Iran Update, April 3, 2023

Apr 3, 2023 - ISW Press

 

Iran Update, April 3, 2023

Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Annika Ganzeveld, and Kitaneh Fitzpatrick

April 3, 2023, 5:00 pm ET 

The Iran Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Contributors: Anya Caraiani and James Motamed

The Israel Defense Force conducted an airstrike targeting at least two Iranian-backed militia bases in western Syria on April 1, 2023. Unidentified Western intelligence sources reported that rockets hit the al Dabaa Military Airport and T4 Tyas air base, according to a Reuters report.[1] An unidentified Syrian military source claimed to the Syrian Arab News Agency that Israeli forces targeted multiple military targets in Homs city and its outskirts on April 1 killing five Syrian soldiers.[2] The Syrian Ministry of Defense released a statement claiming that Syrian air defense systems shot down several Israeli missiles over Homs city and countryside.[3] The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and Crisis 24 reported that the IDF also damaged an Iranian research facility in Khirbat al Tain, western Homs.[4] An anti-Syrian regime Twitter account claimed that a Lebanese Hezbollah leader was killed in the Israeli airstrike on April 1.[5]

Iranian and Iranian-backed media outlets reported on deaths of martyrs in Israeli attacks, likely to set conditions for an attack on US or coalition forces. The IRGC Public Relations Department announced IRGC military advisor Captain Moghdad Mehghani Jafar Abadi died from injuries sustained in the Israeli airstrike in Damascus on March 30.[6] Iranian-state media previously reported that an IRGC military advisor Milad Heydari was killed in the same airstrike in a statement on March 30.[7] Raisi administration Spokesperson Bahadori Jahromi warned that Iran would retaliate for the Israeli airstrikes that reportedly killed Abadi and Heydari in a statement on April 2 reported by Iranian state-media outlet Tasnim.[8] Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Nasser Kanani also released a statement warning that Iran “reserves the right to respond [to Israeli strikes] at the right place and time” during a press conference on April 2.[9]

An unspecified Iranian-backed militia flew an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) into Israeli airspace, which highlights the risk of further escalation in Syria. The militia flew the UAV from Syria into Israeli airspace north of Lake Tiberias, Golan Heights. The IDF reported that its forces monitored the drone in flight before downing it.[10] Israeli media outlets reported that the drone was Iranian made. Iranian media outlet Entekhab circulated reporting on the drone entering Israeli airspace in a report on April 2.[11] Israeli air defense systems shot and destroyed a Qassem Shehab UAV Izz ad Din al Qassem Brigade of Hamas launched towards Israeli airspace on April 3.[12] CTP cannot verify if Iran directed the militias to fly the drones into Israel. Iranian-backed militants periodically conduct attacks independent of Iranian direction.

The Iranian regime has cohered around a collective approach to enforcing mandatory veiling laws that frames the laws as the will of the people, possibly to avoid igniting another round of anti-regime protests. The regime publicly signaled its agreement to strictly enforce the mandatory hijab law on March 30, as CTP previously assessed.[13] The regime’s enforcement model seeks to coopt the social collective as a complementary enforcement mechanism to its security services. The regime has encouraged pro-regime loyalists to issue “verbal warnings” to unveiled women and called on the relevant state entities to continue their enforcement albeit more cautiously.[14] The Education Ministry published a statement on April 3 outlining a guidance plan for educating the youth in the importance of veiling and “chastity.”[15] The statement also suggested that schoolchildren who do not comply with veiling standards will be excused without any detailed explanation. The regime has also sought to expand its enforcement network beyond ordinary regime supporters to non-state social institutions such as local stores and educational centers. The regime reportedly sealed several local shops for serving unveiled women as part of an effort to expand the costs of noncompliance to those who have not directly violated veiling standards, thereby increasing the incentive for shop owners to exert pressure on their customers to observe such standards.[16]

Iranian officials have described adherence to the law as a popular demand in recent days. President Ebrahim Raisi stated on April 3 that most women and girls adhere to the law and that observance of the hijab is a “common” demand.[17] Islamic Guidance and Culture Minister Mohammad Mehdi Esmaili similarly stated that the Iranian nation—as opposed to the regime—opposes improper veiling.[18]

The regime likely instituted a temporary pause on the strict enforcement of the law and its guidance patrol following the death of Mahsa Amini. The regime has altered its approach to what has been a longstanding commitment to mandatory veiling enforcement only following the aftermath of the Mahsa Amini protest movement. President Ebrahim Raisi signed a decree on August 15, 2022, authorizing the use of facial recognition and other surveillance technology to identify those who were not complying with the veiling law, immediately prior to the Mahsa Amini protest movement in September. The regime likely instituted a temporary pause on the strict enforcement of the law and its guidance patrol following the death of Mahsa Amini.

The regime’s collective punishment approach to mandatory veiling—particularly its encouragement of pro-regime loyalists to enforce mandatory veiling—may exacerbate tensions between the Iranian public and the regime. Regime-affiliated media recirculated a 1995 video of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei condemning “attacks” against women with “bad hijab” in recent days, likely in response to a man pouring yogurt on two unveiled women in Khorasan Razavi Province on March 31.[19] Republishing the video indicates the regime is attempting to signal that it supports citizens’ involvement in hijab enforcement but disapproves of physical altercations between regime loyalists and unveiled women. The regime has no ability to control the actions of private citizens who decide to enforce the hijab law, however. Citizens who choose to enforce this law are likely the most passionate about it, and thus may use confrontational methods—such as physical harassment—to implement it. Iranian citizens may additionally accuse individuals who enforce the hijab law of being regime officials, even if they are in fact private citizens. This dynamic puts the regime in a dangerous situation because if vigilantes confront unveiled women aggressively or violently, citizens may place blame for these individuals’ actions on the regime and subsequently call for new anti-regime demonstrations.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has been conspicuously absent from ongoing intra-regime discussions about the hijab, possibly to shield himself from criticisms of the regime’s uncompromising stance on this issue. Khamenei has not explicitly mentioned the hijab in recent weeks, although he did indirectly reference Iran’s “cultural issues” in his Nowrouz message on April 21.[20] Numerous Friday prayer leaders—who receive guidance for the content of their sermons from the Office of the Supreme Leader—emphasized the issue of mandatory veiling in their sermons on March 31, however.[21] Khamenei’s relative silence on the hijab issue may indicate that he recognizes that the regime’s reinvigorated effort to enforce the hijab law is unpopular among segments of the Iranian population. He may therefore be attempting to disassociate himself from this issue to maintain public support. Khamenei’s silence is particularly noteworthy given that he publicly reiterated the mandatory hijab requirement in January 2022 as the Mahsa Amini protest movement was culminating, as CTP previously reported.[22] Khamenei may perceive that there is more resistance to the hijab law among Iranian women now then there was in January, although there is no evidence to support this hypothesis. Regime officials close to Khamenei have additionally attempted to portray the supreme leader as a fatherly and loving figure in recent days, possibly to downplay Khamenei’s role in directing the regime’s crackdown on hijab violations. Supreme Leader Office Head Mohammad Mohammadi Golpayegani stated on April 3 that “Khamenei is extremely kind and cannot tolerate seeing children cry.”[23] Golpayegani added that Khamenei responds to the hardships and unkindness of people with patience and forgiveness.[24]

Key Takeaways

  • The Israel Defense Force conducted an airstrike targeting at least two Iranian-backed militia bases in western Syria on April 1, 2023.
  • Iranian and Iranian-backed media outlets reported on deaths of martyrs in Israeli attacks, likely to set conditions for an attack on US or coalition forces.
  • The Iranian regime has cohered around a collective approach to enforcing mandatory veiling laws that frames the laws as the will of the people, possibly to avoid igniting another round of anti-regime protests.
  • At least four protests occurred in four cities across three provinces on April 3.
  • CTP did not record protest activity that met its reporting thresholds on April 1 and 2.
  • Social media users circulated footage of Iranian security personnel dispersing crowds celebrating Sizdah Behdar—an outdoor picnicking holiday marking the end of the Persian New Year—in Alborz, Gilan, and Tehran Provinces on April 2.
  • A group of Iranian legal advisors claimed on April 2 that Basij members had attempted to coerce detained anti-regime protesters to join the organization upon their release.
  • President Ebrahim Raisi appointed former Farhangian University President Reza Morad Sahraei as education minister on April 3 following Education Minister Yousef Nouri’s April 2 resignation.
  • Iranian media reported a chemical poisoning attack on Iranian school girls in Naghdeh City, West Azerbaijan Province on April 3, marking the first of such attacks since March 13.
  • The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry appointed former Ambassador to Kazakhstan Mojtaba Demirchilou as Ambassador to Azerbaijan on April 1 amid heightened tensions between Baku and Tehran.
  • Iranian officials and media confirmed reports of imminent meetings between high-ranking Iranian and Saudi officials.
  • UK-based Amwaj Media reported that Iran has asked Iraq to play a broader mediator role between Iran and the Arab world, citing a source in the Iraqi National Security Council.
  • Iraqi Security Forces arrested Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) members that were reportedly planning an attack on Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in Buhriz, Diyala Province, while impersonating ISIS militants, likely to misdirect their participation in sectarian violence in Diyala.
  • Iranian media circulated conflicting reports of a purported encounter between Iranian air defense networks and a US aircraft over the Sea of Oman on April 2.

Internal Security and Protest Activity

At least four protests occurred in four cities across three provinces on April 3. CTP assesses with moderate to high confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Hamedan City, Hamedan Province[25]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Teachers

Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province[26]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Retirees

Shoush, Khuzestan Province[27]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Retirees

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Firouzeh, Razavi Khorasan Province[28]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Teachers conducting a sit-in

 

CTP did not record protest activity that met its reporting thresholds on April 1 and 2.

Social media users circulated footage of Iranian security personnel dispersing crowds celebrating Sizdah Behdar—an outdoor picnicking holiday marking the end of the Persian New Year—in Alborz, Gilan, and Tehran Provinces on April 2.[29] Security personnel violently dispersed at least two gatherings in Karaj, Alborz Province, where they reportedly brutally arrested one individual, and Masouleh, Gilan Province, where they reportedly threatened crowds with weapons and tear gas.[30] Iranian security personnel likely targeted Sizdah Behdar--which coincided with Ramadan-- gatherings because some participants may have flouted mandatory fasting during Ramadan. Iranian officials have previously described eating in public places during Ramadan as a crime and have warned against such activity within the past several weeks.[31]

A group of Iranian legal advisors claimed on April 2 that Basij members had attempted to coerce detained anti-regime protesters to join the organization upon their release. Formerly detained protesters told Dadban their local Basij organization following their release.[32] CTP cannot confirm the veracity of this report.

President Ebrahim Raisi appointed former Farhangian University President Reza Morad Sahraei as education minister on April 3 following Education Minister Yousef Nouri’s April 2 resignation.[33] Nouri’s resignation follows First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber prior criticisms blaming the Education Ministry for a delay in teacher payments on March 30.[34] Iranian media circulated reports on the same date that a number of contracted teachers had not received their salaries in six months.[35]

Iranian media reported a chemical poisoning attack on Iranian school girls in Naghdeh City, West Azerbaijan Province, on April 3, marking the first of such attacks since March 13.[36]

Economic Affairs

The Iranian rial appreciated from 549,500 rials to one US dollar on March 31 to 518,000 rials to one US dollar on April 3, marking 5.7 percent appreciation within this timeframe.[37]

Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry appointed former Ambassador to Kazakhstan Mojtaba Demirchilou as Ambassador to Azerbaijan on April 1 amidst heightened tensions between Baku and Tehran. Demirchilou replaced Abbas Mousavi, who occupied the position for three years.[38] Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Nasser Kanani had previously condemned Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Eli Cohen’s March 29 discussion on Iran with his Azerbaijani counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov on March 31. Kanani warned that Azerbaijan was “expected to avoid the trap of enemy relations” and added that Iran would be unable to remain indifferent to improved Israeli-Azerbaijani ties.[39] Uncorroborated reports on April 3 stated that three of the four individuals that Azerbaijani security services arrested for shooting Azerbaijani Parliamentarian Fazil Mustafa on March 28 were working on the order of Iranian security forces. Several Azerbaijani parliamentarians have additionally blamed Iran for the attack.[40]

Iranian officials and media confirmed reports of forthcoming meetings between high-ranking Iranian and Saudi officials. Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan agreed to meet “in the coming days” during a phone call on April 2.[41] First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber separately announced on April 3 that President Ebrahim Raisi has accepted Saudi King Mohammad bin Salman’s invitation to visit Riyadh at an unspecified date.[42]

UK-based Amwaj Media reported that Iran has asked Iraq to play a broader mediator role between Iran and the Arab world, citing a source in the Iraqi National Security Council. Amwaj reported that Baghdad had previously hosted three rounds of talks between Jordan and Iran and prepared for talks between Iran and Egypt, which were placed on hold due to domestic political developments in Iraq. The source claimed that Iran and Bahrain also recently exchanged several messages. The article framed former Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi's February 21 visit to Tehran as a demonstration of Iraq’s efforts to mediate talks between Iran and the Arab world. It also noted that Kadhimi discussed improving ties between Iran and Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE with Iranian officials on his trip.[43]

Foreign Affairs Ministry Senior Advisor Ali Asghar Khaji headed Iran’s delegation in a quadrilateral meeting between Iran, Russia, Turkey, and Syria in Moscow, Russia on April 3. Kahji and his Russian, Turkish, and Syrian counterparts discussed resolving tensions between Damascus and Ankara.[44] Khaji also discussed ongoing events in Syria in a separate meeting with Special Envoy of the Russian President for Middle East and Africa Mikhail Bogdanov.[45]

External Security and Military Affairs

Iraqi Security Forces arrested Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) members that were reportedly planning an attack on Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in Buhriz, Diyala Province, while impersonating ISIS militants, likely to misdirect their participation in sectarian violence in Diyala.[46] The PMF is a loose coalition of Iranian-backed militias. Badr Organization and PMF-affiliated leadership erroneously blamed ISIS militants for a massacre of Sunni civilians on February 20 and a series of assassinations.[47]  However, ISIS failed to claim the February 20 attack deviating from the group’s normal behavior.[48]  Al Qaeda in Iraq and Shia militias manipulated Diyala’s multi-ethnic and sectarian demographics from 2006 to 2007 by conducting targeted attacks to maintain its footprint in the province as a security guarantor.[49]

Iranian media circulated conflicting reports of a purported encounter between Iranian air defense networks and a US aircraft over the Sea of Oman on April 2. Semi-official ISNA reported that Iran’s air defense network issued a warning to an American Lockheed EP-3 aircraft over the Sea of Oman on April 3. ISNA emphasized that the air defense network issued the warning “far" before the aircraft reached Iran’s territorial waters.[50] IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported that the Artesh Navy issued a warning to the US “spy plane” after it had already approached the border of Iranian airspace.[51] Iranian reporting on the purported encounter may be a demonstration of military strength following multiple Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets in Syria within the past several days.

[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-state-media-says-air-defenses-confront-israeli-attack-over-homs-area-2023-04-01/ ;

[2] https://sana dot sy/en/?p=305100 ;

[3] https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=548608164082741&set=a.535390988737792

[4] https://www.syriahr dot com/en/294388/ ;

https://crisis24.garda dot com/alerts/2023/04/syria-suspected-israeli-airstrikes-reportedly-wound-at-least-five-people-in-homs-governorate-as-of-early-april-2-update-1

[5] https://twitter.com/LebUpdate/status/1642872967813029888

[6] https://twitter.com/Syria_24NEW/status/1642445440409907200 ;

https://twitter.com/Syria_24NEW/status/1642445440409907200/photo/1 ;

https://tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/04/02/2874334/another-irgc-officer-pronounced-dead-after-israeli-strike-in-syria ;

https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/580965/%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D8%A6%DB%8C%D9%86%E2%80%8C-%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D8%B4%DB%8C%DB%8C%D8%B9-%D9%88-%D8%AE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%AE%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%87 ;

https://twitter.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1642494193879728128?s=20

[7] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85070468/%DB%8C%DA%A9%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AF; www.irna dot ir/news/85070628

[8] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/01/14/2874591/%D8%B3%D8%AE%D9%86%DA%AF%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%B1%DA%98%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%B5%D9%87%DB%8C%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AE-%D9%86%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%86%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF

[9] https://en.mfa dot ir/portal/newsview/715932

[10] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1642602860843089921 ;

https://t.me/SAM_Syria0/3829 ;

https://twitter.com/QalaatM/status/1642613928659234818 ;

https://www.timesofisrael.com/air-force-downs-unidentified-aircraft-in-north-amid-escalating-tensions-with-iran/ ;

https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-736210 ;

https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1642602860843089921

[11] https://t dot co/ci8X7fGn3u

[12] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1642809466012696577 ;

https://t.me/C_Military1/34308 ;

https://twitter.com/msdrnews1/status/1642933696515784706 ;

https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1642809466012696577  ;

https://t.me/qassambrigades/26832

[13] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-31-2023

[14] https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14020109000567/4-%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%B4%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%87-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%DA%86%DB%8C%D8%AF%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D8%A8%DB%8C%E2%80%8C%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8%DB%8C ; https://t dot co/UMYIhpWdvB

[15] https://t dot co/ndKyG2kdiD

[16] https://t dot co/DHosyIeMe6 ; https://twitter.com/Entekhab_News/status/1642164104981889024?s=20 ; https://www.iranintl dot com/en/202304024843

[17] https://president dot ir/en/143163

[18] https://www.didbaniran dot ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%87%D9%86%DA%AF%DB%8C-6/152357-%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%DA%AF%D8%B4%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%87-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA

[19] https://twitter.com/Tasnimnews_Fa/status/1641890806129741833

[20] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-21-2023

[21] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-31-2023

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-crisis-update-january-4-2023

[23] https://t dot co/ZNQJsC0r1J ;

https://www dot hamshahrionline dot ir/news/751337/%D8%BA%D9%85-%D9%88-%D8%BA%D8%B5%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%A2%D9%82%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A8%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AF ;

https://www dot farsnews dot ir/news/14020114000080/%D9%86%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%AF%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%AF%D9%81%D8%AA-%D9%88%DA%AF%D9%88-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF%DB%8C-%DA%AF%D9%84%D9%BE%D8%A7%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%BA%D9%85-%D9%88-%D8%BA%D8%B5%D9%87 ;

https://www dot mashreghnews dot ir/news/1477148/%D8%B9%D8%B4%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A7-%D8%B9-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%AF%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A8%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%BA%D9%85-%D9%88-%D8%BA%D8%B5%D9%87

[24] https://t dot co/ZNQJsC0r1J ;

https://www dot hamshahrionline dot ir/news/751337/%D8%BA%D9%85-%D9%88-%D8%BA%D8%B5%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%A2%D9%82%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A8%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AF ;

https://www dot farsnews dot ir/news/14020114000080/%D9%86%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%AF%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%AF%D9%81%D8%AA-%D9%88%DA%AF%D9%88-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF%DB%8C-%DA%AF%D9%84%D9%BE%D8%A7%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%BA%D9%85-%D9%88-%D8%BA%D8%B5%D9%87 ;

https://www dot mashreghnews dot ir/news/1477148/%D8%B9%D8%B4%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A7-%D8%B9-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%AF%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A8%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%BA%D9%85-%D9%88-%D8%BA%D8%B5%D9%87

[25] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1642848611573571591?cxt=HHwWjoCxifWGycwtAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1642824647270866944?cxt=HHwWgICxjYGUvswtAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/daneshjo_pishro/status/1642841703164805121

[26] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1642860132307542017?cxt=HHwWgoC9ncGlzswtAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1642855676576661506?cxt=HHwWhICwuZOizMwtAAAA

[27] https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1642821130778968066?cxt=HHwWhICwmanHvMwtAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1642846215430701058?cxt=HHwWhIC8tbj7x8wtAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1642824755500785666?cxt=HHwWhIC9vaeavswtAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1642901966769537028?cxt=HHwWiIC2ocyo4cwtAAAA

[28] https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1642824647270866944?cxt=HHwWgICxjYGUvswtAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1642845068410191880?cxt=HHwWkIC8uda4x8wtAAAA

[29] https://www.instagram.com/reel/CqiCBNYImoU/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link ; https://www.instagram.com/reel/CqkNpd0KAa6/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link ; https://www.instagram.com/reel/Cqi1mhkNcd4/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link ; https://www.instagram.com/reel/CqimGBQoFPV/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link

[30] https://www.instagram.com/reel/CqkNpd0KAa6/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link ; https://www.instagram.com/reel/CqimGBQoFPV/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link

[31] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/719346/%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%87%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%DA%A9%D9%86-%D9%88-%D9%88%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%84%D9%87%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%87-%DA%A9%D9%87-%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A8-%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%87-%D8%A8%DB%8C%E2%80%8C%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AF-%D9%BE%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A8-%D9%88-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%82%DB%8C%D9%81-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%B4%D8%AF ; https://www.iranintl.com/202303158236

[32] https://twitter.com/dadban4/status/1642487864511397888

[33] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85072550/%D9%BE%D8%B0%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%81%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%B4-%D9%88-%D9%BE%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%B4-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%B5%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%BE%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87

[34] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85069342/%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AC-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%B4%DA%A9%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%BE%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%81%D9%86%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%AA%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA

[35] https://t dot co/wyUi7dFsbc

[36] https://www.sharghdaily dot com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%DB%8C-13/875154-%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%88%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4-%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4-%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-13-2023

[37] Bonbast dot com

[38] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/01/13/2874455/سفیر-ایران-در-جمهوری-آذربایجان-تغییر-می-کند

[39] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-31-2023

[40] https://www.jpost.com/international/article-736256

[41] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85071844/%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B7%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%AF%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%86%D9%86%D8%AF

[42] https://t dot co/1pNfJpg9kz

[43] https://amwaj.media/article/inside-story-kadhimi-arab-iranian-dialogue-and-the-witch-hunt-in-iraq

[44] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/5745652/عزم-ایران-برای-حل-و-فصل-سیاسی-مسائل-میان-دمشق-و-آنکارا ; https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/5745616/خاجی-با-نماینده-ویژه-رئیس-جمهور-روسیه-دیدار-کرد ; https://www.isna. dot ir/news/1402011405667/%D8%AA%D8%A7%DA%A9%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%AD%D9%84-%D9%88-%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA-%D8%A2%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%84-%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86

[45] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/483314/Iran-Russia-Damascus-review-political-international-developments

[46] https://twitter.com/Natsecjeff/status/1642611902051229697?s=20

[47] https://twitter.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1633198077644349441 ;

https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/31/iraq-ban-abusive-militias-mosul-operation ;

[48] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-march-1-2023

[49] https://www.understandingwar.org/region/diyala-%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89

[50] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1402011405583/EP-%DB%B3E-%D9%BE%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B3%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AF

[51]https://www.tasnimnew dot com/fa/news/1402/01/13/2874409/%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%B4-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%BE%DB%8C%D9%85%D8%A7-%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7

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Iran Project