Iran Update, January 4, 2024

Jan 4, 2024 - ISW Press
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Iran Update, January 4, 2024

Johanna Moore, Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Peter Mills, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, Kathryn Tyson, Riley Bailey, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm EST 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

  1. Iranian-backed actors in Iraq have intensified their effort to expel US forces from Iraq.
  2. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant reported that Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip “are completing the current mission” as part of their transition to a third phase of operations there.
  3. The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—claimed several attacks on Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip.
  4. Israel moved the evacuation corridor running north-to-south from Salah al Din Road to the coastal road in the Gaza Strip.
  5. Palestinian militias tried to defend against Israeli advances in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip.
  6. Israeli forces have degraded the command-and-control capacity of Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade, according to the Israel Defense Forces.
  7. Hamas’ naval special operations forces have reinforced Palestinian fighters defending Khan Younis via tunnel systems.
  8. The al Quds Brigades fired rockets at Ashkelon from the northern Gaza Strip.
  9. Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters 10 times across the West Bank. Hamas called for continued and intensifying anti-Israel demonstrations in the West Bank in response to Israel killing senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri.
  10. Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  11. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted two drone attacks targeting US positions in Syria.
  12. US NAVCENT Commander Vice Admiral Brad Cooper stated that the Houthis tried to conduct an unmanned surface vessel attack in the Red Sea, marking the first instance of them doing so since the Israel-Hamas war began.
  13. The Afghan branch of the Islamic State—named Islamic State Khorasan Province—claimed responsibility for the recent terrorist attack in Kerman City, Iran. CTP-ISW previously assessed in August 2023 that ISKP terrorist attacks inside Iran will likely exacerbate tensions between Iran and the Afghan Taliban.
  14. The New York Times reported that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered his military commanders to exercise “strategic patience” vis-a-vis the United States on an unspecified date, citing unspecified sources familiar with internal regime discussions.
  15. US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated that Russia has already launched ballistic missiles acquired from North Korea at targets in Ukraine and continues efforts to acquire similar missiles from Iran.

Iranian-backed actors in Iraq have intensified their effort to expel US forces from Iraq. CTP-ISW has assessed that Iranian-backed actors are using almost daily militant attacks and legal and political pressure to force US troops to leave. These Iranian-backed actors have disguised the reason for their attacks, framing them as responses to the Israel-Hamas war. These attacks trigger US self-defense strikes, to which the United States has a legitimate right to protect its servicemembers. The Iranian-backed Iraqi actors exploit these strikes, framing them as violations of Iraqi sovereignty and territorial integrity and thereby pressuring the Iraqi federal government to pursue the removal of US forces.

Iranian-backed actors in Iraq have accelerated these efforts in response to the United States conducting a self-defense strike on January 4, killing a senior official in Iranian-backed militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba (HHN).[1] The United States reported that the HHN official, whose name was Mushtaq Jawad al Jawari, was “actively involved in planning and carrying out attacks on US personnel.”[2] The Washington Institute for Near East Policy similarly reported that Jawari was also responsible for distributing Iranian-supplied advanced conventional weapons to client militias in Iraq and Syria.[3] Jawari was formally the commander of the Popular Mobilization Force’s (PMF) 12th Brigade and the deputy commander of the PMF Baghdad Operations Command.[4] HHN controls the 12th Brigade and has long participated in the Iranian-led attack campaign to expel US forces from Iraq. HHN—through the 12th Brigade—also advocated for sectarian cleansing as part of its counter-ISIS operations in Tarmiyah, referencing Kataib Hezbollah’s (KH) sectarian cleansing of Jurf al Saqr in 2014 as a model of success.[5]

Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are exploiting this most recent US self-defense strike in Baghdad to add further momentum to their effort to remove US troops. The Parliamentary Security and Defense committee, which is controlled by the Iranian-backed Badr Organization, called for an emergency parliamentary session to discuss repercussions for the strike and how to preserve Iraqi security and sovereignty.[6] The committee previously presented a draft resolution to expel US forces from Iraq to the Iraqi Parliament and its speaker, Mohsen al Mandalawi, on December 6.[7] Mandalawi has condemned the strike and said that the Iraqi federal government must act immediately to remove US forces, indicating his openness to supporting a parliamentary effort to this end.[8] Mandalawi replaced former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi on November 15, after the Iraqi Federal Court removed Halbousi from his position.[9] Halbousi blocked a parliamentary motion to expel the US ambassador to Iraq immediately prior to his removal, suggesting that he was removed at least partly for that reason.[10]

The Mohammad Shia al Sudani administration has similarly begun criticizing the United States and indicating support for the removal of US troops, likely in response to pressure from Iranian-backed actors. The United States currently operates in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi federal government. Sudani announced on December 28 that his administration would begin steps to remove US forces.[11] Sudani’s military spokesperson responded to the latest US self-defense strike by describing it as being “akin to terrorist activities.”[12] The military spokesperson added that the strike was outside the mandate of the International Coalition, which is deployed to Iraq for counterterrorism operations.[13]

An Iraqi decision to expel US forces would very likely create space for ISIS to rapidly resurge in Syria within 12 to 24 months and then threaten Iraq. The US military mission in these countries is meant to enable the enduring defeat of ISIS and through cooperation with local partners.[14] The US support to its counter-ISIS partners in Iraq and Syria is instrumental to defeating ISIS.[15] US forces and military infrastructure in Iraq provide the logistical support that enables the presence of US forces in Syria. The expulsion of US forces from Iraq would necessitate a withdrawal from Syria, where ISIS is reconstituting itself in territory held by the Syrian regime.[16] CTP-ISW continues to assess that the United States and its partner in Syria have successfully contained but not defeated ISIS and that the US withdrawal from Syria will very likely cause a rapid ISIS resurgence in Syria within 12 to 24 months.[17] A resurgent ISIS would then be able to threaten Iraq again. The Iraqi Security Forces still face significance deficiencies in fire support, intelligence, and logistics that will impede their ability to defeat ISIS alone.[18]

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant reported that Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip “are completing the current mission” as part of their transition to a third phase of operations there.[19] Gallant said Israeli forces “are reorganizing with the intention of carrying out raids and airstrikes soon.”[20] This remark comes shortly after the IDF announced the withdrawal of five brigades from the Gaza Strip on December 31. The third phase of operations in the northern Gaza Strip will reportedly include the end of major combat operations, a “reduction in forces” in the strip, the release of reservists, a “transition to targeted raids,” and the establishment of a security buffer zone within the Gaza Strip.[21] CTP-ISW warned on January 2 that the third phase of operations as described will very likely enable Hamas to reconstitute itself militarily.[22] Israeli forces have degraded several Hamas units in the northern Gaza Strip. But Hamas’ military forces are neither defeated nor destroyed at this time.[23] Palestinian militias continued to operate in the northern Gaza Strip and have targeted Israeli forces in areas where Israel has degraded the local Hamas units.[24] Israel likely faces continued attacks in these areas in part because it is fighting several Palestinian militias, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs‘ Brigades, rather than just Hamas.

The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—claimed several attacks on Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip on January 4.[25] The group fired mortars and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at Israeli armor and dismounted infantry in Tuffah, where Palestinian fighters have claimed almost daily attacks on Israeli forces since late December 2023.[26] The al Qassem Brigades published footage on January 4 of its fighters firing anti-personnel devices, RPGs, and small arms at Israeli forces in Gaza City.[27] The al Qassem Brigades also targeted Israeli forces in Mughraqa, south of Gaza City, where Israeli forces are continuing clearing operations.[28] The IDF reported on January 4 that it destroyed an underground military compound west of Mughraqa in the past week.[29]

Israel moved the evacuation corridor running north-to-south from Salah al Din Road to the coastal road in the Gaza Strip on January 4.[30] The Salah al Din Road was the primary north-south humanitarian corridor that Israel designated early in the war.[31] Israel designating a new corridor comes as the IDF continues clearing operations in the central and southern parts of the Gaza Strip.

The IDF reported on January 4 that it killed PIJ’s “chief of operational staff,” who operated in the northern Gaza Strip.[32] The IDF stated that the PIJ official, Mamdouh Lulu, worked as an assistant to and was a close associate of PIJ leaders in the northern Gaza Strip. Lulu communicated with PIJ senior officials outside of the Gaza Strip and coordinated attacks on Israel before and during the Israel-Hamas war, according to the IDF. Hamas-affiliated media reported on January 3 that three civilians died in an Israeli airstrike in Rafah, including Lulu.[33]

Palestinian militias tried to defend against Israeli advances in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip. A Palestinian journalist reported on January 4 that Israeli forces have surrounded Maghazi “from all directions.”[34] Another journalist reported on January 4 that Israeli bulldozers constructed sand berms in Maghazi.[35] The al Qassem Brigades detonated an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) targeting an Israeli tank west of Maghazi.[36] The group also targeted an Israeli tank with an anti-tank RPG there.[37]

Israeli forces continued operating in Bureij, north of Maghazi on January 4. The IDF located long-range rocket launchers at the center of the city.[38] The al Qassem Brigades detonated a house-borne improvised explosive device (IED) north of Nuseirat, which neighbors Bureij.[39] The group also mortared Israeli forces and vehicles in Bureij.[40] Israeli forces face other Palestinian militias in the central Gaza Strip. The al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of PIJ—mortared Israeli dismounted infantry and vehicles in Bureij.[41] The National Resistance Brigades—the militant wing of Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—claimed that its fighters clashed with Israeli forces in Bureij and Maghazi.[42] The groups’ fighters detonated an explosive device as Israeli vehicles advanced southeast of Bureij.[43] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah—fired an RPG at an Israeli vehicle as it advanced in Bureij.[44]

Israeli forces conducted airstrikes targeting buildings containing anti-tank elements from the Hamas Deir al Balah Battalion, according to an IDF report on January 4.[45]

Israeli forces have degraded the command-and-control (C2) capacity of Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade, according to the IDF. The IDF said that it has significantly damaged specifically the C2 of the brigade’s northern and eastern battalions.[46] This statement is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that these battalions are under active and intense IDF pressure.[47] The IDF reported on January 4 its fighters killed two company commanders from the northern and eastern battalions of the Khan Younis Brigade.[48] The IDF 98th Division has similarly degraded Hamas’ combat effectiveness in Khan Younis by destroying Hamas military sites and an underground tunnel system hundreds of meters long.[49] Israeli forces conducted airstrikes on Hamas weapons depots in Khan Younis as well.[50] The IDF 4th Brigade commander said his forces are fighting on the southern flank of the Hamas Khan Younis Brigade, demonstrating how Israeli forces have surrounded Khan Younis to fight Hamas there.

Hamas’ naval special operations forces (SOF) have reinforced Palestinian fighters defending Khan Younis via tunnel systems. Five naval SOF fighters surrendered themselves to the IDF 55th Brigade Combat Team in Khan Younis, according to the IDF on January 4.[51] This incident suggests that Hamas continues to draw fighters from less active areas to support battalions under active and intense pressure from IDF clearing operations.

At least four Palestinian militias tried to defend against Israeli advances in central Khan Younis City on January 4. The al Qassem Brigades fired anti-tank rockets and mortars at Israeli armor and dismounted infantry in four separate attacks around Khan Younis.[52] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired mortars and RPGs at Israeli forces in separate attacks as well.[53] The National Resistance Brigades targeted Israeli forces with RPGs, and the al Quds Brigades clashed with Israeli infantry in central Khan Younis City.[54] Israeli fighter jets struck Hamas fighters firing anti-tank missiles and planting IEDs near Israeli forces in Khan Younis.[55]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant discussed on January 4 continuing IDF operations against Hamas and other Palestinian militias in the southern Gaza Strip. Gallant said during a visit to the central Gaza Strip border that Israeli operations above and below ground are getting stronger in the southern Gaza Strip.[56] He also said that Palestinian militants’ “countdown” for Israeli forces leaving the Gaza Strip is wrong.[57]

The al Quds Brigades fired rockets at Ashkelon from the northern Gaza Strip on January 4.[58] IDF Home Front Command lifted civilian educational and workplace restrictions in Ashkelon on December 18 after a situational assessment regarding the threat of Palestinian indirect fire from the Gaza Strip.[59]

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters 10 times across the West Bank on January 4.[60] The al Quds Brigades and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades engaged Israeli forces with small arms and detonated IEDs, including a ”car bomb,” targeting these forces in Tulkarm.[61] The IDF said that it concluded a 40-hour counterterrorism operation in the Noor Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm on January 4.[62] The IDF said that it destroyed militia infrastructure, detained hundreds of suspects for questioning, and seized weapons during the operation.[63] The IDF also conducted an airstrike on fighters who attacked IDF forces in the camp.[64] The Jenin Battalion of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades separately attacked Israeli forces in Sir, south of Jenin.[65] Palestinian fighters engaged Israeli forces in small arms clashes in Sanur, south of Jenin as well.[66]

Hamas called for continued and intensifying anti-Israel demonstrations in the West Bank in response to Israel killing senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri.[67] Hamas called for an escalation in demonstrations and other “solidarity activities” in the West Bank in the upcoming days. Arouri was the deputy chairman of Hamas‘ political bureau and directed Hamas military operations in the West Bank.[68] Arouri also helped found Hamas’ military wing in the West Bank.[69]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.[70] LH claimed that it conducted seven attacks targeting Israeli military positions in northern Israel on January 4.[71] This rate of attacks marks a decrease from the 13 attacks that LH claimed on January 3.[72] LH launched the uptick in attacks on January 3 likely in response to Israel killing senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri in Beirut on January 2. LH acknowledged that nine of its fighters died fighting Israel on January 3.[73] Unspecified fighters separately launched rockets targeting Goren in northern Israel on January 3.[74]

The Economist reported on January 4 that LH withdrew an unspecified number of fighters two to three kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon border.[75] The Economist suggested these withdrawals signal that LH seeks to avoid further escalation with Israel.[76] Israeli media previously reported that LH began withdrawing its “Radwan” special forces away from the border on December 24 due to high casualties inflicted by Israeli airstrikes.[77] The Economist reporting did not specify which LH units or how many LH fighters have withdrawn from the border, although it is possible that the Economist was referring to the same event that Israeli media covered. LH’s continued attacks into northern Israel on January 4 demonstrates that LH retains military forces along the border.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told a US envoy on January 4 that Israel needs a “new security reality” on its northern border so that its citizens can return to their homes in northern Israel.[78] Gallant stated that Israel prefers a diplomatic solution but that there is a "short window of time” to find one.[79] LH Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem stated on December 31 that LH will not allow displaced Israeli civilians to return to their homes in northern Israel until Israel halts its military operations in the Gaza Strip.[80] Israeli officials have repeatedly expressed concern about the threat that LH poses to Israel in recent weeks. IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi met with IDF commanders and discussed Israel’s military readiness during a trip to northern Israel on January 3.[81]

Hamas leaders mourned the death of former Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Saleh Arouri during his funeral in Beirut on January 4. Hamas Political Bureau members, including Ismail Haniyeh, Mahmoud Mardawi, and Hossam Badran, eulogized Arouri via recorded video at the ceremony.[82] Hamas West Bank deputy leader Zaher Jabareen spoke in-person at the ceremony.[83] The leaders' emphasized that Arouri’s killing would not weaken the resolve of Palestinian militias against Israel and that the war remains completely active. Several LH officials and Palestinian militia supporters attended the funeral in Beirut.[84]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted two drone attacks targeting US positions in Syria on January 4. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq targeted US forces at Rukban and al Omar oil field.[85]

US NAVCENT Commander Vice Admiral Brad Cooper stated that the Houthis tried to conduct an unmanned surface vessel (USV) attack in the Red Sea on January 4, marking the first instance of them doing so since the Israel-Hamas war began.[86] The Houthi USV traveled around 15 miles before detonating within a “couple of miles” of US Navy and commercial vessels.[87] Cooper stated that the USV attack did not cause any casualties or damage to nearby ships. The attempted attack follows a statement from the United States and 12 of its international partners on January 3 warning that the Houthis will face unspecified consequences if the group continues to attack shipping in the Red Sea.[88] The Houthis conducted the USV attack likely to demonstrate their capabilities in response to the statement from the United States and its partners. The IRGC Quds Force has furnished the Houthi movement with explosive-laden drone boats in recent years, and the Houthis conducted their first waterborne IED attack on a Saudi naval frigate in January 2017.[89]

Cooper additionally discussed Operation Prosperity Guardian on January 4, stating that the United States has intercepted 19 Houthi drones and missiles and that around 1,500 vessels have transited the Red Sea since the formation of the maritime coalition on December 18.[90] The United States established Operation Prosperity Guardian to ensure freedom of navigation and bolster regional security.[91]

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdul Malik al Houthi and senior Houthi official Mohammad Abdul Salam released statements calling for mass demonstrations across Yemen in support of Palestinians on January 5.[92] Both officials warned that the Houthi movement will “respond and punish” the United States for the killing 10 Houthi members on December 31. The United States killed the Houthi militants after they fired at US helicopters trying to aid a commercial vessel under Houthi attack in the southern Red Sea.[93]

The Afghan branch of the Islamic State—named Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)—claimed responsibility for the recent terrorist attack in Kerman City, Iran, on January 4.[94] Two ISKP members detonated suicide vests during a ceremony commemorating the anniversary of the United States killing Qassem Soleimani, killing at least 84 civilians and wounding dozens of others, on January 3.[95] This attack marks the third that ISKP has claimed inside Iran in recent years. ISKP previously conducted shooting attacks at a prominent Shia shrine in Shiraz in October 2022 and again in August 2023.[96] ISKP attacks beyond Afghanistan raise the group's profile among Salafi-jihadi organizations, helping ISKP attract financing and recruits.[97] ISKP attacks in Iran also support the group's efforts to undermine the Taliban government by exacerbating divisions within the Taliban movement, which remains divided between those who want to prioritize addressing domestic issues in Afghanistan versus those who wish to continue supporting jihadist movements internationally.[98]

CTP-ISW previously assessed in August 2023 that ISKP terrorist attacks inside Iran will likely exacerbate tensions between Iran and the Afghan Taliban.[99] Tehran has repeatedly pushed the Taliban to adopt stronger counterterrorism measures since the Taliban came to power in August 2021.[100] Iran and the Taliban have previously engaged in counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation vis-a-vis the ISKP, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[101] These attacks compound with additional Iranian grievances toward the Taliban, moreover. Tensions have risen between Iran and the Taliban over water resources in recent months.[102] Iranian state media claimed on January 4 that the enemies of Iran are trying to create tensions between Iran and other Muslim countries, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, where ISKP operates.[103]

Iranian officials discussed the ISKP attack with regional states on January 4. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi stated that terrorists will not be able undermine Iran’s security and unity with attacks during a phone call Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.[104] Raisi also accused Israel of trying to spread insecurity to Iran due to its failures in the Gaza Strip in a phone call with Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamid al Thani.[105] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian emphasized that fighting terrorism is the main priority of Iran and Pakistan during a phone call with his Pakistani counterpart, Jalil Abbas Jilani.[106]

The New York Times reported on January 3 that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered his military commanders to exercise “strategic patience” vis-a-vis the United States on an unspecified date, citing unspecified sources familiar with internal regime discussions.[107] Khamenei reportedly stressed that Iranian military commanders should avoid any actions that would risk direct military confrontation with the United States. It is unclear when Khamanei issued this directive to his military officials, though the reporting is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran seeks to avoid a direct military confrontation against the United States and Israel.[108] CTP-ISW has recently assessed, however, that Iran and the Axis of Resistance are trying to exploit the Israel-Hamas war to fulfill Iran’s longstanding strategic objective of forcing a US military withdrawal from Iraq and Syria.[109] Iran will likely pursue this objective in a manner that seeks to avoid a direction confrontation with the United States, namely through proxy and partner militia attacks, exploiting legal mechanisms in host countries, and other coercive measures, consistent with Khamenei’s reported directive.[110]

NOTE: A version of the following text appears in the ISW January 4, 2024, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on January 4 that Russia has already launched ballistic missiles acquired from North Korea at targets in Ukraine and continues efforts to acquire similar missiles from Iran. Kirby stated that North Korea provided Russia with ballistic missile launchers and an unspecified number of ballistic missiles and that Russian forces launched at least one of the North Korean missiles into Ukraine on December 30, 2023.[111] Kirby also stated that Russian officials continue efforts to buy ballistic missiles from Iran. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported earlier on January 4 that unspecified US officials stated that Russia could receive Iranian short-range ballistic missiles as early as spring 2024 but that the officials do not believe that Russia and Iran have yet completed a deal.[112]

Russia may be intensifying efforts to source ballistic missiles from abroad because these missiles appear to be more effective at striking targets in Ukraine in some circumstances. Russian forces routinely use short-range ballistic missiles to strike Ukrainian cities closer to the frontline, and these missiles appear to be more effective at penetrating or avoiding Ukrainian air defenses. Ukrainian air defenses have intercepted 149 of a reported 166 Russian cruise missiles in intensified attacks since December 29, 2023, but have only intercepted a handful of the ballistic missiles that Russia has launched at Ukraine in the same period, for example.[113] Russian forces have repurposed S-300 and S-400 air defense missiles for conducting strikes against surface targets in Ukraine, and Ukrainian officials have acknowledged that Ukrainian air defenses struggle to intercept these unorthodox missile attacks using their own S-300 and S-400 systems.[114] Ukrainian forces have also appeared to be less successful in intercepting Iskander ballistic missiles during recent strikes, although Ukrainian forces did intercept an Iskander-M missile during a less intense series of Russian missile and drone strikes on December 30.[115] Ukrainian forces reportedly intercepted all Iskander-M or S-300/S-400 missiles that Russian forces launched at Kyiv on December 12.[116] Ukrainian forces reportedly also intercepted all 10 Kinzhal missiles that Russian forces launched at Ukraine on January 2 with Western-provided Patriot systems.[117] The effectiveness of Russian ballistic missiles thus appears to depend in part on the configuration of Ukraine’s air defense umbrella in the target area and the strike package of which the missiles are part.

The relative success that Russian forces have had in striking targets in Ukraine with ballistic missiles in combination with cruise missiles and drones may be prompting an intensification of Russian efforts to source ballistic missiles from abroad. Russia can reportedly produce roughly 42 Iskander missiles and four Kinzhal missiles per month, although it is unclear how many S-300/S-400 missiles Russia can produce.[118] Russia‘s defense industrial base (DIB) likely cannot produce ballistic missiles at the scale required for a persistent strike campaign in Ukraine that relies on regularly expending a large volume of ballistic missiles, and Russia likely has to source ballistic missiles from abroad if it wishes to maintain large-scale missiles strikes against Ukraine.

[1] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-strike-kills-iran-backed-militia-leader-in-iraq-71256676

[2] https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/pentagon-confirms-responsibility-baghdad-strike-targeting-militia-leader

[3] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/who-are-nujaba-and-why-did-us-just-strike-them

[4] https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/iraq/2024/01/04/%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-12-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%B4%D8%A3%D9%86%D9%87%D8%9F ; https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88-%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B0%D9%8A-%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF ; https://www.kataibhezbollah dot me/news/3346

[5] https://twitter.com/HussainMouanes/status/1626552529004658691

[6] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1099174

[7] https://almaalomah dot me/news/49308/politics/%D8%A3%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B2-%D9%81%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9-%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9

[8] https://al-hashed dot gov dot iq/?p=517217

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-7-2023

[10] https://www.iraqfsc dot iq/news.5066/ ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%85%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6-%D8%B9%D9%82%D8%AF-%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AB%D9%86%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9

[11] https://t.me/MohamedShiaAlsudanii/2445

[12] https://twitter.com/IraqiPMO/status/1742869319132852587

[13] https://twitter.com/IraqiPMO/status/1742869319132852587

[14] https://dod.defense.gov/OIR/

[15] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/ending-the-us-presence-in-syria-could-cause-a-rapid-isis-reconstitution-and-threaten-core-us-national-security-interests

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-august-16-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-11-2023

[17] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/ending-the-us-presence-in-syria-could-cause-a-rapid-isis-reconstitution-and-threaten-core-us-national-security-interests

[18] https://media.defense.gov/2023/Nov/27/2003347442/-1/-1/1/OIR_Q4_SEP2023_FINAL_508.PDF

[19] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1742960424864108997

[20] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1742960424864108997

[21] https://www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/defense/660419 ; https://www.haaretz dot com/israel-news/2023-12-22/ty-article/.premium/the-unbridgeable-gulf-between-israeli-politicians-rhetoric-and-the-reality-in-gaza/0000018c-8e1e-da31-adff-8e5eb1060000

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-2-2024

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-2-2024

[24] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1199; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1069; https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4041; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/order-battle-hamas%E2%80%99-izz-al-din-al-qassem-brigades-part-2

[25] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1222; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1223; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1225; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1226; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1218; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1219

[26] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1196; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1198; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1201; https://t.me/sarayaps/17137; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1148; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1149; https://t.me/sarayaps/17117; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1122

[27] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1227

[28] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1218

[29] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1742974452466340319

[30] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1742840499239563738

[31] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1712846493747495223/photo/1

[32] https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1742936829027143743; https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news-01-04-24/h_40662275b4bb30b496b408f03b415c27

[33] https://twitter.com/SafaPs/status/1742544068792516941

[34] https://twitter.com/ytirawi/status/1742898990788587877

[35] https://twitter.com/MuathHumaid/status/1742808920547115427

[36] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1212

[37] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1221

[38] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1742826559055045074

[39] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1215

[40] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1216

[41] https://t.me/sarayaps/17147

[42] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4049

[43] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4049

[44] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/5435

[45] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1742826488934617261

[46] https://www.idf dot il/169273

[47] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/order-battle-hamas%E2%80%99-izz-al-din-al-qassem-brigades-part-2

[48] https://www.idf dot il/169273

[49] https://www.idf dot il/169273

[50] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1742826488934617261

[51] https://www.idf dot il/169273

[52] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1220 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1213 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1214 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1217

[53] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/5436 ; https://t.me/AymanGouda/5909

[54] https://t.me/sarayaps/17150 ; https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4050

[55] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1742826488934617261

[56] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1742960424864108997

[57] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1742960424864108997

[58] https://t.me/sarayaps/17146

[59] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1736779493665108034

[60] https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/2676; https://t.me/QudsN/353318; https://t.me/QudsN/353347; https://t.me/QudsN/353368; https://t.me/hamaswestbank/49579; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/5431; https://t.me/newpress1/63687; https://t.me/newpress1/63705; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/5434; https://t.me/jeninnews1/84805; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/5437

[61] https://t.me/newpress1/63687; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/5434

[62] https://www.idf dot il/169495

[63] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1742837719871455455; https://www dot idf dot il/169495

[64] https://www dot idf dot il/169495

[65] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/5431

[66] https://t.me/newpress1/63705

[67] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/49583

[68] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-2-2024

[69] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-2-2024

[70] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1742660777197093309 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/43267 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/43285 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/43287 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/43288 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/43289 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/43311 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/43314 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/43331

[71] https://t.me/C_Military1/43285 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/43287 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/43288 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/43289 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/43311 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/43314 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/43331

[72] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-3-2024

[73] https://t.me/newpress1/63664 ; https://twitter.com/JoeTruzman/status/1742691697572893138

[74] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1742660777197093309

[75] https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/01/04/another-war-could-break-out-on-the-israel-lebanon-border

[76] https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/01/04/another-war-could-break-out-on-the-israel-lebanon-border

[77] https://www.jpost dot com/arab-israeli-conflict/article-779390

[78] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-780767 ; https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/israel-at-war/1704382364-hezbollah-pulls-back-forces-2-miles-from-israel-border-report

[79] https://www.axios.com/2024/01/04/biden-hochstein-israel-lebanon-hezbollah-tensions

[80] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-31-2023 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/43010

[81] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-3-2024

[82] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/49586 ; https://t.me/hamaswestbank/49581 ; https://t.me/hamaswestbank/49595 ; https://t.me/hamaswestbank/49594

[83] https://t.me/hamasps/18872

[84] https://t.me/hamasps/18863 ; https://t.me/hamasps/18864

[85] https://t.me/elamharbi/202 ;

https://t.me/elamharbi/203

[86] https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/houthis-launch-sea-drone-attack-ships-hours-after-106106351 ;

https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3631484/navcent-commander-vice-admiral-brad-cooper-holds-an-off-camera-on-the-record-pr/

[87] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/israel-hamas-war-live-updates-rcna132207/rcrd29113?canonicalCard=true

[88] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/03/a-joint-statement-from-the-governments-of-the-united-states-australia-bahrain-belgium-canada-denmark-germany-italy-japan-netherlands-new-zealand-and-the-united-kingdom/

[89] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Pivot-to-Offense-How-Iran-Is-Adapting-for-Modern-Conflict-and-Warfare.pdf?x91208

[90] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/israel-hamas-war-live-updates-rcna132207/rcrd29113?canonicalCard=true

[91] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3621110/statement-from-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-ensuring-freedom-of-n/

[92] https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1742946085121732987 ;

https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1742936657027027007 ;

https://twitter.com/abdusalamsalah/status/1742932013425070424

[93] https://www.forbes.com/sites/zacharyfolk/2024/01/01/american-helicopters-sink-red-sea-houthi-boats-killing-10-heres-when-the-us-has-attacked-since-war-began-in-gaza/#:~:text=Dec.%2031U.S.%20Navy%20helicopters,the%20ship's%20distress%20call%2C%20the

[94] https://x.com/AliHussainiBBC/status/1742938751301804051?s=20 ; https://x.com/khorasandiary/status/1742939247018131837?s=20

[95] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/04/world/middleeast/us-isis-iran-general-suleimani.html

[96] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-16-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-26

[97] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iskp-goes-global-external-operations-afghanistan;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-july-26-2023;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/islamic-state-khorasan-province-expands-attacks-beyond-afghanistan;

https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/04/whats-next-talibans-leadership-amid-rising-dissent

[98] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iskp-goes-global-external-operations-afghanistan;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-july-26-2023;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/islamic-state-khorasan-province-expands-attacks-beyond-afghanistan;

https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/04/whats-next-talibans-leadership-amid-rising-dissent

[99] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-14-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-16-2023#:~:text=Iran%20is%20facing%20poor%20economic,protest%20movement%20in%20September%202022.

[100] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85081369 ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85024167

[101] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-august-16-2023 ; https://www dot almirsaad dot com/%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b1%d8%b5%d8%a7%d8%af-%d8%af-%d9%81%d8%aa%d9%86%d9%87-%da%ab%d8%b1%d9%88-%d8%af-%d8%a8%d8%b1%db%8c%d8%af%d9%88%d9%86%d9%88-%d9%87%d8%ba%d9%87-%d9%be%d9%84%d8%a7%d9%86-%d8%aa%d8%b1; https://twitter.com/abdsayedd/status/1689555229891518464?s=20

[102] https://www.reuters.com/world/two-killed-clash-iran-afghan-border-taliban-official-says-2023-05-27/

[103] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85343074

[104] https://president dot ir/fa/149221; https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2024/01/04/717572/Iran-Turkey-Qatar-Raeisi-Kerman-terrorist-attacks-Recep-Tayyip-Erdo%C4%9Fan-Sheikh-Tamim-bin-Hamad-Al-Thani-Israel-Gaza

[105] https://president dot ir/fa/149222 ; https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2024/01/04/717572/Iran-Turkey-Qatar-Raeisi-Kerman-terrorist-attacks-Recep-Tayyip-Erdo%C4%9Fan-Sheikh-Tamim-bin-Hamad-Al-Thani-Israel-Gaza

[106] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85343839

[107] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/03/us/politics/war-israel-iran-hezbollah-yemen.html

[108] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-18-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-16-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-23-2023

[109] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-25-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-8-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-29-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-30-2023

[110] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-25-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-4-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-8-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-29-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-30-2023

[111] https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/04/kirby-russia-used-north-korean-missiles-in-ukraine-00133879

[112] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-moves-forward-with-plans-to-buy-iranian-ballistic-missiles-cf3560e4

[113] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010324

[114] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011423 ; https://24tv dot ua/intervyu-yuriyem-ignatom-pro-ppo-f-16-raketi-yaki-mozhe-ne-mozhe_n2268925; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-russian-strike-pattern-suggests-it-is-low-ballistic-missiles-2023-01-16/; https://en.interfax dot com.ua/news/general/884852.html

[115] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010324

[116] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121323

[117] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010324

[118] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122923

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