Iran Update, March 12, 2024

Mar 12, 2024 - ISW Press

Iran Update, March 12, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Elizabeth Volynsky-Lauzon, Anne McGill, Kathryn Tyson, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

Northern and Central Gaza Strip: The IDF 162nd Division continued to operate in the northern and central Gaza Strip.
Southern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias continued to conduct a deliberate defense of Hamad neighborhood, northern Khan Younis.
Political Negotiations: The Qatari foreign affairs minister said that Israel and Hamas are “nowhere near a deal” regarding a ceasefire deal and prisoner-for-hostage exchange.
IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani alluded to the need for Hamas to “negotiate firmly” in the ceasefire negotiations, possibly indicating support for Hamas’ maximalist position.
West Bank: IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani claimed that the Israeli fear of Palestinian operations in the West Bank “reached its peak” in the current Persian calendar year (March 2023-March 2024) during an interview with Iranian state media.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah launched over 100 rockets targeting Israeli forces in the Golan Heights.
The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure in Beqaa and Baalbek Governorates.
Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting Ben Gurion Airport in Lod, Israel.
Iraq and Syria: The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) assessed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will “almost certainly” resume attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria
Yemen: The Houthi movement launched two anti-ship missiles on March 11 that targeted a Singaporean-owned, Liberian-flagged merchant vessel in the Red Sea.
US CENTCOM confirmed that it conducted preemptive strikes targeting 18 Houthi anti-ship missiles and an unmanned underwater vessel in Houthi-controlled Yemen.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 162nd Division continued to operate in the northern and central Gaza Strip on March 12.[1] The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) located and destroyed rocket launchers that Palestinian fighters previously used to launch rockets into Israel.[2] Israeli forces directed an airstrike in the area targeting Palestinian fighters who had launched two rockets at them.[3]

A Palestinian activist separately reported sounds of clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters south of Gaza City on March 12.[4]

Palestinian militias continued to conduct a deliberate defense of Hamad neighborhood, northern Khan Younis, on March 12. Three IDF brigades have been clearing Hamad of Palestinian fighters and military infrastructure since March 3.[5] The IDF had intelligence that Palestinian fighters retreated from other areas in Khan Younis to hide in Hamad.[6] Israeli forces directed airstrikes to kill Palestinian cells and located weapons in buildings during clearing operations on March 12.[7] Four Palestinian militias claimed attacks targeting Israeli forces in Hamad using mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and other unspecified explosive devices.[8]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in other sectors of northern Khan Younis on March 12. The IDF Bislamach Brigade have killed over 100 Palestinian fighters by sniper fire, mortar and shell fire, and airstrikes over the past two weeks in Qarara, northern Khan Younis, and in eastern Khan Younis.[9] Israeli forces located infrastructure, weapons, combat equipment, and a drone launcher.[10] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters detonated an explosively-rigged tunnel and a house-borne improvised explosive device (HBIED) targeting Israeli forces in Qarara.[11] The Wall Street Journal published a map of the tunnel network in the Gaza Strip from 2014, which does not include any tunnels in Qarara.[12] The New York Times reported in January 2023 that the IDF now believes that there are more tunnels underneath the Gaza Strip than previously thought.[13]

The Qatari Foreign Affairs Minister said on March 12 that Israel and Hamas are “nowhere near a deal” regarding a ceasefire deal and prisoner-for-hostage exchange.[14] The minister also noted that Qatar is engaged in a “constructive” dialogue with Israel and Hamas. CIA Director William Burns said on March 12 that a potential ceasefire deal “is still a possibility” despite the difficult process of negotiations.[15] Hamas’ maximalist demands for a permanent ceasefire, return of displaced people, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces, and sufficient humanitarian aid do not align with Israeli plans to continue clearing operations in the Gaza Strip until Hamas is defeated.

Israeli media reported that Senior Hamas Political Bureau official Mohammad Nazzal told al Jazeera that ceasefire negotiations are ongoing.[16] Nazzal said that the talks ”had reached an impasse“ but that international mediators are continuing their work. He also accused Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of impeding progress on negotiations and affirmed that there will be no deal until Israel agrees to Hamas’ terms.

IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani alluded to the need for Hamas to “negotiate firmly” in the ceasefire negotiations, possibly indicating support for the maximalist position that Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh presented on March 10.[17]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant put forth the head of the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) General Intelligence Service, Majed Faraj, as a candidate to temporarily manage civilian life in the Gaza Strip.[18] Faraj is a member of Fatah‘s Revolutionary Council and considered a possible successor to PA President Mahmoud Abbas.[19] Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has consistently opposed the PA’s involvement in governing the Gaza Strip.[20] However, his post-war plan does not explicitly rule out the role for the PA.[21] Israel previously discussed turning to former PA security official Mohammad Dahlan for governance in the Gaza Strip.[22] Dahlan said in a November 2023 interview with Time that he would not participate in a future Palestinian government but that he would help rebuild the Palestinian political system.[23]

Israel reported that a Palestinian fighter launched mortars from the southern Gaza Strip into Israel on March 12.[24] Palestinian militias have not claimed the attack at the time of this writing. Israeli forces monitored the source of fire and directed an airstrike to target the perpetrator. The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting military infrastructure in the strip in retaliation for the attack.[25]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least five times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 11.[26] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades detonated an IED in the Psagot settlement on March 11.[27] An unspecified individual separately attempted to stab an Israeli civilian in Givat Ronen.[28]

Israeli forces detained 10 wanted individuals during operations across the West Bank on March 12.[29] The IDF said that Israeli forces detained PIJ fighter Mehdi Fayyad, who has conducted previous attacks on Israeli forces, according to the IDF.[30] Israeli forces also located four lathes for manufacturing weapons in Urif village south of Nablus.[31]

IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani claimed that the Israeli fear of Palestinian operations in the West Bank “reached its peak” in the current Persian calendar year (March 2023-March 2024) during an interview with Iranian state media on March 12.[32]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least 14 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 11.[33] Hezbollah launched over 100 rockets targeting Israeli forces in the Golan Heights.[34] This attack was one of the largest Hezbollah has conducted since the war began.

The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure in Beqaa and Baalbek Governorates, Lebanon, on March 11 and March 12, respectively.[35] The Baalbek Governorate is approximately 100 km north of the Israel-Lebanon border.[36] The IDF said that the strikes were in response to Hezbollah’s attacks targeting northern Israel. The IDF separately published a summary of its air campaign in Lebanon and Syria over the past five months.[37] The IDF reported that its attacks in northern Lebanon “harm Hezbollah’s air and ground capabilities as well as its top command.”

An unspecified Lebanese Hezbollah parliamentary source said that the group is “prepared for any expansion of hostilities” with Israel in a statement to al Araby on March 12.[38] The source said that “Hezbollah will not be silent about the Israeli attacks.” Hezbollah launched at least 60 rockets targeting an IDF site in the Golan Heights on February 26 in retaliation for the IDF’s only other airstrike near Baalbek.[39]

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah met with a delegation of Hamas officials in Beirut, Lebanon, on March 12.[40] Hamas’ Deputy Political Bureau leader for the Gaza Strip Khalil al Hayya led discussions on Hamas’ operations in the Gaza Strip as well as on the Israel-Hamas negotiations. Nasrallah and the Hamas delegation discussed the developments in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank as well as the ”multiple support fronts,” likely referring to the Iranian-backed attacks from Iraq, Syria, and Yemen targeting Israel.

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul Amir al Shammari discussed “security and training” cooperation with Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev in Baghdad on March 12, possibly as part of a Russian effort to supplant the United States as a security guarantor in Iraq.[41] Kutrashev has met with at least six Iraqi officials, including senior security leaders, since January 2024.[42] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia may be setting conditions to try to supplant the United States in anticipation of the United States reducing its military presence there.[43] Kutrashev previously told Russian media in January 2024 that Russia seeks to expand its “presence” in Iraq and “invest additional resources in areas related to security.”[44] The Iraqi Interior Ministry, which is largely controlled by the Iranian-backed Badr Organization, is responsible for domestic law enforcement and oversees the Federal Police.[45] Shammari is affiliated with the Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties—and previously served as the deputy commander of the Joint Operations Command for Iraq.[46]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting Ben Gurion Airport in Lod, Israel, on March 11.[47] The group described the attack as part of its “second phase of operations” to support Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.[48] CTP-ISW previously reported that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq appears to have refocused its attacks to target primarily Israel rather than US forces for the moment.[49] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has not attacked US forces since February 4 but has claimed 10 attacks targeting Israel during this same period.[50] It is unclear, however, how many of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s attacks targeting Israel have succeeded.

The Jordanian armed forces reportedly intercepted the Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s drone after it entered Jordanian airspace from Syria.[51] A Jordanian security official stated on March 12 that the Jordanian armed forces had located drone fragments near the city of Irbid near the Jordan-Syria border.[52]

Iraqi National Security Adviser Qasim al Araji claimed that ending the US-led international coalition mission in Iraq will not affect NATO’s mission in Iraq during a meeting with the Dutch, German, Italian, and NATO mission ambassadors to Iraq on March 11.[53] Washington and Baghdad began talks to evaluate the status of the US-led international coalition in Iraq in late January 2024.[54] Araji called for greater cooperation between the NATO Mission in Iraq and the Iraqi defense and interior ministries.[55] An Iraqi Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee member separately claimed on March 12 that the NATO Mission in Iraq does not present “a threat to Iraq’s security and stability” like the US-led international coalition allegedly does.[56]

The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) assessed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will “almost certainly” resume attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria.[57] The ODNI published its findings in the 2024 Annual Threat Assessment on March 11. These militias suspended their attacks targeting US forces following a one-way drone attack that killed three US servicemembers in northeastern Jordan in late January 2024.[58] IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Baghdad after the attack and instructed the militias to pause their attacks. Numerous Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have signaled in recent weeks that they will resume conducting attacks targeting US forces in the region.[59] The ODNI’s assessment is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are using US support for Israel in the current war as an excuse to attack US forces. The militias’ actual objective of these attacks is to advance Iran’s long-standing effort to erode US influence in the Middle East.[60] Iran and its Axis of Resistance will almost certainly continue their decades-long effort to expel US forces from the Middle East regardless of whether there is a ceasefire agreement in the Israel-Hamas war.

The ODNI assessed in its annual report on March 11 that Iran is not currently pursuing nuclear weapons.[61] The DNI stated specifically that Iran is not conducting the “key nuclear weapons-development activities” for a testable nuclear explosive. The DNI also stated that Iran will likely pursue further nuclear advancements to “build negotiating leverage” and in response to “additional sanctions, attacks, or censure against its nuclear program.”

Iran has continued to expand its nuclear program since 2021. Iran has produced enriched uranium metal at its uranium conversion facility in Esfahan.[62] Enriched uranium metal can be used to develop the core for nuclear weapons.[63] Iran has also stockpiled several significant quantities (or bombs’ worth) of highly enriched uranium, which it can use in a nuclear weapon.[64] Iran has additionally amassed a large stockpile of low-enriched uranium, which it can enrich to higher levels in a short period of time given its current enrichment capacity.[65] The graph below illustrates Iran’s current uranium stockpile, the number of significant quantities therein, and how quickly it can enrich those stockpiles to weapons-grade uranium:

Note: The above graph reflects the estimates reported by the International Atomic Energy Agency in its November 2023 verification and monitoring report.

The Houthi movement launched two anti-ship missiles on March 11 that targeted a Singaporean-owned, Liberian-flagged merchant vessel in the Red Sea.[66] US CENTCOM confirmed that the missiles did not impact the merchant vessel, Pinocchio.[67] The Houthi military spokesperson falsely claimed that the vessel is an “American ship.” The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reported an explosion near a vessel in the Red Sea on March 11.[68]

The Houthi military spokesperson said on March 11 that the group will escalate its military operations during Ramadan, which he called the “month of Jihad.”[69] The spokesperson was presumably referring to Houthi attacks targeting international shipping and Israel. Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi previously alluded to an expansion of attacks on March 7.[70]

US CENTCOM confirmed that it conducted preemptive strikes targeting 18 Houthi anti-ship missiles and an unmanned underwater vessel in Houthi-controlled Yemen on March 11.[71] CTP-ISW previously reported the preemptive strikes impacted around Ras Issa, al Urj, and Jabanah in Hudaydah Governorate on March 11.[72]

Western media reported on March 12 that the European Union is prepared to impose “new and significant measures” against Iran in response to reports that Iran may transfer ballistic missiles to Russia.[73] Reuters reported that EU leaders expressed concern in a draft conclusion for their upcoming March 21-22 summit that “Iran may transfer ballistic missiles and related technology to Russia.” Reuters also reported that the European Union in the draft text called on unspecified third parties to cease “providing material support to Russia” and that the European Union “is prepared to respond swiftly. . . with new and significant measures against Iran,” including further sanctions.

Iranian sources told Reuters on February 21 that Iran provided hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to Russia in early January 2024.[74] The Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson said on February 21 that Ukraine does not possess any information confirming that Iran has transferred missiles to Russia.[75] The US National Security Council spokesperson similarly said on February 22 that the United States has yet to confirm that Iran has transferred missiles to Russia.[76]

The United States and Bahrain jointly sanctioned several Iran-based individuals on March 12 for supporting the Iranian-backed al Ashtar Brigades.[77] The US Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) noted that the sanctions are meant to demonstrate “the critical role that the Iranian regime plays in providing support to Al-Ashtar Brigades.” OFAC and Bahrain sanctioned the following Iran-based individuals:

Hussein Ahmad Abdallah Ahmad Hussein Al Dammami for facilitating “lethal aid” into Bahrain to support the al Ashtar Brigades
Al Ashtar Brigades member Ali Abdulnabi Ahmed Ebrahim M Alshofa for facilitating “lethal aid”
Al Ashtar Brigades member Hasan Ahmed Radhi Husain Sarhan for “plotting terrorist operations” in Bahrain
Al Ashtar Brigades financier Isa Saleh Isa Mohamed Salman for involvement in money transfers

The al Ashtar Brigades is an Iranian-backed Shia militant group operating in Bahrain.[78] The US State Department previously designated the al Ashtar Brigades as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in 2018.[79]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reiterated on March 12 his call for Muslim countries to cut political and economic ties with Israel.[80] Khamenei also reiterated his calls for Muslim countries to help Palestinians. Khamenei has repeatedly called on Muslim states to impose an international embargo on Israel since the Israel-Hamas war began.[81] Khamenei further expressed his desire for the Axis of Resistance to destroy the Israeli state.

[1] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1767463953393647701

[2] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1767463955075604850

[3] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1767463956694667541

[4] https://t.me/hamza20300/221992

[5] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1764188165642805459; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-3-2024

[6] https://www.idf dot il/184023

[7] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1767463943335756244; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1767463953393647701

[8] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/5998; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/5997; https://t.me/sarayaps/17558; https://t.... https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4167

[9] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1767498402181357734

[10] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1767498402181357734

[11] https://t.me/sarayaps/17559

[12] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/israel-hamas-war-biden/card/map-shows-l...

[13] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/16/us/politics/israel-gaza-tunnels.html

[14] https://twitter.com/BeckyCNN/status/1767554524107948037

[15] https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news-03-1...

[16] https://twitter.com/kann_news/status/1767413698128126214?s=20

[17] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/656593 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/12/22/3053987/ ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-11-2024

[18] https://www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/politic/720623/; https://jcpa dot org/the-battle-for-succession-in-the-palestinian-authority/

[19] https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/majed_faraj/

[20] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/11/12/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news...

[21] https://www.axios.com/2024/02/23/netanyahu-gaza-war-palestinian-authorit...

[22] https://www.mako dot co.il/news-columns/2023_q4/Article-6c8738498209c81026.htm?sCh=31750a2610f26110&pId=1714799902

[23] https://time.com/6337833/mohammed-dahlan-exclusive-palestine-israel/

[24] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1767463950759694632

[25] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1767463950759694632

[26] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/5992 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/5993 ; http...

[27] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/5994

[28] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1767592147199397961

[29] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1767487204320837833

[30] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1767487204320837833

[31] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1767487206430564620

[32] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/656593 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/12/22/3053987/

[33] https://t.me/mmirleb/2576 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1767443727268577434 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/2579 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/2584 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/2590 , https://t.me...

[34] https://t.me/mmirleb/2576; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1767443... com/israel-news/2024-03-12/ty-article/idf-strikes-hezbollah-stronghold-deep-in-lebanon-100-rockets-fired-at-northern-israel/0000018e-3263-df45-afaf-3f7775df0000

[35] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1767515424416031095; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1767315659862536244/

[36] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1767515424416031095; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1767315659862536244/

[37] https://www.idf dot il/185274

[38] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B4%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9?blockId=block_114345

[39] https://t.me/mmirleb/2283; https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1762... https://t.me/C_Military1/46421

[40] https://t.me/QudsN/380843; https://twitter.com/kann_news/status/1767436...

[41] https://ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?Key=1112567

[42] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-20-2024;

https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-6-2024

[43] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-20-2024

[44] https://tass dot com/politics/1737141

[45] https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-pract...

[46] https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/igphoto/2002423918/;

https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-3-2023

[47] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/988

[48] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/988