Iran Update, December 18, 2024

 

Iran Update, December 18, 2024

Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) is calling for a unified Syrian state without federal regions, which aligns with Turkey's objective of destroying the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and constitutes an implicit call by HTS to disarm the SDF. A top HTS military commander called for a unified Syrian state, which implies that the SDF could not exist as an autonomous organization and that all Kurdish communities would be under the control of Damascus.[1] This demand is consistent with HTS’s broader objective in Syria, which is likely to solidify its control over Syrian territory. Controlling all of Syria in a unitary system would require the dismantling of the SDF because the SDF’s leaders appear to desire a federal region. The SDF is currently facing a Turkish-led or Turkish-backed assault on Kobani and other Kurdish-held territory in northeastern Syria.[2] Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan named the “eliminat[ion]” of the SDF as a Turkish strategic objective on December 13.[3] Increased Turkish force buildup on the Turkish-Syria border, the dismantling of the Kobani-Turkey border wall, and increased drone attacks in the Manbij countryside suggest that Turkey intends to pursue this assault to “eliminate” the SDF in the coming days and that Turkey could launch this assault with Turkish forces.[4]

HTS is deepening its cooperation with Turkey and Turkish-backed groups to solidify its control over Syrian territory. HTS, while not a Turkish proxy or beholden to Turkey, receives significant support from Turkey. Turkey was almost certainly aware of and approved of HTS’s offensive that toppled Assad.[5] The HTS-led interim government has publicly expressed solidarity with the Kurdish people since coming to power, but it has not yet provided concrete assurances or a path toward any sort of autonomous authority that the SDF desires. HTS leader Ahmad al Shara has met and possibly forged alliances with Turkish-aligned armed factions to negotiate the absorption of these factions into the new Syrian government's armed services.[6] Shara has met with several SNA elements that have previously fought against the Kurds—including the Suleiman Shah Brigades, which are sanctioned for committing serious human rights abuses against Kurdish populations during the Turkish-backed operation to seize Afrin, northwestern Syria, in 2019.[7] Shara also indicated interest in a direct relationship with Turkey, telling an Islamist Turkish daily newspaper on December 18 that Syria would pursue “strategic relations” with Turkey moving forward and meeting with Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin on December 12.[8] HTS is likely eager to formalize its relationship with Turkey in HTS’s capacity as the de facto authority of Syria because it needs formal relationships with influential states at a time when it is still designated as a terrorist organization by the US, EU, and UN.

HTS’s military commander, Murhaf Abu Qasra (aka Abu Hassan al Hamawi), said the Kurds are “components of the Syrian people” and that HTS does not seek to allow any “federal entities” within Syria.[9] Incorporating SDF-held territory into the new Syrian government would require the SDF to disarm and disband its security forces. Elements of these forces would be reintegrated into the Syrian army alongside other militia groups, some of which have worked to kill and displace Kurdish communities. The Syrian army—which HTS or one of its close allies would likely control—could then dilute the influence of any wholly Kurdish forces on the ground. The SDF’s Kurdish leaders will almost certainly resist such a step, given their previous experience with the abuse of Kurdish civilians in northern Syria by the very forces that would integrate into the Syrian army alongside former SDF fighters. HTS’s leadership in Damascus has not yet officially weighed in on the issue of Kurdish-held territory in northern Syria, and it is unclear how much authority Qasra has over the HTS-led government’s intentions. HTS and the SDF do not appear to have made public contact to discuss these issues as of this writing. SDF commander General Mazloum Abdi indicated on December 13 that he planned to send an SDF delegation to Damascus to negotiate SDF representation in the new Syrian government and armed forces, but this meeting has not yet materialized.[10]

HTS’s intensifying alignment with Turkish interests is an existential threat to the SDF, given the likely Turkish incursion into Syria to “eliminate” the SDF.[11] Arab communities continued to defect from the SDF on December 18 and called an end to SDF rule in Arab areas in Raqqa and Hasakah.[12] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi has attempted to preserve and unify the Kurdish base, calling on Kurdish and Arab youth to “join the ranks of the SDF.” He has also reportedly called up reserve SDF fighters in an attempt to bolster its forces.[13]

The US-backed SDF and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) ceasefire in northeastern Syria appears to have failed. SNA and SDF fighters have resumed fighting in the Manbij countryside since the ceasefire was announced on December 17. The SDF and SNA agreed on December 17 to extend the temporary ceasefire “to the end of the week.”[14] The People’s Defense Units (YPG), a component of the SDF, accused the SNA of “breaching” and “disregarding” the ceasefire.[15] The YPG reported that Turkish reconnaissance drones supported SNA attacks on SDF forces at the Tishreen Dam.[16] The SDF repelled two SNA attacks on the Tishreen Dam, killing 37 SNA fighters and wounding “dozens.”[17] The YPG reported that Turkish drones also conducted airstrikes near the Qere Qozak Bridge and Bir Hisso, approximately 28 kilometers north of the Tishreen Dam.[18] Pro-SNA media posted imagery reportedly showing SNA fighters detaining SDF fighters in an unspecified area of the Manbij countryside.[19]

Israeli forces continued to operate in villages in Quneitra and Daraa provinces since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on December 17. Local Syrian sources reported that an Israeli armor convoy, bulldozers, and ten other military vehicles entered Saida town, Quneitra Province, on December 17, to destroy former SAA military infrastructure and seize military equipment.[20] Geolocated footage showed IDF soldiers with residents in Kwdana, Quneitra Province, on December 18.[21] Local Syrian media also reported Israeli convoys in unspecified locations in Daraa province.[22] Local Syrian media claimed that Israel conducted an airstrike targeting radar systems near Deir ez Zor city on December 18, stating that it was the second Israeli airstrike on this site in 12 hours.[23] The IDF has not commented on this strike at this time of writing.

Commercially available satellite imagery captured on December 18 showed a cargo plane on the tarmac of Russia’s helicopter base at Qamishli, northeastern Syria, suggesting that the Russian withdrawal there is still underway and Russian forces remain there as of December 18.

The Palestinian Authority (PA) is likely exploiting the current weakness of major Palestinian militia groups to reduce their strongholds in the northern West Bank. Israeli ground operations in the Gaza Strip and West Bank over the last year have severely degraded both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), diminishing the ability of both groups to resist the PA. Various Palestinian militias, including Hamas and PIJ, have effectively controlled certain areas of the West Bank in recent years.[24] The fact that the PA feels empowered enough at this time to crack down on West Bank militias—particularly in the historic militia stronghold of Jenin—demonstrates the extent to which militias including Hamas have been militarily damaged.[25] This is likely due to recent Israeli counterterrorism operations targeting militias in the northern West Bank in Summer 2024.[26] Palestinian militias clashed with PA security forces in Jenin for the 14th consecutive day on December 18.[27] Clashes between the PA and militias began following an unusual PA raid targeting militias in Jenin on December 5.[28] Hamas called on Palestinians across the West Bank to “take a decisive stance“ against the PA on December 14.[29] An Israeli journalist reported that shops closed in Jenin camp on December 18 due to local strikes.[30] It is unclear at this time if the shop closures are a result of any Hamas calls for strikes or the aforementioned call for a ”decisive stance”, or if shop owners closed the shop due to the violence. CTP-ISW has not observed Palestinians heeding Hamas’ call to confront the PA in other areas of the West Bank at this time of writing.

Key Takeaways:

• HTS Consolidation: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) is calling for a unified Syrian state without federal regions, which aligns with Turkey's objective of destroying the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and constitutes an implicit call by HTS to disarm the SDF. HTS is deepening its cooperation with Turkey and Turkish-backed groups to solidify its control over Syrian territory. Incorporating SDF-held territory into the new Syrian government would require the SDF to disarm and disband their security forces. Elements of these forces would be reintegrated into the Syrian army alongside other militia groups, some of which have worked to kill and displace Kurdish communities.
• SDF-Syrian National Army Ceasefire: The US-backed SDF and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) ceasefire in northeastern Syria appears to have failed.
• Israel in Syria: Israeli forces continued to operate in villages in Quneitra and Daraa provinces since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on December 17.
• Russia Withdrawals from Syria: Commercially available satellite imagery captured on December 18 showed a cargo plane on the tarmac of Russia’s helicopter base at Qamishli, northeastern Syria, suggesting that the Russian withdrawal there is still underway and Russian forces remain there as of December 18.
• West Bank: The Palestinian Authority (PA) is likely exploiting the current weakness of major Palestinian militia groups to reduce their strongholds in the northern West Bank.

Gaza Strip:

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and the public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip on December 18. A Palestinian journalist reported on December 17 that IDF bulldozers cleared streets leading to the Kamal Adwan Hospital in Beit Lahia before the IDF had repositioned in the western area of Beit Lahia.[31] Palestinian militias conducted five attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 17, including three Hamas attacks in Jabalia camp.[32] The IDF said it struck multiple Hamas fighters planning an attack targeting Israeli forces in Jabalia on December 18, according to Reuters.[33]

Israeli forces continued operations near Gaza City since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 17. A Palestinian journalist reported shooting from vehicles around a mosque south of the Zaytoun neighborhood, Gaza City, on December 17.[34]

The IDF issued evacuation orders for residents of al Bureij, central Gaza Strip, on December 18 due to rocket fire from the area.[35] The IDF last reported that it intercepted rockets from the central Gaza Strip on November 14.[36] The IDF issued evacuation orders for neighborhoods south of Deir al Baleh after the November 14 attack.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office and unidentified Saudi officials denied Israeli media reports that Israel and Saudi Arabia agreed to normalize relations during the second phase of a ceasefire-hostage deal between Israel and Hamas on December 18.[37]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

•  Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades’ fighters shot at Israeli civilians who entered Joseph’s Tomb, Nablus, without IDF coordination on December 18.[38] Israeli forces detained 19 Israelis for questioning regarding the illegal entry.[39] The IDF reiterated that it is prohibited for Israeli citizens to enter Area A in the West Bank.[40]

Northern Israel and Lebanon

Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:

• End Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip
• Survive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over Lebanon

The IDF Yahalom special operations combat engineering unit destroyed an underground Hezbollah tunnel and headquarters in southern Lebanon on December 18.[41] The IDF stated that Hezbollah used the site to plan and launch attacks targeting the Upper Galilee region since 2023. The IDF also located weapons, surveillance systems, and other military equipment used by Hezbollah to direct attacks in the region. The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson stated that the IDF located combat equipment near the headquarters.[42] The IDF-Arabic language spokesperson added that the IDF discovered weapons and an ammunition warehouse inside a mosque located 10 meters from the tunnel in southern Lebanon. Geolocated footage posted on X on December 18 showed IDF bulldozers operating near a mosque in Bani Haiyyan, southeastern Lebanon.[43] The IDF reiterated that the 188th Armored Brigade (91st Division) will continue to operate in southern Lebanon in accordance with the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire.[44]

Lebanese media reported that the IDF detonated unspecified infrastructure in two towns on the Israel-Lebanon border on December 18.[45]

The IDF confirmed on December 18 that an Israeli settlement activist group illegally crossed into southern Lebanon on December 10 and set up tents there.[46] The IDF removed the civilians from Lebanon. Geolocated footage posted to X showed the civilians in Aitaroun, 5 meters north of the United Nations Blue Line that divides Israel and Lebanon.[47]

Hezbollah-owned media reported that an Israeli tank shelled a house in Naqoura on December 18.[48]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

Iran and its partners in Iraq are continuing to try to gain control over the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS). Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani appointed Hamid al Shatri as head of the INIS on December 18.[49] Shatri previously served as an administrative assistant to Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh and supported Fayyadh during the Iranian-backed crackdown on the Tishreen protest movement that began in October 2019.[50] Shatri is a member and Fayyadh is a former member of the Dawa Party, which is led by former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki.[51] Iranian-backed figures, including individuals affiliated with Fayyadh, have increasingly infiltrated the INIS since Sudani came to power in late 2022.[52] Several individuals close to Fayyadh, including his nephew Faisal Ghazi al Lami, have assumed senior positions in the organization since late 2022.[53]

Iraqi State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki warned that terrorist groups may try to exploit the situation in Syria to threaten regional security during a meeting with Turkish Ambassador to Iraq Anil Bora Inan on December 17.[54] Maliki emphasized that Turkey bears the "greatest responsibility" for maintaining security in Syria.[55] Inan separately met with Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul Amir al Shammari on December 18 to discuss enhancing security along the Iraq-Turkey border.[56]

Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri criticized the Iraqi federal government’s stance toward Syria in a speech on December 17.[57] Ameri stressed the need to confront the “occupation” of Syrian territory by Syrian opposition groups. Ameri also lamented that the United States, Russia, Turkey, and Israel are defending their interests in Syria while Iraq “stands idly by.” Ameri has previously challenged the Iraqi federal government’s stance toward Syria, which opposes interference in Syrian affairs.[58] Ameri called on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to defend the Assad regime and “not wait for Baghdad to escalate” during the height of the Syrian opposition offensive in early December 2024, for example.[59]

Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi met with Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani and separately held a phone call with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on December 18 to discuss developments in Syria.[60] Safadi emphasized Jordan's continued support for the Syrian people in their efforts to “rebuild Syria."[61] Safadi and Mashhadani discussed opportunities for bilateral cooperation on regional issues.[62] Safadi criticized Israeli attacks on Syria during his call with Lavrov.[63]

The United States sanctioned several entities and individuals involved in facilitating the Iranian drone and missile production programs on December 18. The US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the Iran-based Sanat Danesh Rahpuyan Aflak Company Ltd., Mohammed Abedininajafabadi, Kaveh Merat, and Switzerland-based Illumove SA.[64] The US State Department also imposed sanctions on IRGC Aerospace Force Deputy Brigadier General Sayyed Hosein Majid Mousavi Eftekhar and two Iran-based entities for assisting the production of Shaheed-136 drones and ballistic missiles.[65] Iran sells both ballistic missiles and Shahed-136 drones to Russia.[66]

Unspecified sources including Western officials, and Iranian “insiders” told Reuters on December 18 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) now controls up to 50% of Iranian oil exports. This is a significant increase from three years ago when the IRGC controlled 20% of exports.[67] The Iranian government initiated this shift in 2013, implementing a policy to allocate oil to the IRGC instead of cash. This policy sought to give the IRGC access to greater resources because the Iranian government faced budgetary pressures under sanctions. The IRGC established a network involving a shadow fleet of tankers, Chinese front companies, and ship-to-ship transfers to evade sanctions. One such front company, China-based Haokun, operated by former Chinese military officials, continues to facilitate IRGC oil sales despite being sanctioned by the US Treasury in 2022.[68] The US Energy Information Administration estimated Iran's oil revenues were $53 billion in 2023.[69] These revenues primarily fund Iranian support for the Axis of Resistance, including proxies and regional operations.

Mashregh and Mehr News reported on December 18 that "Syrian terrorists" destroyed the graves of the "defenders of the shrine" at the cemetery next to the Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Damascus.[70] Iran usually refers to Iranian forces who fought in Syria as "defenders of the shrine." CTP-ISW found no evidence, including in Syrian media, to support the claim that Syrian rebel fighters destroyed the graves.

Some Iranian media outlets have been consistently reporting on alleged incidents of sectarian harassment at Shia holy sites in Syria, but CTP-ISW has observed little evidence to support these claims.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

[1] https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241217-syria-ex-rebel-military-chief-says-to-dissolve-armed-wing

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-17-2024; https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1869385902985732192

[3] https://en dot apa.az/asia/pkk-elements-in-syria-must-leave-country-turkish-fm-455547

[4] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-fears-military-buildup-by-turkey-signals-preparations-for-incursion-into-syria-1c2e88e9; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1868745584104050697; https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1869385902985732192 ; https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1869417839746035755 ; https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1869130527128854904

[5] https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20241210-bashar-al-assad-s-fall-turkey-proves-once-again-it-can-t-be-ignored-erdogan-syria-islamist-rebels-kurds-sdf-snf-ypg-hts-golani

[6] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1868040937974493361; https://x.com/Mekut_Mallet/status/1868737345094402066 ;

https://x.com/azelin/status/1868733772428202149 ;

https://t.me/aleamaliaat_aleaskaria/347

https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/1865791697940328541/photo/1

[7] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1699; https://x.com/Mekut_Mallet/status/1868737345094402066 ;

https://x.com/azelin/status/1868733772428202149 ;

https://t.me/aleamaliaat_aleaskaria/347 ;

https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/1865791697940328541/photo/1

[8] https://www.yenisafak dot com/dunya/ahmet-el-sara-culani-yeni-safaka-konustu-bu-turk-halkinin-da-zaferi-4663802; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkish-intel-head-syria-meetings-sources-ministry-say-2024-12-12/

[9] https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241217-syria-ex-rebel-military-chief-says-to-dissolve-armed-wing

[10] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-ally-halts-fight-against-islamic-state-in-syria-as-it-battles-rebel-group-f6638826?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2 ; https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1867492577743655266

[11] https://en dot apa.az/asia/pkk-elements-in-syria-must-leave-country-turkish-fm-455547

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-14-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-16-2024 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1869453413387505831; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1869306075176108469

[13] https://sdf-press dot com/en/2024/12/statement-of-our-sdf-general-command-regarding-the-attacks-of-the-turkish-occupation-and-its-mercenaries-on-kobani/ ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1868936839727599799

[14] https://x.com/ragipsoylu/status/1869087346236502243 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HstitcKxZGQ&ab_channel=U.S.DepartmentofState

[15] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1869385902985732192

[16] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1869417839746035755

[17] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1869385902985732192 ; https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1869385902985732192 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1869402577504555257

[18] https://x.com/farhad_shami/status/1869130527128854904 ; https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1869385902985732192 ; https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1869385902985732192 ; https://t.me/SyrianToPersian/40504

[19] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/129980

[20] https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1869172543212638321

[21] https://x.com/andynovy/status/1869382661019697504

[22] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1869443268171518157

[23] https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1869321470842945652

[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/west-bank-city-jenin-hotbed-israel-palestinian-conflict-2024-08-28/ ; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-12-15/palestinian-authority-mounts-rare-lethal-raids-in-west-bank

[25] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/west-bank-city-jenin-hotbed-israel-palestinian-conflict-2024-08-28/

[26] https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/06/middleeast/israeli-military-operation-jenin-west-bank-enters-second-week-intl/index.html

[27] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/1869324644022464727 ; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-12-15/palestinian-authority-mounts-rare-lethal-raids-in-west-bank

[28] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-12-15/palestinian-authority-mounts-rare-lethal-raids-in-west-bank

[29] https://hamasinfo dot info/2024/12/14/4794/

[30] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/1869324644022464727

[31] https://t.me/hamza20300/319199

[32] alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/20122/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84-438-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AB%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/18947 ; alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8350/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%87-%D9%88%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%82%D9%86%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A7

[33] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-mediators-intensify-ceasefire-efforts-israeli-strikes-kill-16-people-2024-12-18/

[34] https://t.me/hamza20300/319139

[35] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1869320954826109368 ;

[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-15-2024

[37] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/israel-and-saudi-arabia-deny-report-claiming-breakthrough-in-normalization-talks/

[38] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1869264153808138343 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/8016

[39] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1869277008641097969

[40] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1869264156593189342

[41] https://www.idf dot il/258383

[42] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1869400684853899752

[43] https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1869377558648963526

[44] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/full-text-the-israel-hezbollah-ceasefire-deal/

[45] https://t.me/almanarnews/187111 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/109539

[46] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1869303849099391094 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-troops-remove-israeli-settler-group-who-crossed-into-lebanon-2024-12-18/

[47] https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1869431415357800485

[48] https://t.me/almanarnews/187103

[49] https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1869387684470456449 ;

 https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B0

[50] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/exposing-and-sanctioning-human-rights-violations-iraqi-militias

[51] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PolicyFocus163-KnightsMalikTamimi-v3%281%29.pdf ;

https://alkhanadeq dot org.lb/post/180/%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A6%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B6

[52] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraqs-watergate-and-fallout-us-relations

[53] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraqs-watergate-and-fallout-us-relations

[54] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%B0%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%BA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%B3-%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%81%D8%B8-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86

[55] https://baghdadtoday dot news/264149-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%83%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%81%D8%B8-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%88%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7.html

[56] https://ina dot iq/eng/37148-moi-and-the-turkish-ambassador-discuss-securing-the-borders.html

[57] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF-%D8%B6%D8%B9%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%87

[58] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA-%D9%83%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84

[59] https://t.me/platformB/3146

[60] https://x.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1869305354007261692; https://x.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1869362922876452882

[61] https://x.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1869362922876452882

[62] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86

[63] https://x.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1869305354007261692

[64] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2755

[65] https://www.state.gov/u-s-imposes-sanctions-on-contributors-to-irans-uav-and-missile-programs/

[66] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-6-2024;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-8-2024

[67] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-revolutionary-guards-extend-control-over-tehrans-oil-exports-sources-say-2024-12-18/

[68] https://archive.is/9Nx0R

[69] https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/SHIP_Act/SHIP-Act.pdf

[70] https://www.mashreghnews dot ir/news/1672001/ ; https://x.com/mehrnews_ir/status/1869269882497626477