Iran Update, March 3, 2025

 

Iran Update, March 3, 2025

Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Avery Borens, Parker Hempel, Maryam Sadr, Bailey Pasternak, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Iran appears to be revising its air defense concepts since Israel neutralized the Iranian S-300s in 2024. Brigadier General Ali Reza Sabahi Fard, who commands the Artesh Air Defense Force and Khatam ol Anbia Joint Air Defense Headquarters, said on March 1 that the armed forces plan to change their air defense “tactics” in response to “current threats.”[1] Sabahi Fard was likely referring to the possibility of a conventional strike on Iran. Iranian officials have conducted a flurry of activities in recent months that further reflect their concern about a potential strike on Iran. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri appointed Sabahi Fard as commander of the Khatam ol Anbia Joint Air Defense Headquarters in early February 2025.[2] This headquarters is responsible for coordinating air defense activity between the Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Sabahi Fard’s appointment highlights the regime focus on strengthening Iran’s air defense capabilities and improving air defense coordination between the Artesh and IRGC. The Artesh Air Defense Force and IRGC Aerospace Force have also conducted a series of exercises, particularly around Iranian nuclear infrastructure, in recent weeks.[3] These exercises have tested indigenous Iranian air defense systems, such as the Bavar 373.[4] Iran may recognize that Russia’s constrained manufacturing capacity and demand for ground-based air defense systems will likely prevent Iran from acquiring new S-300s in the near future, and Iran may therefore prioritize the development of its indigenous systems. Sabahi Fard announced on March 2 that Iran will soon unveil a new version of the Bavar 373.[5]

Iranian leaders are responding to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted strikes into Iran in its April and October 2024 that neutralized the S-300s.[6] These Russian-sourced S-300s were the most advanced Iranian air defense capability to this point. The loss of the S-300s has forced Tehran to develop new ways to counter aerial threats, though it is far from clear that it will develop any seriously viable solutions.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz directed the IDF on March 3 to “prepare to defend the Druze community” in response to fighting in Jaramana, Rif Dimashq.[7] It is unclear what political end state the Israeli government seeks to achieve with these plans. The Israeli government has yet to release further details or articulate a clear vision of what a victory would encompass. Netanyahu said on February 23 that the Israeli government will “not tolerate any threat to the Druze community” and called for southern Syria to fully demilitarize.[8] Protests erupted across Syria, particularly in majority Druze areas, on February 25 and 26, rejecting Israeli intervention.[9] The Druze community is highly diverse and loyalty to a particular leader within the community varies across Israel, Lebanon, and Syria.[10] Prominent Lebanese Druze politician Walid Jumblatt claimed on March 2 that Israel was attempting to stoke sectarian divisions within Syria.[11]

Growing tensions in southern Syria risk destabilizing the interim Syrian government, which would create opportunities for ISIS and the IRGC to expand their presences in Syria, contrary to Israeli objectives. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned on February 25 that Israel would attack the interim Syrian government or “terrorist organizations” if they try to establish themselves in southern Syria.[12] Such fighting could distract the interim government and create opportunities for the IRGC and ISIS to make inroads in other places in Syria.[13]

The interim Syrian government is likely trying to increase security cooperation with local actors in southern Syria. Druze Jaramana Shield Brigade fighters attacked HTS-led forces at a checkpoint to Jaramana, Rif Dimashq, on March 1, killing one fighter and kidnapping another.[14] A delegation of Druze officials led by former Men of Dignity member Laith al Balous negotiated the release of the hostage and permitted HTS-led forces to enter Jaramana to arrest the wanted fighters.[15] Balous accompanied a delegation of Druze officials to Damascus on February 24 to discuss security cooperation within Suwayda Province and southern Syria.[16] Jaramana is a former Assad regime stronghold with several regime-aligned Druze militias.[17] HTS-led forces have faced resistance from former Assad regime members, as they attempt to consolidate territorial control over Syria.

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announced an immediate ceasefire with Turkey on March 1.[18] The PKK Executive Committee stated that it would disarm in line with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan’s call to dissolve on February 27.[19] The PKK’s People’s Defense Center Command Headquarters ordered a ceasefire that is ”valid for all our forces,” including ”all autonomous units.”[20] It remains unclear at this time the extent that sub-national PKK affiliate groups will observe the ceasefire. The PKK command headquarters ordered forces to redeploy exclusively on a “defensive basis.”[21] The PKK demanded that Ocalan oversee the ceasefire and be allowed personal freedoms.[22] Turkey has imprisoned Ocalan since 1999 and allowed him little contact with the outside world. Erdogan and his Justice and Democracy Party (AKP) have repeatedly stressed that they will not negotiate with the PKK and that PKK disarmament is a unilateral process.[23]

The PKK ceasefire does not appear to include the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) currently fighting Turkish and Turkish-backed forces in northern Syria, although fighting has stalled in recent days. Kinetic engagements between the SDF and Turkish and Turkish-backed forces have declined since the PKK announced the ceasefire on March 1. Fighting has completely halted around Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge east of Aleppo, where the forces have fought for about three months.[24] The rate of Turkish airstrikes has decreased as well. Turkey identifies the targets of its operations in Syria as “PKK,” even when striking forces under the SDF.[25] AKP spokesperson Omer Celik said that the AKP expects the PKK-linked Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria to dissolve on February 28.[26] The YPG is the military arm of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which dominates the SDF. Turkey often conflates the SDF and YPG with the PKK and uses “PKK” to refer to the entire SDF. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi rejected the idea that Ocalan’s call for disarmament applies to the SDF in Syria on February 27.[27]

Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara appointed seven Syrians to draft a non-permanent  “constitutional declaration” that Shara himself will approve.[28] Shara announced on March 2 that the members of the committee will draft the document that will “regulate“ Syria‘s transitional phase.[29] The newly appointed committee told Syrian state media on March 3 that the constitutional declaration will set ”general foundations” for a system of government and will define the powers of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.[30] The committee said that the document will eventually be supplanted by a permanent constitution.[31] Shara himself has estimated that writing the permanent constitution could take up to three years.[32] The constitutional declaration is therefore expected to provide a legal framework for the Syrian state over the next few years. The systems of governance and values enshrined in the document will likely significantly influence the trajectory of the future permanent Syrian state. Committee member Ismail al Khalfan said that the declaration will be announced within a few days.[33] The committee will then submit their draft to Shara, who will approve the final declaration.[34]

The committee includes the following individuals:

• Abdul Hamid al Awak. Awak is from Hasakah Province and is a faculty member at Mardin Artuklul University in Turkey.[35] Awak holds degrees in constitutional law, administrative law, and public law.[36] Awak previously participated in several regional legal forums addressing constitutional governance and democratic transition and advised a Turkish-based non-profit organization that promoted social services and political reform in northern Syria.[37]
• Yasser al Huwaish. Huwaish is from Deir ez Zor Province and is a dean at Damascus University’s College of Law.[38] Huwaish specializes in international economic law.[39]
• Ismail al Khalfan. Khalfan is a dean at the University of Aleppo’s College of Law.[40] Khalfan previously taught at universities in Gaziantep, Turkey, and in the Aleppo countryside.[41] Khalfan specializes in international law.[42]
• Rian Kuhaylan. Kuhaylan is from Barzeh, Damascus.[43] Kuhaylan is the head of the public law department at Damascus University.[44] She specializes in constitutional and criminal law.[45]
• Mohammad Reda Jalakhi. Jalakhi is a dean in the political science department at Damascus University.[46] Jalakhi previously worked in the administration of Idlib University. Jalakhi was appointed as a board member of the Syrian Development Organization after the fall of the regime.[47]
• Ahmed Qarbi. Qarbi is the director of the Shared Identity and Consensus Unit at the Syrian Dialogue Center.[48] This organization aimed to promote a “culture of dialogue” among segments of Syrian society in order to encourage political and societal cooperation.[49] Qarbi specializes in public law and previously lectured at Aleppo University.[50]
• Bahia Mardini. Mardini is a journalist and lawyer who previously worked as a media representative for the Syrian National Coalition.[51] Mardini is reportedly Kurdish.[52] Kurdish media reported that it was unable to verify Mardini’s involvement with any Kurdish political parties active in Syria.[53] Mardini advocated for Syria to hold free and fair multi-party elections in Syria in 2018.[54]

The extent to which this committee will incorporate the recommendations of the National Dialogue Conference remains unclear. The National Dialogue Conference published a list of recommendations calling on the constitutional committee to draft a new Syrian constitution that ensures a balance of power and enshrines justice, freedom, and equality as Syrian values.[55] The committee said on March 3 that it is “keen” to draw ideas from discussions at the National Dialogue Conference and will not contradict the conferences’ final recommendations.[56] The committee is not legally required to consider these recommendations, however. The constitutional committee also does not appear to represent Syria’s ethnic, religious, and sectarian diversity.

Unspecified sources told al Jazeera on March 3 that Shara will soon appoint 100 members to a transitional legislative body to serve two-year terms.[57] The sources said that Shara will appoint members of the “People’s Assembly” within two months after the constitutional declaration is adopted.[58] Shara will reportedly appoint these members from “fair representation of components and competence.”[59] The sources said that constitutional declaration will allow national parties to be formed later on in the transition.[60]

Shara’s direct control and supervision of these interim governing structures could allow him to co-opt them to solidify his personal power during Syria’s years-long transition. Shara’s direct hand in the formation of these structures may be necessary in order to centralize Syria’s transitional government during an unstable period in its formation and set in motion interim frameworks to govern the country. Shara's control over the creation of the constitutional declaration leaves Syrian citizens few instruments through which they can influence the direction of the Syrian transitional government beyond the committee’s promises that it will consider the recommendations of the National Dialogue Conference. Shara’s reported appointment-by-decree of People’s Assembly members also demonstrates that he could appoint HTS loyalists or other allies, thereby consolidating his own power over the interim legislature.[61] It remains unclear how much power the People’s Assembly will have during the transition period though, and this will presumably be defined within the constitutional declaration. Shara’s oversight and control over those who comprise the constitutional committee and People’s Assembly could allow him to prevent internal checks against his power or keep political rivals out of positions of influence in the government in the long-term. It remains unclear if Shara would seek to pursue such actions in the short-term while dependent on the support of minority groups and the West in order to keep Syria stable.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran appears to be revising its air defense concepts since Israel has neutralized the Iranian S-300s in 2024.
• Syria: Israeli leaders ordered the IDF to “prepare to defend the Druze community” in southern Syria. It is unclear what political end state they seek to achieve.
• Syria: The interim Syrian government is likely trying to increase security cooperation with local actors in southern Syria.
• Syria: The PKK announced a ceasefire with Turkey. It remains unclear how this ceasefire will affect the SDF.
• Syria: Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara appointed seven individuals to draft a non-permanent “constitutional declaration” for him to approve.

Syria

Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) continued to strike SDF positions near Tishreen Dam between February 28 and March 1. The SNA shelled an unspecified location near the Tishreen Dam on March 1, damaging civilian infrastructure.[62] The SDF repelled at least three SNA attacks near the Tishreen Dam, killing eight SNA fighters, on March 1.[63] Anti-SDF media reported mutual shelling between the SNA and SDF near the Tishreen Dam.[64] Turkey conducted several airstrikes targeting SDF positions near the Tishreen Dam on February 28 and March 1.[65] These Turkish airstrikes are meant to support SNA efforts to fix the SDF units at Tishreen Dam and prevent them from reinforcing other positions along the frontline.

The SNA reportedly shelled SDF positions along the Peace Spring frontlines between February 28 and March 2. The SNA shelled the SDF in several villages in the area[66] The SNA also shelled the SDF north of Highway 4.[67]

Turkey and the SNA struck the SDF near Qara Qozak Bridge, east of Aleppo, on March 1 and 2. The SDF reported on March 1 that the SNA fired artillery shells, mortars, and rockets targeting several villages near Qara Qozak Bridge, damaging civilian infrastructure.[68] Turkish aircraft reportedly struck an SDF weapons depot near Sarrin, eastern Aleppo, on March 2.[69]

Turkish aircraft reportedly struck the SDF along Highway 4, near al Tabqah, west of Raqqa on March 1.[70]

The IDF continued operations in Quneitra Province in southern Syria on March 2 and 3. A southern Syria-based journalist reported on March 2 that the IDF established a temporary checkpoint to search vehicles in a village in northern Quneitra Province.[71] The journalist claimed on March 3 that the IDF patrolled the town of al Hamidiyah in central Quneitra Province.[72] The IDF reportedly destroyed infrastructure in a former Russian observation post in a village in southern Quneitra Province before withdrawing to the 1974 disengagement line.[73]

The IDF Air Force struck former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions in Latakia and Tartous provinces on March 3. The IDF reported that it struck a former SAA military site in Qardaha, Latakia Province.[74] Syrian media claimed that the IDF also struck multiple targets near the port of Tartous, including a former Hezbollah base and an air defense site.[75]

HTS-led forces thwarted an attempt to smuggle weapons into Lebanon on March 2.[76] Syrian media reported that interim government forces seized a small arms shipment near Serghaya, Rif Dimashq Province.[77] Government forces have recently thwarted several Hezbollah smuggling attempts along the border.[78]

Syrian media reported on March 1 that the Syrian Interim Defense Ministry likely appointed Ahmed al Homsi as chief of staff of the Homs-based 118th Armored Division.[79] Homsi was a commander in the HTS-led Military Operations Department during the HTS-led offensive to topple the Assad regime in December 2024, according to Syrian media.[80] Homsi’s interviews with Syrian and international media indicate that he likely maintained some role as a media official during the HTS-led offensive in December 2024.[81] The Syrian Interim Defense Ministry has t to verify the reports of Homsi’s appointment at the time of this writing.

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
• Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent

Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia parties are continuing to compete for the chairmanship of the Popular Mobilization Commision (PMC), which Faleh al Fayyadh currently holds.[82] The PMC is responsible for ensuring the militias in the PMF answer to the Iraqi federal government.[83] The PMF law in discussion would force some PMF commanders and leaders, including Fayyadh, to retire due to their age.[84] Iraqi media reported on March 2 that State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki is working “vigorously” to nominate his candidate to replace Fayyadh.[85] Several Shia Coordination Framework leaders reportedly agreed to switch the heads of unidentified bodies and institutions. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Fayyadh claimed on March 2 that the law would only apply to the PMF Chief of Staff position and lower-ranking officials.[86] Fayyadh has long-held tension with PMF Chief of Staff Abu Fadak al Muhammadawi.[87] A parliamentarian told Iraqi media on March 3 that Parliament has not met due to continued disputes over unidentified laws.[88] Parliament met last on February 17.[89] The State of Law Coalition and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun Bloc announced a boycott of Parliament on February 17, until the law was included on the voting schedule.[90]

Iraqi media reported on March 3 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias refused to surrender their weapons and integrate into the Iraqi military establishment.[91] The Iraqi federal government reportedly told the militias that their decision will increase US and Israeli economic and military pressure on Iraq. The militias’ refusal to disarm follows reports that the United States may sanction Iranian-aligned actors in Iraq.[92] The United States also previously pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the PMF.[93]

Shia parties are internally debating changes to the Iraqi electoral law ahead of the October 2025 parliamentary elections. The Iraqi parliament has frequently modified the Iraqi electoral law before parliamentary elections previously.[94] Iraqi media reported on March 1 that unspecified Shia Coordination Framework members are unsupportive of Maliki’s plan to amend the electoral law.[95] Maliki reportedly desires to return to the pre-2020 electoral system likely to favor larger Shia Coordination Framework parties in the upcoming elections.[96] Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim reportedly opposes amending the law.[97] A Wisdom Movement member denied that this difference in opinion equates to division within the Shia Coordination Framework.

Azm Alliance head Muthana al Samarrai emphasized the importance of Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr’s return to politics on March 3.[98] Sadr has not officially confirmed whether his Shia National Movement will participate in the parliamentary elections in October 2025 at the time of this writing. Sadr previously allied with Sunni blocs and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in the 2021 parliamentary elections.[99]

Iraqi media reported on March 2 that Turkey struck PKK positions near Amedi district, Duhok Province, Iraqi Kurdistan.[100] PKK fighters reportedly clashed with Turkish forces in the area.

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

Nothing significant to report.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
• Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Two Lebanese parliamentarians called on the Lebanese government to prepare a specific timeline for the disarmament of Hezbollah and to ensure that the state holds a monopoly on weapons.[101] The two parliamentarians emphasized that international reconstruction aid is contingent on Hezbollah demilitarization.[102] Amal Movement parliamentarian Qassem Hashem argued that allowing Hezbollah to remain armed north of the Litani River deters future conflict with Israel.[103] The Amal Movement and Hezbollah formed a political alliance, and Amal fighters fought alongside Hezbollah during the war with Israel.[104]

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Iranian parliamentarian Ebrahim Rezaei said on March 3 that Iran may reconsider its nuclear weapons policy if the West and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continue to pressure Iran.[105] Rezaei emphasized that Iran currently adheres to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s 2003 fatwa banning the production and use of nuclear weapons but has "no technical limitations" to building a nuclear weapon. Iran has increased its stockpile of 60-percent enriched uranium by 92.5 kilograms (kg), or 2.2 significant quantities since the IAEA‘s November 2024 report, according to an unreleased IAEA report.[106] A significant quantity is the “approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.”[107] IAEA Director Raphael Grossi said on March 3 that Iran has enough 60-percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce six nuclear weapons.[108] Grossi added that the IAEA will produce a "comprehensive and updated" report on Iran's undeclared nuclear activities. The IAEA Board of Governors passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[109] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the IAEA report would almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and lay the foundation for the E3 to impose snapback sanctions.[110]

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) media criticized Turkey’s regional policies on March 3. Basirat News accused Turkey of “betraying” Muslim countries.[111] The article argued that Turkey miscalculated by supporting Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) against the Bashar al Assad regime. It also stated that Turkey seeks to become an "absolute power" and "pursue its plans in the Caucasus." Iranian officials have previously expressed concern about Ankara’s alleged pan-Turkic aspirations and the spread of Turkish and NATO influence in the region. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency separately published a piece criticizing Turkish policy in the region.[112] Tasnim listed a series of Turkish foreign policy "defeats" against Egypt, Russia, Syria, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates. These statements come after Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan criticized Iran's regional policies, including Iranian support for militias in Iraq and Syria.[113] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran views Turkey’s influence in Syria and Iraq as a threat to its long-standing strategic objectives.[114]

Jaish al Adl—a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia—killed two IRGC members in Saravan city, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on March 1.[115] Iranian law enforcement officers separately seized 400 illicit weapons affiliated with “smuggling networks“ in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on March 3.[116] CTP-ISW has observed an uptick in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023.

Iranian parliamentarians voted to impeach Economic Affairs and Finance Minister Abdol Nasser Hemmati on March 2 in response to worsening economic conditions.[117] Hemmati’s removal is unlikely to alleviate these economic challenges, however. The Iranian economy has declined sharply during Hemmati’s eight-month tenure, with the unofficial exchange rate dropping from 595,500 to 927,000 rials to one US dollar.[118] Hemmati’s replacement will almost certainly fail to solve the underlying issues that plague the Iranian economy. These issues include international sanctions, rampant corruption, and the outsized role of the IRGC and parastatal organizations in the economy. Parliamentarians have previously blamed poor economic conditions on economic affairs and finance ministers and interpellated these ministers during periods of economic downturn. Parliament sought to impeach former Economic Affairs and Finance Minister Ehsan Khandouzi in 2021, for example.[119]President Masoud Pezeshkian appointed Rahmatollah Akrami as acting economic affairs and finance minister on March 2.[120]

Iranian Vice President for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif separately resigned on March 2.[121] Zarif claimed that Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei asked him to resign "to prevent further pressure on the government.”[122] Zarif’s resignation comes after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected negotiations with the United States in early February 2025.[123] Zarif played a leading role in negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015.[124] The removal of Zarif and Hemmati is notable given that both officials supported economic reforms and efforts to lift sanctions on Iran.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

[1] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/730167

[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-4-2025

[3] https://iranpress dot com/eqtedar-1403-drills--iran-flexes-air-defense-muscles-in-qom ;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/18/3233677

[4] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/11/17/3251865

[5] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/729897

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/consequences-idf-strikes-iran

[7] https://x.com/joetruzman/status/1895897759775146078?s=46&t=OYTvR5h_qYY_4fPQ5FKbFA

[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-wont-allow-hts-forces-southern-syria-netanyahu-says-2025-02-23/

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-25-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-26-2025

[10] https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna14016435

[11] https://apnews.com/article/israel-syria-druze-jumblatt-lebanon-jaramana-assad-eec72b1477cf5ac337e85c0a1152036b

[12] https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/1894501468683866520

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-26-2025

[14] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1895830836634599516

[15] https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1896232019417501768 ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1895932880976834568

[16] https://x.com/diaa_audi/status/1894710234465116517 ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1894139731728109813

[17] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1895919444800782621 ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/druze-and-assad-strategic-bedfellows

[18] https://anfenglishmobile dot com/features/pkk-we-will-comply-with-leader-Ocalan-s-call-we-declare-a-ceasefire-78180

[19] https://x.com/ragipsoylu/status/1895120510109000176 ; https://anfenglishmobile dot com/features/pkk-we-will-comply-with-leader-Ocalan-s-call-we-declare-a-ceasefire-78180

[20] firatnews dot com/guncel/hsm-209823

[21] firatnews dot com/guncel/hsm-209823

[22] https://anfenglishmobile dot com/features/pkk-we-will-comply-with-leader-Ocalan-s-call-we-declare-a-ceasefire-78180

[23] https://www dot dailysabah.com/politics/top-turkish-official-denies-talks-with-pkk-says-group-must-lay-down-arms/news ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/kurdish-pkk-militia-says-it-will-heed-jailed-leaders-peace-call-declare-2025-03-01/

[24] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1896068793543324115 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1896322561824477425 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136960 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/137021

[25] https://x.com/tcsavunma/status/1893598676729172100 ; https://x.com/tcsavunma/status/1892889632943055124 ; https://x.com/tcsavunma/status/1890315552893055361

[26] https://www dot dailysabah.com/politics/top-turkish-official-denies-talks-with-pkk-says-group-must-lay-down-arms/news

[27] https://www.alhurra dot com/syria/2025/02/27/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%AD-%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7 ; https://x.com/ragipsoylu/status/1895156237425119540

[28] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/565

[29] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/565

[30] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1896579852238512555; https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1896580549512491406

[31] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1896579852238512555; https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1896580549512491406

[32] https://www.france24 dot com/en/middle-east/20250302-syria-forms-committee-to-draft-transitional-constitutional-charter ; https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/01/13/syria-hts-sharaa-government-transition-constitution-minorities-rights/

[33] https://t.me/nahermedia/45342

[34] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/565; https://t.me/nahermedia/45342

[35] https://www.syria dot tv/سبعة-أكاديميين-وقانونيين-من-هم-صُنّاع-الإعلان-الدستوري-في-سوريا؟ ; https://artuklu dot edu.tr/siyaset-bilimi

[36] https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20250302-syria-forms-committee-to-draft-transitional-constitutional-charter ; DNGTS: https://www dot aa dot com dot tr/en/middle-east/syria-forms-committee-to-draft-constitutional-declaration-for-country-s-transition/3498058#; https://www.syria dot tv/سبعة-أكاديميين-وقانونيين-من-هم-صُنّاع-الإعلان-الدستوري-في-سوريا؟ ; https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1068539818634235&id=100064346815567&set=a.630599552428266

[37] https://www.syria dot tv/سبعة-أكاديميين-وقانونيين-من-هم-صُنّاع-الإعلان-الدستوري-في-سوريا؟; https://www.facebook.com/StabUnit/posts/960882592814464

[38] https://www.france24 dot com/en/middle-east/20250302-syria-forms-committee-to-draft-transitional-constitutional-charter

[39] https://www.syria dot tv/سبعة-أكاديميين-وقانونيين-من-هم-صُنّاع-الإعلان-الدستوري-في-سوريا؟

[40] https://www.syria dot tv/سبعة-أكاديميين-وقانونيين-من-هم-صُنّاع-الإعلان-الدستوري-في-سوريا؟

[41] https://www.syria dot tv/سبعة-أكاديميين-وقانونيين-من-هم-صُنّاع-الإعلان-الدستوري-في-سوريا؟

[42] https://www.syria dot tv/سبعة-أكاديميين-وقانونيين-من-هم-صُنّاع-الإعلان-الدستوري-في-سوريا؟

[43] https://x.com/_DRanim/status/1896297866811031848

[44] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/742190/تشكيل-لجنة-لصياغة-مسودة-الإعلان-الدست; https://x.com/GhadawiAbdullah/status/1896545232214229249

[45] https://x.com/GhadawiAbdullah/status/1896545232214229249; https://x.com/_DRanim/status/1896297866811031848

[46] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/742190/تشكيل-لجنة-لصياغة-مسودة-الإعلان-الدست/

[47] https://www.syria dot tv/سبعة-أكاديميين-وقانونيين-من-هم-صُنّاع-الإعلان-الدستوري-في-سوريا؟

[48] https://www.syria dot tv/سبعة-أكاديميين-وقانونيين-من-هم-صُنّاع-الإعلان-الدستوري-في-سوريا؟

[49] https://egsaqtt58cu.exactdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/CenterProfile.pdf

[50] https://www.syria dot tv/سبعة-أكاديميين-وقانونيين-من-هم-صُنّاع-الإعلان-الدستوري-في-سوريا؟

[51] https://www.linkedin.com/in/bahia-mardini-44b7a412a; https://www.syria dot tv/سبعة-أكاديميين-وقانونيين-من-هم-صُنّاع-الإعلان-الدستوري-في-سوريا؟ ; https://www.newarab dot com/opinion/hopes-syrias-year-ahead

[52] https://www.rudaw dot net/english/middleeast/syria/02032025

[53] https://www.rudaw dot net/english/middleeast/syria/02032025

[54] https://www.newarab.com/opinion/hopes-syrias-year-ahead

[55] https://x.com/syriandc/status/1894423507640910077; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-25-2025

[56] https://t.me/nahermedia/45342; https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1896582015803387949

[57] https://x.com/AJA_Syria/status/1896276601207451753

[58] https://x.com/AJA_Syria/status/1896276601207451753

[59] https://x.com/AJA_Syria/status/1896276601207451753

[60] https://x.com/AJA_Syria/status/1896276601207451753

[61] https://x.com/AJA_Syria/status/1896276601207451753

[62] https://sdf-press dot com/en/2025/03/turkish-occupation-escalates-its-aggression-and-our-forces-repel-multiple-mercenaries-attacks-near-tishreen-dam-and-qara-qwzaq/

[63] https://sdf-press dot com/en/2025/03/turkish-occupation-escalates-its-aggression-and-our-forces-repel-multiple-mercenaries-attacks-near-tishreen-dam-and-qara-qwzaq/

[64] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136922

[65] https://sdf-press dot com/en/2025/03/turkish-occupation-escalates-its-aggression-and-our-forces-repel-multiple-mercenaries-attacks-near-tishreen-dam-and-qara-qwzaq/ ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136926 ; https://x.com/SDF_Syria/status/1895912194929541444

[66] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1895583005303079409 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1895851786315137032 ; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1895941062906286426 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/137021

[67] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1895941062906286426

[68] https://sdf-press dot com/en/2025/03/turkish-occupation-escalates-its-aggression-and-our-forces-repel-multiple-mercenaries-attacks-near-tishreen-dam-and-qara-qwzaq/

[69] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1896068793543324115

[70] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/136939

[71] https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1896344382804271332 ; https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1896344382804271332

[72] https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1896549071688802484

[73] https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1896320867958993146 ; https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1896344984154235125 ; https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1896454673504043031

[74] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1896627599042117842

[75] https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1896621349331939598 ; https://x.com/Nuorgolan/status/1896623182343459230 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1896619220374593767 ; https://x.com/NavvarSaban/status/1896629195083829329 ;

[76] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/120478 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1896318113928646939; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1896385152563159113

[77] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/120478 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1896318113928646939; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1896385152563159113

[78] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1892139477075694023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-19-2025 ; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/122783; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-24-2025; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1883437468126748911

[79] https://t.me/ALBADIA_24/3865 ; https://t.me/ALBADIA_24/3864

[80] https://x.com/syr_television/status/1864055518450405544

[81] https://www.npr.org/2024/12/02/nx-s1-5211873/hts-islamist-syria-aleppo-assad-hayat-tahrir-al-sham ; https://x.com/syr_television/status/1864055518450405544

[82] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B6-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9 ; https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/518172/%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B9%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%89 ; https://almadapaper dot net/397565/

[83] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces

[84] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-19-2025 ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A8%D9%80-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B7-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%82%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A

[85] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B6-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9

[86] https://almadapaper dot net/397565/

[87] https://almadapaper dot net/394636/

[88] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/518172/%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B9%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%89

[89] https://iq dot parliament.iq/blog/%d8%ac%d8%af%d9%88%d9%84-%d8%a7%d8%b9%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%84-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d9%84%d8%b3%d8%a9-%d8%b1%d9%82%d9%85-%d9%a6-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a7%d8%ab%d9%86%d9%8a%d9%86-%d9%a1%d9%a7-%d8%b4%d8%a8%d8%a7/

[90] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/825332/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%8A

[91] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%87%D9%85

[92] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-10-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B6%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA

[93] https://almadapaper dot net/389291/

[94] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraqs-endless-electoral-law-debate

[95] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%82%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA

[96] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraqs-endless-electoral-law-debate ; https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Iraqi-lawmakers-move-to-amend-Election-Law-confirm-election-date-in-October-2025

[97] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%82%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA

[98] https://baghdadtoday dot news/269004-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%A4%D9%83%D8%AF-%D8%A3%D9%87%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A.html

[99] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate011025 ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%BA%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9

[100] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/kurdistan/02032025; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%87%D9%88%D9%83 ; https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/1896165662780756414

[101] https://nna-leb dot gov.lb/ar/سياسة/762846/الحاج-على-البرلمان-القيام-بورشة-تشريعية-لمواكبة-ال ; https://nna-leb dot gov.lb/ar/سياسة/763116/درغام-السعودية-لن-تستطيع-المساهمة-في-إعادة-الإعمار

[102] https://nna-leb dot gov.lb/ar/سياسة/762846/الحاج-على-البرلمان-القيام-بورشة-تشريعية-لمواكبة-ال ; https://nna-leb dot gov.lb/ar/سياسة/763116/درغام-السعودية-لن-تستطيع-المساهمة-في-إعادة-الإعمار

[103] https://nna-leb dot gov.lb/ar/سياسة/762861/هاشم-واقع-لبنان-لا-يسمح-بالتطبيع-مع-إسرائيل

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[105] https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1041902/

[106] https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-weapons-grade-uranium-trump-0b11a99a7364f9a43e1c83b220114d45

[107] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/analysis-of-iaea-iran-verification-and-monitoring-report-august-2024

[108] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-3-march-2025

[109] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-nuclear-watchdogs-35-nation-board-passes-resolution-against-iran-2024-11-21/

[110] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-25-2025#_edn9d42657380846070c1884176d9c8bc724

[111] https://basirat dot ir/fa/news/373253/

[112] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/12/11/3267195/

[113] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/853344/

[114] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-28-2025#_edn05a86cde13eb8e6b663b23968a8cd59d46 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-27-2025

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[116] https://www dot mashreghnews.ir/news/1695006/

[117] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/12/12/3268241

[118] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-parliament-impeaches-economy-minister-state-media-says-2025-03-02/

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[120] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/12/12/3268241

[121] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/03/iran-vice-president-reformist-resigns-mohammad-javad-zarif

[122] https://www.iranintl.com/202503020962

[123] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27964

[124] https://apnews.com/article/iran-zarif-resignation-pezeshkian-nuclear-tensions-us-a1f69333ab317789e3acc23cb46c04fc