Iran Update, March 12, 2025

 

Iran Update, March 12, 2025

Annika Ganzeveld, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Siddhant Kishore, Johanna Moore, George Ekmekjian, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

The risk of sectarian violence from Syria spilling into Iraq is increasing. A newly formed Shia group called the Ya Ali Popular Formations announced on March 11 that it has begun to pursue Jabhat al Nusra members and supporters around Baghdad.[1] The group is likely referring to Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) members and supporters, given that Jabhat al Nusra was the predecessor group to HTS. The group then posted a video purportedly of masked individuals physically threatening Syrian nationals in a bakery in Baghdad.[2] The group expressed hope that others would emulate these actions throughout Iraq.[3] This comes after the group stated on March 9 that it would “pursue” and “expel” Syrians who support “[HTS] terrorism against the Alawite people and minorities.”[4] Social media accounts claimed that the group is affiliated with either the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) or the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).[5] CTP-ISW cannot verify these claims at the time of this writing. It is not clear exactly what end state the Ya Ali Popular Formations seeks to generate based on its statements thus far. The group may, in fact, seek to stoke sectarian conflict directly.

The Ya Ali Popular Formations’ activity comes at a particularly tense moment in the Iraqi political scene. Sunni parties have tried to relitigate their position in the Iraqi political order in recent weeks, specifically calling for the implementation of long-held political demands. Prominent Shia leaders, including former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, have responded harshly, using sectarian rhetoric and conflating Sunni parties with extremist groups.[6] Maliki implicitly accused Sunnis of trying to overthrow the Iraqi federal government.[7] The Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada secretary general, Abu Alaa al Walai, similarly compared some Sunni actors to the Islamic State after these actors criticized the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court for blocking certain legislation.[8] The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court suspended the implementation of the General Amnesty Law on February 4.[9] The General Amnesty Law grants amnesty to many Iraqis, including many Sunnis who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.[10] Several notable Sunnis, including former Parliament Speaker Mohamed al Halbousi protested the Federal Supreme Court’s initial decision.[11]

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani reportedly withdrew the PMF Service and Retirement Law from the Iraqi parliamentary agenda on March 11.[12] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[13] The PMF Service and Retirement Law would reportedly require around 3,500 PMF leaders, including Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, to retire due to their age.[14] Sudani likely withdrew the law from the parliamentary agenda because he opposes Fayyadh’s removal and seeks to prevent political deadlock.[15] Parliament has failed to convene in recent weeks because some Iranian-aligned parties have boycotted Parliament over the PMF Service and Retirement Law.[16] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s (AAH) Sadiqoun Bloc and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law Coalition announced in February 2025 that they would boycott Parliament until the law is included on the parliamentary agenda, for example.[17] AAH and Maliki both seek to remove Fayyadh.

Iraqi media reported that the Iraqi federal government seeks to replace the PMF Service and Retirement Law with a law that would restructure the PMF.[18] It is unclear who or what group in the Iraqi federal government is leading the effort to restructure the PMF. Iraqi media reported on March 12 that the PMF restructuring law would “confirm” former Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi’s 2019 decree that required the PMF to integrate into the Iraqi armed forces.[19] The 2019 decree declared that “all Popular Mobilization Forces are to operate as an indivisible part of the armed forces and be subject to the same regulations.”[20] The efforts to restructure the PMF come as the United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve and disarm the PMF and reportedly threatened to sanction PMF leaders.[21] The Iraqi federal government may calculate that it could prevent US sanctions if it takes meaningful steps toward integrating the PMF into the Iraqi security establishment. These efforts have thus far proven fruitless, however, as Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that control units in the PMF have “complete[ly] refused” to disarm and integrate into the Iraqi armed forces.[22]

Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri expressed support for the PMF restructuring law and allowing Sudani to extend Fayyadh’s term as PMC chairman during an interview on March 11.[23] Ameri’s support for the PMF restructuring law and Fayyadh is notable given recent reports that Sudani may ally with Ameri, Fayyadh, and Iraqi Labor and Social Affairs Minister Ahmed al Asadi in the October 2025 parliamentary elections.[24]

Unidentified actors conducted a drone strike targeting a Turkish base in Ninewa Province, Iraq, on March 12.[25] Iraqi media reported that Turkish forces intercepted the drone before it reached Zilkan base. This attack comes as Iran has appeared increasingly frustrated with Turkish influence in Syria and Turkish regional policy.[26] Iranian state media circulated reports that Turkey interfered in Syrian affairs and condoned the killing of Alawites.[27] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have historically attacked Zilkan base and other Turkish positions in northern Iraq to impose a cost on Turkey for its regional activities.[28]

The Houthis announced that they will resume attacks on international shipping.[29] This announcement highlights the threat that the Houthis continue to pose to global commerce around strategic maritime routes. The Houthis announced that their forthcoming attacks will target Israeli vessels, which will likely include vessels that are traveling to and from Israel or affiliated with Israeli entities. The Houthis may attack US vessels as well, given the close relationship between the United States and Israel.

Houthi attacks on international shipping will continue to impose an economic toll on the United States and broader international community. Shipping costs around the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden increased significantly after the Houthis began attacking vessels there in October 2023. These costs have yet to return to their pre-October 2023 levels, even though the Houthis have conducted no attacks since November 2024.[30] The resumption of Houthi attacks will likely raise shipping costs further, as transit around Yemen becomes riskier.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected the possibility of nuclear negotiations with the United States on March 12, marking the third such instance in recent weeks.[31] Khamenei accused the United States of trying to deceive and weaken Iran.[32] Khamenei asserted that Iran cannot secure sanctions relief through talks in response to unspecified domestic calls for engagement with the United States. That Khamenei has reiterated this rejection of negotiations frequently in recent weeks may indicate that he is specifically responding to pro-negotiations elements in the regime. His comments come as senior UAE official Anwar Gargash delivered a message from US President Donald Trump to Iran on March 12.[33] The message called for negotiations, according to Trump.[34]

The Iranian defense minister paid an official visit to Belarus, highlighting the burgeoning strategic relationship between the two countries. Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Victor Khrenin in Minsk on March 12.[35] Nasir Zadeh lauded Tehran-Minsk cooperation against “unilateralism” and signed a defense memorandum of understanding. This memorandum likely related to defense industrial cooperation, given that is one of the primary responsibilities of the Iranian defense ministry.[36] This visit follows other recent meetings between senior Iranian and Belarusian officials held multiple in late 2024.[37] These meetings come as Iran and Belarus signed a strategic cooperation agreement and Iran began working to build a military drone factory in Belarus in order to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: The risk of sectarian violence spilling from Syria into Iraq is increasing. A newly formed Iraqi Shia group called for attacks and harassment targeting HTS members and supporters.
• Iraq: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani reportedly withdrew the PMF Service and Retirement Law from the Iraqi parliamentary agenda.
• Yemen: The Houthis announced that they will resume attacks on international shipping, highlighting the threat that they pose to global commerce around strategic maritime routes.
• Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected the possibility of nuclear negotiations with the United States, marking the third such instance in recent weeks.
• Iran: The Iranian defense minister paid an official visit to Belarus, highlighting the burgeoning strategic relationship between the two countries.

Syria

The Syrian Constitutional Committee is expected to present an initial draft of the constitution to interim Syrian President Ahmed al Shara on March 12. Unspecified sources cited by al Jazeera claimed that the draft constitution will be founded in Islamic jurisprudence, define the separation of power, including an independent judiciary, and emphasize transitional justice to hold former Assad regime members accountable for crimes committed under the Assad regime.[39] Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara appointed seven Syrians to draft a non-permanent “constitutional declaration” that Shara himself will approve.[40] Shara's control over the creation of the constitutional declaration leaves Syrian citizens few instruments through which they can influence the direction of the Syrian transitional government beyond the committee’s promises that it will consider the recommendations of the National Dialogue Conference.

Former Assad regime members have continued to attack interim Syrian government forces in western Syria since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on March 11. Interim Syrian government forces deployed to Barmaia, Tartous Province, on March 12 to secure the area.[41] Syrian media later reported that former Assad regime members killed nine Syrian soldiers in Barmaia on March 12.[42] Former Assad regime members also attacked an interim government fuel truck convoy between Latakia and Baniyas.[43]

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) resumed attacks targeting the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria despite the SDF-Syrian interim government ceasefire. The SNA shelled SDF positions along the M4 highway in Aleppo and Hasakah provinces on March 11 and 12.[44] The SDF signed the ceasefire agreement with the interim government in Damascus at roughly 2000 local time on March 10.[45] The SNA briefly paused attacks on SDF positions in northeastern Syria after the SDF and the Syrian interim government agreed to a ceasefire.[46] Turkey, however, continued to strike SDF positions between March 10 and 12, despite the ceasefire.[47]

The SNA attacks on the SDF suggests that Syrian interim government has limited control over the SNA. The SNA started integrating its forces into the Syrian Interim Defense Ministry in late December 2024.[48] The absorption of the SNA into the new Syrian army therefore obliges the SNA to uphold the ceasefire. SNA’s violation of the ceasefire indicates that the interim government has not yet integrated the SNA factions as individuals or alternatively has allowed SNA factions to integrate into the Defense Ministry as blocs. Integrating SNA elements as military blocs within the defense ministry allows the SNA to preserve its original command structure. The SNA units will therefore remain loyal to their respective political leaders and not necessarily follow the Defense Ministry chain of command. Allowing SNA elements to exist as unified blocs creates difficulties for Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara to effectively control these units and consolidate power in SNA-controlled areas of northeastern Syria.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz reiterated Israel’s intent to protect the Syrian Druze community during a visit to Israeli forces deployed in the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) zone on March 11.[49] Katz visited an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) position located on top of the Syrian side of Mount Hermon.[50] Katz stated that the Syrian side of Mount Hermon is one of the three Israel-designated ”security zones” inside the Syrian territory. Mount Hermon is a strategic site as it offers observation into both southern Syrian plain and Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. The IDF seized the Syrian side of Mount Hermon on December 8 and has since launched ground operations to destroy military sites in southern Syria.[51] A southern Syria-based journalist reported that the IDF searched a residence in Jabata al Khashab, Quneitra Province, on March 11.[52]

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
• Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent

Iraqi media, citing Kurdish sources, reported on March 12 that Turkish aircraft struck Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) positions around Amedi District, Duhok Province, Iraqi Kurdistan.[53]

The Iraqi federal government repatriated 161 Iraqi families from al Hol camp in northeastern Syria on March 12.[54] A camp administrator told Iraqi media that US forces escorted the buses carrying the families to the Iraq-Syria border, where the families would be transferred to al Jadaa camp in Ninewa Province. This development comes after the Iraqi Displacement and Migration Ministry announced on March 5 that Iraq would not repatriate Iraqi citizens from al Hol camp for four to six months and would focus on rehabilitating the approximately 3,500 Iraqi citizens in al Jadaa camp.[55] The Displacement and Migration Ministry spokesperson said in February 2025 that the Iraqi federal government could suspend repatriation from al Hol camp due to a lack of US funding resulting from the USAID funding freeze.[56]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

See topline section.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
• Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Iran, Russia, and China concluded the trilateral “Maritime Security Belt 2025” exercise in the Indian Ocean on March 12.[57] Iranian Artesh Navy and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy vessels participated in a parade along the Russian and Chinese vessels. Iranian, Russian, and Chinese special operations forces practiced recapturing a hijacked vessel during the exercise.[58]

The Iranian rial depreciated from 923,300 rials to one US dollar on March 11 to 926,800 rials to one US dollar on March 12.[59]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

[1] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/138168

[2] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/138145

[3] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/138168

[4] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1898801700833476918

[5] https://x.com/ismaelalwaily/status/1899574024403046884 ; https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1899791628681859308

[6] https://www.aljazeera dot com/features/2011/12/28/rivals-say-maliki-leading-iraq-to-civil-war

[7] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/010220253

[8] https://x.com/aboalaa_alwalae/status/1886908906062123310

[9] https://almadapaper dot net/395212/

[10] https://www.newarab dot com/news/iraqi-parliament-debates-controversial-amendment-amnesty-law

[11] https://x.com/AlHaLboosii/status/1886773790987763821 ; https://almadapaper dot net/395220/ ; https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/823206/%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D8%A9-%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%88%D9%83-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9

[12] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A8-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces

[14] https://almadapaper dot net/398498/

[15] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/825332/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%8A ;

https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5121064-iraqi-pm-suspends-popular-mobilization-forces-retirement-law

[16] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A9

[17] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/825332/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%8A

[18] https://almadapaper dot net/398498/

[19] https://almadapaper dot net/398498/

[20] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2019/7/1/iraqi-pm-decree-curbs-powers-of-iranian-allied-militias ;

https://www.facebook.com/Adil.Abd.Al.Mahdi1/posts/2555597017838156

[21] https://almadapaper dot net/389291/ ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-10-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B6%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA

[22] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%87%D9%85

[23] https://t.me/platformB/3498

[24] https://iraqtoday dot com/ar/news/88630/%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B2%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A?latest

[25] https://baghdadtoday dot news/269731-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%85%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A6.-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B6%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9.html

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-11-2025

[27] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6401569/

[28] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/muqawamas-duel-turkey

[29] http://x.com/army21ye/status/1899563866599678368 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1899883401034842138

[30] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/756ca769315d4b879ca7fdd6bd4a82be ; https://www.drewry.co.uk/supply-chain-advisors/supply-chain-expertise/world-container-index-assessed-by-drewry

see graphic below

[31] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=59652

; https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27964 ; https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/speech-content?id=59631 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/731792 ; https://www.isna dot ir/news/1403122013688; https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/854920

[32] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=59652

[33] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6406368

[34] https://www.axios.com/2025/03/07/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-letter

[35] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6406152

[36] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Pivot-to-Offense-How-Iran-Is-Adapting-for-Modern-Conflict-and-Warfare.pdf (P. 20)

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-12-2024

[37] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/683452;

https://eng.belt dot by/partner_news/view/belarus-air-force-chief-meets-iranian-commanders-to-discuss-defense-ties-160327-2024/;

https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6280330

[38] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/607393;

https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-742605 ;

[39] https://www.aljazeera dot net/news/2025/3/12/%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B2-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86

[40] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/565

[41] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/125030

[42] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/138219

[43] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1899874740317151301 ; https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/120840

[44] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/138163 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1899734321272910201

[45] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/593

[46] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025

[47] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/138153 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1899585841053245830 ;

 https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1899796978529136750

[48] https://x.com/AljawhariS25970/status/1873682886261391599 ; https://syrianobserver dot com/security/sharaa-meets-leaders-of-military-factions-agree-to-integrate-them-under-ministry-of-defense.html

[49] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/atop-peak-of-mt-hermon-katz-says-syrian-leader-will-see-indefinite-idf-deployment/

[50] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/atop-peak-of-mt-hermon-katz-says-syrian-leader-will-see-indefinite-idf-deployment/

[51] https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/article-832540 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-8-2024

[52] https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1899576444759552206

[53] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1191421

[54] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%80%D9%85%D8%B9/161-%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1 ; https://x.com/NPA_Arabic/status/1899730523091521906 ; https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/829339/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF-160-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7

[55] https://www.rudaw dot net/english/middleeast/iraq/050320251

[56] https://www.rudaw dot net/english/middleeast/iraq/150220252

[57] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/12/22/3274207

[58] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/12/22/3274027

[59] https://www.tgju dot org/profile/price_dollar_rl