitive warfare in the international community.” It said Geng’s statement demonstrated that the PRC only has “political calculations” against Taiwan and no goodwill.[19] ROC Foreign Minister Joseph Wu also strongly condemned Bolivia for expressing solidarity with the PRC after the earthquake. Wu said Bolivia “shouldn’t be the evil, expansionist PRC’s pathetic puppet that jumps when Beijing says jump. Just like Taiwan, Bolivia is NOT part of communist China. No more, no less.”[20] The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Bolivia was “bewitched by the Chinese government” and spread false statements that belittled Taiwan’s sovereignty.[21]

PRC civilian drones repeatedly approached islands of Taiwan’s Kinmen archipelago to film military facilities on the islands. PRC aerial photography drones repeatedly flew over Taiwan’s Erdan and Dadan islands, part of the Kinmen Island group located 10 kilometers (around 6 miles) from the PRC mainland, and filmed footage that was later posted on the internet. Drones filmed Taiwan Army activities on the island of Erdan on March 30.[22] A video that circulated on the Internet on April 1 claimed to show Taiwanese soldiers on Erdan and Dadan being “scared away” by the drone filming them.[23] The Army’s Kinmen Defense Command said it used flares and jamming guns to drive away PRC civilian drones approaching Erdan and Menghu Island on April 8.[24] ROC Army Chief of Staff Chen Chien-yi said on April 3 that such drones constituted “gray zone intrusions” and “cognitive operations” by the PRC. He dismissed the possibility that “mainland civilian bloggers trying to gain popularity on the Internet” were responsible for the drone incursions and instead said it was part of PRC “cognitive warfare” to undermine Taiwanese and international confidence in Taiwan’s military. Chen said such drone incursions had happened before and would happen again in the future. He said it was standard policy to shoot down drones over military facilities if the drones are in range.[25]

Civilian drone incursions into Kinmen’s airspace may be part of a broader effort to test and erode Taiwan’s military readiness and control over Taiwan’s territory. The PRC has normalized daily air and naval activities around Taiwan, including near-daily aerial crossings of the median line in the Taiwan Strait into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), since 2020.[26] It also normalized the use of high-altitude balloons that fly through Taiwan’s ADIZ near or directly over Taiwan, including near-daily balloon overflights in the weeks before and immediately after Taiwan’s election in January 2024. Taiwan does not scramble aircraft in response to all PRC ADIZ violations, but it does put military personnel on standby to respond quickly if needed. The high frequency of ADIZ violations drains Taiwan’s resources, exhausts military personnel, and degrades Taiwan’s threat awareness. The use of civilian assets such as photography drones and balloons in tandem with law enforcement and military incursions further wears down Taiwan’s response capability by making it more difficult for Taiwan to determine which air incursions constitute actual threats.

Taiwan

Czech media reported that a PRC military attaché tailed Taiwan vice president-elect Hsiao Bi-khim while she was in Prague in March. Hsiao visited the Czech Republic on March 17-19 at the invitation of Czech Senate President Miloš Vystrčil. Czech media Seznam Zpravy reported that Prague police stopped a PRC embassy staff member who ran a red light and almost caused a car accident while tailing Hsiao’s motorcade through Prague. The diplomat followed Hsiao to her hotel. The Czech foreign ministry summoned PRC Ambassador to Czechia Feng Biao for an explanation. Czech Foreign Minister Jan Libavsky said he was not satisfied with Feng’s explanation and did not consider the matter closed.[27] Members of the DPP condemned the incident.[28] The TAO reiterated on April 10 that the PRC has always opposed “any form of official exchanges between countries that have diplomatic relations with China and Taiwan.” It said that the DPP, Hsiao’s political party, was “colluding with external forces” but “cannot change the fact that Taiwan is part of China.”[29]

China

The PLA participated in the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) Working Group with their American counterparts in early April for the first time since December 2021.[30] President Joe Biden and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping previously agreed to restart the MMCA during their meeting on November 15, 2023.[31] The United States views military-to-military talks as a means of escalation management to prevent and control crises. The CCP views these talks, at least in part, as a bargaining chip that it can use to influence US behavior to the party’s benefit, however. The CCP could end military-to-military dialogue in response to a US action it opposes, for example. The party previously did this by cutting off high-level military dialogue in the aftermath of then-Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022.[32]

Northeast Asia

Japan

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) criticized the United States and Japan for expanding security relations to counter the PRC. The United States and Japan announced a series of measures to deepen their security and defense cooperation on April 10 during Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s state visit to the United States. The White House announced that the two countries would modernize command and control structures and work towards improving interoperability between their militaries, in what President Biden called “the most significant upgrade to the US-Japan alliance” since its inception.[33] MFA spokesperson Mao Ning framed the Biden-Kishida meeting as representative of a “Cold War mentality” and labeled their cooperation as harmful to regional stability.[34] Mao centered the PRC’s disapproval around US-Japan interference in Taiwan after Biden commended Kishida for his support in maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait. Kishida’s visit culminated in a trilateral summit with Philippines President Bongbong Marcos on April 11, during which the three heads of state advocated for “multilayered cooperation” in the interest of maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific.[35] Mao expressed the PRC’s disapproval of the trilateral summit, criticizing it for forming “exclusive small circles and camp confrontation.”[36]

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning also criticized AUKUS for forming exclusive cliques and instigating an arms race in the Asia Pacific.[37] Japan is in talks to increase cooperation with AUKUS, the trilateral security partnership including the US, UK, and Australia. The AUKUS Defense Ministers issued a joint statement on April 8 signaling their intent to bolster collaboration with Japanese industry on developing military technologies.[38] Mao’s comments echo the PRC’s concerns that a US-led regional security network risks the formation of a united front to collectively deter Chinese aggression, carrying implications for the PRC’s irridentist claims to Taiwan and the South China Sea.

The PRC is taking steps to discourage the formation of PRC-facing multilateral security cooperation. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Southern Theater Command conducted joint naval and air exercises in the South China Sea on April 7-8, coinciding with joint exercises in between the US, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines in the latter’s exclusive economic zone.[39] The Southern Theater Command announced that military activities aimed at disrupting the South China Sea and creating “hot spots” were under control.[40] Mao called the exercises an act of hegemony and emphasized that the PRC would not be deterred from safeguarding its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights.[41]

The national security advisors from the US, Japan, and the Philippines held a joint call in December, in which they reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen trilateral cooperation amidst escalating PRC provocations against the Philippines over disputed islands in the South China Sea.[42] The three advisors previously agreed to enhance trilateral defense and security capabilities by leveraging mechanisms such as Japan’s technology and equipment-sharing policy and the QUAD’s Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) training and technology initiative.[43] Japan recently took steps to increase the transfer of military equipment to the Philippines, demonstrated by its sale of an advanced air surveillance radar system to the Philippines on December 20.[44] Japan is also in the process of finalizing a Reciprocal Access Agreement with the Philippines, which would enable the temporary stationing of troops to each other’s territory for exercises and patrols.[45] Japan finalized a Reciprocal Access Agreement with Australia in August 2023. [46]

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The PRC has normalized Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) harassment of Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and supply ships near the Second Thomas Shoal since December 2023 to render the Philippines unable and unwilling to defend its claim to the Second Thomas Shoal. The CCG harassed the PCG and associated supply ships six times at the Second Thomas Shoal between November 2021 and November 2023.[47] The CCG has increased the rate of harassment at the Second Thomas Shoal by doing so 11 times since December 1, 2023. The methods of harassment that the CCG employs have remained constant during the past three years. The CCG shines military-grade lasers to blind the PCG crews, sprays water cannons to immobilize supply ships and injure Filipino sailors, and rams PCG ships.[48] CCG water cannons damaged the Unaizah Mae 4 supply ship twice in March. The Philippines stated that such actions aim to deter it “from exercising our legal rights over our maritime zines, including Ayungin Shoal [Second Thomas Shoal] which forms part of our EEZ and continental shelf.”[49] The PRC MFA also stated on April 3 that the Philippines is the “root cause” of the South China Sea dispute by “relying on the support of external forces… and repeatedly provoking China.” [50] The harassment of PCG ships combined with the PRC MFA statement indicates that the CCP aims to degrade the Philippines’ willingness and capability to defend its presence on the shoal.

The CCP used a similar strategy in 2012 that resulted in the Philippines withdrawing from the Scarborough Shoal, indicating the party’s intent with CCG activity around disputed shoals is to gain control of that territory. The CCP engaged in negotiations with the Philippines in 2012 to end a standoff at the Scarborough Shoal, which Manilla administered at the time, while steadily increasing the number of Chinese Coast Guard ships near the shoal.[51] This resulted in the Philippines withdrawing its ships from the shoal in mid-June 2012 under a now-disputed agreement that the PRC would do the same.[52] The CCP subsequently kept its ships near the shoal and achieved its political objective of gaining de facto control of the Scarborough Shoal by July 2012.[53]

Oceania

Fiji

Fiji ordered PRC police to leave the country after choosing to maintain a Fiji-PRC policing agreement. Fiji decided on March 15 to uphold a Fiji-PRC police cooperation agreement signed in 2011 after putting the agreement on hold for a 12-month review.[54] Fiji Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka announced on March 27 that his government has removed PRC officers who were embedded with Fiji’s police force, however. Rabuka said Fiji had no need for the embedded PRC officers and expressed concern that the PRC’s growing presence in the Pacific could undermine democratic systems. Rabuka said senior Fiji police officers would continue training in the PRC.[55]

Tonga

Tonga is open to security cooperation with the PRC during the Pacific Islands Forum in August. Tonga Prime Minister Siaosi Sovaleni said on April 4 that he is open to the PRC’s offer of security support when Tonga hosts leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum in August if Tonga police deem it necessary. He said discussions with the PRC have focused on the PRC providing vehicles and training for Tongan police ahead of the forum. The PRC is not a member of the Pacific Islands Forum. The PRC has pursued security and policing cooperation with many South Pacific countries, including a controversial security pact with the Solomon Islands in 2022. The United States has urged countries in the region not to strike security pacts with the PRC over fears that the PRC could use such agreements to expand its influence and military involvement in the region.[56]

Tongan officials privately criticized Australia and New Zealand’s negative response to the PRC security agreement with the Solomon Islands. A leaked document from Tonga's Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed officials criticizing Australia and New Zealand’s “condescending” and “frantic” response to a controversial 2022 security agreement between the PRC and the Solomon Islands. The document characterized Australia and New Zealand’s views were that “only they (or the Pacific [region collectively]) can decide which countries Pacific states should align themselves with.” The document acknowledged that many Pacific Island states are facing "threats to strategic independence as a result of growing indebtedness to Beijing.” It stressed that the Solomon Islands is a sovereign nation and has the right to make decisions about its security, however.[57] A leaked draft of the PRC-Solomon Islands agreement included language granting the PRC access and replenishment rights to Solomon Islands ports, as well as the right to use its armed forces to protect Chinese projects and personnel in the Solomon Islands.[58] Australia, New Zealand, and the United States warned at the time that the broadly worded agreement could open the door for PRC troops or even a PRC military base on the Solomon Islands.[59]

Russia

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping and Foreign Minister Wang Yi on April 9 in the leadup to a Xi-Putin meeting in the unspecified future. Kremlin newswire TASS reported that Wang suggested that China and Russia engage in “dual counteraction” in response to alleged Western attempts at “dual containment” targeting Russia and China.[60] Xi reaffirmed his commitment to “intensify” bilateral collaboration with Russia and through international bodies to “promote the reform of the global governance system.”[61] Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov declined to specify the date of Putin’s visit, but stated on April 9 that Lavrov’s visit “can be seen as preparation for upcoming contact at the highest level.”[62] Reuters reported on March 19 that Putin will travel to China in May to meet with Xi.[63]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, March 28, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, and Nils Peterson of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: April 3 at 5 pm ET

Key Takeaways

Former Republica of China (ROC) President Ma Ying-jeou met with the People's Republic of China's (PRC) Taiwan Affairs Office Director Song Tao in Shenzhen.
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) proposed legislative reforms in response to the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party's (TPP) reforms that threaten to undermine the DPP's governance.
CCP Secretary General Xi Jinping emphasized Taiwan and economic issues in a phone call with US President Joe Biden. The PRC readout of the call did not mention the US key security concerns.
Top PRC officials met with US business and academic leaders to boost foreign investment.
A flotilla of PLA Southern Theater Command naval warships carried out live-fire drills in an unspecified area of the South China Sea on the weekend of March 30.

Former ROC President Ma Ying-jeou met with the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office Director Song Tao on April 1 in Shenzhen. Song repeated standard rhetoric expressing the PRC’s cross-strait policy, including urging adherence to the “1992 Consensus” and opposing Taiwanese independence and foreign interference. Ma echoed Song’s statements and advocated for stronger cross-strait cooperation and exchanges in all areas, especially between the youth.[1] Ma’s meeting with Song occurred on the first day of his trip to the PRC and did not appear on his public itinerary.[2] The stated purpose of Ma’s visit to the PRC is to lead a delegation of Taiwanese students to participate in exchanges with mainland youth and promote cross-strait stability from April 1-11.[3]

The CCP insists that all cross-strait negotiations must be on the mutual basis of the “1992 consensus,” which Ma and the Kuomintang (KMT) recognize but the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) does not. The 1992 Consensus is an alleged verbal agreement between semi-official representatives of the PRC and the then KMT-ruled ROC following negotiations in 1992. It states that both sides agree there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The CCP interprets this “one China” to be the People’s Republic of China, however, while the KMT interprets it to be the Republic of China. The CCP does not acknowledge that the KMT’s interpretation of the 1992 Consensus does not align with its own. The PRC severed official cross-strait contact in 2016 based on the DPP’s refusal to accept the 1992 Consensus.[4]

CEO of the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation and former Ma aide Hsiao Hsu-tsen mentioned the possibility that Ma will meet with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping on April 8.[5] Ma last met Xi in Singapore in 2015, when Ma was ROC president. The 2015 meeting was the first between the leaders of the PRC and Taiwan. Ma became the first former Taiwanese president to visit the PRC in March 2023 during a visit that overlapped with sitting president Tsai Ing-wen’s trip to the United States. Ma did not meet Xi on that visit, however. PRC officials have repeatedly lauded the period during Ma’s presidency as a high point in cross-strait relations to portray relations as having failed under the DPP. The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua stated on March 13 that Taiwan should aim to relive the prosperity and peaceful development that cross-strait relations enjoyed from 2008 to 2016.[6]

Several senior KMT officials reacted positively to Ma’s trip. KMT Vice Chairman Andrew Hsia, who has held numerous meetings with CCP officials since assuming his role in 2021, expressed confidence that Ma’s trip will have a placatory and stabilizing effect on cross-strait relations.[7] Legislative Yuan Deputy Speaker Johnny Chiang urged respect for Ma’s itinerary and advocated for “diverse and multi-level” cross-strait exchanges.[8] DPP members have been critical of Ma’s trip, however. DPP Caucus Whip Rosalia Wu expressed disapproval of Ma’s gracious attitude despite the CCP’s failure to acknowledge Ma as the former president. Wu warned Ma to be cautious with his words and actions during his trip.[9] Premier Chen Chien-jen called on Ma to assert that “Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country” in front of Xi Jinping if the two of them meet.[10]

Taiwan

The DPP proposed legislative reforms on April 3 in response to KMT-TPP reform plans that threaten to undermine the DPP's governance.[11] The KMT proposed a series of legislative reforms to increase the Legislative Yuan’s (LY) oversight of the government on March 6. The reforms call for the establishment of inquiry committees and hearing procedures to compel individuals— including the president— to testify before the LY, assert penalties for perceived non-compliance or dishonesty in responses, and empower the LY to confirm political appointments.[12] The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) released a similar draft on February 16.[13] The DPP’s recommended reforms do not include core elements of the opposition’s proposals, including the creation of special inquiry committees and the ability to hold testifiers in contempt.

The TPP and KMT have consistently stated that establishing a legislative investigative task force to intensify supervision of the executive branch is at the top of their agenda.[14] TPP Caucus Whip Huang Kuo-chang stated the TPP and KMT align in their reform direction, and the TPP’s support for the KMT in the LY will be aimed at achieving reform.[15]

The KMT has largely dismissed the DPP’s proposal as an attempt to water down necessary reforms and pledged to continue pursuing the reforms that it proposed. KMT legislator Luo Chih-chiang stated that the KMT would persist in defending the LY’s dignity and legislative reform.[16] KMT Caucus Secretary-General Hung Mong-kai claimed the DPP’s version would not achieve the goal of strengthening legislative oversight to increase the representation of public opinion in the LY.[17] KMT Caucus Whip Fu Kun-chi, a leader of the reforms, has consistently urged for the need to impose checks and balances on the government to limit its power and expose corruption.[18]

DPP Caucus Whip Ker Chien-ming emphasized the constitutionality of the DPP’s proposed reforms and stated that they would never sow chaos in politics, unlike the reforms that the opposition parties put forth.[19] The DPP has consistently criticized the opposition’s dogged determination to pursue the legislative reforms. Ker stated that “the evil forces of Blue and White,” referring to the KMT and TPP, are taking advantage of their collective majority in the LY to expand their power and wage a new “White Terror” against the executive branch.[20] DPP General Secretary Rosalia Wu emphasized the unconstitutionality of the opposition’s proposals and stressed that the LY cannot directly interfere with the executive branch by subjecting the president to legislative oversight.[21]

The opposition’s plan to impose checks and balances on the DPP could significantly hamper the government’s ability to pass policy by miring it in defensive actions against accusations of overstepping authority or corruption. KMT Caucus Deputy Secretary-General Lin Tzu-ming earlier referred to the proposed reforms as a “great weapon” that the LY must use to supervise the government.[22] The KMT’s outspoken rejection of the DPP’s reform proposal indicates the two largest parties will not compromise on the DPP’s revised version. Collaboration between the KMT and the TPP to advance their reforms suggests their version will pass with a majority in the LY, as the TPP’s eight seats constitute a crucial swing vote. The opposition’s determination to derail the DPP government is favorable to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) interests, especially if it hinders the government’s ability to implement its foreign and defense policy.

The LY’s Judiciary and Organic Laws and Statutes Committee will review the DPP’s proposal under the KMT’s rotating chairmanship of the committee next week.[23]

China

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized cross-strait relations and economic issues in the US-PRC relationship during a phone call with US President Joe Biden on April 2. The PRC readout of the call did not address the US security concerns, including the PRC's support for Russia and heightened tensions in the South China Sea. Xi and Biden spoke by phone on April 2, in their first direct conversation since their meeting in San Francisco on November 15, 2023. According to the PRC readout of the call, Xi warned that the PRC considers the “Taiwan question” a “red line” and will act to counter Taiwanese “separatists” and external support for them. He also objected to US sanctions measures on PRC companies which he claimed are “suppress[ing] China’s trade and technology development,” saying the PRC welcomes mutually beneficial trade with the United States but will not “sit back and watch” if the United States seeks to “deprive China of its legitimate right to development.” Xi also said the three underlying principles of US-PRC relations in 2024 should be to value peace, to prioritize stability, and to uphold the credibility of commitments to each other.[24]

The PRC readout did not elaborate on many other issues the two discussed according to the White House readout, including freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, PRC support for Russia’s defense industrial base, and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.[25] The Xi-Biden call followed a call between US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and PRC Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu on March 27, which discussed similar issues.[26] The focus of the PRC readout shows the CCP is trying to portray trade issues and US support for Taiwan as the core disputes in an otherwise stable US-PRC relationship while downplaying US concerns about the PRC’s threats to regional and US national security.

The PRC used a series of high-profile meetings with US political, business, and academic leaders to boost foreign investment. The PRC invited top US business, academic, and strategic leaders to the PRC for the China Development Forum on March 25-26 and a meeting with Xi Jinping on March 27. Nearly all top PRC officials for economic affairs, including Premier Li Qiang, Vice Premiers Ding Xuexiang and He Lifeng, Vice President Han Zheng, and Xi Jinping’s Chief of Staff Cai Qi held high-level meetings with foreign business executives including Blackstone CEO Stephen Schwarzman, Qualcomm CEO Cristiano Amon, and US-China Business Council president Craig Allen.[27] Academics, such as former Harvard Kennedy School dean Graham Allison, also attended meetings with Xi and other top officials, as did National Committee on US-China Relations (NCUSCR) Chairman Evan Greenberg.[28] The meetings and PRC state media reporting about them sought to boost foreign investor confidence in the PRC economy and signal “win-win opportunities” for investors.

Xi used the occasion to reiterate that US-China "incorrect perceptions" from the US side are a key cause of tensions in the US-China relationship.[29] PRC state media Xinhua ran a series of commentary articles promoting the development of healthy US-PRC relations.[30] Global Times published an interview with Allison in which he said the United States and PRC were “inseparable, conjoined Siamese twins” and praised PRC leaders for seeking to escape the “Thucydides Trap,” a term Allison coined to describe the historical tendency of rising powers and established great powers to go to war.[31] CCP meetings with US business leaders, academics, and PRC-friendly groups like NCUSCR and the US-China Business Council may offer avenues for the CCP to influence US policy and lend credence to CCP narratives, such as the narrative that problems in US-PRC relations are caused by “incorrect perceptions” in the United States and the promotion of investment opportunities in the PRC.

The PRC also promoted stabilizing relations and boosting investment in meetings with European officials, including Premier Li Qiang and Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s meetings with French Foreign Minister Stéphane Séjourné on April 1.[32]

PRC officials expressed opposition to the expansion of the AUKUS security partnership. New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters said New Zealand expects the PRC to respect its right to explore joining AUKUS, a trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. MFA spokesperson Lin Jian responded by expressing the PRC’s “strong concerns” about AUKUS and noting that the PRC opposes “camp confrontation” and forming “exclusive small circles.”[33] PRC Ministry of Defense (MOD) spokesperson Wu Qian criticized the expansion and upgrading of AUKUS as a “dangerous step in a more dangerous direction.” Wu was referring to an AU$4.6 billion agreement for the UK to build nuclear submarines for Australia and US plans to discuss Japan’s technical cooperation with AUKUS when Japan Prime Minister Fumio Kishida meets with US President Joe Biden in April.[34] CCP opposition to AUKUS is consistent with the CCP view that all US alliance structures are in alignment against the PRC. The MOD also expressed concerns about NATO’s “eastward march into the Asia-Pacific and the Taiwan issue” during the 8th China-NATO security policy dialogue held in mid-March.[35]

Northeast Asia

North Korea

The PRC abstained from voting for a United Nations Security Council resolution about extending a monitoring panel that tracks adherence to UN sanctions against North Korea. Russia vetoed the UNSC resolution on March 28.[36] The UN Security Council has unanimously adopted the annual renewal of the North Korean sanctions monitoring panel’s mandate since its inception in 2009.[37] The PRC Permanent Mission to the UN stated that the “sanctions should not be set in stone, nor should it be indefinite.” It instead called for “adjust[ing] the sanctions against the DPRK in the humanitarian and livelihood field.”[38] The PRC MFA Spokesman Lin Jian claimed on March 29 that there was “still time for consultations” when the UNSC “rushed" the resolution for a vote.[39]

Japan

Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels entered disputed waters around the Senkaku islands 101 days in a row as of April 1 in an ongoing effort to assert PRC sovereignty over the islands. The Senkaku Islands, called the Diaoyu Islands in Chinese, are an uninhabited archipelago about 120 miles northeast of Taiwan and 200 miles southwest of Japan's Okinawa Prefecture. Japan administers the islands, but the PRC and Taiwan also claim the islands.[40] The CCG has normalized daily incursions into the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands, which is between 12 and 24 nautical miles from the islands. The current string of consecutive daily CCG incursions into the islands’ adjacent waters began on December 22, 2023, the same day Japan’s Cabinet approved a record-high defense budget of 7.95 trillion yen ($48 billion) for 2024.[41] The PRC has repeatedly expressed opposition to Japan increasing its defense budget or taking a more active military role in the region.[42]

The CCG began near-daily incursions into the Senkaku Islands’ adjacent waters in 2012 and significantly increased the volume of these incursions in 2019. It has made 90-110 incursions in most months since April 2019 into the Senkaku Islands’ contiguous zone, as well as 4-12 incursions into the territorial waters within 12 nautical miles of the islands. CCG ships entered 121 times into the archipelago’s contiguous zone and 10 times into its territorial waters in March 2024.[43] There were only 10 days since April 1, 2023, without CCG incursions into the contiguous waters.

The PRC is framing growing US-Japan military cooperation as a threat to the PRC. The Japanese Parliament passed its record $48 billion defense budget on March 28 for the fiscal year beginning April 1. This is the same budget the Cabinet approved in December. MFA spokesperson Lin Jian said Japan’s annually increasing defense budget, relaxation of restrictions on arms exports, and breakthrough military developments raise “strong doubts” about whether Japan is sincerely focused on defense and peaceful development. He urged Japan to respect the security concerns of its neighbors, “deeply reflect on its history of aggression,” and avoid “further breaking the trust of its Asian neighbors.”[44] MOD spokesperson Wu Qian framed the possibility of Japanese technical cooperation with AUKUS as a “dangerous step in a more dangerous direction.”[45] Foreign Minister Wang Yi met former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and urged Japan to “do more things conducive to regional peace and stability, rather than the opposite.”[46] PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times claimed the US-Japan alliance is evolving into an “axis of evil” that threatens regional stability and cited scholars who claimed the US recruitment of Japan to participate in trilateral US-Philippines-Japan patrols in the South China Sea was part of a US attempt to “consume allies’ resources and weaken China.”[47] US President Joe Biden will host Japan Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on April 10 to discuss enhanced military cooperation.[48]

Southeast Asia

Philippines

A flotilla of PLA Southern Theater Command naval warships carried out live-fire drills in an unspecified area of the South China Sea on the weekend of March 30. The drills included fire targeting an armed militia fishing boat and an enemy jet. The drills followed separate daytime and nighttime exercises in the South China Sea that the PLAN carried out on an unspecified date in early spring.[49] State-owned tabloid Global Times quoted PRC analysts who said the drills signaled that the PRC will be on “high alert” regardless of US, Philippine, or Japanese activities in the region.[50]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, March 22, 2024
Click Here to Read the Full Report

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: March 26 at 5 pm ET

Key Takeaways

Taiwanese media reported that former ROC President Ma Ying-jeou will meet CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping during a “private” visit to the PRC in April. The CCP may use the meeting to advance its preferred vision of cross-strait relations and legitimize the KMT as a negotiating partner on behalf of Taiwan.
The Chinese Coast Guard has normalized patrols around Kinmen since February 14. Normalizing operations around Taiwan’s waters sets conditions for the PRC to apply further pressure on Taiwan in the future.
ROC President Tsai Ing-wen declined to visit Taiwan-controlled Itu Aba in the South China Sea before her term ends. The Tsai administration has cited regional and personal security concerns in explaining Tsai’s decision to not visit Itu Aba.
The United States, United Kingdom, and New Zealand accused PRC-state-sponsored cyber threat actors of conducting malicious cyber operations against democratic institutions.
The Chinese Coast Guard is driving heightened tensions in the South China Sea while the PRC blames the Philippines and the United States for the crises.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwanese media reported that former ROC President Ma Ying-jeou will meet CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping during a planned “private” visit to the PRC in April. CEO of the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation and former Ma aide Hsiao Hsu-tsen announced on March 25 that Ma will lead a delegation of students to the PRC on April 1-11 to visit sites in Guangdong, Shaanxi, and Beijing. When asked if Ma would meet with Xi, Hsiao did not confirm the meeting but hinted that Ma was hopeful to meet “an old friend” if PRC arrangements permit it.[1] PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Spokesperson Chen Binhua said that the PRC welcomed Ma to participate in cultural activities but did not mention any meetings with Xi or other CCP officials.[2] Taiwan’s Storm Media reported on March 26 that former ROC President Ma Ying-jeou will meet with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping on April 8 during his visit, however.[3]

Ma last met Xi in Singapore in 2015, when Ma was ROC president. This was the first meeting between the leaders of the PRC and Taiwan. In March 2023, Ma became the first former Taiwanese president to visit the PRC, in a visit that overlapped with sitting president Tsai Ing-wen’s trip to the United States. Ma did not meet Xi on that visit, however.

Ma is a member of the Kuomintang (KMT) political party and is known for his PRC-friendly views and controversial statements on Taiwan-PRC and Taiwan-US relations, especially after leaving office. Ma said in a January interview that Deutsche Welle posted several days before the ROC’s 2024 presidential election that Taiwan must trust Xi Jinping when it comes to cross-strait relations.[4] The comment drew condemnation from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and prompted KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih to politically distance himself from Ma, saying his views were “somewhat different.”[5] In a speech at New York University in October 2023, Ma said that the United States and other Taiwan-friendly Western countries should encourage Taiwanese leaders to engage in dialogue with the PRC rather than encouraging them “to move toward Taiwanese independence or even transforming Taiwan into a second Ukraine.”[6] Ma’s allegation that the United States is pushing Taiwan toward independence and risking war with the PRC aligns with CCP rhetoric on the US-Taiwan relationship.

The CCP may use a Xi-Ma meeting to advance its preferred vision of cross-strait relations and legitimize the KMT as a negotiating partner on behalf of Taiwan in contrast to the DPP. TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua said on March 14 that Taiwan would be able to alleviate tensions and “sleep soundly” if it could relive the “peaceful development period across the Taiwan Strait from 2008-2016.” Chen’s statement refers to the years of Ma’s presidency.[7] A meeting between Xi and Ma would also be consistent with the CCP’s effort to legitimize the KMT as a negotiating partner while not directly interacting with Taiwan's DPP-led government. The PRC cut off official exchanges with Taiwan after Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP became president of Taiwan in 2016. CCP officials have repeatedly met with KMT officials during this time. The CCP insists that all cross-strait negotiations must be on the mutual basis of the “1992 consensus,” which Ma and the KMT recognize but Tsai and the DPP do not. The 1992 Consensus is an alleged verbal agreement between semi-official representatives of the PRC and the then KMT-ruled ROC following negotiations in 1992. It states that both sides agree there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The CCP interprets this “one China” to be the People’s Republic of China, however, while the KMT interprets it to be the Republic of China. Although Ma no longer holds an official position in the KMT, KMT Vice Chairman Andrew Hsia said the KMT would be glad if Ma meets Xi and hopes his trip can help stabilize cross-strait relations.[8]

The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) has normalized patrols around Kinmen since February 14. A PRC fishing boat in Taiwan’s prohibited waters near Kinmen capsized while fleeing from a legal Taiwanese Coast Guard pursuit on February 14. The capsizing resulted in the deaths of two of the four fishermen onboard. The CCG pledged on February 18 to strengthen law enforcement activities around Kinmen. The CCG has maintained a consistent presence around Kinmen and repeatedly violated Taiwan’s maritime boundaries since then. The CCG boarded a Taiwanese sightseeing ship on February 19, marking the first time a CCG ship conducted inspections in Taiwanese waters.[9] Five CCG marine surveillance ships entered Taiwan’s contiguous zone around Kinmen on February 26, including one that crossed into territorial waters.[10] The total number of CCG ships around Kinmen reached 11 on February 27, including two that entered Taiwan’s contiguous zone. Four CCG ships operated in Taiwan’s territorial waters around Kinmen Island for two consecutive days for the first time on March 15 and 16.[11] One of the ships was a converted naval corvette that conducted the passage with its gun covers removed.[12] The CCG’s removal of its gun covers during its passage through Taiwan’s waters illustrates its offensive posturing, indicating its actions are intended to intimidate the Taiwanese Coast Guard rather than uphold a safe maritime environment. CCG ships have previously used this tactic to intimidate rival law enforcement in contested waters, including the Philippines Coast Guard around Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea.[13]

Normalizing operations around Taiwan’s waters sets conditions for the PRC to apply further pressure on Taiwan in the future. It provides the precedent for the PRC to justify future CCG around other offshore ROC islands, such as Matsu. The patrols near the offshore islands create domestic political pressure on the ROC government to negotiate with the PRC from a position of weakness to mitigate the frequency of patrols and defend ROC sovereignty.

The CCP has normalized the patrols around Kinmen while keeping the Kinmen incident and subsequent CCG incursions from escalating into a crisis. The use of the CCG rather than the PLA Navy is one way the CCP employs force to change the status quo without eliciting a foreign response because the former is not a military vessel. This activity is part of a trend of coercive actions that change the status quo in the PRC’s favor and do not reach the threshold of a ROC or third-party military response. The lower levels of PLA Air Force violations of Taiwan’s ADIZ in 2024 compared to 2023 demonstrate that the party has avoided pursuing opportunities to escalate tensions to the point of inciting a military response. Every month from January to November 2023 averaged over 100 ADIZ violations. No month in 2024 has yet reached 100 ADIZ violations.[14] This aligns with two unspecified Taiwanese security officials’ comments to Bloomberg on March 18 that the PLA activity around Taiwan has not increased in intensity since the January presidential election.[15]

The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) delayed the release of a Taiwanese fisherman that it rescued near Kinmen for over a week on suspicion that he is a ROC soldier. The CCG rescued two Taiwanese fishermen early in the morning of March 18 after their boat ran out of fuel and drifted out of Taiwanese waters around Kinmen. It held the fishermen in Quanzhou, a PRC coastal city a short distance from Kinmen. The PRC planned to hand the fishermen over to Taiwanese authorities on March 19 but delayed the handover after claiming one of the fishermen tried to hide that he was an active member of the Taiwan military.[16] Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense confirmed on March 23 that the fisherman is part of the Kinmen garrison brigade.[17] The CCG finally released one of the fishermen and his boat on March 23 but continues to hold the soldier in custody.[18] The ROC Coast Guard, Kinmen County government, and KMT legislator Jessica Chen of Kinmen maintained communication with PRC authorities to secure the release of the fishermen and allow their families to visit them. Chen denied that the PRC was engaging in “hostage diplomacy.”[19]

Taiwan

ROC President Tsai Ing-wen declined to visit Taiwan-controlled Itu Aba in the South China Sea before her term ends. Itu Aba is the largest island in the Spratly archipelago and the only one that Taiwan controls. The PRC, the Philippines, and Vietnam also claim Itu Aba as their territory. The KMT has called on Tsai to visit Itu Aba, known in Chinese as Taiping Island, in the South China Sea to assert Taiwan’s sovereignty there before the end of her presidency on May 20.[20] Tsai’s predecessors Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT and Chen Shui-bian of the DPP both visited the island before leaving office.[21] KMT politicians criticized Tsai for not attending the inauguration ceremony for a newly renovated pier on Taiping Island on March 26.[22]

The Tsai administration has cited regional and personal security concerns in explaining Tsai’s decision to not visit Itu Aba. Taiwan Foreign Minister Joseph Wu and National Security Bureau (NSB) director Tsai Ming-yen advised President Tsai not to travel to Itu Aba due to high regional tensions and militarization of the South China Sea. Wu said the PRC has built “enormous” military bases on three islands surrounding Itu Aba – Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef – and has 20 warships patrolling the South China Sea daily. He also noted escalating tensions in the region between the Philippines and the PRC and said Taiwan should consider “peaceful means” to avoid aggravating the situation.[23] NSB Director Tsai said there were security risks to President Tsai’s flight if she visits the island. He said PRC forces have harassed aircraft and ships replenishing Taiwan’s base on Itu Aba.[24]

The KMT criticized Tsai for not visiting Itu Aba and organized a legislative delegation to visit the island on May 16 to assert Taiwan’s sovereignty. Ma Wen-chun, who is the co-chair of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee in the Legislative Yuan, said that her delegation would go to the island regardless of whether President Tsai went.[25] Ten KMT legislators including Ma, three TPP legislators, and one DPP legislator also have signed up for the trip. These include LY Deputy Speaker Johnny Chiang Chi-chen of the KMT, who is a member of the committee. LY Speaker Han Kuo-yu of the KMT, who is also on the committee, said he would not go due to political considerations, however.[26]

KMT Chairman Eric Chu dismissed the Tsai administration’s concerns about Tsai visiting Itu Aba as an “excuse,” noting that Taiwan has its own coast guard and military personnel on the island to protect the president’s flight and that past presidents visited despite similar concerns.[27] Former president Ma urged Tsai to visit the island to “safeguard national interests.”[28] Some KMT legislators alleged that the true reason for Tsai Ing-wen’s unwillingness to visit Itu Aba is related to her unwillingness to upset the United States.[29] This framing from the KMT implicitly criticizes US influence over Taiwan and frames Tsai as subordinate to US interests at the expense of Taiwanese sovereignty. The American Institute for Taiwan, the de-facto US embassy in Taiwan, said it was “disappointed” when Ma Ying-jeou announced plans to visit the island in 2016 because the trip could exacerbate tensions.[30]

China

The United States, United Kingdom, and New Zealand accused PRC-state-sponsored cyber threat actors of conducting malicious cyber operations against democratic institutions. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department of Justice (DOJ) charged seven PRC nationals with cybercrimes on March 25. The cybercrimes were espionage and transnational repression in a far-reaching campaign that the PRC’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) directed.[31] The indictment accused the MSS-backed group, referred to as Advanced Persistent Threat 31 (APT 31), of malicious cyber activities focused on infiltrating government networks globally to collect sensitive data from public officials who criticized the PRC. The indictment alleges that APT31 embedded malware in over 10,000 emails that collected data on target recipients, including political candidates and campaign personnel. APT31 used the data to enable direct hacking operations against targets, including infiltrating home routers. The US indictment corresponds to earlier reports from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) that revealed PRC cyber actor attempts to interfere with federal election infrastructure networks in 2020 and 2022.[32]

APT31’s hacking campaign has been going on for the past 14 years.[33] APT31 and its members have perpetrated numerous other malicious cyber campaigns in recent years, including spear-phishing operations targeting the United States Naval Academy, the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, and Hong Kong legislators and democracy advocates.[34]

The US charges coincide with similar accusations against the PRC from the United Kingdom and New Zealand. The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) assessed with high confidence on March 25 that APT31 conducted extensive cyber espionage on UK parliamentarians in 2021.[35] NCSC also officially attributed the compromise of Electoral Commission networks in 2021 to the PRC, which exfiltrated the data of over 40 million people from electoral registers.[36] The head of New Zealand’s Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) Judith Collins declared her country’s support for the UK’s condemnation of the PRC’s cyber operations. Collins announced on March 26 that GCSB also traced malicious cyber activity targeting parliamentary entities to PRC state-sponsored cyber group APT40.[37]

The US and UK jointly imposed sanctions on March 25 against two defendants and an entity they allege is an MSS front company that enables cyber operations.[38] The UK Foreign Office summoned the PRC chargé d’affaires on March 26 to express “unequivocal condemnation” of the PRC’s hacking activities.[39] UK political figures such as former Tory leader Sir Iain Duncan Smith and former immigration minister Robert Jenrick are urging the government to take harsh punitive action against the PRC.[40]

The latest revelations about the PRC’s hacking activities highlight the PRC’s large-scale data theft and espionage against its adversaries. The MSS conducted a large-scale hacking operation from 2014 to 2015 against the Office of Personnel Management, the United States government’s chief human resources agency that manages federal employees’ records for security clearances. The MSS exfiltrated the background investigation data of over 22 million federal employees and contractors.[41] A PRC state-backed cyber actor related to APT40, known in open source as Hafnium, exploited vulnerabilities in Microsoft email servers in 2021 to extract sensitive data from organizations around the globe, compromising 30,000 companies and entities in the US alone.[42] NCSC called the espionage-focused incident the largest cyber intrusion against the UK and its allies to date.[43] The alleged APT31 operation also targeted companies of “national economic importance,” including defense contractors who supply the US military and a “leading provider” of 5G network equipment.[44]

The PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Lin Jian denied the allegations on March 26 and pointed to recent PRC reports of US government cyber operations against the PRC. Lin accused the United States of recruiting Five Eyes allies to spread disinformation and villainize the PRC.[45] The PRC’s counter accusations are consistent with its past reactions to reverse the narrative, portraying itself as a responsible actor in cyberspace and a victim of US transgressions.

Northeast Asia

North Korea

Top CCP officials met with a North Korean delegation led by Minister of the International Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Kim Sung-nam in Beijing to discuss bilateral relations.[46] Kim met separately with Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Chairman Wang Huning and Director of the CCP International Liaison Department Liu Jianchao on March 21.[47] Wang Huning stressed unwavering ties despite changes in the international situation, according to Pyeongyang’s official media.[48] Kim met with Secretary of the CCP Secretariat Cai Qi on March 22.[49] PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Kim met on March 23, during which Wang expressed the PRC’s will to maintain and develop its friendship with North Korea.[50] Kim declared North Korea’s support for the PRC in all Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang-related issues. This is Kim’s first overseas trip since assuming his position as the head of International Department of the WPK.[51]

PRC readouts of the meetings repeated expressions of goodwill between the two countries and pledges to strengthen bilateral cooperation. The PRC did not comment on North Korea’s aggressive behavior in the region, which is consistent with PRC actions since mid-December. The CCP has not publicly criticized North Korea for launching ballistic missiles, testing alleged underwater nuclear drones, or labeling South Korea as its “primary foe.” The CCP has instead called for dialogue to portray the party as a responsible regional stakeholder while avoiding steps to stop North Korea's provocations. The PRC MFA has messaged since mid-December that “trying to solve the problem [on the Korean Peninsula] through military deterrence and pressure will not work…[and] dialogue and consultation” are how to resolve the issue.[52] The CCP has also emphasized the PRC’s close relations with North Korea and plans to deepen “mutually beneficial cooperation” this year, which will be the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries.[53]

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) is driving heightened tensions in the South China Sea while the PRC blames the Philippines and the United States for the crises. Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Spokesperson Jay Tarriela stated that Filipino marine scientists conducted research at Sandy Cay on March 21, two nautical miles from the Philippine-controlled Thitu Island, while the CCG and maritime militia harassed the researchers, including by helicopter.[54] Over 15 CCG vessels remained in the area between Sandy Cay and Thitu Island on March 22.[55] The CCG blamed the Philippines for “infringing on China’s territorial sovereignty,” since the PRC claims both Sandy Cay and Thitu Island as its own.[56]

The CCG also fired water cannons at a Philippine supply ship heading to the Second Thomas Shoal on March 23. The water cannons rendered the ship immobile and caused unspecified injuries to the Filipino crew. Two PCG ships towed the supply ship away while a motorboat successfully transported new soldiers and supplies to the Second Thomas Shoal.[57] The Second Thomas Shoal is a submerged reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea which the Philippines and the PRC both claim. The Philippines controls the shoal with troops based on the grounded warship BRP Sierra Madre. Filipino Undersecretary for Bilaterial Relations and ASEAN Affairs Theresa Lazaro protested the CCG and maritime militia actions to PRC Vice Foreign Minister Chen Xiaodong via phone call on March 25.[58]

The CCG actions since March 21 are part of a coercive trend targeting the Philippines. A CCG vessel attempted to block and collided with a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel escorting a supply mission to Second Thomas Shoal on March 5, causing minor damage to the Philippine ship.[59] Two CCG ships also fired water cannons at a separate Philippine supply ship, injuring four Philippine personnel, and later collided with it.[60]

The CCG actions In the South China Sea support PRC claims of sovereignty over nearly the entirety of the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, through the “nine dash line” maritime boundary. The PRC rejects a 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that declared the nine dash line claims are unlawful.[61] The PRC has constructed, seized, and attempted to seize many islands in the South China Sea so it can build a military presence throughout the critical waterway. The PRC has built military infrastructure on islands that it has seized control of or artificially constructed to expand its power projection capability, strengthen domain awareness, and increase its control over critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) through the South China Sea. Developing the capability to monitor or restrict ships through the South China Sea would support a future PRC effort to implement a blockade of Taiwan or block US and allied reinforcements from reaching the Taiwan Strait in wartime.

The PRC blames the Philippines and the United States for the regional tension. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. gave an interview to Bloomberg on March 19 where he stated the Philippines is trying to keep relations with the PRC “on an even keel” but “since the threat [from the PRC] has grown, we must do more to defend our territory.”[62] The PRC MFA responded on March 20 that the Philippines is driving the crisis by alleged “maritime infringements” on South China Sea islands the PRC claims as its own.[63]

The PRC MFA is framing the planned United States-Japan-Philippines summit on April 11 as provocative toward the PRC.[64] PRC MFA Spokesman Wang Wenbin claimed on March 14 that the United States “traveled thousands of miles to China’s doorstep to … provoke trouble” as part of its “hegemonic activity.”[65] He then framed the revisionist PRC territorial aggression in the South China Sea as a protection of his country’s “territorial sovereignty.”[66] Wang’s rhetoric is consistent with previous PRC messaging about the US role in the region. The PRC MOD framed the United States as “creating bloc confrontations that escalate regional tension” after the June 2023 US-Japan-Philippines trilateral summit.[67] Wang’s comments exemplify the view of CCP leadership that the United States-led security architecture in East Asia is inherently aggressive rather than defensive in nature.

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: March 22 at 12pm ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) is expanding efforts to erode the Republic of China's (ROC) sovereignty around Kinmen Island.
The PRC Ministry of Defense (MOD) warned the United States was “playing with fire” in stationing Green Berets on the Kinmen and Penghu islands.
The PRC is framing the upcoming April 11 US-Japan-Philippines trilateral as a way for the United States to drive tension in the South China Sea.
The PRC MFA framed the United States–South Korea Freedom Shield military exercise as causing instability on the Korean Peninsula.
The PRC had its first public diplomatic meeting with a Hamas official and its first diplomatic visits to Israel and Palestine since Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) expanded its efforts to erode the Republic of China's (ROC) sovereignty around Kinmen Island. Four CCG ships operated in Taiwan’s territorial waters around Kinmen Island for two consecutive days for the first time on March 15 and 16.[1] One of the ships was a converted naval corvette that conducted the passage with its gun covers removed.[2] The CCG framed its operations as legitimate law enforcement to safeguard Chinese fishermen, including those from Taiwan.[3] The CCG’s removal of its gun covers during its passage through Taiwan’s waters illustrates its offensive posturing, indicating its actions are intended to intimidate the Taiwanese Coast Guard rather than uphold a safe maritime environment. CCG ships have previously used this tactic to intimidate rival law enforcement in contested waters, including the Philippines Coast Guard around Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea.[4]

Kinmen is a Taiwan-controlled island with a large military garrison roughly 3 kilometers from the coast of the PRC. The Taiwan Coast Guard Administration (CGA) enforces maritime laws around Kinmen and its lesser islands. The CCP does not accept Taiwan’s sovereignty over the waters around the island, however.[5]

The latest violations are part of a trend of CCG incursions following an incident on February 14 in which a PRC fishing boat in Taiwan’s prohibited waters near Kinmen capsized while fleeing from a legal Taiwanese Coast Guard pursuit. The capsizing resulted in the deaths of two of the four fishermen onboard. The CCG pledged on February 18 to strengthen law enforcement activities around Kinmen. The CCG has maintained a persistent presence around Kinmen and repeatedly violated Taiwan’s maritime boundaries since then. The CCG boarded a Taiwanese sightseeing ship on February 19, marking the first time a CCG ship conducted inspections in Taiwanese waters.[6] Five CCG marine surveillance ships entered Taiwan’s contiguous zone around Kinmen on February 26, including one that crossed into territorial waters.[7] The total number of CCG ships around Kinmen reached 11 on February 27, including two that entered Taiwan’s contiguous zone. Normalizing operations around Taiwan’s waters sets conditions for the PRC to apply further pressure on Taiwan in the future.

The rapid normalization of CCG operations in Kinmen’s waters in response to the incident suggests the PRC had pre-formulated reactions to this type of contingency. The PRC exploited the capsizing incident as a pretense to initiate a concerted coercion campaign that serves to incrementally challenge and erode the ROC’s sovereignty in its adjacent waters.

The PRC has shown that it is unwilling to return to the status quo before the Kinmen incident. The CCG and CGA cooperated on a joint search and rescue effort after a PRC fishing vessel capsized in PRC-controlled waters around Kinmen on March 14.[8] Both coast guards conducted search operations within their respective jurisdictions. CGA Director Chou Mei-wu framed the cooperation as a means to ease tensions with the PRC after the initial capsizing incident in February.[9] The CCG’s successive border violations on March 15 and 16 demonstrate the PRC’s rejection of opportunities to de-escalate tensions as it continues to erode ROC sovereignty around its outer islands.

The Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) are pursuing political reforms that threaten to undermine the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) governance by expanding legislative oversight of the executive branch. The reforms aim to strengthen the Legislative Yuan’s (LY) investigation rights by granting it more power to conduct inquiries and call on officials to testify before the LY, establish penalties for perceived non-compliance or dishonesty in responses, and empower the LY to confirm political appointments.[10] The TPP and KMT have consistently stated that establishing a legislative investigative task force to strengthen oversight of the executive branch is at the top of their agenda.[11] KMT caucus Secretary-General Lin Tzu-ming earlier referred to the proposed mechanism as a “great weapon” that the LY must use to supervise the government.[12] Collaboration between the KMT and the TPP on the proposals suggests that the reforms will pass with a majority in the LY, as the two opposition parties outnumber the DPP in the LY. The opposition’s plan to impose checks and balances on the DPP could significantly hamper the government’s ability to pass policy by miring it in defensive actions against accusations of overstepping authority or corruption.

The reforms have passed the initial stage and are scheduled for review by the LY’s Judiciary and Organic Laws and Statutes Committee. DPP Caucus Whip and LY Judicial Committee member Ker Chien-ming argued that the reforms are unconstitutional. Ker threatened a procedural objection that could delay the committee’s review process if the KMT did not arrange a public hearing to scrutinize the bill.[13] KMT Caucus Whip and LY Judicial Committee member Fu Kun-chi accused the DPP of obstruction and stated that “only checks and balances will prevent the DPP from falling into corruption.”[14]

The PRC Ministry of Defense (MOD) warned the United States was “playing with fire” in stationing Green Berets on the Kinmen and Penghu islands. US-based special operations-focused online publication SOFREP first reported on March 8 that US Army Special Forces (Green Berets) would be permanently stationed at the Taiwanese Army’s amphibious command centers on the outlying islands of Kinmen and Penghu.[15] ROC Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng responded to media inquiries about the permanent presence of US troops in Taiwan on March 14 without confirming the details of the SOFREP report. Chiu stated that interactions with friendly countries fall within the scope of exchange and cooperation, and help Taiwan’s armed forces recognize blind spots and shortcomings in military preparedness.[16] US service members have trained Taiwanese military personnel for decades in an arrangement that Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen first acknowledged in 2021.[17] Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command John Aquilino said on March 20 that reports of US troops “permanently stationed” on Kinmen were inaccurate, however.[18]

PRC MOD spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang responded to the ROC claim on March 15 by stressing that the “Taiwan issue” is the first “insurmountable red line” in US-PRC relations. Zhang said that the US troop deployment and arms sales to Taiwan aimed to “weaken, hollow out, and distort” the one-China principle and warned that “those who connive at and support ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces will get burned for playing with fire and taste the bitter fruit of their own doing.” He said the PRC military will “resolutely smash ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist activities and external interfering attempts.”[19]

PRC officials strongly objected to Taiwan Vice President-Elect Hsiao Bi-khim’s visits to the United States and Czechia. Hsiao, Taiwan’s former envoy to the United States, began a low-profile “personal trip” to Washington DC during the week of March 12. Media reports said that US and Taiwanese officials tried to keep the trip a secret to avoid angering the PRC, but cited unnamed sources who said Hsiao would meet with unspecified US officials to discuss her incoming administration’s agenda.[20] Spokesperson for the PRC embassy in the United States Liu Penghu called Hsiao a “diehard Taiwan independence separatist” and expressed Beijing’s firm opposition to her trip.[21] Liu and MFA spokesperson Wang Wenbin both stressed the PRC “firmly opposes” any official interaction between the United States and Taiwan.[22] Hsiao also visited Czechia on March 19 and met with Czech Senate President Miloš Vystrčil at a think tank event.[23] MFA spokesperson Lin Jian expressed opposition and warned Czechia to end its “bad behavior” of holding exchanges with Taiwan.[24]

China

The PRC signaled strong opposition to a US bill that would ban TikTok in the United States if TikTok’s PRC parent company does not sell its stake. TikTok is owned by the PRC technology firm Bytedance. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Wang Wenbin accused the United States of overstretching the concept of “national security” to hinder foreign competition, said the attempt to force the sale of TikTok was based on “sheer robbers’ logic,” and warned that the US moves would eventually backfire. Wang claimed the US government has never found evidence that TikTok poses a national security threat.[25] Wang also claimed the PRC’s bans on Facebook, Instagram, and other Western social media were “completely incomparable” to the US approach to TikTok because the PRC allegedly welcomes all foreign products and platforms “as long as they observe Chinese laws,” while the US government was discriminating against a specific company.[26]

TikTok has claimed it never shares US user data with the PRC, but the US government recommended that government employees avoid the app over concerns that it may allow PRC access to user data.[27] Former head of engineering for TikTok in the United States Yintao Yu claimed in 2023 that CCP officials could access US user data from the app.[28] TikTok’s parent Bytedance is a private company but has an internal CCP committee to regulate its “political direction,” like most large PRC firms.[29] The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) additionally stated that TikTok accounts run by a “PRC propaganda arm” targeted US Congressional candidates during the 2022 midterm elections.[30]

Northeast Asia

Japan

The PRC MOD framed the growth of Japan’s defense budget increase as unjustified and militaristic rather than a response to regional security issues, including PLA military coercion targeting Japan. The Japanese Cabinet approved a USD 55.9 billion defense budget for Fiscal Year 2024 in December 2023. The budget stipulates annual increases until it reaches USD 62.5 billion for Fiscal Year 2027.[31] The PRC MOD claimed on March 15 that this increase makes “the international community question whether Japan… adheres to the path of peaceful development.”[32] The Japanese defense budget increase comes in response to PRC aggression around the Japanese home islands. Japan’s Joint Staff noted in January 2024 that it scrambled fighters 555 times in the last nine months of 2023.[33] 98 percent of the scrambles responded to Chinese and Russian aircraft, and more than 50 percent occurred near Japan’s southwest airspace, which encompasses the Miyako Strait.[34]

North Korea

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko met with Chinese Special Representative on Korean Peninsula Affairs Liu Xiaoming in Moscow on March 19 to discuss the situation on the Korean Peninsula.[35] Rudenko and Liu accused the United States and its allies of threatening the military situation in northeastern Asia and warned the United States against the proliferation of Cold War-style “bloc thinking.”[36] The PRC MFA issued similar comments in framing the United States–South Korea Freedom Shield military exercise as causing instability on the Korean Peninsula.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The PRC is framing the United States as a destabilizing force in the South China Sea ahead of the April 11 US-Japan-Philippines trilateral summit.[37] PRC MFA Spokesman Wang Wenbin remarked on March 14 to a question about the summit that the “US has traveled halfway around the world to China’s doorsteps to form exclusive circles, flex muscles and make provocations.”[38] United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken reiterated an “ironclad” commitment to the US-Philippine alliance on March 19 in the ongoing aftermath of PRC revisionism in the SCS.[39] PRC MFA Spokesman Lin Jian responded on March 19 that the United States is “not a party” to South China Sea issues and therefore has no right to “intervene” in Sino-Philippine disputes.[40] The MFA’s rhetoric is consistent with previous PRC messaging about the US role in the region. The PRC MOD framed the United States as “creating bloc confrontations that escalate regional tension” after the June 2023 US-Japan-Philippines trilateral summit.[41]

The messaging from the PRC MFA aims to deflect blame from the PRC for heightened tensions in the South China Sea, namely over the Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal. Scarborough Shoal is a contested atoll that the PRC and the Philippines claim and that has been under de facto PRC control since 2012.[42] The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) erected a floating barrier and intercepted Philippine Coast Guard vessels in February to deny the Philippines access to the shoal.[43] The CCG has also disrupted Philippine Coast Guard missions to ensure the security of Filipino fishermen near the shoal. The Second Thomas Shoal is a submerged reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea which the Philippines and the PRC both claim. The Philippines controls the shoal with troops based on the grounded warship BRP Sierra Madre. A CCG vessel attempted to block and collided with a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel escorting a supply mission to Second Thomas Shoal on March 5, causing minor damage to the Philippine ship.[44] Two CCG ships also fired water cannons at a separate Philippine supply ship, injuring four Philippine personnel, and later collided with it.[45]

The CCG actions In the South China Sea support PRC claims of sovereignty over nearly the entirety of the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, through the “nine dash line” maritime boundary. The PRC rejects a 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that declared the nine dash line claims are unlawful.[46] The PRC has constructed, seized, and attempted to seize many islands in the South China Sea so it can build a military presence throughout the critical waterway. The PRC has built military infrastructure on islands that it has seized control of or artificially constructed to expand its power projection capability, strengthen domain awareness, and increase its control over critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) through the South China Sea. Developing the capability to monitor or restrict ships through the South China Sea would support a future PRC effort to implement a blockade of Taiwan or block US and allied reinforcements from reaching the Taiwan Strait in wartime.

Australia

PRC Foreign Minister Want Yi visited Australia and New Zealand between March 17 and 21. Wang’s meeting with New Zealand Foreign Affairs Minister Winston Peters addressed implementing the China-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement, as well as disagreements over New Zealand’s potential ascension into AUKUS.[47] The PRC MFA framed Wang’s separate meetings with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Penny Wong as seeking common ground and opportunities for Sino-Australian collaboration.[48] Wang’s visit to Australia also included meetings with the Australian business community and former Prime Minister Paul Keating.[49] Keating is a prominent critic of AUKUS and a former board member of the CCP-run China Development Bank.[50] This is the first visit by a PRC foreign minister to Australia since 2017.[51]

Europe

Russia-Ukraine War

The PRC advocated for direct dialogue between Russia and Ukraine without committing to the Ukraine-proposed “global peace summit” in Switzerland. PRC Ambassador to Switzerland Wang Shihting said in an interview on March 18 that the PRC supports direct dialogue between Russia and Ukraine as soon as possible. He also stated that the PRC is “examining the possibility of taking part” in the Ukraine-proposed “global peace summit." [52] MFA spokesperson Lin Jian subsequently avoided directly answering whether the PRC would participate in the summit or whether it would push for Russia to participate.[53]

Wang Shihting’s comments do not signal a change in PRC policy toward the war in Ukraine. The PRC has consistently backed peace talks or negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, in abstract terms, and portrayed itself as an impartial and “stabilizing” force in pushing for a political settlement to end the war. It has not committed to any specific peace talk proposals, however. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi dismissed Ukraine’s proposal for peace talks in Switzerland on February 17 during the Munich Security Conference, stating that there were not “ripe conditions” for peace talks, in comments that were omitted from PRC readouts.[54] Wang Yi told the National People’s Congress on March 7 that the PRC supports holding “in due course” an international peace conference recognized by both Russia and Ukraine.[55] Russia has said it will not participate in the summit even if invited.[56] PRC Special Envoy for Eurasian Affairs Li Hui reiterated PRC support for a “timely convening of an international peace conference” but acknowledged on March 22 that “there is a relatively big gap in [the Russian and Ukrainian] understanding of peace talks.” Li’s acknowledgement of differences in the two sides’ understanding of peace talks was absent from the PRC readout of his remarks.[57]

The PRC rhetorically aligns with Russian framing in criticizing NATO, portraying the Western security order and arms sales to Ukraine as fueling the war, opposing sanctions on Russia, and calling for respect for Russia’s “legitimate security concerns.”[58] The PRC has not shown any willingness to pressure Russia to end the war.

Middle East

Israel-Hamas War

The PRC had its first public diplomatic meeting with a Hamas official and its first diplomatic visits to Israel and the West Bank since Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7. PRC MFA envoy Wang Kejian met with the head of Hamas’ political bureau Ismail Haniyeh in Doha, Qatar on March 17. This was the first meeting between PRC and Hamas officials that the PRC has publicly acknowledged since the war in Gaza began in October 2023. Hamas claimed that Wang called Hamas “part of the Palestinian national fabric” and said the PRC is “keen on relations with it.”[59] The PRC readout simply said Wang and Haniyeh “exchanged views on the Gaza conflict.”[60] The PRC has not publicly criticized Hamas since the war began. MFA Spokesperson Lin Jian said on March 19 that the PRC supports the Palestinian Authority in governing all Palestinian territories and called for “internal reconciliation” among all political factions in Palestine, however.[61]

Wang, who is a former ambassador to Lebanon, has been in the Middle East since at least March 10 discussing the Gaza war with officials in Egypt, Israel, the West Bank, and Qatar.[62] He led the PRC’s first diplomatic trip to Israel and Palestine since the war began, meeting with Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister Riyad al Maliki in the West Bank on March 13 and Israeli foreign ministry officials Hagai Shagrir and Rachel Feinmesser in Israel on March 14. The PRC readouts for the meetings in Israel and the West Bank said Wang reiterated the PRC support for a ceasefire in Gaza, humanitarian aid, and the promotion of a two-state solution, though these policy positions were absent from the readout of the Hamas meeting.[63] This has been the PRC’s consistent stance on the conflict, which broadly aligns with the view of Arab states and allows the PRC to portray itself as a responsible great power that is pushing for peace. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi endorsed Palestine becoming a full member of the UN on March 7.[64]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, March 15, 2024

Click here to read the full report

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: March 14 at 5 pm ET

Key Takeaways

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense announced that it redefined its criteria for a “first strike” against PRC military assets, which now include a “first move” by PLA aircraft and vessels across Taiwan’s territorial boundaries.
A PRC Taiwan Affairs official participated in the negotiations on Kinmen, which is inconsistent with the CCP policy of not holding official exchanges with Taiwan’s DPP government.
Taiwan’s Kuomintang is implementing party reforms to restrain the influence of a hardline faction and better appeal to young voters in future elections.
The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua stated that “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan remains the PRC’s policy despite the omission of the term “peaceful” from the Two Sessions government work report.
The PRC, Russia, and Iran held the joint Maritime Security Belt – 2024 naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman from March 11 to 15.
The People’s Liberation Army increased the number of military aircraft flights through the Miyako Strait in March, likely as part of an effort to normalize flights outside of the first island chain.
The PRC portrayed the Philippines as a provocateur rather than a partner for managing disputes in the South China Sea while the Chinese Coast Guard drives heightened tensions in the South China Sea.
The PRC defined its coastal baseline that extends its territorial waters and claims of sovereignty in the Gulf of Tonkin. The baseline is not in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, to which the PRC is a signatory.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced that it redefined its criteria for a “first strike” against PRC military assets, which now include a “first move” by PLA aircraft and vessels across Taiwan’s territorial boundaries. ROC Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng told Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan that Taiwan reserves the right to take military countermeasures if enemy military planes or ships enter Taiwan’s territorial waters or airspace and Taiwan fails to expel them by interception, identification, and warning. He did not clarify if the “first strike” concept applies to Taiwan’s outlying islands. Chiu said that the MND adopted the concept of a “first move” in February 2021. It further developed the concept after the large-scale PLA air and naval exercises around Taiwan in August 2022, which the PRC launched in response to then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. Chiu said the MND’s definition of an enemy “first strike” before the policy change specifically referred to enemy artillery or missile fire at Taiwan. The reason for changing the definition was to counter the PRC’s “gray zone” operations around Taiwan.[1] The CCP has not publicly commented on the policy change as of March 13.

Chiu also described the security situation in the Taiwan Strait to legislators and explained that it is “on the brink” of escalating to a heightened threat alert level. He referenced recent events that have contributed to escalating tensions, including the PRC’s explicit denial of the median line in the Taiwan Strait and the death of two PRC fishermen near Kinmen, whose boat capsized while they fled from Taiwan’s Coast Guard. Chiu also said that the PRC has increased the frequency of its air and naval missions near Taiwan and that these missions take place closer to Taiwan than before. He said he did not expect war to break out, however.[2]

The PRC is conducting dredging operations in the Liuwudian Channel near Taiwan’s Kinmen island group, possibly to facilitate the passage of PRC vessels. The Liuwudian Channel is located between Lieyu Island (known as Little Kinmen) and the islands of Dadan and Erdan, which are part of Taiwan’s Kinmen Island group. The ROC agreed in 2015 to let PRC ships pass through the Liuwudian Channel between Xiamen port on the PRC mainland and the sea even though the channel passes through Kinmen’s restricted and prohibited waters. The PRC did not make use of the channel after Tsai Ing-wen was elected president of Taiwan in 2016, however. Deputy Minister of Taiwan’s Ocean Affairs Council Chou Mei-wu said that the dredging activities were routine operations on the PRC side of the Liuwudian channel, but that the dredgers sailed through restricted and prohibited waters around Kinmen.[3]

Retired ROC General Lee Cheng-chieh said the dredging of the channel means the PRC plans to use the waterway in the future. He said the PRC could use ships in the Liuwudian channel in the future to block military supply shipments to Taiwanese garrisons on Dadan and Erdan.[4] Lee is a frequent commentator on foreign and military affairs whose opinions are often covered by KMT-aligned media and PRC media.[5] ROC Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng said dredging vessels operating in Kinmen’s restricted waters do not constitute a “first strike” under the MND policy which authorizes Taiwan to respond with military force to enemy military incursions into its territory.[6]

Dredging sand in Taiwan-controlled waters is one of a growing range of “gray zone” tactics the PRC uses to harass Taiwan, assert its territorial claims, and strain Taiwan’s resources and response capability.[7]

Thousands of PRC dredgers have illegally operated in and around Taiwan’s restricted waters, including around the Kinmen and Matsu islands, for at least a decade. The dredgers usually extract sand and gravel from the seabed for use in construction projects.[8] Taiwan’s CGA interpreted illegal dredging to be non-political profit-seeking behavior in 2020 and agreed to cooperate with the PRC to crack down on the activity.[9] Taiwanese media and scholars were openly describing dredging activities near Taiwanese territory as “gray zone warfare tactics,” as of late 2023, however. Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan passed a law to allow Taiwan to confiscate any vessels caught illegally dredging sand in its waters.[10]

ROC National Security Bureau Director Tsai Ming-yen said the PRC’s "joint combat readiness patrols" around Taiwan are related to Taiwan’s exchanges with foreign countries. Tsai said the PRC patrols occur every 7–10 days on average and involve around 10 military aircraft and 3 to 4 naval ships. Tsai said that whenever other countries pass resolutions friendly to Taiwan, foreign vessels pass through the Taiwan Strait, or foreign dignitaries visit Taiwan, the PRC coordinates its existing regular patrols to coincide with these diplomatic events.

Tsai further said the PRC is likely to intensify its “push and pull” tactics against Taiwan before and after President-elect Lai Ching-te’s May 20 inauguration, including military and political intimidation combined with economic incentives for Taiwanese people to further the cause of “reunification.”[11] Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense said in a report to the Legislative Yuan that the PRC has stepped up “multi-front saturated gray-zone tactics” around Taiwan, including balloons, drones, and civilian vessels, along with increased patrols of military ships and planes. The MND report said the PRC aimed to "increase burdens of [Taiwan’s] naval and air forces and to obscure the existence of the median line in the strait.[12] ISW has reported that some of “gray zone” tactics increased during Taiwan’s 2023-2024 election season in tandem with influence operations over local Taiwanese officials and businesspeople, as well as the PRC’s ongoing push for economic “cross-strait integration.”

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) denied media reports that ROC-PRC negotiations on the “Kinmen incident” broke down and said they would resume after Kinmen prosecutors finish investigating the incident. The Kinmen incident refers to the February 14 event in which a PRC fishing boat in Taiwan’s prohibited waters near Taiwan’s Kinmen Island, which is roughly 10 kilometers from the PRC city of Xiamen, capsized while fleeing from a legal Taiwanese Coast Guard pursuit. The capsizing resulted in the deaths of two of the four fishermen onboard. PRC and ROC representatives have held 15 rounds of negotiations on Kinmen to resolve disputes around the incident, including PRC demands that Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) apologize, reveal the truth of what happened, and return the capsized boat. Taiwanese media reported that the negotiations collapsed on March 6 because the two sides failed to reach a consensus and went home. The CGA claimed the negotiations broke down because the PRC demanded to interrogate CGA personnel and did not recognize Taiwan’s maritime boundaries or law enforcement rights.^[13] The MAC denied that negotiations had “broken down,” however, and merely said the first phase of negotiations had ended. MAC officials said negotiations would resume after Taiwan’s judicial investigation into the incident concludes.^[14] [15]

A PRC Taiwan Affairs official participated in the negotiations on Kinmen, which is inconsistent with the CCP policy of not holding official exchanges with Taiwan’s DPP government. Quanzhou Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) deputy director Li Zhaohui was one of three leaders of a PRC delegation to negotiate with Taiwanese authorities about the February 14 capsizing incident.^[16] The other two were Jinjiang Red Cross chairman Cao Rongshan and Director of the Coordination Department of the China Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) Xu Weiwei.^[17] Quanzhou and Jinjiang are PRC cities near the Kinmen islands. Although Li is a TAO official, PRC state media CGTN, Enlightenment Daily, and other PRC media described him as an associate or advisor to the Red Cross in articles about the negotiations.^[18] The ROC side of the negotiations was led by CGA officials including Deputy Director-General Hsu Ching-chih and Fleet Branch Director Liao Te-cheng.^[19]

The presence of a PRC government official at the negotiations is inconsistent with the CCP policy of not directly interacting with the Taiwanese government. This has been the CCP’s policy since Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party became president of Taiwan in 2016. The CCP insists that all cross-strait negotiations must be held on the mutual basis of the “1992 consensus,” which Tsai and the DPP do not recognize. The 1992 Consensus is an alleged verbal agreement between semi-official representatives of the PRC and the then KMT-ruled ROC following negotiations in 1992. It states that both sides agree there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The CCP interprets this “one China” to be the People’s Republic of China, however, while the KMT interprets it to be the Republic of China.

Li’s involvement in the negotiations also undermines the CCP's effort to legitimize the KMT as a negotiating partner on behalf of Taiwan in contrast with the DPP. KMT vice chairman Andrew Hsia traveled to the PRC and met with TAO director Song Tao on February 29 to discuss the Kinmen capsizing incident concurrently with the DPP government-led negotiations on Kinmen.

Taiwan

Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and DPP-led government raised concerns that a KMT push to legalize absentee voting for overseas Taiwanese could enable CCP interference in Taiwan’s elections. Taiwanese voters are required to return to the city or county of their household registration to vote in elections.[20] Taiwan’s cabinet approved a bill in February 2024 that allows absentee voting for national referenda for Taiwanese nationals living in Taiwan. This means that voters can vote in person in the area where they live instead of having to return to their hometown. Premier Chen Chien-jen and Interior Minister Lin Yu-chang said the government has no plans to permit absentee voting for national elections, however.[21] The KMT has been pushing for legislation to legalize absentee voting in elections, including permitting mail-in ballots for Taiwanese people living overseas. DPP politicians including National Bureau Director Tsai Ming-yen raised concerns that permitting overseas absentee voting, especially for Taiwanese people living in the PRC, could create a security risk of PRC interference in Taiwan’s elections.[22] KMT politicians, including party chairman Eric Chu, pointed out that many countries, including the United States, have implemented absentee voting and accused the DPP of disenfranchising Taiwanese citizens under the pretense of national security.[23]

Taiwan’s Overseas Community Affairs Council estimates that around 2 million Taiwanese citizens live overseas, excluding the PRC.[24] Estimates of Taiwanese who live or work in the PRC range from around 160,000 according to the PRC’s 2021 census to over 1 million by other estimates.[25] The CCP frequently conducts outreach to Taiwanese businesspeople and other ROC nationals living in the PRC to influence them to vote for more PRC-friendly candidates.

Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT) is implementing party reforms to restrain the influence of a hardline faction and better appeal to young voters in future elections. KMT Chairman Eric Chu announced on March 6 that the party would disband its historic Huang Fuxing branch and reorganize it into a “veterans service working committee.” Huang Fuxing is a powerful conservative branch of the party that older military veterans and their dependents dominate. It supports Taiwan’s eventual reunification with China. It is organized separately from local party branches and has around 80,000 members. Chu said the reform was part of an effort to improve the efficiency of party affairs, integrate with local governments to expand services to party members, and appeal to younger generations.[26] KMT vice chairman Sean Lien said the reorganization aims to better allocate party resources. He said that Huang Fuxing’s NT$60 million of annual expenditures amounted to the KMT’s largest expense and dwarfed spending on other departments including publicity, youth, and women’s party organizations.[27] Various Huang Fuxing members and other KMT politicians strongly objected to the reform, however, and said it could cost the KMT a crucial base of support in elections. Some hardliners called on Eric Chu to resign and threatened to leave the KMT or join third parties like the Taiwan People’s Party or the New Party to show their displeasure.[28]

The KMT’s dissolution of the Huang Fuxing branch shows an effort by the party's central leadership to constrain the influence of the older and more conservative deep-Blue faction in favor of appealing to younger voters. The reform was triggered by the KMT’s loss in the 2024 presidential election and the increasing unpopularity of PRC-friendly policies promoted by the deep-Blue wing of the party.

The reforms may lead the KMT to moderate its stance on cross-strait relations to be more in line with the Taiwanese public, which overwhelmingly embraces a Taiwanese (and not Chinese) identity and opposes unification with China. The reforms risk former members of Huang Fuxing leaving the KMT or defecting to other parties, however, which would split the pan-Blue vote in future elections and decrease the KMT’s chances of victory.

China

The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua stated that “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan remains the PRC’s policy despite the omission of the term “peaceful” from the Two Sessions government work report.[29] Premier Li Qiang’s work report to the National People’s Congress on March 5 omitted the word “peaceful” in the continuation of a trend of CCP officials using less restrained language about unification with Taiwan. Chen said the PRC is willing to “create a broad space for peaceful reunification” but will never renounce the right to use force or “all necessary measures” to achieve reunification. This language is consistent with the PRC’s standard messaging regarding Taiwan. The TAO is the primary agency responsible for cross-strait relations and conducting the PRC’s Taiwan policy.

The PRC’s recent measures to exert pressure on the ROC illustrate its adoption of a more aggressive approach to realizing unification, however. These measures include influence operations and the use of law enforcement to erode Taiwan’s territorial control. The PRC recently expanded its efforts to conceal its pressure campaigns. Deputy leader of the Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs Wang Huning led an interagency meeting in December to coordinate and camouflage the CCP’s efforts to influence Taiwan’s elections, according to a Taiwanese intelligence leak of the top-secret meeting. Wang allegedly urged officials at the meeting to step up effectiveness to influence Taiwan’s public opinion and reduce the detectability of its tactics by “external parties.”[30] The PRC’s opportunistic exploitation of the Kinmen capsizing incident to increase pressure on Taiwan further illustrates its growing pressure on Taiwan. The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) pledged in February to strengthen law enforcement and conduct regular inspections in the waters around Kinmen, resulting in an unprecedented boarding of a Taiwanese civilian vessel in Kinmen’s waters.[31]

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping’s address during the Twentieth Party Congress in 2022 also signals the impetus for more intense efforts to pressure Taiwan. Xi called for cracking down on Taiwanese separatism and foreign interference in Taiwan and urged stronger efforts to realize unification.[32] Xi’s call to action serves to galvanize a more aggressive attitude in CCP policymakers, indicating the trend of escalation against Taiwan will continue.

Russia and Iran

The PRC, Russia, and Iran held the joint Maritime Security Belt – 2024 naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman from March 11 to 15.[33] Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestia reported on March 11 that a detachment of ships of Russia’s Pacific Fleet, including the Varyag Slava-class cruiser, arrived at Iran’s Chabahar Port to participate in Maritime Security Belt-2024 alongside Iranian and Chinese naval detachments.[34] The annual exercise began in 2019.[35] The Russian Marshal Shaposhnikov Udaloy-class destroyer; the Chinese Ürümqi destroyer, Linyi frigate, Dongpinghu replenishment ship; and 10 unnamed Iranian ships, boats, and supply vessels and three naval helicopters are taking part in the exercise.[36] Representatives of Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Oman, India, and South Africa will observe the exercise.[37]

Northeast Asia

Japan

The People’s Liberation Army increased the number of military aircraft flights through the Miyako Strait in March, likely as part of an effort to normalize flights outside of the first island chain. The PLA flew a Y-9 medium transport aircraft in the Miyako Strait on March 9 and 10.[38] It then flew a Y-9 and two H-6 bombers through the Miyako Strait on March 12.[39] Japan’s Joint Staff noted in January 2024 that it scrambled fighters 555 times in the last nine months of 2023.[40] 98 percent of the scrambles responded to Chinese and Russian aircraft and more than 50 percent occurred near Japan’s southwest airspace, which encompasses the Miyako Strait. [41] The concentration of the PLA component of these intrusions in the southwest indicates the PLA’s intent to operate outside the first island chain.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The PRC portrayed the Philippines as a provocateur rather than a partner for managing disputes in the South China Sea while the Chinese Coast Guard drives heightened tensions in the South China Sea. The PRC sent 11 proposals for “managing the situation at sea and carrying our maritime cooperation” to the Philippines in April 2023.[42] PRC MFA Spokesman Wang Wenbing claimed on March 12, 2024, that “the Philippines has not yet responded to most of the proposals and made frequent infringements and provocations at sea.” [43] Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr stated on March 11, 2024 that “we have not rejected any proposals that China has made to us but the premise is something that we questioned…that premise that China has made is that their territory follows what is now described as a 10 dash line.”[44] The 10 dash line is the expansive PRC territorial claim over the South China Sea and Taiwan. The PRC’s nine-dash line precursor claimed the same territory but with one less dash around Taiwan.

Wang’s comments aim to deflect blame from the PRC to the Philippines for heightened tensions over the Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal. Scarborough Shoal is a contested atoll that the PRC and the Philippines claim and that has been under de facto PRC control since 2012. The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) erected a floating barrier and intercepted Philippine Coast Guard vessels in February to deny the Philippines access to the shoal. The CCG has also disrupted Philippine Coast Guard missions near the shoal to ensure the security of Filipino fishermen in the area. The Second Thomas Shoal is a submerged reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea which the Philippines and the PRC both claim. The Philippines controls the shoal with troops based on the grounded warship BRP Sierra Madre. A CCG vessel attempted to block and collided with a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel escorting a supply mission to Second Thomas Shoal on March 5, causing minor damage to the Philippine ship. Two CCG ships also fired water cannons at a separate Philippine supply ship, injuring four Philippine personnel, and later collided with it.

The CCG actions in the South China Sea support PRC claims of sovereignty over nearly the entirety of the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, through the “nine dash line” maritime boundary. The PRC rejects a 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that found the nine dash line claims are unlawful. The PRC has constructed, seized, and attempted to seize many islands in the South China Sea so it can build a military presence throughout the critical waterway. The PRC has built military infrastructure on islands that it has seized control of or artificially constructed to expand its power projection capability, strengthen domain awareness, and increase its ability to block critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) through the South China Sea. Developing the capability to monitor or restrict ships through the South China Sea would support a future PRC effort to implement a blockade of Taiwan or block US and allied reinforcements from reaching the Taiwan Strait in wartime.

The PRC and Philippines' bilateral diplomatic forums for managing tensions in the South China Sea are unlikely to change PRC behavior in the region. The CCP has a track record of engaging in dialogue while driving crises to achieve its political objective. In 2012 the party engaged in negotiations with the Philippines to end a standoff at the Scarborough Shoal, which Manilla administered at the time, while steadily increasing the number of Chinese Coast Guard ships near the shoal.[45] This resulted in the Philippines withdrawing its ships from the shoal in mid-June 2012 under a now-disputed agreement that the PRC would do the same.[46] The CCP subsequently kept its ships near the shoal and achieved its political objective of gaining de facto control of the Scarborough Shoal by July 2012.[47] In 2016 the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Arbitration Tribunal unanimously ruled in favor of the Philippines by rejecting the legitimacy of PRC claims to territory inside of the nine dash line and land reclamation activities.[48] The CCP has ignored the ruling by continuing land reclamation efforts and maritime coercion in the South China Sea over the last eight years.

These PRC efforts continue despite PRC Assistant Foreign Minister Nong Rong and Philippine Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Theresa Lazaro co-chairing the eighth meeting of the China-Philippines Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) on the South China Sea in January 2024.[49] The PRC has continued its coercive behavior over the past decade in the South China Sea while not honoring prior diplomatic or international legal agreements.

Vietnam

The PRC defined its coastal baseline that extends its territorial waters and claims of sovereignty in the Gulf of Tonkin. The baseline is not in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, to which the PRC is a signatory. [50]A baseline is a conceptual line that a state uses to define its territorial waters, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and continental shelf. The PRC last issued a baseline in 1996 with the announcement of 49 points that stretch eastward from the island of Hainan to the Shandong peninsula on its eastern seaboard.[51] The 1996 baseline excluded the Gulf of Tonkin. The PRC and Vietnam signed the landmark Maritime Boundary Delimitation Agreement in 2000 that defined each country’s territorial waters and EEZs in the Gulf of Tonkin.[52] The new PRC baseline in the Gulf of Tonkin extends 24 nautical miles beyond where normal basepoints would be under the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.[53]

Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Pham Thu Hang urged that the PRC adhere to the UNCLOS when determining the baseline to measure territorial waters and “respect and comply with” the 2000 delimitation agreement. [54] The PRC claimed that the baseline is in accordance with its domestic laws, however.[55] The PRC’s Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs posted on WeChat that the new baseline in the Gulf of Tonkin “fills the gap of the westernmost part of the Chinese mainland’s territorial sea.”[56] The WeChat announcement framed the baseline necessary to exercise national sovereignty and jurisdiction in the territorial sea.

The PRC’s rationale for the new baseline is unclear. The baseline is consistent with PRC efforts to solidify its legal claims over maritime areas and features, however. The PRC has taken incremental steps over decades to consolidate control over its ambitious maritime territorial claims, which encompass the entirety of the South China Sea. This is evident in the PRC’s seizure of the Paracel Islands from Vietnam in 1974, its excessive baseline assertions around them in 1996, and subsequent militarization across the Paracels. The PRC’s gradual assertion of sovereignty over the Paracel Islands highlights a gradational strategy to increase control and legitimacy in the disputed territory over long periods. The PRC’s gradual delimitation of regional bodies of water serves to establish a basis for its territorial claims and ultimately advance its control over sensitive maritime areas.

Maritime territorial conflicts between the PRC and Vietnam stretch back decades, with each country claiming to have held sovereignty over contested areas for centuries. Past disputes include the Gulf of Tonkin, while unresolved claims over the resource-rich and strategically important areas encompassing the Paracel and Spratly Islands make for ongoing conflict.

The PRC conducts regular maritime patrols around Vietnam’s oil and gas fields, which receive less public attention than PRC engagements with other rival claimants such as the Philippines.[57]

The PRC and Vietnam have a long-standing record of maritime disputes in the South China Sea and engage in occasional high-profile confrontations over South China Sea territorial claims. The PRC instigated a tense standoff in 2014 by deploying an oil rig in disputed waters south of the Paracel Islands, which Vietnam saw as a direct territorial provocation. The PRC sent approximately 40 Coast Guard vessels, 6 warships, a military aircraft, and dozens of logistical and fishing vessels to support the rig, prompting reciprocal military deployment from Vietnam.[58] The standoff ended when the PRC withdrew the oil rig after two months, claiming early completion of its work and denying any relevance to “external factors.”[59]

Oceania

The United States approved $7.1 billion in funding for the Compacts of Free Association, which are the financial assistance commitments that govern the US relationship with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands and grant US military access throughout their territories. Congress previously funded the COFAs for a 20-year period in 2003.[60] The United States renewed COFAs with Palau and Micronesia in May and the Marshall Islands in October and the US Congress approved them in March 2024.[61] [62] The $7.1 billion will cover the new 20-year COFAs that cover the period 2024 to 2043.[63]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, March 7, 2024
Click here to read the full report

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: March 7 at 12:00pm ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) claimed that three Chinese Coast Guard ships entered Taiwan’s contiguous zone off the east coast of the main island on February 27.
The Kuomintang (KMT) initiated a legislative inquiry into the Kinmen capsizing incident to determine the liability of Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration. This supports the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to vilify and undermine domestic Taiwanese support for the Democratic Progressive Party.
PRC Premier Li Qiang’s work report to the National People’s Congress continued a trend of CCP officials using more belligerent language about “reunification” with Taiwan but did not signal a major policy change.
Recent PRC diplomatic outreach in Europe may aim to advance the PRC’s September 2023 Proposal on the Reform and Development of Global Governance, which faults the West for the war in Ukraine.
Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ships fired water cannons and collided with Philippine ships while attempting to block a Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration claimed that three Chinese Coast Guard ships entered Taiwan’s contiguous zone off the east coast of the main island on February 27.[1] The contiguous zone around Taiwan and its closer islands constitutes the buffer between 12 and 24 nautical miles from the coast.[2] Taiwanese media reported that the presence of Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels in the waters along Taiwan’s east coast is rare, and the three vessels in question usually operate around the contested Senkaku Islands, which Japan controls.[3] The CCG vessels left without incident after the Coast Guard Administration (CGA) deployed to the location and demanded that they depart the area.[4] This incident coincides with a consistently higher presence of PRC ships in the waters around Kinmen since the capsizing incident. The Kinmen capsizing incident refers to the February 14 event in which a PRC fishing boat in Taiwan’s waters capsized while fleeing from a legal Taiwanese Coast Guard pursuit. The capsizing resulted in the deaths of two of the four fishermen onboard. CGA Director General Chou Mei-wu reported increased PRC vessel presence near Kinmen since the incident, with up to 11 vessels per day, including law enforcement and official ships.[5]

The presence of more CCG vessels around Taiwan’s water serves to incrementally challenge and erode the Republic of China's (ROC) sovereignty in its adjacent waters. Normalizing operations around Taiwan’s waters can set conditions for the PRC to apply further pressure on Taiwan in the future. The CCP does not accept Taiwan’s sovereignty over the waters. PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Zhu Fenglian denied the existence of Taiwan’s so-called prohibited and restricted waters on February 28.[6] The increase in the number of the CCG vessels illustrates the PRC’s opportunism as it capitalizes on heightened cross-strait tensions and political sensitivity stemming from the Kinmen capsizing incident.

The PRC’s intensified maritime activities complement its regular violations of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). Retired ROC Air Force Lieutenant General Chang Yen-ting pointed out on February 29 that the Ministry of National Defense (MND) detected a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft as close as 23 nautical miles from Taiwan’s northern coast.[7] Chang highlighted the proximity to Taiwan’s airspace and the challenges to the military’s operational depth and early warning time. The ROC Air Force announced on March 6 that it would resume nighttime flight training.[8] Chang stated in an interview that the measure is a necessary response to the higher frequency of PLA aircraft harassing Taiwan in recent years.[9]

The Kuomintang initiated a legislative inquiry into the Kinmen capsizing incident to determine the liability of Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration. This supports the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party to vilify and undermine domestic Taiwanese support for the Democratic Progressive Party. KMT-aligned independent legislator May Chin convened the Legislative Yuan’s Internal Affairs Committee on March 4, summoning Coast Guard and government officials to testify regarding the law enforcement process and subsequent handling of the incident. Chin favors closer relations with the PRC and has a history of meeting with CPP officials, prompting accusations from DPP members that she is under the CCP’s influence.[10] Ocean Affairs Council Minister and DPP member Kuan Bi-ling and CGA Director General Chou Mei-wu faced fierce questioning from Chin and KMT lawmakers about the cause of the incident and the liability of the CGA. Kuan and Chou pushed back against the notion that the CGA vessel’s collision with the mainland fishing boat caused it to capsize. Kuan and other DPP cabinet members stood by the Coast Guard’s actions as lawful and denied insinuations of guilt. DPP legislators disagreed with the KMT’s framing of the incident in a report, claiming it lent itself to the TAO’s position.[11] Kuan refuted allegations that she ordered the Coast Guard to open fire or that she was a hindrance to the reconciliation process. Kuan characterized the rumors as a cognitive warfare strategy by the CCP and emphasized the role of misinformation in shaping public perception of sensitive cross-strait issues.[12]

The KMT and CCP are urging the DPP to disclose the truth about the incident. The PRC blames the DPP and CGA for the deaths and failure of the reconciliation process.[13] The PRC has responded by repeatedly deploying CCG patrols into waters around Kinmen and Matsu, two Taiwan-controlled island groups that are close to the coast of the PRC.

China

The National People’s Congress announced a 5% GDP growth target and a 7.2% defense budget increase for 2024. PRC defense spending has outpaced the GDP growth target for over a decade.[14] Both figures are identical to growth targets announced at the 2023 National People’s Congress session.[15] Premier Li Qiang’s work report to the annual session of the NPC focused primarily on the PRC’s economic goals, including maintaining target growth rates, developing “new productive forces” to drive the economy, and furthering “reform and opening up” policies. Li said the economy was improving with a growth rate of 5.2% in 2023 but acknowledged that achieving the economic growth goals would not be easy.[16] The spokesperson for the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the PRC’s top advisory body which is having its annual session concurrently with the NPC, also signaled that the CPPCC was chiefly concerned about the economy.[17]

The PRC has the world’s second-largest defense budget after the United States and the budget is set to increase to 1.67 trillion yuan ($232 billion) in 2024. Although PRC defense spending has doubled since 2015, annual increases in defense spending have declined to single-digit percentages as economic growth has slowed. Official spending increases in defense have hovered around 7% each year since 2016.[18] The US Department of Defense estimated in 2021 that the PRC’s true spending on defense could be 1.1 to 2 times its official budget.[19] The PRC can likely sustain its military spending despite slowing economic growth, however. The state exerts considerable control over the country’s economy and the distribution of resources to various sectors. The PRC’s official defense spending is also much smaller than US defense spending as a percentage of GDP, equaling 1.6% of GDP in 2022 compared to 3.5% for the United States.[20]

PRC Premier Li Qiang’s work report to the National People’s Congress continued a trend of CCP officials using more belligerent language about “reunification” with Taiwan but did not signal a major policy change. Li stressed that the CCP must “resolutely oppose ‘Taiwan independence’ separatism and external interference.” Li’s predecessor Li Keqiang said in the 2023 work report that the CCP should “advance the process of the peaceful reunification of the motherland,” but Li Qiang dropped the word “peaceful” and called on the CCP to “unswervingly advance the great cause of the reunification of the motherland.” Li Qiang did say the CCP should promote the “peaceful development” of cross-strait relations, however.[21] State-owned media Global Times cited PRC scholars who said that the omission of the term “peaceful reunification” does not signal that the CCP has dropped this goal but rather signals that it considers fighting Taiwanese “secessionism” will be a more urgent task in 2024.[22] The change in the language of the report is consistent with the change of tone in CPPCC Chairman Wang Huning’s speech at the Taiwan Work Conference on February 23, which emphasized the need to “fight” (rather than merely “oppose”) Taiwanese independence and foreign interference.[23]

The premier’s government work report to the NPC also omitted the term “peaceful reunification” in 2016 and 2020, the years that ROC President Tsai Ing-wen won the presidential elections. That the report again dropped the term after the DPP won the 2024 presidential elections indicates that the change in rhetoric signals disapproval of the DPP presidency.[24]

CCP Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairmen Zhang Youxia and He Weidong highlighted the need to improve the military’s preparation for “major missions” at the annual National People’s Congress. Zhang and He participated in deliberations by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and People’s Armed Police (PAP) delegations as they reviewed the government work report at the NPC. Zhang highlighted the need to implement the CMC Chairman responsibility system, step up troop training, strengthen coordination of preparations for “major missions”, accelerate construction and implementation of network-enabled information systems, integrate military and civilian resources, and improve the military's “ability to win.” He Weidong stressed the need to strengthen training in CCP theory in the military and deepen political “rectification” and anti-corruption efforts.[25] Zhang and He’s recommendations provide insight into the PLA’s priorities in improving its readiness for “major missions” such as operations against Taiwan. These priorities include strengthening centralized CCP control over the military, strengthening personnel training and political loyalty, deepening military-civil fusion, and constructing information systems to facilitate joint operations in “informationized” warfare.

Russia

Recent PRC diplomatic outreach in Europe may aim to advance the PRC’s September 2023 Proposal on the Reform and Development of Global Governance, which faults the West for the war in Ukraine. The proposal calls the root of the “Ukraine crisis” lying “in the problem of security governance in Europe.” The “parties concerned… [must] accommodate each other’s legitimate concerns… [and] abandon the Cold War mentality.”[26] These are thinly veiled references to accommodating Russian historical grievances at the price of NATO unity and Ukrainian territorial sovereignty. The alleged “stabilizing force” of any PRC-negotiated ceasefire along these lines would normalize the principle of revisionist international aggression. This principle would provide the CCP with a precedent for the party to falsely justify aggressive coercion aimed at Taiwan, with the eventual political objective of annexing Taiwan into the PRC.

PRC Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs Li Hui traveled to Europe on March 2 for a round of visits to Russia, the EU, Poland, Ukraine, Germany, and France. PRC MFA Spokeswoman Mao Ning claimed that Li Hui would “pave the way for peace talks.”[27] Li’s comments align with Kremlin talking points, however. The South China Morning Post reported on March 6 that PRC Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs Li Hui reiterated the Kremlin talking point that the discussion of Ukrainian territorial sovereignty could only occur when violence ceases. He also implied that the EU needs to stop sending weapons to Ukraine for this to happen.[28] Li’s claims align with PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s message at the Munich Security Conference in mid-February that the PRC is a “responsible major country” that would serve as a “stabilizing force” amid global turmoil. [29] Wang also repeated his claim on March 7 that the PRC “supports the timely convening of an international peace conference” during a press conference at the annual Two Sessions meeting.[30] CCP leadership delivers policy guidance for the upcoming year to the party cadre at this annual meeting.

The PRC and Russia are collaborating on the development of surveillance and energy-related space capabilities that threaten US access to space and space-based capabilities. The China National Space Administration (CNSA) stated in late February that the PRC plans to construct a surveillance system around the in-progress International Lunar Research Station. The surveillance system will use the Skynet mass surveillance system as a model.[31] Skynet is the PRC’s nationwide camera surveillance system that includes over 600 million cameras.[32] The ILRS is a multinational space station initiative that Russia and the PRC founded in 2021 that is scheduled for competition by the 2030s. CNSA did not specify how it would prioritize surveillance efforts in space. The head of Russia’s space agency, Roscosmos, Yuri Borisov also stated on March 5 that the PRC and Russia are considering cooperation to build a nuclear power plant on the moon in the early 2030s.[33] This is a competing initiative to an ongoing NASA project to design a nuclear fission reactor on the moon.[34]

Commander of United States Space Command General Stephen N. Whiting stated that these types of space-based systems compete with US interests during his February 29 testimony to the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services. He warned that the PRC “and the Russian Federation continued to field systems and engage in behavior that threaten U.S., Allied, and Partner access to space and space-based capabilities.”[35]

Southeast Asia

Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ships fired water cannons and collided with Philippine ships while attempting to block a Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal. A CCG vessel attempted to block and collided with a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel escorting a supply mission to Second Thomas Shoal on March 5, causing minor damage to the Philippine ship.[36] PCG spokesperson for the West Philippine Sea Commodore Jay Tarriela said that the CCG and Chinese Maritime Militia ships attempted “dangerous” blocking maneuvers against PCG vessels in an “unprovoked [act] of coercion.”[37] Two CCG ships also fired water cannons at a Philippine supply ship, injuring four Philippine personnel, and later collided with it. The supply ship returned to the Philippines under PCG escort. Another Philippine ship completed its mission of delivering supplies to personnel on the BRP Sierra Madre, a deliberately grounded derelict warship that serves as the Philippine base on Second Thomas Shoal.[38] The MFA claimed the Philippine supply mission was transporting construction materials.[39]

The CCG claimed that it took “control measures in accordance with the law” to stop the Philippines’ “illegal intrusion” and that a Philippine ship “deliberately rammed” a CCG ship.[40] A PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson accused the Philippines of violating its commitments to China to tow the Sierra Madre and violating the PRC’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights by “infringing, provoking and causing trouble” in the waters of Second Thomas Shoal, which the PRC calls “Ren’ai Reef” and the Philippines calls “Ayungin Shoal.”

Second Thomas Shoal is a submerged reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea which the Philippines and the PRC both claim. The Philippines controls the shoal with troops based on the grounded warship BRP Sierra Madre. It maintains its presence at the shoal with regular shipments of living supplies for its personnel and construction materials for repairing the World War II-era warship, which is in poor condition. The Philippines began “superficial repairs” on the ship in October 2023 to make it more livable for the roughly dozen Philippine military personnel stationed there.[41]

The PRC opposes these shipments and claims the Philippine military presence is illegal. The PRC claims sovereignty over nearly the entirety of the South China Sea including the Spratly Islands through its “Nine Dash Line” maritime boundary. It rejects a 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that found the Nine Dash Line claims are unlawful. The PRC has constructed, seized, and attempted to seize many islands in the South China Sea so it can build a military presence throughout the critical waterway. The PRC has built military infrastructure on islands that it has seized control of or artificially constructed to expand its power projection capability, strengthen domain awareness, and increase its ability to block critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) through the South China Sea. Developing the capability to monitor or restrict ships through the South China Sea would support a future PRC effort to implement a blockade of Taiwan or block US and allied reinforcements from reaching the Taiwan Strait in wartime.

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs objected to the Philippines’ passage of the “Maritime Zones Act” that codifies Philippine territorial claims in the South China Sea. The act is based on the 2016 Arbitration ruling, which found the PRC’s competing territorial claims in the region to be invalid. The Philippine Senate passed the Maritime Zones Act on February 26. The act establishes the Philippines’ archipelagic boundaries, internal waters, and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2016 Arbitral Ruling.[42] The 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration found that the PRC’s “Nine Dash Line” territorial claims to nearly the entire South China Sea, including many Philippine-claimed features, had no legal basis.[43] A PRC MFA spokesperson said on March 5 that the PRC “firmly opposes” the law. She reiterated the PRC stance that the PRC has sovereignty over many islands the Philippines claims, including the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal. She also asserted that the treaties originally delineating Philippine territory did not include these islands, that the Philippines illegally occupied PRC territory in the South China Sea, and that the 2016 arbitration ruling is illegal under UNCLOS.[44]

The PRC’s use of legal arguments in tandem with maritime operations to assert territorial claims over most of the South China Sea serves to lay the groundwork for PRC military control over the South China Sea. PRC control over the sea could enable it to establish domain awareness or block passage through the waterway to support a blockade or military operations against Taiwan. The legal arguments about UNCLOS and the territorial boundaries of rival claimants are part of a CCP effort to legitimize PLA and CCG actions in the South China Sea. “Legal warfare” is one of the PLA’s “three warfares” strategies of non-kinetic warfare, which also include psychological and public opinion warfare.

Oceania

Compacts of Free Association

The House of Representatives voted to renew the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) on March 6.[45] The bill is now before the Senate for consideration. The COFAs govern the United States’ relationship with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands while granting the United States military access throughout their territories. The United States renewed COFAs with Palau and Micronesia in May and the Marshall Islands in October.[46] [47] Congress previously funded the COFAs for a twenty-year period in 2003.[48] That funding has now expired. The renewal of the COFAs in 2024 would replenish this funding at a total cost for all three of the twenty-year agreements of roughly $7 billion spread over the period 2024 to 2043, according to the Congressional Research Service.[49]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, February 29, 2024

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, February 23, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, and Joseph Su of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: February 29 at 11am ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways:

The PRC Coast Guard patrolled prohibited and restricted waters around Taiwan-controlled Kinmen, likely as part of a PRC strategy to assert sovereignty over the island.
The PRC has increased deployments of research vessels in Taiwan’s contiguous zone to assert its territorial claims over Taiwan.
The Kuomintang chose defense obstructionist Ma Wen-chun to co-chair the Foreign and National Defense Committee of the Legislative Yuan. Ma proposed 135 cuts or freezes to Taiwan’s defense budget during 2023.
CCP rhetoric regarding Taiwan signals a redoubling of efforts to exert pressure on the ROC under the DPP's renewed mandate.
The PRC’s recent national security policy initiatives reflect the CCP’s growing threat perception of security risks to classified and sensitive information in the fraught geopolitical climate.
The Chinese Coast Guard has continued efforts to assert control over Scarborough Shoal. It erected a floating barrier and intercepted vessels that belong to the Philippine Coast Guard and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources.
The PRC is pursuing security cooperation with Kiribati to increase its security foothold in the Pacific Islands.

Cross-Strait Relations

The PRC Coast Guard entered and patrolled prohibited and restricted waters around Taiwan-controlled Kinmen, likely as part of a PRC strategy to assert sovereignty over the island. The Fujian branch of the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) announced that it had conducted law enforcement patrols around Kinmen on February 25.[1] PRC state media Global Times cited an “anonymous professional” who claimed the CCG entered the “restricted zone” around Kinmen island.[2] Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) did not confirm or deny the incursion.[3] ROC Ocean Affairs Council Minister Kuan Bi-ling stated that five CCG marine surveillance ships entered Kinmen’s “restricted zone” on February 26, however, including one that crossed into Kinmen’s “prohibited zone.” The total number of CCG ships around Kinmen increased to 11 on February 27, including two that entered Kinmen’s “restricted zone.”[4]

Taiwan does not claim any territorial waters around Kinmen partly due to its proximity to the PRC, but it designates “prohibited” and “restricted” waters around Kinmen which it treats as equivalent to territorial waters and a contiguous zone. Taiwan authorizes its coast guard to search and detain foreign vessels entering its prohibited waters. PRC authorities have said they do not recognize any “restricted” or “prohibited” waters around Kinmen because they claim that Kinmen, like all of Taiwan, is the territory of the PRC.[5] Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council has said that the PRC has tacitly abided by Kinmen’s claimed maritime boundaries until now, however.[6]

The latest PRC incursions into waters around Kinmen are part of an ongoing dispute over an incident on February 14 in which a Taiwanese Coast Guard vessel collided with a PRC fishing boat while chasing the boat out of Kinmen’s prohibited waters, resulting in the deaths of two of the four fishermen. The PRC blamed Taiwan for the deaths and has responded by repeatedly deploying CCG patrols into waters around Kinmen and Matsu, two Taiwan-controlled island groups situated very close to the coast of the PRC.[7] The CCG detained and boarded a Taiwanese tourism vessel near Kinmen on February 19.[8] The PRC state-owned Global Times said the CCG activities signal the normalization of law enforcement patrols in the waters near Kinmen and Xiamen, the PRC city near Kinmen, and that Taiwan’s government has no right to intervene.[9]

The PRC is taking advantage of the crisis instigated by the deaths of the fishermen to assert sovereignty over Kinmen and Matsu through law enforcement activities in the adjacent waters. Its actions also represent an increased pressure campaign against Taiwan ahead of Lai Ching-te’s May 20 inauguration as president of Taiwan. The PRC’s law enforcement activities in Kinmen’s waters may embolden it to attempt such tactics around other Taiwanese offshore islands such as Matsu and Penghu.

ROC Ocean Affairs Council Minister Kuan Bi-ling said the ships on February 26 left after the CGA broadcast a warning. She called the incursion “a clearly politicized attempt to exert sovereignty claims.”[10] Kuan noted Taiwanese media speculation that the PRC intends to impose a “Diaoyu” model in the waters around Kinmen, a move that Kuan said was unacceptable.[11] The CCG regularly patrols in waters around the Japan-administered Diaoyu islands (called Senkaku in Japanese) to assert PRC sovereignty over the islands. Taiwan Minister of Defense Chiu Kuo-cheng said on the same day that Taiwan’s military would not consider CCG vessels in Kinmen’s restricted waters a threat as long as they do not approach too close to land forces.[12] The CGA said it would not adjust patrols around Kinmen and would not do anything to escalate the situation further.[13]

The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson condemned Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government on February 28 for allegedly lying about and concealing the facts of the incident and for not apologizing.[14] She accused Kuan Bi-ling by name of handling the incident as a “personal political performance,” concealing the truth, shifting blame, telling lies, failing to apologize, and setting up “obstacles” in the aftermath.[15]

The Kinmen fishermen incident has become increasingly politicized in Taiwan as Kuomintang officials have criticized the CGA and DPP administration’s handling of the matter. Kuomintang (KMT) lawmakers criticized the CGA for mishandling the incident on February 14, failing to record video footage of the event, and allegedly concealing the facts about the cause of the fishermen’s deaths.[16] The CGA confirmed that the capsizing of the PRC fishing boat was caused by a collision with a CGA vessel on February 22, over a week after the incident occurred, but denied that it was trying to conceal information.[17] The February 14 incident and resulting opposition criticism of the CGA promotes public perceptions that the CGA is incompetent and untrustworthy. The propagation of this narrative threatens to undermine Taiwanese confidence in Taiwan’s ability to control its waters, especially if Taiwanese people perceive that their government is unable or unwilling to repel CCG encroachment in Taiwan’s waters.

KMT Deputy Chairman Andrew Hsia’s visit to the PRC may legitimize a back channel for ROC-PRC negotiations as official negotiations on Kinmen have not reached a consensus. Taiwanese officials led by CGA deputy director-general Hsu Ching-chih conducted five days of closed-door negotiations on with a PRC delegation, including a Red Cross official and family members of the deceased fishermen. The PRC representatives demanded the CGA apologize, pay compensation, and reveal the full truth of what happened in the incident. The negotiations failed to produce results as of February 29, however.[18]

KMT Deputy Chairman Andrew Hsia began a seven-day trip to the PRC on February 26 with the stated purpose of visiting Taiwanese people living and working there. He said he would not pass up the opportunity to meet PRC officials if the opportunity arose, however. Hsia called for the DPP government to find a channel for dialogue with the PRC to deescalate tensions. He acknowledged that the KMT has its own channels for negotiation with the PRC, but said the party was not authorized to negotiate on behalf of Taiwan since it is not the ruling party.[19] Hsia met with TAO director Song Tao in Shanghai on February 29. He offered condolences for the deaths of the two fishermen and said he would urge the DPP to properly handle the issue. Song said the PRC will never tolerate the DPP’s “atrocious behavior” that ignores the safety of mainland fishermen’s lives. He said Beijing was willing to work with the KMT to “meet each other halfway,” promote cross-strait relations, oppose Taiwanese independence, and promote “national reunification.” Song and Hsia both said they were willing to maintain dialogue on the common basis of the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwanese independence.[20] Hsia is a former director of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council. He has repeatedly traveled to the PRC and met top PRC Taiwan Affairs officials in his capacity as the KMT’s deputy chairman, including during Taiwan’s 2024 election.[21]

Hsia’s visit to the PRC amid unsuccessful DPP-led negotiations in Kinmen may enable the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to further legitimize the KMT in contrast with the DPP as a negotiator on Taiwan’s behalf. The CCP cut off formal contacts with Taiwan’s government when ROC President Tsai Ing-wen was elected in 2016. The party refuses to have a dialogue with the DPP directly because the DPP does not recognize the “1992 Consensus.”[22] This is why the PRC side of the Kinmen negotiation is represented by a Red Cross official. The 1992 Consensus is an alleged verbal agreement between semi-official representatives of the PRC and the then KMT-ruled ROC following negotiations in 1992. It states that both sides agree there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The CCP interprets this “one China” to be the People’s Republic of China, however, while the KMT interprets it to be the Republic of China.

The PRC has increased deployments of research vessels in Taiwan’s contiguous zone to assert its territorial claims over Taiwan. The Financial Times published a report based on ship tracking data that the PRC has sent nine research vessels to waters within 24 nautical miles of Taiwan since September 2023. There were only two such incursions during each of the past three years. One research vessel, the unmanned drone carrier Zhu Hai Yun which the PRC began operating in January 2023, sailed the full length of Taiwan’s east coast in November 2023. The US-based think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies reported that the Zhu Hai Yun has ties to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and that the unmanned surface, undersea, and aerial vehicles it carries can be used to conduct military reconnaissance in addition to scientific marine surveys. The Da Yang, another PRC research vessel, operated off Taiwan’s east coast on February 15-17.[23]

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) grants each country the right to restrict transit within its territorial waters, which extend 12 nautical miles from its coast. It further defines a contiguous zone between 12 and 24 nm from the coast, within which each country can exert the control needed to prevent or punish the infringement of its laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea.[24] The PRC considers Taiwan to be part of its territory and denies that Taiwan’s government has legitimate control over any adjacent waters. However, the deployment of scientific and other non-military vessels within Taiwan’s contiguous zone is a means of testing Taiwan’s response and gradually normalizing PRC presence around Taiwan. The PRC uses such tactics in tandem with near-daily air and naval violations of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), Chinese Coast Guard patrols near Kinmen and Matsu, adjustment of civilian flight routes to fly closer to Taiwan, and balloon flights through Taiwan’s airspace to wear down Taiwan’s threat awareness and resources, forcing it to be selective in which perceived incursions it chooses to respond to. Blurring the lines between military and civilian activities also has the effect of making it more difficult for Taiwan to determine which activities are potential threats.

The CCP will add two additional flights along a sensitive civil air route over the Taiwan Strait likely to further strain Taiwan’s resources and air defense response time. The TAO spokesperson confirmed on February 28 that the PRC would add two new civilian flights connecting to route M503, which flies a few kilometers from the median line of the Taiwan Strait.[25] The PRC unilaterally adjusted route M503 on February 1 to fly closer to the median line. Taiwan at the time decried the move as unsafe and responded by canceling plans to resume Taiwanese group tours to the PRC on March 1.[26] The new flight paths will increase PRC air traffic near the median line.

The PRC has stated that it does not recognize the existence of any “median line” in the Taiwan Strait. Chieh Chung, a senior analyst at the KMT-affiliated National Policy Foundation, said that moving flight routes closer to the median line will allow PRC aircraft to more quickly change course to cross the median line, shortening Taiwan’s air defense response time. He also said military planes may fly along the same routes. Increasing the volume of both civilian and military flights in the sensitive area likewise serves to strain Taiwanese resources as Taiwan must monitor, assess, and prepare to respond to each potential incursion.[27]

CCP rhetoric regarding Taiwan signals a redoubling of efforts to exert pressure on the ROC under the DPP's renewed mandate. Top Politburo Standing Committee member Wang Huning called for the need to “fight” so-called Taiwanese independence and contain foreign interference during the annual Taiwan Work Conference on February 23.[28] Wang’s speech took on a distinctly bellicose tone compared to last year’s conference, which used relatively modest language urging “opposition” to Taiwanese separatism.[29] Wang’s speech this year also made more references to unification compared to previous years, illustrating the CCP’s hardening resolve to take possession of Taiwan. Wang is Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a foremost United Front work organization, as well as deputy leader of the Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs. These roles make him one of the top CCP officials responsible for overseeing the PRC’s policy toward Taiwan. He is also a leading CCP ideological theorist and policy architect who has accrued significant influence as a trusted advisor to CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping. Wang led an interagency meeting in December to coordinate and camouflage the PRC’s efforts to influence Taiwan’s elections, according to a Taiwanese intelligence leak of the top-secret meeting.[30] President-elect Lai Ching-te’s victory in Taiwan’s January elections represents a failure of the PRC’s influence operations. Lai’s election is a logical impetus for Wang’s stronger language, galvanizing a defiant response from CCP leadership. Wang’s rhetoric indicates the PRC will intensify efforts to erode Taiwan’s sovereignty and curb international support to help Taiwan resist pressure.

Taiwan

The Kuomintang (KMT) chose defense obstructionist Ma Wen-chun to co-chair the Foreign and National Defense Committee of the Legislative Yuan. The Foreign and National Defense Committee is the legislative standing committee responsible for legislation related to Taiwan’s policies and spending on defense and foreign affairs.[31] Standing committees have the authority to conduct budget reviews, make recommendations to the Legislative Yuan (LY) based on reviews of draft legislation, and summon officials from relevant agencies to respond to inquiries. Ma Wen-chun is a KMT legislator who has served in the LY since 2009. She is known as one of the biggest obstructionists of Taiwan’s defense spending in the LY, having proposed 135 cuts or freezes to the defense budget during 2023, including to Taiwan’s Haikun submarine program.[32] Ma is under criminal investigation due to a scandal in 2023 when several legislators publicly accused her of leaking classified information about the submarine program to South Korea and the PRC to hinder the submarine’s completion.[33]

The KMT’s selection of Ma to co-chair the legislative committee in charge of defense spending indicates its intent to obstruct what they view as “excessive” defense spending in the new legislative session. The KMT and the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) hold divergent views on defense policy, with the former advocating for a comparatively modest approach that seeks to de-escalate tensions with the PRC. The KMT has consistently criticized President Tsai Ing-wen’s DPP administration for excessive defense spending.

DPP legislator Wang Ting-yu will serve as the other co-chair of the 13-member Foreign and National Defense Committee. The allocation of committee membership is proportional based on each party’s overall representation in the LY. The KMT and DPP are nearly tied in the LY with 52 and 51 seats, respectively. KMT Speaker of the LY Han Kuo-yu and Deputy Speaker Johnny Chiang will also be part of the Foreign and National Defense Committee. The minority Taiwan People’s Party, which holds eight seats in the legislature, voted for Ma and the KMT’s other candidates for co-chair in all eight standing committees.[34]

China

The PRC’s recent national security policy initiatives reflect the CCP’s growing threat perception of security risks to classified and sensitive information in the fraught geopolitical climate. The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) adopted a revised State Secrets Law on February 27 that broadens the scope of information that will be treated as confidential.[35] The law strengthens the confidentiality of so-called “work secrets,” privileged information that is not explicitly designated as a state secret but could undermine national security if leaked, especially information related to sensitive technology.[36] The law also restricts government employees with access to classified information from traveling overseas without prior approval. The unnamed head of the PRC’s National Administration of State Secret Protection spoke to reporters on February 28 about the revised law. The official stressed the importance of the CCP’s leadership in governing “confidentiality work,” and stated the revised law will help the CCP leverage its political and organizational advantages in managing confidential information.[37]

The PRC’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) separately unveiled a three-year plan to strengthen the industrial sector’s data security on February 26. The plan will apply protective measures to over 45,000 companies, including enhanced risk assessment, ransomware simulations, and integration of data security products and services.[38] Both policies are designed to strengthen national security by safeguarding political integrity and maintaining tight control over sensitive information. The PRC’s new policy actions are the CCP’s response to a perceived hostile external environment, which Xi Jinping characterized as demanding defiance against foreign containment at the 20^th Party Congress in 2022.[39] These measures are rooted in Xi’s comprehensive national security doctrine, which encourages heightened vigilance and robust safeguarding against anything that could threaten the CCP’s legitimacy. This approach entails a strategic application of the doctrine across various segments of society, aiming to fortify ideological, economic, and military security in the face of Western resistance to the PRC’s ascent.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) has continued efforts to assert control over Scarborough Shoal by erecting a floating barrier and intercepting vessels that belong to the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR). On February 22, the PCG reported that the CCG placed a floating barrier at the entrance to the Scarborough Shoal lagoon to prevent Philippine fishing vessels from entering.[40] The PRC first erected a similar barrier on September 20, 2023, which the PCG removed on September 25, 2023, following strong condemnation from the PCG and BFAR.[41] On February 26, a spokesperson for the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the Philippines has taken a “series of actions infringing on China’s sovereignty in the waters off Scarborough Shoal” and affirmed that the PRC would take necessary measures to guard its sovereignty, maritime rights, and interests.[42]

From February 22-23, the PCG and BFAR vessel BRP Datu Sanday conducted a resupply mission of 44 fishing vessels in the waters near Scarborough Shoal.[43] The PRC accused the Philippines of “illegally intruding” into Chinese territory. PCG Spokesperson Commodore Jay Tarriela refuted the accusation by saying that the Philippine vessels are “actively ensuring the security of Filipino fishermen” in the area.[44] A CCG ship positioned itself horizontally in front of the bow of the BRP Datu Sanday during the resupply mission in an attempt to deny access to waters adjacent to the Shoal. The CCG also conducted electronic jamming of the BRP Datu Sanday’s Automatic Identification System (AIS) to prevent the transmission of positional information that may conflict with the CCP narrative.[45] The PCG Spokesperson reported three PRC Navy vessels shadowed the BRP Datu Sanday 25 nautical miles outside of the Shoal and deployed a helicopter to observe the Philippine vessels.[46] [47]

Scarborough Shoal is a contested atoll that the PRC and the Philippines claim and that has been under de facto PRC control since 2012. The atoll falls within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, which gives the Philippines sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal per the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The PRC claims the shoal under its nine-dash line, which the Permanent Court of Arbitration rejected in a 2016 ruling. The PRC rejected the court’s ruling.[48] The PRC has sought to control Scarborough Shoal, most of the Spratly Islands, the Paracel Islands, and many other islands and features in the South China Sea that are disputed with other regional states. The CCP has built military infrastructure on islands it has seized control of or artificially constructed to expand its power projection capability, strengthen domain awareness, and increase its ability to block critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) through the South China Sea. The PRC has built military infrastructure on islands it has seized control of or artificially constructed to expand its power projection capability, strengthen domain awareness, and increase its ability to block critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) through the South China Sea. Developing the capability to monitor or restrict ships through the South China Sea can support a future PRC effort to implement a blockade of Taiwan or block US and allied reinforcements from reaching the Taiwan Strait in wartime. The PRC has not built any infrastructure on Scarborough Shoal, however, because Philippine vessels continue to actively contest its control of the territory.

Oceania

Kiribati

The PRC is pursuing security cooperation with Kiribati to increase its security foothold in the Pacific Islands. Kiribati's acting police commissioner Eeri Aritiera told Reuters on February 23 that uniformed PRC police officers are operating in the country to assist local law enforcement with a community policing program and managing a crime database program.[49] Kiribati has not publicly announced a security agreement with the PRC. The PRC’s policing cooperation efforts with Kiribati serve to enhance its security influence in the Pacific. Expanding the agreement to military cooperation could provide the PRC with access to strategic locations for potential military use in exchange for assisting island nations with internal security. The significance of these agreements lies in their contribution to the PRC’s broader geopolitical ambitions, including countering Western influence and establishing a more favorable balance of power in the region.

The PRC’s ambassador to Australia Xiao Qian denied that the PRC harbors military-related ambitions as part of its cooperation with the Pacific Islands. Xiao stated on January 17 that security is a component of the PRC’s relationship with Pacific Island countries, and the purpose of security partnerships is to help maintain “social stability and basic order.”[50] Xiao’s comments came days after the PRC won formal diplomatic recognition from Nauru at Taiwan’s expense. Kiribati cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of the PRC in 2019.

The PRC has pursued similar security cooperation with other Pacific Island nations. Former Solomon Islands provincial leader Daniel Suidani leaked a draft security agreement between the PRC and Solomon Islands in March 2022. Suidani was an outspoken critic of the government’s decision to switch recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in 2019.[51] The leaked document included language granting the PRC access and replenishment rights to Solomon Islands ports, as well as the right to use its armed forces to protect Chinese projects and personnel in the Solomon Islands. Australian state media verified the authenticity of the document.[52] A former Solomon Islands prime minister and confidante of the incumbent stated that the final agreement, which was signed a month later, is “very close” to the leaked draft.[53] The PRC began supplying the Solomon Islands with police training and riot control equipment later that year. [54] The PRC’s Ministry of Defense denied rumors that the PRC is pursuing a naval base on the Solomon Islands.[55] The two countries upgraded their security cooperation again in July 2023 with a pact that recommitted the PRC’s provision of law enforcement support to the Solomon Islands as a part of their “comprehensive strategic partnership.”[56]

Tuvalu

Tuvalu’s newly elected prime minister assuaged fears that Tuvalu would cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Tuvalu’s parliament unanimously elected Feleti Teo as its new prime minister on February 26. Teo is Tuvalu’s former attorney general and a former regional fisheries official. His victory thwarted the prime ministerial ambitions of former finance minister and newly elected legislator Seve Paeniu, who said he would review Tuvalu’s diplomatic ties with Taiwan if he became prime minister.[57] Taiwan’s ambassador to Tuvalu Andrew Lin said he had received assurances from Teo and other Tuvaluan members of parliament that the Tuvalu-Taiwan relationship was “rock solid” and “everlasting.”[58] Tuvalu's new government formally released a Statement of Priorities on February 28 reaffirming its relationship with Taiwan.[59] Tuvalu is one of 12 countries that maintains diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) rather than the PRC. The PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs urged Taiwan’s diplomatic allies to “stand on the right side of history” by recognizing the “one-China principle.”[60]

Compacts of Free Association

The loss of Compacts of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands risks United States control of key sea lines of communication (SLOC) in East Asia. These COFAs govern the United States’ relationship with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands while granting the United States extensive military access throughout their territories. The United States renewed COFAs with Palau and Micronesia in May.[61] It then did so with the Marshall Islands in October.[62] Congress previously funded the COFAs for a twenty-year period in 2003.[63] That funding has now expired. The newly re-signed COFA agreements are now before Congress for funding consideration in the form of H.J.Res.96 and S.J.Res.48.[64] The total cost for all three of the twenty-year agreements would be roughly $7 billion spread over the period 2024 to 2043, according to the Congressional Research Service.[65]

The loss of funding also threatens the continuation of the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site in Micronesia, the Department of Defense high-frequency radar system under construction in Palau, as well as the opportunity for the United States Air Force Agile Combat Employment operations to take place in Micronesia.[66]

The loss of COFA funding also threatens the security of key SLOCs for the United States that provide a secure route connecting American allies and partners, such as the Philippines and Taiwan, to the US territory of Guam and the state of Hawaii. The United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) defines SLOCs as “the principal maritime routes between ports, as used for trade, military, or other purposes.”[67]

The loss of Compact of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands presents opportunities for the People’s Republic of China to fill the gap in funding to threaten the SLOCs. COFA funding accounts for $36.9 million of Palau’s annual $124.2 million revenue as of fiscal year 2023 and $35.2 million of the Marshall Islands’ annual $173.9 million revenue as of fiscal year 2023.[68]^,[69]The Presidents of Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands sent a letter to the leaders of the United States Senate on February 6 stating that they “cannot overstate the importance to all of our nations of final approval [of COFA funding] by the U.S. Congress” and that its delay “has resulted in undesirable opportunities for economic exploitation by competitive political actors active in the Pacific.”[70] “Competitive political actors” is a veiled reference to the Chinese Communist Party.

click here to read the full report with maps

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: February 21 at 5pm ET

Key Takeaways

The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) pledged to begin conducting regular maritime inspections around Taiwan-controlled Kinmen Island. Normalizing PRC maritime enforcement around the island will erode Taiwan’s control over its territorial waters and risk confrontations between the PRC and Taiwan’s maritime law enforcement.
The CCP is engaging in global cyberattacks to degrade regional countries’ capacity to engage in military action against the PRC during a crisis. The cyberattacks could also facilitate actions against individuals who oppose the CCP.
CCP International Department Head Liu Jianchao and PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi gave conflicting stances on global governance and the Russia-Ukraine War at the “For Freedom of Nations” forum in Russia and the Munich Security Conference in Germany.
Three of the PRC’s “Big Four” state banks stopped accepting payments from Western-sanctioned Russian financial institutions.
The PRC deployed a People’s Liberation Army detachment to monitor a joint US-Philippines air force patrol over the South China Sea.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) pledged to begin conducting regular maritime inspections around Taiwan-controlled Kinmen Island. Normalizing PRC maritime enforcement around the island will erode Taiwan’s control over its territorial waters and risk confrontations between the PRC and Taiwan’s maritime law enforcement. Kinmen is a Taiwan-controlled island with a large military garrison roughly 3 kilometers from the coast of the PRC. The Taiwan Coast Guard Administration (CGA) enforces maritime laws around Kinmen and its lesser islands. An incident on February 14 that resulted in the death of two PRC nationals prompted the CCG to defy Taiwan’s sovereignty in the waters around its outer islands. A four-man PRC fishing boat intruded almost a mile into Taiwan’s territorial waters around Kinmen and capsized after colliding with a CGA ship while fleeing from a CGA inspection.^[1]^[2] The CGA was able to rescue only two of the fishermen, who returned to the PRC on February 20. CCG Spokesperson Gan Yu stated on February 18 that the CCG will strengthen law enforcement and conduct regular inspections in the waters around Kinmen and Xiamen, the nearby PRC city.^[3] PRC Taiwan Affairs Office Spokesperson Zhu Fenglian refuted the existence of Taiwan’s territorial or restricted waters and stated that the PRC has the right to take “further measures,” and that Taiwan will “bear the consequences.”^[4] Zhu also condemned Taiwan for its “brutal treatment of mainland fishermen” and disregard for human life.[5]

The CCG conducted its first maritime inspection in the Taiwan-controlled waters around Kinmen Island on February 19. CCG personnel boarded a Taiwanese sightseeing ship off the coast of the island. The personnel remained onboard for about 30 minutes, during which they inspected the ship’s voyage plan and registration. The CGA commented that this was the first CCG boarding of a Taiwanese vessel in Taiwan-controlled waters.^[6] A CCG maritime surveillance ship entered Taiwan’s territorial waters south of Kinmen on February 20 and left an hour later.[7]

The CCG’s assertive behavior also extends to Taiwan’s other outer islands near the mainland. Three CCG ships entered the territorial waters around the Taiwan-controlled Matsu Islands on February 21.[8] The Matsu Islands are 10 kilometers off the mainland coast at their closest point and roughly 240 kilometers northeast of Kinmen Island.

A ROC official warned that the CCG may expand its operations into other Taiwan-controlled waters as well. KMT legislator Alex Tsai Cheng-yuan speculated on February 21 whether the Penghu Islands would be the next target for the CCG.[9] The Penghu Islands are located on the east side of the median line in the strait between the PRC and Taiwan, roughly 140 kilometers southeast of Kinmen Island. The islands hold strategic significance due to Taiwan’s robust military presence there and their ability to enable early detection and response to PRC military activities. The location of the islands in the Taiwan Strait makes them a valuable potential staging ground for the PRC to launch a future invasion of Taiwan.

The Kuomintang appointed two key legislators to oversee foreign and defense policy, which signals its determination to oppose the Democratic Progressive Party’s political agenda in these areas. Kuomintang (KMT) Caucus Whip Fu Kun-chi announced the party’s designation of Legislative Yuan Speaker Han Kuo-yu and Deputy Speaker Johnny Chiang Chi-chen to serve on the Foreign and National Defense Committee on February 21.[10] The Foreign and National Defense Committee is a legislative committee with the authority to conduct budget reviews, make recommendations to the Legislative Yuan (LY) based on its review of draft legislation, and summon officials from relevant agencies to respond to inquiries. The KMT and the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) hold divergent views on defense policy, with the former advocating for a comparatively modest approach that seeks to de-escalate tensions with Beijing. The KMT has consistently criticized President Tsai Ing-wen’s DPP administration for excessive defense spending.[11] The KMT’s appointment of its leading legislators to the committee suggests the party will focus considerable resources on shaping foreign and defense policy, making it one of the primary areas of competition in the LY. The KMT likely seeks to wield its influence in the committee to obstruct the DPP’s defense agenda, such as freezing budget appropriations and shaping policy proposals.

Fu declared in his announcement that there is nothing more important than imposing checks and balances on the DPP and stated that “Taiwan would not be well until the DPP falls.”[12] The KMT’s adversarial approach carries negative implications for President-elect Lai Ching-te, whose policy platform emphasizes stronger international relationships and national defense. The KMT's determination to block the DPP’s political agenda is favorable to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) interests, especially if it hinders the government’s ability to implement its foreign and defense policy.

The Kuomintang and Taiwan People’s Party are pursuing political reforms that threaten to undermine the Democratic Progressive Party’s governance by entangling the party in defensive struggles. KMT and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) party leaders discussed a joint proposal for “legislative and judicial reforms” in the Legislative Yuan on February 22.[13] TPP Caucus Whip Huang Kuo-chang stated that the two opposition parties maintain a close consensus on the issue.[14] The TPP and KMT have consistently stated that establishing a legislative investigative task force to strengthen oversight of the executive branch is at the top of their agenda.[15] KMT caucus Secretary-General Lin Tzu-ming earlier referred to the proposed mechanism as a “great weapon” that the Legislative Yuan must use to supervise the government.[16] Collaboration between the KMT and the TPP to introduce the proposals suggests the reforms will pass with a majority in the LY, as the TPP’s eight seats constitute a crucial swing vote. The opposition’s plan to impose checks and balances on the DPP could significantly hamper the government’s ability to pass policy by miring it in defensive actions against accusations of overstepping authority or corruption.

China

The CCP is engaging in global cyberattacks to degrade regional countries’ capacity to engage in military action against the PRC during a crisis. The cyberattacks could also facilitate actions against individuals who oppose the CCP. US and foreign partner cybersecurity and intelligence agencies confirmed in a joint advisory on February 7 that a PRC state-sponsored cyber threat actor known as Volt Typhoon infiltrated critical infrastructure organizations in the continental United States and US territories.[17] The authoring agencies assessed with high confidence that Volt Typhoon’s goal was to develop the capability to disrupt key operational technology functions in the event of a conflict with the United States by leveraging its access to informational technology environments. The cyber company I-Soon, which has contracts with the PRC Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, and People’s Liberation Army, subsequently leaked documents in late February that revealed additional CCP cyber operations. The targets of the operations include NATO, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Taiwan, South Korea, Vietnam, and India.[18] I-Soon also hacks X (formerly Twitter) accounts to uncover user identities.[19]

A February 13 report from the US security firm Trellix also shows a significant increase in cyberattacks against Taiwan during the 24 hours before its January 13 presidential election.[20] The report stated that the cyberattacks targeted a myriad of institutions such as governmental offices, police departments, and finance entities.[21] Trellix is reviewing the data but posited that PRC threat actors may have been responsible.[22]

The CCP refuted that it is responsible for the cyberattacks. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokeswoman Mao Ning refuted US FBI Director Christopher Wray’s statement that Chinese offensive malware is at an unprecedented high. Mao falsely claimed on February 22 that “China firmly opposes and combats all forms of cyberattacks.”[23]

United States and Europe

CCP International Department Head Liu Jianchao and PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi gave conflicting stances on global governance and the Russia-Ukraine War at the “For Freedom of Nations” forum in Russia and the Munich Security Conference in Germany. “For Freedom of Nations” is a Russian forum of international political parties against “neo-colonialism” that Russia’s United Russia ruling party organized for the first time on February 15–16. It overlapped with the Munich Security Conference, which ran from February 16–18. Liu told the primarily Russian and Global South participants including former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev that the PRC advocated “reforming the global governance system,” among other things. [24] A joint statement claiming to represent the forum’s over 400 participants denounced “modern practices of neo-colonialism,” “selective application” of international law and a “rules-based world order,” and interference in other countries’ internal affairs.[25] These were thinly veiled attacks on the Western-led international order, which has been highly critical of both Russia and the PRC. Wang Yi presented an opposing view of PRC policies to the Western audience in Munich. He stated that the PRC is a “responsible major country” that would serve as a “stabilizing force” amid global turmoil. He said the PRC wished to “strengthen” global governance by upholding the authority of the United Nations and enhancing the voice of the Global South. Wang also portrayed the PRC as a stabilizing force in promoting cooperation between major world powers and in dealing with “hot issues” such as the “Ukraine crisis.” [26] Wang’s core message to European powers is part of a broader “charm offensive” toward Europe as the PRC seeks to boost Western trade and investment to revitalize its troubled economy.

Liu’s endorsement of “reforming” global governance to a primarily non-Western audience contrasts with Wang’s claim to European leaders that the PRC supports “strengthening” global governance. The PRC aims to use existing organs of global governance and new international mechanisms to promote an alternative PRC-led world order that advances PRC interests. It is simultaneously trying to reassure Western powers that it is not a threat and is a reliable partner, however. Liu did not comment on Ukraine in publicly available statements, but his attendance at a Russia-hosted “anti-neocolonialist” forum concurrent with the Munich Security Conference undermines Wang Yi’s message that the PRC can be relied upon as an impartial interlocutor and promoter of peace in Ukraine.

The CCP also issued conflicting perspectives on ending the Russian war in Ukraine. Wang claimed to European leaders and in a meeting with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba that the PRC did not “sit back and watch” the “Ukraine crisis” but instead has stayed committed to promoting peace talks. He did not call the Russia-Ukraine war a war. He stressed that “the earlier peace talks resume, the less damage for all sides.”[27] Bloomberg reported that Wang rejected Ukraine’s proposal for high-level peace talks in March, however, claiming that conditions were not ripe for parties to go back to the negotiating table. This comment was absent from the official PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) readout of his statements and contradicts Wang’s statement that peace talks should resume as early as possible.[28]

The PRC’s conflicting messaging about the Russia-Ukraine War reflects a strategy to balance support for Russia with attracting Western investment while avoiding Western sanctions. Wang Yi falsely stated about the “Ukraine crisis” that the PRC “did not sit back and watch, let alone take advantage of the opportunity to make profits.”[29] This is exactly what the PRC has done by selling military or dual-use products to Russia and buying Russian fuel at cheap prices during the war.[30] Wang warned world leaders that “de-Sinicizing” in the name of economic “de-risking” would be a “historic mistake.”[31] His economic messaging to incentivize Western investment in the PRC plays on his inaccurate security message to the West that the PRC is a necessary “responsible major country” that implicitly has leverage over the Russians it would willingly use. The PRC MFA readouts of Wang’s meetings with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, as well as subsequent visits to Spain and France after the conference all align with this message by portraying the PRC as desiring economic exchanges with each of these countries.[32] The PRC has lifted travel barriers with several European countries and urged Western countries to stop sanctions and “de-risking” measures against PRC companies.[33]

Three of the PRC’s “Big Four” state banks stopped accepting payments from Western-sanctioned Russian financial institutions. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China Construction Bank (CCB), and Bank of China have rejected payments from sanctioned Russian banks since the start of 2024. Russian newspaper Izvestia reported that the PRC banks began introducing restrictions in December 2023 after the European Union imposed its 12th sanctions package against Russia and the United States authorized secondary sanctions on financial institutions that helped Russia evade sanctions. An unnamed Russian source told Izvestia that ICBC and CCB were rejecting the payments regardless of which system they went through: Europe’s SWIFT, Russia’s SPFS, or the PRC’s CIPS. Other PRC banks have also tightened compliance checks.[34] Zhejiang Chouzhou Commercial Bank, the main PRC bank used by Russian importers, suspended all business with Russian and Belarusian clients including those not under sanctions. The Russian business newspaper Vedomosti reported that Russian businesses feared a “logistics collapse.”[35]

Southeast Asia

The PRC deployed a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) detachment to monitor a joint US-Philippines air force patrol over the South China Sea. The PRC’s Southern Theater Command accused the Philippines of “enlisting foreign countries” to create trouble in the South China Sea and stated that it sent air and naval forces to “closely monitor the situation.”[36] The Philippines Air Force stated that the patrol occurred within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 90 nautical miles west of its largest island Luzon.[37] The PRC’s actions belong to a trend of increasingly confrontational posture in the South China Sea to undermine the Philippines’ sovereignty over the waters immediately west of its territory.

The CCG twice claimed that it expelled Philippines Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) vessels from the waters around Scarborough Shoal on February 15 and 22.[38] The Philippines denied both claims, stating that the ships in question continued to patrol the area to ensure the security of Filipino fishermen.[39] The Philippines regularly deploys BFAR vessels alongside the Philippines Coast Guard to deliver food and supplies to Filipino fishermen around contested features in the South China Sea’s Spratly Islands. The PRC’s claims resemble earlier CCG statements that it “allowed” the Philippines to airdrop supplies to Filipino troops on Second Thomas Shoal on January 21. The Philippines denied that it required anyone’s permission to conduct its activities on the shoal.[40] The PRC regularly attempts to intercept and prevent the Philippines’ resupply missions to the Second Thomas Shoal.

Oceania

Compacts of Free Association

The loss of Compacts of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands risks United States control of key sea lines of communication (SLOC) in East Asia. These COFAs govern the United States’ relationship with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands while granting the United States extensive military access throughout their territories. The United States renewed COFAs with Palau and Micronesia in May.[41] It then did so with the Marshall Islands in October.[42] Congress previously funded the COFAs for a twenty-year period in 2003.[43] That funding has now expired. The newly re-signed COFA agreements are now before Congress for funding consideration in the form of H.J.Res.96 and S.J.Res.48.[44] The total cost for all three of the twenty-year agreements would be roughly $7 billion spread over the period 2024 to 2043, according to the Congressional Research Service.[45]

The loss of Compact of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands presents opportunities for the People’s Republic of China to fill the gap in funding to threaten the SLOCs. COFA funding accounts for $36.9 million of Palau’s annual $124.2 million revenue as of fiscal year 2023 and $35.2 million of the Marshall Islands’ annual $173.9 million revenue as of fiscal year 2023.[48]^,[49]The Presidents of Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands sent a letter to the leaders of the United States Senate on February 6 stating that they “cannot overstate the importance to all of our nations of final approval [of COFA funding] by the U.S. Congress” and that its delay “has resulted in undesirable opportunities for economic exploitation by competitive political actors active in the Pacific.”[50] “Competitive political actors” is a veiled reference to the Chinese Communist Party.

Tuvalu

Tuvalu is considering reviewing its diplomatic ties with Taiwan after electing its new prime minister.[52] The sixteen representatives elected on January 26, 2024, who comprise the Parliament of Tuvalu, planned to choose a prime minister the week of February 5. Poor weather conditions continue to delay the vote, however, by preventing four elected members of parliament from reaching the capital Funafuti.[53] Tuvalu has not set a new date for the election of the new prime minister.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, February 15, 2024

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, February 8, 2024

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: February 13 at 5pm EST

Key Takeaways

Taiwan’s Tourism Administration canceled plans to resume group tours to the PRC on March 1 in response to the CCP changing a commercial flight route over the Taiwan Strait.
Eight PRC high-altitude balloons that crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait two days in a row on February 9 and 10 are likely part of a campaign to test and erode Taiwan’s military readiness.
US and foreign partner cybersecurity and intelligence agencies confirmed in a joint advisory on February 7 that a PRC state-sponsored cyber threat actor infiltrated critical infrastructure organizations in the continental United States and US territories.
Philippines Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. called for a stronger Philippines military presence in the northern Batanes Islands on February 6. The People’s Liberation Army routinely sends naval ships through the Bashi channel between the Batanes and Taiwan.
The loss of Compact of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands presents opportunities for the People’s Republic of China to fill the gap in funding.
The PRC and Russia held “interagency consultations” on February 1 to discuss military applications of artificial intelligence (AI).

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

Taiwan’s Tourism Administration canceled plans to resume group tours to the PRC on March 1 in response to the CCP changing a commercial flight route over the Taiwan Strait. The PRC’s Civil Aviation Administration unilaterally changed the M503 domestic north-south flight route to fly within 7.8 kilometers of the median line in the Taiwan Strait. The median line serves as a de facto boundary between the PRC and Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) does not recognize the median line and denies its existence.[1] The change took effect on February 1 without consulting Taiwan’s government.[2] The CCP’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) claimed that the move will alleviate air traffic congestion. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) said that the move posed safety risks and accused the CCP of using commercial air travel to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, however.[3] Taiwan’s Tourism Administration responded on February 7 by telling travel agencies to stop organizing group tours to the PRC. The Tourism Administration had planned to resume group tours from Taiwan to the PRC on March 1 for the first time since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in January 2020. Taiwan’s government will permit tours already organized from March 1 to May 31 to proceed, however.[4] Taiwan Vice President and President-elect Lai Ching-te said that the PRC had not shown the requisite goodwill necessary to conduct friendly tourism exchanges.[5]

Taiwanese tour operator associations visited the Kuomintang (KMT) headquarters on February 8 to express their opposition to the cancellation of group tours because it harms their business. The tour operators said they may stage protests at Lai Ching-te’s inauguration on May 20 if the government does not change the policy. About one-third of the annual 17 million overseas trips by Taiwanese nationals were to the PRC before the pandemic. Group tours accounted for approximately half of those trips.[6]

The KMT and CCP have seized on this policy to criticize the DPP. Former KMT vice presidential candidate Jaw Shaw-kong accused Lai and the DPP of breaking pre-election promises to reopen group travel to the PRC and of unfairly harming the local travel sector.[7] TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian said that the resumption of the ban on group tours was an instance of the DPP’s “political manipulation of tourism,” would harm the economic interests of both sides of the strait, and would lead to popular dissatisfaction with the DPP in Taiwan.[8]

Eight PRC high-altitude balloons that crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait two days in a row on February 9 and 10 are likely part of a campaign to test and erode Taiwan’s military readiness. At least two of the eight balloons on February 9 and at least six of the eight balloons on February 10 flew directly over the island of Taiwan.[9] Eight balloons crossing the median line in the Taiwan Strait in one day is a record high since Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) started publicly tracking such balloons in December 2023. Six balloons flying directly over Taiwan in one day is also a record high. The balloons flew at altitudes ranging from 12,000 to 38,000 feet.[10]

The spike in the number of balloons passing over the median line on February 9 and 10 coincided with the beginning of the Lunar New Year celebrations in Taiwan and the PRC. The CCP may be using increased balloon incursions during the holiday to further strain Taiwan’s resources. The balloon activities are consistent with ISW’s assessment that the CCP is trying to normalize using balloons in tandem with other aerial and naval violations of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) as part of a broader effort to wear down Taiwan’s resources and threat awareness.[11]

The CCP’s Taiwan Affairs Office claimed on January 31 that such balloons were “mostly” launched by private enterprises and “mostly” for “livelihood purposes such as meteorological monitoring.”[12] Retired Taiwanese Air Force General Chang Yen-ting warned that even standard meteorological balloons could provide useful data about conditions around Taiwan to help plan air and naval operations against Taiwan, however.[13]

China

US and foreign partner cybersecurity and intelligence agencies confirmed in a joint advisory on February 7 that a PRC state-sponsored cyber threat actor infiltrated critical infrastructure organizations in the continental United States and US territories.[14] The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Security Agency (NSA), and Five Eyes cybersecurity agencies co-authored the report, which detailed the PRC state-sponsered cyber threat actor known as Volt Typhoon's extensive penetration of critical infrastructure organizations. The authoring agencies assessed with high confidence that Volt Typhoon’s goal was to develop the capability to disrupt key operational technology (OT) functions in the event of a conflict with the United States by leveraging its access to informational technology (IT) environments. OT systems are made up of software and hardware that control physical equipment and processes. The advisory did not specify the compromised targets but stated that CISA, FBI, and NSA observed compromises in the IT networks of organizations spanning sectors such as communications, energy, transportation, and water management systems. The advisory highlighted Volt Typhoon’s focus on gathering intelligence to facilitate access to OT assets, which can be leveraged to conduct follow-on offensive operations with physical impacts. The advisory revealed that Volt Typhoon potentially gained access to files that interact with critical infrastructure facilities, including an electrical substation and water treatment plants. The advisory divulged that Volt Typhoon may have maintained access to some targets for at least five years.

Microsoft also released a report in May 2023, in which it assessed Volt Typhoon was pursuing the capability to disrupt “critical communications infrastructure” between the US and the Asia region in a potential crisis.[15] Volt Typhoon’s infiltration of networks in Guam supports the notion that sabotage is a primary motive for the PRC’s hacking. Guam is strategically positioned between the continental US and Southeast Asia and is home to several military bases whose forces would play a significant role in a potential conflict with the PRC. A disruption of communication would significantly degrade the US military’s ability to respond to a crisis in Asia and deploy its forces to the region.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

Philippines Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. called for a stronger Philippines military presence in the northern Batanes Islands on February 6. The Batanes are the northernmost Philippines islands and are less than 125 miles from Taiwan. The Bashi Channel between the Batanes and Taiwan is a strategically important bottleneck that funnels maritime traffic between the South China Sea and the Western Pacific. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) routinely sends naval ships through the channel and aircraft over it to exert military pressure on Taiwan. The PLA’s Shandong aircraft carrier strike group sailed through the Bashi Channel at least four times in the last 12 months during deployments to and from the Western Pacific, for example.[16] Teodoro called for the development of more structures on the Batanes, calling the islands the “spearhead” of the Philippines’ northern baseline.[17] He also announced that the “operational tempo” for the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) will be higher in 2024. Teodoro made the comments while visiting the Batanes’ naval detachment, where he also observed the ongoing construction of the Naval Forward Operating Base Mahatao.

Teodoro’s comments sparked criticism from the PRC. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated on February 8 that the Philippines needs to understand that the “Taiwan question… is a red line that must not be crossed,” and urged the Philippines to “tread carefully and not play with fire.”[18] The PRC’s response underscores that the CCP views the Philippines' military presence on the island as a provocation that threatens its military’s operability around Taiwan. The Philippines Department of National Defense responded to Wang’s statements, declaring that “China should refrain from engaging in provocative rhetoric and activities if it truly wants to earn widespread trust and respect that it is trying so hard to gain but has, so far, been unable to.”[19]

The PRC’s China Coast Guard (CCG) spokesperson Gan Yu stated that a Philippines Coast Guard (PCG) vessel “intruded” into the waters around Scarborough Shoal from February 2–9.[20] Gan stated that the CCG intercepted and forcibly expelled the PCG vessel from the waters around the shoal. Gan claimed that the CCG’s actions were a lawful and justified response to uphold the PRC’s maritime rights and sovereignty. The Scarborough Shoal is a maritime feature in the South China Sea that the Philippines, the PRC, and Taiwan separately claim. The PRC has controlled the Scarborough Shoal since 2012 when it stationed a persistent Coast Guard presence there after instigating a maritime standoff with the Philippines.[21] The PCG published a statement saying that it monitored the presence of CCG and four Chinese Maritime Militia (CMM) vessels near Scarborough Shoal during a nine-day patrol to deliver food to Filipino fishermen.[22] The statement claimed the CCG vessels shadowed the PCG vessel on more than 40 occasions and performed blocking maneuvers by crossing the bow of the PCG vessel. PCG commander and spokesperson Jay Tarriela posted videos of the CCG blocking maneuvers on X.[23] Tarriela reiterated the Philippines’ sovereignty over the shoal and its surrounding waters per the 2016 arbitration by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague.

A contingent of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Southern Theater Command is participating in the multinational “Cobra Gold 2024” military exercise from February 10 to March 8 in Thailand. Cobra Gold is the world’s longest-running international military training program and one of the Indo-Pacific region’s largest combined military exercises. Troops from the seven main participants — the United States, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, South Korea, and Japan — will join combat rehearsals at five locations, including amphibious landings, strategic parachute jumps, ground and air live-fire drills, and cyber warfare. 2024 is the 11th consecutive year that the PLA will participate in the exercise. The PLA will not take part in combat drills but will join civic action missions with India.[24] Chinese military personnel will engage in activities such as engineering assistance, humanitarian rescue, disaster relief table-top exercises, high-level forums, as well as live drills in personnel search and rescue, water and fire rescue, chemical spill handling, and medical emergency aid. The PRC’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) said its participation aims to facilitate the exchange of experiences in rescue and disaster response among the participating militaries and further promote practical cooperation in related fields.[25]

Oceania

Compacts of Free Association

The loss of Compact of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands presents opportunities for the People’s Republic of China to fill the gap in funding. These COFAs govern the United States’ relationship with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands while granting the United States extensive military access throughout their territories. The United States renewed COFAs with Palau and Micronesia in May.[26] It then did so with the Marshall Islands in October.[27] Congress previously funded the COFAs for a twenty-year period in 2003.[28] That funding has now expired. The newly re-signed COFA agreements are now before Congress for funding consideration in the form of H.J.Res.96 and S.J.Res.48.[29] The total cost for all three of the twenty-year agreements would be roughly $7 billion spread over the period of 2024 to 2043, according to the Congressional Research Service.[30]

The loss of COFA funding prompted political leadership from Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands to warn of PRC opportunities to gain influence in their countries. Micronesian President Wesley Simina also stated in late November that his country would be at a “fiscal cliff” without US Congressional approval of COFA funding. This would mean that “we [Micronesia] will have to find different sources of funding… and that’s not out there available immediately.”[31] Marshall Islands President Hilda Heine also stated that the PRC is targeting her country: “A proposal to develop one of our atoll municipalities – if it were granted autonomy from our national government – that I opposed generated an effort to topple my government in our parliament.”[32] Palau President Surangel Whipps Jr. stated that “every day it [COFA] is not approved plays into the hands of the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] and the leaders here (some of whom have done ‘business’ with the PRC) who want to accept its seemingly attractive economic offers – at the cost of shifting alliances, beginning with sacrificing Taiwan.”[33]

COFA funding accounts for $36.9 million of Palau’s annual $124.2 million revenue as of fiscal year 2023 and $35.2 million of the Marshall Islands’ annual $173.9 million revenue as of fiscal year 2023.[34]^,[35] The Presidents of Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands sent a letter to the leaders of the United States Senate on February 6 stating that they “cannot overstate the importance to all of our nations of final approval [of COFA funding] by the U.S. Congress” and that its delay “has resulted in undesirable opportunities for economic exploitation by competitive political actors active in the Pacific.”[36]

COFA Funding as Share of Government Revenue in Freely Associated States[37]

The loss of COFA funding threatens the security of a key sea line of communication for the United States that provides a secure route connecting American allies and partners, such as the Philippines and Taiwan, to the US territory of Guam and the state of Hawaii. The loss of funding also threatens the continuation of the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site in Micronesia, the Department of Defense high-frequency radar system under construction in Palau, as well as the opportunity for the United States Air Force Agile Combat Employment operations to take place in Micronesia.[38]

The opportunity for the CCP to gain economic leverage over the COFA countries also threatens US efforts to preserve the sovereignty of the Republic of China (Taiwan). Palau and the Marshall Islands are also 2 of the 12 countries that maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[39] The maintenance of official diplomatic recognition is a key means for Taiwan to demonstrate its international sovereignty separate from the People’s Republic of China. Palau President Surangel Whipps Jr also stated that “the PRC has already offered to ‘fill every hotel room’ in our tourism-based private sector – ‘and more if more are built – and $20 million a year for two acres for a ‘call center.’”[40] The uptick in flights from the PRC to Palau and the CCP encouraging PRC nationals to vacation in the country suggests that the party seeks economic influence over Palau to coerce it into switching diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC. The number of flights from the PRC to Palau increased from one to eight per month last year to almost daily as of this month.[41]^,[42] This change is a reversal in the CCP policy that cut tourism to Palau over the last decade to nearly zero as punishment for maintaining full diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[43]

The CCP has a history of using economic incentives to convince Pacific Island countries to switch diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC. The PRC offered incentives such as a commercial aircraft to Kiribati or USD 8.5 million to the Solomon Islands, both in 2019, to successfully incentivize them to switch diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC.[44] Australia evacuated the refugees that it paid Nauru to host, which led to a budget shortfall.[45] The CCP then reportedly offered Nauru USD 100 million per year in 2024 to successfully switch recognition from the PRC to the ROC, according to a Reuters report that cited an unspecified senior Taiwanese official.[46]

Tuvalu

Tuvalu is considering reviewing its diplomatic ties with Taiwan after electing its new prime minister.[47] The sixteen representatives elected on January 26, 2024, who comprise the Parliament of Tuvalu, planned to choose a prime minister the week of February 5. Poor weather conditions have delayed the vote, however, by preventing four elected members of parliament from reaching the capital Funafuti.[48] Tuvalu has not set a new date for the election of the new prime minister.

Papua New Guinea

Australia successfully countered the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s offer of internal security assistance to Papua New Guinea. Papua New Guinea received an offer of security assistance from the PRC in September 2023. Papua New Guinea Foreign Minister Justin Tkachenko stated during the week of January 29 that the offer of internal security assistance from the PRC is still under consideration without specifying the details of the offer.[49]

Papua New Guinea Prime Minister James Marape and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese also announced on February 8 that Australia would fund AUD 100 million to the Australia-Papua New Guinea Law and Justice Partnership, which has a focus on internal security.[50] This made the PRC offer less attractive while also buttressing Marape’s chances of political survival. This announcement of Australian security assistance is a necessary political lifeline for Marape as he is set to face a vote of no confidence in at least a week due to the deadly riots in January that occurred amidst a police strike.[51]

Europe

Russia

The PRC and Russia held “interagency consultations” on February 1 to discuss military applications of artificial intelligence (AI). The Russian Foreign Ministry stated that the meeting highlighted the alignment of Russian and Chinese approaches to the military application of AI.[52] The South China Morning Post reported that the Chinese readout from the meeting did not mention the military application of AI, only “outer space security, biosecurity, and artificial intelligence.”[53] ISW has not been able to independently verify the PRC readout.

PRC-Russian cooperation in emerging AI technology is already materializing. Russian tech company Soft-Logic signed a distribution contract with PRC AI microchip manufacturer SophGo in early February. Soft-Logic CEO Denis Loginov stated that the company plans to develop and produce Russian artificial intelligence infrastructure using Chinese processors.[54] SophGo is developing a new high-performance chip based on designs from the US company SiFive, which incorporates an open-source chip architecture known as RISC-V. US Senators Marco Rubio and Mark Warner encouraged the Biden administration in October to broaden export controls to include open-source semiconductor designs to prevent the PRC from surpassing US companies.[55]

Middle East

Iran

PRC Deputy Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani discussed the Red Sea and the Iranian nuclear issue. Their meeting occurred on February 8. Ma framed the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea as a spillover from the “Gaza conflict,” which is a narrative that absolves Iranian partners and proxy groups of blame for instigating regional tensions.[56] Ma’s comments are consistent with previous PRC rhetoric insofar as they do not condemn Houthi aggression or call on the Houthis to stop their attacks on maritime shipping.

The PRC and Iranian readouts of the meeting both emphasized the resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue through political and diplomatic channels.[57] The PRC avoided condemning or approving the increasing Iranian stockpile of 60 percent highly enriched uranium. This stockpile continues to increase even as Iran adjusts the rate of its 60 percent highly enriched uranium as tensions with the United States ebb and flow. [58]This level of highly enriched uranium can be used as fuel for a nuclear explosive device. The PRC position is consistent with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping’s February statement after a meeting with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi that emphasized diplomacy as a means to resolve the Iran nuclear issue.[59]

Africa

Gabon and Equatorial Guinea

The CCP seeks port access in Gabon and Equatorial Guinea for military purposes, which would enhance the People’s Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN’s) power projection capacity. The Wall Street Journal reported on February 10 that the CCP is attempting to convince leadership in Gabon and Equatorial Guinea to grant it military access to ports.[60] The CCP has targeted Equatorial Guinea as a potential military port to gain access to since at least 2021.[61] This CCP effort led then-Commander United States Africa Command Stephen Townsend to state to a House Armed Service Committee hearing in March 2022 that “the thing I think I’m most worried about is this military base on the Atlantic coast, and where they [the CCP] have the most traction for that today is in Equatorial Guinea.”[62] A PLAN port in either of these countries on the Atlantic would enhance the PLAN’s power projection capacity.

Latin America

Guatemala

Guatemala is considering trade relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) while attempting to maintain formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan).[63] Guatemalan President Bernardo Arévalo stated on February 8 that he does not intend to switch diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC.[64] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Wang Wenbin’s February 6 statement that Guatemala would need to recognize the one-China principle to “conduct cooperation” between the two countries underscores the difficulty Arévalo will face holding that position.[65] The one-China principle is the People’s Republic of China’s position that it is the sole legitimate representative of China and that Taiwan is a part of China. Guatemala accepting the PRC’s one-China principle would mean breaking its relations with Taiwan.

Guatemala and Belize are the only countries in Central America that recognize the Republic of China. The other five Central American countries broke relations with the Republic of China between 2007 and 2023. Guatemala and Belize are also 2 of the 12 countries, including Vatican City, that recognize the ROC.

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: February 6 at 5pm ET

Key Takeaways

The Kuomintang (KMT) will present a series of policy proposals to the Legislative Yuan on February 20 that aim to expand legislative oversight over the presidency. The proposals presage what will likely be a contentious dynamic between the KMT and the Democratic Progressive Party in the legislature.
The CCP denied allegations that it carried out cyberattacks against the United States, Japan, the Philippines, and the Netherlands.
The New York Times reported on February 4 that the rapid growth of the PRC’s nuclear arsenal under CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping reflects a shift in the party’s thinking on nuclear deterrence.
The PRC is intensifying its information operations to support its claims in the South China Sea.
The loss of Compact of Free Association funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands presents opportunities for the CCP to expand its influence in each country. The CCP may leverage revenue shortfalls in Palau and the Marshall Islands to incentivize them to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC.
CCP and Russian officials held collaboration talks on the military application of artificial intelligence (AI) in early February.
The People’s Liberation Army Navy is providing security escorts to PRC cargo ships near the Red Sea amid ongoing Houthi missile attacks on shipping in the region.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The Kuomintang (KMT) will present a series of policy proposals to the Legislative Yuan (LY) when the new session begins on February 20. The proposals center around empowering the LY to confirm the appointment of cabinet ministers and the creation of an oversight mechanism in the LY to impose checks and balances on the executive branch. Strengthening the LY's confirmation power over political appointments risks opposition parties rejecting Lai's cabinet picks, which could degrade the Lai administration's ability to carry out policies. Using such political oversight to restrain the DPP’s power could also exacerbate polarization and erode public trust in the government.

The KMT’s proposals presage what will likely be a contentious dynamic between the KMT and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) during Lai Ching-te’s presidency. KMT caucus members have indicated that their party will aggressively attempt to restrain the DPP’s power. KMT caucus Secretary-General Lin Tzu-ming accused the DPP of corruption during the last eight years of Tsai’s presidency and emphasized the futility of bringing cases to the Ministry of Justice or the Control Yuan, which is the Taiwanese government’s supervisory branch. Lin referred to the future oversight mechanism as a “great weapon” that the Legislative Yuan must use to supervise the government.[1] KMT Legislator Wu Tsung-hsien also stressed the importance of LY confirmation for ministerial positions and other high-level posts, potentially posing a threat to Lai’s administration before his inauguration on May 20.[2]

DPP-led restorative justice initiatives are in part responsible for the fraught KMT-DPP relationship. The DPP, under President Tsai Ing-wen, focused on rectifying misconduct and crimes during Taiwan’s KMT-imposed authoritarian rule from 1945 to 1992. The DPP-majority legislature established the temporary Transitional Justice Commission to increase public access to political archives, redress judicial injustices, and dismantle symbols of authoritarianism.[3] The commission operated from 2018 to 2022. The KMT regarded the commission as a tool of political persecution and power expansion.[4] The KMT strengthened its criticism of the commission after revelations the then-vice chairman of the commission, a DPP member, sought to use its authority to eliminate officials who held positions of power during KMT authoritarian rule, such as then-New Taipei City Mayor Hou You-ih.[5] The scandal fueled KMT accusations that the DPP weaponized government institutions against political opponents, including the Central Election Commission and the Ill-gotten Party Assets Settlement Committee.[6] The latter oversaw the confiscation of a large share of KMT assets since its inception in 2016.[7] KMT Deputy Secretary-General Lo Chih-chiang stated that the proposed investigative task force would not discriminate between parties, indicating the KMT did not intend to exact retribution against the DPP.[8]

The KMT’s apparent inclination to impose checks on the DPP aligns with the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) desire to foment disarray during Lai’s presidency and undermine the DPP. Constraints on Lai and the DPP will curb the government’s efficiency and degrade the DPP’s ability to implement its policy agenda, which centers around resisting PRC efforts to undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty.

Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) Chairman Ko Wen-je announced that he will sue DPP spokesperson Justin Wu Cheng for spreading misinformation about his proposed TPP-DPP collusion in the election of the LY speaker. Wu circulated claims on February 2 that Ko contacted a DPP affiliate the night before the election to negotiate with Lai Ching-te. He said that Ko sought the DPP’s support for TPP LY speaker candidate Vivian Huang, in exchange for the TPP’s support for the DPP’s deputy speaker candidate.[9] The TPP nominated Huang in a surprise move earlier that day, which ultimately enabled KMT candidate Han Kuo-yu to secure victory in the second round of voting for the LY speaker. Independence activist and former DPP politician Chen Yung-hsing published an open letter after Wu’s statements revealing that he received the call from Ko, which confirms that the DPP convened to discuss the proposal but ultimately rejected it.[10] Ko has persisted in his accusations of misinformation against Wu.[11]

Acrimony between the TPP and DPP risks cooperation between the TPP and KMT in the Legislative Yuan. The TPP caucus announced a series of priority bills on February 5 that similarly proposed to strengthen the LY’s oversight authority, indicating the TPP will back KMT legislation to establish a task force.[12] The TPP’s eight seats in the LY position the party to be the crucial swing vote and could further complicate the passage of DPP policies. The TPP’s eight seats will make its votes the deciding factor for some legislation. TPP-KMT cooperation against the DPP in the LY aligns with the CCP’s interest in a weaker DPP.

DPP legislators are rushing to secure influence over the Legislative Yuan’s international engagement activities by signing up for diplomatic “friendship associations.” There were 73 friendship associations during the previous LY session that conducted parliamentary relations between Taiwan and other countries.[13] Some of the associations focus on specific issues of interest between Taiwan and foreign legislators and engage with international organizations.[14] The LY dissolves the associations at the end of each legislative session and forms new ones at the start of each session. The legislators that set up the new associations develop charters, invite members to join, and hold the founding meetings before officially establishing the associations can officially be established. The legislators that first accomplish these tasks can officially conduct relations with target foreign legislators on behalf of the LY.[15]

DPP legislator Chiu Chih-wei stated that the DPP is worried by Han’s embrace of the 1992 Consensus, and the legislature must work to uphold Taiwan’s sovereignty and democracy.[16] This reflects the DPP’s fears that LY Speaker Han Kuo-yu’s preference for warmer relations with the PRC will undermine Taiwan’s progress in deepening ties with foreign countries.

China

The United States, Japan, and the Netherlands said that the CCP targeted them in separate cyberattacks. The US Department of Justice (DOJ) said on January 31 that a court-ordered operation dismantled a botnet of hundreds of US-based small office/home office (SOHO) routers hijacked by PRC state-sponsored hackers. The DOJ said the hackers had used the routers to conceal the PRC origin of additional hacking activities that targeted critical infrastructure in the United States and elsewhere. FBI Director Christopher Wray said PRC hackers were targeting US critical infrastructure to “pre-position” so they could cause harm to US citizens in the event of a conflict.[17] Japanese media citing unspecified government sources reported on February 5 that a PRC cyberattack on Japan’s foreign ministry in 2020 resulted in the leak of classified diplomatic documents.[18] The Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service said on February 6 that it uncovered a CCP-backed attempt to use “sophisticated” malware to spy on a computer network that’s used by the country’s armed forces. The malware was found on a standalone computer used for unclassified research and development and did not result in damage to the defense network.[19]

The Philippines also claimed it had been the target of hacking from within the PRC but did not attribute the cyberattack to the CCP. The Philippines Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT) said on February 5 that hackers operating in the PRC failed to break into several official systems in January. The systems included its email systems, the website of the National Coast Watch, and the personal website of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. DICT did not attribute the attacks to any state but asked the PRC to help prevent further attacks.[20]

The CCP denied allegations that it carried out cyberattacks against the United States, Japan, the Philippines, and the Netherlands. Officials from the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) denied the allegations as “smears” and claimed that the PRC opposes and cracks down on all cyberattacks. MFA Spokesperson Wang Wenbin said the United States jumped to conclusions without valid evidence to smear the PRC. He called the United States the “origin and biggest perpetrator of cyberattacks” and accused the US Government of sponsoring long-running cyberattacks against the PRC’s critical infrastructure.[21] He did not make counter-allegations against the Japanese, Philippine, and Dutch governments but reiterated that the PRC opposes cyberattacks and groundless accusations against it.[22] The PRC embassy in Manila decried “groundless” and “irresponsible” speculation by some Philippine politicians and media that the thwarted hacking attempts were sponsored by the PRC government or related to ongoing PRC-Philippine maritime disputes.[23]

The New York Times reported on February 4 that the rapid growth of the PRC’s nuclear arsenal under CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping reflects a shift in the party’s thinking on nuclear deterrence. The article assessed that “anxiety and ambition” motivated the PRC’s rapid nuclear arsenal expansion under CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping based on internal Xi speeches, internal CCP documents, and scholarly writings. Xi asserted to generals of the Second Artillery Corps shortly after he took power in late 2012 that a first-rate nuclear force was a symbol of the PRC’s “great power” status and that the nuclear force should be prepared to counter a “powerful enemy.” Xi reorganized the Second Artillery Corps into the PLA Rocket Force in 2015 and said its mission was to enhance “a credible and reliable nuclear deterrent and nuclear counterstrike capability.” The CCP also fears “nuclear blackmail” by the United States, based on official party accounts of the Korean War and crises over Taiwan during the 1950s.

The CCP may use its nuclear arsenal to deter US intervention in a war over Taiwan. The expanding PRC arsenal of nuclear missiles, submarines, and bombers also confer more nuclear strike options to the CCP. PRC nuclear weapons threaten US cities as well as military bases in the Pacific region.[24]

A Bulletin of Atomic Scientists report on January 15 estimated that the PRC’s nuclear arsenal had doubled to 500 warheads since Xi Jinping took power. The US Department of Defense’s 2021 and 2022 China Military Power Reports predicted that the PRC could reach 1,000 warheads by 2030 and 1,500 warheads by 2035.[25]

Northeast Asia

Japan

The Japan Coast Guard found a PRC buoy floating upside down in Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), roughly 170 kilometers northwest of the disputed Senkaku Islands. Japan controls the uninhabited Senkaku Islands, but the PRC and Taiwan also claim the islands, calling them Diaoyu in Chinese. Japanese media reported that the chain holding the buoy in place likely broke, causing it to drift.[26] Director-General of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Hiroyuki Namazu called on the PRC to remove all of its buoys from Japan’s exclusive economic zone.[27] PRC MFA spokesperson Wang Wenbin claimed this buoy was originally placed in waters near the Yangtze River estuary but drifted on its own due to “technical failure.” Wang used the occasion to add that the Diaoyu (Senkaku) islands are PRC territory and that the PRC does not recognize Japan’s exclusive economic zone, however.[28] The PRC has not complied with Japan’s request to remove the buoy.

Japan previously discovered another PRC buoy in its EEZ about 80 kilometers northwest of the Senkaku Islands in July 2023 and demanded its removal. It judged that the earlier buoy was likely placed by a PRC research vessel operating in the nearby waters.[29] The Japan Coast Guard believes that the PRC uses such buoys to monitor ocean conditions to aid PRC Coast Guard vessels in patrolling waters around the Senkaku Islands. The PRC has not complied with Japan’s requests to remove the buoy.[30]

PRC Coast Guard vessels have sailed within the Senkaku islands’ territorial waters nearly every day since 2013, the year that the PRC declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea that overlaps with Japan’s ADIZ.[31] The PRC sends scientific, commercial, law enforcement, and other non-military vessels and personnel to assert PRC territorial claims in the East and South China Seas while controlling the risk of military confrontation with rival claimants. Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper reported on January 28 that the PRC also has at least three warships deployed at all times on the borders of its claimed ADIZ, which includes the Senkaku Islands. It cited unnamed Japanese government sources, who said that the PRC is enforcing a perimeter that could be used to deny access to US and Japanese naval vessels in the event of a Taiwan contingency.[32]

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The PRC Coast Guard claimed that it allowed another Philippine shipment of supplies to the Second Thomas Shoal but drove away Philippine vessels approaching Scarborough Shoal. The Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal are maritime features in the South China Sea that the Philippines, the PRC, and Taiwan separately claim. The PRC has controlled the Scarborough Shoal since 2012,[33] while the Philippines retains control over the Second Thomas Shoal using a derelict grounded warship as a base. The CCG claimed that it “monitored” a Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal on February 3.[34] The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) previously claimed that it had made “temporary special arrangements” to allow a similar resupply mission on January 21, though the Philippines denied that it needed outside permission to deliver supplies to its troops.[35] Institute of Maritime Strategy Studies of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) Deputy Director Yang Xiao claimed that the PRC was exercising restraint and showing “humanitarian spirit” in allowing the Philippines to deliver subsistence supplies to its troops on Second Thomas Shoal. Yang said the Philippines must inform Beijing in advance and cannot ship construction materials, however.[36] CICIR is a research institute operated by the PRC Ministry of State Security.

The CCG actions and statements aimed to assert PRC sovereignty over the Second Thomas Shoal, which the PRC calls Ren’ai Reef or Ren’ai Jiao. The CCG did not allow Philippine vessels to reach Scarborough Shoal, however. It claimed that it drove away four Philippine nationals who tried to “illegally intrude” into Scarborough Shoal on January 28 as well as a Philippine Coast Guard ship on February 5. CCG spokesperson Gan Yu claimed the PRC had “indisputable sovereignty” over Scarborough Shoal, which Beijing calls Huangyan Island, and would always conduct law enforcement and safeguard its rights and interests in waters under PRC jurisdiction.[37]

The Second Thomas Shoal was the site of confrontations between the Philippines and PRC in recent months. The two countries held bilateral maritime consultations on January 17 to de-escalate tensions. The PRC’s choice not to block the January 21 and February 3 resupply missions may indicate the PRC’s willingness to de-escalate tensions in the near term.[38] The PRC is determined to seize control of the Second Thomas Shoal and other disputed territories but is willing to be patient until an appropriate opportunity arises. As long as the CCG continues to block the Philippines from delivering construction equipment to the shoal, Manila will be unable to construct a more permanent outpost there or maintain the crumbling warship as a viable base for its troops.[39]

The PRC is intensifying its information operations to support its claims in the South China Sea. The Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post reported that the PRC has significantly increased its use of Mandarin pinyin names in English-language references to its claimed maritime features. It noted PRC government officials and state media have dramatically increased their use of terms such as “Ren’ai Jiao” for Second Thomas Shoal or “Nansha Qundao” for the Spratly Islands in 2023. It previously called these features Ren’ai Reef and Nansha Islands. The change is likely a way for the CCP to assert PRC sovereignty over the territories in English-language discourse.

The PRC has promoted its own legal arguments to reject the Philippines’ claims over disputed territories in the South China Sea. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Wang Wenbin said on February 2 that the Philippines’ territory was defined by a series of international treaties in 1898, 1900, and 1930, which did not include Scarborough Shoal within the Philippines’ legally defined boundaries. Wang also re-iterated the PRC’s rejection of the 2016 South China Sea arbitration that dismissed the PRC’s “Nine Dash Line” territorial claims over the South China Sea. Wang called the arbitration a “political manipulation” by the Philippines to gain “illegal interests.”[40] The PRC uses such legal arguments in tandem with more forceful or coercive tactics as a way to promote acceptance of PRC territorial claims in international discourse.

Oceania

Compacts of Free Association

The loss of Compact of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands presents opportunities for the CCP to exert influence over strategically important states in the United States security architecture in East Asia. These COFAs govern the United States’ relationship with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands while granting the United States extensive military access throughout their territories. The United States renewed COFAs with Palau and Micronesia in May.[41] It then did so with the Marshall Islands in October.[42] Congress previously funded the COFAs for a twenty-year period in 2003.[43] That funding has now expired. The newly re-signed COFA agreements are now before Congress for funding consideration. The total cost for all three of the twenty-year agreements would be roughly $7 billion spread over the period 2024 to 2043, according to the Congressional Research Service.[44]

The COFA states are important to the United States’ strategic interests because they control key sea lanes that provide a secure route connecting American allies and partners, such as the Philippines and Taiwan, to the US territory of Guam and the state of Hawaii.

The loss of COFA funding would present the CCP with the opportunity to pressure Palau and the Marshall Islands to switch diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC as part of an ongoing campaign to buttress the narrative that Taiwan is a province of the PRC. Palau and the Marshall Islands are also 2 of the 12 countries that maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[45] The maintenance of official diplomatic recognition is a key means for Taiwan to demonstrate its international sovereignty separate from the People’s Republic of China. COFA funding accounts for $36.9 million of Palau’s annual $124.2 million revenue as of fiscal year 2023 and $35.2 million of the Marshall Islands’ annual $173.9 million revenue as of fiscal year 2023.[46]^,[47]Micronesian President Wesley Simina also stated in late November that his country would be at a “fiscal cliff” without US Congressional approval of COFA funding. This would mean that “we [Micronesia] will have to find different sources of funding… and that’s not out there available immediately.”[48] The Presidents of Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands sent a letter to the leaders of the United States Senate on February 6 stating that they “cannot overstate the importance to all of our nations of final approval [of COFA funding] by the U.S. Congress” and that its delay “has resulted in undesirable opportunities for economic exploitation by competitive political actors active in the Pacific.”[49]

The CCP may use these revenue shortfalls to incentivize Palau and the Marshall Islands to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC. The party has already taken this approach to Nauru, Kiribati, and the Solomon Islands. The PRC offered incentives, such as a commercial aircraft, to Kiribati and USD 8.5 million to the Solomon Islands in 2019.[50] The CCP also offered Nauru USD 100 million per year in 2024 to switch recognition from the PRC to the ROC, according to a Reuters report that cited an unspecified senior Taiwanese official.[51] All three of these countries switched their diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC.

The uptick in flights from the PRC to Palau and the CCP encouraging PRC nationals to vacation in the country suggests that the party seeks economic influence over Palau to coerce it into switching diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC. The number of flights from the PRC to Palau increased from one to eight per month last year to almost daily as of this month.[52]^,[53] This change is a reversal in the CCP policy that cut tourism to Palau over the last decade to nearly zero as punishment for maintaining full diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[54]

Tuvalu

Tuvalu is considering reviewing its diplomatic ties with Taiwan after electing its new prime minister.[56] The sixteen representatives elected on January 26, 2024, who comprise the Parliament of Tuvalu, were aiming to choose a prime minister the week of February 5. Bad weather prevented an unspecified number of legislators from reaching the capital Funafuti, which delayed voting for the prime minister.[57]

Papua New Guinea

Papua New Guinea is considering internal security assistance from the People’s Republic of China. Papua New Guinea Foreign Minister Justin Tkachenko stated the week of January 29 that the offer is still under consideration. Tkachenko did not elaborate on the specifics of the PRC’s offer, which it initially proposed in September 2023.[58] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Wang Wenbin neither confirmed nor denied the ongoing talks on January 29.[59] US Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Richard Verma urged the PNG to reject the offer via a Sydney Morning Harald article published on February 5.[60]

Europe

Russia

Unspecified CCP and Russian officials held collaboration talks on the military application of artificial intelligence (AI) in early February. The Russian Foreign Ministry said that the officials “discussed doctrinal guidelines and initiatives of Russia and China related to the application of AI technologies for military purposes.”[61] The South China Morning Post reported that the People’s Republic of China's statement did not refer to the military use of AI, but acknowledged the meeting focused on “outer space security, biosecurity and artificial intelligence.”[62] ISW cannot independently verify the PRC statement. The PRC has portrayed itself as a leader in responsible AI regulation since launching the Global AI Governance Initiative in October 2023.[63] The PRC omitting that it is collaborating with Russia on the military applications of AI aims to avoid undercutting its image as a responsible AI stakeholder via this initiative.

This meeting occurred in the aftermath of the January 31 meeting about military-to-military cooperation between PRC Defense Minister Dong Jun and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.[64] The timing of the early February meeting indicates that it aimed at implementing the defense minister’s intentions about military-to-military cooperation. All of these meetings fit into a trend of concerted Sino-Russian technological collaboration since at least 2019.[65]

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is using AI to achieve its “intelligentization” force modernization goal, which aims to complexify and enhance the speed of warfare.[66] It also conceptualizes AI as an important tool for achieving decision dominance in the battlespace.[67] Sino-Russian AI cooperation supports this goal.

Middle East

The People’s Liberation Army Navy is providing security escorts to PRC cargo ships near the Red Sea amid ongoing Houthi missile attacks on shipping in the region.[68] The PRC Ministry of National Defense confirmed on February 5 that the Type 052D guided missile destroyer Urumqi from the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 45th escort task force had escorted a PRC ship through the Gulf of Aden.[69] The PLAN escort task force consists of the Urumqi, Type 054A guided missile frigate Linyi, and Type 903A replenishment ship Dongpinghu.[70] Commercial PRC-affiliated ships continue to signal their affiliation to avoid Houthi missile attacks.[71] PRC-owned ships are also receiving discounted shipping insurance when transiting through the Red Sea.[72]

These escorts enable the CCP to buttress the narrative that the PRC provides regional security in comparison to the allegedly provocative United States. The CCP continues to stress that US-led counter strikes on the Houthis and not the Houthi’s attacks on maritime shipping risk a wider regional escalation. PRC Ambassador to the European Union Fu Cong stated in a late January interview with Bloomberg that the US-led strikes against the Houthis “can only escalate tension and it’ll not guarantee or maintain the safe passage of the commercial vessels.”[73] The PLAN 45^th escort task force providing safe passage to PRC ships demonstrates the contrast with the United States, from the CCP perspective, that Fu’s comments aim to portray: the PRC military presence does not lead to escalated regional tensions in implicit contrast to the United States.

Iraq

PRC Ambassador to Iraq Cui Wei met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al-Sudani on February 5 to discuss the Strategic Development Road Project.[74] Iraq launched the project in May 2023 to connect the still incomplete Grand Faw Port to Turkey for commercial benefit.[75] Iraq joined the Belt and Road Initiative in September 2019, which resulted in agreements with PRC companies in October 2019 to rebuild Iraqi infrastructure in exchange for oil.[76] PRC discussions around the Strategic Development Road Project, either regarding its construction or financing, would align with the CCP's geopolitical objective to further the logistical infrastructure necessary for the Belt and Road Initiative.

Iran

Islamic Republic of Iran Navy Commander Shamran Irani announced on February 4 that Iran, Russia, and China will conduct joint naval exercises before the end of the Iranian year on March 19.[77] The exercises will be the continuation of a trend in the annual trilateral Marine Security Belt exercises, which have taken place since 2019. Several countries—such as Brazil, Pakistan, Oman, India, and South Africa, will participate as observers.[78] The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has not yet issued a statement confirming its attendance.

The US Department of Justice (DOJ) charged four PRC nationals for exporting US-origin electronic components to Iran and Iranian-backed militias through PRC-based front companies. The four individuals are Baoxia Liu (Emily Liu), You Wa Yung (Stephen Yung), Yongxin Li (Emma Lee), and Yanlai Zhong (Sydney Chung). The DOJ stated that the four individuals “unlawfully exported and smuggled U.S. export-controlled items through China and Hong Kong ultimately for the benefit of entities affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), which supervises Iran’s development and production of missiles, weapons, and military aerial equipment to include Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).”[79]

Gaza

The CCP expressed support for funding the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). The US State Department temporarily paused funding to UNRWA on January 26 following evidence that its staff were involved in the October 7 attack.[80] PRC MFA Spokesman Wang Wenbin said that the international community should continue funding UNRWA to avoid furthering the “collective punishment” of Gazans. He also stated that the PRC supports an investigation into claims of UNRWA employees involved in the October 7 attack.[81]

The PRC is currently pursuing a diplomatic line of effort that aims to supplant US influence with Arab states by proposing what it claims to be a more inclusive and cooperative regional security framework.[82] This involves portraying Washington as a self-interested and destabilizing influence in the region while simultaneously positioning Beijing as an altruistic and unbiased actor.[83] Wang’s comments support this effort by insinuating countries that cut off aid to UNRWA, such as the United States, are responsible for the “collective punishment” of Gazans.

Latin America

Guatemala

Guatemala is considering trade relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) while attempting to maintain formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan).[84] Guatemala Foreign Minister Carlos Ramiro Martínez stated on February 6 that “this is not an ambush against Taiwan or the United States.”[85] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Wang Wenbin then stated on February 6 then state that Guatemala would need to recognize the one-China principle to “conduct cooperation” between the two countries.[86] The one-China principle is the People’s Republic of China’s position that it is the sole legitimate representative of China and that Taiwan is a part of China. Guatemala accepting the PRC’s one-China principle would mean breaking its relations with the Republic of China (ROC).

China-Taiwan Weekly Update February 2, 2024

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 25, 2024

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Information Cutoff: February 1 at 9am ET

Key Takeaways

Kuomintang legislator Han Kuo-yu was elected speaker of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan on February 1.
PRC Ministry of Defense and state media criticized comments from NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg about the PRC’s threat to Europe and the prospects for a PRC invasion of Taiwan.
The PRC Ministry of Defense confirmed ongoing coordination with the US military about the next meeting under the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement.
The PRC and Russia held several high-level minister exchanges to enhance “strategic coordination,” which support the PRC’s effort to challenge the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific.
The PRC Coast Guard claimed it had “allowed” the Philippines to airdrop supplies to Philippine troops on Second Thomas Shoal on January 21.
A loss of Compacts of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the CCP to expand its leverage points over these countries.
The PRC is engaging diplomatically with North Korea to undermine United States-South Korea security ties for the PRC’s benefit.
The PRC contacted Iran to restrain the Houthi’s attacks on maritime shipping in the Red Sea. The outreach did not slow or stop the Houthi attack campaign.
CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping accepted credentials from Taliban Ambassador to China Bilal Karimi on January 30.

Taiwan

The Legislative Yuan (LY) elected Kuomintang (KMT) legislature Han Kuo-yu speaker of the legislature on February 1. Han received all 52 KMT votes and 2 others from independent legislators in the second round of voting. No candidate secured a majority during the first round.[1] The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) nominated incumbent Legislative Yuan Speaker You Si-kun, who received 51 votes from DPP legislators. You had been the speaker of the Legislative Yuan since 2020. The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) nominated one of its eight legislators, Vivian Huang, and voted unanimously for her.[2] The TPP abstained in the second round of voting. Huang was an unexpected addition to the race, as the TPP had indicated that it would support the DPP or KMT in exchange for political concessions. The potential to secure the TPP’s backing fueled competition between the two parties to appease the TPP until the party announced Huang’s candidacy on January 31.[3] The TPP’s last-minute participation in the LY speaker race caused controversy within the DPP, which viewed the move as an ultimatum to tear DPP support away from its candidate by those who advocated preventing Han’s victory at any cost.

Han is a divisive figure in Taiwanese politics, notorious for his Beijing-friendly platform that contributed to popular dissatisfaction with his incumbency and subsequent removal from office as mayor of Kaohsiung in 2020.[4] Han held closed-door meetings with CCP officials during an unannounced trip to Shenzhen, PRC, and Hong Kong during his mayorship in 2019. Han met with then director of the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Liu Jieyi and CCP Chief for Shenzhen Wang Weizhong. Han also met the director of the PRC’s liaison office, which manages relations with Hong Kong.[5] Han’s meeting with CCP officials drew public criticism for endangering national security and breaking with official protocol for engaging with PRC officials.[6] Han’s meeting preceded a turbulent period in Hong Kong society that resulted in the PRC’s erosion of Hong Kong’s political autonomy and civil liberties by the PRC. Hong Kong’s plight earned widespread sympathy in Taiwan, intensifying criticism of Han.[7]

The KMT’s victory will strengthen its influence over policymaking during Lai Ching-te’s incoming administration. The speaker is responsible for guiding legislative processes, such as setting the agenda, voting on laws, and presiding over sessions. Control over legislative proceedings enables the speaker to prioritize or delay legislation based on political alignment and adjudicate debates on policies proposed by the executive branch. The DPP led a minority government under President Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008, during which the KMT-led opposition persistently blocked DPP policies, including arms procurement from the United States.[8] KMT Vice Chairman Sean Lien promised strong LY oversight of the DPP government under Han’s leadership.[9] KMT Caucus Whip Fu Kun-chi also warned that the KMT would strive to expose DPP corruption from the past eight years, portending an acrimonious relationship between the KMT and DPP during Lai’s presidency.[10]

The TPP’s eight seats in the LY position the party to be the crucial swing vote and could further complicate the passage of DPP policies. The KMT’s 52 seats plus two KMT-aligned independents and DPP’s 51 seats do not grant either a majority in the 113-member body. The TPP’s 8 seats will make its votes the deciding factor for some legislation.

Han’s position as the LY speaker also has ramifications for Taiwan’s international representation as the speaker represents Taiwan in a diplomatic capacity. Outgoing Speaker You Si-kun frequently met with foreign representatives during his tenure to advocate for Taiwan’s integration with the international community, deterrence of PRC aggression, and strengthening of democratic values. You’s diplomacy featured meetings with officials from key partners, including the United States, European Union, and Japan.[11] Han’s preference for warmer relations with Beijing and support for the 1992 Consensus suggests he will take a different diplomatic approach from You, who called attention to the PRC’s threat to cross-strait peace and highlighted Taiwan’s status as a sovereign polity. Han’s emphasis on the economy during his mayoral and presidential campaigns indicates he will use his platform to promote trade and investment opportunities, including with the PRC.[12] The Speaker of the LY also holds the chairmanship of the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD), a government-funded non-profit organization whose purpose is to promote democracy in Taiwan and abroad. DPP caucus whip Ker Chien-ming expressed his fear that PRC pressure on Han would constrain the LY’s diplomatic efforts, which he called the LY’s biggest responsibility.[13] Former Taiwanese diplomat Dale Jieh wen-chieh predicted that the DPP government would intentionally refrain from arranging for foreign guests to visit TFD under Han’s leadership to deprive him of a diplomatic platform.[14]

The PRC demonstrated its preference for Han as the LY speaker in a puff piece featured in the state media outlet CCTV on January 24. The program covered Han’s candidacy for speaker, emphasizing his support for the 1992 Consensus and his stance against being “pro-US and anti-China”.[15] The 1992 Consensus refers to a mutual understanding between the CCP and KMT of “One China”, though interpretations differ between them. CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping explicitly stipulated acceptance of the 1992 Consensus as a precondition for cross-strait dialogue in 2017.[16]

The CCP may seek to leverage its rapport with Han to shape legislative outcomes in the LY, such as curbing DPP national defense-related proposals in the LY. The KMT’s historic inclination to reject DPP proposals in the LY aligns with the CCP’s desire to stymie the efficiency of Lai’s presidency and foment political disarray. Han’s conflicting policy agenda with the DPP indicates that he will wield his authority as speaker to this end, potentially causing problems for Lai’s administration.

The PRC unilaterally changed a domestic commercial flight path closer to the median line in the Taiwan Strait. The new route came into effect on February 1 and comes within 7.8 kilometers of the median line at its closest point.[17] The Taiwan Strait median line has acted as the unofficial border between the PRC and Taiwan since a “tacit agreement” between the two sides in 1958 to observe the line, although the PRC publicly denies its existence.[18] PRC aircraft began crossing the median line with increasing frequency in 1999, under Taiwan’s first democratically elected leader Lee Teng-hui.[19] Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) accused the PRC of using civil aviation to “package” political and military issues to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.[20] The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) reiterated its claim that the purpose of shifting the route is to alleviate airspace congestion.[21] Chieh Chung, an analyst at the Taiwanese think tank National Policy Foundation, stated the move would significantly curtail Taiwan’s air defense early warning and reaction time.[22]

Taiwan’s Premier Chen Chien-jen labeled the PRC’s actions a ploy to undermine cross-strait stability and likened it to the PRC’s increasingly frequent flights of high-altitude balloons.[23] Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) recorded 9 PRC balloons flying near Taiwan since January 25.[24] The PRC also flew a combined 55 military aircraft through Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) from January 30 and February 1, 25 of which crossed the median line.[25] The ADIZ incursions over these two days represent a sharp increase from earlier that week and coincide with the election of the LY speaker.

Tuvalu is considering switching its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC. Tuvalu Ambassador to the Republic of China Bikenibeu Paeniu stated in a January 19 interview with The Australian that there were rumors Tuvalu would go down the same path as Nauru and switch recognition at some point after Tuvalu’s January 26 election.[26] Tuvalu’s Finance Minister Seve Paeniu also stated that Tuvalu expects to review diplomatic ties with Taiwan after the election as his country seeks additional financial support for development.[27] The Tuvalu government said Bikenibeu Paeniu’s comments did not represent its official stance and reaffirmed its ties to Taiwan.[28] Seve Paeniu is now one of the candidates in the race to become Tuvalu’s next Prime Minister as the newly elected lawmakers aim to form a cabinet in the coming week.[29] He is open to recognizing the PRC based on support for Tuvalu’s development priorities and aspirations.[30]

The CCP reportedly offered Tuvalu unspecified financial benefits in the period 2020 to 2023 in exchange for switching diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC. Then Tuvalu Minister for Justice, Communication & Foreign Affairs Simon Kofe refused the offer.[31] Tuvalu is the only country in the Asia-Pacific region that maintains relations with the ROC and does not have a Compact of Free Association (COFA) agreement with the United States.

China

PRC Ministry of Defense and state media criticized comments from NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg about the threat that the PRC poses to Europe and the prospects for a PRC invasion of Taiwan. Stoltenberg said at the World Economic Forum summit on January 16 in Davos, Switzerland, that “China is coming close to us” through its activities in Africa and the Arctic and in trying to control critical infrastructure. He stressed that NATO is a transatlantic regional alliance and does not regard the PRC as an adversary, however.[32] Stoltenberg also commented during a visit to the United States that Western support for Ukraine is “closely watched in Beijing” and that a Russian victory in Ukraine could embolden the PRC to seize Taiwan.[33] The CCP-owned China Daily claimed on January 19 that NATO, not the CCP, was responsible for global instability. It said NATO had become expansionist and that its recent shift of focus to the Asia-Pacific posed a threat to the PRC and jeopardized regional peace and stability.[34] A January 23 China Daily article also described Stoltenberg as “the hawkish head of [an] aggressively expansionist transatlantic alliance” and accused him of “scaremongering” about PRC activities in Africa and the Arctic.[35] The state-owned Global Times wrote on January 30 that Stoltenberg’s “hyping” of the China and Russia threats will not alleviate Western “fatigue” over support for Ukraine.[36]

The CCP expressed concern about the NATO Steadfast Defender military exercises and inaccurately claimed that NATO is driving instability in Europe and the Asia-Pacific. NATO began its Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises on January 24, its largest military exercise since 1988. The drills will feature around 90,000 troops from all 31 NATO member states and Sweden and will last until May 31.[37] PRC MoD spokesperson Wu Qian said at a January 25 press conference that the PRC was “highly concerned” about the exercise, as well as Stoltenberg’s comments about China, and accused NATO of approaching the Asia-Pacific and taking advantage of a “non-existent ‘China threat’” to threaten regional security. He called NATO a “walking ‘war machine’ that brings chaos wherever it goes.”[38] The state news agency Xinhua featured a news article on January 25 that argued that NATO’s Steadfast Defender exercises will only deepen hostilities between European countries and Russia.[39]

The PRC’s rhetoric about NATO aligns with Russian messaging about NATO since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. PRC government bodies and state media have portrayed NATO as an expansionist and aggressive military bloc controlled by the United States that threatens Russian security and regional stability. The CCP has also portrayed the war in Ukraine as a proxy conflict between the United States and Russia, in which Ukraine is a “pawn” of the United States.[40] PRC messaging also aligned with Russia in portraying the Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises as “provocative.”[41]

The PRC Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed ongoing coordination with the US military about the next meeting under the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA). MoD spokesperson Wu Qian did not announce the date of the meeting but said it was part of an ongoing effort to resume military dialogues with the United States.[42] US President Joe Biden and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping agreed during their November 15 summit in San Francisco to resume high-level military talks, including the MMCA talks, US-China Defense Police Coordination (CDPC) talks, and telephone conversations between theater commanders.[43] The first CDPC consultation since the summit occurred on January 8-9.[44] The theater command-level talks have yet to be scheduled.

The PRC and Russia held several high-level minister exchanges to enhance “strategic coordination,” which support the CCP’s effort to challenge the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific. The talks took place from January 29-31 and included meetings between the two countries’ defense ministers and vice foreign ministers. The exchanges addressed a range of issues, such as BRICS cooperation, expanding military cooperation, the war in Ukraine, and developments in the Asia-Pacific, Korean peninsula, and Middle East.[46] The PRC’s defense minister readout on January 31 noted that “Russia will play a greater role in comprehensive strategic coordination and maintaining global security and stability.”[47] The meetings signify the continued growth of military and diplomatic ties between Russia and the PRC, including increased cooperation on shared strategic goals.

The Russian Pacific Fleet also conducted an anti-submarine exercise in the South China Sea on January 29.[48] PRC state media did not publicize the event. The Russian frigate Marshall Saposhnikov of the Pacific Fleet previously conducted anti-submarine warfare drills in the South China Sea on January 29.[49] The Pacific Fleet exercise is likely aimed at demonstrating that Russia is a strong Pacific power that supports China against the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific, as the Kremlin has routinely stressed in the past.[50] The dearth of CCP media coverage on the event reflects the party’s attempt to avoid drawing international attention to the South China Sea while the party is also engaging in military aggression toward the Philippine-controlled Second Thomas Shoal.

Second Thomas Shoal

The PRC Coast Guard claimed that it “allowed” the Philippines to airdrop supplies to Philippine troops on Second Thomas Shoal on January 21. PRC Coast Guard Spokesperson Gan Yu said on the Chinese social media app WeChat that the Coast Guard had made “temporary special arrangements” to allow a small Philippine aircraft to airdrop supplies to troops stationed at the grounded warship that serves as the Philippine base on Second Thomas Shoal. Philippine National Security Council spokesperson Jonathan Malaya denied the PRC allegation that it had allowed the airdrop and said the Philippines did not need anyone’s permission to deliver supplies. He neither confirmed nor denied that the airdrop had occurred.[51]

The PRC inaccurately framed the airdrop as “provocative” amid the easing of tensions in the region. The Second Thomas Shoal is a disputed reef feature in the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea, which the Philippines controls but which the PRC and Taiwan claim. It was the site of confrontations between the Philippines and PRC in recent months. The Philippines and PRC held bilateral maritime consultations on January 17 to de-escalate tensions and the Philippines had not sent vessels to Second Thomas Shoal for over a month before the resupply mission.[52] PRC state-owned media outlet Global Times framed the airdrop as “provocative”, however. PRC Coast Guard Spokesperson Gan Yu reiterated the point in calling on the Philippines to stop its alleged “provocations” and “hyping” the dispute to mislead the international community.[53] He added that the Coast Guard will continue to defend the PRC’s sovereignty, rights, and interests on the Second Thomas Shoal and step up “law enforcement” activities around the shoal.

Compacts of Free Association

A loss of Compacts of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the CCP to expand its leverage points over these countries. These COFAs govern the United States’ relationship with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands while also granting the United States extensive military access throughout their territories. The United States renewed COFAs with Palau and Micronesia in May.[54] It then did so with the Marshall Islands in October.[55] The signed agreements are now before Congress for funding consideration. Congress previously funded the COFAs for a twenty-year period in 2003.[56] The total cost for all three of the twenty-year agreements would be roughly $7 billion spread over the period 2024 to 2043, according to the Congressional Research Service.[57] Deputy Secretary of State nominee Kurt Campbell stated during his Senate confirmation hearing on December 7 that “if we don’t get it [COFA funding] you can expect that literally the next day Chinese diplomats — military and other folks — will be on the plane…trying to secure a better deal for China.”[58] The US House of Representatives Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party also called for renewing the COFAs in a mid-December report.[59] President Biden signed the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act into law on December 22, but it did not include COFA funding.[60] Funding the COFAs is a key part of the US Pacific Partnership Strategy to “fulfill our [United States] historical commitments and strengthen our enduring relationships with the full Pacific Islands region, including our special relationship with the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia.”[61] Palau’s President Surangel Whipps Jr expressed concern in a December 27 interview with ABC Australia over the lack of Congressional-approved funding for the COFA agreement, in part because the 2010 Palau Compact Review Agreement was not funded by the US Congress until 2018.[62]

These three island countries control key sea lanes that provide a secure route connecting American allies and partners, such as the Philippines and Taiwan, to the US territory of Guam and Hawaii. Palau and the Marshall Islands are 2 of the 12 countries that maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[63]

The loss of COFA funding would present an opportunity for the CCP to expand its economic influence with these vital Pacific Island countries. For example, this funding loss would cause severe financial pressure in Palau because COFA funding accounts for $36.9 million of the national government’s annual $124.2 million revenue as of fiscal year 2023.[64] This is an economic vulnerability that the CCP could partially fill by encouraging PRC nationals to vacation in Palau. The CCP cut tourism to Palau over the last decade to nearly zero as punishment for maintaining full diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[65] The reversal of this CCP policy would provide the party with economic leverage to wield over Palau in the event of future policy disagreements. The expansion of the CCP’s economic influence in Palau would also provide the party a leverage point to coerce the countries into switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The PRC aims to coerce countries into switching diplomatic recognition to falsely argue that Taiwan is a province of the People’s Republic of China rather than a legitimate country named the Republic of China. Palau President Surangel Whipps Jr. stated that the CCP is intensely pressuring his country, including personally harassing him with angry phone calls to the point he changed his phone number, ahead of its November election to achieve this goal.[66]

The loss of COFA funding would also exacerbate the CCP narrative put forth by the propaganda outlet Global Times that the United States only cares about Palau for security reasons rather than mutually beneficial cooperation. [67] The Palau Senate passed a resolution in November rejecting the permanent deployment of a US Patriot missile defense battery.[68] This was the first instance of lawmakers challenging President Surangel Whipps Jr’s request for the United States to construct an over-the-horizon radar system in Palau.[69] In a December 27 interview with ABC Australia, Whipps tied this Palau Senate resolution to a narrative among unspecified portions of Palau that the United States actions were not in the best interests of Palau, as seen by the repeated delay in COFA funding.[70] The associated fiscal challenges that Palau faces without COFA funding buttresses the CCP’s narrative, which in turn creates hurdles for deploying mutually beneficial United States defense resources to the country.

The loss of COFA funding would also provide the CCP an opportunity to expand influence efforts targeting Micronesian political elites. The CCP has completed infrastructure projects throughout the country, such as houses for the country’s president, vice president, speakers of congress, and chief justice.[71] Axios reported that former Micronesian officials confirmed receiving gifts from the PRC, such as money, while on official state visits to the country.[72] The lack of COFA funding would exacerbate the appeal of CCP monetary gifts or infrastructure projects that target the Micronesian political elite. Micronesian President Wesley Simina also stated in late November that his country would be at a “fiscal cliff” without US Congressional approval of COFA funding. This would mean that “we [Micronesia] will have to find different sources of funding… and that’s not out there available immediately.”[73] The loss of COFA funding would also provide opportunities for external powers such as the CCP to enhance their economic influence in the country by filling these funding gaps. The loss of COFA funding would also undermine the intent of annual humanitarian missions to Micronesia, such as that by the USNS Mercy in January 2024, to bolster US-Micronesia relations.[74]

The COFA funding also makes up $35.2 million of the Marshall Islands national government's annual $173.9 million revenue as of fiscal year 2023.[75] The loss of COFA funding would expose the country to similar severe fiscal challenges as Palau and Micronesia. The powerful waves that flooded portions of US Army Garrison Kwajalein Atoll in late January 2024 highlight the Marshall Islands’ geographic vulnerabilities that the COFA funding would provide resources to address.[76]

The CCP may use these revenue shortfalls to incentivize Palau and the Marshall Islands to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC. Australia evacuating refugees it paid Nauru to host led to a budget shortfall.[78] The CCP then reportedly offered Nauru USD 100 million per year in 2024 to successfully switch recognition from the PRC to the ROC, according to a Reuters report that cited an unspecified senior Taiwanese official.[79] This follows a regional trend of the PRC offering incentives such as a commercial aircraft to Kiribati or USD 8.5 million to the Solomon Islands, both in 2019, to successfully incentivize them to switch diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC.[80]

North Korea

PRC Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong met with North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Pak Myong-ho on January 26 to discuss bilateral relations and the “international and regional situation.”[81] The PRC did not comment on North Korea’s aggressive behavior in the region, which is consistent with PRC actions since mid-December. The CCP has not publicly criticized North Korea for launching ballistic missiles, testing alleged underwater nuclear drones, or labeling South Korea as its “primary foe.” The CCP has instead called for dialogue to portray the party as a responsible regional stakeholder while avoiding steps to stop North Korea's provocations. The PRC MFA has messaged since mid-December that “trying to solve the problem [on the Korean Peninsula] through military deterrence and pressure will not work…[and] dialogue and consultation” are how to resolve the issue.[82] The CCP has also emphasized the PRC’s close relations with North Korea and plans to deepen “mutually beneficial cooperation” this year, which will be the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries.[83]

The PRC is engaging diplomatically with North Korea to undermine United States-South Korea security ties for the PRC’s benefit. The PRC's strategy toward the Korean Peninsula is to push South Korea into a foreign policy that balances the interests of the United States and the PRC.[84] This is based on the view that a regional balance of power shift is underway that is unfavorable to the United States as the PRC engages in a military buildup and South Korea increases its military ability to independently defend against North Korea.[85] Implicit in this view is that the PRC military buildup will force South Korea to account for PRC strategic interests in the peninsula at the expense of the United States-South Korea security relationship.

Israel-Hamas War

The PRC contacted Iran to restrain the Houthi’s attacks on maritime shipping in the Red Sea. The outreach did not slow or stop the Houthi attack campaign. The Financial Times reported on January 24 that US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and Secretary of State Antony Blinken asked the PRC to pressure Iran to stop Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. The report also stated that unspecified US officials had seen little evidence of China acting upon these requests.[86] PRC officials asked Iran to have the Houthis show restraint regarding attacks in the Red Sea, according to a Reuters report citing unspecified Iranian officials. The unspecified Iranian officials stated that the PRC did not make specific threats toward Iran if Houthi attacks threatened PRC shipping interests.[87]

The PRC has not condemned Houthi aggression and has instead called for regional calm rather than take steps or support international efforts to stop the Houthi attacks on maritime shipping. PRC foreign affairs officials called on all parties to “play a constructive and responsible role” in keeping the Red Sea safe on January 4 and expressed concern on January 12 about the alleged ”escalation of tensions in the Red Sea” after United States-led strikes on Houthi positions.”[88]^,[89] A joint PRC MFA and Arab League statement on January 16 reiterated these points in calling on “all parties to cool down the situation…and effectively maintain regional peace and stability.”[90] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Wang Wenbin implied that US-led strikes on Houthi positions in Yemen are illegitimate because “the [United Nations] Security Council has never authorized the use of force by any country on Yemen.”[91] The only exception to in the PRC’s rhetoric about the Houthi attacks on maritime shipping occurred on January 10, when Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations Zhang Jun “call[ed] on the Houthi armed forces to immediately stop harassing civilian ships and respect the freedom of navigation of all countries.”[92]^,[93]

The CCP continues to stress that US-led counter strikes on the Houthis and not the Houthi’s attacks on maritime shipping risk a wider regional escalation. PRC Ambassador to the European Union Fu Cong stated in a late January interview with Bloomberg that the US-led strikes against the Houthis “can only escalate tension and it’ll not guarantee or maintain the safe passage of the commercial vessels.”[94] A regional escalation would further threaten PRC economic interests by increasing shipping costs and disrupting oil supplies from the region.

Afghanistan

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping accepted credentials from Taliban Ambassador to China Bilal Karimi on January 30.[95] PRC MFA Spokesperson Wang Wenbin did not confirm nor deny whether the PRC recognizes the Taliban government in Afghanistan during a press conference on January 31.[96] The PRC appointed the new ambassador Zhao Sheng to the country in September 2023.[97] The PRC did not explicitly recognize the Taliban. No country officially recognizes the Taliban regime. The event demonstrates growing PRC-Taliban ties, however, as Xi accepted Karimi’s credentials at a ceremony in which he accepted credentials from diplomats from 38 other countries.

This is the latest indication of growing ties between the CCP and the Taliban regime and builds on agricultural and economic deals that the two signed last year. The PRC signed a 6.5 billion USD mining deal and oil deals worth hundreds of millions of US dollars in 2023.[98]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 19, 2024

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: January 25 at 10 am ET

Key Takeaways

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Kuomintang (KMT) are preparing for the election of the speaker and deputy speaker of the Legislative Yuan. The party that secures the role will steer legislative processes in a divided legislature.
PRC Premier Li Qiang appealed to foreign business leaders to invest in China at the World Economic Forum (WEF) summit in Davos, Switzerland. The PRC is increasingly emphasizing economic cooperation with Europe as fraying relations with the US threaten to dampen the PRC’s growth.
The Philippines and PRC began bilateral negotiations over South China Sea disputes on January 17. The CCP's track record of engaging in dialogue while driving crises in the region to achieve its political objective indicates that the Philippine-PRC dialogue will not change the party’s behavior in the region.
A loss of Compacts of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the CCP to expand its leverage points over these countries.
Tuvalu is considering switching its diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC.

Taiwan

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Kuomintang (KMT) are preparing for the election of the speaker and deputy speaker of the Legislative Yuan. The party that secures the role will steer legislative processes in a divided legislature. The legislative candidates who won seats in the January 13 elections will take office at the beginning of the new legislative session on February 1. The members will vote on a new speaker and deputy speaker.[1] The speaker is responsible for guiding legislative processes, such as setting the legislative agenda, voting on laws, and presiding over sessions. Control over legislative proceedings means the speaker can prioritize or delay legislation based on political alignment and steer debates on policies proposed by the executive branch.[2]

Han Kuo-yu and Johnny Chiang Chi-chen announced their candidacies for speaker and deputy speaker, respectively, on January 18 and received the KMT’s nomination on January 24 after a short-lived internal challenge to Han for the speakership.[3] Han is a divisive figure in Taiwanese politics. He rose to prominence in the KMT after a surprise 2018 victory in the mayoral race in Kaohsiung, a DPP stronghold, and ran an unsuccessful presidential campaign in 2020 against President Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP. Han’s PRC-friendly platform contributed to popular dissatisfaction in Kaohsiung and his subsequent recall from the mayor’s office.[4] Chiang is a former chairman of the KMT who worked to review the party’s cross-strait policy after Han lost the 2020 presidential election. He represents a younger and more moderate wing of the party and advised the KMT’s 2024 presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih in formulating his cross-strait policy.[5]

The DPP legislative caucus said that it would support You Si-kun and Tsai Chi-chang, who are the incumbent speaker and deputy speaker. The caucus has not completed the nomination process as of January 25, however.[6]

A KMT speaker would exacerbate the obstacles that the divided legislature will pose to incoming president Lai Ching-te’s agenda. The legislature is divided, with the KMT holding the largest number of seats but without a majority party. This alone will challenge the incoming DPP administration’s ability to pass legislation. The DPP last led a minority government under President Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008, during which the KMT-led opposition frequently blocked arms procurement from the United States and other policies favored by the DPP.[7] Han Kuo-yu would likely facilitate similar obstructionism if he becomes the speaker. DPP legislative caucus leader Ker Chien-ming claimed that if Han becomes speaker of the LY, “there is a high possibility he will be controlled by the CCP.”[8]

The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) will be the crucial “swing vote” between the two major parties in the selection of the next speaker and deputy speaker. The KMT’s 52 seats (plus two KMT-aligned independents) and DPP’s 51 seats do not grant either a majority in the 113-member body. The TPP’s 8 seats will make its votes the deciding factor.[9]

The KMT has been trying to win TPP support before the new legislative session begins. Han and Chiang said that Chiang would step aside if the TPP nominates a deputy speaker candidate to run with Han.[10] Han said on January 24 that he agreed with some legislative reforms proposed recently, such as those pushed by the TPP.[11] Fu Kun-chi, the KMT legislator who briefly announced his candidacy for speaker on January 21 before dropping out, also reached out to the TPP and offered to cooperate on its preferred parliamentary reforms.[12] The TPP legislators-elect Huang Shan-shan and Huang Kuo-chang said the priority of the TPP caucus was to implement reforms to increase government transparency and give the Legislative Yuan more oversight over the Executive Yuan, Taiwan’s executive branch. They expressed appreciation for the KMT outreach and show of support. The incoming TPP legislators said on January 15 and 18 that they would support speaker candidates who could explain how they would implement their preferred reforms.[13] Han and Chiang can win without TPP support if the TPP abstains or fields its own candidates. The KMT outreach to the TPP shows that it is concerned about the possibility of the TPP endorsing the DPP candidates instead.

ISW has not noted reports of significant DPP efforts to win TPP support for its candidates, the incumbents. Huang Kuo-chang said on January 24 that he was unclear about the attitude of the DPP toward parliamentary reform.[14] DPP legislative caucus leader Ker Chien-ming criticized the eight TPP legislators-elect for using their decisive positions to “sow chaos.”[15] DPP incumbent speaker You Si-kun said that he had once proposed reforms similar to what the TPP wanted, but there was no consensus on them within the DPP. He also said that he was friends with TPP Chairman Ko Wen-je and would fight for TPP support, but did not know if he would get it.[16] You also said that “any combination is possible,” however, including a scenario in which a TPP candidate becomes the next speaker as a possible compromise.[17] The five TPP legislators of the previous legislative session voted for You in 2020.[18]

The PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS) said on January 17 that it will step up efforts to counter alleged Taiwanese infiltration of the PRC. The MSS claimed on its official WeChat account that Taiwan’s intelligence and defense agencies had been “infiltrating China since the DPP came to power in 2016.” It claimed to have dismantled multiple Taiwanese espionage networks in 2018 and 2020 and vowed to intensify counterintelligence and “anti-separatist” efforts related to Taiwan. The MSS accused Taiwan’s intelligence agencies of acting like “thugs for ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces,” “hyping up rumors” about the PRC interfering in Taiwan’s elections, suppressing people who oppose the DPP, and colluding with “external forces.” It echoed statements by the Taiwan Affairs Office that the DPP does not represent Taiwan’s “mainstream public opinion.”[19]

The MSS made the post in response to Lai Ching-te’s victory in the January 13 presidential election. The timing and framing suggest the announced espionage crackdown is partly meant to punish Taiwan for electing the CCP’s least favored candidate. It is also probable that the MSS claims about Taiwanese infiltration are related to the December 2023 leaks from Taiwanese intelligence about a secret top-level CCP meeting in which Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Chairman Wang Huning, who is the fourth-ranked member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, discussed how to increase the effectiveness and subtlety of PRC efforts to interfere in Taiwan’s election. An unnamed senior Taiwanese official leaked the information to Western media.[20]

The PRC continued to send high-altitude balloons into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) after a four-day hiatus. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported PRC high-altitude balloons flying across the Taiwan Strait every day this month except January 16-19. The MND reported a record high of 6 PRC high-altitude balloons violating its Air Defense Identification Zone in one day on January 21. At least one flew directly over Taiwan’s territory.[21] This pattern of activity is consistent with the ISW assessment that the PRC is trying to normalize using balloons in tandem with other aerial and naval ADIZ violations as part of a broader effort to wear down Taiwan’s threat awareness. The break in balloon flights after an uninterrupted streak of daily incursions in the first half of January suggests the recent increase in balloon activities was related to Taiwan’s January 13 election.

China

PRC Premier Li Qiang appealed to foreign business leaders to invest in China at the World Economic Forum (WEF) summit in Davos, Switzerland. Li addressed an audience of global business executives and politicians, painting a rosy picture of the PRC’s economic health and urging the world to cast off skepticism over its challenging economic prospects. Li announced that the PRC met its 2023 growth target, remains committed to financial liberalization, and promised a responsible economic growth model.[22]

Li’s speech was tailored to resonate with an international business audience, highlighting the PRC’s economic potential on the merits of its size while ignoring the broader global political environment. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s speech, by contrast, took a distinct focus on geopolitical issues. Von der Leyen hailed freedom and democracy as the drivers of innovation and highlighted challenges posed by growing disinformation and disregard for national sovereignty.[23]

The contrast between Li and von der Leyen’s speeches captures the challenges of EU-PRC relations, which are subject to the push and pull of ideological confrontation and economic opportunities. The EU adopted an economic security package on January 24 in response to “growing geopolitical tensions and profound technological shifts.”[24] The initiatives in the package align with von der Leyen’s calls to “de-risk” the EU’s relationship with the PRC, especially in high-tech areas, a strategy she first proposed in March 2023.[25] The measure includes plans to increase screening of foreign investment into the EU, strengthen export controls, manage risks associated with outward investment in certain technologies, support research and development of dual-use technologies, and enhance research security.

The PRC, however, is increasingly emphasizing economic cooperation with Europe as fraying relations with the US threaten to dampen the PRC’s growth. Li advocated for economic cooperation with French and German officials in June 2023 during a visit to France and Germany.[26] CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping and French President Emmanuel Macron stressed the importance of strong economic ties during a meeting in April 2023.[27] Li told von der Leyen that the PRC wanted to import more EU products and urged the EU to ease high-tech export restrictions on the PRC during a meeting between the two on the sidelines of the summit in Davos.[28] Von der Leyen previously announced an investigation into electric vehicle subsidies in the PRC as part of the EU’s de-risking efforts during her September 15 State of the Union speech.[29]

A reporter from CCP-operated China Daily highlighted the contrasting sentiments expressed by Li and von der Leyen in a request for comment by the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), referencing von der Leyen’s de-risking strategy without mentioning her by name. MFA spokesperson Mao Ning responded that fragmentation would only weaken the global economy. Mao extolled the potential of the PRC economy and appealed to foreign companies to heed Premier Li’s calls to invest. [30]Li’s attendance at the WEF summit provided the PRC with an opportunity to directly lobby the business community where diplomatic efforts have yielded limited progress in strengthening inward investment. Li participated in a luncheon with the heads of 14 multinational companies, including Siemens, Volkswagen, and JPMorgan Chase. The PRC MFA described the meeting as a productive discussion about the benefits of investing in China, noting Li’s promises of strong returns.[31]

The Philippines and PRC began bilateral negotiations over South China Sea disputes on January 17. PRC Assistant Foreign Minister Nong Rong and Philippine Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Theresa Lazaro co-chaired the eighth meeting of the China-Philippines Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) on the South China Sea.[32] The PRC MFA stated that the two sides agreed to “continue to properly manage sea-related conflicts and differences through friendly consultations.”[33] The CCP-controlled English language outlet Global Times reported on January 18 that the Philippines has not sent vessels near Second Thomas Shoal in over a month, the longest period without “provocations” since August 2023.[34]

The Philippine-PRC dialogue will not change the party’s behavior in the region, based on the CCP's track record of engaging in dialogue while driving crises to achieve its political objectives. In 2012 the party engaged in negotiations with the Philippines to end a standoff at the Scarborough Shoal, which Manilla administered at the time, while steadily increasing the number of Chinese Coast Guard ships near the shoal.[35] This resulted in the Philippines withdrawing its ships from the shoal in mid-June 2012 under a now-disputed agreement that the PRC would do the same.[36] The CCP subsequently kept its ships near the shoal and achieved its political objective of gaining de facto control of the Scarborough Shoal by July 2012.[37] In 2016 the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Arbitration Tribunal unanimously ruled in favor of the Philippines by rejecting the legitimacy of PRC claims to territory inside of the nine-dash line and land reclamation activities.[38] The CCP has ignored the ruling by continuing land reclamation efforts and maritime coercion in the South China Sea over the last eight years.

The Philippines and Vietnam are expected to sign a memorandum of understanding between their coast guards when President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. visits the country in late January.[39] This would provide one mechanism for the Philippines to leverage in attempts to prevent CCP coercion in the South China Sea from increasing.

Compacts of Free Association

A loss of Compacts of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the CCP to expand its leverage points over these countries. These COFAs govern the United States’ relationship with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands while also granting the United States extensive military access throughout their territories. The United States renewed COFAs with Palau and Micronesia in May.[40] It then did so with the Marshall Islands in October.[41] The signed agreements are now before Congress for funding consideration. Congress previously funded the COFAs for a twenty-year period in 2003.[42] The total cost for all three of the twenty-year agreements would be roughly $7 billion spread over the period 2024 to 2043, according to the Congressional Research Service.[43] Deputy Secretary of State nominee Kurt Campbell stated during his Senate confirmation hearing on December 7 that “if we don’t get it [COFA funding] you can expect that literally the next day Chinese diplomats — military and other folks — will be on the plane…trying to secure a better deal for China.”[44] The US House of Representatives Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party also called for renewing the COFAs in a mid-December report.[45] President Biden signed the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act into law on December 22, but it did not include COFA funding.[46] Funding the COFAs is a key part of the US Pacific Partnership Strategy to “fulfill our [United States] historical commitments and strengthen our enduring relationships with the full Pacific Islands region, including our special relationship with the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia.”[47] Palau’s President Surangel Whipps Jr expressed concern in a December 27 interview with ABC Australia over the lack of Congressional-approved funding for the COFA agreement, in part because the 2010 Palau Compact Review Agreement was not funded by the US Congress until 2018.[48]

The loss of COFA funding would present an opportunity for the CCP to expand its economic influence with these vital Pacific Island countries. For example, this funding loss would cause severe financial pressure in Palau because COFA funding accounts for $36.9 million of the national government’s annual $124.2 million revenue as of fiscal year 2023.[50] This is an economic vulnerability that the CCP could partially fill by encouraging PRC nationals to vacation in Palau. The CCP cut tourism to Palau over the last decade to nearly zero as punishment for maintaining full diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[51] The reversal of this CCP policy would provide the party with economic leverage to wield over Palau in the event of future policy disagreements. The expansion of the CCP’s economic influence in Palau would also provide the party a leverage point to coerce the countries into switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The PRC aims to coerce countries into switching diplomatic recognition to falsely argue that Taiwan is a province of the People’s Republic of China rather than a legitimate country named the Republic of China.

The loss of COFA funding would also exacerbate the CCP narrative put forth by the propaganda outlet Global Times that the United States only cares about Palau for security reasons rather than mutually beneficial cooperation. [52] The Palau Senate passed a resolution in November rejecting the permanent deployment of a US Patriot missile defense battery.[53] This was the first instance of lawmakers challenging President Surangel Whipps Jr’s request for the United States to construct an over-the-horizon radar system in Palau.[54] In a December 27 interview with ABC Australia, Whipps tied this Palau Senate resolution to a narrative among unspecified portions of Palau that the United States actions were not in the best interests of Palau, as seen by the repeated delay in COFA funding.[55] The associated fiscal challenges that Palau faces without COFA funding buttresses the CCP’s narrative, which in turn creates hurdles for deploying mutually beneficial United States defense resources to the country.

The loss of COFA funding would also provide the CCP an opportunity to expand influence efforts targeting Micronesian political elites. The CCP has completed infrastructure projects throughout the country, such as houses for the country’s president, vice president, speakers of congress, and chief justice.[56] Axios reported that former Micronesian officials confirmed receiving gifts from the PRC, such as money, while on official state visits to the country.[57] The lack of COFA funding would exacerbate the appeal of CCP monetary gifts or infrastructure projects that target the Micronesian political elite. Micronesian President Wesley Simina also stated in late November that his country would be at a “fiscal cliff” without US Congressional approval of COFA funding. This would mean that “we [Micronesia] will have to find different sources of funding… and that’s not out there available immediately.”[58] The loss of COFA funding would also provide opportunities for external powers such as the CCP to enhance their economic influence in the country by filling these funding gaps.

The COFA funding also makes up $35.2 million of the Marshall Islands national government's annual $173.9 million revenue as of fiscal year 2023.[59] The loss of COFA funding would expose the country to similar severe fiscal challenges as Palau and Micronesia.

The CCP may use these revenue shortfalls to incentivize Palau and the Marshall Islands to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC. Australia evacuating refugees it paid Nauru to host led to a budget shortfall.[61] The CCP then reportedly offered Nauru USD 100 million per year in 2024 to successfully switch recognition from the PRC to the ROC, according to a Reuters report that cited an unspecified senior Taiwanese official.[62] This follows a regional trend of the PRC offering incentives such as a commercial aircraft to Kiribati or USD 8.5 million to the Solomon Islands, both in 2019, to successfully incentivize them to switch diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC.[63]

Tuvalu

Tuvalu is considering switching its diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC. The Tuvalu Ambassador to the Republic of China Bikenibeu Paeniu stated in a January 19 interview with The Australian that there were rumors Tuvalu would go down the same path as Nauru and switch recognition at some point after Tuvalu’s January 26 election.[64] Tuvalu’s Finance Minister Seve Paeniu also stated that Tuvalu expects to review diplomatic ties with Taiwan after the election as his country seeks additional financial support for development.[65] The Tuvalu government said Bikenibeu Paeniu’s comments did not represent its official stance and reaffirmed its ties to Taiwan.[66] Tuvalu is the only one in the Asia-Pacific region that maintains relations with the ROC and does not have a COFA with the United States.

Israel-Hamas War

The PRC has chosen not to engage with Iran to stop Houthi maritime shipping attacks. The Financial Times reported that US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and Secretary of State Antony Blinken asked the PRC to pressure Iran to stop Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. The report also stated that unspecified US officials had seen little evidence of China acting upon these requests.[67] The PRC has only explicitly condemned the Houthis one time since the shipping attacks began. The PRC abstained on January 10 from UN Resolution 2722 which condemned Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.[68] In explanatory remarks, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations Zhang Jun did however “call on the Houthi armed forces to immediately stop harassing civilian ships and respect the freedom of navigation of all countries.”[69]

The CCP has maintained rhetoric calling for regional calm instead of acting to resolve the Houthi shipping attacks. PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Wang Wenbin called on January 4 for all parties to “play a constructive and responsible role” in keeping the Red Sea safe.[70] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokeswoman Mao Ning also expressed concern on January 12 about the alleged ”escalation of tensions in the Red Sea” after United States-led strikes on Houthi positions on January 11.[71] A joint PRC MFA and Arab League statement on January 16 called on “all parties to cool down the situation…and effectively maintain regional peace and stability.”[72] Wang also called on January 24 for “a stop of causing disturbance [sic] to civilian ships” in the Red Sea while also implying American-led strikes against Houthi positions in Yemen were illegitimate because “the [UN] Security Council has never authorized the use of force by any country on Yemen.”[73] The bigger problem from the CCP’s perspective is not the hostilities instigated by the Houthis, but rather the United States-led counterstrikes. The party views the willingness of the United States and allies to strike Houthi positions as risking wider regional escalation, which would threaten PRC economic interests, such as increasing shipping costs and disrupting oil supplies from the region.

North Korea

The PRC MFA has messaged since mid-December that “trying to solve the problem [on the Korean Peninsula] through military deterrence and pressure will not work…[and] dialogue and consultation” are how to resolve the issue.[74] Head of the CCP International Liaison Department Liu Jianchao reiterated these points during a January 19 meeting with the North Korean Ambassador to the PRC Ri Ryong-nam. The officials also agreed to deepen the PRC and North Korea’s “mutually beneficial cooperation” this year, which will be the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries.[75] The PRC MFA repeated its call on January 25 for “meaningful dialogue” over “legitimate concerns” in response to the North Korean ballistic missile test on January 24.[76] The CCP has not criticized North Korea for launching ballistic missiles, alleged underwater nuclear drones, or labeling South Korea as its “primary foe.”

Click here to read the full report

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: January 18 at 5pm ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

Democratic Progressive Party candidate Lai Ching-te won the Taiwanese presidential election on January 13. The DPP did not secure a majority in the Legislative Yuan and will face opposition from the KMT and Taiwan’s People’s Party in the legislative body.
Nauru severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with the PRC on January 15.
Head of the CCP International Department Liu Jianchao commented on the need for stronger “international cooperation” during an interview at the US Council on Foreign Relations on January 9.
President Joe Biden and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping agreed on November 15, 2023, to resume high-level military-to-military communication.
The CCP views United States-led strikes against the Houthis as escalating regional tensions.
A second PRC-brokered ceasefire in northern Myanmar failed to stop the fighting between the Myanmar junta and rebel groups.

Taiwan

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Lai Ching-te won the Taiwanese presidential election on January 13. Lai won by a margin of nearly seven percentage points over the second-place Kuomintang (KMT) candidate.[1] Lai’s election signals continuity with the cross-strait policy and diplomatic strategy of the incumbent administration of Tsai Ing-wen, during which Taiwan has favored closer cooperation with the United States at the expense of relations with the PRC.

Lai’s victory is a defeat for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP conducts constant influence operations against Taiwan to erode support for the DPP and steer perceptions of a Chinese national identity that lends legitimacy to the CCP. The CCP’s influence operations were especially intense during Taiwan’s election season, ranging from covert to overt and varied in target audience. Some of the most salient examples include the mass posting of disinformation content to social media, subsidizing trips to the PRC for local political and business leaders, and warning of armed conflict by framing the election as a choice between peace and war. The DPP’s reelection represents the failure of PRC interference in Taiwan’s democracy and highlights the prevalence of the Taiwanese identity that the DPP champions.

The PRC’s response to the results has so far been minimal compared to the political and military pressure it has exerted on Taiwan. The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) issued a statement focusing on the DPP’s weaker mandate compared to previous elections, stating that “the DPP can by no means represent mainstream public opinion on the island.”[2] The PRC did not expand its military posturing immediately after the election. PLA ADIZ violations remained within the bounds of normal activity until a modest spike on January 17 and 18, when 29 PLA aircraft crossed the Taiwan Strait median line over the two days.[3] These actions are consistent with the PRC’s responses to Taiwan’s last presidential election. The TAO similarly dismissed Tsai’s 2020 reelection and declared the PRC’s absolute intolerance for so-called separatism.[4] The PRC also sailed the newly commissioned Shandong aircraft carrier through the Taiwan Strait immediately before Tsai Ing-wen’s reelection in January 2020 but did not take aggressive actions in the week after.[5]

The DPP did not secure a majority in the Legislative Yuan and will face opposition from the KMT and Taiwan’s People’s Party (TPP) in the legislative body. None of the three major parties won a majority through the legislative elections. The DPP won 51 seats, which is a 10-seat loss compared to the last election. The KMT gained 14 seats for a total of 52, putting it ahead of the DPP by 1. The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) secured 8 seats, which positions it to play a decisive role on divided issues in legislative decision-making. Two independent candidates who are aligned with the KMT also won seats.[6] A divided legislature will pose challenges for the incoming DPP administration’s ability to pass legislation. The DPP last led a minority government under President Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008, during which the KMT-led opposition frequently blocked arms procurement from the United States, for example. The KMT-led opposition also blocked other policy initiatives, such as amendments to voting laws and regulations governing party assets and state-owned property.[7]

The DPP will likely face opposition to its defense policies in the Legislative Yuan. Lai has promised to continue former President Tasi Ing-wen’s deterrence-focused national defense strategy, which entails robust defense spending, arms procurement, and military reforms.[8] The expansion of defense-related spending under the Tsai administration was often funded by special budgets, which the DPP’s political opponents deem fiscally irresponsible.[9] The KMT and TPP expressed similar views about defense spending throughout the campaign. KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih and TPP chairman candidate Ko Wen-je sharply criticized Tsai and the DPP for lack of fiscal discipline during the election campaign, despite Taiwan’s debt levels trending down over Tsai’s tenure.[10] Hou promoted a strong national defense strategy but emphasized that Taiwan should prioritize easing tensions with the PRC over reckless spending on several occasions.[11] Ko advocated for defense expenditure of up to 3% of GDP but disagreed with the DPP on the allocation of funds.[12]

Seat allocation in the Legislative Yuan

The Legislative Yuan is set to elect a speaker on February 1. Former KMT presidential hopeful Han Kuo-yu announced his candidacy on January 18 and is the top contender for the role given the KMT’s plurality.[14] Han is a divisive figure in Taiwanese politics, notorious for his pro-Beijing platform that contributed to popular dissatisfaction with his incumbency and subsequent removal from office as mayor of Kaohsiung.[15] The role of the speaker is consequential for the DPP’s relative political power. The speaker is responsible for guiding legislative processes, such as setting the legislative agenda, voting on laws, and presiding over sessions. Control over legislative proceedings means the speaker can prioritize or delay legislation based on political alignment and steer debates on policies proposed by the executive branch.

The handful of TPP legislators will play a decisive role in the election of the speaker. Cooperation between the KMT and TPP since last November to “work together to maximize their presence” in the Legislative Yuan has fueled speculation that the parties will elect Han to be the legislative speaker.[16] Lingering resentment between the TPP and KMT after bitter negotiations to form a joint presidential ticket failed also threatens to complicate the two parties’ cooperation, however.[17]

Ko may use the TPP’s political leverage in the Legislative Yuan to selectively cooperate with the DPP on some policies. Lai and Ko each presented housing policies that emphasized increasing the availability of social housing.[18] The two candidates also advocated for investment in technology and innovation to increase economic competitiveness.[19] Ko’s flexible policy position has led many to regard him as an opportunist who will act according to political interests rather than ideological alignment.[20]

Nauru severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with the PRC on January 15. Nauru cited the “One China Principle” and UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 as the basis for its decision.[21] UN Resolution 2758 recognized the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate representative of “China” to the United Nations and removed the Republic of China (Taiwan) as a UN member. Nauru previously cut ties with Taiwan in favor of the PRC in 2002, then switched back to relations with Taiwan in 2005. Without Nauru, Taiwan now has 12 “diplomatic allies” with which it has formal diplomatic relations.[22]

Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) “strongly condemned” the decision and accused the PRC of manipulating Nauru with offers of financial aid. The MOFA claimed that Nauru had been asking for “a huge amount of financial aid that surpassed what Taiwan would normally provide to diplomatic allies.” It said that the switch in recognition was a means for the PRC to “suppress Taiwan” and called it “revenge against democratic values” following Taiwan’s January 13 elections.[23] The MOFA also issued a statement refuting the “fallacious” use of UN Resolution 2758, pointing out that the resolution does not mention Taiwan and does not say Taiwan is part of the PRC.[24]

Taiwan’s Central News Agency cited unnamed Taiwanese officials who claimed Nauru had asked Taiwan for 2.6 billion NTD (about 82 million USD) in financial aid, over half of Nauru’s national budget. The money was intended to cover a revenue gap primarily caused by Australia’s closure of its Nauru Regional Processing Center for asylum seekers. The unnamed sources said that the PRC took advantage of Taiwan’s inability to afford this amount and agreed to provide the requested aid in exchange for Nauru cutting ties with Taiwan and recognizing the PRC.[25] Australian Minister for International Development and the Pacific Pat Conroy said Nauru informed Australia that it would cut ties with Taiwan but did not ask Australia for financial aid to fill the hole in its budget.[26]

The PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) said the PRC “welcomes and appreciates” Nauru’s decision and claimed it “fully demonstrates once again that the one-China principle is the aspiration of the people and the general trend.” It did not directly respond to Taiwan’s accusations that the diplomatic switch was related to Taiwan’s elections.[27] It denied engaging in “money diplomacy” to lure Nauru but said cooperation with the PRC promised “broad prospects and will bring unprecedented development opportunities for Nauru.”[28]

China

Head of the CCP International Department Liu Jianchao commented on the need for stronger “international cooperation” during an interview at the US Council on Foreign Relations on January 9. He stated that “for domestic circulation to function well, it does need stronger international cooperation, more foreign trade, and better use of FDI [Foreign Direct Investment].”[29] Liu’s remark about domestic circulation is a reference to “dual circulation,” which is an economic strategy that involves the creation of a self-sustaining domestic economy with links to international markets.[30] The strategy aims to reduce the PRC’s vulnerabilities to sanctions during crises by leveraging foreign investment and trade to bolster the country’s economy without becoming reliant on international markets. CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping previously explained on June 7, 2023, that the strategy will “ensure the normal operation of the national economy under extreme circumstances.”[31] The dual circulation strategy is the CCP’s response to international anti-globalization trends, supply chain challenges, and the need for China to adopt a new innovation-driven “development pattern.”[32]

Xi’s emphasis on ”institutional openness to advance high-level financial opening up” to become a financial power during a January 17 speech to the Party School of the CCP Central Committee aligns with this dual cycle strategy.[33] The emphasis on international economic engagement to buttress domestic circulation is a key tenant of creating a dual circulation economy. Other CCP policies are not consistent with the strategy, however. Chinese state security raids on foreign firms, such as the Mintz Group, Bain & Company, and Capvision Partners in early 2023 run counter to the party’s effort to gain foreign investment as part of this strategy.[34] These raids create uncertainty over whether capital invested in the PRC is safe from arbitrary state actions and whether foreign firms’ personnel can safely operate in the country.

President Joe Biden and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping agreed on November 15, 2023, to resume high-level military-to-military communication. They agreed to restart the US-China Defense Policy Coordination (CDPC) Talks, the US-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) meetings, and telephone conversations between theater commanders.[35] The CDPC Talks occurred on January 8-9 under the leadership of US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Chase and Deputy Director of the Central Military Commission Office for International Military Cooperation Major General Song Yanchao.[36] The official PRC Ministry of National Defense readout of the CDPC urged the United States to “reduce military presence and provocation in the South China Sea…and stop manipulating and hyping-up relevant issues.”[37] The MMCA and theater command-level talks have yet to be scheduled.

The United States views military-to-military talks as a means of escalation management to prevent and control crises. The CCP views these talks as a bargaining chip to manipulate United States behavior to the party’s benefit, however. An action that the CCP deems unfavorable by the United States would be grounds, in the party’s view, to cut off military-to-military dialogue. The party previously did this by cutting off high-level military dialogue in the aftermath of then-Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022.[38] This precedent indicates that the CCP will continue to use military-to-military dialogue opportunities to shape United States behavior in the lead up to at least the May 20 ROC presidential inauguration.

Israel-Hamas War

The CCP changed its messaging about the Houthis attacks on maritime shipping by explicitly calling on the Houthis to stop the attacks. The PRC abstained on January 10 from UN Resolution 2722 which condemned Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.[39] In explanatory remarks, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations Zhang Jun did however “call on the Houthi armed forces to immediately stop harassing civilian ships and respect the freedom of navigation of all countries.”[40] This is a shift in PRC rhetoric to explicitly recognize the Houthis as instigators of regional instability.

The CCP views the United States-led strikes against the Houthis as escalating regional tensions, however. PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Wang Wenbin called on January 4 for all parties to “play a constructive and responsible role” in keeping the Red Sea safe.[41] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokeswoman Mao Ning also expressed concern on January 12 about the alleged ”escalation of tensions in the Red Sea” after United States-led strikes on Houthi positions on January 11.[42] A joint PRC MFA and Arab League statement on January 16 called on “all parties to cool down the situation…and effectively maintain regional peace and stability.”[43] The bigger problem from the CCP’s perspective is not the hostilities instigated by the Houthis, but rather the United States-led counterstrikes. The party views the willingness of the United States and allies to strike Houthi positions as risking wider regional escalation, which would threaten PRC economic interests in the region.

Myanmar

A second PRC-brokered ceasefire in northern Myanmar failed to stop the fighting between the Myanmar junta and rebel groups. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning announced on January 12 that the PRC had mediated a formal ceasefire agreement between the Myanmar junta government and three ethnic armed groups. Ceasefire negotiations took place in Kunming, Yunnan in the PRC on January 10 and 11. The MFA claimed that the two sides agreed to implement the ceasefire immediately, to address disputes and concerns through peaceful negotiation, and not to undermine the safety of Chinese people living in the border area and Chinese projects and personnel in Myanmar.[44] Unnamed officials who attended the negotiations told Radio Free Asia that the ceasefire applied only to Shan state in northern Myanmar and did not specify a given length of time. An “ex-military official” said the ceasefire was not sustainable and it had resulted from PRC pressure on both sides. The official said the PRC was concerned about the war negatively impacting industrial products from the PRC’s Yunnan Province, which borders Myanmar’s Shan State.[45] Myanmar’s military broke the ceasefire on January 13, however, one day after it was announced. The Ta’ang National Liberation Army rebel group reported 19 artillery strikes by the military on targets throughout Shan and northern Myanmar.[46]

The PRC previously negotiated a ceasefire on December 14, which also immediately failed to stop the fighting.[47] The PRC’s interests in the Myanmar civil war include re-opening trade disrupted by the fighting, ensuring the safety of PRC nationals and projects, protecting border security, and cracking down on telecommunications fraud centers in northern Myanmar which have defrauded and kidnapped PRC nationals. The PRC has maintained ties with both the junta and multiple rebel groups in pursuit of these goals.[48]

The CCP may also seek to negotiate a ceasefire to bolster its diplomatic reputation. The PRC has often portrayed itself as a promoter of global peace, security, and stability, for example through its Global Security Initiative and its ongoing calls for peace talks in the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas wars.[49]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 11, 2024

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 4, 2024

Authors: Daniel Shats and Nils Peterson of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: January 9 at 5pm ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

PRC high-altitude balloon flights through Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) have become a daily occurrence and are likely part of a CCP effort to test Taiwan’s responses and wear down its threat awareness.
Taiwan arrested an independent legislative candidate on suspicion of accepting money from the CCP to run for office.
The CCP threatened further economic punitive measures against Taiwan related to the cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA).
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Southern Theater Command conducted air and naval exercises in the South China Sea from January 3 to 5.
The December purges of top PLA military and defense industry officials reflect Xi Jinping’s fears of disloyalty in the military and show that the anti-corruption campaign has not yet succeeded in rooting out endemic corruption in the military.
A loss of Compacts of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the CCP to expand its leverage points over these countries.
The Times of Israel reported that Israeli Defense Forces encountered “vast quantities of weapons manufactured by China” in Gaza.

Taiwan

Taiwan’s three presidential candidates are making their last appeals for votes before the January 13 presidential election. Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Lai Ching-te urged voters to “choose the right road” and not reverse eight years of progress by the Tsai Ing-wen administration. Lai and the DPP also continued past messaging of protecting Taiwan’s democracy against CCP interference. Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Hou Yu-ih and the KMT heavily promoted an appeal for all anti-DPP voters to strategically concentrate their votes on him because he is the candidate most likely to defeat Lai. The KMT also continued criticizing the DPP for alleged corruption and incompetence. Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je continued to criticize both major parties and promote his economics-focused “Third Way” campaign.

DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te, vice-presidential candidate Hsiao Bi-khim, and President Tsai Ing-wen campaigned together and emphasized a message of not “turning back time” on progress made during the eight years of the Tsai administration. They warned of negative consequences if voters allowed the KMT to win the presidency or a legislative majority. The consequences they noted include the obstruction of defense spending, a reduction of Taiwan’s economic competitiveness, and a return to the unratified Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) that sparked mass student protests in 2014.[1]

Taiwanese media reported that many viewers commented that a recent viral DPP campaign ad resonated with them. The January 2 campaign ad, which features Lai, Tsai, and Hsiao on a road trip, received over 10 million views across social media platforms by January 5. The video showed Tsai and Lai casually chatting and joking in the car as Tsai drove around. Near the end, Tsai handed the keys to Lai and got out, telling him he was a better driver than her. The trip continued with Lai driving and his running mate Hsiao as a passenger.[2] Lai, Hsiao, and Tsai continued using the ad’s theme of “choosing the right road for Taiwan” as a motif in campaign events throughout the week.[3]

KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih, vice-presidential candidate Hsiao Bi-khim, party chairman Eric Chu, and top-ranked legislator-at-large nominee Han Kuo-yu attempted to secure more backing from voters who support the opposition. The KMT officials repeatedly called on supporters of TPP candidate Ko Wen-je and former independent candidate Terry Gou to strategically concentrate their votes on Hou.[4] They argued that Hou was the candidate most likely to defeat the incumbent DPP. Hou was in second place behind Lai in most polls since the November 25 candidate registration. He consistently hovered around 29% support in a weighted average of polls, compared to Lai at around 34% and Ko at around 22%. Hou and Jaw also repeatedly said that Ko and Gou would be included in discussions of their Cabinet composition if they won the election.[5] The KMT candidates also continued to attack the DPP for allegedly corrupt and ineffective governance and for creating “panic” over PRC election interference to discredit its political opponents.[6]

Ko and Gou have not been receptive to the KMT’s appeal to consolidate the opposition, however. Ko claimed that the KMT lacks integrity and that its offer to include him in its cabinet was a “trick” to promote strategic voting.[7] Terry Gou continued not responding to calls from Hou or Jaw.[8] Ko did not call on Terry Gou to endorse him but said “true friends” did not need to force each other. The president of a Gou support organization endorsed Ko and claimed that most former Gou supporters now supported Ko despite efforts by Hou’s campaign to win over Gou supporters and Gou’s previous attempts to unite the opposition against Lai.[9]

TPP presidential candidate and chairman Ko Wen-je and vice-presidential candidate Cynthia Wu Hsin-ying continued to emphasize that economic issues as central to their “Third Way” campaign. Ko published an article in The Economist in which he argued that the two dominant parties were overly focused on the “unification or independence” debate even though he claimed 90% of Taiwanese citizens supposedly support the “status quo.” He laid out broad policy proposals for “pragmatic” and “rational” domestic and international policies, listing economic development as first among them.[10] He also criticized the DPP administration for failing to construct promised social housing units.[11]

There have not been any new polls about the Taiwan election since Taiwan’s Central Election Commission instituted a “polling blackout” beginning on January 3. The final Taiwan News Poll of Polls, released on January 2, showed Lai in first place in a weighted aggregate of polls from the previous 15 days. At the time, Lai had 35.3% support, Hou had 28.7%, and Ko had 24%.[12]

PRC high-altitude balloon flights through Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) have become a daily occurrence and are likely part of a CCP effort to test Taiwan’s responses and wear down its threat awareness. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported eleven PRC high-altitude balloons that floated over or around Taiwan since January 3. This number included three balloons on January 3, one on January 4, two on January 5, one on January 6, three on January 7, four on January 8, and one on January 9. At least five of the balloons flew directly over the island of Taiwan. The MND detected the balloons at altitudes ranging from 15,000 to 33,000 feet.[13] The MND first reported a PRC balloon among its daily updates of PRC violations of Taiwan’s ADIZ on December 8 and has since reported them with high frequency throughout late December and every day of 2024 so far.[14]

An MND press statement on January 6 said the balloons posed a “serious threat” to international air routes and condemned the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) “disregard for the safety of passengers.” It assessed that the main purpose of the balloons is to carry out gray-zone harassment and “cognitive operations” to harm the morale of the Taiwanese people.[15] Retired Taiwanese Army Major General Ko Yung-sen echoed this perspective, saying that the balloons were part of PLA “gray zone” operations intended to normalize the PRC’s territorial claims over the Taiwan Strait and reduce Taiwanese people’s threat awareness.[16] Colonel Wang Chia-chun, who is the deputy head of the MND’s joint operations planning section, said that the CCP wanted Taiwan to shoot down the balloons, but MND would not waste ammunition attempting to do so.[17] MND previously assessed that the balloons were harmless weather balloons.[18]

The PRC has normalized daily air and naval activities around Taiwan, including near-daily aerial crossings of the median line in the Taiwan Strait, since 2020.[19] Taiwan does not scramble aircraft in response to all PRC ADIZ violations, but it does put military personnel on standby to respond quickly if needed. The high frequency of ADIZ violations drains Taiwan’s resources, exhausts military personnel, and degrades Taiwan’s threat awareness. The PRC’s daily balloon flights around Taiwan in 2024, including an increasing number of balloons flying directly above the island, indicate that it is trying to normalize these activities as well. Taiwan’s MND’s statements on the balloon flights and its unprecedented inclusion of the balloons in its daily maps of ADIZ violations starting in December show that Taiwan considers the balloons a part of the PRC’s broader coercion campaign.

The CCP has not issued an official explanation for the increase in balloons that have passed over Taiwan since early December. Two articles in the PRC’s state-owned Global Times on January 4 cited unnamed “experts” who claimed the PRC balloons over Taiwan were weather balloons that drifted unintentionally and said they should not be “sensationalized.”[20] ISW cannot confirm the nature of the balloons themselves, but the trend of balloons flying first near Taiwan, then directly over Taiwan in increasing numbers and frequency closer to Taiwan’s election is unlikely to be the result of natural weather patterns.

Taiwan arrested an independent legislative candidate on suspicion of accepting money from the CCP to run for office. Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB) said on January 5 that it arrested independent legislative candidate for the city of Taoyuan Ma Chih-wei on suspicion of colluding with the CCP. Prosecutors said that Ma had received over 1 million NTD (over $32,000) in cryptocurrency and US dollars from a source in the PRC through money transfer apps, such as Tether. The money was intended to fund a run for a legislative seat in Taoyuan. Ma was formerly the spokesperson for the Taoyuan office of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). She failed to secure her party’s nomination for the legislative seat and continued to run as an independent, however. Ma made trips to the PRC in April, May, October, and December 2023, including a trip in May to partake in a Mazu religious pilgrimage and meet with CCP contacts together with the current chairman of the TPP’s Taoyuan Office Huang Cheng-chun.[21] Prosecutors also accused Ma of passing information about intelligence officials and classified information about her legislative race to PRC contacts.[22]

Trips to the PRC by Taiwanese politicians have been a frequent source of controversy during the last few months of the Taiwanese election. A Keelung borough warden on January 9 became the first borough warden to be indicted for allegedly leading a CCP-funded group trip to the PRC, where participants were encouraged to support certain legislative candidates in Taiwan. A borough warden is a type of local official below the municipal level. Taipei prosecutors had previously questioned 41 borough wardens in December over similar trips they made to the PRC.[23]

The CCP threatened further economic punitive measures against Taiwan related to the cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). The PRC’s Ministry of Commerce said on January 9 that it was “studying” additional measures to suspend tariff concessions for certain Taiwanese products under ECFA because Taiwanese authorities had “not taken any effective measures to ease trade restrictions.” Targeted industries may include agriculture, fishing, machinery, auto parts, and textiles.[24] The PRC previously announced on December 15 that Taiwan had violated its commitments under ECFA by imposing “trade barriers” on trade with the PRC.[25] On December 21 it announced it would end tariff restrictions on 12 chemical products originating in Taiwan.[26] Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) said on January 9 that the PRC had ignored Taiwanese proposals to negotiate trade disputes within the framework of ECFA because it was determined to interfere in Taiwan’s election. The MAC issued its “strongest condemnation” of the CCP and said the CCP’s methods would not succeed in intimidating Taiwanese people and forcing them to submit.[27]

The CCP’s threat of additional economic punishment for Taiwan conflicts with the party’s simultaneous measures to promote cross-strait economic integration, however. On January 8, the PRC Ministry of Commerce, Taiwan Affairs Office, National Development and Reform Commission, and Ministry of Industry and Information Technology jointly released new guidelines to help the PRC’s Fujian Province deepen economic integration with Taiwan. The guidelines said Fujian would establish an institutional system and regulatory model conducive to cross-strait integrated development, including encouragement for Taiwanese businesses to explore the Chinese market.[28] The CCP Central Committee previously announced in September 2023 that Fujian would be built into a “demonstration zone” for cross-strait integrated development.[29] A January 8 Global Times article said the measures were meant to boost Taiwanese business confidence in the PRC and to demonstrate “goodwill” toward Taiwan in alleged contrast with actions by Taiwan’s DPP administration.[30] The CCP’s policies to promote economic integration with Taiwan are part of a long-term effort to increase PRC influence over Taiwan. In the short term, these measures may serve as a “carrot” to incentivize Taiwanese businessmen to support the KMT in pairing with the “stick” of threatening economic “retaliation” to punish the DPP.

China

The People’s Liberation Army Southern Theater Command conducted air and naval exercises in the South China Sea from January 3 to 5.[31] The exercises were in response to joint Philippines-United States operations in the South China Sea from January 3 to 4, which the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson led.[32] These operations occurred in the wake of CCP harassment of Philippine ships near Philippine-controlled territory since December. Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels attempted to thwart Philippine supply missions near the Second Thomas Shoal by firing water cannons and acoustic weapons at Philippine government ships delivering supplies on December 9 and 10, for example. A CCG vessel also rammed a Philippine ship near Second Thomas Shoal.[33] The PRC MFA inaccurately framed the Philippines as the instigator on December 25 by stating that it “provocatively violated relevant waters in the South China Sea, spread false information, and colluded with external forces to undermine peace and stability in the South China Sea.”[34] The PRC MFA repeated this language on January 4 by claiming that US-Philippine naval activities “hinder the management and control of maritime situations and disputes.”[35]

The December purges of top PLA military and defense industry officials reflect Xi Jinping’s fears of disloyalty in the military and show the anti-corruption campaign has not yet succeeded in rooting out endemic corruption in the military. Bloomberg reported that United States intelligence assessments attribute the purges of top military and defense industry officials in late December to graft that resulted in missiles filled with water and missile silos with improper lids.[36] PLA Navy Lt. Col. Yao Cheng, who defected to the United States in 2016, stated that widespread misappropriation of the equipment budget for events such as dinners was common during his time in the PLA.[37] This shows that the extent of corruption before Xi’s 2015-2016 PLA reforms stretched beyond the military leadership to the officer cadre. The December 2023 purges demonstrate that those reforms did not eliminate lower-level corruption because the purged PLA leadership were burgeoning leaders a decade ago.

Compacts of Free Association

A loss of Compacts of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the CCP to expand its leverage points over these countries. These COFAs govern the United States’ relationship with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands while also granting the United States extensive military access throughout their territories. The United States renewed COFAs with Palau and Micronesia in May.[38] It then did so with the Marshall Islands in October.[39] The signed agreements are now before Congress for funding consideration. Congress previously funded the COFAs for a twenty-year period in 2003.[40] The total cost for all three of the twenty-year agreements would be roughly $7 billion spread over the period 2024 to 2043, according to the Congressional Research Service.[41] Deputy Secretary of State nominee Kurt Campbell stated during his Senate confirmation hearing on December 7 that “if we don’t get it [COFA funding] you can expect that literally the next day Chinese diplomats — military and other folks — will be on the plane…trying to secure a better deal for China.”[42] The US House of Representatives Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party also called for renewing the COFAs in a mid-December report.[43] President Biden signed the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act into law on December 22, but it did not include COFA funding.[44] Funding the COFAs is a key part of the US Pacific Partnership Strategy to “fulfill our [United States] historical commitments and strengthen our enduring relationships with the full Pacific Islands region, including our special relationship with the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia.”[45] Palau’s President, Surangel Whipps Jr, expressed concern in a December 27 interview with ABC Australia over the lack of Congressional-approved funding for the COFA agreement, in part because the 2010 Palau Compact Review Agreement was not funded by the US Congress until 2018.[46]

These three island countries control key sea lanes that provide a secure route connecting American allies and partners, such as the Philippines and Taiwan, to the US territory of Guam and the state of Hawaii. Palau and the Marshall Islands are 2 of the 13 countries that maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[47]

The loss of COFA funding would present an opportunity for the CCP to expand its economic influence with these vital Pacific Island countries. For example, this funding loss would cause severe financial pressure in Palau because COFA funding accounts for $36.9 million of the national government’s annual $124.2 million revenue as of fiscal year 2023.[48] This is an economic vulnerability that the CCP could partially fill by encouraging PRC nationals to vacation in Palau. The CCP cut tourism to Palau over the last decade to nearly zero as punishment for maintaining full diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[49] The reversal of this CCP policy would provide the party with economic leverage to wield over Palau in the event of future policy disagreements. The expansion of the CCP’s economic influence in Palau would also provide the party a leverage point to coerce the countries into switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The PRC aims to coerce countries into switching diplomatic recognition to falsely argue that Taiwan is a province of the People’s Republic of China rather than a legitimate country named the Republic of China.

The loss of COFA funding would also exacerbate the CCP narrative put forth by the propaganda outlet Global Times that the United States only cares about Palau for security reasons rather than mutually beneficial cooperation. [50] The Palau Senate passed a resolution in November rejecting the permanent deployment of a US Patriot missile defense battery.[51] This was the first instance of lawmakers challenging President Surangel Whipps Jr’s request for the United States to construct an over-the-horizon radar system in Palau.[52] In a December 27 interview with ABC Australia, Whipps tied this Palau Senate resolution to a narrative among unspecified portions of Palau that the United States actions were not in the best interests of Palau, as seen by the repeated delay in COFA funding.[53] The associated fiscal challenges that Palau faces without COFA funding buttresses the CCP’s narrative, which in turn creates hurdles for deploying mutually beneficial United States defense resources to the country.

The loss of COFA funding would also provide the CCP an opportunity to expand influence efforts targeting Micronesian political elites. The CCP has completed infrastructure projects throughout the country, such as houses for the country’s president, vice president, speakers of congress, and chief justice.[54] Axios reported that former Micronesian officials confirmed receiving gifts from the PRC, such as money, while on official state visits to the country.[55] The lack of COFA funding would exacerbate the appeal of CCP monetary gifts or infrastructure projects that target the Micronesian political elite. Micronesian President Wesley Simina also stated in late November that his country would be at a “fiscal cliff” without US Congressional approval of COFA funding. This would mean that “we [Micronesia] will have to find different sources of funding… and that’s not out there available immediately.”[56] The loss of COFA funding would also provide opportunities for external powers such as the CCP to enhance their economic influence in the country by filling these funding gaps.

The COFA funding also makes up $35.2 million of the Marshall Islands national government's annual $173.9 million revenue as of fiscal year 2023.[57] The loss of COFA funding would expose the country to similar severe fiscal challenges as Palau and Micronesia.

PRC in the Middle East

The Times of Israel reported that Israeli Defense Forces encountered “vast quantities of weapons manufactured by China” in Gaza.[59] Business Insider reported that the weapons included items, such as assault rifles and grenade launchers. An unspecified Israeli intelligence source expressed concern over the technological sophistication of the uncovered weaponry and communications technology because it is “stuff that Hamas didn’t have before, with very sophisticated explosives which have never been found before and especially on such a large scale.” [60] It remains unclear whether the PRC knowingly supplied the weapons to Hamas or if the group acquired these weapons via a third party.

The PRC is currently pursuing a diplomatic line of effort that aims to supplant US influence with Arab states by proposing what it claims to be a more inclusive and cooperative regional security framework.[61] This involves portraying Washington as a self-interested and destabilizing influence in the region while simultaneously positioning Beijing as an altruistic and unbiased actor.[62] The use of Chinese weapons by Hamas contributes to undercutting this narrative, regardless of whether Beijing knowingly supplied these items.

The CCP is balancing in Yemen by financially supporting the Republic of Yemen and avoiding condemning the Houthis. The Charge d'affaires of the Chinese Embassy in Yemen Shao Zheng held a meeting with Director of the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yemen al-Qadir in Riyadh on January 7.[63] The meeting comes in the aftermath of a December 7 “economic and technical cooperation agreement” between the Republic of Yemen and the People’s Republic of China.[64] The Republic of Yemen is a separate political entity from the Houthi Movement, which ISW and CTP have assessed is attacking shipping in the Red Sea as part of a broader regional escalation strategy led by Iran.[65] The CCP meeting with the Republic of Yemen official allows the PRC to claim it supports stability and economic development in the region.

PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Wang Wenbin instead called on January 4 for all parties to “play a constructive and responsible role” in keeping the Red Sea safe.[66] The CCP avoided condemning Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. The absent condemnation of the Houthis reflects the PRC aiming to avoid antagonizing Iran.