Iran Update, December 23, 2024

 

Iran Update, December 23, 2024

Johanna Moore, Ria Reddy, Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led Syrian interim government stated it will discuss mechanisms for disarming and dissolving the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF) with SDF leadership, according to unspecified SDF sources.[1] The sources cited by a Syrian journalist claimed that the interim government will avoid any negotiation to establish a decentralized system that grants some autonomy to Kurdish-governed areas. HTS and Turkey have called for a unified Syrian state without federal regions, which CTP-ISW previously identified as implicitly demanding that the SDF disarm and cease to exist as an autonomous organization.[2]

The HTS-led interim government does not appear to have discussed integrating the SDF into the newly forming Syrian armed forces as the interim government has with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). The HTS-led interim government has emphasized the disarmament and dissolution of the SDF.[3] HTS leader Ahmad al Shara has meanwhile met extensively with SNA elements to negotiate the absorption of these factions into the new Syrian armed forces.[4] The interim government’s call for the SDF to disarm comes amid the threat of a Turkish-led assault to “eliminate” the SDF and ongoing fighting between the SDF and SNA.[5] Disarming the SDF would leave it vulnerable to Turkey and Turkish-backed forces which have previously committed atrocities against the Kurdish population and its fighters.[6]

The SDF and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) continued to engage in fighting around Tishreen Dam and Qere Qozak Bridge on December 23. Elements of the Manbij Military Council, which is under the SDF, thwarted an attack on Tishreen Dam, according to the People’s Defense Units (YPG) Media Center.[7] Forces then combed nearby villages used by the SNA to stage attacks. The Manbij Military Council forces reportedly destroyed an SNA tank in Abu Qalqal, around 9.5 kilometers northwest of Tishreen Dam.[8] SDF spokesperson Farhad Shami reported that SDF elements are operating around 15 kilometers from Manbij City.[9] Footage posted on December 23 by anti-Kurdish media appeared to show the SNA in possession of an SDF armored vehicle after reportedly killing its crew.[10]

Elements of the SDF continue to defect in areas that are protesting SDF control. Around 70 Arab SDF fighters from the Raqqa Military Council refused orders to join fighting at Tishreen Dam and turned their weapons into their command headquarters.[11] Anti-Kurdish media claimed tha around 10 fighters abandoned fighting in the Aleppo countryside and returned home to al Shaddadi.[12] A group of fighters from Markada, south of Hasakah, defected from the SDF as well.[13]

Russian forces have reportedly withdrawn completely from most of their positions in Syria, including their base at Qamishli in northern Syria. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 23 that Russian elements completed their withdrawal from all positions in Syria’s interior and are now only present at Hmeimim airbase and the port of Tartus.[14] CTP-ISW cannot independently confirm the GUR report, though it is consistent with the pace of Russian military evacuations from Syria since the fall of Assad. CTP-ISW last observed Russian forces present at the Qamishli base, Hasakah Province, on December 18, suggesting that Russian elements fully evacuated the base in the days since.[15] Russia still maintains a presence in coastal Syria at Hmeimim airbase and the port of Tartus, but visual evidence and Syrian reporting continue to indicate that Russian forces are preparing to either significantly draw down or withdraw fully from coastal Syria.[16] The GUR stated on December 23 that a Russian cargo ship that broke down off the coast of Portugal was traveling to Syria to evacuate Russian equipment and weapons from Tartus.[17]

Russia’s reported evacuation from its helicopter base at Qamishli marks its withdrawal from its last sizeable base in northern Syria amid an ongoing Turkish-backed and potential Turkish-led offensive against the SDF. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Russia’s withdrawal from northern Syria and its loss of influence in Syria overall will likely expose the SDF to continued Turkish or Turkish-backed attacks.[18] Russia's presence across northern Syria had previously enabled Moscow to oppose and block Turkish ground offensives into Syria in 2021 and 2022.[19] One of the primary barriers against a Turkish or Turkish-led attempt to ”eliminate” the SDF is now gone.

It remains unclear whether Russia will withdraw from coastal Syria. The GUR stated on December 23 that Russia and the HTS-led interim government have continued negotiations and have discussed alleged Syrian demands that Russia withdraw from Hmeimim and Tartus no later than February 2025.[20] It does not appear that an agreement has yet been reached. Several HTS-affiliated sources have given conflicting statements to Western media about the future of Russia’s presence in Syria, suggesting that there is likely some dissonance within the interim government regarding its plan for Russian bases.[21] HTS is likely facing substantial international pressure to fully remove the Russian presence in Syria. HTS may demand Russia's full military withdrawal to convince the international community to lift sanctions on Syria, which HTS has repeatedly called upon the international community to do.[22]

Syrian interim government officials met with several Arab officials from Jordan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia in Damascus on December 22 and 23. HTS leader Ahmed al Shara and Syrian Interim Foreign Affairs Minister Asad al Shaibani met Jordanian Foreign Affairs Minister Ayman Safadi.[23] Safadi expressed support for the drafting of a new Syrian constitution and noted that Jordan will help Syria rebuild.[24] Safadi also said that Jordan and Syria agreed to combat arms and drug smuggling from Syria to Jordan. Shara and Shaibani also met with Qatari Minister of State Mohammed bin Abdulaziz al Khulaifi to discuss Syria’s impending “broad strategic cooperation” with Qatar, particularly in the energy sector and in rebuilding Syrian ports.[25] Qatar, which never normalized relations with the Assad regime, was among the first states to open contact with HTS after the fall of Assad.[26] Syrian media separately reported that Shara met with a Saudi delegation in Damascus on December 22.[27] Shara recently gave an interview with Saudi outlet Asharq al Awsat in which he praised Riyadh’s economic vision and said that Syria planned to cooperate economically with Saudi Arabia.[28]

An Iraqi parliamentarian claimed on December 20 that Iraq has halted crude oil exports to Syria.[29] Iraq previously exported around 120,000 barrels of crude oil to Syria daily.[30] Syria’s largest oil refinery, the Baniyas refinery, stopped operating on December 20 after Iran ceased oil exports to Syria.[31] Iran previously supplied 90 percent of Syria’s crude oil before the fall of Assad.[32] The Baniyas refinery director told Western media on December 19 that the refinery is undergoing maintenance so that it will be “ready for when crude oil is made available.” The cessation of Iranian and Iraqi oil exports to Syria comes as the Gulf states, particularly Qatar and Saudi Arabia, appear to be vying to replace Iran and Iraq as oil suppliers to Syria.[33]

The Iraqi federal government is reportedly reconsidering its request for US forces to withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2026 because it is concerned that the fall of Bashar al Assad in Syria threatens Iraqi security.[34] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that remaining troops would withdraw by the end of 2026.[35] An unspecified Iraqi official told the Washington Post on December 23 that there has been a “shift” in how Iraqi officials view the withdrawal of US forces since the fall of Assad.[36] The official stated that the 2026 deadline for the US military withdrawal “now seems distant” and speculated that the Iraqi federal government will extend the deadline.[37] An unspecified US official separately told the Washington Post on December 23 that Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani showed a “fresh appreciation” for the presence of US forces in Iraq during his meeting with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Baghdad on December 13.[39] The Iraqi federal government’s shifting view on the presence of US forces in Iraq reflects Iraqi concerns that ISIS remnants and possibly other actors in Syria could threaten Iraq. The Iraqi federal government has equated former Syrian opposition forces to Salafi-jihadi groups, such as ISIS, and repeatedly emphasized the need to prevent a “repetition of 2014,” referring to the ISIS takeover of Mosul in June 2014 and subsequent seizure of swaths of Iraqi territory.[40]

Iran is facing a severe energy crisis marked by electricity and natural gas shortages. Iranian officials have increasingly warned of an energy crisis in recent days and shut down or significantly reduced the operating hours for government buildings, public facilities, and schools.[41] The Iranian regime has cut the fuel supply to several power plants to compensate for shortages.[42] Reduced power plant operation has significantly limited domestic manufacturing. Chief of the Coordination Council of Industries Mehdi Bostanchi estimated that taking power plants offline in recent days could reduce domestic manufacturing by up to 50 percent and lead to billions of dollars in losses. Bostanchi said that the situation in Iran was “unlike anything industries have ever experienced.” The situation is likely to worsen throughout the winter as temperatures drop and demand for energy increases.

A variety of factors have likely caused the severe energy crisis in Iran. IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi lamented on December 23 that Iran ranks “second in gas reserves, but we cannot solve the energy problem.”[43] The Iranian regime heavily subsidizes gas prices, which contributes to overconsumption. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has previously suggested that raising gas prices is necessary to combat overconsumption. The Pezeshkian administration is likely reticent to raise gas prices, however, given that doing so could cause widespread civil unrest. Some Iranian officials have attributed the energy crisis to Israel’s attack on two gas pipelines in Iran in February 2024.[44] Former Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji said that the pipelines were repaired within three days, however, making it seem unlikely that the airstrikes caused the current crisis.[45]

The energy crisis could generate internal unrest in Iran regardless of whether the Pezeshkian administration cuts fuel subsidies. Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei recently ordered Iranian security forces to prepare for potential unrest.[46] Ejei made this statement while discussing the energy crisis, which suggests the regime may be concerned that the crisis will trigger unrest. Protests have previously erupted due to gas shortages.[47] The energy crisis comes at a time when Iran is facing other crises and dire economic conditions, which could compound and drive anti-regime sentiment. The Iranian rial recently reached historically low levels, valuing at 784,000 rials to one US dollar on December 23.

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: The HTS-led Syrian interim government reportedly stated that it will discuss mechanisms for disarming and dissolving the US-backed SDF with SDF leadership. The government also reportedly wants to avoid negotiations that would grant regional autonomy to the SDF.
• Syria: Russian forces have reportedly withdrawn completely from most of their positions in Syria, including their base at Qamishli in northern Syria. Russia’s only remaining positions are at Hmeimim and Tartus along the Syrian coast.
• Iraq: The Iraqi federal government is reportedly reconsidering its request for US forces to withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2025 because it is concerned that the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria could threaten Iraqi security.
• Iran: Iran is facing a severe energy crisis marked by electricity and natural gas shortages. This crisis presents a serious threat to regime stability given that it will likely stoke anti-regime sentiments and could spark protests.

Gaza Strip:

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip on December 23. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) conducted two separate attacks targeting the IDF in Jabalia.[48] Hamas separately claimed to stab three Israeli soldiers in Beit Lahia, before storming the building and shooting the Israeli soldiers inside.[49] The IDF has not confirmed Hamas’ claim at the time of this writing. Palestinian fighters separately conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack, killing three Israeli soldiers and wounding a fourth in Sheikh Zayed, west of Beit Hanoun.[50]

The IDF issued evacuation orders for residents of Shujaiya, eastern Gaza City, on December 23 due to rocket fire from the area.[51] Palestinian militias last claimed a rocket attack from the Gaza Strip into Israel on December 14.[52]

The IDF reported that its December 22 airstrike targeting a Hamas command-and-control site in Darraj neighborhood, Gaza City, killed a senior member of Hamas’ security apparatus.[53] The IDF reported that the IDF Air Force killed the head of Hamas’s Security Directorate, Tharwat Mohammed Ahmad al Bayk. Hamas’s Security Directorate falls under its General Security Service, Hamas’s main intelligence organization. The IDF stated that the Security Directorate provides intelligence to Hamas’ decision makers and protects senior members so operational activities can continue.

Palestinian militias conducted two separate mortar and rocket attacks targeting the IDF around the Netzarim Corridor on December 23.[54]

Hamas and PIJ have conducted three separate IED and small arm attacks targeting the IDF north of Nuseirat refugee camp since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 22[55]

The IDF Air Force struck a Hamas fighter in al Mawasi humanitarian zone on December 22.[56] The IDF added that it took multiple steps to avoid civilian harm in the airstrike.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the National Resistance Brigades mortared an Israeli command-and-control-site east of Rafah.[57] The National Resistance Brigades separately fired rockets targeting the IDF around the Rafah border crossing.[58]

Israeli sources denied on December 23 that Israel has agreed to withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor.[59] An unspecified Israeli official cited by a Times of Israel correspondent stated that whether the IDF withdraws from the corridor depends on what conditions are set in a ceasefire-hostage deal.[60] The source claimed that Hamas leaders abroad are placing pressure on Hamas’ Gaza Strip-based officials to negotiate a ceasefire.[61] A Palestinian official told Reuters on December 23 that the main issues to be resolved are which Palestinian prisoners Israel will release in return for hostages and the withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip.[62] An Israeli official separately told Israeli media that Israel will not agree to end to the war but potentially a ”prolonged ceasefire.”[63]

A Popular Resistance Committees delegation met with a Hamas delegation in Cairo on December 23 to discuss ceasefire-hostage negotiations and post-war governance.[64]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

•  Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

An unidentified man tried to stab an Israeli soldier at Himza checkpoint, north of Jerusalem, on December 23.[65] The IDF shot the man before any casualties occurred.

Northern Israel and Lebanon

Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:

• End Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip
• Survive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over Lebanon

Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander General Joseph Aoun and Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati visited LAF and UNIFIL positions in southern Lebanon on December 23.[66] Aoun and Mikati met with UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander Lieutenant General Aroldo Lázaro at the UNIFIL Sector East headquarters in Ebel el Saqi, north of Khiam.[67] Aoun, Mikati, and Lázaro visited the town of Khiam, where the LAF and UNIFIL recently backfilled the IDF 7th Armored Brigade after the brigade withdrew on December 11.[68] Aoun and Mikati also visited LAF barracks in Marjaayoun, southwestern Lebanon, on December 23.[69] UNIFIL said in a statement about the visit that it “strongly urged” accelerated progress in the IDF’s withdrawal and the LAF’s deployment in southern Lebanon before the 60-day period ends.[70] The ceasefire agreement stipulates a full IDF withdrawal from Lebanon by January 26, 2025.[71]

The IDF 91st Division continued operations in southern Lebanon on December 23. The IDF 769th Infantry Brigade identified a weapons depot containing over 100 IEDs and about 20 rocket launchers.[72] Israeli forces also located mortar shells and other military equipment during other raids in the area.[73] The IDF confiscated and destroyed the equipment.[74]

The LAF continued to seize sites in southern Lebanon on December 23 that were previously affiliated with Palestinian militias.[75] The LAF announced it took control of a center near Qousaya in the Bekaa Valley that had been affiliated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine- General Command (PFLP-GC).[76] PFLP-GC is primarily based in Syria.[77] The LAF confiscated weapons, ammunition, and military equipment from the site and detonated mines planted nearby.[78]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri visited the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Ninewa Operations Command Headquarters on December 23.[79] The PMF Ninewa Operations Command has been involved in securing the Iraq-Syria border since the fall of Assad in Syria.[80] PMF Ninewa Operations Commander Kazem al Matrohi attended the meeting.[81] Matrohi is affiliated with the Badr Organization, having previously served as the commander of the Badr-controlled PMF 21st Brigade.[82]

Iraqi police arrested a student on December 23 for writing “slogans glorifying the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)” at a school in al Zafaraniya in southeastern Baghdad.[83] The student confessed that he entered the school at night and wrote “extremist slogans” on classroom walls. Al Zafaraniya and neighboring Jisr Diyala are predominantly Shia neighborhoods that ISIS frequently attacked in the mid-2010s.[84] The incident in al Zafaraniya follows several other incidents across Iraq in recent weeks involving the promotion of ISIS imagery and slogans. Iraqi authorities arrested an individual who wrote ISIS slogans on buildings in al Nusour, Anbar Province, on December 17.[85] Iraqi media reported on December 20 that unspecified individuals raised an ISIS flag at a school in Daquq District in eastern Kirkuk Province.[86]

An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leader announced on December 23 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, has suspended attacks on Israel.[87] An unspecified Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba leader told Lebanese media that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq reached an agreement with the Iraqi federal government to suspend attacks on Israel and refrain from intervening in Syria.[88] The Iraqi federal government has pressured the militias in recent months to stop attacking Israel in order to avoid an Israeli retaliatory attack on Iraq. An unspecified member of the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee, which coordinates activities among Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, similarly told Iraqi media on December 23 that the committee agreed to prevent the militias from interfering in Syria.[89]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei said on December 23 that Iran has no "direct contact" with the Syrian groups that overthrew Assad "at the moment."[90] A senior Iranian official previously told Reuters on December 9 that Iran opened direct communication with unspecified Syrian opposition forces to "prevent a hostile trajectory" between the two countries.[91]

The Times reported on December 22 that Iran may turn Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut into a "new logistics hub, just as [Iran] did in Syria," citing an unspecified regional source aware of discussions in Tehran.[92] The source said that Iran may seek to establish a new "hub" in Beirut for military shipments since its routes to Lebanon via Syria have been severed by the fall of Assad. Iran has historically moved materiel to Lebanon to build Lebanese Hezbollah and its military forces. Israeli media reported on December 22 that HTS leader Ahmad al Shara recently decided to prevent Iranian civilian and military flights from transiting Syrian airspace, which will significantly limit Iranian freedom of movement in the Middle East.[93] Loss of access to Syrian airspace will severely limit Iran’s ability to rearm Hezbollah and require Iran to establish other access routes, although it is unclear how viable the alternative routes could be.

The Houthis conducted a drone attack targeting two unspecified Israeli military sites in Ashkelon and the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area on December 23.[94] The IDF intercepted a drone launched from Yemen before it entered Israeli territory.[95] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu separately said on December 23 that he ordered the IDF to destroy Houthi infrastructure in response to the Houthi drone and missile attacks on Israel in recent days.[96]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Russian Deputy Prime Minister for Transport Vitaly Savelyev in Tehran on December 23 to discuss the Astara-Rasht railway and bilateral trade.[97] Russia agreed to partially finance Iranian construction of the railway--a missing link in the International North South Transit Corridor--in May 2023.[98] Savelyev emphasized continued Russian commitment to implement the agreement and said that Russia "has provided the necessary credit line" and wants Iran to cooperate with Azerbaijan to implement the project.[99] Savelyev added that Iran and Russia will be able to transport 15 million tons of goods between the two countries with the implementation of the railway. Savelyev extended an invitation to Pezeshkian to visit Russia in early 2025, likely to discuss the new comprehensive strategic partnership agreement between Moscow and Tehran.[100]

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

[1] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1871163552654094378

[2] https://www.france24 dot com/en/live-news/20241217-syria-ex-rebel-military-chief-says-to-dissolve-armed-wing ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-18-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-19-2024

[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-19-2024

[4] https://www.alaraby.co dot uk/politics/%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%82%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A1 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1868040937974493361 ; https://x.com/Mekut_Mallet/status/1868737345094402066

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-22-2024

[6] GRAPHIC https://x.com/JulianRoepcke/status/1866436366269321369 ; https://rojavainformationcenter dot org/2024/12/update-december-13-and-14-turkish-backed-sna-mobilization-geared-towards-assault-on-kobane/ ; https://www.yahoo.com/news/turkish-backed-fighters-accused-executing-134726056.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAHNCy4ivh4vUrG0VHNh5ceghm1BgEz4UzzqCsyX4fSplASO7KoKYtgwv1k6h7gvp3h49eMp9VhcIx_HY2ThB0HzWrfVClbE-lBHZqpQU4Uz7BGHmva_qQbsCiT6FxBxmRX2zFv5mtVffJGvHC2ZSUEsGxaDwZivgF42baAIwBuAH ; https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2019/10/syria-damning-evidence-of-war-crimes-and-other-violations-by-turkish-forces-and-their-allies/

[7] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1871136614023319950

[8] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1871187186860929312

[9] https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1871260507925041396

[10] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/130545

[11] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/130520 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1871144981626527818

[12] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1871151403236000226

[13] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1871167799336603794

[14] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/ne-doplyvly-sudno-dlia-vyvezennia-rosiiskykh-viisk-z-syrii-zlamalos-u-vidkrytomu-mori.html

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-18-2024

[16] https://t.me/damascusv011/26832; https://x.com/AlArabiya_SY/status/1869370349407609098

[17] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/ne-doplyvly-sudno-dlia-vyvezennia-rosiiskykh-viisk-z-syrii-zlamalos-u-vidkrytomu-mori.html

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-15-2024

[19] https://warontherocks.com/2022/12/turkeys-russian-red-light-in-syria/; https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-asks-turkey-refrain-full-scale-syria-offensive-2022-11-23/

[20] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/ne-doplyvly-sudno-dlia-vyvezennia-rosiiskykh-viisk-z-syrii-zlamalos-u-vidkrytomu-mori.html

[21] https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/12/16/the-secret-talks-between-syrias-new-leaders-and-the-kremlin; https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%91%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9

[22] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/ne-doplyvly-sudno-dlia-vyvezennia-rosiiskykh-viisk-z-syrii-zlamalos-u-vidkrytomu-mori.html ; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c05p9g2nqmeo; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/16/world/middleeast/syria-al-shara-al-assad.html

[23] https://x.com/syrianmofaex/status/1871156970721620296;

[24] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1871143379897290856; https://x.com/ForeignMinistry/status/1871200652010963215

[25] https://x.com/syrianmofaex/status/1871167063986675897; https://x.com/MofaQatar_EN/status/1871158855344009227; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1871189024645534145; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-offers-syria-support-meeting-with-new-leader-2024-12-23/

[26] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatar-opens-contacts-with-syrias-hts-group-source-says-2024-12-09/

[27] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1870771962387337628

[28] https://aawsat.com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5093404-الشرع-لـالشرق-الأوسط-سوريا-لن-تكون-منصة-قلق-لأي-دولة-عربية

[29] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7

[30] https://oilprice dot com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Syrian-Oil-Supply-Crisis-Deepens-as-Iraq-Cuts-Exports.html

[31] https://www.ft.com/content/9d65fb40-a389-42ad-b9c5-42533a276dde

[32] https://www.ft.com/content/9d65fb40-a389-42ad-b9c5-42533a276dde

[33] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1871189024645534145 ;

https://www.arabnews dot com/node/2584000/saudi-arabia

[34] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/12/23/syria-us-troops-trump-hts-turkey/

[35] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-iraq-deal-would-see-hundreds-troops-withdraw-first-year-sources-say-2024-09-06/

[36] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/12/23/syria-us-troops-trump-hts-turkey/

[37] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1870772901961404658

[39] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/12/23/syria-us-troops-trump-hts-turkey/

[40] https://www.masrawy dot com/news/news_publicaffairs/details/2024/12/3/2685462/ ;

https://almadapaper dot net/387516/ ;

https://t.me/teamsmediawar_1/106885

[41] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/21/world/middleeast/iran-economy-energy-crisis.html ; https://president dot ir/fa/155763

[42] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/21/world/middleeast/iran-economy-energy-crisis.html

[43] https://www.didbaniran dot ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-3/210089-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%81%D8%AF%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%AE%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%B6%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%DA%A9%D9%87-%D9%85%DB%8C-%DA%AF%D9%88%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AF-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AE%D8%AA-%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AF

[44] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/21/world/middleeast/iran-economy-energy-crisis.html

[45] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6025742/

[46] https://www.mizanonline dot ir/fa/news/4810965

[47] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-crisis-update-january-26-2023

[48] alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8366/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%84-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B0%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/18974

[49] alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8363/%D8%B7%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-3-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%B5%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%81%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%87%D9%85-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B9

[50] https://t.me/moriahdoron/17738 ; https://idfanc dot activetrail.biz/ANC2312202482374623

[51] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1871167121889100128

[52] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1867970470961958979

[53] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1871243661553615107 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-22-2024

[54] https://t.me/alwya2000/7218 ; https://t.me/darebmojahden/5424

[55] https://t.me/sarayaps/18971 ; alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8364/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86-105-%D9%88%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B9 ; alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8365/%D8%AA%D8%AF%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B9

[56] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1870927805338546282

[57] https://t.me/pflpgaza1/14925

[58] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4498

[59] https://t.me/moriahdoron/17730 ; https://x.com/Lazar_Berman/status/1871208508127158692

[60] https://x.com/Lazar_Berman/status/1871208508127158692

[61] https://x.com/Lazar_Berman/status/1871208501336531125

[62] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/some-gaps-have-narrowed-elusive-gaza-ceasefire-deal-sides-say-2024-12-23/

[63] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/hamas-has-given-signs-of-life-for-a-few-hostages-israeli-official-says-as-talks-go-on/

[64] https://t.me/alwya2000/7216

[65] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-834562

[66] https://x.com/UNIFIL_/status/1871188957406306742

[67] https://x.com/UNIFIL_/status/1871188957406306742 ; ; https://x.com/UNIFIL_/status/1871188970337628349; https://x.com/UNIFIL_/status/1871188975387328857

[68] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-11-2024

[69] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1871214019664556096

[70] https://x.com/UNIFIL_/status/1871188975387328857

[71] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16912

[72] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1871204376544485784

[73] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1871204376544485784

[74] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1871204376544485784

[75] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1871152923448574235

[76] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1871152923448574235

[77] https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/popular_front_for_the_liberation_of_palestine_general_command/

[78] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1871152923448574235

[79] https://t.me/teamsmediawar_1/107639

[80] https://t.me/teamsmediawar_1/107597

[81] https://t.me/teamsmediawar_1/107639

[82] https://ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?Key=846001 ;

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-badr-organization

[83] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B3-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF

[84] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/iraq%20SITREP%202017-01-05%20PDF.pdf ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20SITREP%202015-2-24-25_V2.pdf ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/2014-08-12%20Situation%20Report.pdf ;

 https://www.cnn.com/2015/07/21/middleeast/iraq-violence/index.html ; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23861541 ;

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/10/iraq-car-bombs-baghdad ;

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22545402 ;

[85] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%B6-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1

[86] https://baghdadtoday dot news/264493-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%AE%D9%88%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9.-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4%D8%9F.html ;

https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Iraqi-security-forces-capture-seven-ISIS-militants-in-Kirkuk

[87] https://al-akhbar dot com/arab/817218/%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84--%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%85%D8%AA-%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A

[88] https://al-akhbar dot com/arab/817218/%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84--%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%85%D8%AA-%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A

[89] https://baghdadtoday dot news/264463-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%B1-%D8%A5%D8%BA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%84-%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84.html

[90] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/03/3224373/

[91] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-is-direct-contact-with-groups-within-syrias-new-leadership-says-iranian-2024-12-09/ ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-9-2024#_ednb62c06ce9cb9677873fa02a8ece38d8347

[92] https://www.thetimes.com/world/middle-east/article/iran-considers-airborne-supply-routes-for-proxy-forces-985x7sqvv

[93] news dot walla.co.il/item/3713538 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-22-2024

[94] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1871241874973040849

[95] https://x.com/IDF/status/1871195757975568813

[96] https://www.arabnews dot com/node/2584076/middle-east

[97] https://president dot ir/fa/156141

[98] https://president dot ir/fa/143951 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-17-2023

[99] https://president dot ir/fa/156141

[100] https://tass dot com/world/1390491