Iran Update, March 29, 2023

Iran Update, March 29, 2023

Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, Zachary Coles, Johanna Moore, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, and Riley Bailey

March 29, 2023, 5:00 pm ET

Contributors: Anya Caraiani, Aleeshyah Lightfoot, and James Motamad

The Iran Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian alluded to Iranian involvement in the recent attacks on US bases in Syria during his meeting with Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov in Moscow, Russia on March 29.[2] Abdollahian rejected US reports that Iranian drones were involved in the March 23 attack on a US base in Syria but added that Iran responded “decisively and clearly to the American side” in “the events that took place east of the Euphrates.” The US conducted airstrikes on at least two Iranian-backed militant positions in eastern Syria on March 23 in retaliation for a drone attack on a US base near Hasakah.[3] Likely Iranian-backed militants conducted a rocket attack on the US base at the Green Village base in eastern Syria on March 24, likely in retaliation for the US airstrikes, as CTP previously assessed. Amir Abdollahian’s rejection of Iranian drone involvement in the recent attacks was likely a reference to the March 23 drone attack on the Hasaka base. His second statement about the decisive "response" was likely a reference to the Iranian's separate retaliatory rocket attack on the Green Village base, as CTP previously assessed.[4] Amir Abdollahian’s use of the Persian word “pasokh” or “respond” suggests that he may be claiming responsibility for the rocket attacks on the Green Village base.

Amir Abdollahian also announced that Iran and Russia are finalizing a comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement, that Iran has made progress in becoming a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and noted increased economic cooperation between the two countries. Amir Abdollahian did not deny recent reports about Russo-Iranian cybersurveillance cooperation and described such cooperation as “defensive.” Amir Abdollahian emphasized the need to maintain security in the Caucasus without upsetting the region’s current geopolitical balance and agreed to discuss resolving regional tensions between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Iran in upcoming talks in Tehran. Iran previously engaged Turkey to address Iran’s security concerns about Azerbaijan on March 17 and 20, and could be likewise consulting Russia on these concerns.[5] Amir Abdollahian also expressed support for a ceasefire in Yemen and promoted an intra-Yemeni dialogue to end the conflict. Iran reportedly agreed to stop encouraging cross-border Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and to halt weapons shipments to its proxy in Yemen as part of the March 10 agreements with Saudi Arabia, as CTP previously reported.[6] Lavrov praised the Iran-Saudi March 10 decision to normalize relations. Lavrov also extended support for the Hormuz Peace Endeavor, a longstanding Iranian proposal for a regional security dialogue forum and confidence-building-and-security-measures between the littoral states of the Persian Gulf. Both ministers emphasized the need for resuming the stalled nuclear negotiations between Iran and the West.

NOTE: The following text will also appear in The Institute for the Study of War’s (ISW) March 29 Ukraine Update.

Lavrov promoted Iran’s “Hormoz Peace Plan” for security in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman and stated that the Kremlin demands an immediate return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[7] Abdollahian and Lavrov likely discussed continued Russian efforts to procure Iranian weapon systems for use in Ukraine and a finalized agreement for Russia to provide Iran with Su-35 attack aircraft.[8] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on March 29 that Iranian Pouya Air Transport resumed regular flights between Tehran and Moscow on March 13 likely to support weapons transfers.[9] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported that Iranian officials are planning to deliver Shahed-131 drones to Wagner Group personnel and that Wagner personnel have started training to operate the drones, although ISW has not observed confirmation that Wagner Group personnel have used Iranian-made drones in Ukraine.[10] ISW previously assessed that Russia is relying on Iran for military and technological support in Ukraine and that some Iranian personnel are likely in Ukraine directly supporting Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure.[11] Iran is likely attempting to solidify a bilateral security relationship with Russia in which the two are more equal partners and will likely increase weapons transfers to Russia in pursuit of this goal.

The Raisi administration’s efforts to stabilize the economy in recent weeks appear to have failed. The regime temporarily stabilized the value of the Iranian rial between February 26 and March 16.[12] The rial has depreciated approximately 16 percent since March 16, however, reaching 538,500 rials to one US dollar on March 29.[13] This depreciation indicates that the government’s previous economic solutions—namely injecting hard currency into the economy—were insufficient to stabilize the Iranian rial and economy for a protracted period of time.[14] The government’s unwillingness to adopt meaningful reforms—such as limiting parastatal organizations’ control of the economy—leaves it with very few economic solutions and forces it to announce policies that have the appearance of meaningful change but will likely not improve economic conditions.

President Ebrahim Raisi announced temporary economic solutions on March 29 that are unlikely to alleviate Iran’s economic problems in the long term.[15] Raisi ordered First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber to form a working group to “prevent decisions that increase inflation” during a cabinet meeting on March 29.[16] Raisi previously tasked Mokhber with forming an economic working group on February 1 after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei described Mokhber as bearing a specific responsibility for the Iranian economy in a speech on January 30, as CTP previously reported, although it remains unclear what this working group accomplished, if anything, within this timeframe.[17] Raisi thus likely announced the formation of a new working group on March 29 to publicly portray his administration as proactively attempting to resolve Iran’s economic challenges instead of meaningfully providing an economic solution. Raisi additionally called on Education Minister Yousef Nouri [18] This directive is a response to nationwide teacher protests on March 28, indicating that the Raisi administration is prioritizing addressing immediate economic grievances among discontented segments of the population instead of pursuing long-term economic policies that will benefit the The Social Security Organization similarly announced on March 2 that it would distribute new year's payments to retirees--many of whom have organized demonstrations to protest[19][20]

Source: Bonbast.com

Some regime officials are increasingly advocating for a social pressure campaign to enforce the mandatory hijab law. Khorasan Razavi Province Supreme Leader Representative Hojjat ol Eslam Ahmad Alamolhoda called on the Iranian people to intervene in incidents of “indecency,” likely referencing mandatory veiling standards, during a speech on March 29.[21] Alamolhoda acknowledged that citizens who confront “indecency” may be ridiculed on social media but stated that “a true believer is someone who is not afraid of sacrificing his reputation, position, and wealth.”[22] Alamolhoda previously emphasized on March 17 that mandatory veiling should be enforced with “the effort of the people.”[23] Iranian authorities have continued to seal multiple establishments where shop keepers or restaurant owners failed to confront unveiled female customers.[24] Regime officials may be stressing the public’s role in enforcing the hijab law in response to some Iranian women’s regular defiance of this law in major urban areas.[25] Women who defy the hijab law appear to do so independently, an uncoordinated act of anti-regime defiance that Iranian authorities are unable to preempt. Iranian officials  to coopt pro-regime loyalists to enforce mandatory veiling to prevent more women from openly defying the hijab law. It is far from clear if a collective punishment model to enforce mandatory veiling standards will succeed, however, and such efforts may further entrench societal divisions and anti-regime sentiments. Social media users have recently circulated videos of individuals confronting those reprimanding unveiled women, a trendline that may continue in the coming weeks.[26]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian alluded to Iranian involvement in the recent attacks on US bases in Syria during his meeting with Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov in Moscow, Russia.
• President Ebrahim Raisi announced temporary economic solutions on March 29 that will likely not alleviate Iran’s economic problems in the long term.
• Some regime officials are increasingly advocating for a social pressure campaign to enforce the mandatory hijab law.
• At least three protests occurred in three cities across two provinces in Iran.
• Iran cancelled its contracts with the Assad regime to rehabilitate two power stations in Aleppo and Hama provinces.
• Unidentified militants gunned down a Shia family in Al Khalis district, Diyala Province.
• The Iraqi Wisdom Movement party and the Coordination Framework – a loose coalition of pro-Iranian political parties – are negotiating an agreement to remove judges from Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) according to a statement given to Iraqi news outlet Al Mada.

Internal Security and Protest Activity

At least three protests occurred in three cities across two provinces on March 29. CTP assesses with moderate to high confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Hamedan City, Hamedan Province[27]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Taxi drivers
• Notes: Strike and protest

Haft Tappeh, Khuzestan Province[28]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Haft Tappeh Sugarcane Factory workers

Shoushtar, Khuzestan Province[29]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retirees

Economic Affairs

IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported an increase in Iran’s crude oil production from January 2023 on March 29. Tasnim claimed that Iran is currently producing 2.65 million barrels per day, over 20,000 barrels more than January of this year.[30]

External Security and Military Affairs

IRGC Spokesperson Brigadier General Ramezan Sharif described ongoing political events in Israel as a “golden opportunity” for Palestinians to destabilize the country on March 28. Sharif reiterated the regime’s support for Palestine.[31]

Iran cancelled its contracts with the Assad regime to rehabilitate two power stations in Aleppo and Hama provinces on March 13. Shaam Network and Enab Baladi reported that work stalled on the powerplants after the Iranian company Pemanir refused to accept payment for the $115 million contract in raw phosphate, as the Syrian government had previously proposed.[32] Al Araby al Jadeed reported that anonymous Pemanir officials said the refusal stemmed from the changing price of phosphate.[33] The price in US dollars for a metric ton of Phosphate rocks, however, has risen by more than 25% to over $322 since the agreement was signed in October of 2021.[34] Al Araby al Jadeed claimed the true reason for Pemanir cancelling the contract is a larger Iranian pivot to reconsider its investments with the Syrian government after recent developments on the Assad regime normalizing ties with Iran’s regional adversaries, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.[35]

Eye of Euphrates reported that a large number of IRGC Quds Force and Iranian-backed militia leaders met in Al Mayadin, Deir ez Zor Province on March 29.[36] The officials reportedly discussed methods of mitigating operational security failures and responding to recent US airstrikes on Iranian-backed militia positions in Deir ez Zor province.[37] US forces struck the positions on March 23 and 24 to retaliate for Iranian-backed militants conducting a kamikaze drone attack on US forces in northeast Syria on March 23, as CTP previously reported.[38] The March 29 meeting allegedly included a discussion of how to identify local groups in SDF-held territory on the eastern side of the Euphrates that would attack US positions.[39] Eye of Euphrates claimed the meeting included a senior Lebanese Hezbollah commander for eastern Syria, local Fatemiyoun commanders, IRGC Quds Force Deir ez Zor Commander Hajj Abbas, and several other senior Axis of Resistance local officials.[40] CTP cannot verify the accuracy of Eye of Euphrates’ reporting, and no other local media sources have corroborated the story. Such a meeting is nonetheless plausible and supported by prior reporting from CTP about IRGC Quds Force officials meeting with local officials to solve operational security issues on March 27.[41]

Unidentified militants gunned down a Shia family in Al Khalis district, Diyala Province on March 29.[42] Al Araby reported the militants burned down a local hut to distract from the attack.[43] The Al Rafaidain International Center for Justice and Human Rights, a local non-profit organization, claimed that Iranian-backed militants conducted the attack, while a Telegram channel affiliated with Shia militia Asaib Ahl al Haq referred to the incident as a terrorist attack perpetrated by ISIS.[44] Diyala-based Twitter sources blamed the March 29 attack and other recent violent incidents—including the February 20 massacre in Al Khalis district likely perpetrated by Badr-affiliated militants—on Iranian-backed Shia militias in an act of genocide against the local Sunni population.[45] As CTP has previously stated, sectarian conflict in Diyala presents an opportunity for ISIS to establish itself as a security guarantor for Sunnis in the province.[46]

The Iraqi Wisdom Movement party and the Coordination Framework – a loose coalition of pro-Iranian political parties – are negotiating an agreement to remove judges from Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) according to a statement given to Iraqi news outlet Al Mada.[47] A Wisdom Movement official, Fahd al Jubouri, inaccurately claimed that IHEC failed to prevent election fraud in 2021. Jubouri announced that the Commission’s judges will be replaced with “experts” under the new agreement. IHEC is an independent government organization that conducts election oversight and issues rulings on election fraud, vote counting, and procedural violations.[48] Iraq’s Parliament determined in 2019 that IHEC’s Board of Commissioners will consist of independent judges to preserve election integrity in response to demands from Tishreen Movement protesters.[49] It is unclear at this time how this restructuring will impact Iraq’s election integrity.

[1] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85069068

[2] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85069068

[3] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-24-2023

[4] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-24-2023

[5] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-20-2023#_edncede6d00160f47aa847bd5aa9aa06275ref35

[6] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-13-2023#_edn44e96ebe12f11e437b3733155f66a6f5ref56; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-16-2023

[7] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/01/09/2873132; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85069158

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2023; https://twitter.com/IrnaEnglish/status/1634481569300709377

[9] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/03/29/iran-ta-rf-posylyuyut-spivrobitnycztvo/

[10] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/03/29/iran-ta-rf-posylyuyut-spivrobitnycztvo/

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021323

[12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-27-2023;

https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-16-2023

[13] https://bonbast dot com/

[14] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-2-2023

[15] https://www dot irna dot ir/news/85069076

[16] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85069076

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-crisis-update-february-1-2023;

https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-january-30-2023

[18] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85069076

[20] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-2-2023

[21] https://t dot co/wUd4RjPfoh

[22] https://t dot co/wUd4RjPfoh

[23] https://www.farsnews dot ir/razavi/news/14011226000392

[24] https://t dot co/jVOwm1u419

[25] https://twitter.com/Javanan_mashh/status/1640848166328074240?cxt=HHwWgICwxdatu8UtAAAA

[26] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1641139339697455127?s=20

[27] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1641080207552413696?cxt=HHwWgICwsaDwpMYtAAAA; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1641082142242353163?cxt=HHwWlsC9-e7gpcYtAAAA; https://twitter.com/javanane_hmd/status/1641047884010332164?cxt=HHwWiIC9neOWlsYtAAAA

[28] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1641097665453719552?cxt=HHwWgIC88bforMYtAAAA; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1641003129985462273?cxt=HHwWgsCz4d_pgcYtAAAA; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1640999780418568194?cxt=HHwWhIC-xeOmgMYtAAAA; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1641000017933529088?cxt=HHwWgMCzlc20gMYtAAAA; https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1641028891119681536?cxt=HHwWgIC8lZ_FjcYtAAAA

[29] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1641008629745700871?s=20; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1641028149642182661?cxt=HHwWioC23YqajcYtAAAA

[30] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/01/09/2872956

[31] http://sahebkhabar dot ir/news/59409788

[32] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/archives/633311; https://shaam dot org/news/syria-news/shrkh-iyranyh-trfdh-msuwl-ykshf-tfasyl-tathr-tahyl-mhth-mhrdh

[33] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/economy/%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%86%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B0-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A9

[34] https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/5d903e848db1d1b83e0ec8f744e55570-0350012021/related/CMO-Pink-Sheet-March-2023.pdf

[35] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/economy/%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%86%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B0-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A9; https://amwaj dot media/media-monitor/syria-s-assad-continues-normalization-push-with-gulf-arab-states

[36] https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/ar/news/2023/03/29/8088

[37] https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/ar/news/2023/03/29/8088

[38] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-24-2023; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-27-2023

[39] https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/ar/news/2023/03/29/8088

[40] https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/ar/news/2023/03/29/8088

[41] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-28-2023

[42] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A3%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AD%D9%88-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%88%D9%84%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9

[43] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A3%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9

[44] https://twitter.com/Hanan3Abdulatif/status/1641121626929479682; https://t.me/sabreenS1/72815

[45] https://twitter.com/mahmoud64710503/status/1641089736424009734; https://twitter.com/linaassil_assil/status/1641107314361999360; https://twitter.com/Hanan3Abdulatif/status/1641121626929479682; https://twitter.com/salehksaj/status/1641089155366019073

[46] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-10-2023

[47] https://almadapaper dot net/view.php?cat=286429

[48] https://ihec dot iq/%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%a6%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a7%d8%ad%d8%b2%d8%a7%d8%a8-%d9%88%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%86%d8%b8%d9%8a%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%8a%d8%a7%d8%b3%d9%8a%d8%a9/

[49] https://iraq.un.org/en/139735-independent-high-electoral-commission-ihec-fact-sheet-2-iraq-elections-2021