Iran Update, July 31, 2023

Iran Update, July 31, 2023

Johanna Moore, Karolina Hird, and Nicholas Carl

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched a new interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions.

Key Takeaways

1. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia is not seeking a confrontation with the United States in Syria but is prepared for “any scenario,” likely to deflect accountability in the event of an escalation between US and Russian forces in Syria. Putin’s comments suggests that Russian aggression in Syria will continue but does not indicate whether the activity will escalate further.
2. Iran hosted a delegation of senior Syrian officials in Tehran on July 31 as part of an effort to expand its economic and political relationships with Bashar al Assad’s regime.
3. Iran and Belarus are discussing deepening bilateral military cooperation over the backdrop of their mutual support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. They may have discussed establishing Shahed kamikaze drone factories in Belarus to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
4. Iran has exported a record high of around one million barrels of oil per day (bpd) to China since January 2023, which reflects deepening the economic cooperation between the two countries.

Iranian Activities in the Levant

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia is not seeking a confrontation with the United States in Syria but is prepared for “any scenario,” likely to deflect accountability in the event of an escalation between US and Russian forces in Syria.[1] CTP previously assessed that Russia, Syria, and Iran are coordinating military activity as part of a coercive campaign to expel the US from Syria.[2] Russian officials have repeated false claims that US aircraft have violated Russian airspace in Syria in conjunction with an increase in Russia’s violations of US airspace and aggressive maneuvers endangering US aircraft in Syria. Russian Deputy Head of the Reconciliation Center for Warring Parties in Syria Oleg Gurinov claimed on July 29 that US aircraft have dangerously approached Russian aircraft in Syria 23 times since January 2023.[3] He also claimed that US aircraft have locked weapons systems on Russian aircraft 11 of those 23 times, causing Russian jets to deploy flares. Putin’s comments suggests that Russian aggression in Syria will continue but does not indicate whether the activity will escalate further.

Iran hosted a delegation of senior Syrian officials in Tehran on July 31 as part of an effort to expand its economic and political relationships with Bashar al Assad’s regime. The delegation included Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal Mekdad and Economy and Foreign Trade Minister Mohammad Samer al Khalil.[4] Iranian officials met with Mekdad and Samer al Khalil to follow up on Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to Damascus in May 2023, during which he signed 15 cooperative agreements on energy, trade, and transportation ties.[5] Raisi’s visit was the first trip an Iranian president had made to Syria since the start of the civil war in 2011.

Iranian leaders seek to achieve several effects in expanding economic and political cooperation with the Assad regime.

• Expanding economic interaction and trade with the Assad regime will help Iranian leaders revitalize their own economy, especially if Arab states send investment and reconstruction funds to Syria. An influx of cash and financial resources into Syria will create opportunities for Iran to circumvent sanctions and leech funds from the Syrian economy. Such circumstances would also empower Iran to send more funds to its proxy and partner militias throughout Syria, further reinforcing its military presence.
• The regime seeks to secure an unbroken rail line from Iran, through Iraq, to Syria and Lebanon to facilitate trade with and additional material support to the Assad regime, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Palestinian militias. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian stated that the parties addressed removing obstacles to this transportation link during the visit.[6]
• The Raisi administration used the Syrian delegation’s visit to present a unified front against the presence of US and Turkish forces in Syria. Abdollahian and Mekdad condemned the presence of these forces in a joint conference on July 31.[7] CTP has closely followed coordinated efforts between Iran, Russia, and Assad to pressure the US to leave Syria since June 2023.[8]

Iranian Domestic and Political Affairs

This section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.

Iran and Belarus are discussing deepening bilateral military cooperation over the backdrop of their mutual support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Gharaei Ashtiani hosted and signed a military cooperation agreement with his Belarusian counterpart, Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin, in Tehran on July 31.[9] They may have discussed establishing Shahed kamikaze drone factories in Belarus to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine claimed that Iranian engineers traveled to Belarus in May 2023 to modify local factories to produce these drones for Russia.[10]

Iran exported a record high of around one million barrels of oil per day (bpd) to China since January 2023, which reflects deepening economic cooperation between the two countries.[11] Iranian oil exports to China have steadily risen since 2020, when Iran was selling around 325,000 bpd. These growing sales are part of the larger Iranian effort to strengthen strategic partnerships with other revisionist states, such as China and Russia, which CTP continues to assess and cover extensively in these updates. Iranian leaders seek such cooperation with these states to push back against US global influence and build a multipolar world order. Iran joining the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization on July 4 is similarly part of this effort.[12]

Iran could derive several benefits from increasing energy sales to China.

• Iranian leaders will likely use the increasing oil exports to help buoy their deteriorating economy and circumvent US sanctions. The Iranian regime relies heavily on energy sales to generate revenue and finance its annual budget. US sanctions have dramatically limited such sales since 2019, however.[13]
• Iranian leaders may obtain Chinese support in developing domestic infrastructure in exchange for some oil sales. An Iranian transportation official announced on July 8 that Iran is conducting preliminary negotiations involving China constructing roads connecting Tehran to the Caspian Sea in exchange for Iranian oil.[14] Developing this infrastructure would support the larger Iranian effort of developing the country into a regional and international transportation corridor.

[1] https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-753036

[2] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-20-2023-64b9d7ab38bc6

[3] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/18403741

[4] www.irna dot ir/news/85186070

[5] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-updates-may-3-2023

[6] www.irna dot ir/news/85186070

[7] www.irna dot ir/news/85186070

[8] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-28-2023

[9] http://www.defapress dot ir/fa/news/607168

[10] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-742605

[11] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/487358

[12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-5-2023

[13] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/24/us/politics/iran-sanctions.html

[14] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-7-2023