Iran Update, May 25, 2023

Iran Update, May 25, 2023

Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Ashka Jhaveri, and Kitaneh Fitzpatrick

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

[Correction: A previous version of the text incorrectly stated the Popular Mobilization Forces'  (PMF's) total budget would increase by about 458 billion USD. The correct text is that the PMF's total budget would increase by about 458 million USD. We have updated the text to fix this error.]

Key Takeaways

1. Axis of Resistance news sources coordinated a disinformation campaign that claimed the United States will establish a new base in Iraq, likely to reignite domestic US pressure on policymakers to withdraw forces from the Middle East.

2. The Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) stands to gain a significant increase in funds from Iraq’s 2023 budget, which very likely would position the group to improve its status as a parallel security institution in Iraq to state security forces.

3. Syrian regime military security coordinated with the IRGC Quds Force in Albu Kamal to monitor civilians, which may advance Iranian efforts to secure the Albu Kamal-Deir ez Zor City land route in eastern Syria.

4. An Iranian-backed militia leader stressed the need for secrecy around headquarters in Deir ez Zor City, likely to secure advanced weapons and IRGC Quds Force commanders from Israeli targeting.

Iranian Activities in the Levant

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant and especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

Axis of Resistance news sources coordinated a disinformation campaign that claimed the United States will establish a new base in Iraq, likely to reignite domestic US pressure on policymakers to withdraw forces from the Middle East. Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated Al Mayadeen English reported that the US is planning to build a new military base in Anbar Province, Iraq on May 23, citing an unidentified “Iraqi security official.”[1] CTP cannot verify this report, and such claims should be viewed with skepticism. Several Iranian state-affiliated media outlets circulated the Al Mayadeen report on their English-language sites, suggesting that the outlets coordinated with Al Mayadeen to target English-speaking audiences.[2] Iran and the Axis of Resistance have long sought the removal of US forces from the Middle East. US officials have not indicated that the United States will establish a new base in Anbar Province.

The Axis of Resistance disinformation campaign could elevate the risk of an attack against US interests or personnel in Iraq within the coming weeks. The report could renew attention to the US force presence in Iraq and inspire lower-level Iranian-proxies or unaffiliated militants to attack US forces. Iranian-backed militants previously threatened to attack US forces in Iraq on May 15 after US Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski commented on US plans to remain in the Middle East, but did not follow through with the attack.[3]  Iranian-backed Iraqi proxy channels, contrastingly, have not responded to or republished the Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah media claims about the rumored US base in Anbar Province. Few media sources have published the report, which suggests local militants were not the target audience.

An Iranian-backed militia leader stressed the need for secrecy around headquarters in Deir ez Zor City, likely to secure advanced weapons and IRGC Quds Force commanders from Israeli targeting. An IRGC-affiliated official discussed security measures at a local headquarters with unspecified Iranian-backed leaders in Deir ez Zor City on May 25.[4] He ordered the leaders not to restore buildings in the vicinity of headquarters across Deir ez Zor city to preserve the locations' secrecy.[5] Iranian-backed militias have previously repurposed civilian buildings into weapons depots in Deir ez Zor Province.[6] Greater operational security for headquarters in Deir ez Zor would provide security for IRGC Quds Force and Iranian-backed militants in Deir ez Zor and help Iran facilitate the transfer of advanced weapons systems into Syria. Iranian shipments of advanced air defense equipment and precision guided munitions that arrived in Syria through the Albu Kamal border crossing in Deir ez Zor Province were the targets of Israeli drone strikes in February and March, as CTP previously reported.[7]

CTP previously assessed that the weapon shipments Israel targeted in Syria may have carried air defense system components. CTP has not recorded any Israeli airstrikes in eastern Syria since March 22, after which the escalation cycle between Israel and Iran resulted in the death of a US contractor. Since then, Iranian-backed militias have continued to arrive from Iraq into Syria.[8] Iran also has transferred unsophisticated air defense weapons to Syria.[9] IRGC Quds Force leadership additionally directed several measures in Deir ez Zor Province since late March to ensure the operational security of the Albu Kamal-Deir ez Zor land route.[10] Iran’s focus on operational security and shift to sending unsophisticated weapons to Syria suggests that Iran has taken an operational pause on bringing advanced weapons systems into Syria.

Syrian regime military security coordinated with the IRGC Quds Force in Albu Kamal to monitor civilians, which may advance Iranian efforts to secure the Albu Kamal-Deir ez Zor City land route in eastern Syria. Syrian state security official Abu Haidar and the Albu Kamal District IRGC Quds Force Commander agreed to establish a Syrian military security detachment in Albu Kamal city on May 25.[11] Syrian military security forces have previously coordinated with Iranian-backed militias to conduct counter-ISIS operations and arrest locals accused of leaking military information.[12] CTP has not previously observed such coordination in the vicinity of Albu Kamal, however. Syrian regime forces’ coordination with Iran to monitor civilians indicates the regime is unable to challenge Iranian military development in Albu Kamal or that Iran needs regime forces to secure the area. Iranian securitization of the Al-Qaim-Albu Kamal border crossing and the land route to Deir ez Zor city enables the transfer of Iranian-backed militant personnel and military equipment, as CTP has previously reported.[13]

Iranian Activities in Iraq

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout Iraq. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

The Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) stands to gain a significant increase in funds from Iraq’s 2023 budget, which very likely would position the group to improve its status as a parallel security institution in Iraq to state security forces. Iraq’s 2023 draft budget nearly doubles the number of employees under the PMF from 122,000 to 238,075 employees.[14] The PMF’s total budget would increase by about 458 million USD. The 2023 budget draft shows that the Ministry of Transportation, which is run by the Badr Organization’s Fatah party, would more than triple its budget. The Ministry of Higher Education, which is run by Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun party, would increase its budget by over 600 percent.[15] The PMF cultivates legitimacy within Iraqi communities by providing services that state run institutions may struggle to provide independently like social services and counter-ISIS operations.

More funding and personnel may embolden and enable the PMF to intervene in Iraqi elections and engage in sectarian violence. PMF militias were accused of intimidating and killing protesters and activists in the lead up to the 2021 elections.[16] Iraq’s parliament recently passed a Shia Coordination Framework-backed election law that is expected to marginalize independent and minority political parties in Iraq, as CTP previously reported.[17] An emboldened PMF may seek to manipulate or intimidate voters in key districts to help secure votes in favor of Coordination Framework parties. In addition, Badr Organization militants likely committed a series of targeted killings of Sunni civilians in Diyala Province between February and March 2023.[18] Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri successfully pressured Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani to remove Iraqi Special Forces from the province who had been deployed in response to the Badr-committed violence ultimately gaining de facto control.[19]