Iran Crisis Update, February 1, 2023

Iran Crisis Update, February 1, 2023

Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Zachary Coles, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, and Frederick W. Kagan

February 1, 2023, 5:30 pm ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Crisis Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Iranian officials across the political spectrum are cohering around different lessons the regime should draw from the protest movement and how to best respond. Former reformist president Hassan Rouhani criticized the regime for marginalizing moderate and reformist actors in the political sphere in an interview on February 1. Rouhani implied that Iranian leadership had lost the support of the Iranian population and acknowledged the existence of deep societal fissures following the Mahsa Amini protest movement. Rouhani urged Iranian officials to address protester grievances by enforcing corresponding cultural and political changes, although he did not specify the nature or content of these changes. Rouhani framed deepening divides between Iranian leadership and its population as a serious threat to the legitimacy and preservation of the regime, stating: “we have no choice but to preserve and fix the regime […] we must bring the people who have turned away from us back into the fold.”[1] Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—a hardline Iranian official and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier General—echoed Rouhani’s warnings of schisms between the regime and its people on February 1. Ghalibaf stressed the importance of Iranian leadership maintaining a dialogue with the population and stated that “the Islamic Revolution has no meaning without the participation of the people […] the people are the foundation of the revolution.”[2]

Moderates and reformists have previously called for greater plurality and participation within the Iranian political establishment; they have sought to regain their influence following the regime-backed election of President Ebrahim Raisi in 2021.[3] Rouhani’s criticisms of the regime coincide with a ten-day holiday commemorating the 1979 return to Iran of Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini—the founder of the Islamic Republic--however, making his comments particularly noteworthy. It is also significant that Ghalibaf--a prominent hardliner--has echoed moderate and reformist talking points in recent months. Ghalibaf endorsed limited economic and sociopolitical reforms in a parliamentary address on November 5, 2022 and described changes made within the parameters of the Islamic Republic as ”legitimate and necessary.”[4] Officials affiliated with Ghalibaf have separately blamed other hardliners’ uncompromising and inflexible views for stoking the Mahsa Amini protest movement.[5] Rouhani and Ghalibaf constitute part of an increasingly broad swath of pro-regime actors adopting a pragmatist approach to anti-regime sentiments and are seeking to gain the support of disillusioned Iranian youth.[6] This camp likely seeks to strengthen the regime through pragmatic measures like increased dialogue with alienated Iranians and limited sociopolitical concessions. It is unclear how and to what extent this camp seeks to execute such measures, although it is clear that it does not seek to overthrow or significantly alter the regime.

Ultra-hardline individuals offered a contrasting solution to addressing anti-regime sentiments and advocated for greater indoctrination and paternalistic social control measures on February 1. IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami dismissed recent unrest as a foreign conspiracy aimed at minimizing the regime’s regional influence in a speech.[7] Tehran Province IRGC Commander Ahmad Zolghadr called on Iranian officials to “better explain” the Islamic Republic’s ideology to Iranian youth on February 1 and described the regime’s protest suppression response to the Mahsa Amini movement as “tolerant” and restrained.[8] Human rights organizations estimate that Iranian security personnel have killed at least 522 protesters since September 16.[9] Iranian officials separately promoted initiatives that would enforce mandatory veiling laws on February 1.[10] Calls for exerting increased control over the Iranian population are likely to exacerbate tensions between the regime and its people, however, and are based a fundamental misdiagnosis of the root causes of anti-regime sentiments.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian officials across the political spectrum are cohering around different lessons the regime should draw from the protest movement and how to best respond.
• IRGC-affiliated and ultra-hardline individuals advocated for exerting greater control over Iranian youth and women on February 1.
• At least one protest occurred in one city across one province on February 1.
• Protest organizations called for individual and sustainable acts of anti-regime defiance from February 1-11.
• Iranian officials close to President Ebrahim Raisi are attempting to downplay recent criticisms of the Raisi administration.
• President Ebrahim Raisi ordered First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber to form a working group to implement Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s economic recommendations.
• Anti-regime outlet Iran International published a report claiming that the officials working at the Iranian embassy in Baghdad are involved in an IRGC Quds Force money laundering operation.
• A credible, open-source intelligence Twitter account claimed unspecified IRGC forces are preparing to conduct cross-border attacks on anti-regime Kurdish groups along the Iran-Iraqi Kurdistan border.
• A possibly Iran-backed militia launched at least eight rockets at the Zilkan Turkish military base near Bashiqa, Nineveh Province, Iraq.

Protest Activity

At least one protest occurred in one city across one province on February 1. CTP assesses with moderate confidence that one protest occurred in the following location:

Tehran City, Tehran Province[11]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Families of prisoners sentenced to death
• Notes: It is unclear if participating families are connected to arrested protesters

Protest organizations called for individual and sustainable acts of anti-regime defiance from February 1-11. Protest coordinators encouraged their followers to participate in non-protest, anti-regime activity for the “Farj Decade,” a ten-day regime holiday that commemorates former Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini’s return to Iran and the subsequent Islamic Revolution in 1979. The Tehran Neighborhood Youth called on Tehran residents to chant “I swear on the blood of my comrades, we will stand together until the end” every night at 21:00 local time throughout this ten-day period.[12] CTP did not observe footage documenting this chant on February 1 as of 5:30 pm ET. The group emphasized that new protest techniques are necessary to reduce the costs incurred by protesters. The United Youth of Iran separately called on its followers to destroy all public symbols, including banners, flyers, and streamers, that commemorate Khomeini’s return.[13]

Reuters obtained a confidential report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on February 1 addressed to member states on the subject of Iran’s uranium enrichment activity at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.[14] The report stated that Iran has altered the interconnection between two cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow without notifying the IAEA in violation of article 45 of its Safeguards Agreement. IAEA inspectors discovered the alteration during an unannounced inspection of the facility on January 21. Iran has been using the IR-6 centrifuge cascades at Fordow to enrich uranium to 60 percent purity since November 22, 2022.[15] The alteration could increase Iran’s ability to produce a greater volume of 60 percent enriched uranium at a faster rate. Iran’s present stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium is enough to meet the IAEA’s standard for the approximate level needed for a compact nuclear explosive. [16]

Iranian officials close to President Ebrahim Raisi are attempting to downplay recent criticisms of the Raisi administration. Vice President for Parliamentary Affairs Mohammad Hosseini denied rumors that unspecified parliamentarians are gathering signatures to bring President Ebrahim Raisi to parliament for questioning on February 1.[17] Hosseini also dismissed claims about a dispute between parliament and the Raisi administration.[18] Information and Communications Technology Minister Issa Zareh Pour separately stated that the Raisi administration was not involved in the Supreme National Security Council’s (SNSC) decision to filter Instagram and Telegram, likely another effort to evade criticisms directed at Raisi for ongoing internet restrictions.[19]

President Ebrahim Raisi ordered First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber to form a working group to implement Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s economic recommendations on February 1.[20] Khamenei gave a speech on January 30 in which he appeared to blame Mokhber for the Raisi administration’s economic mismanagement, as CTP previously reported.[21] Raisi is likely capitalizing on Khamenei’s comments to establish Mokhber as a scapegoat for his administration’s failing economic policies.

Anti-regime outlet Iran International published a report claiming that the officials working at the Iranian embassy in Baghdad are involved in an IRGC Quds Force money laundering operation.[22] The report stated embassy employees are coordinating with Quds Force Unit 400 financial manager Mohammad Tajan-Jari to circumvent Western sanctions and launder revenue from oil and natural gas exports back into Iran.[23] Iranian oil and gas companies reportedly transferred approximately $40 million of export revenues to the Iranian embassy in Baghdad in 2021. The funds were earmarked for embassy expenses, but embassy officials allegedly transferred the funds to the IRGC.[24]

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

A credible, open-source intelligence Twitter account claimed unspecified IRGC forces are preparing to conduct cross-border attacks on anti-regime Kurdish groups along the Iran-Iraqi Kurdistan border.[25] The account claimed to have observed significant IRGC movement along the northern part of Iran’s border with Iraqi Kurdistan.[26] CTP cannot independently verify this claim. Iranian state-affiliated media outlets Mehr News and Nour News published reports that accused Kurdish opposition groups of supplying and smuggling into Iran the drone components and explosive material used in the January 28 drone attack on the Esfahan Ministry of Defense facility.[27] Iranian state media may be focusing on the role of anti-regime Kurdish groups to set conditions for renewed cross-border attacks against alleged Kurdish militia positions in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The Iraqi government and Assad Regime agreed to remove restrictions on cross-border commerce traveling through the al-Qa'im border crossing near Abu Kamal, Deir ez-Zour Province, Syria.[28] The Middle East Monitor reported on February 1 that Iraqi and Syrian truck drivers with multiple-entry visas can now travel through the border crossing without unloading their goods for inspection and subsequently transferring them to another truck on the other side of the border.[29] The IRGC frequently attempts to smuggle munitions and military equipment into Syria on trucks allegedly transporting perishable foodstuffs. Israeli airstrikes have increasingly targeted these likely IRGC military shipments after they cross into Syria through the al-Qa'im crossing, as CTP previously reported.[30] The loosened border restrictions may facilitate the IRGC’s attempts to obscure its shipments amongst regular commerce flowing through the border crossing.

The Syrian Transportation Ministry also announced that biweekly passenger flights between Damascus and Baghdad will resume on February 2 after a two-year hiatus.[31] The IRGC may use the flights to transport Quds Force personnel or Iran-backed militants into Syria to avoid casualties associated with Israeli airstrikes on IRGC shipments through the al-Qa'im border crossing.

A possibly Iran-backed militia launched at least eight rockets at the Zilkan Turkish military base near Bashiqa, Nineveh Province, Iraq on February 1. The Kurdistan Regional Security Council reported that two rockets impacted within the base without harming any Turkish military personnel or damaging property and that the other six landed without incident outside the base.[32] Liwa Ahrar al-Iraq (LAI) published a statement claiming responsibility for the attack.[33] LAI first began claiming responsibility for attacks against Turkish military positions in northern Iraq in June 2022.[34] LAI likely is at least loosely affiliated with Iran-backed militias operating in northern Iraq, although it is uncertain the degree to which the group is integrated into Iran’s Iraqi proxy command structure.[35]

Unidentified Palestinian militants launched a single rocket at Sderot, Israel on February 1.[36] The militants conducted the attack from an unspecified location in North Gaza Province, Gaza Strip. Israeli air defenses intercepted the rocket without incident.[37] The Jerusalem Post claimed without direct evidence that the Palestinian Islamic Jihad declared responsibility for the attack.[38]

[1] https://t.co/VZXk4EXzxT

[2] https://t.co/qybEgUIUDj

[3] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/iran-file/can-iranian-moderates-and-reformists-threaten-raisis-chances-of-becoming-supreme-leader ; https://www.ilna.ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C-4/1323119-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%DB%8C-%D9%85%DB%8C-%DA%AF%D8%B0%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%82-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%81%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%81-%D8%AE%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%84-%D9%85%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AE%D8%AA%D9%86-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AF-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%BA%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%DA%A9%D8%AC%D8%A7-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA

[4] https://twitter.com/SharghDaily/status/1589136257124560902

[5] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1401080301933/%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%BE%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86-%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%86%D8%AF ; https://www.rouydad24 dot ir/fa/news/321795/%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%88-%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%BE%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%AF%D8%B1%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%88%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%84%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C

[6] https://amwaj.media/article/inside-story-amid-protests-talk-of-reform-crosses-political-divide-in-iran ; https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-protests-government-mahsa-amini-11669137860

[7] https://t.co/DjfQJzwkIu

[8] https://www.khabaronline.ir/news/1726477/%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B4-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1

[9] https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-protests-death-count-human-rights-report/32224340.html

[10] https://www.radiofarda.com/a/morality-police-and-hijab-in-iran/32248892.html ; https://www.irna.ir/news/85016331/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%B3-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B6%D9%88%D8%B9-%D9%BE%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%B4

[11] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1620798052125777920?s=20&t=WISTgshj21JeY_A6R965cg;

https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1620847726366687241?cxt=HHwWkoCw0eyatP4sAAAA;

https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1620871129903599621?cxt=HHwWisC4yY7tvv4sAAAA

[12] https://twitter.com/javanane_t/status/1620527545115607040?s=20&t=jvGn9_6W9bPBRzcixXx58A

[13] https://twitter.com/UYI_fa/status/1620822061529862144?s=20&t=sW45GY4k8VEjso04HJlcYg

[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iaea-report-chides-iran-undeclared-change-fordow-uranium-enrichment-set-up-2023-02-01/

[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-enrich-uranium-60-purity-fordow-nuclear-site-tv-2022-11-22/

[16] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/entering-uncharted-waters-irans-60-percent-highly-enriched-uranium

[17] https://www dot irna dot ir/news/85016468/%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D9%88-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B1%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%B3-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1

[18] https://www dot irna dot ir/news/85016468/%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D9%88-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B1%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%B3-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1

[19] https://t dot co/qybEgUIUDj

[20] https://president dot ir/fa/142170

https://www dot irna dot ir/news/85016489/%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B4%DA%A9%DB%8C%D9%84-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87-%D9%BE%DB%8C%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%82-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B5%DB%8C%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%88

[21] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-january-30-2023

[22] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202301317124

[23] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202301317124

[24] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202301317124

[25] https://twitter.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1620779616599416832?s=20&t=KZifVwS6xhftwNzqGtjQ5Q

[26] https://twitter.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1620779616599416832?s=20&t=hMxccYENZRIY_oc46MDeZw

[27] nournews dot ir%2FEn%2FNews%2F127296%2FKurdish-opposition-participation-in-the-attack-on-the-workshop-complex-of-the-Ministry-of-Defense-in-Isfahan&hmac=JZ92WFRxAFRYsRrVpAuFqdOIieF3IbfYmBilzejYwqA%3D; https://www dot mehrnews dot com/news/5697889/مشارکت-ضدانقلاب-کردی-در-حمله-به-یک-مرکز-نظامی-اصفهان

[28] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230131-syria-and-iraq-agree-on-cross-border-trade/

[29] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230131-syria-and-iraq-agree-on-cross-border-trade/

[30] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-january-30-2023

[31] https://sana dot sy/en/?p=298189

[32] https://www.facebook.com/KURDISTAN.CT/posts/pfbid04FGBYREGmsefxoZBYhJKoYgGV1EGeCXKR5zsK1D8bCq7goT6jvELpPh4JJw5EPR6l

[33] https://twitter.com/ciyako65/status/1620712384431271936?s=20&t=oSPJ14nGe8ZGb5UI0tEcQw

[34] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-liwa-ahrar-al-iraq; https://twitter.com/ciyako65/status/1620712384431271936?s=20&t=oSPJ14nGe8ZGb5UI0tEcQw

[35] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-liwa-ahrar-al-iraq

[36] https://www dot jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-730309

[37] https://www dot jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-730309

[38] https://www dot jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-730309