Iran Crisis Update, February 2, 2023

Iran Crisis Update, February 2, 2023

Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, and Frederick W. Kagan

February 2, 2023, 4:30 pm ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Crisis Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Contributors: Anya Caraiani and James Motamed

A group of pragmatic hardliners is continuing to cohere around calls for the regime to reconcile with its alienated population in the wake of the Mahsa Amini protests. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—a hardline Iranian official and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier General—urged the regime to examine its weaknesses on February 2, expounding on his February 1 comments about schisms between the Islamic Republic and its population. Ghalibaf warned that Iran’s enemies would exploit its weaknesses if the regime failed to probe them.[1] Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei separately urged Iranian officials to rectify economic, livelihood, and social justice issues and stated that Iran’s adversaries would “seize this weakness,” rhetorically mirroring Ghalibaf’s warning on the same date.[2] Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi additionally stated that the regime must engage in constructive dialogue with activists who operate within the ideological framework of the Islamic Republic and stressed the importance of political participation on February 2.[3] Vahidi is an IRGC Brigadier General and formed Quds Force Commander and was the Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister under former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Vahidi is currently an elected official of the ultra-hardline Raisi administration and oversees the Iranian Law Enforcement Command--which the regime mobilizes to violently suppress anti-regime demonstrations—making Vahidi’s calls for improving political engagement with the Iranian population particularly noteworthy. Vahidi previously acknowledged that the Mahsa Amini protest movement had created deep sociopolitical fissures between the regime and Iranian youth on January 26.[4] Ghalibaf’s, Ejei’s, and Vahidi’s comments follow former President Hassan Rouhani’s February 1 statement implying that Iranian leadership had lost the support of its population.[5]

Anti-regime outlet Iran International reported that former Rouhani officials discussed limiting Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s authority on January 30, citing exclusive access to an audio file of the meeting. Former President Hassan Rouhani’s Deputy for Logistics and former North Khorasan Provincial Governor Mohammad Reza Salehi allegedly criticized the regime's response to the Mahsa Amini protest movement and its economic policies in a meeting with other unspecified former Rouhani administration provincial governors and former First Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri. Iran International claimed that Salehi framed anti-regime sentiments as an urgent threat to the Islamic Republic and stated that structural reforms were the only solution to this threat. Salehi allegedly criticized recent privatization initiatives and legislation proposals aimed at curtailing freedom of speech and likened sham trials for arrested protesters to “a systemic massacre.” The former Rouhani administration official also alleged that former Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Chief Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari offered to issue a televised apology for Mahsa Amini’s death but was instructed to violently suppress unrest, presumably by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Khamenei dismissed Ashtari as law enforcement commander on January 7, likely due to Khamenei’s dissatisfaction with the performance of the LEC in responding to the protests.[6] Iran International also claimed that Salehi advocated for convincing Khamenei to hold referenda to reduce the Supreme Leader’s executive powers and suggested that the next Supreme Leader might oppose such a referendum. These comments, if true, corroborate other indicators that supreme leader succession is coloring how the Iranian political establishment is conceptualizing and responding to the Mahsa Amini protest movement.[7]

CTP cannot verify the claims made in Iran International’s February 1 article. Still, this reporting is consistent with prior CTP assessments about internal regime divisions caused by recent unrest and by increasing regime focus on supreme leader succession. CTP previously wrote that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s refusal to concede on the mandatory hijab law was likely driving fissures among the political elite on October 18.[8] Iran International’s February 1 article additionally coheres with multiple CTP assessments that hardline officials were pursuing sociopolitical reforms in hopes of preempting further unrest. Such officials include Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani, Vice President for Economic Affairs Mohsen Rezaei, and Ghalibaf.[9]

Recent reporting and comments from Iranian officials on February 1 and 2 suggest the coherence of a group of pragmatic hardliners who acknowledge the disconnect between the regime and its population and are struggling with hardline ideologues who are either unable or unwilling to recognize the grievances that led to the Mahsa Amini protest movement. The pragmatic hardliners ultimately seek to preserve and strengthen the regime through limited concessions and should not be seen as seeking or supporting any fundamental changes in the nature of the regime. Recent statements and reports suggest a certain degree of urgency with which this faction seeks to bridge societal divides as the regime continues to enforce policies that led to recent unrest. CTP assessed on January 20 that the Mahsa Amini protest movement had largely culminated but that the conditions for the resumption of significant anti-regime activity remained intact.[10] It is possible that individuals within the pragmatic hardline camp have reached a similar assessment.

Key Takeaways

• A group of pragmatic hardliners are continuing to cohere around calls for the regime to reconcile with its alienated population in the wake of the Mahsa Amini protests.
• At least one protest occurred in one city across one province.
• Iranian regime-affiliated news outlets confirmed reports that one hundred protesters chanted anti-regime slogans and damaged pro-regime symbols in Abdanan, Ilam Province on February 1.
• Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri called for expanding ties with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
• A senior Iranian diplomat explicitly blamed Israel for the January 28 drone attack on a military munitions factory in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province for the first time and warned of Iran’s right to retaliation.
• Information and Communications Technology Minister Issa Zahreh Pour announced on February 2 that unknown actors conducted a cyberattack that significantly impacted Iranian internet infrastructure on January 24.
• President Ebrahim Raisi defended his administration’s economic policies amidst growing criticism.
• The Israeli Air Force conducted an airstrike on two Hamas weapons manufacturing facilities in the Gaza Strip.
• Turkish forces have likely withdrawn from a military checkpoint located in Qastoun, Syria.
• The Iraqi and Saudi governments signed a memorandum of understanding to link Iraq’s electrical grid to the Saudi electrical grid on February 2

Protest Activity

At least one protest occurred in one city across one province on February 2. CTP assesses with moderate confidence that one protest occurred in the following location:

Esfahan City, Esfahan Province[11]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Farmers
• Notes: This activity is not related to and predates the Mahsa Amini protest movement

 Iranian regime-affiliated news outlets confirmed reports that 100 protesters chanted anti-regime slogans and damaged pro-regime symbols in Abdanan, Ilam Province on February 1.[12] Protesters destroyed a Basij statue and the store of an alleged regime informant in response to the arrest of local protest leader Sajjad Moradi Vandi.[13] Ilam Province Prosecutor Abdol Wahab Bakhshandeh announced that Iranian authorities arrested 10 individuals for participating in the protest.[14] Iranian officials have historically denied reports of internal unrest, making the relatively expeditious acknowledgment of the Abdanan protest noteworthy. CTP did not include the Abdanan, Ilam Province protest in its February 1 update because it could not initially verify whether the activity was an anti-regime protest or an isolated act of vandalism. CTP has updated its map for February 1 following the publication of new footage and regime-affiliated reporting confirming the demonstration on February 2.

A senior Iranian diplomat explicitly blamed Israel for the January 28 drone attack on a military munitions factory in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province for the first time and warned of Iran’s right to retaliation. Iranian Representative to the UN Amir Saeed Iravani wrote a letter to the UN Security Council Secretary General and Interim Chairperson on February 2 stating that Iranian internal investigations identified Israel as the perpetrator of the January 28 attack.[15] Iravani’s letter marks the first time an Iranian official has officially attributed the attack to Israel. Iranian and Iranian-backed militants have previously discussed attacking US forces at the al Omar oil field or Koniko gas fields eastern Syria in retaliation for the Israeli drone attack, as CTP previously reported.[16] Iravani separately reiterated the regime’s policy of ”active neutrality” in the Ukraine conflict and criticized Ukrainian Presidential Adviser Mykhailo Podolyak’s January 30 tweet suggesting that the Israeli strike was retaliation for Iranian military support to Russia.[17]

Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri called for expanding ties with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on February 1. Iranian media circulated a message that Bagheri sent to newly appointed DPRK Army General Staff Department Chief Pak Su-Il. Bagheri advocated for greater Iranian-North Korean cooperation in confronting unilateralism and deterring threats to global security.[18] Tehran may seek to expand military cooperation efforts with Pyongyang, particularly as it relates to Iran’s ballistic missile development and nuclear program. Bagheri’s calls for increased ties with the DPRK may additionally encompass a broader effort among revisionist states like Iran, Russia, and North Kora to circumvent US economic sanctions.

Information and Communications Technology Minister Issa Zahreh Pour announced on February 2 that unknown actors conducted a cyberattack that significantly impacted Iranian internet infrastructure on January 24. Zahreh Pour described the attack as “serious” and stated that it had resulted in a 10-minute internet disruption in Tehran Province.[19] Internet watchdog organizations and social media users additionally recorded significant internet disruptions in Kurdistan, Mazandaran, and Sistan and Baluchistan Provinces on January 29, possibly suggesting that the effects of the January 24 attack were long-lasting and significant. Internet disruptions recorded on January 29 could alternatively indicate that Iran was subjected to a separate and additional cyber-attack on its internet infrastructure[20]

President Ebrahim Raisi defended his administration’s economic policies amidst mounting domestic criticism. Raisi toured numerous construction projects when visiting Ray, Tehran Province on February 2, ostensibly demonstrating his administration’s commitment to Iran’s economic development.[21] Raisi also defended the Iranian rial’s depreciation, stating that “real economic activists should know that we don’t have a currency problem, enemies want to sow doubts and worries into the hearts of the people.”[22] Cooperatives, Labor and Social Welfare Minister Solat Mortazavi—a Raisi appointee—separately claimed that Raisi had fulfilled his promise of creating one million new jobs within his first year in office. Mortazavi dismissed critics of the Raisi administration’s economic policies as uninformed.[23]

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

The Israeli Air Force conducted an airstrike on two Hamas weapons manufacturing facilities in the Gaza Strip on February 2.[24] Hamas released footage of militants launching anti-aircraft missiles at an Israeli fighter jet over Gaza in response to the airstrikes.[25]  The Israel Defense Force (IDF) reported that unspecified militants fired 12 projectiles from Gaza.[26] The IDF airstrikes were likely in retaliation for an unclaimed rocket attack into Sderot on February 1.[27]

Turkish forces have likely withdrawn from a military checkpoint located in Qastoun, Syria. Turkish forces were seen removing cement barriers from the checkpoint south of the M4 Aleppo-Latakia highway on February 2.[28] The Assad regime previously set demands that the M4 highway be reopened as a condition for engaging in rapprochement talks with Turkey.[29]

The Iraqi and Saudi governments signed a memorandum of understanding to link Iraq’s electrical grid to the Saudi electrical grid on February 2.[30] Iraq and Gulf Cooperation Council countries had previously agreed to integrate Iraq into its power grid in 2019.[31] Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz Salman stated that this memorandum was a component of Saudi Arabia’s broader goal of bringing the “Arab world” onto the Saudi electrical grid. Iraq’s Parliamentary Oil and Gas Committee announced that Iraq plans to phase out its gas imports from Iran by 2025.[32]

[1] https://t.co/usmor0NhYr

[2] https://t.co/Ue8TSjMDTl

[3] https://www.irna.ir/news/85017739/%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B6-%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%85

[4] https://diyarmirza.ir/1401/11/%D9%85%D8%B4%DA%A9%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%E2%80%8C%D8%B4%D8%AF%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%AE%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%8C-%D9%82%D8%B7/

[5] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-february-1-2023

[6] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-january-9-2023

[7] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202302013708 ; https://www.iranintl.com/202302015431

[8] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-18

[9] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-december-29

[10] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-january-20?mkt_tok=NDc1LVBCUS05NzEAAAGJcPld9BJcNX7Az9RduUY95NpNRgxtBFq9_my55YR4zRw6_Yyv2DhGKT9SwFsMLdsU0_YoLNfbDOsThDo-FAaDYU_m_mP8vIr3r04Vg9xfcLu-haMd

[11] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1621091543309488131?s=20&t=m63Ean5roDGIatKsvouMfw;

https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1621062932393246720?cxt=HHwWgIDSvb6Jlv8sAAAA;

https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1621118469893943300;

https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1621228520939601920

[12] https://twitter.com/Entekhab_News/status/1621117650746347524?s=20&t=b7F5jLA2DVvcAI6vuyF6JQ

[13] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1621070355048841218?s=20&t=m63Ean5roDGIatKsvouMfw;

https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1620907703005757448?s=20&t=m63Ean5roDGIatKsvouMfw

[14] https://twitter.com/Entekhab_News/status/1621117650746347524?s=20&t=b7F5jLA2DVvcAI6vuyF6JQ

[15] https://t.co/KKLI9snCHe

[16] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-january-31-2023

[17] https://twitter.com/Podolyak_M/status/1619647615016251392?s=20&t=OkcNyGI7F34qljMaHHHieA

[18] https://defapress.ir/fa/news/570507/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%87-%D9%87%D9%85%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B2%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%87%D8%B1%DA%AF%D9%88%D9%86%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%87%D9%85%E2%80%8C%D8%B2%D9%86%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C ; http://en.isna.ir/news/1401111209779/Iranian-Chief-of-Staff-Tehran-Pyongyang-cooperation-based-on

[19] https://t.co/qBd48Wrs02

[20] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1619588294999949316?s=20&t=TFkT97Dr5voTyu606zNkqQ ; https://twitter.com/filterbaan/status/1619989599299969024?s=20&t=A1MtdW_67gFOhasOwNAwnA ; https://twitter.com/netblocks/status/1619650088149880834?s=20&t=Ycw409CxmuTR1mHjwfE6eg ; https://haalvsh dot org/2023/01/30/11701/

[21] https://president dot ir/fa/142184;

https://president dot ir/fa/142185;

https://president dot ir/fa/142193;

https://president dot ir/fa/142198;

https://president dot ir/fa/142201;

https://president dot ir/fa/142204;

https://president dot ir/fa/142205

[22] https://t dot co/LSGEr6Yx9I

[23] https://t.co/7oj7fIVaXN

[24] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1620960779267887106

https://www dot dailysabah.com/world/mid-east/tensions-rise-further-after-israeli-airstrikes-hit-gaza-strip

[25]  https://t.me/manniefabian/33095

https://t.me/qassambrigades/26383

[26] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-12-projectiles-fired-overnight-at-israel-from-gaza/

[27] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-february-1-2023

[28] https://www dot alaraby.co.uk/node/6054409

https://www dot syriahr.com/en/287055/

[29] https://www.syriahr.com/en/287055/ ; https://www.alaraby.co.uk/node/6054409

[30] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220125-saudi-arabia-iraq-sign-agreement-linking-power-grids/

https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/02/iraq-saudi-seek-boost-economic-cooperation

https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%81-%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AA%D8%B2%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A8%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9

https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9

[31] https://www.bayancenter.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/16923.pdf

[32] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D9%80%D8%A7%D8%AF/%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%BA%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%88%D9%84-2025