Iran Update, April 4, 2023

 Iran Update, April 4, 2023

Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, and Nicholas Carl

April 4, 2023, 5:00 pm ET

The Iran Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Contributors: Anya Caraiani, Aleeshyah Lightfoot, James Motamed, and Andie Parry

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reaffirmed his commitment to enforcing the mandatory hijab law during a meeting with senior regime officials on April 4. Khamenei framed the law as both a political and religious requirement.[1] He added that the hijab issue “will definitely be solved,” but did not specify how exactly regime officials should go about enforcing mandatory veiling.[2] It is noteworthy that Khamenei provided no specific guidance on how to enforce the hijab law given that regime officials have articulated different theories on how to do so in recent days. Khamenei’s explicit endorsement of mandatory veiling on April 4 differs from his vague reference to this issue in his Nowrouz address on March 21. Khamenei previously implied that the economy should be the primary topic of intra-regime debate in his Nowrouz address, as CTP previously reported, implying that socio-cultural issues, such as the hijab requirement, are not up for discussion.[3] Khamenei contrastingly stated on April 4 that “choosing an economic slogan does not mean disregarding social and cultural issues.”[4] Khamenei may have made this clarification to explain to regime officials that they can discuss the hijab—in addition to the economy—so long as their discussions about veiling are in the context of enforcing the hijab law.

Khamenei identified solving Iran’s economic problems as critical to promoting societal cohesion and stability. Khamenei stated that “economic problems...have a negative effect on the people’s culture, thoughts, and behavior.”[5] He further stated that solving Iran’s economic problems will give the population a “feeling of comfort.”[6] These statements suggest that Khamenei may believe that the public will accept—or at least be more amenable to—various social restrictions, such as the hijab law, if the regime can meaningfully improve the economic health and trajectory of the country. Khamenei similarly stated in his March 21 Nowrouz message that addressing the people’s economic problems will largely solve Iran’s political and sociocultural issues, as CTP previously reported.[7] Khamenei separately called on “the presidential administration, Parliament, Judiciary, and all institutions” to prioritize realizing the new year’s slogan—“control inflation and increase economic production”—in his April 4 speech.[8] Khamenei may have been responding to regime officials’ overwhelming focus on the hijab in recent days and implicitly instructing them to redirect their attention to the economy.[9]

Iranian leaders have continued overtly threatening to retaliate against recent Israeli airstrikes in Syria but have not yet done so. Several senior IRGC leaders repeated on April 4 their commitment to retaliation in response to Israel killing two IRGC officers in airstrikes in Damascus on March 30.[10] These remarks follow several days of Iranian officials and state media publicly vowing to seek to revenge, as CTP has previously reported.[11] This sustained rhetoric is likely creating an expectation among domestic supporters that the regime will respond in some way, and Iranian leaders may feel pressure to meet this expectation.

Iranian leaders have several retaliation options, which they are likely weighing. Regime officials have frequently warned that they hold the US accountable for Israeli airstrikes and could attack US positions in Syria in response.[12] Iran has likely acted on this threat previously, such as when Iranian-backed militants conducted a kamikaze drone attack on a US base in northeastern Syria, killing an American contractor, on March 23.[13] Iran could alternatively target Israeli personnel or interests abroad, as it has tried to do in the past.[14]

Israel has likely continued its air campaign against the IRGC in Syria and especially against air defense assets. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) likely conducted four airstrikes against Iranian-affiliated military positions around Damascus and southern Syria, including two air defense sites, on April 3.[15] Iranian officials and state media have continually expressed their intent to help the Assad regime strengthen its air defense capabilities in recent months—likely on the theory that such support may deter further Israeli airstrikes. Deputy Defense Minister for International Affairs Brigadier General Hamzeh Ghalandari emphasized the readiness of the regime to support such efforts on April 4.[16] Iranian state media reported in February 2023 that Tehran will likely sell Damascus air defense equipment, such as radars and surface-to-air missiles, as CTP previously reported.[17]

Key Takeaways

• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reaffirmed his commitment to enforcing the mandatory hijab law during a meeting with senior regime officials.
• Khamenei identified solving Iran’s economic problems as critical to promoting societal cohesion and stability.
• Iranian leaders have continued overtly threatening to retaliate against recent Israeli airstrikes in Syria but have not yet done so.
• Israel has likely continued its air campaign against the IRGC in Syria and especially against air defense assets.
• At least one protest occurred in one city across one province.

Internal Security and Protest Activity

At least one protest occurred in one city across one province on April 4. CTP assesses with low confidence that one protest occurred in the following location:

Babol, Mazandaran Province[18]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Nurses

Iranian media reported three school poisonings in Naghdeh, West Azerbaijan Province; Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province; and Esfahan City, Esfahan Province on April 4, marking the second consecutive day of attacks since March 13.[19] Iranian media also reported a school poisoning attack in Naghdeh City, West Azerbaijan Province on April 3, as CTP previously reported.[20]

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf began to articulate a nuanced approach to enforcing the mandatory hijab law on April 4. Ghalibaf criticized the morality patrol program, describing it as “ineffective and expensive.”[21] He instead advocated for an approach that distinguishes between women who overtly violate the law and those who only partially veil. Ghalibaf stated that the state security apparatus should respond to the former with “negative” treatment and to the latter with “positive” treatment.[22] He did not elaborate what exactly he meant by these statements, but his combined statements indicate a preference for a more tempered regime approach that does not rely at least primarily on morality police.

Former President Hassan Rouhani called for a “referendum” on the regime’s domestic, economic, and foreign policies during a meeting with former members of his administration on April 4.[23] Rouhani using the term “referendum” is noteworthy given that some dissident political figures, such as reformist leader Mir Hossein Mousavi and prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid, have used the term in recent months in the context of calling for a referendum on whether to continue the Islamic Republic. Rouhani’s rhetoric was less extreme and consistent with his previous calls for major changes in regime behavior.[24] Rouhani also called for free elections and using foreign policy as an instrument for solving Iran’s economic problems.

Economic Affairs

President Ebrahim Raisi held a meeting with Iranian entrepreneurs on April 3 to discuss his administration’s economic policy.[25] Raisi announced plans to hold weekly and quarterly meetings with key domestic producers to ensure that their needs are met. He also reiterated his government’s commitment to invigorating the Iranian private sector without exactly specifying how. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other regime officials have recently expressed support for a vague idea of “privatization” without elaborating further, as CTP previously reported.[26]

The Iranian rial appreciated from 518,000 rials to one US dollar on April 3 to 506,500 rials to one US dollar on April 4.[27] Iranian state media attributed the appreciation of the rial to “the exit of excited buyers from and increase in sellers in the currency market.”[28]

Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

Foreign Affairs Ministry Political Deputy Ali Bagheri Kani announced the appointment of Reza Ameri as ambassador to the UAE on April 4—the first Iranian ambassador to the UAE in eight years.[29] Ameri was previously the director general of the Foreign Affairs Ministry’s Iranians Abroad Office. Iran has recently engaged in a series of diplomatic initiatives to improve its relations with the Persian Gulf states, including Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani’s March 16 visit to the UAE, which CTP previously reported.[30]

Iranian Ambassador to Oman Ali Najafi met with his Saudi, Syrian, and Iraqi counterparts in the Iraqi Embassy in Muscat on April 4.[31] Iraqi Ambassador to Oman Ghais al Amiri stated that the ambassadors discussed “the good opportunities that await the countries in the region in the shadow of peace,” likely referencing the March 10 normalization of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

UK-based outlet Amwaj Media reported that the Iranian and Saudi foreign affairs ministers will likely meet in Beijing on April 6.[32] Iranian and Saudi officials alternatively proposed to meet in Baghdad, Geneva, or Muscat. Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan agreed to meet “in the coming days” during a phone call on April 2, as CTP previously reported.[33]

External Security and Military Affairs

Iraqi protesters held demonstrations from April 1 through April 3 against alleged efforts by the Shia Coordination Framework to normalize Iraq’s relations with Israel, possibly instigated by Shia cleric Moqtada al Sadr. Unverified reports claimed that the Iraqi government plans to normalize relations with Israel following the US-led virtual 2023 Summit for Democracy that Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attended.[34] Several hundred supporters of prominent Shia cleric Moqtada al Sadr demonstrated in Nasiriyah, Dhi Qar Province on April 1 against the reported normalization by burning Israeli flags and carrying pictures of Sadr.[35] Over 100 pro-Sadr protesters gathered on April 2 in Sadr City, Baghdad waving banners and played music in protest of the reports of normalization and were seen waving banners with Sadr’s image in his support.[36] An unidentified Sadrist Brigade released a video statement showing armed militia members threatening to resist the Shia Coordination Framework’s normalization with Israel.[37] Sadrist Movement followers also protested on April 3 in Basra showing support for Sadr and rejecting normalization by burning the Israeli and US flags.[38]

[1]  dot leader dot ir/fa/content/26409

[2] https://www dot leader dot ir/fa/content/26409/%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A6%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85

[3] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-21-2023

[4] https://www dot leader dot ir/fa/content/26409/%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A6%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85

[5] https://www dot leader dot ir/fa/content/26409/%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A6%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85

[6] https://www dot leader dot ir/fa/content/26409/%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A6%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85

[7] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-21-2023

[8] https://www dot leader dot ir/fa/content/26409/%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A6%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85

[9] https://t dot co/gs9CtqWoxJ ;

https://www dot irna dot ir/news/85072611/%D8%AA%D8%A7%DA%A9%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%B3-%D9%82%D9%88%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%85%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B9%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%B6-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AD%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%AE%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B5%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%AA ;

https://www dot isna dot ir/news/1402011405634/%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%DA%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B1%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%B3-%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%81-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AF ;

https://www dot farsnews dot ir/tehran/news/14020114000694/معاون-وزیر-کشور-مسوولان-قوای-سه%E2%80%8Cگانه-برای-رفع-نگرانی-مردم-درخصوص

[10] http://www.defapress dot ir/fa/news/581170; http://www.defapress dot ir/fa/news/581071; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/01/15/2875180

[11] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-31-2023; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-3-2023

[12] http://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1400/09/29/2629184

[13] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-24-2023

[14] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2022/6/23/turkey-foiled-iranian-plot-to-kill-israelis-in-istanbul-fm

[15] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/archives/636509;

https://www.timesofisrael dot com/israeli-airstrike-kills-2-near-damascus-amid-series-of-attacks-syrian-state-media;

https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-736323 ;

https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/middle-east/levant-turkey/1680558445-syrian-air-defense-intercepts-reported-israeli-attack;

https://sana dot sy/?p=1870240;

https://damascusv dot com/archives/50272;

https://www.iranintl dot com/en/202304049254

[16] www.irna dot ir/news/85073574

[17] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-updates-february-2023

[18] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1643262187375411207?cxt=HHwWjoC-9ZiQhc4tAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1643302937521709073?cxt=HHwWooCzlZXUl84tAAAA

[19] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/721210; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1643209999387181058?cxt=HHwWhIC-jbqy7c0tAAAA; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1643209101101486080?cxt=HHwWgMC-rZX-7M0tAAAA; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1643265219127390211?cxt=HHwWhsC9ndXAhs4tAAAA; https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1643231579282587648?cxt=HHwWgIC-7cia980tAAAA; https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1643201834490773509?cxt=HHwWioC-8ZjX6c0tAAAA

[20] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-3-2023

[21] https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-65172063; https://aftabnews dot ir/fa/news/832813

[22] https://www.radiofarda.com/a/ghalibaf-on-mandatory-hijab-in-iran/32348765.html

[23] http://www.rouhanihassan dot com/fa/news/99651; https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/721199

[24] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-february-1-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-14-2023

[25] https://president dot ir/fa/143170; http://irna dot ir/news/85073286/آیت-الله-رئیسی-هیچ-تصمیم-اقتصادی-بدون-نظر-بخش-خصوصی-گرفته-نشود

[26] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-22-2023; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-23-2023

[27]  https://bonbast dot com/

[28]  dot ir/news/85073582

[29] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1402011506438/%D8%B3%D9%81%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%DA%A9%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA

[30] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-16-2023

[31]  dot ir/news/85073526

[32]  dot media/article/inside-story-will-iranian-saudi-dialogue-return-to-china

[33]  https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-3-2023

[34] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/node/6351661

[35] https://twitter.com/Q2lili/status/1642280629214560263?s=20

[36] https://www dot alaraby.co.uk/node/6351661 ;

https://twitter.com/raad_arabi/status/1642604877292658689?s=20

[37] https://twitter.com/DrRadhyShow/status/1642724139889770500?s=20

[38] https://twitter.com/Aljarmaqnetnews/status/1643012103677136898?s=20 ;

https://t.me/sabreenS1/73068